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Ivan IV and Kyiv

CHARLES J. HALPERIN

DESPITE THE IMPORTANCE assigned to the “Kyivan inheritance” by sixteenth-century Muscovite chronicles and narrative works, reacquisition of Kyiv¹ and the territory of Kyivan Rus’ was not a high priority of the Muscovite court during the reign of Ivan IV. Rather, Muscovite foreign policy focused on two other theaters of operation: first, the Tatar, to the south and southeast, the annexation of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, relations with the Nogai Hordes, and defense against the Crimean khanate; and second, the Baltic, to the west and northwest, the conquest of Livonia, and wars with Sweden, Lithuania, and Poland. Nevertheless, the Muscovite court, notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Posol’skii prikaz*), was far from ignorant of Muscovy’s relationship to Kyivan Rus’ or indifferent to the status of the city of Kyiv.

The Muscovite government, in its dealings with Poland-Lithuania, repeatedly—indeed stubbornly—insisted that Kyiv and other cities of Kyivan Rus’ were the patrimony (*votchina*) of the Muscovite grand prince and later tsar. In the 1536–37 negotiations with envoys of King Sigismund, Muscovite boyars declared that Kyiv “from the beginning” was theirs, and in the future would be “returned” to them by God.² The April 1537 Muscovite-Lithuanian truce stipulated that Muscovy would not attack Kyiv. During negotiations in Moscow in 1542, the Muscovite boyars asserted that Kyiv, Vitsebsk, Polotsk, and “other Rus’ cities” (*inye goroda russkie*) were the “patrimony as of old” (*votchina izstari*) of the Muscovite prince. 25 June 1542 instructions to Morozov and the other members of the Muscovite embassy to Sigismund to secure the latter’s signature on the Muscovite-Lithuanian truce repeated the assertion that Kyiv, Polotsk, and Vitsebsk were Ivan’s “patrimony” (*otchina*) from his “ancestors” (*praroditeli*). Kyiv was listed in the truce as a city of Poland-Lithuania to remain inviolate during 7050–7057 (1542–49). During the January–March 1549 negotiations in Moscow, Muscovite boyars declared that their ruler’s ancestors had ruled Kyiv, Volhynia, Vitsebsk, and Polotsk, which were “Rus’ cities,” as his “eternal patrimony” (*izvechnaia votchina*). In 1549 the Muscovite government insisted to Sigismund II Augustus’ delegation that a precondition for

“eternal peace” was the return of their patrimony, Kyiv. Aleksei Adashev and Ivan Viskovatyi referred to Kyiv as Ivan’s patrimony in their reply to Sigismund II Augustus’ envoy of 1558.³ If the Muscovite envoys to Lithuania in 1559 were asked what Muscovy’s “Cherkes”—Circassians, here Cossacks, led by prince Dmytro Vyshnevets’kyi—were doing on the Dnipro River, they were to reply that the “Circassians” were defending the area against the Tatars, not attacking Lithuanian fishermen. Besides, Lithuanian “Cossacks” (*kazaki*) were stealing the Muscovite “Circassians” horses. Moreover, the Muscovite envoys were to declare that since the Dnipro originated in Muscovite territory, it belonged to Muscovy for its entire length, although it had never been demarcated.⁴ This claim would have extended Muscovite sovereignty down the Dnipro all the way to the Black Sea!

In 1561 negotiations in Moscow, the Muscovite delegation again claimed Kyiv, Podolia, Volhynia, and Vitsebsk.⁵ In 1563 the Muscovites informed Sigismund II Augustus’ representative (*poslannik*) that Ivan’s patrimony included all lands that had been ruled by Mstislav, son of Volodimer Monomakh, Grand Prince of Kyiv, including Vilnius and the Podolian, Galician, and Volhynian lands, because they had all belonged to Kyiv, which was also Muscovite.⁶ In 1562–63 the boyars informed the Lithuanian Rada that “the entire Rus’ land” and the “entire Lithuanian land” (*vsia russkaia zemlia, vsia litovskaia zemlia*) were the patrimony (*votchina*) of Muscovy.⁷ Muscovite negotiators on 11 December 1563 defined as Ivan’s patrimony both territories already in Muscovite hands, and those not, including a wide swath of Ukraine and Belarus: Kyiv, Liubech, Mahilëu, Minsk, Vitsebsk, Surozh, Kaniv, Cherkassk, Volodymyr (Volyns’kyi), Kholm, Halych, Lviv, Peremyshl, and Chernihiv, to the territorial limits of what had been ruled by grand prince Sviatoslav Iziaslavovich, including Brest, Podolia, and Volhynia. When the Lithuanian envoys objected that Kam’ianets-Podilskyi and Galich were part of the Corona Polska, not the Grand Principality of Lithuania, and thus their deposition was beyond their competence, the Muscovite diplomats yielded no ground, insisting that those too were “Rus’ cities,” which had been lost to Rus’ rule after Mongol conquest. The Muscovite diplomatic team evinced great familiarity with Kyivan geography when delineating the boundaries between Muscovy and Lithuania. Ivan IV personally insisted that the current location of some cities he claimed in Poland was not important, because he had inherited them from his ancestor Volodimer, a conception laid out explicitly in 1556 negotiations in Moscow, proclaiming that Kyiv was Ivan’s inheritance from his ancestor Volodimer, Grand Prince of Kyiv, who baptized the “Rus’” land, and passed it down through the generations to Ivan.⁸

