Chapter 7

Politics and Military Action of Ethnic Ukrainian Collaboration for the "New European Order"

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Between the First and Second World Wars, German–Ukrainian relations functioned according to a frequently performed script, even when the constellation of the principle actors varied.[1] Despite the strong anti-Slavic orientation of Nazi ideology, Germany was still able to, and did in fact, use Ukrainian nationalist currents for its own ends. The political and military strategies of Ukrainian separatism were pitted against the goals and methods of Germany's policies with respect to Poland and the Soviet Union. At the peak of German power over Eastern and Central Europe, Berlin proclaimed the idea of a conquest for *Lebensraum* in the east. In this context, the *Lebensraum* paradigm, and not territorial revisionism, was the dominant ideology at stake. In order to get a piece of the "Russian cake," Ukrainians and other ethnic groups that collaborated with the Germans—such as the Byelorussians, Lithuanians, and Croatians—maintained firm illusions about German war aims. On June 26, 1941, four days after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), formulated its political demands to the Reich Chancellery. The OUN, known as the dominant group of the Ukrainian national movement since the early 1930s, worked under the assumption that Germany was not only pursuing economic goals but also had political plans for Soviet Ukraine. The Nazi vision of a New Order in the East, they thought, could not be conceived without Ukraine's economic potential. The advantageous size of Ukraine's territory and population, thought the nationalists, could enable them to establish a wealthy nation-state. According to their view, a German-occupied Ukraine with titular nation status would be the sole partner as well as the only morally

legitimate factor in maintaining order. At least this was the OUN expected, and they attached three postulates to a future New Order under German administration: first, the creation of an independent Ukrainian state; second, the integration of the Ukrainian state into a New European Economic Order; and third, a Ukrainian army.[2]

The Third Reich's policy of Germanization was rooted in a vision of a social Darwinist struggle for supremacy between stronger and weaker peoples. German policy was at one and the same time a mask and a general instrument created in order to transform the Polish nation-state and the Ukrainian Soviet republic into colonies based on a tribal model of society.[3] Most importantly, in such a society the Aryan race was deemed to be the superior culture and civilization with respect to other minor races, in particular the Jews and the Slavs. Secondly, the occupier viewed itself as the "master race" and therefore claimed the right to decide over the political and social existence of the population residing in the occupied areas. Economically, Ukraine was to be treated as a breadbasket that would allow Germany to become a global power.[4] Ideologically, this model of a pre-state societal structure masked the plans of the German leadership under Hitler and Himmler to destroy the existing nation-states in the occupied territories of the East.[5] According to their vision, the Ukraine was populated by inferior Slavs, and Ukrainians were labeled as Baltic peoples but racially still above those slated for immediate destruction: the Jews and Roma, followed by Poles and to a lesser extent the Great Russians and Byelorussians.[6] In contrast to this view, the OUN saw itself as the avant-garde of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in Eastern Galicia amidst interethnic rivalries. Obviously, such competing leitmotifs were clearly contradictory, a fact that leads to the underlying question of this article: Under what conditions did Ukrainian nationalists of the OUN commit themselves to German promises of a New European Order between 1938 and 1944?

The principal attraction of Ukraine as a case study for the mechanisms of collaboration is that the basic motivation for nationalist collaboration was not political but ethnic in nature. For the Ukrainian nationalists, the war was another phase of a generation-old struggle against the dominant ethnic group, the Poles, and the Nazis were their unsatisfactory, albeit indispensable, allies in this new round of open ethnic struggle. Therefore, the Ukrainians worked with the Germans mainly in order to overcome domestic enemies.[7] This was to be achieved by wiping out Poles, Russians, and Jews from "ethnic Ukrainian territories," to use OUN jargon,[8] through collaboration with the Nazis, something that became the principal policy of the OUN.[9] From the German perspective, it was not Ukrainian state-building that was at issue but rather the destruction of the Polish and Russian peoples that formed the core of German–Ukrainian relations between 1939 and 1944.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the formation of a modern national consciousness had become more important than mere confessional

differences—in fact, the majority of Poles were Roman Catholics whereas the Ukrainians were overwhelmingly Orthodox Catholics. In the cities, Poles formed the majority, whereas most Ukrainian people lived in the villages. The Polish nobility, however, owned a major part of the country. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, Ukrainians made up 96 per cent of the peasant population of Galicia. This figure did not change much in the following decades.[10] If it had not been for the distinction between the Greek (Orthodox) and Latin (Roman) rites, western Ukrainians might have become Polonized in the nineteenth century. In 1918, when Eastern Galicia fell to the newly emerged Polish state, the situation changed only marginally. Economic and political conditions led representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to return to rural areas. Since there were no jobs for them in the city, they looked for jobs in the well-developed rural movements of social cooperatives. Thus the Ukrainian intelligentsia gained a hold over every part of social life in the countryside. As more and more academics moved back to the villages and small towns, social life started to develop there, leading to the creation of reading rooms, choirs, and amateur theaters in these communities.[11] In addition to this trend, the political arena became more radical, and nationalist movements began influencing the identity of Ruthenian Ukrainians. The emerging Ukrainian elites wished to determine the specific traditions of the *gente Rutheni* and to break away from *natione Poloni*, which was depriving them of their historical roots. The Ukrainian rural population, and in particular the intelligentsia, had always been deeply rooted in their homeland. In an interview, Vasyl Mudry, leader of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (one of the largest Ukrainian parties in Galicia) and vice-president of the Polish parliament, said: "Every Ukrainian academic had an agrarian background, either in the first or the second generation. There were very few academics born before 1848. The Ukrainian academic, doctor, or lawyer, is rooted to this soil with his own flesh and blood. Be it a brother or an uncle living in the village."[12]

