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Kiev and Moscow: An Aspect of Early Muscovite Thought

The significance of Kievan Rus' in Russian history did not cease with the thirteenth century when the Mongols destroyed the Kievan state, and no historical appreciation of Kievan Rus' would be complete without discussion of its impact on subsequent periods of Russian history. This article will deal with only one aspect of the post-Kievan history of Kievan Rus', the role of Kiev in early Muscovite thought of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Intellectuals and artists in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century northeastern Russia actively fostered the cultural heritage of Kievan Rus' by revising and restoring its literary and artistic treasures. Kievan literary works served as models for northeast Russian writers: the Kievan Primary Chronicle, *Povest' vremynnkh let*, was the source and opening section of the new chronicles, and the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, in the dominant view, inspired a new epic, the *Zadonshchina*, which pictured the Russo-Tatar conflict as a continuation of the Russo-Polovtsian one.[1] There is evidence that the Kievan *byliny* cycle had already raised the *bogatyri* of the court of St. Vladimir to mythic proportions in Russian folklore. New redactions were prepared of the *Paterikon* of the Kievan Monastery of the Caves (*Pecherskaia lavra*)[2] and of the church statutes of Vladimir and Iaroslav.[3] Chroniclers were familiar with the works of Daniil the Prisoner (*Zatochnik*),[4] efforts to restore the frescoes of the *Uspenskii* Cathedral in Vladimir were sponsored by Vasilii I, political commentators invoked Kievan-Polovtsian relations as a guide for Russo-Tatar dealings,[5] and either the *Povest'* or the *Paterikon* inspired extremely facile allusions to the legend of St. Andrew's visit to Kiev and to the lives of Saints Anthony and Theodosius of the Kievan Lavra.[6] In sum, Kievan literature, art, folklore, law

1. For Likhachev's canonical interpretation of the *Zadonshchina*, see D. S. Likhachev, "Zadonshchina," *Literaturnaia ucheba*, no. 3 (1941), pp. 87-100, from which his later discussions of this text derive.

2. Richard Pope, "The Pre-Sixteenth-Century Literary History of the *Kievan Caves Paterikon*," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1970.

3. Ia. N. Shchapov, *Kniazheskie ustavy i tserkov' v drevnei Rusi, XI-XIV vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1972).

4. *Troitskaia letopis'. Rekonstruktsiia teksta*, ed. M. D. Priselkov (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1950), s.a. 1378, p. 417.

5. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*], 34 vols. (Moscow-St. Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, AN SSSR, Nauka, 1846-1978), XV, 1st ed. (St. Petersburg, 1865), 475, a Tverian chronicle.

6. (Epifanii Premudrii), *Zhitie Sviatago Stefana*, ed. V. S. Druzhinin (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 1907), p. 11; (Zosima), "Khozhdenie inoka Zosimy," ed. Kh. M. Lopanev, *Palestinskii sbornik*, 7, vyp. 3 (24) (St. Petersburg, 1889), 2.

and politics received new life in Suzdalian Russia long after Kievan Rus' had ceased to exist.

D. S. Likhachev has done the most to elucidate this idealization of the Golden Age of Kievan Rus' in the culture of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century northeastern (and Novgorodian) Russia,[7] and he has labelled this attitude toward the Kievan past Historicism.[8] If Likhachev is undoubtedly correct in seeing a connection between these seemingly diverse areas of cultural history, what he has not done is to sort out the elements of this Historicism or to analyze its nature with sufficient rigor. This essay will look in greater detail at the evidence of intellectual, and specifically ideological, history of early Muscovy in order to examine the connection between Kiev and Moscow.

