


SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY
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Christopher Gilley

**The 'Change of Signposts' in the
Ukrainian Emigration**

*A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism
in the 1920s*

With a foreword by Frank Golczewski



ibidem

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Christopher Gilley

**THE 'CHANGE OF SIGNPOSTS'
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This book is dedicated to my parents, Sheridan and Margaret Gilley, who encouraged my love of the past through repeated day trips to Hadrian's Wall.

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Glossary

- Borotbisty* – the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries.
- Central Rada – a body set up in 1917 which brought together different nationalist organisations in the Ukraine and developed into a form of revolutionary parliament.
- ChUHA – Red Ukrainian Galician Army: made up of members of the UHA who crossed over to the Bolsheviks during the civil war.
- GPU – State Political Directorate: the Soviet secret police; after the creation of the USSR, the GPUs in the republics were brought under the central control of the OGPU (Unified State Political Directorate).
- KP(b)U – Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine.
- KPSH – Communist Party of Eastern Galicia: precursor to the KPZU.
- KPZU – Communist Party of Western Ukraine.
- korenizatsiia* – policy of 'indigenisation', whereby the Bolsheviks sought to garner support among the non-Russian peoples by promoting non-Russian cultures and increasing the number of non-Russians in party and state structures.
- NEP – New Economic Policy: the economic policy which replaced 'War Communism' and aimed to improve the economic situation of the peasants.
- Nezalezhnyky* – Independentists: the left wing of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, which later formed the UKP.
- OUN – Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists: right-wing nationalist organisation active in Poland and the emigration.
- POW – prisoner of war.
- RKP(b) – Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).

- RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.
- RUP – Revolutionary Ukrainian Party: the first significant Ukrainian political party created in the Russian-ruled Ukraine.
- Selrob – Ukrainian Peasant-Worker Union: Communist front organisation in the Western Ukraine.
- Selsoiuz – Ukrainian Socialist Peasants' Union: West Ukrainian socialist party.
- Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) – Ukrainian scholarly society founded in the nineteenth century in Galicia.
- smenovekhovstvo* – the movement in favour of supporting the Soviet regime among former opponents of the Bolsheviks; its adherents were known as *smenovekhovtsy* (the singular noun being *smenovekhovets*), and the associated adjective was *smenovekhovskii*.
- Socialists-Federalist – members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists, a liberal, democratic party which had no interest in socialism.
- Socialists-Independentists – members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independentists, a small, nationalist party set up during the revolution.
- Sovnarkom – Council of People's Commissars: the highest executive and administrative body in the Ukraine.
- Spilka* – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union, which was formed by Marxists disenchanted with the nationalist line of the RUP.
- SUHUF – Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France.
- TsK – Central Committee.
- UHA – Ukrainian Galician Army: the armed forces of the ZUNR.
- Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party – a conservative, democratic and nationalist party founded in 1917 in the Eastern Ukraine.
- UKP – Ukrainian Communist Party: also known as the *Ukapisty*.

- UNDO – Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance: a conservative, democratic party founded in 1925, which became the main legal Ukrainian party in inter-war Galicia.
- UNDP – Ukrainian National Democratic Party: Ukrainian nationalist party formed in Galicia before the First World War.
- UNR – Ukrainian People's Republic: the Ukrainian state created from the Ukrainian lands ruled by the Romanovs.
- UNTP – Ukrainian National Labour Party: the successor to the UNDP formed in 1919.
- UPP – Ukrainian Party of Work: breakaway group from the UNDO of supporters of Ievhen Petrushevych.
- UPSR – Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries: peasant populist party in the Eastern Ukraine.
- USDP – Ukrainian Social Democratic Party: the Social Democratic Party in Galicia.
- USDRP – Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party: the Social Democratic Party in the Eastern Ukraine.
- USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- UVO – Ukrainian Military Organisation: the Ukrainian terrorist organisation which fought against the Poles in the 1920s.
- VUAN – All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: the highest academic institution in the Soviet Ukraine.
- Vukopspilka – All-Ukrainian Association of Consumer Cooperative Organisations: Soviet central association of Ukrainian cooperatives.
- ZUNR – West Ukrainian People's Republic: the Ukrainian state created in Eastern Galicia following the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy.

Foreword

Christopher Gilley's doctoral thesis – upon which this monograph is based – fills a gap in the existing research on the history of the Ukraine in the interwar period. Whereas *smenovekhovstvo* is a well-known and thoroughly researched topic in Russian history, the subject of the return (or immigration) of Ukrainians into the USSR has received barely any attention, despite the prominence of the individuals involved.

Dr. Gilley achieves this not only by looking at the groups of 'returners' but also the general history of Sovietophilism. The Ukrainian historiography has often brushed over this latter aspect. Following the Second World War, in response to the Russification in the Ukraine and the persecution of nationalists, the Ukrainian emigration refused even to consider the possibility of a pro-Soviet position; they declared that only those on the 'right' were 'genuine' Ukrainians. In doing so, they succumbed to the comprehensive 'turn to the right' (Alexander Motyl) of the 1930s and failed to see that, until its revision in 1929, the Soviet policy of *korenizatsiia* really was attractive for Ukrainian émigrés and inhabitants of Polish Eastern Galicia. After all, those who went back could not have foreseen that almost all the Ukrainian returnees to the USSR would be killed in the 1930s.

Dr. Gilley divides the thought of the pro-Soviet émigrés into two periods. During the first phase (from 1919 to 1923), he argues that those who supported the Soviet version of a Ukrainian republic justified their position with ideological arguments based on a socialist or socialist-revolutionary worldview. The early returnees did not believe that social and national demands conflicted with one another. During the second stage, which began with the Entente's recognition of Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia and the introduction of *korenizatsiia* (i.e. from 1923 to 1933, the year in which the last returnee considered here went back), Sovietophilism became more widespread among Galicians, who saw a Ukrainian national state being created under Soviet aegis. They returned to the Soviet Union not due to 'ideological' but rather 'national' reasons. Because the USSR did not understand itself as a federation

of nation states, this motivation diametrically opposed the political perspective of the Soviet Union itself. Through this interpretation, Dr. Gilley implies that the Soviet classification of the returnees as dangerous – a fact which led to their murder in the 1930s – was entirely 'logical'.

Of equal importance to these chronological distinctions is the geographical differentiation. Through his research in the Kyivan archives and above all his sophisticated reading of the journals and internal arguments of the 'left-wing' émigrés, Dr. Gilley has made an important contribution to the historical literature of a subject that has until now received insufficient consideration. In addition, he corrects the view that Prague was the centre of Ukrainian *smenovek-hovstvo*, arguing instead that Vienna occupied this position.

Finally, Dr. Gilley successfully substantiates his initial thesis that the Ukrainian version of this movement differed from its Russian counterpart in that the Ukrainians found it easier to accommodate themselves to the Soviet form of statehood. The Ukrainians had no experience of an alternative that had survived in the past. He argues convincingly that the Ukrainian returnees deserve far more attention than the Russians, suggesting that the role of the former in the early Soviet Ukraine requires further investigation.

In doing so, Dr. Gilley's doctoral dissertation – which at first glance only presents an additional aspect of Soviet history – in fact serves as a further indication of the differences between Russian and Ukrainian perspectives in the Soviet period.

Frank Golczewski
University of Hamburg

Introduction

Ukrainian Sovietophilism and the Problem of *Smenovekhovstvo*

The Ukrainian émigré community which emerged in Central Europe from 1918 onwards was a society created by defeat: most of its members had left their homeland following the failure of one or other of the Ukrainian states created between 1917 and 1921; the rest had found themselves stranded abroad, unable to return to a home which had been occupied by a hostile power in their absence. For some, especially those from the Western Ukraine, this enemy was the Poles; for others, above all those from the East Ukrainian lands, it was the Bolsheviks. For this reason, many Ukrainians felt themselves to be among the losers of the post-1918 reordering of Europe. Consequently, the Ukrainian emigration exhibited characteristics common to many of those European communities in the 1920s which believed that they had lost out through the Paris peace treaties: liberal ideas of parliamentary democracy and individual rights were abandoned in favour of a corporatism which fused elements of both right- and left-wing thought; the politics of moderation were replaced with a willingness to inflict or excuse horrendous suffering for the sake of a utopian vision. For many in the Ukrainian emigration this meant the rejection of peaceful agitation and moderate socialism in favour of a doctrine of integral nationalism, which subordinated personal, party and class interests to the cause of the achievement of a united, independent Ukrainian nation state. The intellectual developments within the Ukrainian emigration between the two world wars were therefore characterised by Alexander Motyl as a 'turn to the right'.¹

1 Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, New York: East European Monographs, 1980. See also Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte des ukrainische nicht sozialistischen Exils (Petljura-Lypypnyskyj-Donzow)', in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappler (eds.), *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, pp.100-117 (pp.100-1).

There were, however, other intellectual seductions present in inter-war Europe. Following the Bolshevik revolution, many on the left, even those who condemned aspects of the ideology and practice of Bolshevism, were filled with enthusiasm at the prospect of the creation of the first socialist society. As the leading British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm wrote in 1969, for those 'whose political memories go back no farther than Krushev's denunciation of Stalin or the Sino-Soviet split, it is almost impossible to conceive what the October revolution meant to those who are now middle-aged and old. It was the first proletarian revolution, the first regime in history to set about the construction of the socialist order, the proof of both the profundity of the contradictions of capitalism, which produced wars and slumps, and of the possibility – the *certainty* – that socialist revolution would succeed'.² More than thirty-five years later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union proved finally the tenuousness of this 'certainty', Hobsbawm's words are an important reminder of the hopes which the events of 1917-21 had awakened.

Hobsbawm's comment also holds true for some parts of the Ukrainian emigration. Despite the fact that they had actively struggled against the establishment of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, and witnessed the ruthlessness of Bolshevik rule at first hand, many Ukrainian émigrés also began to express support for the Soviet regime and actually returned to the country ruled by their former enemies. Among those who went back was Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, who is regarded by many Ukrainians as the father of modern Ukrainian historiography and the head of the first independent Ukrainian state. With him went a section of his party, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries. Another key figure to go back, if only for a short while, was Volodymyr Vynnychenko, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Workers' Party, who led two of the governments set up during the revolution. Although Vynnychenko himself became disillusioned with the Soviet regime after a visit to Moscow and Kharkiv, many of his followers, for example the economist Vasyl Mazurenko, maintained their pro-Soviet position and returned to their homeland. Other prominent returnees who had served the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) created during the revolutionary years included Andrii Nik-

2 Eric Hobsbawm, 'Problems of Communist History', in id., *Revolutionaries*, London: Abacus, pp.3-12 (pp.3-4).

ovskiy, who had been UNR foreign minister and vice prime minister, and Iuri Tiutiunnyk, the commander of the last Ukrainian raid against the Bolsheviks in 1921, who in emigration wrote for the far-right journal *Zahrava*.³ In addition to these members of the intelligentsia and the political classes, several thousand UNR soldiers, who had been interned in Poland, also went back to the Ukraine.

At the same time, the Soviet Ukraine exerted a strong attraction for Ukrainians from the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. Ievhen Petrushevych, who had headed the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), adopted a pro-Soviet position – although he remained in Germany. Many Galician intellectuals and academics, who had left Galicia following the Poles' occupation of the province, immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine. These included Iulian Bachynskiy, who is often accredited as writing the first call for Ukrainian independence, the geographer Stepan Rudnytskyi, the writer Antin Krushelnytskyi and the publicist Mykhailo Lozynskiy. A number of soldiers who had served in the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), the armed forces of the ZUNR, also applied for entry into the Soviet Ukraine. One cannot describe these individuals as 'returnees' because they had not lived in the Eastern Ukraine before the First World War, although the UHA had fought there during the Civil War. However, it is very possible that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic appealed to both East and West Ukrainian Sovietophiles in similar ways.

A third group of Ukrainians to support the Soviet regime existed in Northern America. In 1924, Ukrainian immigrants to Canada founded the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association to spread pro-Communist ideas among the Ukrainian workers and farmers in the country, many of whom had been economic migrants from the Western Ukraine who had left their homeland before the First World War. The Association set up several satellite organisations

3 The Socialist Federalist and literary scholar Serhii Iefremov, who is often described as a returnee (see Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996, p.542), is not dealt with here as it seems that he never in fact emigrated. Rather, following the withdrawal from Kyiv of Polish and UNR troops in June 1920, he adopted a false name and went to ground in Prevarka, a suburb of Kyiv. He was able to resurface after the Bolsheviks issued an amnesty for members of the Academy of Sciences; however, he had to pretend that he had been abroad. His diary entry for 15th February confirms that he spent 1920 near Kyiv and that he had too much time on his hands. See Serhii Iefremov, *Shchodennyky 1923-9*, ed. O.I. Putro et al., Kyiv: Gazeta Rada, 1997, pp.14, 29, 73.

and published a number of pro-Soviet newspapers; by the end of the 1920s the latter had a combined circulation of over 25,000.⁴ Some Ukrainians in Canada even immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine, for example the writer Myroslav Irchan.⁵

There has been very little research on pro-Soviet movements in the Ukrainian emigration. In the West, Ukrainian history in general is understudied. There have been a few surveys of the inter-war Ukrainian emigration published in the West. Those that have been written have tended to concentrate on the right-wing movements which appeared in the émigré community at this time.⁶ The ideology of the far right came to dominate the political thought of the Ukrainian emigration. This laid the foundations for the collaboration between Ukrainian nationalists (for example the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and the German National Socialists during the Second World War. In contrast, by the beginning of the 1930s Sovietophilism was a spent force in the emigration; it therefore appeared to be only a temporary phenomenon. The right-wing organisations caught the attention of Western historians first because their impact was more immediately apparent. This was especially true for those historians whose interest in the Ukraine was sparked by an interest in the Second World War – although this is not to say that the historians writing on the OUN and the Ukrainian right were unaware of the importance of the Sovietophiles.⁷

In addition, for a long time most of those writing on Ukrainian history in the West were themselves members of the Ukrainian diaspora.⁸ One of the strongest self-images of the diaspora was that it was a society living in opposition to the Soviet Union: its central tasks included the preservation of Ukrainian culture at a time when it was under attack by Russifiers in the

4 John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion. The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada*, Toronto: Peter Martin, 1979, pp.3-6.

5 Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p.79.

6 See Motyl, *Turn to the Right*; Frank Golczewski, 'Die Ukrainische Emigration', in id. (ed.), *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Göttingen, 1993, pp.224-40 (pp.235-40) and id. 'Politische Konzepte'.

7 Motyl and Golczewski both make references to them. See Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.57-60 and Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', p.101.

8 Mark von Hagen, 'Does Ukraine Have a History?', *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, 1995, No.3, pp.658-73 (pp.658-9).

Ukraine, and spreading knowledge in the West of Soviet human rights abuses.⁹ The call on émigrés to return to their country undermined the justification for the preservation of the community in which the diaspora writers lived. The debates of the 1920s about the statehood of the Ukraine and the emigration's proper relationship to the Soviet Union were still part of the political discussion within the diaspora community even as late as the 1980s. It should, therefore, be no surprise that it was a topic which diaspora historians were not keen to cover. The importance of many of the returnees to the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness meant, however, that it was impossible to avoid the matter entirely. Biographical studies of these people appeared in the diaspora, but were tentative when dealing with the return of their subject to the Ukraine.¹⁰

In the Ukraine itself, the neglect of this topic is a symptom of wider trends in Ukrainian historical writing. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet historiography dismissed the Sovietophiles as bourgeois nationalists who wanted to subvert the Soviet system to their own ends.¹¹ Following the attainment of Ukrainian independence, according to Mark von Hagen, many Ukrainian historians, freed from the official injunction to conform to the Marxist scheme of history, simply replaced the materialist dialectic with a nationalist teleology. This new dogma posits an eternal and unchanging nation, whose history was defined by the struggle against a 'national oppressor' for Ukrainian independence and unity. Those historical figures who did not see the fate of their country in this way, for example in that they advocated federation with Russia, are either ignored, rejected as collaborators or incorrectly presented, in contradiction to their own writings, as separatists.¹²

9 Satzewich, *Ukrainian Diaspora*, pp.150-8.

10 On Hrushevskiy see Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevskiy. The Politics of National Culture*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, pp.197-207. For Vynnychenko, see Melanie Czajkowskyj, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko and his Mission to Moscow and Kharkiv', *Journal of Graduate Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 3, 1978, No.2, pp.3-24, and Hryhorii Kostiuik, 'Misiia V. Vynnychenka v Moskvi i Kharkovi 1920 roku', in Hryhorii Kostiuik, *Volodymyr Vynnychenko ta ioho doba*, New York, 1980, pp.210-225.

11 For example, see V.A. Chyrko, 'Krakh ideologii ta polityky natsionalistychnoi partii Ukapistiv', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1968, No.12, pp.24-35 (pp.30-2).

12 von Hagen, 'Does Ukraine Have a History', pp.665-6.

This also applies to the treatment of those Ukrainians who returned during the 1920s. For the Ukrainian nationalist understanding of history, the return of émigrés to the Soviet Union appears to be a compromise with the twin enemies of the Ukraine, Russia and Bolshevism. Ukrainian writers dealing with this period have preferred to concentrate on the right-wing nationalist organisations like the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN was unquestionably a separatist movement in favour of an independent Ukrainian state and for this reason it passes much more comfortably into the paradigm of nationalist historiography. Because it cooperated with the German National Socialists during the Second World War, the OUN, like the Sovietophiles, carries the taint of collaboration with a foreign regime which was responsible for millions of deaths. However, the OUN's separatism redeems it in the eyes of the nationalist historiography, which has done its best to argue that the collaboration of the OUN with the Nazis was not based on ideological affinity but rather purely tactical, geo-political considerations.¹³

One must add that, almost without exception, the Sovietophiles became victims of Stalinist repression in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Their works were banned for a long time in the Soviet Union and their memory subjected to official abuse. For this reason they had the reputation among Ukrainians as opponents of the Soviet regime and their writings possessed the subversive attraction of forbidden fruit. Serhii Plokhy, for example, tells how he first had the chance to read a whole book by Hrushevskyy when one of his professors, who feared a search of his flat because he was under investigation for anti-Stalinist remarks, asked Plokhy to look after some banned books until the danger was over. One of these was Hrushevskyy's *Illustrated History of the Ukraine*, which, wrote Plokhy, 'struck me as a revelation about the Ukrainian past – a truth hidden from us by official Soviet historiography and the regime that it supported'.¹⁴ Plokhy himself wrote a very accurate account of Hrushevskyy's Sovietophile period, but his feelings about Hrushevskyy show how difficult it might be for some Ukrainian scholars, who grew up with the

13 For a recent expression of this argument, see I.K. Patryliak, 'Do pytannia pro vnesok OUN ta UPA u borotbu proty natsystrykykh okupantiv na terytorii Ukrainy', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2004, No.5, pp.81-95.

14 Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia. Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, p.ix.

prohibitions on the words of the former Sovietophiles, to accept that these martyrs for the Ukrainian cause had actually supported the regime which imprisoned or killed them.

Consequently, the Ukrainian literature on Sovietophilism is rather limited. What has been written deals mainly with the personal fates of prominent individuals in the emigration, most notably Volodymyr Vynnychenko¹⁵ and Mykhailo Hrushevskyy,¹⁶ but also Ukrainians from the Western Ukraine such as Ievhen Petrushevych,¹⁷ Iuliian Bachynskyy¹⁸ and Mykhailo Lozynskyy.¹⁹ Beyond these biographical studies, there are broader accounts of those members of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia who immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine²⁰ and the émigré political groups led by Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyy.²¹

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- 15 S.V. Kulchytskyi, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko: svitohliadna evoliutsiia', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2005, No.4, pp.47-70; Mykola Sappa, 'Vynnychenko i Rakovskyy', *Vitchyzna*, No.11, 1990, pp.131-143; V.F. Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b) 1920r. pro V. Vynnychenka', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2005, No.4, pp.70-89 and id. 'Evoliutsiia suspilno-politychnykh pohliadov V.K. Vynnychenka v doby ukrainskoi revoliutsii', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1994, No.6, pp.15-26 and 1995, No.1, pp.13-22.
- 16 Valentyna Piskun, 'Povernennia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho v Ukrainu iak zvaba bilshovyzmom i spovidannia na dii', in *Mykhailo Hrushevskyy – naukovets i polityk u konteksti suchasnosti*, Kyiv: Kyivskyy Natsionalnyi Universytet Imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, 2002, pp.45-54; V.A. Potulnytskyi, 'Naukov diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho v emihratsii (1919-1924)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1992, No.2, pp.48-57; Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevskyy i GPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924-1934*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 1996; R.Ia. Pyrih, 'M.S. Hrushevskyy: mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu (1924-1934rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1991, No.4, pp.54-66 and id. 'Ideino-politychni pidstavy kompromisu Mykhaila Hrushevskoho z Bilshovytskoiu vladoiu', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, No.5, pp.4-19; Arkadii Zhukovskyy, 'Politychna i publitsystychna diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho na emihratsii 1919-1924 rr.', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2002, No.1, pp.96-125.
- 17 O.V. Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha: perekonannia chy vymushenist?', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.3, pp.109-18 and No.4, pp.95-102.
- 18 Ihor Behel, *Iuliian Bachynskyy: sotsial-demokrat i derzhavnyk*, Kyiv: Osnovni Tsinnosti, 2001.
- 19 O.S. Rublov, 'Shliakhmy na Solovky: radianske desiatyrichchia Mykhaila Lozynskoho', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.4, pp.103-135; Oleksii Sukhyy, *Mykhailo Lozynskyy: vchenyi, hromadskyy diiach, polityk*, Lviv, 1995.
- 20 O.S. Rublov and Iu.A. Cherchenko, *Stalinschyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelligentsii. 20-50ti roky XX st.*, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994.
- 21 *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy XX stolittia. Tom 5. Ukrainci za mezhamy URSR (1918-1940)*, Kyiv: Heneza, 2003, pp. 176-90 and pp.213-225, which largely draws on V.P. Troshchynskyy, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia v levropi iak istorychne i sotsialno-politychne iavyshe*, Kyiv: Intel, 1996, pp.99-121.

Nevertheless, a synthesising overview of the different groups which adopted a Sovietophile position does not exist. Moreover, with some exceptions, the existing research fails to do justice to the Sovietophilism of its subjects: some authors, following the paradigm used in the historiography of the OUN, dismiss the pro-Soviet stance as a purely tactical, pragmatic choice;²² others excuse it by writing off the Sovietophiles as politically naïve;²³ yet others have argued that the Sovietophiles were actually opponents of the Soviet regime, sometimes backing up their claims with selective quotations from the Sovietophiles' written works.²⁴ Those Ukrainian historians who have written about the returnees have often preferred to concentrate on the persecution of the émigrés by the Bolsheviks after their arrival in the Ukraine, thereby changing a story of collaboration into one of national martyrdom.²⁵ There has also been a tendency to assume that the movement appeared in response to two events in 1923, the March decision on the future of Galicia and the introduction of Ukrainianisation in the Soviet Ukraine, and thus that the Sovietophiles had national, rather than social or socialist, motivations.²⁶

Clearly, there is a need for more research in this area which brings together and compares the different arguments put forward by those émigrés who settled in the Ukraine and which does not seek apologies in naivety or political necessity. The first task of this book, therefore, is to give an account of the different Sovietophile individuals and groupings, analyse and compare their

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- 22 See, for example, O.V. Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petreushevycha', No.4, pp.99-100.
- 23 See the quotations from Pritsak and Vynar in Zhukovskiy, 'Politychna i publitsychna diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho', p.98.
- 24 An example relating to Iulian Bachinskyy can be found in O.I. Saltovskyy, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti v istorii vitchyznianoï politychnoi dumky (vid vytkov do pochatku XX storichchia)*, Kyiv: Parapan, 2002, p.289.
- 25 See, for example, the works by Pyrih and Prystaiko and Shapoval.
- 26 The March decision and Ukrainianisation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. Both were events which promoted a pro-Soviet sentiment among Ukrainians for national reasons. For historians who describe Sovietophilism as a response to these developments, see: Jarosław Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy. 1772-1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu*, Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000, pp.174, 196-7; James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983, pp.63-4; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.92; Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschyna*, pp.19-20; I.A. Soliar, 'Radianofilstvo u zakhidnii Ukraini (1920-ti rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2009, No.1, pp.55-67 (p.56); Iurii Shapoval, *Liudyna i systema (shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraini)*, Kyiv: Instytut Natsionalnykh Vidnosyn i Politologii NANU, 1994, p.120.

political thought, and chart the emergence and decline of this movement. It will investigate whether Sovietophilism was simply a response to the March decision and Ukrainianisation in 1923, or whether it appeared earlier and had deeper roots in pre-war Ukrainian political thought. Connected to this, it will ask whether Ukrainian Sovietophiles only had national motivations, or whether they were driven by social goals, in particular the desire to reconstruct society through socialism. Because some historians have been so reluctant to recognise the Sovietophilism of these figures, and indeed in the worst cases have given a distorted account of their political writings, it is necessary to conduct a detailed exposition of the political ideas of the Sovietophiles which makes clear how their Sovietophilism worked as a coherent argument.

Given the lack of research on the subject, it is useful to find a point of comparison which could suggest an approach to the topic. One candidate is the *smenovekhovstvo* movement in the Russian emigration of the 1920s. In September 1921, a collection of articles appeared in Prague, written by six Russian émigrés, five of whom had taken part in the White struggle against the Bolsheviks. Its authors called upon the Russian émigrés to end their opposition to the Bolsheviks. They argued that the new government in Moscow represented Russian national interests. For this reason, the émigrés should go back to their homeland and help the Soviets in the reconstruction of the land devastated by war and revolution. The title of the book was *Smena vekh*, or 'Change of Signposts'. This position became known as *smenovekhovstvo* and its adherents as *smenovekhovtsy* (singular – *smenovekhovets*). The title was a reference to the *Vekhi* (Signposts) collection which appeared in 1909 as a response to the 1905 revolution. *Vekhi* sought to reassess the intelligentsia's proper relationship to the people and the idea of revolution after the events of 1905 had revealed the violence which the Russian people and revolution could unleash. Similarly, the *smenovekhovtsy* sought to understand the role of the intelligentsia in the light of the October revolution and the civil war; they believed that they were responding in the tradition of the *Vekhi*, hence the title of their book. The collection was followed by two regular publications, a weekly, also called *Smena vekh*, which appeared in Paris 1921-2, and the

Soviet-funded Berlin daily, *Nakanune* (On the Eve), which came out between 1922 and 1924.

The *Smena vekh* collection and the ensuing publications were part of a much larger phenomenon. As early as January 1920, a group of Russian prisoners of war set up the group *Mir i trud* (Peace and Work) in Berlin, which argued for a cessation of the attempts to overthrow the Bolsheviks and called for reconciliation with Russia's current rulers. Early in 1921, soldiers of the defeated White Army began returning to their country. In Bulgaria this took on greater proportions with the creation of the Soviet-backed Union for Return to the Motherland in the spring of 1922. Within Russia there was also a movement in favour of reconciliation with the country's new rulers. Many former tsarist officers served in the Red Army, some due to coercion, but others out of a feeling of national duty. Most importantly, General Brusilov, a general in the imperial army and the supreme commander under the Provisional Government, had offered his support to the Bolsheviks following the Polish invasion of the Soviet Ukraine in April 1920. There were also members of the intelligentsia who quickly came to accept the Bolsheviks. One such was the anti-clerical populist Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz, who praised the October revolution for bringing about a regeneration in Russian life.

The group which published the original *Smena vekh* collection has been thoroughly and comprehensively investigated by Hilde Hardeman.²⁷ Hardeman aimed to put an end to the inflation of the term '*smenovekhovstvo*' in academic writing. In Soviet works the word had been used to refer to all sorts of movements which the communists claimed hoped to turn the Soviet Union into a 'bourgeois capitalist' state. Even individuals who explicitly condemned *smenovekhovstvo* had been described as *smenovekhovtsy* by Soviet historians.²⁸ The main western work, by the Russian émigré Mikhail Agursky, imitated this tendency; Agursky used the phrase loosely, lumping a whole range of groups together.²⁹ This approach was highly problematic. Because a single

27 Hilde Hardeman, *Coming to Terms with the Soviet Regime. The "Changing Signposts" Movement among Russian Émigrés in the Early 1920s*, Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994.

28 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.14-5.

29 Mikhail Agurskii, *Ideologiia natsional-bolshevizma*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1980, repr. Moscow: Algoritm, 2003. A revised and expanded version of this work was pub-

term was applied to several individuals, organisations and publications, there was an assumption that these groups were all part of a single movement, possessing organisational links and a common ideology.³⁰ Hardeman brought attention back to the group which produced *Smena vekh* and the publications which they later founded. She denied that many émigrés who returned to Russia did so under the influence of the *Smena vekh* group.³¹ In this way, she performed an important service to the history of *smenovekhovstvo* by reintroducing clarity to an understanding of the origins behind the term.

However, as Hardeman herself says, the terms *smenovekhovets* and *smenovekhovstvo* 'entered the Russian vocabulary and were widely used to describe any readiness on the part of non-communists to accept the new regime'. For example, in a survey of engineers in Moscow conducted by the Soviet institutions in autumn 1922, nearly half of those interviewed, when asked about their political position, described themselves as *smenovekhovtsy*.³² In the political language of the time, therefore, *smenovekhovstvo* referred to a much larger section of Russian society than the group investigated by Hardeman. Indeed, it was for this very reason that the word *smenovekhovstvo* has been bandied around so indiscriminately in the historical literature, especially that produced by Soviet historians. Because *smenovekhovstvo* acquired this broader meaning within the terminology of the time, it seems perfectly acceptable to investigate *smenovekhovstvo* in its more general sense. This must be done with the knowledge that in writing the history of *smenovekhovstvo* as the term was used in the 1920s, many of those who were referred to as *smenovekhovtsy* did not accept the label or possess any ideological affinity with 'fellow' *smenovekhovtsy*.

Consequently, this book posits two understandings of the word *smenovekhovtsy* and *smenovekhovstvo*: the first, the 'narrow definition', uses the words as Hardeman does, to refer to those involved in the *Smena vekh* collection and weekly journal, and the daily *Nakanune*; the second, the 'broad definition', uses the words as they entered the political language of the 1920s, to

lished in English as Mikhail Agursky, *The Third Rome. National Bolshevism in the USSR*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987.

30 See, for example, Agursky, *The Third Rome*, pp.255-7.

31 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.166.

32 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.174-5. The quoted passage is from p.175.

describe any individual or group willing to contemplate reconciliation with the Bolsheviks or return to the Soviet republics.

The Bolsheviks used the terms *smenovekhovtsy* and *smenovekhovstvo* to describe those members of the Ukrainian emigration who had advocated reconciliation with the Soviet Ukrainian government and return to the Ukraine. Terry Martin, who in his book on the Soviet nationalities policies in the 1920s and 1930s devotes particular attention to the role of the returnees in the implementation of these policies, offers many examples of this. For example, in 1926 the then first secretary of the KP(b)U, Lazar Kaganovich, wrote that Mykhailo Hrushevskiy had 'legalized himself as a *smenovekhovets*'.³³ Similarly, a circular published by the Soviet secret police, the GPU, from the same year described those Ukrainian émigrés who reassessed their relationship with the Bolsheviks as having undergone a 'Change of Signposts'.³⁴ Chapter Five will show that most of the Bolsheviks dealing with the Ukrainian Sovietophiles referred to them as *smenovekhovtsy*. Indeed, when the Bolsheviks decided to set up a pro-Soviet, non-Bolshevik émigré publication they took *Nakanune*, the Berlin daily run by the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, as their model and spoke of the desire to create a Ukrainian *Nakanune*. For this reason, the use of the phrase 'the Change of Signposts in the Ukrainian Emigration' in the title of this book is a reference to the context in which many of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles' contemporaries understood Ukrainian Sovietophilism.