During the 1576–78 Polish-Lithuanian Interregnum, in which Ivan IV, the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, and his son Ernest were candidates for

the Polish-Lithuanian throne, the Muscovite government engaged in extensive negotiations with the imperial representatives, Printz and Kobenzl, to coordinate their efforts. No doubt at Muscovite insistence, Printz and Kobenzl agreed that Kyiv had always been the patrimony of Moscow.⁹ If Poland and Lithuania were partitioned, then, the Muscovite negotiating team insisted, Ivan would assume the throne of Lithuania with Kyiv, the Kingdom of Poland going to Ernest.¹⁰ The Muscovite envoy to the Holy Roman Emperor was instructed to specify in no uncertain terms that Ivan was to acquire Kyiv as well as Lithuania in a partition.¹¹ A member of the Polish gentry, Krzysztof Grajewski (spelled "Graevskii" in the sources), in a bizarre turn of events, wound up carrying Ivan's electoral demands back to Poland in 1574–75. These demands emphasized Muscovite control over Kyiv as well as Livonia. Indeed, in Ivan's title as joint ruler of Muscovy, Poland and Lithuania, "of Kyiv" (*kyivskii*) would have pride of place, ahead of even Poland.¹² All these plans came to naught.¹³

Muscovite pretensions to Kyiv were so well appreciated in Europe that in the 1580s Pope Gregory XIII offered Ivan not only an imperial title and possession of Constantinople in return for ecclesiastical union, but also Kyiv, his "ancestral patrimony."¹⁴ While the Russian diplomatic papers mention this offer, the papal envoy deputed to negotiate an end to the Livonian War, the Jesuit Antonio Possevino, for whatever reason, omitted it from his account of the process that led to the Peace of Jam Zapolski.¹⁵ This papal offer lacked the vested interest of a papal offer of Constantinople.

It would not be difficult to dismiss Muscovite posturing about possession of Kyiv as no more than a diplomatic ploy, a negotiating point in Muscovy's relations with Poland-Lithuania, a weapon to be used to achieve Ivan IV's real goal, Livonia, or as no more serious than Polish-Lithuanian claims to Novgorod and Pskov (although Stefan Batory made Polish-Lithuanian claims to Pskov more than theoretical). Some statements by Ivan and his representatives would confirm such an interpretation. In 1549 the Muscovite boyars declared that since Ivan was a Christian monarch, trying to avoid bloodshed in Lithuania, he might, they averred, be quiet concerning Kyiv, his ancient patrimony, in return for concessions elsewhere. Note that this far-from-subtle *démarche* was made long before the Livonian War. In 1558–59 negotiations, after Muscovy's invasion of Livonia, the Muscovites offered to forget Kyiv and other "Rus' cities" if the Poles-Lithuanians would reciprocally forget their claims to Muscovite domains and all previous disagreements. Ivan personally volunteered, yet again, to omit Kyiv from his territorial pretensions. While such a concession precluded the signing of a peace treaty, Ivan energetically proposed that in its stead the negotiators move on to discussions of a truce,¹⁶ which is what happened. On 10 May 1570, Ivan told boyars negotiating with Sigismund II Augustus' delegation to Moscow that they could withdraw claims to Kaniv,

Mahilëü, Liubech, and other cities, but to keep Kyiv and the Dnipro River, but by 17 May Ivan's position had changed and the *boyare* were authorized to give up Kyiv, Vitsebsk, and even part of the Polotsk district.¹⁷