A separate Muscovite principality did not begin to emerge until the latter decades of the thirteenth century.[9] We would not expect to find any ideological expressions of Muscovite provenance until after Muscovy had accumulated at least enough of a power base to lend some credibility to her pretensions. It is not surprising then that we can find only one text in the first half of the fourteenth century which expresses a Muscovite point of view, the *vita* of Metropolitan Peter. Peter, later canonized, was the first metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' to reside in Moscow, where he endowed the first stone cathedral, and later died. The earliest redaction of this text, probably written at Muscovite behest, notes that Peter was buried in Moscow: "Thus did God praise the Suz'dal Land (*Suzdal'skaia zemlia*) and the city called Moscow . . . ."[10] Claims to exalted status grounded in patron saints were, of course, quite common in the medieval world, but what is significant here even more than Moscow's

7. See D. S. Likhachev, *Kul'tura Rusi vremeni Andreia Rubleva i Epifaniia Premudrogo (konets XIV-nachalo XV v.)* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1962); *idem., Nekotorye zadachi izucheniia vtorogo iuzhnoslavianskogo vliianiia v Rossii. IV. Mezhdunarodnii s' 'ezd slavistov. Doklady.* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1959); *idem.*, "Cherty podrazhatel'nosti 'Zadonshchiny' (K voprosu ob otnoshenii 'Zadonshchiny' k 'Slove o polku Igoreve')," *Russkaia literatura*, no. 3 (1964), pp. 84-107; *idem.*, "Predvorozhdenie na Rusi v kontse XIV-pervoi polovine XV veka," in *Literatura epokhi vozrozhdeniia i problemy vsemirnoi literatury* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1967), pp. 136-82; *idem., Chelovek v literature drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), pp. 72-96; *idem., Razvitie russkoi literatury X-XVII vekov. Epokhi i stili* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1973), pp. 75-126; and *idem., Velikoe nasledie. Klassicheskie proizvedeniia literatury drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1975), pp. 239-53.

8. Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Muscovite Claims to the 'Kievan Inheritance'." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 1, No. 1 (March 1977), 30-32, properly castigates Likhachev for not discussing the nineteenth-century German idealist origin of the very concept of Historicism, but Pelenski goes too far, I think, in denying any utility to Likhachev s formulation, for which no other term seems handy.

9. On the earliest and least well-known phase of Muscovy's development, now see V. A. Kuchkin, "Rol' Moskvy v politicheskom razvitii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi kontsa XIII v.," in *Novoe o proshlom nashei strany. Pamiati Akademika M. N. Tikhomirova* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1967), pp. 54-64.

10. V. A. Kuchkin, "Skazanie o mitropolita Petra," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* [hereafter *TODRL*], 18 (1962), 59-79.

first saint is the identity of the region in which Moscow is said to be located, the Suzdalian Land, a provincial term of only local value. At the end of the fourteenth century this *vita* was edited by metropolitan Kiprian, already under Muscovite influence; the extent to which Muscovite ambitions had grown is indicated by Kiprian's insertion of a new term throughout the text as well as to replace the Suzdalian Land in this sentence. That new concept is the Russian Land (*russkaia zemlia*).[11] This substitution is obviously quite conscious; the shift from identifying Moscow with the Suzdalian to the Russian Lands is one of the keys to understanding early Muscovite ideology. What had happened in the interval between the first and second redactions of the life of metropolitan Peter was the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380, the first major Russian, largely Muscovite, victory over the Tatars in nearly a century and a half, a victory which permitted Muscovy to aspire to far higher ideological status, and which rendered her rather modest pretensions in the first half of the fourteenth century obsolete.

It is appropriate to begin our analysis of the role of Kiev in early Muscovite thought with another text which is associated with metropolitan Kiprian but which also reflects the Muscovite point of view, the reconstructed *Troitskaia* chronicle.[12] Like other chronicles of the time, notably the *Lavrent'skaia*, it begins with the *Povest' vremennykh let*. It presents the history of the Mongol period as a direct continuation of that of the Kievan era. In both epochs we read about the Rus', the Russian grand princes and later the grand princes of all Rus'. In addition, the *Troitskaia* chronicle utilizes the concept of the Russian Land in a way which has not been sufficiently understood. The Russian Land, as I have tried to show elsewhere,[13] was a central political myth of Kievan Rus', as the very title of the *Povest' vremennykh let* demonstrates.[14] It is clear from the patterns of usage of the concept of the Russian Land that any "objective," territorial meaning the term may have had was less important than the political and ideological pretensions projected onto it and subsumed under it. The Russian Land is invoked as a standard of supreme political loyalty,

11. I. B. Grekov, *Vostochnaia Evropa i upadok Zolotoi Ordy (na rubezhe XV v.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 318-19.