In general, Ukrainian nationalists traditionally stressed how for centuries, beginning with the ancient Kievan Rus', much of Ukraine had either maintained close economic, political, and dynastic ties with Europe or had been incorporated into Central European states, such as Poland and Austria-Hungary. As a result, the ideas of Western humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation all allegedly permeated into the Ukrainian world-view. By contrast, Russia, which was said to have traveled a substantially different historical trajectory from Ukraine, was relegated to the Eurasian cultural sphere. From this perspective Imperial Russian and then Soviet domination distorted and suppressed the essentially Western and European nature of Ukrainian culture, but could not eliminate it.[13] The Polish side tried to hold on to the societal unity of the ancient pre-1772 Polish Republic and treated the Ukrainian national movement more as a social than a national or political problem.[14] After the First World War, the struggle between Poles and Ukrainians for the dominant role in

this former Habsburg *Kronland* escalated. The two groups sought national independence in order to assume the leading role in the region. Their respective goal was the integration of Galicia into either a Polish or a Ukrainian nation-state. Ukrainian nationalists always interpreted the incorporation of Galicia into the Polish state after 1921 as a form of Polish occupation, and they saw the Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia from 1939 to 1941 as a transfer from Polish to Jewish dominance.

Political Collaboration

The OUN did not achieve any of their political goals as presented to the Reich authorities in June 1941. An overestimation of their significance in the game of power politics was supplemented by a fatal misinterpretation of German propaganda with respect to Ukraine's role in a new, German-ruled Europe. After the liquidation of the Polish government in Warsaw, the OUN expected the *Wehrmacht* to conquer the Soviet-occupied eastern Polish regions. The basis of this conviction was, in part, derived from German propaganda, which masked a meticulously planned war of conquest as a "European crusade against Bolshevism."[15]

In order to explain the German–Ukrainian nexus, it is necessary to take a biographical approach. The myth of a Ukraine-friendly Reich originated among the elite of the Galician leadership of the OUN itself, of whom the majority were born in Galicia in the late Habsburg period, an era they saw as the golden age of Ukrainian renaissance in the region. They believed in Berlin's purported mission of civilizing the East and imagined that German political goals would bring order, security, and justice to the region. In addition, Berlin—alongside Prague and Vienna—was regarded as a center of Ukrainian emigration in the years before the First World War. Numerous Ukrainian nationalists had studied and organized there in relative freedom. Not to be underestimated in this context were the steady assurances of moral support for the Ukrainian idea of a nation-state from representatives of the German Foreign Office and the *Wehrmacht* throughout the 1930s.[16] With respect to fascist ideology, the militant methods and ambiguous vision of the future offered by the Nazis had parallels with the radicalism and terrorism of the OUN.[17]

The decisive impulse for the pro-German position of the OUN came in September 1939, when German troops freed the majority of the OUN leadership from a Polish concentration camp in Bereza Kartuska. Moreover, the German presence in west Ukraine meant an end to waves of arrests, executions, and deportations carried out by the NKVD, the Soviet secret police. Indeed, by June 1941, thousands of OUN supporters and leaders had been killed. According to one Polish study, up to 20,000 members of the OUN and their families had been

deported and liquidated by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941.[18] There were concrete reasons for the OUN's anti-Bolshevik course. According to Ukrainian archival documents, Lavrentii Beria, chief of the NKVD, had ordered the elimination of Ukrainian nationalists in the eastern Polish territories just two days before the Red Army invaded Poland.[19]

As Timothy Snyder has pointed out, the OUN needed more than the restoration of a state; it needed the creation of a new one.[20] With respect to Soviet pressure, the OUN became quite convinced that only a German invasion of Ukraine could improve the situation for their organization in their homeland. Typical of the OUN view was the statement of one of their spokesmen, in which the position of the Ukrainian state was given in the following way: Ukrainian society would continue to firmly support the Germans even if repression of the Ukrainian nationalist movement followed in the wake of the occupation of Soviet Ukraine.[21] In its program of April 1941, the OUN explicitly saw itself as an ally of the German Reich: "The organization recognizes as allies of the Ukraine all states, political groups, and forces that are interested in the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the establishment of a sovereign, united, and independent Ukrainian state."[22]