Most Ukrainian historians have not looked at Ukrainian Sovietophilism within this framework. One reason for this is that opponents of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles also referred to them as either *smenovekhovtsy* or the Ukrainianised version of the word, *zminovikhivtsy*, thereby tainting the word with the accusation of national betrayal.³⁵ Rublov and Cherchenko, in their book on the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, only draw the comparison between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Sovietophile Ukrainians in order to deny that there was such a thing as Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*. They argue that the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* saw the Soviet Union as a revival of the tsarist empire.

33 Quoted in Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp.223-4.

34 Yuri Shapoval, ' "On Ukrainian Separatism" A GPU Circular of 1926', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol.18, 1994, No.3/4, pp.275-302 (p.292).

35 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.59.

The Ukrainians had been oppressed under the tsars and therefore could feel no sympathy for the old regime. Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* was therefore impossible.³⁶ As we will see in the next chapter, Rublov and Cherchenko's argument rests partially on a distorted view of Russian *smenovekhovstvo*; the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* themselves did not necessarily pine for the tsarist regime. More importantly, the claim that it is necessary to look at Ukrainian Sovietophilism within the context of *smenovekhovstvo* is not an attempt to suggest that the Ukrainian and Russian *smenovekhovtsy* possessed the same reasons for their stance. The political opinions of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles and the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* differed greatly in many areas, and the pro-Soviet Ukrainian émigrés explicitly rejected the label *smenovekhovtsy* to describe themselves.³⁷ However, despite all the differences, the Ukrainian Sovietophiles and the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* shared one fundamental characteristic: they both advocated reconciliation with their former enemy, the Bolsheviks, and return to their homeland in order to help the Soviet state reconstruct their country.

Clearly, the relationship between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and Ukrainian Sovietophiles requires greater clarification. The second task of this book will be to look at how Ukrainian Sovietophilism fitted into the broader movement of *smenovekhovstvo*. It will compare the ideas of the Ukrainian and Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, and relate any differences to their nationality and the character of émigré communities from which they emerged. It will ask whether *smenovekhovstvo* was more significant for the Ukrainian or Russian émigré community, and whether collaboration with the Bolsheviks forced the Russian and Ukrainian groups to adopt a similar stance, thereby reducing the intellectual differences between them. It will also examine the Bolshevik response to Russian and Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*, and study the role the movements played in Soviet politics.

In order to effect such a comparison, the Chapter One draws a brief sketch of the *Smena vekh* group, highlighting the central aspects of its ideology, the

36 Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, pp.14-5.

37 The Russian academic Doronchenkov claims that the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* influenced, for example, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, gives no evidence for this. As Chapter Three will seek to show, such a claim is preposterous. Askold I. Doronchenkov, *Emigratsiia "pervoi volny" o natsionalnykh problemakh i sudbe Rossii*, St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001, p.71.

setting in which it appeared and the place it occupied within émigré and Soviet politics. Because a solid body of literature already exists in this area, the aim of the chapter is to provide the context for the primary research later in the book. Taken individually, it does not claim to possess a high degree of novelty; rather, the originality lies in looking at the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* at the same time as the Ukrainian Sovietophiles. Chapter Two provides further background information by giving an overview of the Ukrainian national movement, the Ukrainian revolution and the Ukrainian communities in the 1920s, that is those developments which determined the conditions for the emergence of Ukrainian Sovietophilism. It presents the central question asked during the analysis of the political thought of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles, namely whether they were more attracted to the Soviet Ukraine on national or social grounds.

The next five chapters deal with the Sovietophile groups in roughly chronological order. Chapters Three and Four describe the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries respectively. The similar patterns of the groups' names hint at the parallels in their origins: both were the émigré offshoots of parties which played a leading role during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921 – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party for the Foreign Group, and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in the case of the Foreign Delegation. Both of these chapters concentrate on the period before the appearance of the *Smena vekh* collection, and as a result the term '*smenovekhovstvo*' hardly appears in these two chapters. Chapter Five gives an account of the emergence of pro-Soviet sentiment in the Ukrainian emigration on a larger scale and the attempts by the Bolsheviks to develop a response to this. It then portrays the result of this response, the journal *Nova hromada*, a Soviet-funded émigré publication whose aim was to spread Sovietophilism in the Ukrainian emigration. By and large, these three chapters are concerned with émigrés originally from the parts of the Ukraine ruled before the First World War by Russia, although there are Eastern Galicians present, especially in Chapter Five. By way of contrast, Chapters Six and Seven look at Ukrainians from the lands ruled by Poland in the 1920s, above all Eastern Galicia. Chapter Six discusses the emergence of Sovietophilism

among the East Galician emigration and in the lands ruled by Poland. Chapter Seven analyses the immigration of East Galician intellectuals to the Soviet Ukraine.

These five chapters constitute the main body of the thesis. They are chiefly based on primary sources. These include the published journals of the émigrés themselves, and their published letters, memoirs and diaries. Three archives in Kyiv were also used: the *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy* (TsDAHO – the Central State Archive of Public Organisations of the Ukraine), which was the archive of the Bolshevik party, the *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vldy ta upravlinnia Ukrainy* (TsDAVO – the Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of the Government and Administration of the Ukraine) and *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, Kyiv* (TsDIA – the Central State Historical Archive of the Ukraine, Kyiv). These archives contain the resolutions of the higher organs of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine (KP(b)U) and the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, the letters and reports of the Soviet Ukrainian representatives based abroad, and the unpublished letters of some of the émigrés. In addition, TsDAHO also has the minutes of the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Many earlier accounts have been based on only archival sources or émigré writings. This mix of sources has enabled the author to build up a broad picture of the Sovietophile émigré groups and their relationship to the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, there are other sources which were not used due to financial and time constraints, but would have been beneficial. Most notably, it was not possible to use the Russian archives, or the papers of Volodymyr Vynnychenko held at Columbia University in New York. In addition, there are collections in the Ukraine which are not yet open to the public, for example the papers of Ievhen Petrushevych. Like all historical works, the conclusions of this book are provisional, subject to revision once these other sources have been studied.

These final thoughts are presented in Chapter Eight and the Conclusion. The eighth chapter starts with a review of the responses to the emergence of Ukrainian Sovietophilism among the rest of the Ukrainian émigré community. This is used as a basis to examine the place of Ukrainian Sovietophilism within the 'turn to the right', that is the triumph of the doctrine of integral na-

tionalism within Ukrainian political thought between the two world wars. The Conclusion continues this theme by showing how this research on Ukrainian Sovietophilism changes the present understanding of the inter-war Ukrainian emigration and Ukrainian intellectual history in general. It then draws some final comparisons between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Ukrainian Sovietophiles. In this way, it argues that is valid to talk of a 'Change of Sign-posts' in the Ukrainian emigration.

(Note: Many of the Ukrainian national figures discussed in the book may not be familiar to some readers. Short biographical notes on those individuals who appear several times in the text have been provided in the appendix. For those who only appear once, this information has been provided in the footnotes).

1 Russian *Smenovekhovstvo*

Overview

In order to understand the context in which the Ukrainian emigration and the Ukrainian Bolsheviks responded to the emergence of Ukrainian Sovietophilism, it is first necessary to give a short overview of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*. This summary does not aim to provide a comprehensive picture of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, for a great body of research already exists on this topic and the main subject of this book is the Ukrainian rather than the Russian emigration. Nevertheless, it is one of the arguments of this book that, despite the ideological differences between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Ukrainian Sovietophiles, they were part of the same historical phenomenon.

The original *Smena vekh* collection appeared in response to the faltering campaign of the White movement against the Bolsheviks – over the course of 1920 the anti-Bolshevik forces had experienced defeat after defeat, as a result of which thousands of the Bolsheviks' opponents, including those who had not participated in the White movement but simply feared persecution at the hands of the Red Army, streamed across Russia's borders to Central and Western Europe, and Northern China (mainly to the city of Kharbin, which was the centre of the Russian-Chinese railroad). The émigré community which this movement created was not only made up of aristocrats, but in fact included all classes, from urban professionals to Cossack farmers, and members of the intelligentsia to skilled workers. With the exception of the Bolsheviks, all the political parties and tendencies of the revolutionary period were present: the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the many different shadings of monarchist. Against the background of such political diversity, and with the wounds of the revolution and civil war still open, émigré hopes that a common ground could be found on the basis of opposition to the Bolsheviks were soon shown to be illusory. In fact, the impotence of emigration increased political fragmentation: in the course of the decade the Constitutional Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries were riven by disagreements and splits, while the monarchists ar-

gued over who was the rightful heir to the murdered tsar, and whether the future monarchy should be constitutional, absolutist or something in between.³⁸ Meanwhile, in Russia the Bolsheviks sought to step back, at least publicly, from some of the bloodier policies of the civil war. In March 1921, they introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), which included economic measures more favourable to the peasants such as ending requisitioning and forced collectivisation, and allowing peasants to sell their produce. In addition, small-scale, private manufacturing was made legal, as was the activity of commercial middle-men.³⁹

In response to the failure to defeat the Bolsheviks, the impossibility of the emigration ever exercising political power and the hope that the Bolshevik regime would take on milder forms, a group of Russian émigrés started to argue in favour of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. The major document of this change of heart was a collection of articles, *Smena vekh*, or the 'Change of Signposts'.

The organiser of the collection was Iurii Kliuchnikov, a Kadet who before the revolution had taught international law at Moscow University. During the revolution, he had served as Admiral Kolchak's⁴⁰ foreign minister, but had been sidelined in the government's conduct of its foreign policy, and travelled to Paris in order to take part in the peace conferences there.⁴¹ The second most important contributor was Nikolai Ustrialov, who like Kliuchnikov had taught in the law department of Moscow University and been a member of the Kadet

38 On the creation and composition of the Russian emigration see Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad. A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939*, Oxford: OUP, pp.21-7. The best account of the political differences in the Russian emigration is still to be found in Hans von Rimscha, *Russland jenseits der Grenzen. Ein Beitrag zur russischen Nachkriegsgeschichte*, Jena: Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1927. Also very useful is Claudia Weiss, *Das Rußland zwischen den Zeilen. Die russische Emigrantenpresse im Frankreich der 1920er Jahre und ihre Bedeutung für die Genese der "Zarubežnaja Rossija"*, Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 2000.

39 Robert Service, *A History of Twentieth Century Russia*, London: Penguin, 1997, pp.124-7

40 Aleksandr Kolchak (1873-1920): a tsarist admiral, who joined the anti-Bolshevik Ufa Directory. In winter 1918, he overthrew the Ufa Directory, and proclaimed himself supreme ruler of the Russian state, establishing a dictatorship over Siberia, the Urals and the Far East centred in Omsk. His government was forced further eastwards by the Red Army, and in January 1920 he was captured and executed. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR: entsiklopediia*, Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1987, ed. S.S. Khromov, p.269.

41 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.61-4.

party. He had also served in Kolchak's government in Omsk, where he had been director of the press bureau. Ustrialov was one of the first émigrés to argue openly that only the Bolsheviks could save Russia, in articles in the newspaper *Novosti zhizni* (News of Life), which was published in Kharbin, the northern Chinese town to which Ustrialov had emigrated. Ustrialov did not write an article for *Smena vekh*; rather Kliuchnikov compiled a piece faithfully based on the writings of Ustrialov which he included under Ustrialov's name.⁴² The other contributors were, like Kliuchnikov, all based in Paris. They included Sergei Lukianov, who had little political experience and had emigrated following a failed attempt to join Wrangel's⁴³ government in southern Russia; Iurii Potekhin, a friend of Ustrialov and Kliuchnikov and fellow Kadet, who had served as Denikin's⁴⁴ vice-minister of industry and trade; A.V. Bobrshchev-Pushkin, a joint founder of the Party of Legal Order and one of the Octobrists' leading publicists, who had worked in Denikin's propaganda office during the revolution, and Sergei Chakhotin, a prominent bio-physicist who had worked as a publicist for the Denikin government and the United Military Government of the Don.⁴⁵

The title chosen by Kliuchnikov, *Smena vekh*, referred to *Vekhi* ('Signposts'), a collection of articles which appeared in 1909 and sought to question the fundamental axioms held by the intelligentsia in the light of the 1905 revolution. The contributors to the volume had all, albeit for different reasons, come to abhor the intelligentsia's subordination of the absolute values of nation, state, law, religion and truth to the political goal of revolution and a naïve devotion to the people. This misplacement of values, they argued, had been re-

42 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.29-57. Less useful are the recent Russian studies of Ustrialov. See L.A. Bystriantseva, 'Mirovozzrenie i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia deiatelnost N.V Ustrialova (1890-1937)', *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 2000, No.5, pp.162-190; V.K. Romanovskii, 'Nikolai Vasilevich Ustrialov', *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 2002, No.4, pp.79-99.

43 Petr Wrangel (1878-1928): succeeded Denikin as commander of the anti-Bolshevik forces in southern Russia in April 1920. He fought the Bolsheviks in Crimea and the south of the Ukraine until defeat forced him and his army to evacuate Sevastopol in November 1920. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiiia*, p.122.

44 Anton Denikin (1872-1947): leader of the Volunteer Army which fought the Bolsheviks in southern Russia. Despite threatening Moscow in a campaign of summer-autumn 1919, by spring 1920 his forces had been defeated. He and the remnants of his army were evacuated from Crimea and in April 1920 he proclaimed Wrangel as his successor. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiiia*, p.183.

45 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.73-5, 78-9.

sponsible for the descent into violence of the 1905 revolution. They were in favour of cooperation with the tsarist regime, and called on the intelligentsia to turn to their own spiritual renewal. *Vekhi* was subjected to vicious attack by all sides of the Russian intelligentsia, but it also represented a basic reinterpretation of the role of the intelligentsia in Russian society.⁴⁶ Kliuchnikov hoped in *Smena vekh* to emulate the role played by the *Vekhi*. He saw himself responding to the 1917 revolution in the spirit of the *Vekhi*'s reaction to the upheaval of 1905. His opening article discussed *Vekhi* and its legacy in the light of the Bolshevik's takeover of power.⁴⁷

Though on certain issues there were differences of opinion between the six articles, the arguments put forward by the contributors in favour of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks were very similar. *Smena vekh*'s starting point was that the struggle against the Bolsheviks was lost; to prosecute it further would only inflict more harm on Russia.⁴⁸ However, the collection sought to convince the émigrés that there were grounds for consolation. Despite the Bolsheviks' outwardly internationalist ideology, the Soviet government was restoring Russia's great power status. Although the Bolsheviks had recognised the right of nations to self-determination up to independence, this had been merely a tactical concession which they would not honour; rather, 'the Soviet regime will try by all means to reunite the border countries with the centre – in the name of the idea of world revolution'.⁴⁹ Several contributors contrasted the Whites' betrayal of Russian national interests with the 'patriotic' actions of the Reds; whereas the Whites had colluded with the Allies' and Poland's attacks on Russia, the Reds had defended the country from foreign invasion.⁵⁰ Indeed, for a number of the *Smena vekh* group, Poland's attack on Russia had been one of the key turning points in their conversion to a pro-Soviet position.⁵¹ Moreover, the slogan of world revolution was a powerful tool for Russian foreign policy: it gave Russia the sympathy of the workers of the world

46 On *Vekhi* see Aileen M. Kelly, *Toward Another Shore. Russian Thinkers Between Necessity and Chance*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998, pp.154-200, and Leonard Schapiro, 'The *Vekhi* Group and the Mystique of Revolution', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol.34, 1955, pp.58-76.

47 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, Prague: Nasha rech, 1921, pp.3-51.

48 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.33-4, 47-8, 91-6, 142-3, 154-8, 161.

49 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.58-9. The quotation is on p.59.

50 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.59, 137-41, 175-6

51 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.188.

and the colonial peoples of Asia. Western workers were unwilling to support their governments' wars against Russia and Moscow's influence on the working class compelled the governments of the West to listen to Russia's voice. The support for the Bolsheviks in Turkey, India, Persia and Afghanistan was enabling the Soviet state to realise traditional Russian interests in these areas.⁵²

The Bolsheviks, according to *Smena vekh*, had also strengthened the Russian state internally. All the contributors to the collection decried the anarchy created by the civil war and praised the Bolsheviks for bringing order back to the country. Bobrishchev-Pushkin pointed to the irony that the Whites applauded anarchic events, such as the Kronstadt rising and Makhno's revolts, in the hope that it would bring about the collapse of their enemies.⁵³ Moreover, *Smena vekh* argued that the revolution was overcoming the age-old failure of the people to identify with the state, which the *Smena vekh* group, under the influence of the *Vekhi*, had identified as one of Russia's greatest problems. Under the aegis of the Soviet regime, the peasants and proletariat had come to see the state as their own and to identify their fate with its fate. In this way, the people had matured by acquiring a political consciousness.⁵⁴

A further argument common to all the articles in the *Smena vekh* collection was that the Soviet regime was becoming more moderate. As the Ustrialov article put it, 'obeying the voice of life, the Soviet regime, clearly, is deciding on a radical tactical change in the direction of the renunciation of a Communist position'. He argued that it must be apparent to the Bolsheviks that socialism meant economic suicide; they had realised that they must abandon it in the name of self-preservation and the future of the world revolution, and that they must cooperate with world capitalism and introduce bourgeois economic measures. He recognised that the Bolsheviks described this as a purely tactical, temporary change, but replied that 'a fact remains a fact': he was convinced that the policy was now irreversible.⁵⁵ Other contributors pointed to developments which indicated that the change would become es-

52 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.41, 59, 133, 136, 176-7.

53 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.89-90, 97-100, 179-80

54 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.88-9, 109, 174-6.

55 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.62-5. The quotations are on p.62 and p.63 respectively.

tablished. Both Chakhotin and Potekhin argued that the participation of the intelligentsia in the reconstruction of Russia would strengthen the evolution taking place.⁵⁶ Lukianov and Potekhin spoke of the Bolsheviks' success in overcoming the utopianism of the masses.⁵⁷ For the *Smena vekh* group, the moderation of Bolshevism was not only evident in economic policy; Lukianov, for example observed a reduction in the use of terror.⁵⁸

Although they all hoped for changes in the Bolshevik state, most of the contributors, with the notable exception of Chakhotin, rejected a return to parliamentarianism. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, for example, believed that the developments witnessed during the nineteenth century had left parliamentary democracy hopelessly outdated, unable to deal with the economic and social questions thrown up by capitalism. He thought that the idea that people's opinions were represented in parliaments was a fiction; rather, parliaments were farces through which politicians used the people's hopes to get into power.⁵⁹ For him, it was too early to judge what form the reformed state would take; however, he identified decentralisation as one of the defining aspects of the Soviet structure and argued that by transferring power to the cities and regions of Russia, the people would be drawn into the state structure and freedom guaranteed.⁶⁰

Underlying all these arguments was the belief that history was a conscious agent, determining the course of events, driving human behaviour. The form in which history expressed itself in the world was the exact opposite of the inner meaning which the events possessed. Thus, according to the 'Ustrialov' article, 'the odd dialectic of history' had bestowed upon the internationalist Bolsheviks the role of the defender of Russian national interests.⁶¹ Similarly, Chakhotin wrote that 'history compelled the Russian "Communist" republic, despite its official dogma, to take upon itself the national cause of reuniting

56 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.161-2, 164-5, 173.

57 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.87-8, 180.

58 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.87.

59 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.102-6. See also p.48 and p.172, in which Kliuchnikov and Potekhin respectively reject Western parliamentary democracy as inappropriate for Russia.

60 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.116.

61 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.59.

Russia, which was disintegrating'.⁶² This view of history convinced the *smenovekhovtsy* that the result of the revolution had been inevitable. 'There was nothing accidental', wrote Potekhin, 'in the inevitable development of the Russian revolution'.⁶³ Similarly, Lukianov described the question of whether it could have been different as 'pointless': the revolution 'had to take such an extreme character, which in turn, with exactly the same necessity, had to find its leader in the person of Russian Bolshevism'.⁶⁴

At the same time, all of the arguments in the *Smena vekh* collection were an attempt to find sense in the bloodshed which Russia had experienced over the last four years. Kliuchnikov attacked the idea of returning to the old regime as this would deny the agony of the civil war any meaning: 'We are criminals if we defile and destroy our suffering country, only to return to the old [...]. After the terrors of the revolution, a period of happiness must come'.⁶⁵ However, this desire to elevate the catastrophe which had befallen the country into something transcendent seduced the contributors to *Smena vekh* into becoming apologists for violence. Both 'Ustrialov' and Lukianov excused the crimes of the Bolsheviks by arguing that all great historical events were accompanied by destruction.⁶⁶ Bobrshchev-Pushkin wrote that there were two types of terror, that which has a purpose, is used to build, and therefore is historically justified, and that which is mere bloodlust and therefore futile; the red terror, of course, fell into the first category, which put it alongside the brutality of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Cromwell and Robespierre.⁶⁷

Some of the contributors argued that the revolution was an event of importance not only for Russia, but also for the whole world. Bobrshchev-Pushkin described the revolution as a new dawn for the world: what had happened in Russia would be repeated in the rest of Europe. He clearly felt that the meaning of the revolution emanated from the agony which it had involved. 'The Russian people', he wrote, 'in the guise of slaves', in the pangs of countless

62 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.160.

63 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.168.

64 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.89-90.

65 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.36.

66 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.54-6, 89.

67 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.121-3.

sufferings, will carry universal ideals to their exhausted brothers'.⁶⁸ The theme of suffering also appeared in Kliuchnikov's article, which stressed that the Russian people were attracted by the Bolsheviks because it gave them the opportunity 'to suffer for the workers and peasants, for the oppressed and abused of the world', 'to kill evil in the word and replace it with eternal justice'.⁶⁹ Potekhin described the revolution as the opening of a new era, and compared its significance to the emergence of Christianity and the discovery of America.⁷⁰

Above all, the *Smena vekh* collection was an appeal to the Russian intelligentsia. As mentioned above, Kliuchnikov's opening article, with the title 'Smena vekh', sought to analyse the intelligentsia's response to the October revolution, just as the original *Vekhi* had examined its relationship with the 1905 revolution. He believed that the intelligentsia was a class created to bring about the revolution. However, it had acquired a number of bad characteristics as a result, which the *Vekhi* had identified: it had failed to understand the importance of the state and the nation in the country's life, and accordingly lacked an understanding of the 'mystique of the state'; it was isolated from the people whom it claimed to represent; rather than seeking to achieve the possible, it made maximal demands, and as a result it worshipped destruction and was incapable of construction. At the same time, Kliuchnikov also criticised the failure of the original contributors to *Vekhi* to accept the new revolution: through the revolution, the 'mystique of the state' was being realised in Russia, bringing about a fusion of the state and revolution and offering the chance for the emergence of a new intelligentsia, which had overcome the defects highlighted by the *Vekhi*. He therefore called on the intelligentsia to accept the revolution.⁷¹ The other contributors to the collection also addressed themselves to the intelligentsia in the Russian emigration, albeit in more practical tones. Chakhotin and Potekhin called on the intelligentsia to return to Russia and take part in the reconstruction of the country.⁷² In contrast, Bobrishchev-Pushkin wanted pro-Soviet émigrés to remain abroad in

68 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.147-8. The quotation is on p.148.

69 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.40-1.

70 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, p.173.

71 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.9-10, 15-8, 37-8, 49-50.

72 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.162-5, 172-3.

order to counter the propaganda of the anti-Soviet emigration, while Lukianov spoke more vaguely of reaching out one's hand to help one's homeland.⁷³

The *Smena vekh* collection was followed by the *Smena vekh* weekly, which appeared in Paris from October 1921 to March 1922. With the exception of Chakhotin, all the original contributors played a role in the new publication; a number of new people also became involved, the most prominent of whom was V.N. Lvov, the former chief procurator in the Provisional Government.⁷⁴ Of later importance was B.V. Diushen, who had been a Socialist Revolutionary and had served on the staff of *Svoboda Rossii*, the organ of General Iudenich's⁷⁵ government. After February 1921, he had started moving away from the SRs. He argued that one should differentiate between the Communist party, which he believed would soon fall, and the Soviet system, much of which he found praiseworthy. Like the *Smena vekh* group, he praised the Red Army as a truly national force, hoped that the revolution was awakening the peasants and workers of Russia and believed that the intelligentsia had an important role to play in the future Soviet state.⁷⁶

Whereas the Prague collection had been programmatic, stating the fundamental ideology of the group, the Paris weekly had the more practical goal of convincing the émigré community that conditions were improving under the Bolshevik regime.⁷⁷ The paper described improvements in both the material and intellectual conditions in the country. *Smena vekh* hailed the New Economic Policy (NEP) for the changes it had brought about in the economic situation in the country. It tried to explain the intentions of the NEP to its readers, presenting it as a form of economic organisation halfway between the free market and state intervention, bringing together the different interests of peasants, workers and entrepreneurs for the good of the whole country's economy. This, claimed *Smena vekh*, was already showing positive results. The contributors believed that the Bolsheviks might make further concessions

73 *Smena vekh. Sbornik statei*, pp.90, 145.

74 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.111-2.

75 Nikolai Iudenich (1862-1933): commander of the Russian army in the Caucasus during the First World War; between October and November 1919 he led a campaign to take St. Petersburg from the Bolsheviks, but was defeated and at the beginning of December retreated into Estonia. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsia*, p.693.

76 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.115-6.

77 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.119-20.

to private capital, but the permanence of the NEP would rest on the West's willingness to cooperate with Russia and reduce international tension.⁷⁸

Even more important for the intelligentsia audience, at which the Paris *Smena vekh* was aimed, was the question of Russian intellectual life. *Smena vekh* believed that Russian culture under the Bolsheviks was blossoming. Articles enthusiastically described a renaissance in theatre, art and literature in the Russian Soviet Republic, which was raising the cultural level of the people.⁷⁹ At the same time, *Smena vekh* observed a resurgence in interest in intellectual matters, for example describing a budding intellectual life in the universities, which, unlike the old regime, reached out to the working classes and sparked within them an interest in the life of the mind.⁸⁰ The journal also dealt with the issue of intellectual freedom. It admitted that for the time being freedom of opinion was impossible to introduce, but absolved the Soviet government of blame by claiming that conditions in the country, above all the danger posed to Russia, necessitated the restriction of individual freedoms. However, *Smena vekh* assured its readers that once the threat had gone away, these freedoms would be restored. They saw the replacement of the Cheka by the GPU as the Soviet secret police in February 1922 as an indication of this new direction.⁸¹

Another significant change was the move in the original *Smena vekh*, in which the contributors had acknowledged that Bolshevism was not as bad as had at first seemed, to the weekly journal's exultation in the future which the revolution promised for Russia and the whole world.⁸² The weekly *Smena vekh* argued that Europe was undergoing a crisis similar to that to which Russia had been subjugated, and that the continent would soon descend into revolution. This could only be avoided if the Western powers were willing to accept the new Russia into the international arena and lessen international tensions: for example, improved relations with Russia would help placate the

78 *Smena vekh*, No.3, 12 November 1921, pp.4-6, 16-9; No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.11-4, No.9, 24 December 1921, pp.22-3; No.17, 18 February 1922, pp.21-2.

79 *Smena vekh*, No.2, 5 November 1921, pp.7-9, 17-24; No.7, 10 December 1921, pp.21-4; No.8, 17 December 1921, pp.23-4; No.13, 21 January 1922, pp.20-1.

80 *Smena vekh*, No.4, 19 November 1921, pp.22-4; No.17, 18 February 1922, p.22.

81 *Smena vekh*, No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.13-4; No.12, 14 January 1922, pp.21-3; No.15, 4 February 1922, 9-11; No.18 25 February 1922, p.9.

82 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.121-2.

anger of workers in those countries which were prepared to compromise. The *Smena vekh* group sought to contribute to the integration of Soviet Russia into the world order by calling on other powers to recognise her. For Kliuchnikov, the highpoint in this campaign was his participation in the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference of April/May 1922, at which Soviet Russia discussed her economic relationship with the Western countries, as a specialist for international law. Lenin, who had been impressed by one of Kliuchnikov's articles, had himself suggested that Kliuchnikov take part.⁸³ Though the contributors to *Smena vekh* welcomed the Bolsheviks' abandonment of the idea of world revolution for the immediate future, they also felt that Russia's leading role in world politics rested on its status as the leader of the international revolution, to which the proletariat in other countries looked for leadership. Consequently, they argued that the Bolsheviks must continue to express revolution as a long term aim; the evolution away from pure Communism should not go too far.⁸⁴

As Kliuchnikov's presence at Genoa attests, in the first months of 1922 the *smenovekhovtsy* were adopting an increasingly cosy relationship with the Bolsheviks. A further sign of this was the publication by the *smenovekhovtsy* of the first issue of a Soviet-funded daily, called *Nakanune* (On the Eve), in Berlin in March 1922. Indeed, uniquely for an émigré publication, the paper was distributed within Russia, and it had its own office in Moscow. Kliuchnikov became the editor-in-chief, and most of those who had worked on both the Prague and the Paris *Smena vekh* were also involved in *Nakanune*. However, those who had worked on the original collection of essays were increasingly pushed into the background and newer converts to *smenovekhovstvo* such as B.V. Diushen came to play a more prominent role. As a consequence, the ideological position of *Nakanune* was being determined more and more by men with a socialist background. Most importantly, Grigorii Kiredtsov became joint editor-in-chief of the new daily. Kiredtsov was an economist who, before the First World War, had written for liberal and socialist newspapers, and in 1919 headed the press and propaganda department

83 *Smena vekh*, No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.8-10, 13-7; No.9 24 December 1921, pp.1-4. On Kliuchnikov's participation in the conference see Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.135-7.

84 *Smena vekh*, No.2, 5 November 1921, p.1; No.5, 26 November 1921, pp.9, 13.

of General Iudenich's government. At the same time, the paper's political line was also closely supervised by the Soviets.⁸⁵

These facts were evident in the tone of the paper. For example, in *Nakanune* the *smenovekhovtsy* increasingly adapted their analysis of the NEP to the official understanding of the policy. The editorial of the 9th issue warned that one 'cannot see in the New Economic Policy a renunciation by the Soviet regime of the final ideals put forward by the October revolution and all of Russian and world history'; rather the final victory of labour would have to be achieved in steps. This gradualism had been made necessary by peasant dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime, and the NEP had been introduced to overcome this. The article concluded that the 'interests of Russia, indissolubly connected with the interests of the revolution, demand that the reduction in revolutionary needs does not outstrip the demands of life, so that the achievements of the revolutionary wave are maintained at the highest point allowed by real conditions'.⁸⁶ This was not a complete departure from the group's previous arguments: the *Smena vekh* weekly had already claimed that the Soviet regime should not lose its revolutionary character if it was to serve Russian national interests. As Hardeman argues, the decisive ideological shift had taken place in the Paris *Smena vekh* when the *smenovekhovtsy* 'moved from accepting that the October revolution was not exclusively a destructive phenomenon, to hailing it as an event that heralded a better future for the whole of mankind'.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, in this case, the emphasis had moved from the desire to prevent a complete loss in revolutionary fervour to a call to maintain it at the highest level practicable. Thus, though no fundamental change had taken place in the group's thinking with the foundation of *Nakanune*, it represented a further step in the reduction of the intellectual independence of the *smenovekhovtsy* from the Bolsheviks.

The content of *Nakanune* also closely reflected the aims of the Bolsheviks. Moscow hoped that the paper would destroy the influence of the émigrés on foreign governments. At the same time, it would campaign for the international recognition of the Soviet republics.⁸⁸ Consequently, international politics

85 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.137-41, 145.

86 *Nakanune*, No.9, 5 April, 1922, p.1.

87 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.153.

88 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.176.

was the topic which the paper addressed most often: above all, it sought to proclaim Russia's international rights and defend the country's authority on the international stage. *Nakanune* did not neglect other topics, seeking, for example, to acquaint its readers with new developments in literature back home and portray the conditions in the country.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, its concentration on international affairs underlined its character as a tool of Soviet foreign policy.