12. See Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, 23 (1976), 58-68 with the bibliography cited therein, and in addition Ia. S. Lur'e, *Obshcherusskie letopisi XIV-XV vv.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1976), pp. 17-68, and Grekov, pp. 421-42.

13. Charles J. Halperin, "The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Century," *Russian History*, 2, No. 1 (1975), 29-38.

14. *Povest' vremennykh let.*, ed. V. P. Adrianova-Peretts, 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1950), I, 10: "Se povesti vremiannykh let, otkudu est' poshla Ruskaia zemlia, kto v Kieve pervie kniazhiti, i otkudu Ruskaia zemlia stala est'."

and as the unassailable object of indigenous patriotism.[15] It was shared by the entire political elite of Kievan Rus', secular and clerical, and can be found throughout monuments of Kievan thought right up to the Mongol conquest.

Between the middle of the thirteenth and the middle of the fourteenth centuries authors gradually stopped referring to Suzdalian Russia as the Suzdalian Land and began to describe it as the Russian Land. In so doing they relocated the Russian Land from the Dnepr' region to the Volga-Oka mesopotamia, from Kiev to Moscow. The *Troitskaia* chronicle reflects this evolution better than any other source, using the term the Suzdalian Land often for entries c. 1240-c.1340 but also employing the concept of the Russian Land to refer to the northeast. The triumph of the myth of the Russian Land came in the fourteenth century, in entries about the reign of Ivan Kalita from the Moscow house, who brings "peace" (*tishina*) to the Russian Land and who is mourned on his death by the "whole Russian Land" (*vsia russkaia zemlia*). By the late fourteenth century annals of the *Troitskaia* chronicle, the Russian Land almost always means Muscovy, signifying the completion of the *translatio* of the Russian Land from Kiev to Moscow.[16]

Muscovite sources after 1380, from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, habitually use the phrase "the Russian Land" to describe the grand principality of Moscow. For example, in the *Zadonshchina* the Russian princes fight at the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380, in the characteristic refrain of the text, "for the Russian Land and the Christian faith."[17] Compared to the Igor' Tale, the Russian Land of Kiev, Chernigov and Pereiaslavl' had become the Russian Land of Moscow, Serpukhov and Kolomna. The tales of the sack of Moscow by Khan Tokhtamysh in 1382 identify the object of his attack as the Russian Land, and categorize those who warned Moscow of his approach as "advocates" (*pobornitsi*) of the Russian Land.[18] The so-called *vita* of Dmitrii Donskoi entitles him Tsar of the Russian Land, praises Ivan Kalita as the "gatherer of the Russian Land" (*sobiratel' russkoi zemli*), and calls the Russian Land Donskoi's patrimony (*otchina*).[19] The Tale of the

15. I have tried to grapple with the relationship of the Russian Land to notions of national consciousness in "The Concept of the Russian Land and Medieval Russian National Consciousness (from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries)," paper presented to the American Historical Association Convention, San Francisco, 29 Dec. 1978.

16. *Troitskaia letopis'*, entries s.a. 1237, 1250, 1257, 1280, 1299, 1309, 1328, 1340 *et passim.*

17. See Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar," pp. 9-13; for a text, M. N. Tikhomirov, V. F. Rzhiga, and L. A. Dmitriev, eds., *Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitve* [hereafter *PKB*] (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1959), pp. 9-17.

18. See Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar," pp. 44-48; for texts, *PSRL*, XVIII (1913), 132 (the *Simeonovskaia* chronicle) and *PSRL*, XXIII (1910), 127 (the *Ermolinskaia* chronicle).