On June 30, 1941, after the retreat of the Red Army, the OUN declared a Ukrainian state in Lviv. For the sake of the Ukrainian state and the establishment of a global New Order, the declaration also stated the intention of cooperating closely with "Greater Germany." At the same time, the foreign minister of the OUN government endeavored to achieve international recognition by informing the ambassadors of states allied to the Reich (Italy, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) in Berlin, asking them to recognize the Lviv government.[23] Not only did the OUN fail in its attempts to gain political recognition, but, within days, the OUN government was arrested by the German security police. From the beginning of the war in September 1939, Ukrainian politicians in Poland decided against the status quo ante and put their destiny in the hands of German totalitarianism. There was no reason, however, to harbor any great expectations of German policy toward Ukraine. Clear indications of the Nazi leadership's anti-Ukrainian policies included the German–Polish Nonaggression Pact of January 1934, German acquiescence to the Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine in March 1939, the partition of Poland that resulted from the German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939, and the reaction to the proclamation of the OUN government on June 30, 1941.

From Berlin's point of view, the occupied territories did not, as a rule, present any politically significant players worthy of meaningful concessions from the Reich. Nonetheless, Germany made symbolic concessions to the Ukrainian national movement. The *Wehrmacht* sponsored the participation of Ukrainian troops in the invasion of Soviet Ukraine in June 1941. Ukrainian units were also encouraged to track down stragglers of the withdrawing Soviet army from

Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. In addition, there was the collaboration of the OUN with German *Einsatzgruppen* in the first phase of the annihilation of Polish and Ukrainian Jewry.[24] With the formation of a civil administration within the General Government (western Ukraine was subordinated on August 1, 1941) and the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* (incorporating southern and central Ukraine on September 1, 1941), a central task of the German police became, in addition to the extermination of the Jews, the political control of Ukrainian nationalist factions.[25]

On September 19, 1941, the *Wehrmacht* occupied the historic Ukrainian capital of Kiev. Physically, Kiev appeared to be a center of German–Ukrainian friendship, with the German swastika and the yellow-blue Ukrainian national flag flying side by side. Formally, leaders of the Ukrainian national revival supporting the OUN had been authorized to organize the administrative matters of the city. The Mel'nyk faction was able to exert a dominating influence on local politics in Kiev,[26] comparable to that of the Bandera faction in western Ukrainian territories during the summer of 1941. Under the guise of administrative duties, Ukrainian nationalists infiltrated the German administrative system with the aim of Ukrainianizing public affairs in the capital.[27] A wave of arrests directed at OUN members got underway in November 1941 in the eastern occupied territories as the Germans tried to purge local administrations and auxiliary police forces of OUN influence.[28] As a result, by the end of 1942, the organizational structure of the OUN had been completely destroyed by the commander of the security police and security service in Ukraine. On December 4, 1942, at the height of German repression against the dominant national movement in Ukraine, the OUN headquarters, including a large armory in Lviv, were discovered, and the military head of the organization, Ivan Klimiv, arrested.[29] Although the Germans persecuted the Ukrainians, the latter nonetheless adhered to their schedule. Berlin's aim was something completely new—a colonial empire from the Atlantic to the Urals. While Ukrainian territorial revisionism ran counter to German plans for the Ukraine, Berlin's allies shared similar goals, not least with respect to the Ukraine. Since the Munich Agreement of 1938, which paved the way for the German occupation of Czech lands and the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine, German policy had strived to build on the Axis alliance by addressing the various territorial grievances of would-be allies such as Romania and Bulgaria, and thus to prepare a coalition for war against the Soviet Union.

Administrative Collaboration

Only at the outbreak of the Soviet campaign did the military agreement between Ukrainian nationalists and the Nazis afford a short-term basis for collaboration toward a "New European Order."[30] German racial politics proved to have a

negative impact on the Ukrainians. Ukrainians put forward their ethnic claims, while German policy-makers regarded them as racially inferior. Unlike this very short alliance between Ukrainian nationalists and the Reich, political and military cooperation during the Second World War outlasted the unfulfilled vision of a Ukrainian satellite state. Interestingly enough, it was to a large extent a lively debate over the "German question" that led to a schism within the OUN in April 1940. The younger faction (OUN-B), which was led by Stepan Bandera, attacked the older generation, which had remained loyal to Colonel Andrii Mel'nyk's faction, which seemed to give more emphasis to collaboration than to statehood.[31] A representative of the conservative Mel'nyk faction of the OUN recognized the priorities of the moment and called upon his countrymen to work under German leadership for a new Europe in which the Ukrainian nation would also find its place: "A New Europe [arises] in which the Ukrainian nation will find its place, and the better it will be for us, the more we subordinate ourselves and work for this order. German leadership will also provide us guidance, and it is therefore to our benefit to collaborate with the German authorities." [32]

The author of these words was Volodymyr Kubiyovych, head of the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), as the official representatives of the Ukrainians in the General Government was known. His correspondence with the administration of the government provides an excellent means for exploring separatism and collaboration in the occupied eastern territories.[33] For the Germans, Kubiyovych was a natural choice as head of the UCC: he was politically inexperienced, enjoyed excellent contacts with Germans from before the war, and spoke fluent German.