However, it would not be quite as easy to dismiss the fact that Ivan IV raised the issue of Kyiv not only to the Poles and Lithuanians, but also to the Holy Roman Emperor. Granted, Kyiv was still subordinate to Livonia in Muscovite policy. Granted, to some degree restoring Kyiv to the ruler of Lithuania was campaign strategy on Ivan's part, to appeal to elements in the Grand Principality of Lithuania who wanted to reverse the territorial settlement of the Union of Lublin. Electing Ivan IV ruler of either Lithuania or Lithuania and Poland would have been a means to an end for such interest groups. Granted, finally, it is arguable that Ivan's candidacy itself was no more than a device to achieve leverage against the Commonwealth in Livonia. Nevertheless, the fact that both the Holy Roman Emperor in 1574–76¹⁸ and the Pope in the 1580s thought to dangle Kyiv in front of Ivan's eyes as a prize reinforces the notion that the Kyiv issue was taken seriously outside Muscovy because it was more than a pose within the Muscovite court.

Muscovite claims to Kyiv were clearly dynastic in origin.¹⁹ Ivan was entitled to Kyiv as the heir to the Riurikid grand princes of Kyiv.²⁰ Ivan IV's fictive genealogy to Prus, the brother of Roman Emperor Augustus, via the Varangian Riurik, was central to Muscovite foreign policy. Iaroslav "the Wise" had founded Tartu (Rus. Iurev). Ivan's sovereignty over Livonia derived from his "inheritance" of Iaroslav's realm. That Tartu was a Rus' city justified the demand for Livonian tribute to Muscovy.²¹ Similarly, Ivan derived his tsarist title from his ancestor, Volodimer Monomakh, Grand Prince of Kyiv, who had supposedly held that same status.²² Ivan IV lay claim to the "Rus' land" because that was the realm of St. Volodimer, who had baptized the "Rus' land," and Ivan was the heir of St. Volodimer.²³ In addition, since Lithuania had paid tribute to Kyivan Grand Prince Mstislav Volodimerovich, the Lithuanian land was also Ivan's patrimony,²⁴ and even that point was moot, since the Muscovites invented a fictive genealogy of the Lithuanian princes that traced their descent from the princes of Polotsk. Because the princes of Polotsk had been subordinate to the Kyivan grand prince, and Ivan was heir to the Kyivan grand prince, Ivan was automatically overlord of Lithuania.²⁵ Genealogy, both Muscovite and Lithuanian, was a fundamental building block of Muscovite ideology vis-à-vis Ukraine and Lithuania, not just Muscovite claims to Kyiv. It is impossible to take genealogy seriously as an element of Muscovite secular society and ideology and not credit claims to Kyiv based on princely genealogy.

The essence of an irredentist claim is that one's own historically legitimate territory is now under illegitimate foreign rule. Therefore, there is no confusion between Muscovite admissions that Kyiv was currently within the "Lithuanian land" and Muscovite pretensions that Kyiv belonged to the "Rus' land," the

patrimony of the Muscovite ruler. Since even the "Lithuanian land" was, in Muscovite thought, the patrimony of the ruler of Moscow, Ivan's claims to Kyiv were over-determined.²⁶

The Muscovite court and Foreign Affairs Office did not deal with Kyiv simply on paper; Kyiv was a real city to them, geographically and politically. The diplomatic books record that in 1543–44 Ivan sent a *dvorianin* to Sigismund with instructions to complain, inter alia, that Pskov merchants traveling to Constantinople (Tsargrad) via Kyiv had been robbed of oil (*neft'*) and then imprisoned in Vilnius; despite complaints, no compensation had been forthcoming. In 1550 there were further complaints of a lack of satisfaction to Chernihiv victims of border incursions by the *namestnik* of Kyiv. Sigismund II Augustus sent his Kyiv *gorodniks* to Moscow. Kyiv administrator Vyshnevet's'kyi played a role in the transmission of parcels to Crimea or the Ottomans.²⁷ Moscow even had an opinion on who should be Kyiv *voevoda*, namely the Orthodox prince Kostiantyn (Vasyl') Ostroz'kyi ("Vasilii Ostrozhskii" in the sources), who would behave properly when Muscovite interests were involved.²⁸