In the light of this, the question of how close one could stand to the Bolsheviks without compromising one's independence caused great disagreement within the *Smena vekh* group. When in early January 1922 Ustrialov first received the opportunity to read the collection which he had 'contributed' to, he wrote a positive review of the Prague *Smena vekh*. However, in private he expressed concern about some of the contributors' willingness to compromise with the Bolsheviks. In a letter to Kliuchnikov he warned that 'reconciling themselves to the revolution, they should not abandon their own understanding of the national idea, nor become imbued with esteem for Marx's beard'. The character of the weekly *Smena vekh* strengthened his misgivings, as did the even more sycophantic *Nakanune*. Ustrialov described the latter as an attempt to 'be more Bolshevik than the Bolsheviks themselves'. He was worried that the *Smena vekh* group was gripped by the romance of the Bolshevik revolution. Despite these doubts, he did not publicly break with the group in the belief that it was necessary to maintain the outward appearance of unity.⁹⁰ The Paris-based group, too, was critical of Ustrialov's refusal to accept fully the implications of the Russian revolution. In October 1921, an open attack on Ustrialov appeared in *Smena vekh*, in which he was condemned for 'understanding the evolution of the Soviet regime as a far-reaching reconciliation with the past and a return to the social-political forms from which all the radically new, the daring, the "October" had been excluded'.⁹¹

There were also differences within the Paris group. In their writings, both Potekhin and Bobrishchev-Pushkin were guilty of the 'revolutionary romanticism' which Ustrialov condemned. However, in private they were more cynical

89 V.A. Osipov, 'Gazeta "Nakanune" Berlin (1922-1924rr.)', *Rossia i sovremenii mir*, 1994, No.2, pp.173-9 (p.177).

90 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.45-6. The quotations appear on p.46.

91 Quoted in Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.125.

about the goals of Bolshevism: the former called the Bolsheviks' revolutionary ideals 'a tale written by adults for themselves', while the latter saw them as 'naïve and grossly primitive'. Potekhin's support for Bolshevism rested on the hope that it would revive Russia, not enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks as such. Bobrishchev-Pushkin sought in revolutionary romanticism the comforting thought that Russia's suffering had not been in vain. The only way to contribute to the rebuilding of the country was to remain silent on the negative sides of Bolshevik rule. In contrast, even in private Kliuchnikov was enthusiastic about the future of Russia under the Soviet regime and the role she would play in the world.⁹²

The newspaper's dependency on Moscow was underlined at the end of May 1922 when Kliuchnikov and Potekhin travelled to Moscow as 'special correspondents' and *Nakanune's* Moscow office opened in June. While in the Russian capital, Kliuchnikov and Potekhin gave a series of lectures in which they claimed that they maintained their ideological independence, but at the same time expressed their unequivocal support for the Soviet regime. This angered both the non-Communist intelligentsia and emigration on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks on the other: the former disliked being preached at; the latter were alarmed by Kliuchnikov and Potekhin's attempt to distance themselves from the Communists and their demand that the non-Communist intelligentsia play a leading role in bringing about a synthesis of the old order and the new. At the same time, the staff of *Nakanune* was annoyed at the two travellers' denial that the paper was socialist. On 20th July 1922, Kiredtsov, seeking to distance *Nakanune* from Kliuchnikov and Potekhin, wrote an article drawing a line between the 'left-wing' and the 'non-socialist' *smenovekhovtsy*. This did not placate Moscow, and several Bolshevik leaders attacked *Nakanune*, accusing it of being bourgeois and counter-revolutionary. This forced the paper's editorial board to make ever more concessions to the Bolsheviks; one article, for example, praised the impartiality of the court which at that time was conducting a show trial of the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary party. Kliuchnikov understood the stance taken by his colleagues as betrayal, and in an interview with *Izvestiia* he complained that a change in the paper's tone had taken place. He sent a declaration to Berlin pointing out that

92 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.133-4. The quotations appear on p.133.

neither he nor Potekhin had edited the daily since leaving Berlin. Kiredtsov took this as an opportunity to remove Kliuchnikov from the editorial board.⁹³

The change, however, following Kliuchnikov's dismissal was not very large. *Nakanune* continued to speak of Russia's mission to save mankind; it longed for a great and powerful Russia; it described the moderation of Soviet policy through the NEP, which was seen as an indication of Soviet 'realism'; it warned against taking the reduction of the Bolshevik's revolutionary spirit too far; it talked of the creation of an alternative to parliamentary democracy; it hoped for the establishment of a new world order, to be achieved by other countries copying the changes in Russia; it spoke of the Russian intelligentsia's role in this construction. The paper also followed similar aims to the previous incarnations of *Smena vekh*. It sought to bring about the disintegration of the émigré community and convince the 'healthy' elements within it to return. It tried to provide pro-Soviet reporting abroad and to establish contacts with Western politicians and public figures. Back home its task was to discredit the emigration in the eyes of the non-Communist intelligentsia in Russia and convince them to accept the Soviet regime. *Nakanune* claimed that one of its roles was to provide constructive criticism of Russia's rulers. However, in practice it gave the Bolsheviks whole-hearted support.⁹⁴

In June 1924, the last issue of *Nakanune* came out. The Soviet Union had achieved official recognition from the other powers, and it was no longer necessary to discredit the Russian emigration. Funding for the paper therefore ceased.⁹⁵ All of the original collaborators in the *Smena vekh* collection returned to Russia: Potekhin had remained in the country after the unsuccessful lecture tour of 1922 and taken up a post as an economic specialist at the Supreme Council of the National Economy; Kliuchnikov returned to Soviet Russia in August 1923, where he taught and regularly contributed to the organ of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs; Bobrishchev-Pushkin went back at the same time as Kliuchnikov and resumed his work as a lawyer; Lukianov joined the Russian section of the French Communist party and travelled to Moscow in 1930 as a member of the Soviet press agency TASS; Chakhotin stayed in the West, concentrated on his scientific work, survived

93 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.146-53.

94 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.153-9.

95 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.159-60.

internment in a concentration camp during the Second World War, only to return to Russia in the late 1940s and join the Institute for Biophysics of the Academy of Sciences.⁹⁶

Ustrialov remained in Kharbin until 1935 where he continued to comment on developments in the Soviet Union. While the NEP was still in force, he wrote expectantly of the complete transition to a 'bourgeois' economy. His writings in the mid-1920s bear witness to his enthusiasm for the developments within the country. For example, he began to hail socialism and internationalism, which in 1920 he had condemned, as the ideas upon which the coming age would be based. The end of the NEP may have dented Ustrialov's confidence in the imminent onset of a Russian Thermidor, but he still hoped that Bukharin would re-introduce the NEP. The destruction of the 'right deviation' destroyed this optimism, although even in the early 1930s he continued to speak of a return to a 'neo-NEP'. He was not against industrialisation or collectivisation, but doubted whether either could be successful. Despite these reservations, he defended the violence of collectivisation by comparing the situation to the great changes under Peter the Great. By 1934, his uncertainty had disappeared as he proclaimed triumphantly that 'a great program is being implemented, the miraculous transformation of the country is becoming flesh and blood. Doubts and fears have been dispelled: above the peoples of the Soviet land the day of a really new and glorious life is breaking'. Ustrialov had clearly strayed into the 'revolutionary romanticism' which in the past he had criticised. As it became increasingly clear that the Soviet government would sell the Chinese Eastern Railroad (where Ustrialov was employed) to Japan, Ustrialov finally decided to go back to Russia. He was of course apprehensive about his reception there, but was resigned to adopting the political quietism which he knew was the price of return.⁹⁷

Of the others whom the *Smena vekh* group inspired to return, perhaps the most prominent was the writer Aleksei Tolstoi, who had become the editor of *Nakanune's* literary supplement.⁹⁸ Tolstoi had defended his decision to work

96 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.151, 160-1.

97 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.53-7. The quotation appears on pp.53-4.

98 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.143-5; Robert C. Williams, "Changing Landmarks" in Russian Berlin, 1922-1924', *Slavic Review*, Vol.28, 1968, No.4, pp.581-93 (591-2).

with the Berlin daily by claiming it looked to the 'real [...] power which alone now defends Russia's borders from attempts upon them by her neighbours, maintains the unity of the Russian state and alone defends Russia at the Genoa Conference'. He described three steps which led him to reassess his view of the Bolsheviks: the Polish attack on Russia and the support given to it by the White emigration, the refusal of the White emigration to help those suffering from famine in Russia and the changes taking place within the regime. He now felt that the only alternatives to recognising the Soviet regime, and seeking to get the best out of the revolution, were to invade Russia with foreign help, or reduce her through starvation, both of which would only continue the suffering in the country.⁹⁹ He returned to Russia in August 1923, later becoming part of the Soviet literary establishment. He was elected to the Soviet Academy of Sciences and chosen as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet.¹⁰⁰

The ideas of the *smenovekhovtsy* were also attractive to some émigré students. A number of pro-Soviet student groups were created, including the Union of Russian Student-Citizens of the RSFSR, which was set up in Czechoslovakia in July 1922. In December 1922, a conference of these organisations took place in Berlin. The conference decided to found a union of pro-Soviet student organisations. The students would educate themselves while they were in the emigration so that when they went back to their country they would be able to take part in the construction of a new Russia. They distanced themselves from the *smenovekhovtsy* by saying that they were not changing their signposts because they had never possessed signposts in the past. Rather, they were adopting signposts for the first time.¹⁰¹ As will be shown in Chapter Five, in this way the Russian Sovietophile students were very similar to their Ukrainian counterparts, and indeed in, for example, Czechoslovakia, they collaborated in founding a pro-Soviet student journal. The new Sovietophile student organisation claimed that 720 émigré students supported the Soviet regime; however, this figure, which was quite possibly an exaggeration anyway, was only a fraction of the 15,000 Russian students living in the emigration. It was also not very successful in sending émigrés

99 *Pochemu my vernulis na rodinu. Svidetelstva reemigrantov*, Moscow: Progress, 1983, pp.15-20 (the quotation is from p.16).

100 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.161.

101 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.164-5.

back to their homeland: a year after the foundation of the organisation, only 24 émigré students had returned to Russia.¹⁰²

The other groups of returnees had little or no connection to the *Smena vekh* group. The desire to return among the soldiers of the White army had been evident as early as spring 1921. In February 1921, a Turkish steamer, the 'Reshid-Pasha', arrived in the Black Sea town of Novorossiisk carrying about 3,500 Cossacks leaving Wrangel's army in order to go home. By April 1921, the commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine and Crimea Mikhail Frunze reported that another 2,700 returnees had joined them.¹⁰³ Clearly, homesickness was one of the motivations behind return. Much of the propaganda, directed towards the émigré Cossacks, which often appeared in the form of letters from Cossacks who had already returned, appealed to the fact that they were living in far-away lands, separated from their homes and families, in the name of a futile cause; it also sought to stress that the Cossacks could return without fear of reprisals, and called on them to go back to their work on the land for the good of their families and the country's economy as a whole. However, such propaganda was not devoid of political references: for example, it often argued that the Bolsheviks had won because they had the support of the Russian people, or that the Bolsheviks would grant autonomy to the various Cossack lands.¹⁰⁴

In spring 1922, the Union for the Return to the Motherland was founded in Bulgaria with help from the Bolsheviks. Its aim was to promote the return of the soldiers and Cossacks of Wrangel's army exiled in Bulgaria. The organisation received support from the League of Nation's commission to support Russian refugees and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which increasingly came to run the organisation. With the support of the Soviet Russian government, the Union published a pro-Soviet paper, *Novaia Rossiia* (New Russia). Although probably not directly influenced by *Smena vekh*,

102 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.165.

103 *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia 20-kh–40-kh godov. Dokumenty i materialy. Tom 1. Tak nachinalos izgnane 1920-1922gg. Kniga pervaiia. Iskhod*, Moscow: Gaia, 1998, pp.345-6; *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia 20-kh–40-kh godov. Dokumenty i materialy. Tom 3. Vozrashchenie... 1921-1924gg.*, Moscow: Triada-F, 2002, p.22f.

104 *Nakanune*, No.58, 7 June 1922, p.3; No.59, 8th June 1922, p.4; No.62, 11th June, p.6. See also *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, pp.138-9, 141-3, 155-7, 173-7.

some of the returnees from Bulgaria used language very similar to that of Us-trialov and the Paris group. For example, a number of Russian generals, including A. Sekretev, Iu. Gravitskii, I. Klochkov and E. Zelinin, made a statement praising the Soviet government as the defender of Russian national interests, and damning the White movement as an attack on Russia. According to Hardeman, the Union's activity came to an end when the Bolshevik government failed to achieve international recognition at the Conferences of Genoa and The Hague, thereby halting the most comprehensive project for repatriation undertaken by the Russian Soviet government.¹⁰⁵ However, there were also attempts to organise the return of soldiers and Cossacks in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland,¹⁰⁶ France¹⁰⁷ and Turkey.¹⁰⁸

One group which was influenced by the ideas of the *smenovekhovtsy* was the so-called post-revolutionary movement. These were factions on the right, often made up of émigrés who had been old enough to fight in the civil war, but too young to have any deep attachment to the pre-revolutionary regime. They were rebelling against the conservative, liberal and socialist beliefs of their fathers. They were nationalist, anti-Semitic, scathing of the West and materialism, against the restoration of the pre-revolutionary order and infused with an eschatological mysticism which believed that Russia had a messianic role to play in the world. For some, the revolt against the previous generation also involved a reassessment of the nature of the October revolution.¹⁰⁹

This was most notably the case with the *Mladorossy*, or Young Russians, who were indeed accused of being a *smenovekhovskii* movement by their opponents.¹¹⁰ The *Mladorossy* came to prominence with the publication of a collection of articles *K molodoi Rossii* (To a Young Russia) in 1928, which was edited by their leader, Aleksandr Kazem-Bek. Like *Smena vekh*, the Young Russians understood the revolution as a genuinely Russian event and

105 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.166-70; for documents on the Union of Return to the Motherland, see *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, pp.259-458.

106 *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, pp.95-192.

107 *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, pp.232-256.

108 *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, pp.461-502.

109 S.V. Ogenina, 'Porevoliutsionnye politicheskie dvizheniia rossiskoi emigratsii v 20-30e gody (K istorii ideologii)', *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1998, No.4, p.87-98,(pp.93-7).

110 R.P. Ronchevskii, *Mladorossy. Materialy k istorii smenovekhovskogo dvizheniia*, London, Ontario: Zaria, 1973.

a chance for a national revival. They believed that the Bolshevik party contained many non-Communists who were trying to steer the regime in a national direction. The Young Russians aimed to erect a 'neo-monarchy', by which they meant an alliance between a tsar and the Soviets. They hoped that a Russian Bonaparte would come forward to lead the country to a national renaissance. Though they acknowledged Stalin as the leader of the national camp in the Bolshevik party, they did not expect him to be the new Napoleon; rather, this role would fall to one of the new men from the ranks of the Red Army. The Young Russians welcomed every new development in the Soviet Union as evidence that their predictions were coming true. Sometimes, they took this to surreal lengths, for example presenting collectivisation as a step away from Communism. However, by 1938 even Kazem-Bek had to admit that a Russian Napoleon was not going to push Stalin from power. The purge of the army and the Nazi-Soviet pact led Kazem-Bek to condemn Stalin. Despite these disappointments, the Young Russians still sought to serve Russia. During the Second World War, some Young Russians took part in the French resistance; this was seen as a way of defending the Russian homeland. In 1956, following Stalin's death, Kazem-Bek returned to Russia where he became the secretary of the Patriarch of Moscow. Whether he had found that Post-Stalinist Russia accorded with his vision of the second stage of the revolution is, without further research, impossible to say.¹¹¹

Smenovekhovstvo and the Bolsheviks

The appearance of the Prague collection was welcomed by Lenin and Trotsky, who hoped to use it for three purposes. They saw it as a means of bringing about the dissolution of the Russian, anti-Bolshevik emigration, which, to an extent that today seems to verge on paranoia, they still viewed as a direct threat to the security of the Soviet regime. They wanted to employ it as an instrument to campaign for the recognition of the Soviet republics by foreign powers. They believed it could also help win over non-Communist intellectu-

111 Nicholas Hayes, 'Kazem-Bek and the Young Russians' Revolution', *Slavic Review*, 1980, Vol.39, No.2, pp.255-268; Aleksandr Kazem-Bek, 'Pervye itogi', *K molodoi Rossii... Sbornik Mladorossov*, Paris: Impr. d'art Voltaire, 1928, pp.7-22; Ronchevskii, *Mladorossy*, p.2f.

als to cooperation with the Bolsheviks.¹¹² The *smenovekhovtsy* were provided with financial support and their publications were distributed within Russia; the foundation of *Nakanune* represented the highpoint of cooperation between the Soviets and the *smenovekhovtsy*. However, the Bolshevik leadership also stressed that the *smenovekhovtsy* were only temporary allies. At the Eleventh Party Congress of March-April 1922, Lenin told the *smenovekhovtsy* that their belief that the Soviet regime was building a Russian state was unfounded, as was their conviction that the NEP was a permanent step away from Communism. He described them as class enemies, who in their openness about their intentions reminded Bolsheviks of the genuine mood of thousands of non-Communists who served the Soviet regime and participated in the NEP.¹¹³

Not all Bolsheviks accepted Lenin and Trotsky's assessment that the *smenovekhovtsy* were useful. At the Eleventh Congress, opposition to the leadership's line on *smenovekhovstvo* could be found among left-Bolsheviks, like Antonov-Ovsenko, who believed Ustrialov was no different to Miliukov¹¹⁴ and the SRs, who also hoped for the evolution of Soviet power.¹¹⁵ However, the most vocal and definite opposition came from the Ukrainian Mykola Skrypnyk, who saw the *smenovekhovtsy* as the inheritors of the slogan 'Russia, one and indivisible' from Denikin and Wrangel. He believed that there were adherents of *smenovekhovstvo* working inside the Ukraine to undermine the statehood of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and he called on the Central

112 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.177.

113 *Odinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b). Mart-April 1922 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet*, Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1961, pp.27-9.

114 Pavel Miliukov (1859-1943): chairman of the Central Committee of the Kadets and minister of foreign affairs in the Provisional Government. In December 1920, after emigrating to Paris, Miliukov had adopted the 'New Tactic', whereby he called for an end to the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks, and expressed his confidence that the Russian people would be able to liberate themselves from Bolshevik rule. His new faith in the 'worker and peasant masses' was accompanied by a call to accept the 'new social structure' created during the revolution (Jane Burbank, *Intelligentsia and Revolution. Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917-1922*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.158-9). Like Ustrialov he called on émigrés to recognise the fact that the revolution had changed Russia; however, the two differed in that Miliukov still hoped to see the fall of the Bolsheviks.

115 *Odinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, p.78.

Committee to take a 'firm, well-defined line' against the *smenovekhovtsy*.¹¹⁶ Over the next year there was a growing campaign against the support given to *smenovekhovstvo* led by Zinoviev. Within the party press and at the Twelfth Party Conference *smenovekhovstvo* was attacked as a bourgeois, counter-revolutionary movement which was using the tolerance granted by the Bolsheviks to undermine the Soviet regime; there were calls for decisive action to be taken against them to limit their influence.¹¹⁷ At the Twelfth Party Congress, a major change in the Bolsheviks' position on *smenovekhovstvo* took place. The Congress saw the introduction of the policy of *korenizatsiia*, which sought to promote the drawing together of the Soviet peoples by combating the growth of Great Russian chauvinism. This provided the context for an attack on *smenovekhovstvo*: Stalin pointed to the supposed popularity of *smenovekhovstvo* with some workers within the party and state apparatus as a sign that Great Russian chauvinism had taken hold within the Soviet system.¹¹⁸

These attacks set the tone for the treatment of *smenovekhovstvo* within the public statements of the Bolsheviks for the next few years: Bolshevik publicists condemned it as the ideology of the new bourgeoisie created by the NEP, which sought to return the Soviet Union to bourgeois capitalism. The term was widely applied to include almost any form of dissent. Despite this, the Bolsheviks continued to support *Nakanune* as an instrument in the search for international recognition until June 1924, when the Bolsheviks felt that the campaign had already been successful. Nevertheless, as 1923 drew to a close Russian *smenovekhovstvo* was in decline and references to it appeared less and less in Bolshevik statements.¹¹⁹

From 1925, the ideas of Ustrialov and the *smenovekhovtsy* again became the subject of discussion within the Bolshevik leadership. This time individual Bolshevik leaders used attacks on *smenovekhovstvo* as a proxy for censure of their rivals within the party. Shortly before the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925, Zinoviev condemned the approval expressed by Ustrialov for the

116 *Odinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, pp.73-5. See also Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, pp.110, 115 on Skrypnyk's attacks on Russian *smenovekhovstvo* in the Ukraine.

117 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.177-180.

118 *Dvenadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b). 17-25 April 1923 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet*, Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1963, p.481f.

119 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.180-1.

Bolsheviks' supposed willingness to compromise with peasant interests and the policy of 'socialism in one country'. The Bolshevik leader did so in order to deliver a veiled attack on these two aspects of the official party line which he disagreed with. The party leadership replied in the same manner, in a critique of Ustrialov which was intended as a blow against Zinoviev. In 1926 and 1927, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky all accused the Central Committee of following the path set out by Ustrialov in order to discredit the party line by association. Stalin himself was not averse to using the spectre of Ustrialov in order to undermine his opponents. The fact that Ustrialov had praised Bukharin provided Bukharin's opponents with a ready weapon to use against him. As Hardeman argues, the fact that Ustrialov's name featured prominently in the intra-party debates of the mid and late 1920s does not indicate that his ideas influenced Bolshevik policy, as some have claimed, but rather that his praise of certain aspects of the regime and figures in it could be used to bring political opponents into disrepute.¹²⁰

Conclusion

The Russian *smenovekhovtsy* reassessed their relationship with the Bolsheviks in the light of the failure of the White movement to overthrow the Bolsheviks, and the inability of the emigration to offer a realistic solution to the Bolshevik takeover of power. The *smenovekhovtsy* were therefore prepared to recognise that the Bolsheviks had won the civil war, and argued that if the Russian intelligentsia was to play any role in the future development of their country, they must accept this fact. They were attracted to the Bolsheviks because they believed that the party had become the bearers of traditional Russian national interests. In addition, the *smenovekhovtsy* thought that the Bolsheviks had begun to replace socialism with a more realistic economic policy. As the *smenovekhovtsy* started implementing their plan of cooperation with the Bolsheviks, they were faced with the problem that they could not really do so on their own terms, but rather had to subordinate their ideas to the Bolsheviks' goals. The Bolsheviks saw the *smenovekhovtsy* as a tool to bring about the dissolution of the Russian emigration, and to win over support among foreign governments and the domestic intelligentsia. The *smenovek-*

120 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.181-4.

hovtsy were faced with the dilemma of either revoking their call for reconciliation, or abandoning the critical distance they had initially hoped to maintain from the Bolsheviks. Most, even Ustrialov, the enemy of 'revolutionary romanticism', chose the latter course.

This chapter raises some interesting questions with regard to the Ukrainian Sovietophiles. Differences between the Ukrainian and Russian groups can be expected. There is a clear tension between the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, who praised the Soviet Union's defence of Russian national interests, and the goals of Ukrainian nationalists; it is necessary to find out how Ukrainian Sovietophiles portrayed the same regime as fulfilling Ukrainian national aspirations. Equally, *Smena vekh* claimed that there was a difference between socialism and Bolshevism. However, many Ukrainian Sovietophiles were on the left; it is essential to look at how they assessed the socialism of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, similarities are also likely. The views of the *Smena vekh* group were characterised by their self-conscious appeal to the intelligentsia and the discussion of the intelligentsia's role in society; it is important to ascertain whether this was also true of the Ukrainians. A second possible similarity is the willingness of the *smenovekhovtsy* to justify terror in the name of a higher cause. The dilemma facing the *smenovekhovtsy* on how cooperation with the Bolsheviks could be combined with an independent position should also be investigated in the discussion of the Ukrainians. Lastly, the Bolsheviks saw the *smenovekhovtsy* as temporary allies to be exploited for their value in domestic and foreign politics; a study of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles must find out whether this was also the case for them. Chapters Three to Seven will refer to all of these points.

2 The Ukrainian Emigration: Roots, Contexts and Developments

As the previous chapter has shown, the Sovietophilism of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* was deeply rooted in a Russian identity that stressed the country's great power status and international importance; it represented an attempt by those who saw Russia in this way to reconcile themselves to the situation that had emerged in the 1920s. Equally, the Ukrainian Sovietophiles's support for the Soviet Ukraine originated in their understanding of their own identity and their perception of the task of nation building that faced the Ukraine in the 1920s. Both aspects were shaped by the particularities of Ukrainian history before and during the revolution, and the situation that existed in the 1920s. This chapter will discuss these characteristics in order to provide the background for the rest of the research in the book.

The Ukrainian Populist Heritage

The predominant current in Ukrainian nationalist thought before 1917 was populism. Ukrainian populism was a left-wing doctrine which argued that the Ukraine was a peasant nation in which the peasant was the bearer of the Ukraine's national particularity and traditions; because most landowners were Russians or Poles, social differences mirrored the national divide, and as a result the Ukrainians suffered from both national and social subjugation – liberation from the one must therefore go hand in hand with emancipation from the other. Many adherents of this credo later became supporters of the Soviet Ukraine, and it is necessary to understand why this set of beliefs was so popular among Ukrainian intellectuals in order to appreciate the attraction of the Soviet system for some émigrés.

The roots of the popularity of populism are to be found in the situation facing the Ukraine at the turn of the century. At that time, the territory which now makes up the independent Ukraine was divided between the empires ruled by the Romanovs and the Habsburgs. There were about 29 million Ukrainians in the Russian empire, making them the second largest group after the Rus-

sians. In Austria-Hungary, where they were officially referred to as Ruthenians, 4 million Ukrainians lived in the Bukovina, Transcarpathia and, most importantly, Eastern Galicia, where they formed a majority with at least 62% of the population. In both empires the Ukrainian population was predominantly rural; the overwhelming majority were peasants with small parcels of land. In the villages also lived teachers and clergy, who in Galicia formed a national intelligentsia. In the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainian intelligentsia was much smaller, as most of these classes were Russified. The towns were dominated by other nationalities: Russians and Jews in the Romanov empire, Poles and Jews in the Habsburg lands. The ruling classes were also non-Ukrainian. In Galicia the Polish nobility dominated the political and bureaucratic structures of the province. In Russia the aristocracy in the Ukrainian *gubernia* were mainly Russians; the old Ukrainian Cossack elite had also adopted a Russian culture.¹²¹

In Russia there was not wide acceptance that a Ukrainian nation actually existed. Though there were some Ukrainophiles who asserted the cultural distinctiveness of the Ukraine from Russia, this view was not common even among those who might otherwise have been considered of 'Ukrainian' descent. Some saw 'Ukrainians' as an undifferentiated part of the Russian nation, while others described them as 'Little Russians', who alongside the Great Russians and White Russians were one branch of the Russian nation. Even the Ukrainophiles believed that there were links between the Russian and Ukrainian nations.¹²² Moreover, the tsars were suspicious of any signs of 'Little Russian separatism' and therefore cracked down on attempts to assert the cultural individuality of a Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainophile intelligentsia did not have the opportunities to spread their understanding of Ukrainian identity, making it harder for them to reach the peasants. At the same time,

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- 121 Wolfdieter Bihl, 'Die Ruthenen', in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Band III. Die Völker des Reiches. 1. Teil*, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980, pp.555-84 (pp.560-4); Andreas Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine*, Munich: C.H. Beck, pp.145-8; Bohdan Krawchenko, 'The Social Structure of Ukraine at the Turn of the Twentieth Century', *East European Quarterly*, Vol.16, 1982, No.2, pp.171-81; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.417-29.
- 122 Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question. The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, pp.49-58.

the Russian state never made a concerted effort to inculcate the Ukrainian peasantry with a Russian national identity. The very 'backwardness' of the Russian state, for example in its lack of schools, industrialisation and urbanisation, prevented the full incorporation of the mass of the Ukrainian peasantry into the Russian nation.¹²³ One oft-quoted British memorandum on the Ukraine from 1918 described the situation thus: 'Were one to ask the average peasant in the Ukraine his nationality, he would answer that he is Greek Orthodox; if pressed to say whether he is a Great Russian, a Pole or a Ukrainian, he would probably reply that he is a peasant; and if one insisted on knowing what language he spoke, he would say the "local tongue". [...], he simply does not think of nationality in terms familiar to the intelligentsia'.¹²⁴

As already mentioned, these conditions gave rise to a body of thought which idealised the peasant as the bearer of the country's identity, but also sought to better the conditions under which peasants lived – populism. One of the first exponents of this ideology was the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius of the mid-1840s which wanted the abolition of serfdom and the establishment of schools for the peasants and called for the creation of a Slavic federation, free of tsars and nobles, in which the Ukraine would be an equal member.¹²⁵ The tradition was continued in the 1860s by the *khlopomany*, who went out into the villages to teach the peasants about the Ukraine; at the same time they hoped to absorb the peasants' culture and dressed in traditional Ukrainian costume.¹²⁶ However, perhaps the most important populist was Mykhailo Drahomanov. In his writings from the late 1870s to the 1890s, he introduced socialism to Ukrainian populism. He advocated an evolutionary form of socialism for which the first question was the improvement of working conditions under capitalism; the creation of a socialist society would only come later. He rejected Marxism and envisioned the future Communist society as one made up of self-organised groups of workers. He was against the

123 Miller, *Ukrainian Question*, pp.254-6.

124 Quoted in David Saunders 'What makes a Nation a Nation? Ukrainians since 1600', *Ethnic Studies*, Vol.10, 1993, pp.101-24 (pp.111-2) and George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity and Change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923-1934*, Cambridge: CUP, 2002, p.4.

125 Dennis Papazian, 'N.I. Kostomarov and the Cyril-Methodian Ideology', *Russian Review*, Vol.29, 1970, No.1, pp.59-73.

126 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.365-6.

creation of an independent Ukrainian state, and hoped to defend Ukrainian national interests through the reorganisation of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires into federal states.¹²⁷ Drahomanov had a profound influence on the generation which grew up before the First World War.

Although socialism became closely intertwined with Ukrainian nationalism, there was also tension between the two doctrines. The Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), created in 1900, brought together Ukrainian nationalists, Drahomanivists and Marxists. However, its members had very different aspirations and the party soon split. Those who laid greater emphasis on nationalism created the Ukrainian People's Party in 1902. The left split off in 1905 to form the *Spilka*, which joined the Russian Social Democratic Party. The RUP itself re-formed as the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party (USDRP), which hoped to synthesise the nationalist and the socialist causes, but continued to experience divisions over these two goals during the revolution.¹²⁸ As the later chapters will show, this tension was also reflected in the Sovietophiles' thought in the 1920s.

In the Habsburg lands the Ukrainian national movement faced some of the same problems as in Russia. Here, however, it competed with the Poles, who saw Eastern Galicia as part of their patrimony. In comparison to Russia, there was a broader class to act as the bearers of the 'Ukrainian' national movement – the Greek Catholic clergy and the rural intelligentsia. Nevertheless, there were also three distinctive understandings of 'Ukrainian' identity: the Old Ruthenian, which advocated a Ruthenian patriotism limited to the East Slavic lands within the Habsburg empire; the Ukrainophile, which gradually came to see the Ruthenians as part of a Ukrainian nation which included the 'Ukrainians' in the Russian empire; and the Russophile, which declared that the Ruthenians were a branch of the Russian nation. By the outbreak of the world war, the Ukrainophiles had managed to become the most popular current, having set up reading clubs, educational associations and academic so-

127 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Drahomanov as a Political Theorist', in id. *Essays in Modern History*, Harvard: HUIS, 1987, pp.203-53, and id. 'The First Ukrainian Political Program: Mykhailo Drahomanov's "Introduction" to *Hromada*', in op. cit., pp.255-281.