The UCC worked primarily to fulfill the everyday needs of their native population. Unlike the OUN, the UCC did more than just make demands for political representation. The UCC raised close collaboration in administrative affairs to a matter of principle. The UCC also made a point of avoiding contact with both the OUN-B and the Lviv "government" of June 30, 1941.

On August 1, 1941, Eastern Galicia, as it had existed under the Habsburgs from 1772 until 1918, was incorporated into the General Government. From the perspective of the Ukrainian national movement, this region was the core of "ethnic Ukrainian territories." Andrii Mel'nyk, the self-proclaimed "Führer of the Ukrainian Nation," complained about this "renewed division" in protests to Himmler, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Alfred Rosenberg, then still Hitler's commissioner for questions concerning the East.[34] Mel'nyk's rival, Bandera, protested personally at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where his government had been held under arrest since July 7, 1941. While expressing their hope that the division of Ukrainian territories would prove to be a temporary administrative act within the occupied territories, the nationalists feared a territorial reorganization along the lines of the former Polish state borders.[35]

In August 1941, the General Government's main Department for the Interior authorized Kubiyovych to extend the authority of the UCC to the district of Galicia.[36] As head of the only legal Ukrainian organization, Kubiyovych interpreted the formation of the district of Galicia as a positive development, signifying the unification of additional Ukrainian territories under German control.[37] Far more than other groups, the Mel'nyk faction of the OUN conformed with German expectations of what a cooperative local organization should be. When the administration of the General Government superseded the military administration of the *Wehrmacht*, legal units of the Ukrainian auxiliary police began to replace the militias formed by the Bandera faction of the OUN. In recruiting local policemen, the Germans gave preference to applicants who had served as soldiers in the former Polish and Habsburg armies.[38] The distinguishing characteristics of this unconditional cooperation with the German administration were the lack of demands for political power, loyalty, as well as anti-Semitic inclinations. From an objective viewpoint, the Ukrainian population saw itself in a better position, as in prewar Poland. General Governor Hans Frank granted the Ukrainians a limited auxiliary administration and a Ukrainian auxiliary police force. Ukrainian was recognized as an official language and was allowed to a limited extent in the administration. The Ukrainian school system was quickly expanded, while the Ukrainian churches experienced a new freedom of faith. While the property of Polish and Jewish entrepreneurs had been turned over to the German state and their factories closed down, Ukrainian farmers benefited from German nationality policies. Within the General Government, the *Volksgruppe der Ukrainer* (to use the official jargon in Cracow) enjoyed a position of relative privilege within the context of the Polish–Ukrainian antagonism that was deliberately sustained by the Germans.[39] For example, during the expulsion of Jews and Poles from Polish territories annexed by the Reich to the General Government, the Germans made an effort to avoid resettling the expellees in areas with a Ukrainian majority.[40] Also, when elements of the *Generalplan Ost*—the official plan to Germanize the East—were implemented by the General Government in late 1942 and early 1943, Ukrainians were largely spared. As a consequence, Ukrainians could count on a certain degree of Ukrainianization in German-occupied Poland. In the interest of the Ukrainian question in eastern Poland, in 1943/44 Kubiyovych even became a lobbyist for the expulsion of Poles and the deportation of Jews to the extermination camps. He repeatedly appealed to Hitler, Himmler, Frank, and even Adolf Eichmann, head of Jewish affairs and the evacuation desk within the *SS-Hauptamt*, the main office of the Gestapo, to prohibit "any resettlement of Poles and Jews in ethnic Ukrainian territories."[41]

The policy of the Ukrainianization of public life in occupied Poland in no way contradicted the maximum economic exploitation of the Ukrainian population. In its negotiations with the German administration, the UCC tried to restrict forced migration to unskilled workers alone. Ultimately, more than half a million

Ukrainians were sent to perform forced labor in the Reich between 1941 and 1943.[42] In line with the traditional politics of the Ukrainian national movement since the nineteenth century, the UCC and the Mel'nyk faction of the OUN tried to diminish the Polish influence in the General Government and to involve the local elite in the new Ukrainian churches, schools, and trade cooperatives.[43] As Kubiyovych commented on the New Order: "For the first time in ages, cadres of the local intelligentsia have returned to western Galicia. Once Polonized towns have gained back their former face. Teachers have returned to the villages. There are rural cooperatives. And the intelligentsia provides enlightenment to the native population. Our homelands now have an intelligentsia, and the intelligentsia their homelands."[44]