19. See Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar," pp. 69-78, as well as Grekov, pp. 232-33 and Pelenski, pp. 36-42; see the redaction in *PSRL*, IV (1848), 349-57 (Novgorod Fourth Chronicle).

Temir-Aksak, which attributes to the power of the Vladimir *Bogoroditsa* Icon the fact that Moscow was saved from imminent destruction by Timur (Tamerlane) in 1395, also associates Moscow with the Russian Land, and sometimes calls Vasilii I the Autocrat (*samoderzhets*) of the Russian Land.[20] Finally, the *vita* of St. Sergei of Radonezh, written 1417-18 by Epifanii the Wise (*Premudrii*), records Mamai's intention in 1380 to defeat the Russian Land.[21]

The application of the term the Russian Land to Muscovy can hardly have been a mere traditional stereotype: the usage was novel, and can be dated at least precisely enough to assert that it represents a new stage of Muscovite ideology, if not its first serious emergence. The precision with which the term is manipulated bespeaks a deliberateness which, given the very nature and potency of the myth, can only have been for a political and polemical purpose. Moreover, I can find no evidence that any of Moscow's rivals in the northeast, allowing for the relative paucity of sources, made comparable efforts to utilize the myth of the Russian Land.[22]

The Muscovite appropriation of the myth of the Russian Land was but one type of Muscovite reference to Kievan Rus' in late fourteenth- early fifteenth-century Muscovite sources. As is so often the case with myths in an ideological system, the Russian Land, but one element of the Kievan inheritance, occasionally functioned as a surrogate for the whole. However, there are a variety of additional allusions to Kiev in Muscovite sources from this period.

20. See Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar," pp. 48-52; text from the *Tipografskaia* chronicle printed in M. O. Skripil', comp., *Russkie povesti XV-XVI vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdkhudozhlit, 1958), pp. 47-54.

21. (Epifanii Premudrii), "Zhitie prep. i bogonosnogo ottsa nashego Sergiia chudotvortsa . . . ," ed. archimandrite Leonid, *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti* (St. Petersburg, 1885), no. LVIII, pp. 125-27.

22. We can identify two centers for which literary evidence is extant. For Novgorod, during the Kievan period contemporary with the Kievan Primary Chronicle, Novgorod is not described as the Russian Land in the Novgorod First Chronicle (see A. S. L'vov, *Leksika "Povesti vremynnkh let"* [Moscow: Nauka, 1975], pp. 179-82) and during later centuries Novgorod is only very ambiguously associated with the Russian Land (see A. N. Nasonov, ed., *Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov* [Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1950], e.g., pp. 33 s.a. 1169, 89 s.a. 1270, and p. 374 s.a. 1376). Novgorod's relationship to the Russian Land, and the concept of the Novgorodian Land (*novgorodskaia zemlia*), require further study.

In the mid-fifteenth century Tverian ideologues essentially avoided using the term the Russian Land, and proclaimed the glory of their own Tverian Land, because of Moscow's already successful usurpation of the myth of the Russian Land. See Charles J. Halperin, "Tverian Political Thought in the Fifteenth Century," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 18, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1977), 267-73.

Novgorodian treaties with grand princes of Vladimir, from Tver and Moscow, do not describe the Northeast as the Russian Land in the thirteenth, fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth centuries–the Suzdalian Land is used instead. The first exception is the 1456 Novgorod-Muscovite treaty which calls the Muscovite rulers grand princes of the Russian Land (see S. N. Valk, ed. *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova* [Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1949], no. 23, pp. 42-43). This pattern is also hardly accidental.