128 See Jurij Borys, 'Political Parties in the Ukraine', in Taras Hunczak (ed.), *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass.: HURI, 1977, pp.128-58 (pp.131-4, 141-2).

cieties to disseminate their understanding of national consciousness.¹²⁹ Thus, unlike the nationalism of the Russian-ruled Ukraine, the national movement was beginning to gain support among the peasants. This success led Mykhailo Hrushevskyy to describe the province as the 'Ukrainian Piedmont': a centre in which the national, cultural and socio-political revival of the Ukrainian people could be fostered and later transported into the other lands where Ukrainians lived.¹³⁰

The Ukrainian movement had more success in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy for a number of reasons. Though it had to compete with the more powerful Poles, the Habsburgs never actually opposed Ukrainian national identity in the manner of the Romanovs. Moreover, Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were able to take part in elections to the Galician and Viennese Diets, allowing the emergence of Ukrainian political parties. The first Ukrainian party, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party founded in 1890, was heavily influenced by Drahomanov in that it advocated agrarian socialism. As in the Romanov empire, the Radicals were torn between those who were more attracted to socialism and those who advocated a more national programme: the former split off to form the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the latter created the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDP).¹³¹ Despite the variations in ideology, the peasant continued to play an important role in the thinking of all Ukrainian parties. A reoccurring theme of this book is that the centrality of the peasant question to Ukrainian nationalism allowed many members of the Ukrainian national movement to find common ground with the Bolsheviks.

129 John-Paul Himka 'The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in almost all Directions', in Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (eds.), *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999, pp.109-164; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.436-52.

130 Mykhailo Hrushevskyy, 'Ukrainskyi Piemont', in id., *Tvory u 50 tomakh. Tom 1. Seriya suspilno-politychni tvory 1894-1907*, ed. Pavlo Sokhan et al., Lviv: Svit, pp.444-7.

131 Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte*, pp.138-9. On the history of the USDP see Kerstin S. Jobst, *Zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus. Die polnische und ukrainische Sozial-Demokratie in Galizien von 1890 bis 1914. Ein Beitrag zu Nationalitätensfrage im Habsburgerreich*, Hamburg: Döllig und Galitz, 1996.

The Ukrainian Revolution

The fall of the tsar in 1917 created hitherto undreamt of opportunities for the Ukrainian national movement. Ukrainians entered the revolutionary period with limited aims – federation and autonomy, and the achievement of cultural goals; they left it having experienced control over their own state. However, the movement's pre-war weakness meant that the interventions by foreign powers and the success of the Bolsheviks in harnessing terror to achieve their political ends thwarted the Ukrainian state-building projects during the revolution.¹³² Nevertheless, the Ukrainians did force the Bolsheviks to make concessions, such that it was the Bolsheviks rather than the Ukrainian national movement who created a lasting Ukrainian state. This surprising outcome provided one of the prerequisites for Ukrainian Sovietophilism.

A week after the collapse of the tsar, the Central Rada, a form of preliminary parliament, was established in Kyiv. It elected the historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyy as its president and was dominated by the left – the Marxists in the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party and the agrarian socialists of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries. The Rada, in keeping with the populists' federalist tradition, declared its loyalty to the Provisional Government in Moscow and set as its goal the achievement of Ukrainian autonomy within Russia.¹³³ However, the Central Rada was not the only body which claimed to represent the area. In December 1917, a Soviet Ukrainian government was formed in Kharkiv and in the same month the Russian Red Army invaded, forcing the Rada government out of Kyiv in February 1918. This ended, for the time being, the Rada's hopes of a federal solution and it declared the independence of the Ukraine. On the same day that the Central Rada had to leave its new capital, the Ukraine made a separate peace with the Central Powers at the Brest-Litovsk peace conference. The Rada called for military aid from Germany and Austria-Hungary. They sent troops to the Ukraine, and in March the Bolsheviks were pushed out of Kyiv. The Rada government took power once again in the city.¹³⁴

132 For a analysis of the reasons of this failure, see Iaroslav Hrytsak, 'Chomu zaznala porazky ukrainska revoliutsiia?', in id., *Strasti za natsionalismom. Istorychni eseï*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004, pp.66-79.

133 Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte*, p.168.

134 Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte*, pp.171-2.

The Central Powers and Rada were uncomfortable allies: the former hoped to secure grain supplies from the Ukraine through requisitioning, the latter wanted to recognise the peasants' appropriation of the landowners' property. These policies led to conflicts, which the Germans sought to solve by supporting the takeover of power by the conservative General Pavlo Skoropadsky in April 1918. For Ukrainian nationalists his accession to power represented a coup by conservative, pro-Russian interests. The Ukrainians formed their own alternative government – the Directory headed by the Social Democrats Voldymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, who was in charge of the Directory's military forces. The Directory started a rising in November. Ukrainian peasants had already begun resisting grain requisitioning in March 1918. Following the collapse of the German armies in the West, the Directory forced Skoropadsky from power on the back of this peasant revolt. In December, the Directory entered Kyiv and declared itself the government of a restored UNR.¹³⁵

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks, following their expulsion from Kyiv by the Germans, had formed a Ukrainian branch of their party under the name the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine (KP(b)U) in April 1918. In November, it formed its own Ukrainian Soviet government with its capital in Kharkiv and in December war broke out between the Directory and the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. The Directory was in no position to resist the Red Army. It was split by disagreements between Vynnychenko and Petliura: the former wanted to turn the Directory into a form of Soviet government and make peace with the Russian Soviet Republic; the latter wanted an alliance with the Entente in order to beat back the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the new Ukrainian government was overwhelmed with solving problems, such as the land question, without a proper administrative structure. It therefore could not win over peasant support with the necessary reforms. The peasants who had fought for the Directory now turned to the Bolsheviks. In February 1919, the KP(b)U took Kyiv and set up a second Ukrainian Soviet Republic.¹³⁶

135 Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte*, pp.172-3.

136 On the difficulties faced by the Directory, see Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 'The Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic' in Taras Hunczak (ed.), *The Ukraine 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1977, pp.82-103; on the Bolsheviks, see Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.497-8.

The Soviet government, too, had problems. Its attempts to create communal farms angered the peasants who wanted to split the land taken from the landlords among themselves. The Russian bias among the Bolsheviks led them to view and punish expressions of Ukrainian national consciousness as 'bourgeois nationalism'. From April and May 1919, the Bolsheviks faced peasant risings and revolts by their former allies, the independent commanders Nestor Makhno and Nykyfor Hryhoriiv.¹³⁷ The Bolsheviks were still able to conquer nearly all of the UNR's territory, but could not resist their other opponent in the Ukraine, the Russian Volunteer Army under Anton Denikin. In August 1919, Denikin captured Kyiv, and only by the end of the year did the Red Army put him on the retreat; as they launched their third campaign in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks began to reassess their stance on the Ukrainian question in order to avoid repeating past mistakes. In December 1919, the Russian Politburo issued a resolution which condemned Great Russian chauvinism, asserted the need to support Ukrainian culture actively and proposed policies to win over the peasants to the side of the Soviet government. These slogans helped the Bolsheviks re-conquer the Ukraine. By February 1920, almost all of the Eastern Ukraine was controlled by the Red Army. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic headed by the Bulgarian-Rumanian Khristian Rakovskii was restored with its capital in Kharkiv.¹³⁸

Yet another Ukrainian state had been established in November 1918 with the proclamation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) by Ukrainians in Lviv. It was headed by Ievhen Petrushevych, who had been a member of the UNDP and had led the Ukrainian parliamentary faction in the Viennese parliament. Armed conflict with the Poles had broken out even before the announcement of the proclamation; on the 21st the Ukrainians were forced to leave their new capital. The ZUNR looked to the UNR for support and in January 1919 the two governments proclaimed the union of their states; how-

137 Hryhoriiv, Nykyfor (1885-1919): a former captain in the tsarist army who during the revolution led an autonomous army of partisans, which at the height of its strength numbered 15,000. At various times he allied with the UNR, the Bolsheviks and Makhno, who had Hryhoriiv shot when he proposed supporting Denikin's campaign against the Bolsheviks. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovič, p.255.

138 James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983, p.63-4; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.498-500, 502.

ever, in practice the ZUNR retained its independence. The ZUNR still could not resist the Poles, especially after they had been reinforced by the Entente-equipped Polish soldiers under General Haller;¹³⁹ in July the ZUNR government crossed with its army into what was left of the territory of the UNR. Despite the formal declaration of Ukrainian unity, the two governments failed to cooperate with each other. The ZUNR saw the Poles as their enemy, whereas the UNR saw them as a potential ally; equally, the ZUNR's army favoured an agreement with Denikin, with whom Petliura was struggling for control of the Ukraine. Following Denikin's capture of Kyiv, the Galician soldiers joined the White general. Conversely, in April 1920 Petliura, who had been in talks with the Poles since October 1919, signed an agreement with Piłsudski¹⁴⁰ in which the leader of the Directory recognised Poland's control over Eastern Galicia. The break between the UNR and ZUNR was complete; Petrushevych and his government left the Ukraine for exile in Vienna.¹⁴¹

Poland, with the help of Petliura, invaded the Soviet Ukraine. At first, they were successful, capturing Kyiv in May 1920. However, the Polish forces were driven back and in August the Red army had captured a large chunk of Galicia and was marching on Warsaw. The Poles repulsed the Red Army at a battle on the Vistula river, and an armistice was signed between the Polish Republic and the Bolsheviks in October 1920. Petliura's army tried to fight on until March 1921, but after it became clear that the campaign was hopeless, it was interned by his former allies; in the subsequent peace treaties signed with the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet republics the Poles recognised the

139 Józef Haller (1873-1960): a Polish officer in the Austrian army until 1912 and commander of the Second Brigade of the Polish Legions in 1914. In 1918 he led the Polish army organised and equipped by the France. Stanley S. Sokol and Sharon F. Mrotek Kissane, *The Polish Biographical Dictionary*, Wauconda, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carucci Publishers, 1992, pp.143-4.

140 Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935): remembered by the Poles as one of their greatest national heroes. He founded the Polish Socialist Party in 1892 in Russia. Before the First World War, he moved to Austria, where he created paramilitary Polish organisations to fight the Russians; these were the basis of the Polish Legions which fought on the side of the Central Powers. He became Polish chief of state following the country's achievement of independence, and in spring 1920 he was asked to become First Marshal of Poland in order to lead the Polish forces against the Red Army. Sokol and Mrotek Kissane, *Polish Biographical Dictionary*, pp.309-10

141 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.501-2, 512-7. The most complete history of the ZUNR is in German: Torsten Wehrhahn, *Die Westukrainische Volksrepublik. Zu den polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen und dem Problem der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit in den Jahren 1918 bis 1923*, Berlin: Weißensee Verlag, 2004.

Ukrainian Soviet Republic as the sole Ukrainian state and ignored the UNR completely. In the meantime, the Galician army had changed sides, this time to the Bolsheviks following the defeat of Denikin; they then went over to the Poles. These soldiers, too, were interned, or disbanded and sent to Czechoslovakia.¹⁴²

These military campaigns, which shaped the outcome of the Paris peace conferences, decided the fate of the Ukrainian lands, creating *faits accomplis* which the powers meeting in Paris later simply recognised. Of the lands which had belonged to Austria-Hungary, Poland took control of Eastern Galicia after crushing the ZUNR; Transcarpathia went to Czechoslovakia after a plebiscite held by immigrant Ruthenians in the United States had legitimised the despatch of Czechoslovakian troops to the province; the Bukovina, which had a large Rumanian population, was annexed by Rumania. The powers in Paris did not grant Eastern Galicia to Poland; rather the latter was acknowledged as the military occupier of the province. The final decision on the sovereignty of the area was to be made by the victorious powers later. Possession of the lands which had been ruled by the Romanovs was decided purely by the war between the Soviet republics and Poland. As a result of the armistice signed in October 1920, which was then confirmed by the treaty of Riga in March 1921, Podlachia, Kholm and much of Volhynia and Polissia went to Poland, while the rest of the Ukraine became the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.¹⁴³

The Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s

Thus, the Bolsheviks could only exert their will over the Ukraine after they had started to seek compromises with the Ukrainian peasants and Ukrainian national aspirations. This laid the foundations for policies in the 1920s which seemed to promote both Ukrainian statehood and culture. The fact that the Bolsheviks had succeeded where the Ukrainian governments had failed made the Soviet Ukraine very attractive to many émigrés. The following section will describe these achievements.

142 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.502-3; Moytl, *Turn to the Right*, p.21.

143 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.524-8.

In theory, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was an independent state allied with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) through a treaty of December 1920 creating 'joint' Ukrainian-Russian people's commissariats for military and economic affairs. However, this actually meant the centralisation of decision-making in Moscow. Kharkiv did have people's commissariats for foreign affairs, agriculture, justice and education. In foreign affairs the Soviet Ukraine did not have the autonomy of an independent state. Nevertheless, it set up its own missions in Czechoslovakia (March 1921), Germany (September 1921), Poland (October 1921) and Austria (December 1921). These were responsible for discussing matters of trade and organising the return of POWs and émigrés to the Soviet Ukraine. In December 1922, the Soviet republics were reformed into the Soviet Union, which was ostensibly a federal state consisting of four republics – the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belarusian SSR and the Transcaucasian SFSR. As a consequence of the Union treaty, the Ukraine's missions were merged with those of the RSFSR in August 1923. In September 1923, the Ukrainian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was abolished. The Soviet constitution, which was ratified in January 1924, reduced the autonomy of the Ukraine still further. The government in Moscow now had responsibility for establishing the general principles guiding education, justice and health, and controlled the exploitation of natural resources. It could annul decisions made by the individual republics and was in charge of foreign policy. The individual republics were allowed to maintain their representatives within the Soviet consulates and embassies. The Ukrainian SSR, for example, appointed the former left-wing Socialist Revolutionary Antin Prykhodko to this position in Prague. Kharkiv therefore did continue to conduct a foreign policy, albeit a very limited one, targeted above all at the disintegration of the Ukrainian emigration.¹⁴⁴

The Bolshevik party provided another link between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR. This was in fact even more important in ensuring these ties in that it was the institution which determined policy in the Soviet republics.

144 Dmytro Budkov and Dmytro Biedienieiev, *Slovo pravdy pro Ukrainu. Mizhnarodna informatsiina diialnist Ukrainskoi derzhavy 1917-1923rr.*, Kyiv: K.I.S., 2004, pp.121-7; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.526-8; Alexander Motyl, 'The Foreign Relations of the Ukrainian SSR', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol.6, 1982, No.1, pp.62-78 (pp.67-70).

Again, the KP(b)U was nominally a separate party, but in practice it was a branch of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) (RKP(b)) and followed directives from Moscow. This had been a compromise solution. The Bolsheviks in the Ukraine had been split between the supporters, like Mykola Skrypnyk and Volodymyr Zatonskyi, of the creation of a distinct, Ukrainian Bolshevik party, and those who preferred to remain part of the All-Russian party, for example Emmanuil Kviring. These divisions were continued in the debates of the early 1920s over the constitution of the Soviet Republics, during which Rakovskii, Skrypnyk and Zatonskyi unsuccessfully tried to prevent the transfer of the Soviet Ukraine's authority to Moscow.¹⁴⁵ These divisions existed throughout the rest of the decade and even when official policy moved towards a doctrine of cultural autonomy, the opponents of decentralisation continued to resist this compromise.

One justification for the creation of separate Ukrainian government and party structures was the claim that in the non-Russian areas the Bolsheviks were viewed as a foreign force. Certainly, in the Ukraine the party was dominated by Russians or Russified Ukrainians; in 1922 only 23% of the party were Ukrainian.¹⁴⁶ Two Bolshevik governments in the Ukraine had collapsed against a backdrop of peasant unrest caused by the Communists' agricultural policies and insensitivity to the nationalities question. These problems forced the KP(b)U to search for ways to legitimise their rule in the Ukraine. As mentioned above, in December 1919 the Russian Politburo had already issued a declaration condemning Great Russian chauvinism and stating the need to seek allies among the Ukrainian peasants. Another aspect of this was the admission in March 1920 of 4,000 members of the *Borotbisty* to the KP(b)U, that is during Piłsudski's offensive in the Ukraine when fears that the Ukrainians would rise in support of the Poles and Petliura were at their highest. The *Borotbisty* were the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries who had left the party in May 1918. They saw other Ukrainian parties as excessively nationalist, opposed borders between states and wanted peace between the brother workers of Russia and the Ukraine. In the intervening two years, the *Borotbisty* moved closer to Marxism and cooperation with the

145 Mace, *Communism*, pp.28-9; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.531-3.

146 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.531.

KP(b)U, but continued to criticise the Bolsheviks' handling of the peasantry and the national question. They wanted to promote Ukrainian culture in order to liberate the country from the national oppression caused by capitalism.¹⁴⁷ The *Borotbisty* brought a new element to the KP(b)U that was more sympathetic to Ukrainian national concerns.

The Bolsheviks also had to adapt their theories on the agricultural policy in the light of practical experience and the desire to remain in power. Collectivisation and requisitioning had been two of the major grievances of the peasantry during the civil war. The Bolsheviks had also sought to promote 'class struggle' in the village by seizing land from the so-called kulaks, those owning more than 80 acres of land. In 1920 and 1921, discontented peasants revolted against Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine and Russia. One of the Bolsheviks' responses was the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in March 1921. Requisitioning was replaced with a tax-in-kind and forced collectivisation was ended. Peasants were allowed to sell their produce. Private, small-scale manufacturing was made legal, as was the activity of commercial middle-men.¹⁴⁸

These moves culminated in the declaration in 1923 at the RKP's Twelfth Congress that though both the 'great power chauvinism' of the Russians and the nationalism of the non-Russian nations threatened Soviet construction, the former was the more dangerous. Local nationalism had arisen out of the national inequalities of the tsarist period. The removal of these would eradicate the basis for the growth of such nationalisms, creating the prerequisites for a harmonious co-existence between nations and the creation of an all-union culture to succeed that of the nations. The policy of *korenizatsiia*, or 'indigenisation', was introduced. It sought to recruit non-Russians to government and party institutions, to ensure that these organs used local languages in their day-to-day business and to promote the development of local languages and cultures. In the Ukraine *korenizatsiia* was known as 'Ukrainianisation'. The policy was overseen by the two commissars for education Oleksander Shumskiy (1924-7), a former *Borotbist*, and Mykola Skrypnyk (1927-1933), an old Bolshevik who had supported the creation of the KP(b)U and

147 Mace, *Communism*, pp.53-62.

148 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.p.548-50; Service, *Twentieth Century Russia*, pp.124-7.

had defended the autonomy of the Ukrainian SSR. More Ukrainians were recruited to the KP(b)U, the Ukrainian language was promoted in schools and Ukrainian-language newspapers were founded.¹⁴⁹ However, there was also much scepticism in the party towards the policy, and many members of the KP(b)U and RKP hoped to reverse the changes, for example the economist Iurii Larin.¹⁵⁰

Ukrainianisation was not only characterised by the quantitative successes of government measures. In the 1920s, the Ukraine witnessed a cultural and artistic renaissance. The work of the writer Mykola Khvylovyi, the film maker Oleksander Dovzhenko,¹⁵¹ the painter Mykhailo Boichuk¹⁵² and the theatre director Les Kurbas¹⁵³ exemplify this period of creativity. Vasyl Ellan-Blakytnyi¹⁵⁴ set up the proletarian writers' organisation HART to encourage the literary activity of Ukrainian workers; Serhii Pylypenko founded a similar

149 On Ukrainianisation see Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine*, London: Macmillan, 1987; Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy*; Mace, *Communism*; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*. On the policy of *korenizatsiia* in general, see Gerhard Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion. Von der totalitären Diktatur zu nachstalinistischen Gesellschaft*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986, pp.34-77.

150 Mace, *Communism*, pp.162-3.

151 Dovzhenko, Oleksander (1894-1956): a *Borotbist* during the revolution who began making films in 1926 which dealt with the revolution in the Ukraine and the construction of socialism in the country. He was accused of Ukrainian nationalism, and had to live in exile in Moscow, but continued to make films until the late 1940s. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovič, p.751.

152 Boichuk, Mykhailo (1882-1939): an artist from Galicia who sought to combine traditional Ukrainian art with modern trends. He painted murals and frescoes and came to establish his own school of art – Boichukism. He was arrested in the mid-1930s and his paintings were destroyed. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.260.

153 Kurbas, Les (1887-1942): a Galician actor, who sought to raise Ukrainian theatre to the level of that in Western Europe. His *Berezil* theatre group became the centre of theatre in the Soviet Ukraine. In 1933, he was condemned as a nationalist, his plays were banned, and he was arrested and imprisoned on the Solovets Islands. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.716-7.

154 Ellan-Blakytnyi, Vasyl (1894-1925): a writer, poet and journalist, and one of the founders of the *Borotbisty*. He joined the KP(b)U with the other *Borotbisty*, becoming a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee in 1920. He was named the director of the Ukraine's state publishing house and the editor of the Ukrainian governmental newspaper, *Visti VUTsVK*. In the 1930s, his works were banned because of their alleged nationalist content. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.247.

organisation, *Pluh*, for peasants.¹⁵⁵ The academics of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) in Kyiv advanced Ukrainian-language scholarship. Most notably, VUAN, with the support of the Commissariat of Education, sought to work out a standard orthography for the Ukrainian language.¹⁵⁶ In addition, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which had broken away from the Patriarchate of Moscow to form a Ukrainian national church during the revolution, was tolerated by the Bolsheviks as a means of undermining the Russian Orthodox Church. It flourished in the mid-1920s, and in 1924 could claim to have 6 million followers, 1,500 priests and deacons and 30 bishops.¹⁵⁷ These achievements did win over supporters to the regime: in 1924 sixty-six prominent members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including some former émigrés, signed a public declaration of support for the Soviet regime.¹⁵⁸

However, within the Russian and Ukrainian Bolshevik parties there were very different ideas about the extent to which Ukrainianisation could be taken. The commissar for education Shumskyi, for example, wanted the pace of Ukrainianisation to be accelerated. At the end of 1925, he called on Stalin to put a Ukrainian at the head of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. His views were opposed by the RKP and much of the KP(b)U, including supporters of Ukrainianisation like Mykola Skrypnyk. In April 1926, Stalin condemned Shumskyi. This political disagreement became intertwined with a literary discussion on the nature of Ukrainian proletarian literature that had erupted in spring 1925 between Serhii Pylypenko, founder of the Ukrainian peasant writers' organisation, and the acclaimed writer Mykola Khvylovyi. During the argument, Khvylovyi had claimed that Ukrainian culture must look to European literature for inspiration as the Russian canon could not provide this. Stalin interpreted Khvylovyi's opinions on literature as having political implica-

155 Mace, *Communism*, pp.122-30; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.544-5; Myroslav Shkandrij, *Modernists, Marxists and the Nation. The Ukrainian Literary Discussion of the 1920s*, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992, p.31f.

156 Mace, *Communism*, pp.225-30; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.542.

157 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.545-6. For more on the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, 'The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1920-1930: A Case Study in Religious Modernization', in Denis J. Dunn, *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, pp.310-47.

158 Mace, *Communism*, pp.93-4.

tions. He pointed to Khvylovyi's call to turn away from Russia as the type of sentiment that an acceleration of Ukrainianisation could promote. In June 1926, the opponents of Shumskyi and Khvylovyi launched a campaign against the two men. As a result, Shumskyi was forced to leave his post in March 1927, and Khvylovyi twice had to denounce his own ideological errors publicly, first at the end of 1926 and then in February 1928.¹⁵⁹

Mykola Skrypnyk replaced Shumskyi as commissar for education. Under Skrypnyk, the Ukrainianisation of a number of areas of public life reached its highpoint; for example, by 1932-3 88% of all pupils in the Soviet Ukraine were being taught in Ukrainian.¹⁶⁰ However, from 1928 to 1933 the Soviet Ukraine was subject to competing policies. In 1928, the First Five Year Plan was introduced to promote rapid industrialisation. Because rural exports were needed to provide the foreign capital for this, the private commerce of NEP was stopped and collectivisation was introduced to increase the party's control over agricultural production. This was accompanied by a campaign against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. 1930 saw the show trial of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in which prominent members of VUAN and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church were accused of plotting to overthrow the Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks also decided to bring 'class warfare' to the village by eliminating the 'village bourgeois', the so-called kulaks, who in 1930 were deported to Central Asia and Siberia. Collectivisation and dekulakisation reduced rural production drastically. Despite this, the government continued to demand the same level of grain from the peasants in 1932 as in the previous two years. As a result a terrible famine raged in the Ukraine during 1932-3 which claimed the lives of several million people.¹⁶¹

Many Ukrainians have come to think of this as a deliberate act of genocide against the Ukrainian people; it is used by Ukrainian historians to construct a myth of Ukrainian victimhood under the Soviet regime. This interpretation, however, has been contested, in particular by non-Ukrainian historians claiming that the Ukrainians suffered not on account of their ethnicity, but rather

159 For the scandal over Shumskyi's letter to Stalin see Mace, *Communism*, p.97f. The literary debate is the subject of Shkandrij, *Modernists, Marxists and the Nation*. On Khvylovyi, see also Mace, *Communism*, pp.120-160.

160 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.564.

161 Mace, *Communism*, p.264f; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.550f; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, p.238f.

from the fact that they were peasants. Certainly, the famine took place at the same time as a purge against the leaders of the KP(b)U. Skrypnyk committed suicide following a vicious campaign against him. Finally, in November 1933, the Ukrainian Politburo announced that the greatest danger was Ukrainian nationalism, not Russian great power chauvinism. Ukrainianisation had ended.¹⁶²

Thus, the Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s was very attractive to those Ukrainians willing to accept the Bolsheviks' sincerity: it boasted statehood, a cultural renaissance, increasing numbers of Ukrainians in the party and state bureaucracy, and economic policies beneficial to the peasants. However, the pro-Ukrainian policies were never uncontested within Soviet politics and experienced repeated setbacks, even when they were showing results, as can be seen from the Shumskyi affair. By the end of the 1920s, those opposed to Ukrainianisation had won the upper hand. The resulting campaign against Ukrainianisation and the onset of the famine robbed the Soviet Ukraine of its former attractiveness to émigrés. These events provide the timeframe for the present study: Ukrainian Sovietophilism was a phenomenon of the 1920s that was ended by the shifts in policy that culminated in the violence of the early 1930s.

The Ukrainian Lands under Polish Rule

A comparison with the situation in Poland, the country with the largest Ukrainian population outside of the Soviet Union, made the Soviet Ukraine all the more attractive to émigrés in the 1920s. The Poles had twice promised to recognise the rights of non-Polish minorities in international treaties, first in

162 For more on the debate around the famine, and whether it can be considered an act of genocide, see: James E. Mace, 'Zur aktuellen Diskussion über die ukrainische Hungersnot von 1932/3' in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler (eds.), *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, pp.126-44; Stephan Merl, 'War die Hungersnot von 1932-1933 eine Folge der Zwangskollektivierung der Landwirtschaft oder wurde sie bewusst im Rahmen der Nationalitätenpolitik herbeigeführt?' in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler (eds.), *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, pp.145-66; David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains. Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007, pp.35-77; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, pp.302-7, and Gerhard Simon, 'Holodomor als Waffe', *Osteuropa*, Vol.54, 2004, No.12, pp.37-56.

the Minorities Treaty of June 1919, then in the Treaty of Riga with the Soviet republics. Nevertheless, Poland followed a policy of active Polishisation in an attempt to turn the multi-national republic into a nation state.¹⁶³ The Poles set about incorporating Eastern Galicia into the administrative structure of the Second Republic despite the fact that the great powers had officially left the question of Eastern Galicia's sovereignty open. In March 1920, the name 'Eastern Galicia' was replaced with 'Eastern Little Poland'. This was divided into three administrative districts, the boundaries of which were gerrymandered in order to include as large a non-Ukrainian population as possible. The other Ukrainian territories were divided between Polish districts. Polish bureaucrats dominated the organs of local government. In education Polishisation was particularly strong. The Poles reneged on their promise to set up a Ukrainian university; indeed, they closed down all but one of the Ukrainian departments at the university of Lviv and placed restrictions on Ukrainian attendance at Polish universities. The 'lex Grabski', named after the minister of education, converted Ukrainian-language schools into bi-lingual or Polish-speaking ones, bringing about a radical reduction in the number of Ukrainian elementary schools. At the same time, the government policy of land redistribution clearly aimed to introduce more Poles to the Ukrainian regions. The government also sought to counter the Ukrainian nationalist movement by supporting those groups which did not consider themselves to be Ukrainian, for example the Russophiles. Moreover, the authorities tried to limit contacts between Ukrainians in the lands which had belonged to the Romanovs and those in Galicia in order to prevent the former from being 'contaminated' by the nationalism of the latter.¹⁶⁴

The Ukrainian resistance to these policies was very different in the territories which had been part of the Habsburg empire and those which had belonged to the Romanovs. The Galicians refused to recognise the new regime. The

163 Bohdan Budurowycz, 'Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol.25, 1983, No.4, pp.473-500 (pp.473-5); Alexander J. Groth, 'The Legacy of Three Crises: Parliament and Ethnic Issues in Prewar Poland', *Slavic Review*, Vol.28, 1968, No.4, pp.564-80 (p.565f).

164 Budurowycz, 'Poland', p.480; John-Paul Himka, 'Western Ukraine in the Interwar Period', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.22, 1994, No.2, pp.347-63 (p.351-4); Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, p.144

émigré ZUNR government under Petrushevych, encouraged by the Entente's postponement of their decision on the province, sought to win international support for the creation of an independent Eastern Galicia by petitioning the victorious powers.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, the Galician parties in Poland boycotted the 1922 elections to the Polish parliament. The Ukrainians in Volhynia and Polissia did participate in the elections. They sent 20 representatives to the *Sejm* and 6 to the senate, who voted for the budget and backed the government in a vote of confidence in March 1923.¹⁶⁶ In the same month, the Council of Ambassadors finally recognised the Polish annexation of Eastern Galicia. This act fundamentally discredited the attempts by Petrushevych to receive Entente support for the creation of an East Galician state. Petrushevych started following an openly Sovietophile policy.¹⁶⁷

One consequence of this was that the parties in the province moved away from the ZUNR government in exile and began to consider participation in the Polish political system. In order to this, they formed a new party, the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), in 1925. The party represented moderate nationalist opinion and was committed to parliamentary methods. Many of its members, for example Kost Levytskyi, had been prominent Ukrainian politicians under the Habsburgs. It thus represented a continuation of the pre-war tradition of Ukrainian nationalism. The long-term aim of the party was the achievement of an independent Ukrainian state. However, despite its ultimate goals, the party was prepared to work within the legal framework of the Polish Republic in order to improve the conditions of the Ukrainians living within it. From its entry into the Polish parliament in 1928, it was the largest Ukrainian party in Poland and was supported by the most important Ukrainian paper in Eastern Galicia, *Dilo*. In July 1935, the UNDO reached an agreement with the Polish government, called 'normalisation', which sought to grant a number of limited rights to Ukrainians. However, the

165 As contradictory as it may seem, the orientation towards the Allies did not rule out an attempt to turn to the Soviets. Petrushevych and his government in exile sought a solution through both at the same time.