Military Collaboration

While Ukrainian collaboration was ethnic in nature, there was a strong military component in its institutional structure, the biographies of its members, and the skills it came to implement. Many of the Mel'nyk faction (OUN-M) had served in the army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the First World War and spent the period between the wars as officers in the Polish army. The OUN-B consisted of professional terrorists equipped with excellent skills in underground organization. Ukrainian nationalists groups believed that they could provide units for German military intelligence, as had been done in 1939. In May 1941, the OUN-B drew up a plan on the eventuality of a German attack on the Soviet Union. The goal of the OUN was strategic collaboration with a forthcoming German military administration, which would allow Ukrainian hegemony over other political and ethnic groups at the local administrative level in western Ukraine:

> If a war against Moscow by other states reaches into Ukraine, a military occupation of Ukraine by foreign troops is inevitable. This will be the result of actual military strength and the very nature of the war itself. The fact is that Ukraine currently does not have the necessary military strength at its command to defend its borders against Moscow and depends on the military intervention of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory.[45]

According to the plan of May 1941, the OUN-B pursued a strategy of armed collaboration. In doing so, the Ukrainians aimed to make the OUN an essential partner and co-founder of a "New European Order."[46] A secondary aim was to cleanse ethnic Ukrainian territories of Polish, Jewish, and Russian elements.

In what had been Yugoslavia, the Ustashe in Croatia had developed a degree of political and military independence in their persecution of Jews as well as that of Sinti and Roma.[47] In the first weeks of occupation, the Germans gave the

Ukrainian people the false impression that the Ukrainian nationalist movement would be tolerated. In advance of Operation Barbarossa, Ukrainian nationalists from both factions had trained with *Wehrmacht* and SS intelligence. Such German–Ukrainian collaboration signaled to the OUN that Ukrainian independence might find support from the German side. The initial declarations made by *Wehrmacht* propaganda units, which focused on the liberation of Ukrainians from the tyranny of "Jewish-Bolshevik" elements,[48] fit the main criteria of the OUN for alliances with other states. This fact, as well a deeply rooted anti-Bolshevism and a commitment to serve the German campaign, encouraged the Ukrainian nationalists to compile their own survey of villages, which carefully listed ethnic groups and suspected Communist enemies.[49] The pogroms that followed were meant to decimate the Jewish population, which the OUN regarded as the main supporter of the Bolshevik regime and thus the primary political enemy. The OUN set up militias whose main task was to arrest all Red Army soldiers and NKVD members until a town or village could be handed over to the *Wehrmacht*. Poles and Jews who were considered suspect were also arrested. Surviving contemporary documents also make clear that the OUN played a key role in the mass killings of the summer of 1941.[50] The German police exploited the abilities of the Ukrainians and subsequently set up the Ukrainian auxiliary police, whose role in the Holocaust remains a subject of lively debate among scholars to this day.[51] Analysis of West German investigations into the activities of Nazi perpetrators shows, however, that local collaboration in the Holocaust was widespread. Local police forces were an integral part of the German civilian administration and were therefore heavily involved in mass killings.[52]

The Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe demonstrated that the worst aspects of colonialism—forced population movements, slave labor, and mass murder—could be combined and implemented in the heart of "civilized Europe." In an appeal to German soldiers at the start of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler did not deny the ideological essence of the war, but masked the real goal of conquest for *Lebensraum* with the idea of a "New Europe." A few days after the start of the invasion, Hitler discussed with top representatives of the Nazi regime the real objectives of this conflict: "Basically, it's all about properly carving up this enormous cake so that we can first control it, second administer it, and third exploit it."[53] Following the defeat at Stalingrad, the SS allowed the creation of a Ukrainian SS combat unit, an idea previously dismissed due to the Nazis' anti-Slavic prejudice. The UCC organized the creation of what was first called the SS Volunteer Rifles Division Galicia, known in shorthand as the SS Division Galicia. Kubiyovych assured Governor General Frank that his people were prepared to join in the battle against Bolshevism on the side of the *Wehrmacht*, just as they had done in 1941 during the retreat of the Red Army.[54]

In the fall of 1942, disillusioned by the idea of the New Order, the OUN-B set up its own partisan forces, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In the light of an impending collapse of the German Eastern Front in February 1943, when Kharkiv temporarily fell to the Red Army again and advance Soviet units neared Dnipropetrovs'k in March 1943, Ukrainian policemen began to leave their posts by the thousands in order to join the UPA, after which the Germans ratcheted up reprisals another degree. In southern Lublin, some 7,000 UPA fighters became active. According to the head of one German police outpost, these fighters sought to cleanse areas of eastern Poland of its Polish civilians. Because so many Ukrainian auxiliary police officers had already joined the UPA, the German police was no longer able to perform its duties.[55] As the German police had provided the backbone of Nazi authority in the occupied territories, its marginalization undermined the occupation of the countryside.[56] As the dominant force, the UPA was able to create political facts on the ground by imitating the German model. Especially after Stalingrad, when it appeared that the Soviets would win the war, the UPA prepared to engage in a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Poles. The attacks were particularly widespread in the province of Volhynia, but the UPA also launched raids against Poles to the southwest of Galicia; all in all some 50,000 to 60,000 Poles were killed in these campaigns.[57] The Ukrainians viewed their treatment of Poles as legitimate in the ongoing ethnic war, along the lines of German policies toward the Jews. Prior to the withdrawal of the *Wehrmacht* and the German civil administration,[58] the UPA was finally in a position to implement its anti-Polish plan of action.[59] This kind of nationalism was openly declared in peacetime, when there was no chance of political success, yet, in conditions of war, ethnic cleansing was national politics by other means, as an SS intelligence chief and police leader in the General Government wrote in a situation report in May 1944.[60] Ukrainian nationalists expelled the Polish population from "ethnic Ukrainian territories" or tortured and murdered them.