Sofronii of Riazan' begins the *Zadonshchina* by invoking the model of the bard Boian of Kiev, whose songs celebrated princes Igor', Vladimir and Iaroslav. Vladimir is called the ancestor (*praded* or *pravnuk*) of Dmitrii Donskoi, and all the Russian princes come from his nest (*gnezdo*). In addition, Sofronii mentions the blood relatives or kin (*srodniki*) of Dmitrii Donskoi, the saintly princes Boris and Gleb, the two martyred brothers whose cult was central to the Riurikidovichi dynasty.[23] The so-called Chronicle Tale of Mamai (*letopisnaia povest' o Mamae*) also employs distinctly Kievan vocabulary and imagery in presenting the battle of Kulikovo. The author appeals to Boris and Gleb, and likens Dmitrii Donskoi to his *srodnik* Iaroslav. Mamai is bluntly called a New Sviatopolk, the fratricidal murderer of Boris and Gleb, completing the symmetry of the Kievan metaphor.[24] In the highly religious Narration of the Battle with Mamai (*Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*) invocations of Boris and Gleb are frequent; for example, the former thief Foma sees them in a vision before the battle. Dmitrii Donskoi is once again lauded as an Ancient (*drevnei*) Iaroslav; the Russian princes are encouraged to fight because they are from the nest of St. Vladimir. Even the destruction of Kiev by Batyi comes to the fore as the malignant inspiration of Mamai's behavior. Oleg of Riazan' supersedes his ally Mamai in earning the epithet the New Sviatopolk.[25] In the *vita* of Dmitrii Donskoi its saintly hero is described as a lineal descendent of Saint Vladimir and a kinsman of Boris and Gleb, and Mamai returns to his accustomed role as the New Sviatopolk.[26]

The seeming scarcity of these scattered and brief allusions should not deceive us, for a good deal of medieval Russian ideology was expressed in extremely laconic terms. Phrases, words, and titles served in lieu largely of theoretical treatises. The consistent usage of such forms suggests that the medieval ideologues knew what they were doing, for the references are neither arbitrary nor promiscuous. A medieval Russian scribe or copyist, author or redactor, could assume that his audience would understand a meaning conveyed so tersely. The creativity and subtlety of the ideologues was manifested not in the composition of vast theoretical and abstract tractates, but rather in the manipulation of key concepts, which often makes Russian ideological texts look far more traditional than they really are. This manipulation would have been immediately obvious and comprehensible to contemporaries, but the historian is

23. *PKB*, pp. 9, 10, 12.

24. See Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar," pp. 39-44, as well as S. N. Azbelev, "Ob ustnykh istochnikakh letopisnykh tekstov (po materialem kulikovskogo tsikla)," *Letopisi i khroniki* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), pp. 78-95; Grekov, pp. 323-33; and Pelenski, pp. 33-36. See the reprinting of the version in the Novgorod Fourth Chronicle in *PKB*, pp. 29-40, here pp. 36, 38, 32.

25. See Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar," pp. 23-37; and the *Osnovnaia* (Basic) Redaction in *PKB*, pp. 43-76, here pp. 37, 65, 72, 73.

26. *PSRL*, IV, pp. 349, 351.

now compelled to rely upon his informed imagination to decode the texts in order to establish their intended meanings.

The Muscovite sources we have been examining–and we have included all extant, relevant texts–can be interpreted in this light to constitute a comprehensive claim to the Kievan inheritance by the Muscovite state. This continuity between Kiev and Moscow appears in three ways: in terms of genealogy, *viz.* the direct descent of Muscovite princes from Kievan ancestors; in terms of rhetoric, *viz.* acclamation of Muscovite princes in the guise or pose of Kievan mythic models; and finally, in terms of ideological legitimacy, *viz.* the protection of Moscow by Kievan saints and the *translatio* of the myth of the Russian Land from Kiev to Moscow. Collectively these allusions sought to enhance the prestige and justify the pretensions of the Muscovite principality by presenting Moscow as the heir to Kievan Rus'.