166 Budurowycz, 'Poland', p.479.

167 See Chapter 6.

rapprochement did not halt the campaign of Polishisation, leading many within the party to become disillusioned with it.¹⁶⁸

Another consequence of the March 1923 decision on Eastern Galicia was the rise of the far right in the province. In 1921, the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created as a result of several initiatives by Ukrainian soldiers in emigration, most notably Ievhen Konovalts, who during the revolution had led the Sich Rifleman.¹⁶⁹ The organisation rejected parliamentary democracy and used violence to achieve the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. The UVO had structures both in Eastern Galicia and the emigration, and maintained, at least in the first years of its existence, close ties to the exiled ZUNR government.¹⁷⁰ From its inception onwards, the UVO sought to perpetrate assassinations of Poles and Ukrainian 'collaborators' and commit arson, sabotage and 'expropriations', that is the robbery of mail vans and post offices in order to gain funds for the movement.¹⁷¹ The attacks of 1921-2 were soon stamped out by the Polish authorities, and after 1923 the UVO found itself in a state of crisis. The organisation started gathering intelligence for the German military.¹⁷² From 1926, the UVO sought to rejuvenate itself by establishing contacts with the young Galician nationalists. As a result of these efforts, in 1929 Ievhen Konovalts and other representatives of Ukrainian nationalist organisations founded the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).¹⁷³ The OUN continued the policy of sabotage and assassination begun by UVO. Its activities provoked the Poles into an attempt to 'pacify' the

168 Budurowycz, 'Poland', pp.481-2. On UNDO and the attempt at 'normalisation', see *ibid* pp.490-5.

169 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.105-8; A.V. Kentii, *Ukrainska viikova orhanizatsiia (UVO) v 1920-1928 rr. Korotkyi narys*, Kyiv: Instytut Istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 1998, p.14-5. The Sich Rifleman were a military unit created following the outbreak of the revolution in the Russian empire. It was made up of Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia who had served in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War and had been captured and interned by the Russians. It fought for the UNR and its interventions in politics had a large effect on the state's fortunes.

170 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.105-7.

171 For a description of their activities, see: Alexander Motyl, 'Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland', *East European Quarterly*, Vol.19, 1985, No.1, pp.45-55.

172 Kentii, *UVO*, pp.32-4; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.108-11, 120-2. On the organisation's relationship with the Germans see Andrii Bolianovs'kyl, 'Cooperation between the German Military of the Weimar Republic and the Ukrainian Military Organisation, 1923-1928', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol.23, 1999, No.1/2, pp.73-84.

173 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.125-7, 150f.; Kentii, *UVO*, p.65f.

Ukrainian lands in September and November 1930: detachments of the Polish army and police force were sent to Eastern Galicia; they imprisoned Ukrainian activists and arbitrarily beat Ukrainians and burned down their property.¹⁷⁴

The nationalists were not the only group willing to resort to force. In the early 1920s, Polish rule was challenged by a Communist-inspired insurgent movement in Volhynia.¹⁷⁵ The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine (KPZU), an autonomous branch of the Polish Communist Party, was set up and advocated national and social liberation under the aegis of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. The disappointment in the ZUNR government following the March decision also benefited the Communists, as did the success of Ukrainianisation in the Soviet Ukraine. The KPZU was, however, a party wracked by contradictions. It was a supposedly proletarian party in a land which barely possessed a proletariat. The reason for its existence separate to that of the Polish Communists was the national particularity of the Ukrainians, yet many in the party were suspicious of such distinctions. This created conflict both within the KPZU and with the KP(b)U and the Polish Communists. Following the Shumskyi affair in the Soviet Ukraine, these intra-party debates became entwined with the developments in the Ukraine. The party split in 1928.¹⁷⁶

This growth of radical parties is but one indication of the difficulties for rapprochement between the Poles and Ukrainians. Such attempts did take place, for example the 1935 agreement between the UNDO and the Polish government mentioned above. Another was the Volhynia Experiment introduced under Henryk Józewski, a close associate of Piłsudski who became governor of Volhynia in 1928. Józewski, like Piłsudski, envisioned a multi-national Polish state and supported Ukrainian reading societies, a Ukrainian-language theatre and a Ukrainian cooperative organisation; UNR veterans found employment in the Volhynian state apparatus. This was an attempt to combat the growth of the KPZU and the UVO, but was also linked to Poland's conflict

174 Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.596-8; I.K Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh u zakhidnii Ukraini (1919-1939rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2001, No.5, pp.22-42 and No.6, pp.35-64 (No.6, pp.50-2).

175 Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine. 1919-1929*, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983, p.14-5; Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', 2001, No.6, p.38.

176 See Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, p.127f.

with the Soviet Union: Józewski spoke openly of turning the Soviet Ukraine into an independent state, and supported espionage activities on the other side of the border. However, Józewski only tolerated tightly managed expressions of Ukrainian national consciousness; the Ukrainian educational society *Prosvita* was banned and independent cooperatives closed down.¹⁷⁷ These restrictions show that the failure to find a way in which Poles and Ukrainians could live together was not simply a result of the rise in chauvinistic nationalism among both nationalities; the final aims of Polish and Ukrainian moderates like Józewski and the UNDO were also irreconcilable.

Timothy Snyder sums up the different conditions under which Ukrainians in Poland and those in the Soviet Union lived very succinctly when he writes that the 'situation of Ukrainians left in Soviet Ukraine by the Treaty of Riga was at first in some ways much better, and then in every way much worse. Whereas Polish democracy was alien, unrepresentative, and eventually curtailed, Soviet communism was brutal, totalitarian, and eventually genocidal. At first, while Poland fitfully pursued "national assimilation", Soviet policy helped to create a modern Ukrainian culture'. Consequently, argues Snyder, many Ukrainians saw Poland as the main enemy of Ukrainian national aspirations: in Ukrainian eyes, Poland had conquered Ukrainian territory, betrayed the Polish-Ukrainian alliance during the peace negotiations at Riga and subjected its Ukrainian subjects to a policy of Polonisation. Moreover, as deficient as Polish democracy may have been from the Ukrainian point of view, the Second Republic was not so repressive that it could stamp out all opposition.¹⁷⁸ This situation created fertile ground for Sovietophilism among Western Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian Emigration

Ukrainian Sovietophilism was also a product of the intellectual atmosphere and debates within the Ukrainian emigration. This émigré community was made up of those Ukrainians who had served or supported the Ukrainian state institutions set up 1917-21: the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Het-

177 Timothy Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War. A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005, pp.67-82.

178 Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, pp.141-2.

manate, the Directory and the West Ukrainian People's Republic. Some left the country following the collapse of the regime they had supported; others had served abroad as foreign representatives and now found themselves unable to return to their homeland. Another possible pool of recruitment for the Ukrainian emigration were those former soldiers of the Russian imperial army of ethnic 'Ukrainian' background, who had been captured and imprisoned by the Central Powers during the First World War. In addition, Denikin's army, which of course had been active in the Ukraine, included many who might otherwise have been considered to be Ukrainian.

Most of the émigrés went to Central Europe, although France later became attractive due to the economic conditions there. Petliura went first to Poland, his ally against the Soviet Union, then to Paris. The army he had led was interned in Poland, but after the closure of the camps in the mid-1920s a good number of Ukrainians travelled to France as labourers. In the early days of the emigration, Austria was also an important destination for the Ukrainian emigration as many Ukrainians had lived in the former Habsburg capital before the war. Czechoslovakia provided a refuge for exiled Ukrainians in the hope of using them against Poland. Many soldiers of the West Ukrainian state, who had fought against the Poles, escaped to Czechoslovakia, where they were interned. The Czechoslovakian government gave the émigrés support, for example, by helping them found Ukrainian educational institutions,¹⁷⁹ which attracted many émigrés who wanted to study to the country. The Ukrainian community in Germany contained many prisoners of war from the First World War who did not want to go home. In addition, Berlin became a centre for the Hetmanites and, after 1923, the ZUNR exile government. Rumania was also an important post in that a number of units of the UNR army retreated into the country following the defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks.¹⁸⁰

Membership of the Ukrainian emigration was determined not only by geographical origin but also by the subjective decision of individuals to identify

179 These included the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy in Podebrady and the Ukrainian Drahomanov Pedagogical Institute in Prague.

180 Frank Golczewski, 'Die ukrainische Emigration', in id. (ed.), *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1993, pp.224-40 (pp.231-3); Troshchynskyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, pp.20-50.

themselves with the Ukrainian nation. Many 'Ukrainians' had had little contact with the concept of an independent Ukrainian identity, for example, the 'Ukrainians' in Denikin's army and in the POW camps of the Central Powers.¹⁸¹ During the 1920s, Russian émigré institutions provided a relatively extensive infrastructure to meet the physical and spiritual needs of those who had fled the Russian empire. The offer of practical support must have drawn many 'Ukrainians' into the Russian community abroad, while the lack of a defined Ukrainian national identity ensured that there was no impediment to their fuller assimilation into Russian culture. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the passports issued by the League of Nations for emigrants did not recognise 'Ukrainian' as a nationality. On the whole, only those who had consciously adopted a Ukrainian identity resisted this process. This included above all those who had served in the governments and armies of the Ukrainian states, for whom the revolution had opened up a new political and national consciousness. Moreover, not all of those who professed themselves to be Ukrainian were accepted as such by others in the Ukrainian emigration. Hetman Skoropadskyi, especially, was often accused of being a Little Russian.¹⁸²

One consequence of this is that exact statistics for the size of the émigré community remain open to debate and manipulation for political purposes. A whole range of figures are available for different areas, at different times, based, if they give a reference at all, on different sources. The editor of the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* Volodymyr Kubijovych offers perhaps one of the more reliable estimates, claiming that there were between eighty and a hundred thousand Ukrainian émigrés in Central and Western Europe between the two world wars. By contrast, Roman Smal-Stotskyi, the Ukrainian envoy to

181 However, during the First World War the Central Powers allowed Ukrainian organisations to agitate inside the POW camps in order to use the Ukrainian question to undermine the Russian empire. Some Ukrainian prisoners of war may, therefore, have acquired a Ukrainian national consciousness. See Oleh Fedyshyn, 'The Germans and the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, 1914-1917', in Taras Hunczak (ed.), *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass.: HURI, 1977, pp.305-322 (pp.315-6).

182 Frank Golczewski, 'Die ukrainische und die russische Emigration', in Karl Schlögel (ed.), *Russische Emigration in Deutschland 1918 bis 1941. Leben im europäischen Bürgerkrieg*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995, pp.77-84 (p.79); Troshchynskyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, pp.35, 59.

Germany, wrote that there were 100,000 Ukrainians in Berlin alone, most likely in order to retain his status against that of the Soviet bodies.¹⁸³

A second consequence can be seen in the social structure of the Ukrainian emigration. According to studies carried out by the émigrés in the 1920s, in Czechoslovakia 55% of the émigrés were peasants, 13% were workers, 25% members of the intelligentsia and 7% came from other classes; in Rumania the picture was similar – here the peasants represented 58.2%, workers 12.9% and the intelligentsia 28.9%. The majority had received some sort of education. In Czechoslovakia only 15% were illiterate and 20% almost illiterate, whereas 20% had primary-school education, 35% had attended secondary school and 5% had studied at an institute of higher education.¹⁸⁴ Thus, though peasants formed the majority, they were present in a much smaller proportion than in the Ukraine; in contrast, the intelligentsia was considerably over-represented. This was a natural consequence of the fact that the Ukrainian emigration was a community by and large formed by conscious identification with the struggle for Ukrainian statehood, which was strongest among the intelligentsia. During the inter-war period, social differences seem to have levelled out, creating a relatively homogenous community. According to a 1942 survey in Germany, among those who had left the Ukraine following the First World War there were no illiterates, and 90% had completed a course of higher education. Thus, Frank Golczewski has argued that the Ukrainian emigration was formed from the upwardly mobile classes, for whom education or military service had acted as an agent of social mobilisation and promoted the acquisition of a national consciousness.¹⁸⁵

The Ukrainian émigrés were, therefore, highly politicised and had a strong national identity. The 1917-21 revolutions had opened serious rifts in the Ukrainian national movement, which the exiles' political impotence deepened. This created a highly volatile émigré intellectual scene in which various groups sought every possible opportunity, often with the support of foreign

183 Golczewski, 'Die ukrainische und die russische Emigration', pp.77-9. See also Troshchynskyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, p.20.

184 Troshchynskyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, p.50.

185 Golczewski, 'Die ukrainische Emigration', p.230; id., 'Die ukrainische und die russische Emigration', p.80.

governments, to realise their national aspirations. Some turned to Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia. Others sought help from the Soviet Union.

Hetman Skoropadskyi represented the conservative end of the Ukrainian émigré community. He was an anomaly in the Ukrainian emigration in that he had been a general in the Russian army and was seen by many as a representative of the old order. Only during the revolution had he become a member of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Indeed, the Hetman maintained contacts with the Russian émigrés, attending the Bad Reichenhalla meeting of 1923, at which the Russian monarchists sought to create a unified platform.¹⁸⁶ Skoropadskyi made Weimar Germany his base in emigration, where he fostered the contacts to the German generals who had brought him to power during the occupation.¹⁸⁷ With their help his group dominated the Ukrainian Scientific Institute (*Ukrainskyi naukovi institut*), which was founded in Berlin in 1926.¹⁸⁸

In the early years, two prominent intellectuals, both of whom were supporters of Skoropadskyi, were at the head of the institute's work: Viacheslav Lypynskyi and Dmytro Doroshenko. Lypynskyi was the chief ideologue of the Hetmanate movement. He envisioned an independent Ukrainian state as an order based on hereditary monarchy, the Hetman, and a Ukrainian aristocracy which would be guided by the interests of the agrarian classes. Membership of the Ukrainian nation would not be determined on ethnic and linguistic grounds, but rather by loyalty to the state; in this way the creation of a Ukrainian state was the prerequisite for the formation of the Ukrainian nation, not the other way round.¹⁸⁹ This aristocratic ideology did not win mass support for the Hetmanites; indeed, the Hetman alienated even more émigrés when in return for a pension from the Hungarian government he agreed to recognise Hungary's claim to Sub-Carpathian Rus. A number of Skoropadskyi's former

186 Robert C. Williams, *Culture in Exile. Russian Émigrés in Germany 1881-1941*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972, p.177.

187 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.23-4.

188 Carsten Kumke, 'Das Ukrainische Wissenschaftliche Institut in Berlin. Zwischen Politik und Wissenschaft', *Janrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol.43, 1995, No.2, pp.218-53 (p.221).

189 Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', pp.109-113; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.23-8.

supporters, including Lypynskyy, abandoned him.¹⁹⁰ By the end of the 1920s, the Hetmanites found themselves competing with the new nationalist parties for influence in German circles, so that eventually they gradually lost their favoured position here.¹⁹¹

Ievhen Petrushevych, head of the ZUNR government set up in Eastern Galicia, also found it difficult to garner support among the émigré community. After the split with the UNR, Petrushevych followed a policy purely concerned with the fate of Galicia. He hoped that the Entente would decide in favour of the independence of the territory, and tried to lobby the powers meeting at the Peace Conference in favour of this.¹⁹² However, the decision in 1923 by the Council of Ambassadors to recognise Polish sovereignty over the province ended the pro-Entente direction of the ZUNR government in exile. Instead, Petrushevych adopted an openly Sovietophile position. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. As the head of the East Galician government in exile, Petrushevych had initially commanded the loyalty of the Galician parties remaining in the province and of the UVO, the paramilitary group led by Ievhen Konovalts. However, his remoteness from Galicia, his obsession with an international solution to the province's status, his abandonment of an all-Ukrainian policy and, later, his Sovietophilism, caused tension with both the parties in Galicia and the UVO. By 1927, he had split with both. In response, Petrushevych formed his own party, the Ukrainian Party of Work (UPP), and a military group, the West Ukrainian National-Revolutionary Organisation, but by the end of the twenties both had become insignificant.¹⁹³

As will be demonstrated, in the early 1920s it was above all the socialists who were attracted to the Soviet republics; however, this was a thorny issue among the Ukrainian left and led to much disagreement. Volodymyr Vynnychenko had been one of the first émigrés to go into exile after he fell out with Petliura over the course the Directory should take. He travelled to Vienna where, after a split with those USDRP members who supported the Directory, he formed the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party with other

190 Alexander Motyl, 'Viacheslav Lypynsk'kyi and the Ideology and Politics of Ukrainian Monarchism', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol.27, 1985, No.1, pp.31-48 (p.43).

191 Kumke, 'Ukrainische Wissenschaftliche Institut', p.230-4.

192 Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', 2001, No.6, p.36.

193 Kentii, *UVO*, pp.42-3; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.39-43, 119-122.

dissidents from the USDRP. They argued in favour of reconciliation with the Soviet regime for the good of the international revolution. Vynnychenko travelled to Moscow and Kharkiv in order to put his policy of rapprochement into practice. He was, however, disappointed at his treatment by the Bolshevik leaders and the policies followed in the Ukraine. He re-emigrated and conducted a vocal campaign against the Soviet Ukraine which split the Foreign Group, some of whom returned to the Ukraine. Vynnychenko began to withdraw from the political life of the emigration. Nevertheless, over the next decade he continued to flirt with Sovietophilism. These events shall be studied in more detail in Chapter Three.

The Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries abroad, who hailed from the other major Ukrainian socialist party, were organised in a body called the 'Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries'. It, too, was subject to infighting. The first split came in 1920 when the faction led by Mykola Kovalevskyi¹⁹⁴ and Mykola Zaluzniak¹⁹⁵ were excluded for their alleged right-wing tendencies. A more serious division came in 1921 between the pro-Soviet faction under Hrushevskyi and their opponents led by Mykyta Shapoval. Shapoval left Hrushevskyi's group and formed the Foreign Committee of the UPSR as a rival to the Foreign Delegation, while Hrushevskyi and his supporters returned to the Soviet Ukraine. The Foreign Committee was followed, after Shapoval had fallen out with the body's other members, by the Foreign Organisation of the UPSR. Indeed, Shapoval spent the rest of the decade in a spree of fruitless organising, one failed common socialist front to be followed by another. Much of this activity was supported by the Czechoslovakian government. Shapoval's most successful venture was the

194 Kovalevskyi, Mykola (1892-1957): a leading member of the UPSR who served in three of the Central Rada governments. He emigrated in 1919 and finally settled in Innsbruck, where he wrote many articles and books on the Soviet system. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.641-2.

195 Zaluzniak, Mykola (1888-1950): a member of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, an organisation of East Ukrainian émigrés which during the First World War lobbied the Central Powers to support the Ukrainian cause. He headed the UNR mission to Finland between 1919 and 1920, then settled in Vienna. After the Second World War, he was captured by the Soviets and sent to prison, where he died. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, ed. Danylo Husar Struk, p.805.

paper *Nova Ukraina*, which he founded in 1922. In January 1923, Volodymyr Vynnychenko joined its editorial board.¹⁹⁶

A counterpart to the return of Eastern Ukrainians to the Soviet Ukraine was the trend whereby many Ukrainians from the West Ukrainian lands also went home, even though these lands now belonged to the Second Polish Republic. This tendency was particularly strong after the Western powers' recognition of Polish suzerainty over Eastern Galicia ended the ZUNR's hopes that the Entente would create an East Galician state. The Poles issued an amnesty to take advantage of this trend.¹⁹⁷ The returnees included conservative nationalists, such as Kost Levytskyi and Pavlo Lysiak, and socialists, for example Volodymyr Levynskyi and Antin Krushelnytskyi; even Ievhen Konovalets, the leader of the far-right Ukrainian Military Organisation, went back to Eastern Galicia, if only for a short time. Their return did not necessarily indicate acceptance of the Western Ukraine's subjugation to Polish rule. Levytskyi and Lysiak took part in the legal opposition to the Poles, while Levynskyi and Krushelnytskyi were involved in the Soviet-funded journal *Novi shliakhy*, and Konovalets organised military resistance to Warsaw. The Second Polish Republic and the Soviet Union were, of course, very different political regimes: to name but one crucial difference, the Soviet Union was a one-party state, whereas in Poland the Ukrainians were able to form legal opposition parties. It is unlikely that the political considerations behind return to the former were very similar to those motivating travel to the latter, although Eastern and Western Ukrainians may have had similar personal reasons for going back to their homelands, for example homesickness and the material and emotional difficulties of émigré life.

However, there was also an overtly Polonophile course. In April 1920, Symon Petliura, the head of the UNR, signed a treaty with the Poles and supported their offensive against the Soviet Union. Petliura was always the weaker party in the relationship with Poland. He was not even invited to attend the conference in Riga which concluded the war between Poland and the USSR. This did not end his pro-Polish policy, although it certainly attracted immense unpopularity within the emigration. Galicians especially were angered, for in his

196 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.52-4.

197 Troshchynskyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, p.28.

treaty he had recognised Poland's claim to the province.¹⁹⁸ It also caused a split among the UNR. Andrii Makarenko¹⁹⁹ and Fedir Shvets²⁰⁰ left Petliura and set up a group based in Vienna and Prague, which portrayed itself as the successor to the UNR. After the failure of the attack, Petliura remained in Poland until 1923, when he left for Paris, in order to reduce the UNR's dependence on the Poles.²⁰¹ Still, many of his supporters entered into Polish service, for example helping Henryk Józewski implement his experiment in Volhynia.²⁰²

In the same year, Petliura wrote a booklet setting out what he described as the task of the Ukrainian emigration. He stressed that it was necessary to create a single unified national movement under military leadership. He also called for members of the Ukrainian emigration to spread knowledge of the Ukraine among their host countries, and to win support for the Ukrainian cause by impressing foreigners with the discipline and unity of the Ukrainian national movement. This search for allies should not be limited by party affiliation; the aid of all groups should be sought.²⁰³ Indeed, the UNR in exile established links to Paris and London, and, through the creation of the 'Promethean League', it sought to ally itself with other representatives of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR.²⁰⁴ However, despite this abandonment of political criteria in the search for allies, it was clear that the UNR had shifted to the right, abandoning altogether the socialism it had once professed.²⁰⁵ Petliura's assassination in 1926 greatly reduced the effectiveness of the UNR

198 Ihor Kamenetskyi, 'UNR i Ukrainska zahranichna polityka mizh dvoma svitovymi viinamy', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, Vol.30, 1993, No.1-4, pp.78-97 (pp.79-84).

199 Makarenko, Andrii (1886-1963): served in the Hetman government during the revolution, but later cooperated in the revolt against Skoropadskyi, and took up a post in the Directory of the UNR. Following his emigration he settled in Czechoslovakia. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, ed. Danylo Husar Struk, p.274.

200 Shvets, Fedir (1882-1940): a member of the UPSR and the Directory. He emigrated to Prague and took on posts in the Ukrainian educational institutions there. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, ed. Danylo Husar Struk, p.689.

201 Golczewski, 'Die ukrainische Emigration', p.232.

202 Snyder, *Sketches*, p.74.

203 Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', pp.105-6; Arkadii Zhukovskiy, 'Symon Petliura i zavdannia emigratsii', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, Vol.34, 1999, No. 2-4, pp.175-184 (pp.179-80).

204 Kamenetskyi, 'UNR', pp.84-8.

205 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.45-6.

in exile. Petliura, however, became a martyr, and a national hero. Moreover, the fact that he had been killed by a Jew, Samuel Schwartzbard, in revenge for the pogroms in the Ukraine during the civil war, greatly increased the level of anti-Semitism within the exile community.²⁰⁶

Petliura's turn to the right was symptomatic of the emergence of a new nationalism which came to dominate the émigré scene. It claimed to place the interests of nation and state above those of party and class. The central thinker of this ideology was Dmytro Dontsov. Dontsov believed that the events of 1917-21 had proved that the 'law of struggle' governed life. The Ukrainians had failed to create a state because of the heritage of nineteenth-century nationalism, which he believed was dominated by 'provençalism', meaning the tendency to atomise the nation, advocate social progress and place an emphasis on intellect. He contrasted 'provençalism' with 'active nationalism', which was inculcated with 'the "will to life" and the "will to power" ', and 'recognises as moral and ethical only that which increases the strength of the nation and guarantees its growth'. This new nationalism of the will called for a new type of nationalist, decisive and spontaneous; he wanted 'Ukrainians for the Ukraine', not 'the Ukraine for the Ukrainians'. This generation of nationalists would be the 'initiative minority', who would lead the national struggle; the people, in contrast, were only a 'passive factor'.²⁰⁷ Dontsov styled his brand of nationalism as ideologically pure, cleansed of the 'garbage and mud' which had been attached to it in the past, presumably meaning the concern with social questions which before the First World War had been the Siamese twin of Ukrainian nationalism.²⁰⁸ This was all mixed up with a violent hate of Russia, which he believed was locked in a clash of civilisations with the West – including the Ukraine.²⁰⁹

Two groups especially were attracted to this nationalism: Ukrainian students and soldiers – indeed, often they were one and the same set of people.²¹⁰

206 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.49-51.

207 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.75-8.

208 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.69-70. Some extracts from Dontsov's works can be found in Ralph Lindheim and George S.N. Luckyj (eds.), *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine. An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996, pp.261-8.

209 Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', pp.113-5; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.62-4.

210 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.87.

They founded a number of organisations which propounded the new brand of Dontsovian nationalism, including the Group of Ukrainian National Youth, established in 1922 among Ukrainians in the internment camps of Liberec and Josefov, and the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, founded in 1925 by East Ukrainian exiles who had served in the army of the UNR. They inherited from Dontsov the belief in the primacy of the law of struggle and placed the attainment of the unity and independence of the Ukraine above any moral qualms such as mercy or altruism. They therefore stressed the need for ruthless action and a reliance on 'our own forces'.²¹¹

The Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was another important group from this milieu. As already mentioned above, this body was created in 1920/21 as the result of a number of initiatives by Ukrainian émigré soldiers, most notably the leader of the Sich Riflemen, Ievhen Konovalets.²¹² The new organisation aimed to maintain military discipline within the emigration in order to achieve a united and independent Ukraine. The Ukrainian soldiers wanted a purely military body, which was above political factionalism, and therefore was, in the words of one of the many military bodies formed at this time, an 'organisation, not territorial or class[-based], but national'.²¹³ From its inception, the UVO maintained close links to the ZUNR government in exile and established units in Eastern Galicia.²¹⁴ The ties with the former, as mentioned above, were tense from the outset, and during the mid-1920s a fierce struggle took place within the ranks of the UVO between Konovalets and Petrushevych, which eventually led to the expulsion of the latter's supporters from the ranks of the organisation.²¹⁵ The UVO's relationship with the ideologue of the new Ukrainian nationalism was also fraught. Konovalets supported Dontsov in the creation of a journal *Zahrava*, but the failure of this venture soured relations between them.²¹⁶

The UVO was set apart from the other military organisations formed among exiled Ukrainians in that it had a following among Galician youth and was

211 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.129f, especially pp.130-31.

212 Kentii, *UVO*, p.14; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.105-8.

213 Kentii, *UVO*, p.16.

214 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.106-7.

215 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.119-22.

216 Kentii, *UVO*, pp.55-6, 59-61; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.113-8.

able to play a role in the politics of the 'homeland'.²¹⁷ As mentioned above, throughout the 1920s the UVO conducted a violent campaign in Eastern Galicia and gathered intelligence. The concentration on spying strengthened the ties between the UVO and the German military, who saw the Ukrainians as a useful tool in its conflict with Poland.²¹⁸ The UVO also looked for support from other enemies of Poland, including Lithuania²¹⁹ and, perhaps most surprisingly considering the UVO's ideological outlook, the Soviet Union.²²⁰

By the mid-1920s, the UVO was facing stiff competition from both proponents of a legal opposition to Polish rule – by 1926 the majority of East Galician parties had begun to participate in the Polish political system – and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine. The UVO's efforts to create an anti-Polish front had failed.²²¹ Konovalts therefore decided to turn to the nationalist organisations in the emigration, such as the Group of Ukrainian National Youth and the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, and those in the Polish occupied lands, in order to give the military organisation a broad political and ideological base. The result of several years of negotiation was the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was founded in 1929.²²² The ideology of the group was heavily influenced by Dontsov, although he remained aloof from the OUN. This was partially due to the personal conflict between the ideologue and Konovalts. However, ideological differences also existed. For Dontsov nationalism remained purely in the realm of ideas: in order to realise Ukrainian statehood, he argued, it was necessary to identify 'the Ukrainian national idea', for only this could motivate the masses to fight and die for the Ukraine.²²³ In contrast, the OUN saw the problem as one of organisation. Nationalists must harmonise the various organs of the nation in order to create a Ukrainian state. Unlike Dontsov, they tried to describe the nature of this state, which would be hierarchical and corporatist.²²⁴ Still, many themes of the OUN's ideology had a familiar tone. They emphasised the law of struggle and

217 Kentii, *UVO*, p.23.

218 Kentii, *UVO*, pp.50-2. For more details on the relationship between the Germans and the UVO see Bolianovskiy, 'Cooperation'.

219 Kentii, *UVO*, pp.35-6; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.125.

220 Kentii, *UVO*, pp.44-5; Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', 2001, No.6, p.40.

221 Kentii, *UVO*, pp.55-6, 58; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.125-7..

222 Kentii, *UVO*, p.55f, Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.114f.

223 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.76-7.

224 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.135, 165-6.

the redundancy of parliamentary methods. They placed the good of the nation as the highest category of worth, and called for a unification of all constituent parts of the nation, damning socialism and liberalism as harmfully dividing it. Lastly, they stressed the need for a leading stratum of nationalists to lead it.²²⁵

The OUN receives a special place in the literature on the Ukrainian emigration because of the role it played during the Second World War. During the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, it aided the advancing Wehrmacht, believing that the 'Third Reich' would create some form of Ukrainian state. Indeed, in a rash attempt to force a decision upon the Germans, the Bandera faction of the OUN made a declaration of Ukrainian independence. Following the failure of the pro-German course, many OUN members began to undertake as members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which the OUN came to dominate, a partisan war against both the Germans and the Soviets. In 1944, however, the UPA joined forces with the Wehrmacht and Nazi Germany freed all the Ukrainian political leaders in order to form a collaborationist body.²²⁶

Though perhaps the OUN best embodied the new nationalism, many of its tenets were actually commonplaces among the Ukrainian emigration. As mentioned above, many supporters of the UNR abandoned the socialism which they had once professed, calling for a unification of all national forces, regardless of party or class affiliation, under a strong disciplined leadership. For example, Petliura, who had been a member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, now came to place the achievement of national unity above party and class interests.²²⁷ Lypynskyi used very similar language to the integral nationalists, calling for the creation of a corporate state, based on the principle of hierarchy,²²⁸ and the leadership of the national struggle by 'an active minority with an elemental inclination to power, to leadership and to organisation'.²²⁹

225 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.153f.

226 These events are described in John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, Englewood, Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990 and Franziska Bruder, "*Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!*" *Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929-1948*, Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2007.

227 Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', p.105; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.45-6.

228 Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', pp.110-1.

229 Quoted in Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.84.

Another commonplace identified by Motyl as symptomatic of the new ideology was the rejection of 'orientations' towards foreign powers in favour of achieving a Ukrainian state by means of 'our own forces'.²³⁰ However, by refusing to rely on other forces, the Ukrainian nationalists were not renouncing allies of all kinds. Rather, the slogan of 'our own forces' referred to a reliance on one's own, and not a foreign, ideology. As has been shown above, all the groups in the Ukrainian emigration searched for allies abroad, including the OUN. Indeed, according to Golczewski, the lack of choosiness in the Ukrainians' selection of allies was a characteristic common to the non-socialist members of the emigration, and it was this preparedness which provided one of the theoretical foundations of the collaboration with the Third Reich. According to Golczewski, a profound change in emphasis took place in the thought of the inter-war emigration: whereas before the revolution Ukrainian nationalists had talked of the liberation of a nation which already existed, after the revolution the émigrés began consciously to argue that the nation itself needed to be created. This understanding, he argues, underpinned the Ukrainians' search for allies. In this way, the 'tactics' were a central element of the émigrés' ideological world view.²³¹

The dominant trend in the Ukrainian emigration, therefore, was the emergence of a brand of nationalism which placed the achievement of a united and independent Ukrainian state as the highest good, to which everything else must be subordinated. It reflected tendencies in other communities following the First World War. At the same time, this 'turn to the right' had its own specifically Ukrainian character. It originated in the émigrés' experience of the wars against the Poles and Bolsheviks, the failure of the Ukrainian parties to create a Ukrainian state and the disillusionment over the March decision on Eastern Galicia. Thus, the majority of the Sovietophiles, who pursued social and class aspirations and saw Ukrainian statehood being realised in a federation with Russia, were going against the prevailing intellectual current of the Ukrainian emigration.

230 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.172.