In late 1943, hatred of the Germans was undiminished, but the desire to fight the enemies who remained, namely the Russians and the Poles, proved more intense. With approaching defeat, the Germans and Ukrainians came to a sort of truce. German documents from 1943 and 1944 show repeated talks between the UPA, the SS, and the *Wehrmacht*.[61] Although they were unable to agree on any concrete military operations, the German side stopped the political persecution of Ukrainians and gave the UPA a free hand in the mass murder of Polish civilians. In return, the Ukrainian side promised not to attack German units and to fight against Soviet partisan organizations.[62] In 1944, the SS Division Galicia was routed in a hopeless battle with the Soviet army. The influence of this division on events on the battlefield turned out to be negligible, but then it was a product of Nazi German self-interest and expediency.[63] As for the veterans of this SS Division, several thousand were ultimately able to find political asylum in the United Kingdom and Canada.[64]

Conclusion

The politics of German territorial revisionism and Ukrainian unrealized statehood in the aftermath of the First World War provided the framework of what became an explosion of major racial and ethnic conflict. The Ukrainians wanted the guarantee of their own nation-state, which was to be consolidated under German continental power. A letter from the OUN-M to the Reich Chancellery contains a quai-constitution for a "New European Order" suggesting state systems, borders, and political concepts for a future autonomous Ukrainian state. The ideal here was German hegemony in Eastern Europe, a *Pax Germanica* with a Ukrainian satellite state serving as a bulwark against an "eventually resurgent" Russia.[65]

In the short run, Ukrainians saw administrative and military collaboration with the Germans, through the OUN-M and OUN-B respectively, as an opportunity to establish their own regional political hegemony over Poles and Jews in the Ukraine. Different forms of collaboration at the political, administrative, and military levels by certain Ukrainian groups were the price to be paid for better treatment in the future New Order. In the context of East European history, Ukrainian nationalists were only one among several ethnic groups within Hitler's coalition of willing collaborationists. With the destructive concepts of racial expansionism (the "New European Order" of German propaganda) and territorial rule legitimated by ethnic cleansing ("ethnic Ukrainian territories" in the language of Ukrainian nationalist propaganda), post-1918 concepts of territorial revisionism were drastically radicalized. German perpetrators themselves spoke of a *Rassenkrieg* (war of races) or *jüdischer Krieg* (Jewish war), identifying the goal of the German war with the destruction or decimation of groups of people. By contrast, in the agenda of the OUN, as Timothy Snyder argues, Poles were not defined as a racial group but as a "political collectivity." They were expected to behave according to a predictably anti-Ukrainian political logic and were therefore to be removed in order to achieve the ethnic goal of a purely Ukrainian *Lebensraum*.[66] In this sense, ethnic cleansing and anti-Semitism lay at the core of German–Ukrainian relations during the Second World War, ultimately involving Ukrainians in the Holocaust and provoking the start of the Polish–Ukrainian war in 1943.

Notes

I wish to thank Ray Brandon for useful comments and advice on translation.

1. Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914–1939* (Paderborn, 2010).
2. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BK), R43II/1500, OUN an Reichskanzlei, June 26, 1941.
3. Frank Grelka,"Der Befreiungskrieg als Beutezug. Zur Verschleierung der Kriegsziele für den deutschen Vormarsch durch die Ukraine 1918 und 1941," in Timm C. Richter (ed.), *Krieg und Verbrechen* (Munich, 2006), 99–111.

4. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York, 2010), 161.
5. Gerhard Eisenblätter, "Grundlinien der Politik des Reichs gegenüber dem Generalgouvernement, 1939–1945," PhD thesis, Frankfurt University (Frankfurt, 1969), 81–82; Bogdan Musial, "Niemiecka polityka narodowościowa w okupowanej Polsce w latach 1939–1945," *Pamięc i Sprawiedliwość* 2,6 (2004): 13–36.
6. Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill, 2005), 24–27.
7. John A. Armstrong, "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Modern History* 40,3 (1968): 406, 411.
8. This was rather a misnomer: ethnic Ukrainian nationalists of the OUN sought to incorporate all Ukrainians in one state through the annexation of Ukrainian ethnic territory in neighboring states (initially Poland and Soviet Ukraine), although vast parts of the same territories had a Polish, Jewish, Russian, or Byelorussian majorities (such as southern and eastern Soviet Ukraine, parts of Volhynia and even Galicia).
9. For a concise history of the nationalists' anti-Jewish stereotype, see: Marco Carynnyk, "Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussion about Jews, 1929–1947," *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011): 311–52.
10. Stanislaw Stępień, "W kręgu badań nad społeczeństwem II Rzeczypospolitej: Społeczność ukraińska," *Przemyskie Zapiski Historyczne* 4/5 (1987): 137–74.
11. Stanisław Stępień: "Ukraiński 'ideał narodowy' w okresie międzywojennym: Czynniki budujące świadomość narodową postrzegane z perspektywy polityków galicyjskich," *Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze* 15/16 (2003): 79–95.
12. *Bunt Młodych*, December 20, 1935–January 5, 1936.
13. Stephen Shulman, "The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22,6 (1999): 1011–36.
14. Magdalene Kwiecińska, "Drobna szlachta w Galicji–między polskim a ukraińskim ruchem narodowym," *Sprawy Narodowościowe* 34 (2009): 83–97.
15. Wolfram Wette, "Die propagandistische Begleitmusik zum deutschen Überfall auf die Sowjetunion am 22. Juni 1941," in Gerd R. Überschär and Wolfram Wette (eds), *Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), 65.
16. Frank Golczewski, "Ukrainische Reaktionen auf die deutsche Besatzung 1939/41," in Wolfgang Benz, Gerhard Otto and Johannes Houwink ten Cate (eds), *Anpassung, Kollaboration, Widerstand: Kollektive Reaktionen auf die Okkupation* (Berlin, 1996), 199–213. Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter BB) R901/58440; *Chicago Herald Tribune*, February 9, 1939: "It is known only too well that in 'Mein Kampf' Herr Hitler penned a few covetous phrases about the Ukraine. In Berlin there is a great deal of talk about 'the future Ukrainian campaign' and the Ukrainian émigrés residing there have lately been courted, financed and organized by the Nazis. All this leads some observers to believe that a German march on the Ukraine is, beyond dispute, the next move on Herr Hitler's agenda."
17. Frank Golczewski, "Politische Konzepte des ukrainischen nicht sozialistischen Exils (Petljura–Lypynskyj–Donzow)," in A. Kappeler and G. Hausmann (eds), *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates* (Baden-Baden, 1993), 100–2.
18. Piotr Kołakowski, *NKWD i GRU na ziemiach polskich 1939–1945* (Warsaw, 2002), 103–4.
19. Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji RP (ed.), *Polska i Ukraina w latach trzydziestych-czterdziestych XX wieku*, vol. 1 (1998), 24–25.
20. Timothy Synder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, 2003), 156.
21. Halina Czarnocka, *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach*, vol. 2 (London, 1973), 143.

22. OUN, "Postanovy Druhoho Velykoho Zboru OUN shcho vibuvsia v kvitni 1941r.," in Vydannia Zakordonnykh Chastyn OUN (ed.), *OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929–1955rr.*, ch.1 (Kiev, 1955), 31.
23. Frank Grelka, *Die Ukrainische Nationalbewegung unter deutscher Besatzungsherrschaft 1918 und 1941/42* (Wiesbaden, 2005), 250ff.
24. Cf. Alexander Prusin, "Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust," *East European Jewish Affairs* 34,2 (2004): 109–10.
25. Dieter Pohl, "Die Einsatzgruppe C," in P. Klein (ed.), *Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42* (Berlin, 1997), 80–81.
26. The Melnykites was the colloquial name for those members of the OUN who supported Colonel Andrii Mel'nyk after the schism within the organization in 1940. Compared to their breakaway rivals, the Banderites, the Melnykites adhered closely to the initial principles of the OUN and were therefore considered conservative.
27. Grelka, *Die Ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 407.
28. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (Englewood Cliffs, 1990), 90.
29. BB, R58/699, "Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, Nr. 33," December 11, 1942.
30. Armstrong, "Collaborationism in World War II," 401.
31. Grelka, *Die Ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 139ff.
32. Volodymyr Kubiyovych, *Konechnist' nashoï spivpratsi z nimets'koiu vladoiu* (Cracow, 1942), 22.
33. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (ed.), "The Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow and Lviv with the German Authorities 1939–1944," Research Report No.61, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta (Edmonton, 2000) 2 vols.
34. Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv Vlady Ukraïny (hereafter TDAVO), f.3833, op.1, sprava 73, "Lyst Mel'nyka do Himmlera pro priiednannia Zach. Ukr. v sklad Heneral. 'Huber'," July 28, 1941; ibid., "Lyst Mel'nyka do Ribbentropa pro priiednannia Zach. Ukr. v sklad Heneral. 'Huber'," July 24, 1941.
35. BK, R43II/1504b, "Stepan Bandera an den Herrn Deutschen Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler," August 3, 1941.
36. BB, R58/215, "Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 47, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD," August 8, 1941.
37. Grelka, *Die Ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 360ff.
38. BB, R58/216, "Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 52, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD," August 14, 1941.
39. Fritz Arlt (ed.), *Übersicht über die Bevölkerungsverhältnisse im Generalgouvernement* (Cracow, 1940), 46–47.
40. Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie, Amt des Distriktes Lublin, sign. 891, "Protokoll über die am 22.4.40 beim SSPF stattgefundene Besprechung betreffend den Einsatz jüdischer Zwangsarbeiter."
41. Quoted in *Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee*, vol. 1, "Denkschrift des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses an den Herrn Generalgouverneur Dr. Frank, 21.5.1941," 242; ibid., 134–35; see also ibid., 143–51; Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 158.
42. Grelka, *Die Ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 198ff.
43. On the Ukrainian economy during the General Government, see: Myrosław Sycz, *Spółdzielczość ukraińska w Galicji w okresie II wojny światowej* (Warsaw, 1997).
44. Kubiyovych, in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 7, 1940.
45. "Postanovy Druhoho Velykoho Zboru OUN shcho vibuvsia v kvitni 1941r.," in OUN, *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv*, vol. 1, 51.