The degree to which Muscovy was actually, historically, an "heir," i.e., continuation, of Kievan Rus' is a separate matter, and space does not permit comparing their institutional or social structures here. Geographically and economically we should note in passing that twelfth-century Vladimir-Suzdal' was probably more proximate. However, it would be erroneous to accuse the Muscovites of merely imagining or completely inventing "their" Kievan Inheritance. Muscovy's princes were, after all, of the same dynastic house; its metropolitan did bear the title of "metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus'"; the Kievan secular and canon law codes do appear to have been operative in Muscovy, not to be superseded until a much later time; and Kievan culture did serve as the foundation stone for Muscovite, indeed all of northeastern, Russia in the Mongol period. To some extent the validity of claims to an historical continuity lies precisely in historical consciousness, albeit only on the part of the elite, and I have tried to demonstrate that the ideologues of Muscovy did see Kievan Rus' as a precedent for their own historical identity.

These references to Kiev and Kievan Rus' so far adduced all pertain to the classical period of the tenth and eleventh centuries. By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, the Muscovites were intimately aware that Kiev as a city did not just exist in the past, was not merely the ancestor of Moscow to be read about, but also existed very much in the present. Indeed, Muscovite ecclesiastical and political leaders spent a good deal of time dealing with precisely that fact. By the second half of the fourteenth century Kiev was controlled by the growing and aggressive Lithuanian grand principality, whose rulers sought to maximize their influence over the Orthodox East Slavs by securing a metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' in Kiev to their liking. The ecclesiastical wars of metropolitans Roman and Feognost', Kiprian and Alexei, Gregory Tsamblak and Fotii, dominate East European politics during much of the fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth centuries. Lithuanian-Muscovite relations also involved the movement of princes and nobles across the border, from the deposed Orthodox prince of Kiev, Vladimir Olgerdovich,

to the Catholic Svidrigaillo. It is hardly unexpected, therefore, that the Muscovites should have been, had to be, very *au courant* of developments in Kiev. The sack of Kiev by Edigei in 1399, to cite but one example, did not escape their attention.[27] Under such circumstances, the reality of Kiev is not likely to have escaped the consciousness of early Muscovite ideologues.

For purposes of discussion I shall call the classical Kiev of the tenth and eleventh centuries the Historical Kiev, and the Lithuanian-controlled city of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Contemporary Kiev. As far as I know no connection between these two images of Kiev, or two Kievs, has ever been drawn in analyzing early Muscovite thought. At first glance there would appear to be a contradiction in early Muscovite ideology, since Muscovite bookmen claimed the inheritance of the Historical Kiev without possession of the Contemporary Kiev. Surely, one might speculate, the Muscovites must have realized that their claim to the Kievan legitimacy during the Kulikovo era could never be complete without control of the city of Kiev itself, the ultimate proof of which comes in the seventeenth century. To be sure, Lithuanian sovereignty over the "mother of Russian cities," a powerful weapon in the war for dominance of Eastern Europe, was unassailable through the middle of the fifteenth century, until the death of Vitovt, and thus any Muscovite attempts actually to retake the city were precluded.[28] Still, one might suspect that during the early Muscovite period the images of the Historical and Contemporary Kiev might have created some tensions in Muscovite thought, pretensions to the legitimacy of Kiev as inherited by Moscow might have clashed with the tangible physical presence of Kiev under Lithuanian hegemony. The analogy of the Old and the New, the First and the Second, Romes in Byzantine thought springs readily to mind, a model with which the Muscovites could easily have been familiar. Close reading of the early Muscovite sources reveals not the slightest hint that this seeming contradiction was articulated, or even perceived. Muscovite attitudes toward Kiev seem to have been compartmentalized: one claimed the Kievan inheritance and dealt with the contemporary Kiev, even on the leaves of the same folio, so to speak, but did not permit the former to intrude on the latter.