231 Golczewski, 'Politische Konzepte', pp.116-7.

Conclusion

Before 1917, Ukrainians lacked recent memories of their own state; their culture was mocked and suppressed. In contrast, under the Bolsheviks the Ukrainians officially achieved statehood, albeit within the context of the Soviet Union; Ukrainian art and culture underwent an unprecedented renaissance; Ukrainians, many of whom had been members of the national movement, took on an ever greater role in the social and political life of their country, and the NEP had introduced economic policies more favourable to the peasants. Many of those raised in the traditions of Ukrainian populism, which stressed the liberation of the peasantry and the achievement of Ukrainian national and cultural goals within a federation with Russia, were therefore willing to see the Soviet Ukraine as the culmination of their aims. They only need look to Poland, where their compatriots were subjected to Polonisation, to see how the situation could be worse. At the same time, the exile community in which left-wing Ukrainian émigrés lived was undergoing a fundamental change; the new integral nationalism renounced many beliefs which the Ukrainian populists had held dear and sought to incorporate concepts to the Ukrainian nation-building project that were inimical to the left.

Thus, the motivating factors behind Sovietophilism can be organised into those relating to social goals (meaning the reconstruction of society through socialism), such as the legacy of populism and the importance of the peasant question, and those connected to national aspirations, for example the national achievements of the Soviet Ukraine. The next five chapters will investigate how the Sovietophiles' writings dealt with these different elements and explore whether the pro-Soviet émigrés were more attracted to the Soviet Ukraine on national or social grounds. Connected to this, they will examine how the key events highlighted in this chapter – the revolution, the March decision on Galicia, the introduction of *korenizatsiia*, the Shumskyi debates and the famine – shaped the development of Ukrainian Sovietophilism and were reflected in the arguments put forward in favour of working with the Bolsheviks. This will create a picture of how Ukrainian Sovietophilism changed over the 1920s in response to events and allow a periodisation of the movement. In particular, the book will question the claim that Ukrainian Sovietophilism

only appeared in 1923 in response to the March decision and the introduction of Ukrainianisation.

3 Volodymyr Vynnychenko and the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party

Introduction

The first to take up a Sovietophile position was the author and playwright Volodymyr Vynnychenko. Volodymyr Vynnychenko was one of the most prominent literary figures of his generation. Not only was he the first Ukrainian writer to support himself only through his literary work, he was also the first to achieve some international recognition in his own lifetime. Moreover, he was an important member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and in June 1917 he was appointed head of the General Secretariat of the Central Rada. In November 1918, he helped set up the Directory which overthrew Skoropadskyi's government, but he later fell out with Symon Petliura, the commander of the Directory's armed forces. As a result of this disagreement he left the Ukraine in 1919. In the emigration he adopted a pro-Soviet stance and in 1920 travelled to Moscow and Kharkiv to negotiate with the Bolsheviks.

Vynnychenko's reputation in the Ukrainian diaspora was long tainted by the memory of his Sovietophilism. Ivan Rudnytsky portrayed Vynnychenko's support for the Bolsheviks as a symptom of the poverty of his social and political thought.²³² However, two authors, Hryhorii Kostiuk and Melanie Czajkowskyj, have sought to recapture Vynnychenko for the Ukrainian national pantheon. Kostiuk argued that the writer returned to the Ukraine in order to achieve the independence and unification of the Ukraine and, though he suffered terrible privation, never once compromised his ideals for personal gain,²³³ whereas Czajkowskyj portrayed him as an adamant and sharp critic of the Soviet

232 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko's Ideas in the Light of his Political Writings', in id., *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Edmonton: CIUS, 1987, pp.417-36.

233 Hryhorii Kostiuk, 'Misiia V. Vynnychenka v Moskvi i Kharkivi 1920 roku', in Hryhorii Kostiuk, *Volodymyr Vynnychenko ta ioho doba*, New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, 1980, pp.210-225 (pp.224-5).

state.²³⁴ Both of these interpretations are flawed. They misrepresent Vynnychenko's aims in travelling to Moscow and Kharkiv, overemphasising the national at the expense of the social. They portray his comments as overwhelmingly critical, when in fact one of his most notable characteristics at this time was his preparedness after every humiliation to seek reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. They both uncritically accept Vynnychenko's portrayal of his own importance to the Bolsheviks. Moreover, neither sought to portray the event in the context of Vynnychenko's journalistic writings of the period, which were published in the newspaper he edited, *Nova doba* (The New Era). The two latter failings are also evident in the more recent work on Vynnychenko by V.K. Soldatenko, whose research seeks to argue that a genuinely Ukrainian Communism could have developed in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.²³⁵

When studying Vynnychenko's relationship with the Bolsheviks it is necessary to remember that Ukrainian Marxists had always faced a dilemma: the need to reconcile the demands of the international revolution with Ukrainian national aspirations. For example, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), which was founded in 1900 by Ukrainian Marxists and nationalists, was not able to satisfy both wings of the party. In 1902, those who believed national independence was a more pressing task than social liberation left to form the Ukrainian People's Party. Three years later another group split off from the RUP to form the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union (the *Spilka*). They condemned nationalism as a bourgeois ideology and joined the Russian Social Democratic Party. Following the departure of the left, the RUP renamed itself the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP). The new party hoped to synthesise the nationalist and the socialist causes.²³⁶ Though small, the party produced many leading members of the intelligentsia, who, as in the case of Vynnychenko, went on to play central roles in the Ukrainian revolution.

234 Melanie Czajkowskyj, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko and his Mission to Moscow and Kharkiv', *Journal of Graduate Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 3, 1978, No.2, pp.3-24 (p.23).

235 V.F. Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b) 1920r. pro V. Vynnychenka', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2005, No.4, pp.70-89, and id. 'Evolutsiia suspilno-politychnykh pohliadov V.K. Vynnychenka v doby ukrainskoi revoliutsii', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1994, No.6, pp.15-26 and 1995, No.1, pp.13-22.

236 Borys, 'Political Parties', pp.132-4, 140-1, and Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.378-9.

However, the USDRP also experienced divisions on this issue. During the German occupation of the Ukraine in 1918, a left wing emerged in the party calling for the transformation of the UNR into an independent, Soviet government. In January 1919, at the Sixth Congress of the USDRP, the group failed to pass a resolution on this matter and it abandoned the party. Those who had left became known as the *Nezalezhnyky* (Independentists). The new party was also critical of the KP(b)U, charging it with Russian chauvinism and failing to understand the national question in the Ukraine. They believed that the Ukraine required its own revolutionary centre and socialist republic, which would enter into a close alliance with the other Soviet republics. The group at first openly fought the KP(b)U by organising a rising with the help of the warlord Danylo Zelenyi.²³⁷ Following the collapse of this insurrection they changed their tactics. In January 1920, they renamed themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP – following these initials the party became known as the *Ukapisty*). They began petitioning Comintern for admission as the sole representative of the Ukrainian proletariat. Nevertheless, they remained firm critics of Bolshevik policy within the Ukraine.²³⁸

As a member of the USDRP, Vynnychenko, too, experienced the conflict between the national and social goals of the Ukrainian movement. In 1917, Vynnychenko wrote in the organ of the USDRP, *Robitnycha hazeta*, that the time for a social revolution had not yet come. The Ukrainian nation had not yet fully developed and as a consequence strong class antagonisms did not exist within it. The absence of these antagonisms promoted national unity and created favourable conditions for the achievement of Ukrainian national goals. To try to conduct a revolution under class slogans would split the Ukrainian movement and threaten the national revolution.²³⁹

The loss of Kyiv to the Red Army at the beginning of 1918 forced Vynnychenko to rethink this. He came to the conclusion that the Central Rada's concentration on the national question had hindered the solution of important

237 Zelenyi, Danylo (1883-1919): one of the many *otamans* or warlords to spring up in the Ukraine during the revolution. He cooperated with the *Nezalezhnyky* after they broke away from the USDRP and the Directory, and at different times he fought against the Whites, the Bolsheviks and the Directory. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.835.

238 Mace, *Communism*, pp.74-9.

239 Soldatenko, 'Evolutsiia', 1994, No.6, pp.18.

social problems, especially that of the redistribution of the land. Consequently, the Ukrainian working masses had not been drawn into the revolution. The resolution of the social question now became the precondition for the achievement of national goals and Vynnychenko rejected the idea of a united national front.²⁴⁰ At the end of 1918, following the Directory's occupation of Kyiv, Vynnychenko proposed creating a Soviet system of government with power in the hands of the representatives of the working classes; the 'moderate, petit bourgeois and national elements' would be excluded. He believed that the Russian Soviet Republic was the natural ally for the UNR and was a strong advocate in favour of peace talks with the Bolsheviks. In negotiations with two leading Bolsheviks, Dmytro Manuil'skyi and Khristiiian Rakovskii he sought assurances that the Bolsheviks would recognise the Directory following the fall of Skoropad'skyi.²⁴¹

Vynnychenko's turn to the left widened the cleft between himself and his party colleague in the Directory, Symon Petliura, who was in charge of the Directory's armed forces. Petliura favoured an alliance with the Entente, was not interested in the social experiments advocated by Vynnychenko and believed that Ukrainian statehood was best served by strengthening the military. The failure of negotiations with Russia weakened the radicals in the Directory and Vynnychenko could no longer remain head of the government. He resigned in order to allow the Directory to make an alliance with the Entente. Having been removed from the leadership of the Ukrainian revolution, Vynnychenko left the country.²⁴²

Vynnychenko's Reassessment of the Ukrainian Revolution

Vynnychenko abandoned the Ukraine not because the Bolsheviks had driven him from the country, but rather due the differences between himself and his party colleagues in the Directory. Though he had begun to advocate the crea-

240 Soldatenko, 'Evoliutsiia', 1994, No.6, pp.22-3.

241 Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 'Directory', p.91, 93-4. The quotation appears on p.91. Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.498; Soldatenko, 'Evoliutsiia', 1995, No.1 pp.13-4.

242 Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 'Directory', p.93f. On Vynnychenko's critique of Petliura and the Directory, see Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk. Tom pershyi 1911-1920*, ed. Hryhorii Kostiuk, Edmonton and New York: CIUS and the Vynnychenko Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of the Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1980, pp.305-7, 310, 313-4; on his reaction to leaving the Directory, see op. cit., p.322.

tion of a state based on worker, peasant and soldier Soviets, he continued to oppose the Bolshevik party. This would, however, change during his first year as an émigré.

By the middle of March 1919, Vynnychenko was in Austria. In his diary entries at this time he portrayed himself as being torn between a desire to stay out of politics and the wish to help his country in its moment of need. He maintained an interest in the development of revolution in Europe and it was Bela Kun's takeover of power in Hungary which convinced him to return to the political stage. On 28th March, Vynnychenko received a telegram from two Ukrainian emissaries in Budapest asking him to go to the Hungarian capital to undertake talks with the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet governments. Kun hoped to unite Hungary with the two other Soviet republics. Ukrainian support was central as a bridge between Russia and Central Europe. Vynnychenko agreed to go, but he had doubts about negotiating with the Bolsheviks. In his diary he asked whether the Bolsheviks' victory and the creation of the socialist order, 'the birth of which I welcome with ecstasy in my soul', would also mean defeat in the Ukrainian question. This suggested an alternative course of action: 'do not allow the initiative of power from Ukrainian hands. Let there be Bolshevism, let there be reaction, let there be moderation, let there be any form of power so that it is *ours*, national.'²⁴³ Though Vynnychenko did not write that this was the line he intended to take, only a month later he had clearly ruled out such a stance. He came to rest his hopes for the Ukraine on the victory of revolution in the rest of the world.

On 30th March, Vynnychenko arrived in Budapest with another Social Democrat, Iurii Tyshchenko; he met Kun on the same day. Vynnychenko set out five conditions for talks with Moscow, the main points being the independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine, the formation of a Ukrainian national government including the *Nezalezhnyky* and the left-wing SRs, and a military union against hostile powers. Kun assured him that Lenin had already accepted these conditions, though he preferred to leave the question of the composition of the government open. Nevertheless, Vynnychenko remained convinced that the Soviet Ukrainian government, which had so recently re-

243 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, pp.323-8. The quotation is on p.328.

nounced Ukrainian sovereignty, would not agree.²⁴⁴ On 3rd April, his fears were confirmed when they received a telegram saying that Rakovskii had refused Vynnychenko's conditions, despite Moscow's attempts to get the Ukrainian government to consent. Hungarian hopes kept the talks alive, despite Vynnychenko's conviction that the Russians' imperialism and nationalism outweighed their love for socialism.²⁴⁵ However, a telegram received from Moscow a week later showed that no progress towards an agreement had been made; the Russians said that they were prepared to act as mediators between Vynnychenko and the Soviet Ukrainian government, but he must tell them on which forces it was possible to rely and which parties should be included in the government. Vynnychenko repeated the conditions he had set out more than ten days before and told Kun that he intended to leave for Vienna, where he would await Moscow's answer. This was a sign of his exasperation. 'As a result of Mongolian negligence', he wrote, 'the matter is right at the beginning after ten days. But whether it will plod on in the same way, we will see'.²⁴⁶

Despite the disappointment in Budapest, Vynnychenko increasingly became interested in coming to an agreement with the Bolsheviks. He read Lenin's 'State and Revolution' and was impressed by the Communist leader's call for the destruction of the state.²⁴⁷ He had become captivated by the prospect of the spread of revolution to the rest of Europe. 'Old Europe is distantly rumbling', he wrote in one diary entry at the end of May. Vynnychenko became determined to be part of this movement. On 20th May, he sent a letter to the Central Committee of the USDRP calling on them to cease placing their hopes in the Entente and put their faith in the victory of the world revolution. He was highly critical of their failure as socialists: 'their dogged hostility to Communism is simply provincial. And with regards to a socialist position their sin is without doubt absolute. Now is really the moment when the struggle for socialism can be conducted directly, concretely'. On the same day, he had received news from the UNR diplomat in Budapest, Mykyta Shapoval, that

244 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.328, 330.

245 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp. 331, 335. Vynnychenko's distrust can also be seen in that he refers to the Bolsheviks as *moskali* or *kazapy*, derogatory Ukrainian words for Russians.

246 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.348-9. The quotation is on p.349.

247 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.350.

there were rumours that Moscow had agreed to Vynnychenko's five conditions; no doubt this had encouraged him.²⁴⁸

Vynnychenko's change in mood also influenced his position on the Bolsheviks. He stopped calling them *moskali* or *kazapy* in his diary. On 6th July, he wrote, amid jubilation that the hoped-for revolution in France was coming, that the only way to achieve the socialist revolution was to correct the mistakes made by socialists and not to fight them. 'Do not send', he wrote, 'emissaries to the Polish nobility with requests of reconciliation as the Petliurite Directory did. Rather send emissaries to the Bolsheviks, to the only real, tenacious enemies of all nobility, reconcile with them'. The victory of the world revolution, which he believed at that time was unfolding in France, would be the triumph of the Ukraine. Bolshevism, even in its Russian form, had no inherent reason to attack the Ukrainian nationality. On the contrary, it aimed to destroy the state and thereby remove the tool of national as well as social exploitation.²⁴⁹

Certainly, scepticism about the Bolsheviks' aims continued to surface in Vynnychenko's diary. At the beginning of July, he reported rumours that the Bolsheviks were getting ready to make peace with the Poles in order to divide up the Ukraine.²⁵⁰ However, he now felt that any opposition to the Bolsheviks had to be socialist opposition. The Ukrainians should not be used by the Western powers to weaken the revolution. On 27th July, after sending a letter to the TsK of his party calling on them again to take the side of the revolution, he mused about what should be done if the Bolsheviks did not place the Soviet government in the Ukraine into Ukrainian hands. He concluded that one should 'fight with them to the end, but fight with one's own forces, fight in order to expose the chauvinism and imperialism of the Russian Communists'.²⁵¹

Indeed, rumours that Petliura was ready to ally with Denikin were a powerful argument for Vynnychenko in favour of the Bolsheviks. This provided Vynnychenko with a further example of the leader of the Directory's bankruptcy. Vynnychenko wrote that an alliance with the White general and the landed aristocracy would drive the Ukrainian peasants, on whom the Ukrainian idea

248 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.351.

249 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.356-7. The quotation is on p.357.

250 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.359.

251 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.363.

had to rest because the Ukraine was a peasant nation, away from the Ukrainian national cause. In comparison, an agreement with the Bolsheviks was much more favourable, even if in return the Ukraine only received autonomy and not independence. Autonomy would still give the Ukraine a tool to bring about the rebirth of their nation. In contrast, the White generals would crush the Ukraine completely. The idea of the Ukraine represented a greater threat to them than did even Bolshevism: it challenged the very existence of Russia, whereas Bolshevik Russia remained Russian nonetheless.²⁵²

Between 9th and 14th September, a meeting of the USDRP in exile took place in Vienna. The conference saw a split between those members of the party, for example Mykola Porsh and Borys Matiushenko, who supported the line taken by Peltiura's government and those such as Vynnychenko who opposed it. According to Vynnychenko, one of the main differences between the two camps was that Porsh and Matiushenko remained committed to parliamentary government and did not understand the principle of labourers' Soviets as advocated by the opponents of the Directory. Following this disagreement a number of Social Democrats (including Volodymyr Levynskyy, Serhii Vikul, Hryhorii Palamar, Ivan Kalynovich, Iurii Hasenko,²⁵³ Petro Chykalenko²⁵⁴ and Vynnychenko himself) left the party. They would go on to found the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the weekly newspaper *Nova doba*.²⁵⁵

Vynnychenko now began to think seriously about returning to the Ukraine. On 25th September 1919, Vynnychenko discussed the question of travelling to Moscow with Semen Mazurenko, the Social Democrat who was at that time involved in negotiations with the Bolsheviks on behalf of the Directory. Vynnychenko felt that he could not travel there while a number of questions re-

252 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp. 369, 371.

253 Hasenko, Iurii (1894-1933): a writer of children's books and journalist, and member of the USDRP and the UNR diplomatic mission to Rumania. As an émigré he lived in Vienna, Prague, Berlin and Paris, where he died. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, p.417.

254 Chykalenko, Petro: the youngest son of the Ukrainian activist Ievhen Chykalenko; he served the Central Rada and represented the UNR in Turkey. After a period of emigration in Vienna, he returned to Kyiv, where he worked in the state publishing house. At the end of the 1920s, he was arrested; he died in a prison camp. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, p.340.

255 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.390, 417. See below on the founding of the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

mained unanswered. However, he had come to the decision that in principle it was his duty to go to Moscow because, in his words, 'if I *really* want to serve the people, its subjugated and oppressed class, if I really am a socialist and genuinely, honestly and consistently want a new life for the people, the destruction of its dirt and impurity, then I have to go to those who struggle for it'.²⁵⁶ On 10th November, the Ukrainian Social Democrat Pavlo Diatliv, an émigré who had gone into exile before the First World War, visited Vynnychenko with a proposition from the representative of the Russian Soviet Republic in Berlin about resuming negotiations. Vynnychenko repeated his preconditions: independence, a national Ukrainian government, an independent army and struggle for Galicia. These were sent to Berlin in order to be relayed on to Moscow.²⁵⁷

Though Vynnychenko was already convinced of the Bolsheviks' importance as the leaders of the socialist revolution, up till now he had continued to criticise their failings towards the non-Russian nationalities. However, towards the end of 1919 he became ever more convinced that the Russian Communists were making improvements in this area. On 1st October, he wrote in his diary that it was 'increasingly clear that in the national matter the Bolsheviks are immeasurably more favourable towards the Ukraine than is Denikin'.²⁵⁸ In December, Vynnychenko welcomed the decision by the TsK of the RKP and a speech by Trotskii which recognised the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 'All this shows that it seems there must be a different Bolshevik course in the Ukraine', he concluded.²⁵⁹

These developments in Vynnychenko's thought were more systematically presented in his history of the Ukrainian revolution, *Vidrodzhennia natsii* (The Rebirth of the Nation). He had started writing the three-volume work in summer 1919 and by February 1920 it was completed.²⁶⁰

The books' main argument reaffirmed one of pre-war commonplaces of the Ukrainian intelligentsia: 'the matter of *national* liberation is inevitably bound up with the *social* question, with the interests of the Ukrainian working

256 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.396-7. The quotation is on p.397.

257 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.409.

258 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.398.

259 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.410.

260 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.358, 364, 374-7, 411.

masses'.²⁶¹ For Vynnychenko the interconnectedness of these two aspects had determined the course of the revolution and the failure of both Russian and Ukrainian leaders to appreciate it had led to their downfall. The Ukrainian politicians in the Central Rada, including Vynnychenko himself, had stressed the national at the expense of the social. They had not been sufficiently socialist or revolutionary to lead the oppressed Ukrainian masses. One reason was that they had feared the most revolutionary class in the Ukraine, the urban proletariat, because it was made up of Russians and Russified Ukrainians: 'instead of going with its proletariat, even though they were not completely nationally aware, instead of awakening it and absorbing its social decisiveness and courage, instead of going with it *socially*, leading it nationally, we shrank back from it, we were frightened of it, [and] even of the peasantry which went with it. This was our basic mistake and error'.²⁶² Lacking any revolutionary spirit, the Central Rada sought to create a bourgeois state. The working masses of the Ukraine saw this and compared it unfavourably to the Bolsheviks' achievements in overthrowing the bourgeois order in Russia. The Ukrainian people were alienated from their own government. Consequently, in the war between the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks the masses turned to the Bolsheviks. This guaranteed victory for the Russian Communists.²⁶³ Only during the Directory's rising against Skoropadskyi were Ukrainian politicians able to unite the national and social revolutions. However, this opportunity was lost due to the rejection of Vynnychenko's suggestion to turn the UNR into a Soviet republic and the transfer of power within the Directory to Petliura. According to Vynnychenko, the petty bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionaries once again came to dominate the Ukrainian government.²⁶⁴

Vynnychenko criticised the Bolsheviks for making the opposite mistake of the Central Rada: 'they did not understand that without national liberation there cannot be social liberation, that national exploitation is a form of social exploitation'. Vynnychenko was extremely critical of the two Bolshevik regimes set

261 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii. Chastyna III*, Kyiv and Vienna, 1920; repr. Kyiv: Polityvdav Ukrainy, 1990, p.11.

262 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii. Chastyna II*, Kyiv and Vienna, 1920; repr. Kyiv: Polityvdav Ukrainy, 1990, pp.89-97. The quotation is on p.97.

263 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia II*, pp.110, 129-30, 215-7.

264 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia III*, pp.133-6, 184-5, 195.

up by Georgii Piatakov.²⁶⁵ They had misunderstood the national revolution, displayed Great Russian chauvinism and sought to exploit the Ukraine's economic resources for Russia. The resulting policy was an attack on the Ukraine's statehood and culture.²⁶⁶ Just as the Central Rada had tainted the idea of Ukrainian national liberation with bourgeois liberalism and hostility to the socialist revolution, now the Bolsheviks drove Ukrainians away from socialism. This had made counter-revolutionary propaganda against the Bolsheviks easier, led to a wave of risings against the Communist party and resulted in the downfall of the first two Bolshevik governments in the Ukraine.²⁶⁷

Despite this criticism, Vynnychenko defended the Bolsheviks against many of the charges commonly levelled at them by Ukrainians. He blamed the wars between the UNR and the Bolsheviks on the attempt by the Central Rada and Directory to follow bourgeois or counter-revolutionary policies. According to Vynnychenko, Petliura had provoked a popular rising through his reactionary actions, which had deprived him of mass support and allowed the Bolsheviks to take power: 'the Russian Soviet government did not drive us from the Ukraine, but rather our own people, without whom and against whom, I say once more, the Russian Soviet army could not have occupied a single province of our territory'.²⁶⁸ Vynnychenko also justified the force used by the Bolsheviks in dismissing the Provisional Government in Russia. All classes, he wrote, use violence to assert their rule over other classes. However, unlike these other classes, the Bolsheviks did so with a just goal, namely to destroy the rule of the bourgeoisie and the exploitation of the working masses: the Bolsheviks 'used violence and inequality in order to introduce equality and destroy any kind of violence'.²⁶⁹

He concluded *Vidrodzhennia natsii* by arguing that only the Soviet republic set up by the Bolsheviks could guarantee the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation. He echoed the remarks made in his diary by claiming that the RKP's resolu-

265 Piatakov, Georgii (1890-1937): Russian Bolshevik who headed the first two – unsuccessful – Bolshevik governments created in the Ukraine during the revolution. He was replaced by Khristian Rakovskii in January 1919. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, pp.16-7.

266 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia II*, pp.262-71. The quotation is on p.265.

267 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia II*, pp.272-9; III, p.304f.

268 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia II*, p.135; III, pp.201-4. The quotation is on p.204.

269 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia II*, pp.186-90. The quotation is on p.188.

tions of December 1919 (which condemned the past oppression of the Ukrainian nation, asserted the need to actively support Ukrainian culture to overcome this and proposed policies to win over the peasants to the side of the Soviet government) showed that the Bolsheviks had recognised the mistakeness of their policy in the Ukraine.²⁷⁰ In contrast, Petliura had made an alliance with Piłsudski at the price of giving up Ukrainian territory to the Poles. This provided Vynnychenko with further proof that one could not achieve Ukrainian national liberation through the creation of a bourgeois state. 'Therefore, from this it is clear', he wrote, 'that the "more left-wing" the socio-political regime in the Ukraine is, the more favourable it is for the national rebirth of our people'. Of all the regimes that could exist in the Ukraine, the most favourable to Ukrainian national rebirth was a Soviet republic.²⁷¹ However, the mutual dependence of national and social liberation also meant that 'any consistent, active Communist of any nationality, even a former ruling one' would increasingly have to intervene in the national question in order to ensure the future development of the revolution.²⁷² Vynnychenko then stressed that the outcome of the revolution in Russia and the Ukraine rested on the triumph of international socialism. He emphasised Russia's leadership of this movement: it had been the first country to introduce Communism and it posed the greatest threat to the capitalist order.²⁷³ In this way, *Vidrodzhennia natsii* underlined that the solution to the Ukrainian question could only be found through the construction of socialism in the whole world.

The Foreign Group of the UKP and *Nova Doba*

In February 1920, Volodymyr Vynnychenko re-entered active political life by forming the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party. The group was mainly made up of the members of the USDRP abroad who had left the party at the conference in September 1919. After Vynnychenko, one of the most important figures in the new group was the Eastern Galician Volodymyr Levynskyi, who had helped found the Galician USDP and had edited two of its newspapers before the war. Vasył Mazurenko, a long-time member of the

270 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia* III, pp.481-7.

271 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia* III, pp.498-9. The quotation is on p.499.

272 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia* III, p.500.

273 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia* III, pp.500-4.

USDRP and finance minister in one of the UNR governments, also joined the group. Another prominent individual was Petro Diatliv, a Social Democrat who had emigrated from Russia in 1908 and taken part in the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine during the First World War. In addition to the other former members of the USDRP, a Socialist Revolutionary, Hryhorii Tovmachiv (who wrote under the pseudonym Piddubnyi), joined the group. The name of the party was indicative of their understanding of the ideological change which they had gone through: a transition from Social Democracy to Communism. However, this did not mean that the group saw itself as a branch organisation of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP) in the Ukraine. As Vynnychenko wrote in a letter to the UKP's Central Committee in March 1920, the group had not yet decided which of the Communist parties in the Ukraine, the UKP or the KP(b)U, they wanted to join because they did not know enough about the conditions in the country or about the structure of the two parties to make this choice.²⁷⁴

In addition, February 1920 saw the formation of a 'Soviet-Revolutionary Bloc' between Vynnychenko's Foreign Group and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, which at this time also stood on a platform of reconciliation with the Soviet Ukraine. The Bloc aimed to create an independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic within its ethnic boundaries and to introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat as the means of achieving socialism. They renounced concessions or agreements with bourgeois powers.²⁷⁵ Despite the common ground, the Foreign Group remained sceptical of their partners in the Bloc. Vynnychenko felt that though the SRs were sincere in their support of the principle of Soviet government, one could not say that they had abandoned their 'SRism' or developed crystallised Communist convictions. He feared that they had only made a tactical step. He was especially distrustful of the Foreign Delegation's leader Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. He was more positive towards two others, Mykola Chechel and Mykola Shrah, whom he listed as belonging to the Foreign Group of the UKP and who he claimed only remained Socialist Revolutionaries in order to conduct work among other

274 Vynnychenko to Communists-Independents, undated, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.8.

275 *Nova doba*, No.1, 6 March 1920, p.4.

SRs.²⁷⁶ As will be seen in the following chapter, Vynnychenko was wrong about Chechel and Shrah and the suspicion between the Foreign Group and the Foreign Delegation, which was mutual, eventually led to the collapse of the Bloc.

The Foreign Group expounded its position in the weekly newspaper *Nova doba*, which first appeared at the beginning of March 1920. Many of the articles in *Nova doba* were republished as separate booklets as part of the 'Nova doba library'. Above all, the group's support for Soviet Russia was based upon its commitment to the world socialist revolution. One of the commonplaces of the paper was that as a result of the crises facing Europe caused by the First World War, the continent was on the verge of a cataclysmic confrontation between capital and revolution. According to Levynskyi, every Ukrainian who felt himself to be bound up with the fate and suffering of the working and poor peasant masses need not hesitate when deciding on which side to stand: the choice was between world socialist revolution, which would bring about the liberation of all peoples and nations, and counter-revolution, which was for the reinforcement of the tyranny of capital.²⁷⁷

The leader of the world revolution was Soviet Russia. As Hryhorii Palamar wrote, Russia was 'the first great socialist power in the history of mankind [...] she destroyed the capitalist order [in her own country] and by introducing socialism in practice, gave a beginning to the final struggle of the labouring masses of the whole world for the complete liberation of mankind from the terrible yoke of debauched capital'.²⁷⁸ She was therefore no longer the Russia of the tsars, but rather, to quote Palamar, 'the Mecca and Medina to which fly the thoughts of the subjugated and oppressed and from which they await their saviour'.²⁷⁹ Consequently, the bourgeoisie lived in fear of Soviet Russia. 'Nothing threatens it [bourgeois capitalism] at the moment', wrote Levynskyi,

276 Vynnychenko to Communists-Independents, undated, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.10zv.

277 V. Levynskyi, *Sotsiialistychna revoliutsiia i Ukraina*, Vienna and Kyiv: Nova Doba, 1920, pp.3-6, 11. The same argument can be found in V. Vynnychenko, *Vsesvitnia revoliutsiia*, Kyiv and Vienna: Nova Doba, 1920, pp.1-10 and V. Vynnychenko, *Lyst V. Vynnychenka do kliasovo-nesvidomoi ukrainskoi intelligentsii*, Kyiv and Vienna: Nova Doba, 1920, pp.5-6.

278 Hr. Palamar, *Kapital, kolonialni narody i bolshevizm*, Kyiv and Vienna: Nova Doba, 1920, pp.6-7.

279 *Nova doba*, No.2, 13 March 1920, p.1.

'like the existence, the stubborn and powerful existence, of the proletarian (Soviet) Russian republic'.²⁸⁰ The leading role of Russia was reflected in the fact that almost every issue of *Nova doba* contained a section entitled 'From Soviet Russia', which contained short notices describing developments in the country.

It is worth noting that the tone of the Foreign Group of the UKP was not so very different from some of the claims that Stalin himself later made: 'The revolutionaries of all countries look with hope to the USSR as the centre of the liberation struggle of the working people throughout the world and recognise it as their only Motherland. In all countries the revolutionary workers unanimously applaud the Soviet working class, and first and foremost the *Russian* [Stalin's emphasis] working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, as their recognised leader that is carrying out the most revolutionary and active policy ever dreamed of by the proletarians of other countries'.²⁸¹ Such quotations are normally used to demonstrate how the Soviet leader came to introduce Russian nationalism as a legitimising agent for the Soviet state in the 1930s. Of course, the Ukrainians made these points with an entirely different aim: it may have been an attempt to signal to the Soviet authorities the extent of the group's change of position; in order to convince Ukrainians to support the Bolsheviks it was also necessary to prove that RSFSR was fundamentally different to pre-revolutionary Russia. Either way, the praise of the Russian working class was a sign of the Foreign Group's commitment to internationalism.