46. TDAVO, f.3833, op.1, spr.5, "Rishennia ch. 1 Natsional'nykh zboriv ukraïntsiv: Akt vidnovlennia Ukrains'koï Derzhavy."
47. Alexander Korb, "Nation-building and Mass Violence: The Independent State of Croatia, 1941–45," in Jonathan C. Friedman (ed.), *The Routledge History of the Holocaust* (New York, 2010), 291–302.
48. Lower, *Nazi Empire-building*, 37.
49. Ivan Kazymyrovych Patryliak, "Viis'kovi plany OUN (B) u taiemnii instruktsiï revolutsiinoho providu (traven' 1941r.)," *Ukraïns'kyi Istorichnyi Zhurnal* 2 (2002): 127–37.
50. Grelka, *Die Ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 273ff.
51. For recent scholarly literature on the Ukrainian involvement in the Holocaust, see the special section on "Ukrainians, Jews and the Holocaust," *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011).
52. See the investigation against members of the *Einsatzkommando 4a* as part of the *Einsatzgruppe C* in southern Ukraine: Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg, El48/2I, Landeskriminalamt Stuttgart, Bu.352, 353; ibid., El317III, Staatsanwaltschaft beim Landgericht Stuttgart, Bu.120; see also the investigation against police batallion 320 operating in parallel with the *Einsatzgruppe C*: Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, B162/2879; 2892; 3148; 2900; 2902.
53. Gerd R. Ueberschär, "Dokumente zum 'Unternehmen Barbarossa' als Vernichtungskrieg im Osten," in Ueberschär and Wette, *Der deutsche Überfall*, 276.
54. *Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee*, vol. 2, "Kubiyovych to General Governor Frank," 1201.
55. Bundesarchiv Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten, ZM534, vol. 1, "2. Gendarmerie-Hauptmannschaft Zamosc an Kommandeur der Gendarmerie in Lublin," April 23, 1944.
56. Timothy Snyder, "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing, 1943," *Past and Present* 179 (2003): 217–19.
57. Norman M. Naimark, "The Killing Fields of the 'East': Three Hundred Years of Mass Killing in the Borderlands of Russia and Poland," in Marija Wakouning, Wolfgang Mueller, and Michael Portmann (eds), *Nation, Nationalitäten und Nationalismus im Östlichen Europa* (Vienna, 2010), 179–200.
58. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (hereafter BM), RH22/122, HSSPF–Rußland-Süd–Führungsstab f. Bandenbekämpfung, Abt. Ic Buch Nr. 51/43 g., June 30, 1943.
59. For a general overview of anti-Polish action, see: Grzegorz Motyka, *Ukraińska Partyzantka, 1942–1960* (Warsaw, 2006), 381ff; Snyder, "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing," 221–28.
60. BB, R70 Polen/76, Der Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer im Generalgouvernement I c (BdS) Tgb. Nr. 138/44g, May 17, 1944.
61. Ukrainian nationalists and *Wehrmacht* staff of the 4th Tank Army High Command discussed general cooperation in "anti-partisan warfare" against "Jewish gangs" (*jüdische Banden*) in Eastern Galicia. See: BM, RH21-4/317, Tätigkeitsbericht I c, January 1–June 30, 1944.
62. BM, RH24-3/154, Ic-Feindaufklärung, January–June 1944.
63. Michael James Melnyk, *To Battle: The Formation and History of the 14th Galician Waffen-SS Division* (Solihull, 2002), 281; cf. Alexander Brakel, *Unter Rotem Stern und Hakenkreuz: Baranowicze 1939 bis 1944* (Paderborn, 2009), 220–22, on the similar example of the White Ruthenian Home Army, formed by the Germans on February 23, 1944.
64. David Cesarani, *Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals* (London, 2000), 102ff.
65. *Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee*, vol. 1, "Denkschrift Kubiyovych/Omeltshenko an Hitler," June 11, 1941, 220–30.
66. Snyder, "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing," 232.