Nevertheless this working conclusion about the compartmentalization of early Muscovite thought is unsatisfactory for two reasons. Such an hypothesis forces us to assert that the Muscovite authors either had no genuine understanding of the flaws in their own ideological constructions, or that their only mode of response to the realization that the Historical and Contemporary Kievs presented a problem was silence, i.e., denial, an admittedly widespread

27. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

28. Despite the unconvincing contention of A. V. Soloviev, "Avtor 'Zadonshchiny' i ego politicheskie idei," *TODRL*, 14 (1958), 183-86. The earliest explicit Muscovite diplomatic claims to Kiev come in the first decade of the sixteenth century.

but hardly laudable intellectual maneuver. Consequently and somewhat paradoxically, after initially formulating this ostensible dilemma of early Muscovite thought, I suddenly if belatedly realized that the contradiction was real, but superficial; that is, the Muscovite *translatio* theory, if looked at more profoundly, resolved the relationship of the two Kievs—which we can infer Muscovite ideologues therefore appreciated—in an imaginative and powerful way, one which obviated the seeming disparity between their ideological pretensions and political realities. To put it another way, posing the wrong question led, hopefully, to the right answer.

If the sole ideological function of the Historical Kiev was to pass its ideological inheritance to Moscow, then, after it had done so, the Historical Kiev had no ideological *raison d'être*. It logically ceased to exist. For this reason, the Historical Kiev was frozen in time, and therefore outside time and immutable, like any classical past or golden age. The city of Kiev that now existed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had no claim upon the Kievan inheritance, which no longer resided in Kiev, but in Moscow. Consequently, the Lithuanian grand principality acquired no Kievan legitimacy when it assumed power over the Contemporary Kiev, and Lithuanian claims to influence among the East Slavs rooted in her possession of the city of Kiev were devoid of merit.[29] In early Muscovite thought the Contemporary Kiev could not and did not exist. Thus there was no contradiction between the Historical and Contemporary Kievs because they were simply different cities, and could be dealt with, easily, in different ways. Implicitly Moscow was the New Kiev, an epithet unattested in the Muscovite sources, and the Dnepr' Kiev, the equally unknown Old Kiev, was a has-been.

Ia. N. Shchapov has made the penetrating observation that in the middle ages law, genealogy, and history served political functions.[30] Early Muscovite Historicism embraced all three, and more; it constituted more than a vague interest in the Kievan past, its glories, literary and legal models, and religious

29. The problem of the ideology of the Grand Principality of Lithuania falls outside the scope of the present article, but it does seem that its claims to the Kievan inheritance are in need of fresh analysis. It is theoretically possible that Muscovite pretensions to Kievan legitimacy were addressed to the East Slavic population of the Grand Principality of Lithuania, the population of northeastern Russia, or neutral population between them. By population here I mean only the same types of articulate, elite classes, not the "masses." See n. 30 below.

30. Ia. N. Shchapov, "K kharakteristike nekotorykh letopisnykh trudov v XV v.," in *Letopisi i khroniki* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), pp. 173-86.

Unfortunately the peculiar nature of the extant source material, a body of literary texts often preserved in much later manuscripts, precludes analyzing in any concrete way just *how* the Kievan Inheritance was invoked and employed diplomatically and politically in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries by Muscovite ideologues. All we can do is correlate the aggressive policies of the Muscovite grand princes at the time with the ideological milieu of Muscovite ideologues.

luminaries. Kievan ideology was a part of the Kievan inheritance, as Likhachev suggests, but the Kievan inheritance itself, *in toto*, became ideological as well. The Muscovite claim to be the heir of Kiev, validated by linking Muscovy to her laws, literature, saints, and princes, was by definition both historical and ideological. It is no more than the conventional wisdom that Muscovy's pretensions to Kievan legitimacy were designed to undercut her immediate and most dangerous rival for dominance of the East Slavic lands, Lithuania, and the sad fate of the Kievan inheritance as a political football, which has been going strong ever since, begins in the fourteenth century. But we cannot fully comprehend *how* the Kievan inheritance of early Muscovite thought checkmated Lithuanian exploitation of her rule over Kiev unless, in conclusion, we appreciate the relationship between the Historical and Contemporary Kievs in the Muscovite sources, unless we are willing to accept the intellectual and ideological meaning and substance of the *translatio* of Kievan legitimacy to Moscow, and give due credit to the early Muscovite ideologues for their impressive achievements.

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