The Foreign Group of the UKP underlined its conversion to Communism by attacking its former party comrades for abandoning the side of revolution for that of reaction. Vynnychenko wrote of the USDRP that 'it called itself "worker" and "socialist", but in reality it was the party of the petty bourgeoisie with democratic slogans and counter-revolutionary *realpolitik*'. The only genuine workers in the party had left it to join the *Nezalezhnyky*.²⁸² In this way, 'the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party went the way of its sisters – of the whole

280 *Nova doba*, No.1, 6 March 1920, p.2.

281 Quoted in Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy*, p.151.

282 *Nova doba*, No.1, p.3.

Social Democratic world'.²⁸³ Other articles were devoted to the errors of non-Communist socialism. Piddubnyi (the pseudonym of Tovmachiv) attacked those who felt that the world was not ready for revolution by arguing that capitalism had reached its highest point.²⁸⁴ He also criticised 'opportunists', like Karl Kautsky and Ramsey MacDonald, who claimed that the best way to achieve socialism was through 'evolution'. Piddubnyi argued that only following the overthrow of capitalism could socialism be constructed and pointed to the failure of Social Democratic parties in other countries to create a socialist state.²⁸⁵

The group also sought to prove that Communism benefited Ukrainian national aspirations. In *Lyst V. Vynnychenka do kliasovo-nesvidomoi ukrainskoi intelligentsii* (V. Vynnychenko's Letter to those Ukrainian Intelligentsia who Lack a Class Consciousness), Vynnychenko told those members of the intelligentsia who had not yet acquired a class consciousness that they should become sincere Communists because Communism was against all forms of tyranny, including national oppression.²⁸⁶

Vynnychenko expounded the benefits of Communism for the Ukrainian nation more fully in the pamphlet *Ukrainska derzhavnist* (Ukrainian Statehood). He argued that the very structure of the Ukrainian nation meant that Communism was the only political doctrine upon which Ukrainian statehood could be based. The Ukrainian nation was almost exclusively made up of peasants. There was no Ukrainian bourgeoisie; rather this social class was made up of other national groups which were hostile to Ukrainian culture. Thus, both a Ukrainian monarchy and democracy were impossible because they required a bourgeois social base. Soviet socialism, however, sought the destruction of the bourgeois class and based power on the proletariat and the poor peasants, who were Ukrainian. In doing so it created the prerequisites for the re-birth of the Ukrainian nation: 'Ukrainian statehood in the given moment can only be that which the Ukrainian nation itself is, that is worker-peasant'. He also stressed that the socialist doctrine of the Bolsheviks made them allies of

283 *Nova doba*, No.12, p.2. The failures of other Social Democratic parties were also analysed. See *Nova doba*, No.14, 5 June 1920, pp.3-4, which deals with the Polish Social-Democratic Party.

284 *Nova doba*, No.4, 27 March 1920, p.2.

285 *Nova doba*, No.20, 17 July 1920, pp.4-5.

286 V. Vynnychenko, *Lyst*, pp.4-5.

Ukrainian statehood. The RKP saw its own state as merely a tool for the implementation of the socialist task of the proletariat. They therefore did not view Ukrainian statehood as a threat to their own state interests, unlike the Russian reactionaries. Indeed, he continued, all socialists see the state only as a temporary phenomenon, to be used for the destruction of class domination. Consequently, for any consistent Communist the strengthening of the Ukrainian worker-peasant state was necessary as means of prosecuting the struggle against the Ukrainian bourgeoisie.²⁸⁷ Ukrainian statehood was therefore an adjunct of the revolution, and would be achieved through the construction of socialism.

In *Ukrainska derzhavnist* Vynnychenko did admit that much of the proletariat in the Ukraine was Russian or Russified, and that they were indifferent or hostile to the Ukrainian resurgence. However, he described these as the 'traces and scars' of the past order. The Communists had seen the need to combat them. Equally, he felt that though the Soviet regime had lacked a Ukrainian character when it took power in the Ukraine, 'one has already become aware of this mistake in Russia, and one can also observe that it is being corrected'. In contrast to bourgeois exploitation, which is part of the very character of that class, Soviet exploitation had been caused by fear for the survival of the revolution and was therefore temporary. This must also end because, Vynnychenko repeated, the proletariat in essence was against subjugation of all kinds. Similarly, they were always in favour of the development of the national culture of the working masses as this was the best form of organising the struggle against capitalism.²⁸⁸ Vynnychenko argued that it was possible to see this change in direction in the policy of the Bolsheviks: 'We see how the Russian Soviet government all the more and more is taking up positive activity in the Ukrainian national question, how great attention is devoted to national culture'. Whereas Denikin and the Russian bourgeoisie had destroyed Ukrainian schools, replaced the word 'Ukrainian' with 'Little Russian' and arrested and executed Ukrainians, the Russian socialists were delivering the independence of the Ukraine, introducing punishments for vio-

287 V. Vynnychenko, *Ukrainska derzhavnist*, Kyiv and Vienna: Nova Doba, 1920, pp.8-13, 22. The quotation is on p.22.

288 Vynnychenko, *Ukrainska derzhavnist*, pp.13-9. The quotation is on p.16.

lence against Ukrainian culture and showing great energy in guaranteeing the national development of the Ukrainian working people.²⁸⁹

The examples of Soviet Russia's support for the Ukrainian nation were necessarily vague because at this time there were very few such examples to point to. However, one can see that Vynnychenko's criticism of the Soviet regime was far weaker than in *Vidrodzhennia natsii*. The Foreign Group was beginning to adopt the belief that any condemnation of the Soviet republics by Communists would provide the counter-revolution with material to attack the leaders of the world revolution. As will be seen in the following chapter, this was an important difference between the Sovietophilism of Vynnychenko's group and the other partner in Soviet Revolutionary Bloc, the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR.

The renunciation of criticism may be seen in the notices section at the end of *Nova doba*. A regular feature of *Nova doba* was a section entitled 'From the Soviet Ukraine', in which short articles, often drawn from Soviet newspapers, described events in the Ukraine. Naturally, given the orientation of the paper, this information portrayed the regime in a good light. The first issue of *Nova doba* is representative. It described how the Ukrainian SSR was in negotiations with its Russian counterpart on a union between the two, thereby giving the impression that the Ukraine was an independent entity voluntarily joining its fate to that of Russia. A further account presented the Soviet regime as having the support of the Ukrainian population by recounting how a council of Ukrainian parties in Kyiv, which were not named, had agreed on adopting the Soviet form of government in the Ukraine. Under the title 'The Land Question in the Ukraine', the paper reported on a law passed by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Soviet giving land held by large landowners to peasants. The aim of this was said to be to win the trust of both poor and middling peasants in the Ukraine. It was also stressed that the building of the Soviet economy would take the interests of the peasants into account.²⁹⁰

Despite its interest in the Ukrainian question, the *Nova doba* group was determined to prove its internationalism. One can see this clearest in Levynskyi's article, *Komunizm z taktyky* (Communism out of Tactics). The article

289 Vynnychenko, *Ukrainska derzhavnist*, pp.19-20. The quotation is on p.19.

290 *Nova doba*, No.1, pp.7-8.

was written in response to a letter from a group of Galician Ukrainians who had expressed their support for the paper despite the fact that they did not agree with its Communist programme. Levynskyi said that he understood why the Galician petty bourgeoisie would look to Communism for liberation from Polish oppression. However, he reminded the reader that the petty bourgeoisie hoped to take the place of the Poles, not bring about social revolution. They had not renounced the idea of private property and sought to convince Ukrainian peasants that Communist revolution was unnecessary. He therefore warned that one should be cautious of those petty bourgeois who temporarily sympathise with Communism. Levynskyi also addressed himself to the petty bourgeoisie. He told them that 'Communism is not a costume which can be put on and discarded according to weather and whim'. Any members of the petty bourgeoisie sympathising with Communism must 'say to themselves frankly, honestly, without lies, whether they can discard all the rags of their petty bourgeois world view and are ready to stand strongly, firmly, without vacillation, in our ranks, in the ranks of international Communism'.²⁹¹ Thus, Levynskyi highlighted a point only implicit in Vynnychenko's *Lyst do kliasovnesvidomoi ukrainskoi intelligentsii*: it was valid to support the Bolsheviks' attack on national exploitation, but one must adopt all its tenets and change one's own *Weltanschauung*.

Indeed, many of the articles appearing in *Nova doba* and many of the pamphlets published in the *Nova doba* library did not touch upon the national question at all. For example, Hryhorii Palamar's *Kapital, koloniiialni narody i Bolshevizm* (Capital, the Colonial Peoples and Bolshevism) described how Soviet Russia aimed to free the colonial peoples from capitalism and imperialism. Significantly, it did not count the Ukraine as being a colonial people and in fact the country was only mentioned three times. Where the Ukraine did appear in the text, it only did so as a supporter of Soviet Russia's crusade to liberate the Asian countries occupied by West European powers. It was therefore calling on Ukrainians to ally with Moscow not for the sake of their own emancipation, but rather that of the peoples of Afghanistan, Turkistan, Persia and so on. The tone was therefore thoroughly internationalist and was not di-

291 V. Levynskyi, *Sotsialistychna revoliutsiia*, p.12f. The quotation is on p.14.

rected at nationalist concerns at all.²⁹² Almost every issue of *Nova doba* reported on the Communist and workers' movements in other countries.²⁹³ Other brochures did not deal with current events at all but rather expounded Marxist theory to Ukrainians in their own language. *Khto taki komunisty i choho vony khochut?* (Who Are these Communists and What Do They Want?) explained concepts like capital, the dictatorship of the proletariat and nationalisation in language clearly aimed at people with little education.²⁹⁴ Levynskyi wrote an analysis of socialism's understanding of science and religion²⁹⁵ and a description of how capitalism engendered imperialism.²⁹⁶ The Foreign Group clearly saw one of its tasks in emigration as the propagation of the Communist doctrine and the raising of class consciousness among the Ukrainian community abroad.

In particular, the Foreign Group sought to reach Ukrainian prisoners of war, who had been imprisoned in Germany and Austria-Hungary during the First World War, and the soldiers of the ZUNR and UNR interned following the defeat of their armies. At the end of March 1920, an appeal was published in *Nova doba*, calling on Ukrainian POWs to resist efforts by Petliurist agents to recruit them for the war against the Soviet republics. The paper claimed that they would find themselves in Polish internment camps, where they would suffer great privation. They would be sent to fight their brother Ukrainians, who were peasants and workers like them. Whereas the Ukrainian Bolsheviks had driven out the lords and taken their land, Petliura and the Poles wanted to send the POWs to take that land from the peasants and give it back to the rich landowners. The paper therefore called upon POWs to 'cross over to the side of your brothers, of the Bolsheviks, of the peasants and workers of the Soviet Ukraine'.²⁹⁷

292 Palamar, *Koloniialni narody*, 1920.

293 See the overview in 'From the revolutionary movement', *Nova doba*, No.2, 13 March 1920, pp.2-4, the description of the Spartacist rising in *Nova doba*, No.3, 20 March 1920, pp.2-3, and the appeal by the office of the Third International in Amsterdam for a strike, *Nova doba*, No.7, 17 April 1920, pp.1-2.

294 Hr. Khymenko, *Khto taki komunisty i choho vony khochut?*, Vienna and Kyiv: Nova Doba 1920.

295 V. Levynskyi, *Religiia, nauka i sotsiializm*, Kyiv and Vienna: Nova Doba, 1920.

296 V. Levynskyi, *Kapitalizm i imperializm*, Kyiv and Vienna: Nova Doba 1920.

297 *Nova doba*, No.4, 27 March 1920, p.4.

In March 1920, another grouping calling itself the Foreign Group of the UKP appeared in Prague. A third organisation with this name was formed in Berlin in May, and was led by Zinovii Vysotskyi, a former member of the UNR's delegation to the Paris peace conferences who also used the pseudonym of Stepovyi, and V. Moroz. Though all three groups were independent of one-another, they sent delegations to keep each other informed of their work and the group in Vienna was clearly more prominent than the other two. Both the groupings set up in the Czechoslovak and German capitals conducted Communist propaganda among the internment and POW camps in their countries.²⁹⁸ For example, in June 1920 the Berlin group held a congress of Ukrainian POWs. The congress declared that only revolution could free Ukrainian workers and poor peasants from social and national oppression and that only the dictatorship of the proletariat could guarantee their rights and freedom from oppression from capital. It recognised that the only government of the Ukraine was the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in a union with all socialist republics.²⁹⁹

This analysis of the *Nova doba* group's activity and ideology shows that it was interested in both the national and the social liberation of the Ukraine. However, it saw the national question as an element of the international revolution – the Ukraine could only be freed through the achievement of socialism, which was therefore the more pressing concern. By failing to look at Vynnychenko's activity within the *Nova doba* group, both Kostiuik and Czajkowskyj overestimated the importance of the national at the expense of the social when describing Vynnychenko's reassessment of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet system. One must remember that Vynnychenko and his colleagues were responding to the October revolution not only as Ukrainians, but also as socialists. As was the case for many European socialists, the Bolsheviks' violent seizure of power called into question the previous assumptions about the nature of revolution and the best means of constructing socialism. The fact that the Foreign Group were taking part in two debates, the Ukrainian discussion on how to achieve statehood and the socialist dialogue on the implementation of socialism, complicated their stance. The next section will show how these

298 Vysotskyi to the TsK of the UKP, 24.07.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.44 ark.15.

299 Minutes of and declaration by the Congress of the Ukrainian Community in Germany, 12.06.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.44 ark.1-2.

two elements, the national and the social, came into conflict and finally split the Foreign Group.

Vynnychenko's Mission to Moscow and Kharkiv

At the end of March 1920, Vynnychenko started making preparations to travel to Moscow and the Ukraine. He wrote to Dmytro Manuilskyi, a member of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U and commissar for agricultural affairs, promising that his group could mobilise the Ukrainian internees in Czechoslovakia to help the Red Army in the war against Poland. Vynnychenko also suggested that the Bolsheviks make the Foreign Group the official representatives of the Soviet Ukraine in Germany and Austria.³⁰⁰ His diary did not reflect this optimism, as can be seen in a typically melodramatic entry from 30th April: 'The road to Golgotha is set. It is necessary to drink again from the chalice of humiliation, insult, fear, struggle [...]. With a word, I flee quiet, shelter, calm, solitude, serenity for uncertainty, disquiet, suffering, exhaustion, to grief from calm'.³⁰¹ On 5th May, a meeting of the Foreign Group of the UKP was held. It decided that the aim of Vynnychenko's mission was to bring about a unification of the UKP and KP(b)U. Levynskyi was chosen as the head of the group in Vynnychenko's absence. Diatliv was to be his deputy and Palamar became the group's secretary.³⁰² Vynnychenko left Vienna the next day. He was accompanied by Jaromir Nečas,³⁰³ a Czech Social Democrat, Oleksander Badan, a young Galician whom Vynnychenko had met in Prague at the beginning of that year, and by his wife Rozaliia. The party travelled to Moscow via Berlin on Czechoslovakian diplomatic passports and finally arrived in the Russian capital at the end of May.³⁰⁴

Vynnychenko came to Moscow at a time when the Polish-Soviet war was raging on Ukrainian soil. The Poles were allied with the UNR government, and

300 Vynnychenko to Manuilskyi, 20.03.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.2-3.

301 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.415.

302 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 05.05.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.1.

303 Nečas, Jaromir (1888-1944): Ukrainophile Czech political leader who supported Ukrainian national aspirations in Transcarpathia, which between the two world wars was part of Czechoslovakia, and wrote popular works in order to promote them. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.572.

304 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.414-5, 427-30.

the Bolsheviks therefore feared that the Ukrainian peasantry would support Piłsudski and Petliura. For example, on 27th April 1920 Khristian Rakovskii informed Trotskii and Stalin that the situation in the area around Kyiv was critical, with peasant risings erupting behind the Red Army's rear.³⁰⁵ Consequently, the Bolsheviks were seeking to establish connections with Ukrainian socialists. As mentioned in Chapter One, in March 1920 4,000 *Borotbisty* had joined the KP(b)U. Karlo Maksymoych, head of the Foreign Bureau of the KP(b)U, had written at the end of that month to the Central Committee of the UKP calling for joint action to establish contacts with Ukrainian Communists abroad.³⁰⁶ The party leadership in the Ukraine had also been showing interest in Vynnychenko. At the beginning of April, Rakovskii wrote an article in *Komunist* in which he described how Vynnychenko had left the SDs and joined the Communists. The sarcastic tone of the article did not betray any sympathy for Vynnychenko; rather, Rakovskii used Vynnychenko's action to attack the Directory and USDRP. However, in the same month articles by Vynnychenko from *Nova doba* were republished in the Kyivan local party newspaper with the comment that *Nova doba* was conducting Communist agitation in Austria; a few days later Rakovskii included an extract of another article by Vynnychenko in *Komunist* and commented that Vynnychenko's criticisms of requisitioning were correct in that the policy really had driven the peasantry out of the Communist camp. In April and May, at least three other articles appeared in *Komunist* portraying Vynnychenko in a good light. Rakovskii announced at a gubernatorial congress of Soviets at the beginning of May that Vynnychenko was the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet government in Vienna. In the same month, Vynnychenko was elected by the 4th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets as a member of the Central Executive Committee.³⁰⁷

The RKP was also in favour of including Vynnychenko in the Ukrainian government. On 4th May, Lenin wrote a telegram to Felix Kon,³⁰⁸ a member of the Orgbiuro of the KP(b)U and head of the KP(b)U's Galician Organisation

305 Vasyliev, 'Evolutsiia pohliadiv kerivnytsva', p.159.

306 Maksymovych to the TsK of the UKP, undated, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.44 ark.7-10.

307 Mykola Sappa, 'Vynnychenko i Rakovskiyi', *Vitchyzna*, 1990, No.11, pp.131-143 (pp.133-5).

308 Kon, Felix (1864-1941): Polish-Jewish Bolshevik, who during the Polish-Soviet war was the head of the Galician Organising Committee of the KP(b)U. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.595.

Committee, saying 'regarding Vynnychenko we agree in principle. Come to an agreement with Rakovskii about the details'. 'Details' was underlined and in an unknown hand the words 'of the form of inclusion of Vynnychenko in governmental activity' had been added. A copy was also sent to Rakovskii. On 29th May, Chicherin wrote to Rakovskii setting out his ideas on the appropriate position for Vynnychenko: 'In days Vynnychenko, who is arriving here, will visit you. The members of the Politburo find it appropriate to include him in the Council of People's Commissars as people's commissar for education and deputy head of the commissariat'.³⁰⁹ The indications were that the Bolsheviks would be willing to cooperate in some way with Vynnychenko's mission.

Despite these promising signs, the foreboding which Vynnychenko had felt before leaving Vienna developed into despair soon after his arrival in the Russian capital at the end of May. Relations with the Bolshevik leaders started badly. Vynnychenko was terribly offended that no one had met him and his party at the railway station or prepared lodgings for them, despite the fact that the Petrograd Commissariat had telegraphed Moscow about their arrival. He was also disappointed by the state of Communism and the national question in the country. In his first diary entry in Moscow Vynnychenko complained that the idea of socialism had been forgotten in Soviet Russia and that the old Russian nationalism was rearing up once more. This was most evident in the Ukrainian question. Those responsible for Ukrainian affairs denied that there was any Ukrainian question whatsoever because everyone in the Ukraine spoke Russian.³¹⁰

He had received these impressions through his initial conferences with the Bolshevik leaders. In his diary he described the appointment with Radek as 'haphazard and superficial'. Though their relationship had started out comradely, 'tension, coolness and near hostility emerged and have continued to this moment'. Chicherin proved to be an even greater disappointment. Vynnychenko called him 'the wall' on account of the Bolshevik's responsiveness. Vynnychenko complained that when he had begun to talk of how 'the Foreign

309 Vladimir Ilich Lenin, *Collected Works*, Volume 44, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, p.372, <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/may/04.htm>>; Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.75.

310 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.430.

Group sent me to give all my strength for the revolution, words which for the Group and for me sounded so real, so sincere and so full of content, were for the "wall" simply prattle which is so often spouted at any meeting for the revolution. For him it was more interesting to find out with what concrete proposals I had come. What about the Don basin, the Kuban? To whom should they belong?'. Vynnychenko felt that these questions showed that the Bolshevik lacked faith in Communism. In a world-wide socialist federation, he wrote, the question of who owns this or that basin is senseless for the whole world owns the basin and no part can use its wealth only for itself. Moreover, the world federation would be organised according to the principle of ethnicity, not economics. Obviously the Don basin was Ukrainian ethnic territory, thus solving the question of which part of the federation it should belong to.³¹¹ The incident is indicative of the gulf separating Vynnychenko and the Bolshevik leaders. The leader of the Foreign Group had returned full of vague gallantry about sacrificing himself for the revolution. For the government in Moscow, which was faced with the practical difficulties of running an enormous country in an unprecedented state of chaos, such empty heroics can only have been a nuisance. The sudden collision of Vynnychenko's idealism with the realities of the Soviet state also helps explain why Vynnychenko was moved to such despair during his stay in Moscow.

Consequently, as early as 3rd June, in his very first diary entry after coming to Moscow, Vynnychenko wrote that he wanted to return abroad. However, he felt that he would not be allowed to do this: 'For Russia this would not be advantageous. What kind of impression would this make abroad, and especially on Ukrainians? It would strengthen Petliurism!'.³¹² The quotation highlights another hindrance to negotiations between the Ukrainian writer and the Bolsheviks: Vynnychenko was convinced only he could save the revolution in the Ukraine. He believed that his entry into the Ukrainian government would attract the sympathy of national elements to the Soviet regime and thereby redefine the conflict in the Ukraine. What had been a war between Russia on one side and Poland and the Ukraine on the other would become a war between a Russo-Ukrainian socialist alliance and the bourgeois, counter-

311 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.431.

312 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.433.

revolutionary union of Poland and the Ukraine. Vynnychenko put forward these ideas in a letter to Lenin, which he wrote on the third. He demanded that Rakovskii be removed as head of government, as a symbol of the non-Ukrainian character of the Bolshevik government in the Ukraine. Only then would Vynnychenko enter the government.³¹³ Unsurprisingly, the demand was ignored. Convinced of his own value, Vynnychenko could only understand Chicherin's refusal to make him head of the Ukrainian government as an expression of Russian nationalism.³¹⁴ He did not see the unlikelyhood of a ruling party putting an émigré in charge of the state.

It is difficult to assess how much support Vynnychenko had in the Ukraine, but one must remember that he had left the country following a dispute within his own party, in which he had been shown to be the weaker. Moreover, as this chapter will show, his relationship with the Ukrainian Communist Party, the party whose name his group shared, was extremely rocky. Certainly, the Bolshevik leaders believed that his support could help their campaign in the Ukraine – this was the reason that they had entered into negotiations with him. However, many in the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet governments had their reservations about giving Vynnychenko too much power. This was hardly surprising given the fact that he had led a government at war with the Bolsheviks. This proved to be a problem because Vynnychenko, who had cast himself as a saviour going to Golgotha for the good of the revolution, judged the Bolsheviks' intentions on the basis of the posts offered to him.

As mentioned above, Chicherin had written that the Russian Politburo was in favour of appointing Vynnychenko head of Narkomos (the Commissariat of Education) and deputy head of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), the highest ranking non-party institution in the republic. On 31st May, the Ukrainian Politburo resolved that it should suggest to the RKP(b) naming Vynnychenko the Ukrainian ambassador abroad. On 2nd June, they wanted to offer him the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the position of deputy head of Sovnarkom.³¹⁵ Both Trotskii and Stalin wanted to make Vynnychenko the people's commissar for war, albeit with limited powers. Trotskii wrote on 9th

313 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.432-434.

314 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.432.

315 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 31.05.1920 and 02.06.1920, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.7 ark.22-3.

June that 'Vynnychenko thinks that he can split the Petliurist intelligentsia by his active work in a role with responsibility in the Ukraine and draw off a significant number of the *otamans* from Petliura. He thinks that this could be achieved by naming him the Ukrainian people's commissar for war. If we go with this, then the post must be given a principally propagandistic character, sending Vynnychenko to the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front'. After asking the Politburo for its thoughts on the question of how to use Vynnychenko for work in the Ukraine, in particular in the struggle against Petliura, Trotskii added that 'Vynnychenko presents himself, at least according to his own words, as being completely at the party's disposal'.³¹⁶ Interestingly, though Trotskii wanted to limit Vynnychenko's role to one of propaganda, he did not see this as being incompatible with his exercising responsibility. Stalin summed up his thoughts thus: '1. [...] the appearance of Vynnychenko on the horizon must play the most serious role in the struggle with the serious enemies of the revolution in the Ukraine. 2. The appointment of Vynnychenko as the Ukrainian people's commissar for war [...] I consider to be the most convenient and appropriate combination. 3. If Vynnychenko raised the question of the creation of the post of head of the South-Western Revolutionary Military Council and of his appointment to that post, then I have not objections to such a combination. 4. I have no objections to Vynnychenko becoming a member of the South-Western Revolutionary Military Council'.³¹⁷ Rakovskii counselled against the course suggested by Trotskii and Stalin because if he held this post it would be impossible to limit Vynnychenko's powers to propagandistic functions and would give him administrative authority. Rakovskii was even scared of offering Vynnychenko the Commissariat of Education as the Ukrainian might become the focus for the 'Prosvitans' (i.e. the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia, after the *Prosvita* educational societies). He was, however, willing to give Vynnychenko the posts of commissar for foreign affairs, deputy head of Sovnarkom and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Soviet.³¹⁸ One must also remember that Rakovskii had personal reasons for wanting to limit Vynnychenko's role in government: Vynnychenko, as mentioned above, had already demanded that Rakovskii be re-

316 Quoted in Vasyliiev, 'Evoliutsiia pohliadiv kerivnytstva', pp.161-2.

317 Quoted in Vasyliiev, 'Evoliutsiia pohliadiv kerivnytstva', p.162.

318 Rakovskii to Stalin, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.564 ark.4.

moved as head of the Ukrainian government, and that he be put in his place. In contrast, the Politburo of the RKP(b) stressed in a decision of 1st June that Kamenev should look into finding 'serious work in the Ukraine' for Vynnychenko and on 8th June spoke of the 'speedy use of Vynnychenko in the Ukraine'.³¹⁹

Perhaps these divergences led to the somewhat contradictory instructions given to Vynnychenko. At first, on 3rd June, Vynnychenko received news that he should go to Kharkiv, where Rakovskii would tell him what to do. Then, on 9th June, Chicherin, Kamenev and Trotskii suggested that before he left for Kharkiv, Vynnychenko should travel to Petrograd for two weeks to speak before the proletariat there. Vynnychenko agreed to go. However, he was then visited by what he described in his diary as a group of old Russian Communists, who advised him that the system in the Ukraine did not correspond to his aims and only at the centre, in Moscow, could this be changed. This convinced him that he should not leave the capital and he did not travel to Petrograd.³²⁰ The incident indicates that Vynnychenko was wholly reliant on the reports of the Communists with whom he talked for information on the state of the Bolshevik's nationalities policy. The extreme fluctuations in Vynnychenko's feelings towards the Bolsheviks can partially be explained by the fact that while he was in Russia and the Ukraine he was receiving contradictory information from different sources.

Instead of leaving Moscow, Vynnychenko wrote a document entitled *Doklada zapyska* (A Detailed Note), the aim of which was to force the Central Committee of the RKP to state whether it was in favour of the resolution of December 1919 or a 'one and indivisible' Russia.³²¹ The letter stressed his commitment to federation, but noted that the Communists had not put their program on the national question into practice. He set out his plans to remedy this, which involved, for example, refuting the charges of counter-revolution against the RKP, reducing the powers of the Moscow commissariats inside the Ukraine and working out a federal constitution. Only under such conditions could Vynnychenko be of any use in the Ukraine. He ended by calling for clarity in the

319 Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.70.

320 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.433-5.

321 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.434-5.

position of the RKP.³²² Vynnychenko was not optimistic about the letter's chances of success. He felt that national forces in Russia were against a federation, despite Lenin's support for it. Vynnychenko's pessimism was reinforced when an aid close to Lenin failed to get in contact. Vynnychenko understood this as a sign that the suggestions in his note had been rejected.³²³

By 15th June, Vynnychenko's mood had improved. In his diary he wrote that the Ukrainian elements were pressing the Russian, forcing them to change their policy. Evidence for this was a note from Kamenev saying that his *Dokladna zapyska* had been received favourably. On the previous day, he had been visited by a Communist from Halych called Paliiv who claimed that half of the Communist party opposed centralism and though inertia reigned among the higher echelons, the provinces were growing in strength every day. This greatly encouraged Vynnychenko. He wrote that Paliiv had entirely changed his understanding of the situation and he looked forward to having the chance to do something. 'Therefore', Vynnychenko surmised, 'it is possible, and necessary, to travel there [the Ukraine]'.³²⁴ The incident is small in itself, but it is symptomatic of something that both Kostiuk and Czajkowskyj missed: Vynnychenko was encouraged by even the smallest indications that reconciliation with the Bolsheviks on his terms was possible. Such moments spurred him on to negotiate further with the Soviet governments, despite his disappointments. Other encouraging news (which was not actually mentioned in the diary) was that on 15th June the Politburo had again stressed its desire to appoint Vynnychenko as head of the Commissariat of Education and deputy head of the People's Commissariat. The final decision would be made by Rakovskii, Zinoviev and Stalin together.³²⁵

Before leaving for the Ukraine, Vynnychenko had further meetings with leaders of the RKP. Again, these left him unsure of the use of his work in the Ukraine. On the one hand, he was concerned that Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke of the KP(b)U as if it was part of the RKP. At the same time, he reasoned that the Bolsheviks' attempts to woo him must signal that they would

322 Vynnychenko's 'Dokladna Zapyska', 08.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.49-50. This is the typed version. The handwritten version is at ark.34-48 and dated 09.06.1920.

323 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.435-7.

324 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.438-9. The quotation is on p.439.

325 Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.71.

be willing to take Ukrainian elements into account. An audience with Trotskii left him even more uncertain. The Bolshevik told Vynnychenko that he would become the commissar in charge of the army and a member of the military council. However, when asked about what this work actually involved, Trotskii answered vaguely and Vynnychenko concluded that he was not being offered meaningful positions, but was rather being used as a figurehead, which was not entirely unjustified, as can be seen in the letter from Trotskii quoted above. Trotskii also avoided answering Vynnychenko's demand that the Central Committee of the KP(b)U be reformed, which convinced the Ukrainian writer that no changes in party policy would come about. He told Trotskii that under these circumstances he did not think his taking up a position in government would bring any benefit. Trotskii's attitude convinced Vynnychenko that he could not bring about any changes to policy at the centre. Therefore he should abandon the political sphere, and go either to the Ukraine or return to the emigration to conduct literary work.³²⁶

Nevertheless, at the end of June Vynnychenko travelled to Kharkiv for talks with the Ukrainian government. Vynnychenko did not keep a record of these negotiations in his diary. However, an account of them can be found in the report which he sent to the Foreign Group following his re-emigration to the West. He wrote that in the Ukrainian capital he had been 'fooled around' and that Rakovskii was not interested in his *Dokladna zapyska*. Instead, he was offered a number of posts, firstly in the Commissariat of Education, and then as an inspector for the revolutionary tribunal in the Revolutionary Military Soviet. He turned both down, claiming that the former did not have any responsibilities and that the latter position did not exist. Rakovskii then proposed that Vynnychenko become commissar for foreign affairs. Again, Vynnychenko rejected this, claiming that it was also an empty title because the commissariat lacked its own ministerial apparatus. Vynnychenko left the Ukraine for the Russian capital convinced that there was nothing for him there and that the government was not Ukrainian, but rather a form of occupation, seeking to recreate a 'one and indivisible' Russia.³²⁷

326 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.439-42.