In 1556–57 Moscow accused the Kyiv *rotmeister* Stuzhyn's'kyi of collecting ransom from Christians. In a 1567 letter by prince Ivan Dmitrievich Bel'skii to Sigismund II Augustus, usually attributed to Ivan IV, Khodkevych is dismissed socially as a mere Kyiv boyar; as a Muscovite boyar, it was beneath Bel'skii's dignity even to answer him. In a 1567 epistle in Vorotynskii's name to Sigismund II Augustus, also usually attributed to Ivan IV, sarcasm was heaped on the low-status Kurbskii for ranking high in the Kyiv *voevodstvo*. A 1571 report of Muscovite envoys to Sigismund II Augustus included the news that because of a dispute between the Muscovite deserter Laskoi and the Kyiv *voevoda* Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi, Laskoi, fleeing assassins, had departed Kyiv for Volhynia, Podolia, Mezhibozh, Venice [?], and Bratslav.²⁹

Ivan's archive contained a *gramota* from 1572 (the year is given in the "Latin" or "Lithuanian" calendar) from Kyiv bishop Mikołaj Pac to Ivan IV.³⁰ In a 30 January 1576 epistle to the Lithuanian Rada, Ivan addressed both the bishop, Mikołaj Pac, and castellan, Paweł Sapieha, of Kyiv.³¹ In 1582 the archdeacon (*ierodiakon*) Ioakima, born in Kyiv oblast in Kam'ianets-Podil'skyi, came to Moscow seeking copies of Kyivan Rus' literature. He was received by Ivan in the palace in the presence of the boyars.³²

In 1583 the abbot (*igumen*) of the Kyiv Caves monastery Meletii (Melentei) Khrebtovych, simultaneously bishop of Volodymyr-Volyn'skyi, came to Moscow for alms and received 100 rubles in memory of tsarevich Ivan for his trouble, even if Ivan was quite skeptical of Meletii's assertion that Ivan's "ancestors and predecessors" (*praroditeli i predki*) had given "alms" (*dan'*) to the monastery until interrupted by war between Ivan and the King of Poland.³³

In short, the Muscovite court knew who was who in Kyiv, both lay and clerical, and what everyone was doing there. Ignorance³⁴ will not explain why

acquisition of Kyiv never became an operational priority of Muscovite foreign policy under Ivan IV. In the sixteenth century Kyiv was a frontier city, especially vulnerable to Crimean raids. Muscovite representatives insisted to the Lithuanians that if Moscow could take Kazan and Astrakhan, it was absurd to assert that Muscovy would need help in defending Kyiv, once acquired;³⁵ nevertheless, it might have been true that Muscovy could not protect Kyiv. Muscovite pretensions to control the length of the Dnipro seem less than credible given the ultimate failure of prince Dmytro Vyshnevets'kyi and his Ukrainian Cossacks to sustain an assault on the mouth of the river against the Crimeans and the Ottomans.³⁶ It seems doubtful that Kyiv would have given Muscovy a better staging area for defending the southern frontier against the Crimea than Chernihiv. The possibility cannot be excluded that pragmatically the advantages of acquiring Kyiv were just not worth the expenditure required to hold it.

Did the Muscovite court feel any "national" or "ethnic" affection for Kyiv? Of course some Soviet-era scholarship has notoriously exaggerated "fraternal East Slavic friendship" as a moving force in early modern Rus', Russian, and Ukrainian history. Muscovite *claims* to Kyiv, as we have seen, were dynastic, but Muscovite court *consciousness* of Kyiv is more elusive. The foreign policy establishment constantly referred to Kyiv as a "Rus'" city, in the "Rus'" land, which had been baptized by St. Volodimer. There is no question but that during the Kyivan period, Rus' began as a dynastic conception—the Rus' were the people ruled by the Riurikid dynasty, the Rus' land was the territory ruled by the Riurikid dynasty. The question is whether such notions were, if not superseded, then supplemented by broader ethnic or religious notions during the pre-Mongol centuries, or if they acquired a non-dynastic conception during the Muscovite period, including the reign of Ivan IV. The assertion that the Lithuanian land was the patrimony of the Moscow house ill-fits any notion that the court was thinking in ethnic or religious terms. However, the fact that under Ivan IV Moscow made only dynastic claims to Kyiv in and of itself proves no more than that the court thought dynastic claims had a higher probative value than national identity in international law, an understandable approach in a country that was in the process of conquering two Muslim Tatar khanates and trying to conquer the German Lutheran state of a former Catholic crusading order ruling Estonians and Latvians, or in a country bordering the multiethnic, multiconfessional Polish-Lithuanian state. Evidence for Muscovite ethnic or national consciousness of Kyivan continuity must be sought elsewhere.

The repetitive claims of the Muscovite court during the reign of Ivan IV to sovereignty over Kyiv, and much other Ukrainian and Belarusian territory, even if not on Moscow's practical foreign policy agenda, must be taken as seriously by historians now as they were then by Muscovy's would-be allies, the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy. Indeed, the issue of Kyiv may have been more

meaningful, not less, because it was not a foreign policy priority.³⁷ The Muscovite court knew Kyiv and its environs well, and dealt with its clergy—both Catholic and Orthodox—and political leaders. Kyiv's territorial significance did not escape Moscow's notice. Dealing with contemporary Kyiv was a practical necessity for the Muscovite court. Therefore, Kyiv was clearly almost always on the minds of the court, not just the Church, during the reign of Ivan IV, and the theory of Muscovite historical continuity with Kyivan Rus', if only in dynastic terms, was not confined to the monastic scriptorium.

NOTES

1. This essay follows Ukrainian spelling for Ukrainian places and personal names; the Muscovite sources, of course, utilize Russianized spellings for all names.
2. G. O. Karpov, ed., *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s pol'sko-litovskim*, vol. 2, 1533–1560, in *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* [hereafter *SRIO*] 59 (St. Petersburg, 1887), 74. Note that to the Lithuanians, Chernihiv, held by Muscovy, was also in play, but then, so were Novgorod and Pskov (ibid., 84). Chernihiv had been part of the original Dnipro River triangle of Rus', the *rusaskaia zemlia*.
3. Ibid., 558.
4. Ibid., 128, 155, 184, 191, 274, 320–21, 558, 583.
5. G. O. Karpov, ed., *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s pol'sko-litovskim*, vol. 3, 1560–1571, in *SRIO* 71 (St. Petersburg, 1892), 43.
6. Ibid., 172.
7. Ibid., 108. This ambitious assertion is contained in an emotional and verbose peroration (ibid., 102–15) that bears all the stylistic attributes of Ivan's own composition, although it has never, to my knowledge, been attributed to him.
8. Ibid., 260, 266, 270, 272, 276–80, 292, 374.
9. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* [hereafter *PDSDR*], vol 1, part 1, *Snosheniia s gosudarstvami evropeiskimi*, also titled *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Imperieiu Rimskoiu*, vol. 1, *S 1498 po 1594 god* (St. Petersburg, 1851), 533–36.
10. Ibid., 559.
11. Ibid., 589.
12. I. S. Riabinin, "Pokazanie pol'skago shliakhticha Krishtofora Graevskago o svoei poezdke v Moskvu, 1574–1575," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh Pri Moskovskom Universitete* [hereafter *Chteniia*] 1905, vol. 212, bk. 1, 1–16; references to Kyiv are on 11, 15. B. N. Floria, "Artikuly, skazanye cherez Krishtofa Graevskogo"—vazhnyi istochnik po istorii russkoi vneshnei politiki 70-kh godov XVI v.," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1975* (1976): 334–38, makes some critical remarks about the transmission of this text, but does not

- impugn the references to Kyiv. See B. N. Floria, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia i politicheskoe razvitie Vostochnoi Evropy vo vtoroi polovine XVI–nachale XVII v.* (Moscow, 1978), 58.
13. On Muscovite relations with the Holy Roman Empire concerning the Polish interregnum, see I. B. Grekov, *Ocherki po istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii Vostochnoi Evropy XIV–XVI vv.* (Moscow, 1963), 355, 365, 372.
 14. *PDSDR* 10, also titled *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s papskim dvorom i s italianskimi gosudarstvami (1580 po 1699 god)* (St. Petersburg, 1871), 300.
 15. Jaaklo Lehtovirta, “The Uses of Titles in Herberstein’s ‘Commentarii’: Was the Muscovite Tsar a King or an Emperor?” in *450 Jahre Sigismund von Herberstein’s Rerum Moscovitarum Commentarii: 1549–1999*, ed. Frank Kämpfer and Reinhard Frötschner (Wiesbaden, 2002), 195n29.
 16. *SRIO* 59, 279, 572, 575.
 17. *SRIO* 71, 651.
 18. Floria, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia*, 67, 113–16.
 19. Keenan unconvincingly argues that Muscovite claims of *otchina* meant no more than “we have historical interests”; see Edward L. Keenan, “Muscovite Perceptions of Other East Slavs Before 1654: An Agenda for Historians,” in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, and Gleb N. Žekulin, 20–38 (Edmonton, 1992), 24–25.
 20. Paul Bushkovitch, in his review of Jaroslaw Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kyivan Rus'* (Boulder, Colo., 1998) in *International History Review* 21, no. 4 (1999): 987–88, criticizes as “more than ambiguous” Pelenski’s categorization of Muscovite claims to Kyiv in the 1503–4 negotiations with Poland and Hungary as national, rather than dynastic. Pelenski had argued this since Kyiv and Smolensk were referred to as “Lithuanian”—part of the Lithuanian land—as well as the “Russian land.” However, Pelenski himself observes that “these statements reveal some confusion about the delineation of the patrimonies” (92–93). Pelenski concludes that Muscovite claims continued throughout the sixteenth century, culminating in assertions that Moscow was the Second Kyiv (93n88). However, that equation comes from the “Kazan history” (*Kazanskaia istoriia*) and an ambiguous chronicle fragment, neither of which reflected state ideology.
 21. In the 1563–64 negotiations, Ivan informed the Lithuanians that his “ancestor” (*praroditel'*) Georgii Iaroslav had founded Iurev in 6508 = 1000; Ivan also repeated the Prus-Riurik genealogy (*SRIO* 71, 216, 231). See also Ivan to Possevino, *PDSDR* 10, 154.
 22. *SRIO* 59, 287, 309–10, 345, 437.
 23. *PDSDR* 10, 135, 206 (Ivan’s speeches to Possevino).
 24. Floria, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia*, 35–36.
 25. *Ibid.*, 57.
 26. Lehtovirta (“Uses of Titles,” 93) states that “the Muscovites probably failed to understand” that to Poland-Lithuania, claims to derive the title “tsar” from Volodimer

Monomakh meant claims to Kyiv, where Monomakh ruled. I think the Muscovites understood that perfectly well, and clearly intended to convey that assertion in their dealings with the Lithuanians.

27. *SRIO* 59, 225–26, 346–48, 352, 548.
28. *Ibid.*, 550. Ostroz'skyi's selection might not have worked out as well as Moscow hoped; see *Patriarshaia ili nikonovskaia letopis'*, *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* 13 (Moscow, 1965), 390.
29. *SRIO* 71, 464, 503, 513, 806. Hiroaki Kuromiya has kindly suggested this interpretation of the place name Bratslav, spelled "Braklav" in the source.
30. S. O. Shmidt, ed., *Opisi tsarskogo arkhiva XVI veka i arkhiva Posol'skogo prikaza 1614 goda* (Moscow, 1960), 67. The bishop is incorrectly identified as Mikołaj Radziwiłł (Rudy) in Shmidt.
31. *PDSDR* 1, 579–80.
32. "Puteshestvie Kyivskago ierodiakona Ioakima v Moskvu za knigami i predstavlenie ero Tsariu Groznomu v prisutstvii Boiarskoi Dumy v 1582 g.," *Chteniia* 1883, vol. 124, bk. 1, sec. (*otdel*) 5, 1–3.
33. S. M. Kashtanov, "O vzaimootnosheniiakh Kyivo-Pecherskogo monastyria s pravitel'stvom Ivana IV v 1583 g.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 2002, no. 4, 189–203.
34. *Pace* Keenan's remark ("Muscovite Perceptions," 33) that in the second half of the sixteenth century the Muscovites were "neither informed nor interested" in the other East Slavs.
35. *SRIO* 71, 651.
36. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 7, *The Cossack Age to 1625*, trans. Bohdan Strumiński, ed. Serhii Plokhyy, Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton, 1999), 88–98.
37. For a critique of Keenan's conclusion see Simon Franklin, "The Invention of Rus(sia)(s): Some Remarks on Medieval and Modern Perceptions of Continuity and Discontinuity," in *Medieval Europeans: Studies in Ethnic Identity and National Perspectives in Medieval Europe*, ed. Alfred P. Smyth (London, 1994), 180–95, especially 185; reprinted with identical pagination in Simon Franklin, *Byzantium-Rus-Russia: Studies in the Translation of Christian Culture* (New York, 2003), essay 17.