327 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 20.10.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.28.

Vynnychenko was certainly correct in supposing that the Bolsheviks wanted to put restrictions on his authority. However, it should come as no revelation that the Bolshevik leaders, though they accepted that Vynnychenko might be of some use in the Ukraine, wanted to limit Vynnychenko's powers if he joined the leadership of the KP(b)U – he had, after all, led a government with which the Soviet republics had been at war. Indeed, Vynnychenko was not the easiest man to negotiate with. He was convinced that only he could save the revolution in the Ukraine,³²⁸ and therefore judged the Bolsheviks' sincerity in their intentions towards the Ukraine on the basis of his perception of the importance of the posts offered to him. Consequently, it was very difficult for the two sides to come to an agreement. Nevertheless, perhaps Vynnychenko underestimated the responsibilities involved in the positions offered to him. At this time, the Ukrainian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, for example, was setting up its own missions abroad. These conducted negotiations with foreign powers on trade and other issues. Later in the 1920s, the commissars for education Shumskyi and Skrypnyk used their commissariat to implement Ukrainianisation.³²⁹

By 11th July, Vynnychenko was again in Moscow certain that his mission had failed. 'I do not see a way out', he wrote, 'because there are only two ways out: either to renounce being a Ukrainian and then be a revolutionary; or to break completely with the revolution and then it is possible to be a Ukrainian'. He said he could do neither, both options meant death, but 'to unify the one and the other is not possible, history does not allow it'.³³⁰ Vynnychenko here again voiced the dilemma which occupied many Ukrainian socialists: the weighting of the national and socialist aspects of their political programme. In the emigration, it had been easy to claim that social liberation would inevitably lead to national rebirth. However, the nature of Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine forced Vynnychenko to question this assumption.

328 Perhaps the most indicative quotation comes from the diary entry for 5th August, in which Vynnychenko laments 'the poor Ukrainians, they placed too many hopes on my entry into government'. See Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.477. He repeated this very same statement the following month, on 12th September, after his discussions with the government in Kharkiv had finally failed. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.480.

329 Soldatenko, too, stresses that the post in Narkomos possessed real responsibility. See Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.76.

330 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.445.

Vynnychenko spent the rest of July and the first half of August in the Russian capital. His diary entries from this period are full of attacks on the Soviet system. Federation did not exist between Russia and the Ukraine: 'there are no separate countries, but rather a one and indivisible Russia, which is represented by a one and indivisible RKP'.³³¹ He was convinced that the Soviet republics were threatened through war, economic failure, famine, the bureaucracy and governmental centralism, and the failure to draw the Ukrainian masses into the revolution: 'taking all these conditions into consideration, it is not possible to believe in the victory of the revolution with much certainty'.³³² He was in Moscow during the Second Congress of Comintern and was shocked by the pomp associated with the opening of the meeting. Given the precarious situation which he believed the revolution was in, he felt that this pageantry was 'decorative, false and counterfeit'.³³³ He wrote that lying had become ingrained into the Bolsheviks, and they did so even in situations where it was completely unnecessary. As a consequence, workers always viewed any proclamation by the Bolsheviks with scepticism and people who would otherwise have sympathised with Communism were put off it.³³⁴ He therefore longed to return abroad, and petitioned Radek and Chicherin to allow him to travel to America as a representative of the Third International. This plan did not materialise, but he was granted permission to leave the country.³³⁵

On 30th July, Vynnychenko wrote a letter addressed to the Ukrainian workers and peasants, which should be read out at the next party congress of the UKP following his departure from Russia. He said he had rejected the posts offered to him because they had not represented any real responsibility and because the Bolsheviks had hoped to use him as a figurehead. He then turned to the situation in the Soviet republics. 'The USRR [Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic]', he wrote, 'as a separate, federal state is a fiction': Russia's relationship to the Ukraine was that of an imperial state to a colony. Consequently, the Ukrainian working masses were denied their own economic cen-

331 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.452.

332 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.447-450. The quotation is on p.450.

333 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.447.

334 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.453-4.

335 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.446, 453.

tre, depriving them of the possibility for national rebirth. The dictatorship of Russian culture continued. The Bolsheviks justified this with the slogan of the centralisation of forces, which was admittedly a Communist slogan, but in the Ukraine was implemented in the spirit of Russian great power absolutism. Only the healthy, natural force of the Ukrainian working classes, represented by the UKP, resisted this, forcing the Russians to make concessions.³³⁶ Despite this attack on the Bolsheviks, Vynnychenko was not hostile towards the party: 'it is necessary to remind every Ukrainian Communist, and also every member of the UKP, that *there can be no hostility towards the KP(b)U*; this is *our* comradely brother, which on account of different objective and subjective reasons has made mistakes'. He stressed 'the great role' of the RKP in the Communist revolution. Ukrainian Communists had to make the Russians aware of their mistakes, but they should also support Soviet power, enter its institutions and help in the organisation of the Red Army and the rebuilding of the economy.³³⁷

Thus, an improvement in the situation in the Ukraine would come about through the organs of the existing government. The UKP must organise itself and the Ukrainian working class in order to create a force which would compel the Bolsheviks to realise their own aims. Indeed, he claimed that many members of both the RKP and KP(b)U saw the failings of the system and wanted to change them because they were consistent Communists.³³⁸ The speech is interesting because it shows that despite the scathing criticism to be found in his diary, Vynnychenko maintained his belief that Ukrainian socialists should stand on the side of the world revolution led by the Bolsheviks. Moreover, he wrote it believing that he would soon leave Russia; the letter would only be made public when he was already in the West. One cannot claim that he toned down his criticism of the Bolsheviks or called for cooperation with them out of fear of repercussions.

On 3rd August, Vynnychenko and his party were ready to depart from the Russian capital, but they were taken from the train before it set off. The offi-

336 Vynnychenko's letter to workers and peasants, 30.07.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.24-30. The quotation is on ark.26

337 Vynnychenko's letter to workers and peasants, 30.07.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45, ark.32.

338 Vynnychenko's letter to workers and peasants, 30.07.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.30.

cial explanation was that the war with Poland was complicating travel.³³⁹ Two days later Vynnychenko wrote to the Central Committee of the UKP informing them of his failure to leave Moscow and asking them to return the letter he had sent to be read out at their party conference. He stressed that he was against the publication of the letter because since he had written it the situation had changed. At the end of July, it had seemed as if Poland would make peace with the Soviet republics. In such a situation it was right to criticise the Bolsheviks. However, the renewal of the war with Poland meant that any criticism of the Soviet system could harm its chances of survival. He presumed that he would not be able to get out of Russia in the near future, but if he did, he would not publish the letter in the West.³⁴⁰

Unable to leave Russia for the West, Vynnychenko once again thought about going to the Ukraine. On 12th August, he began making preparations for this and he left Moscow for Kharkiv five days later. His plan was to travel from Kharkiv to Kyiv, where he would work with the publisher Dniprosouiz.³⁴¹ Back in the Ukraine, he felt that the situation was explosive with the discontent of the Ukrainian masses turning into violence, as could be seen in the rising popularity of Makhno. Vynnychenko wrote that it was necessary to calm this popular dissatisfaction, but that the government also had to meet it by introducing Ukrainianisation. Unfortunately, 'Ukrainianisation' was only a phrase for the Bolsheviks. They preferred to follow a policy of the dictatorship of Russian culture.³⁴²

In the Ukraine Vynnychenko met leaders of the UKP about making a 'demonstration' against the national policies of the government. An argument developed over Vynnychenko's letter to workers and peasants as the UKP refused to give back the letter. They also argued over the question of the appropriate form of opposition to the Bolsheviks. Vynnychenko said that this must be fitting to the situation, that is whether there was war or peace, echoing the sentiments he had expressed in the letter from the 5th. However, he also complained that the UKP had been so intimidated by the Bolshevik regime that

339 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p. 457.

340 Vynnychenko to the TsK of the UKP, 05.08.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.56-7.

341 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.461, 488; Soldatenko 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.78.

342 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.463.

they no longer held a clear line on the national question and only aped the RKP.³⁴³ Following this meeting, on 23rd August Vynnychenko again wrote to the UKP's Central Committee. This letter reflected his anger. He protested against the Central Committee's refusal to give back the document. Their actions had tarnished his perception of the party. He accused them of holding the same views as the KP(b)U on the national question and declared them to be an anachronism.³⁴⁴ Two days later, the UKP's Central Committee replied, rejecting Vynnychenko's attack on their beliefs and suggested that the real reason he wanted the letter to remain unpublished was his inability to leave Russia and his fear of repercussions. They declared that they viewed the missive as a historical document and would therefore preserve it in their archive.³⁴⁵ It is difficult not to share the UKP leadership's suspicions in this matter, even if Vynnychenko's account of the incident in his diary does correspond to that set out in his correspondence.³⁴⁶ However, despite this fact, one must remember that even when he thought he was about to escape to the West, Vynnychenko warned that any criticism of the Bolsheviks should not harm the Soviet system. Even if later he was thinking of his personal safety, Vynnychenko's argument remained consistent with that set out in the original letter to Ukrainian workers and peasants.

At this time, Vynnychenko was very critical of the Bolsheviks, accusing them of exhibiting 'the old Russian national trait of hypocrisy, brutality, inexcusable violence, the old habit of belief in the providential role of Russia'.³⁴⁷ However, the risings taking place in the Ukraine had cut the rail connection to Kyiv, so he had to abandon his plan to travel there. He now wanted to leave the country, and on 31st August he turned to Rakovskii and Manuil'skyi about this. They brought up the matter of his joining the KP(b)U. Vynnychenko again asked himself whether he was ready to join the revolution and put aside his doubts about the national question, or whether it was better to follow his own interests, keep his hands clean of the mistakes made by the Bolsheviks and return to exile, where a quiet, peaceful life would await him. Once more he

343 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.463-4.

344 Vynnychenko to the TsK of the UKP, 23.08.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.58.

345 The TsK of the UKP to Vynnychenko, 25.08.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.59.

346 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, 471-3.

347 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.467.

chose involvement in the revolution, which he, in his histrionic style, described as meaning his certain destruction. In his diary Vynnychenko returned again and again to this dilemma during his negotiations with the government in Kharkiv.³⁴⁸

On 5th September, Vynnychenko was asked to submit a declaration to the Politburo of the KP(b)U outlining his position on the present Ukrainian state. If this declaration was acceptable, he would be allowed to join the KP(b)U and be appointed deputy head of Sovnarkom and head of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.³⁴⁹ Manuilskyi, who according to Vynnychenko was the Bolshevik most interested in his participation in government, even began to change the writer's opinion of the Soviet system: 'apparently, Manuilskyi is utterly, sincerely convinced in the *Ukrainian* course of the KPU. So sincerely that I am really being persuaded that I was mistaken in my conclusions, made primarily under the influence of information from the UKP and the federalists'.³⁵⁰ It was typical of Vynnychenko that he wavered between abundant hope and utter despair during the negotiations. On 5th September, he described his course as being like the path to Golgotha; however, on 8th September, he optimistically stated that he could enter the government with a clear conscience and predicted that in between six months and a year the Russifiers would be removed from positions of power.³⁵¹

By this stage, a change had taken place in Moscow and Kharkiv's relative desire to cooperate with Vynnychenko. At the time of Vynnychenko's first trip to the Ukraine, it had been the RKP(b) which had been more interested in securing Vynnychenko's support and the KP(b)U which had been reluctant to admit him into government. However, Vynnychenko's regular changes of heart had made the Russian Bolsheviks less keen to seek an agreement with him. On 6th September, the Politburo of the RKP(b) discussed a telegram from Rakovskii on the negotiations with Vynnychenko. The Russian Politburo noted that it was not against allowing Vynnychenko into the party immedi-

348 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.465, 473-4. According to the decisions of the Politburo from 1st September, it was Vynnychenko's declaration that he was willing to enter the party which started the negotiations with Rakovskii. See TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.7 ark.69.

349 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 05.09.1920, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.7 ark.72.

350 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, p.476.

351 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.477-8.

ately, but that due to 'the fickleness of Comrade Vynnychenko's mood' it was against giving him a post in government; instead he should at first be used for practical work.³⁵² This statement, more than any other, gives evidence that Vynnychenko himself was one of the greatest barriers to the success of his mission: his 'playing hard to get' had clearly infuriated the RKP and cooled its desire to work with him. The KP(b)U, on the other hand, seems to have overcome its initial worries about letting Vynnychenko into government and was doing its best to bring this about, despite the scepticism in Moscow.

The declaration which Vynnychenko submitted to the Politburo stated that the Ukraine did not yet have a genuinely socialist government, but that 'only people with a beggarly reason, knowledge and experience or demagogues without a conscience, enemies of the workers, could blame the ruling Communist party or Soviet power for this'; rather, the legacy of the world and civil wars, internal sabotage and attacks by imperialism and counter-revolution had prevented it. The same factors had hindered the creation of a state, although these were being overcome and a worker-peasant state inside a world socialist federation was being built. Moreover, he praised the KP(b)U's 'genuine, sincere activity' towards forming an independent Ukrainian centre. Not even the UNR had created as many opportunities for the Ukrainian working classes as the Soviet regime. He said that the relations between the RKP and the KP(b)U, like the mutual status of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, were not yet clarified. He added that the RKP, as the centre of the world revolution, had a leading role in the intellectual development of all young Communist organisations, and therefore while the KP(b)U did not have its own experienced forces, the party stood under the leadership of the Russians. The quicker Ukrainian national forces took an active part in the organisation of the workers' movement, the easier it would become for the Ukrainians to take the construction of the socialist state in their country into their own hands. He ended by declaring his intention to join the KP(b)U and that he would be followed by the rest of the Foreign Group of the UKP.³⁵³ Clearly, Vynnychenko's criticism of the Soviet system was even softer in this statement than it had been in his *Dokladna zapyska*.

352 Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.70.

353 Vynnychenko to the TsK of the KP(b)U, 09.09.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.60-2zv.

The Politburo discussed the declaration at a meeting on 9th September, at which it accepted the fundamentals of the declaration and resolved that he should finally be allowed into the party. In a second meeting later on in the day, the Ukrainian Politburo decided it was impossible formally to grant Vynnychenko a place on the Politburo before the next plenum of the Central Committee. However, the invitation and right to serve on all sittings of the Politburo and Orgbiuro gave him full opportunity to take an active part in the government. It also entrusted Rakovskii with the task of getting Vynnychenko to explain the sections on 'kulakism and the national state', by which it might have meant the section calling on the inclusion of Ukrainian national elements in the Soviet government.³⁵⁴ The refusal to admit Vynnychenko immediately to the Politburo could have been a delaying tactic, perhaps influenced by Moscow's lack of enthusiasm about allowing Vynnychenko to serve in government. However, it did not rule out his acceptance into the Politburo in the future, and stated the intention to allow him to play a role in government. Indeed, the Ukrainian Politburo was already ready to consider him a member of the government, resolving to ask the Central Committee of the RKP(b) to send Vynnychenko to the imminent peace talks with Poland in place of Manuiskyi.³⁵⁵ At that time, Poland was still refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the Ukrainian Soviet government in the talks and hoped to use the UNR in the negotiations as a 'third force'. By including Vynnychenko in the delegation, Kharkiv sought to undermine this.³⁵⁶

On the same day, the RKP(b) also discussed Vynnychenko's declaration. Their only resolution on the matter was to publish it in *Pravda*.³⁵⁷ Certainly, it seems that at least some members of the Russian government wanted a clearer statement of support from Vynnychenko. On 11th September, Trotskii told the Russian Politburo that 'it is necessary that Vynnychenko proclaims:

- 1) that he himself was the head of the democratic Ukrainian republic.
- 2) that Petliura never had a democratic mandate.
- 3) that Petliura is an agent of the Polish aristocracy.

354 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 09.09.1920, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.7 ark.73, 75.

355 Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.84.

356 Vasyliiev, 'Evoliutsiia pohliadiiv kerivnytstva', pp.164-5.

357 Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)', p.71.

- 4) that under these conditions, Vynnychenko, regardless of those disagreements which he has had in the past with the Soviet regime, considers himself duty bound to join the Red Army as a volunteer, so that with weapon in hand he can fight for an independent Soviet Ukraine against the Polish aristocracy and their mercenaries'.³⁵⁸

The last point was evidence of the RKP's frustration and would have prevented Vynnychenko from taking part in the Ukrainian government.

Despite the RKP's reservations, the Ukrainian Politburo announced Vynnychenko's entry into government via the Ukrainian telegraph agency. Moscow frowned on this haste and Lenin told the head of the Russian telegraph agency to reprimand his Ukrainian counterpart for publishing 'unverified' information.³⁵⁹ Indeed, the announcement did turn out to be premature. On 9th September, Vynnychenko heard about the Politburo's doubts about parts of his declaration. He refused to change the document. However, as Vynnychenko himself admitted in his diary, it was not a disagreement over the content of the declaration which ended his negotiations with the KP(b)U. Rather, it was the refusal to allow him into the Ukrainian Politburo. Vynnychenko rejected the idea that this was a mere formality connected with the timing of the Fourth Plenum of the KP(b)U. He supposed that it was a result of Moscow's reluctance to countenance his participation in the highest organ of decision making in the Ukraine. Given the disagreement between Moscow and Kharkiv, this is possible. Vynnychenko interpreted the absence of an invitation to the Politburo as a sign of the KP(b)U's disinclination to give him a real role in government and its desire to use him simply as a figurehead; a view not entirely borne out by the Ukrainian Politburo's decision, quoted above, which spoke of its wish to let him take part in the Politburo and Orgbiuro. As a consequence, Vynnychenko refused to enter the party and the government.³⁶⁰ He left Kharkiv. By the 16th, Vynnychenko was again in Moscow and on 21st he departed from the Russian capital to enter exile for the second time since the outbreak of revolution in 1917.³⁶¹

358 Quoted in Vasyliiev, 'Evolutsiia pohliadiiv kerivnytstva', p.165.

359 Soldatenko, 'Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)U', p.86.

360 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.478-80.

361 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-20*, pp.481-2.

Kostiuk and Czajkowskyj, closely following Vynnychenko's account in his diary, firmly lay the blame for the failure of Vynnychenko's mission on the Bolsheviks' insincerity in their desire to Ukrainianise the government in the Ukraine.³⁶² Certainly, the Bolshevik leaders were worried about giving Vynnychenko too much real power and wanted to limit the writer's role to propaganda. The Bolsheviks made the most of Vynnychenko's apparent conversion to Communism.³⁶³ Some of Vynnychenko's suppositions about the Bolsheviks' intentions were therefore correct. However, given Vynnychenko's past opposition to Bolshevism it is hardly surprising that the Bolsheviks were not keen on giving him a central position in government; nor is it astonishing that the Bolsheviks sought to use Vynnychenko's change of heart as propaganda. Vynnychenko's belief that he deserved a powerful position within the Ukrainian government, and that this alone would indicate the Bolsheviks' earnestness in their dealings with the Ukraine, was clearly based on a gross overestimation of his own importance to the course of the revolution in the Ukraine. As an émigré who led a small splinter group of the USDRP in Vienna, he was not in a position to insist on the complete reorganisation of the Ukrainian government, and it is not difficult to understand why the Bolsheviks rejected his demands. Vynnychenko later claimed repeatedly that he had not travelled to the Ukraine to take on governmental posts,³⁶⁴ yet from his own account the main topic of discussion with the Bolsheviks was the position he would occupy. The Bolsheviks gave him several chances to join the Ukrainian government and, as argued above, some of the posts offered to him really did involve a certain level of responsibility.

362 Czajkowskyj, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko', pp.22-4; Kostiuk, 'Misiia', pp.224-5.

363 For example, in a speech of 11th September, Trotskii referred to Vynnychenko's repudiation of his 'former errors' and his support for the Soviet Ukraine as a sign that the UNR no longer existed and the Soviet Ukraine was the only legitimate representative of the Ukraine. Lev Trotsky, 'The Polish Gentry Do Not Want Peace', available at www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1920-mil/ch54.htm.

364 For example, see Vynnychenko's 'Lyst do Ukrainykykh robitnykiv i selian', *Nova doba*, No.34, pp.2-5 (also published in Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Publitsystyka*, ed. Viktor Burbela, New York-Kyiv: Ukrainska Vilna Akademiia Nauk u SSHa i NAN Ukrainy, 2002, pp.64-72) and id., *Die Revolution in Gefahr! Ein offener Brief der Auswärtigen Gruppe der Ukrainischen Kommunistischen Partei an die Kommunisten und revolutionären Sozialisten Europas und Amerikas*, Vienna: Nova Doba, 1921, pp.15-6.

***Nova Doba* and the Impact of Vynnychenko's Return to the Emigration**

While Vynnychenko was in Moscow and Kharkiv, the Foreign Group continued publishing *Nova doba*. Between May and September 1920, the main topic of the period was of course the Polish-Soviet war. The accounts of the war were full of polemics against the Poles, Petliura, the ZUNR government and the Ukrainian Social Democrats. Petliura for example was described as a 'pitiful aristocratic clown who betrayed the Ukrainian people, delivered them under the cover of the "independence" of the Ukrainian People's Republic into the hands of [...] its ancient enemy – the Polish aristocracy'.³⁶⁵ *Nova doba*, however, was not only interested in the Ukrainian aspects of the war: 'in the Ukraine, now, this is a struggle for the fate of the peoples of the whole world, the fate of the revolution, the fate of mankind'.³⁶⁶ It is no coincidence that the group was highly active during the Polish-Soviet war: the advance of the Red Army into Eastern Galicia promised not only the spread of revolution to the rest of Europe, but also the achievement of Ukrainian unity. Thus, it seemed that the argument put forward before Vynnychenko left for Moscow was taking shape in reality: the Ukrainian national cause was being advanced through the progress of the world revolution. However, the solution to the Ukrainian question was a purely socialist one: the paper called on East Galician workers and peasants to drive out their Ukrainian leaders from the bourgeois and Social Democratic parties, and transfer power into the hands of worker and peasant Soviets, which alongside Ukrainians would include Russian, Jewish and Polish workers.³⁶⁷ Ukrainians who did not belong to the right class had no place in the new, united Ukraine.

Accordingly, *Nova doba* retained a strongly internationalist character. The paper continued to report on the workers' movements in other countries. As part of their task of disseminating Communist ideas among the emigration, the Foreign Group made works on Communism available to Ukrainian readers. In addition to bringing out their own interpretations of Communist thought (see above), the *Nova doba* circle reprinted the writings of some of the leaders of the RKP, both in the paper itself and as separate booklets. These in-

365 *Nova doba*, No.15, 12 June 1920, p.2.

366 *Nova doba*, No.10, 8 May 1920, p.1.

367 *Nova doba*, No.22, 31 July, p.1.

cluded Bukharin's *Program of the Communists-Bolsheviks* and a number of articles by Lenin, for example on the history of the Third International.³⁶⁸

Information on the situation in the Soviet Ukraine was also provided. *Nova doba* published an article by Dmytro Manuilskyi, the Ukrainian commissar for agriculture, which dealt with the land question in the Ukraine. It described how the new laws introduced by the Soviet regime sought to end the hasty drive towards collectivisation and draw peasants into working on the land.³⁶⁹ In covering the land question, the paper targeted a topic dear to the Ukrainian left and presumably of great interest to the peasants who made up the majority of POWs and internees. Elsewhere, *Nova doba* covered those areas of traditional interest to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Siryi (the pseudonym of Iurii Tyshchenko) contrasted the failure of the Central Rada and Petliura's Directory to support Ukrainian culture with the progress made under the Bolsheviks. He pointed to the creation of theatres for soldiers, the foundation of a peasant-worker university and the work of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kyiv as examples of the Bolsheviks' support for Ukrainian culture. He claimed that workers and peasants were involved in this and creating a new proletarian culture.³⁷⁰ On the whole, however, there were very few articles of this kind: the attention of the paper was much more on the progress of the world socialist revolution. It was not until the introduction of the policy of Ukrainianisation in 1923 that Ukrainian Sovietophiles could point to many concrete examples of Bolshevik support for Ukrainian culture.

The paper's task of propagating Communism among Ukrainians abroad and convincing émigrés and internees to return to the Ukraine was backed up by meetings, organised by the sections in Czechoslovakia and Germany, in the internment camps. *Nova doba* gives an account of a gathering which took place in the camp of Hemelingen in Germany on 27th August. 15 internees took part. A delegate from the Berlin Foreign Group, V. Stepovyi (the pseudonym of Z. Vysotskyi), spoke at the meeting. He explained who the Communists were, what they wanted and what the dictatorship of the proletariat meant. He described the current struggle by Russia and the Ukraine as that of the proletariat against counter-revolution, both foreign and internal. This

368 *Nova doba*, No.20, 17 July 1920, pp.2-4.

369 *Nova doba*, No.19, 10 July 1920, p.2.

370 *Nova doba*, No.20, 17 July 1920, pp.3-5.

talk was followed by questions and a discussion. At the end of the meeting, those present resolved that every worker must be a member of the Communist party and that every member must subordinate himself to the party programme and follow it precisely.³⁷¹ The account is indicative of the nature of this propaganda and the need to adapt it for people lacking a political education. The success of the Foreign Group in getting internees to return was limited. Vysotskyi only mentioned eight such returnees.³⁷² Of course, the Foreign Group lacked the resources necessary to repatriate large numbers of men. However, when the Soviet government came to set up its own apparatus for bringing these soldiers back to the Ukraine, the work conducted by the Foreign Group may have laid some sort of foundation for this.

A second goal of the group in these months was to establish connections with other Communist and pro-Soviet organisations, including the Ukrainian workers' organisation in Vienna, *Iednist*, the Ukrainian Communist parties in East Galicia and Bukovina and the Communist party of German Austria. They also suggested to the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR, their partners in the 'Soviet-Revolutionary Bloc', that the two merge with the Communist party. The Foreign Delegation, however, rejected the proposal and the Bloc was dissolved following a joint meeting on 4th/5th July.³⁷³ The Foreign Group in Berlin, which sought to establish links with the Communists in Germany, also had problems in this area. Its members applied to join the Russian section of the German Communist Party, but the plan failed due to opposition from the Russian section.³⁷⁴

This was not the only setback for the Berlin group. Two of its members, Serhii Vikul and a levhen Hutsailo,³⁷⁵ left because they considered themselves to be more members of the KP(b)U than of the UKP. Later, Marko Bardakh was excluded because of his contacts with 'counter-revolution' (by which was

371 *Nova doba*, No.28, 11 September 1920, p.5.

372 Vysotskyi to the TsK of the UKP, 10.10.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.44 ark.33.

373 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 12.05.1920, 30.06.1920 and 07.07.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.2-3, 13, 15. The dissolution of the Bloc is also dealt with in the following chapter.

374 *Nova doba*, No.25, 21 August 1920, pp.3-4.

375 Hutsailo, levhen (1880-1928): a founder of the USDP in Bukovina. As a member of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, he was involved in educational and cultural work among the Ukrainian POWs in Germany. After immigrating to the Soviet Ukraine, he taught in Kharkiv. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.283.

meant Mykola Porsh and Roman Smal-Stotskyi, members of the UNR mission in Germany) and the Communists. Both Bardakh and Vikul went to Riga, where peace negotiations were taking place between the Soviet republics and Poland. From Riga the two went on to the Ukraine.³⁷⁶

There was also disagreement in Vienna. A struggle seems to have taken place between the leader in Vynnychenko's absence, Volodymyr Levynskyi, and Petro Diatliv, his deputy. In a sitting of 7th July, Levynskyi managed to pass a motion depriving Diatliv of the right to attend the organisation's meetings; he could now only do so with a special invitation.³⁷⁷ Later on in the month, the group received a letter from Vynnychenko on the progress of his talks with the Bolsheviks and a copy of his *Dokladna zapyska*. The new information provided the occasion for the culmination of this disagreement at a meeting on 29th July. Diatliv argued that the *Dokladna zapyska* should be published. This was rejected by the majority led by Levynskyi because 'it would give important material to the counter-revolution'. They refused to change the course of the paper. Diatliv was expelled from the group. He was accused of acting without the support of the Foreign Group by trying to establish links with Communists in Poland and Galicia. He was said to hold a view of the national question different from that of the rest of the group in that he was for a unified state and they were for federation.³⁷⁸

Although the full text of the *Doklada zapyska* did not appear in *Nova doba*, Levynskyi did write a short article based on the information from Vynnychenko. He said that Vynnychenko had been treated coldly by the Bolsheviks and that Vynnychenko had been offered positions in government, but had rejected them because he had travelled to Moscow to serve the revolution, not to take up cushy posts. Levynskyi then set out the five demands made by Vynnychenko in the *Doklada zapyska*.³⁷⁹ The negative tone of this article seems at odds with the group's refusal to provide propaganda for the oppo-

376 Moroz to Vynnychenko, 6.10.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.79-79zv; Vynnychenko to the Foreign Group of the UKP in Vienna, 02.12.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.45 ark.83-4.

377 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 07.07.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.15.

378 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 24.07.1920 and 29.07.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.18-20. The quotation is on ark.18-9.

379 *Nova doba*, No.22, 31 July, 1920, p.3.

nents of the Soviet republics. One explanation was that the disagreement over Vynnychenko's letter was merely a pretext to remove Diatliv from the group and that the positions held by Diatliv and Levynskiyi were not so different. Alternatively, it is possible that the criticism in Levynskiyi's article was viewed as remaining within the limits of socialist analysis; a boundary which would have been crossed by publishing the full text.

Nevertheless, the pessimistic information received from Vynnychenko did make the remaining members of the group uncertain about their position. On 4th August, they discussed their relationship to the KP(b)U. Before the arrival of Vynnychenko's letter 'there was the thought that if Diatliv had not been a member of the group then we would have seen ourselves, at least morally, a part of the KP(b)U'. However, they now knew that the KP(b)U was split into three wings, defined by their understanding of the relationship of the party to the RKP: the regionalists ('oblasnyky'), the federalists and the unionists. The unionists dominated the upper echelons of the party; because the KP(b)U was just a regional organisation of the RKP and in a state of ferment, they felt they could not join the party. At the same time, they did not have enough information on the UKP to join it. They decided that they could not enter any party and had to wait for more information from Vynnychenko.³⁸⁰ This was reiterated at another meeting six days later. At the second sitting, it was stressed that it did not matter at that time which party the Foreign Group joined. The current task was to spread the idea of Communism among the emigration, the internees and in Galicia.³⁸¹ They wrote to the Central Committee of the UKP explaining their refusal to join the party and their 'wait and see' position towards the KP(b)U.³⁸²

To a certain extent, these doubts can be seen in *Nova doba*. On the one hand, the paper published the resolutions of the 4th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. These stated that the Ukrainian SSR was an independent state and a member of an All-Russian Socialist Federation of Republics. They described the redistribution of the land to the peasants and the support for

380 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 04.08.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.23.

381 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 10.08.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.24-5.

382 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 14.08.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.25.

Ukrainian culture. On the other hand, in the same issue appeared the declaration of the UKP to the Congress, which criticised the KP(b)U, the Bolsheviks' agricultural policy and the fact that the Ukraine did not run its own economic, military and political affairs.³⁸³ However, at least some of the writers for the paper were less uncertain. In September 1920, Hryhorii Palamar declared that 'the Russian Bolsheviks have already recognised in their declarations the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic a number of times, that the independent Ukrainian republic exists as a separate state with its own government and institutions, that it is supported and esteemed by the entire force of the Ukrainian labouring masses'.³⁸⁴ In the following month, the group acquired a copy of one of the Soviet papers announcing the encouraging news that the government in Kharkiv had accepted Vynnychenko's conditions. It reported that Vynnychenko had joined the KP(b)U and was to be appointed the deputy head of Sovnarkom and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. His conditions, all of which referred to the granting of genuine independence to the Ukrainian Republic and the Ukrainianisation of its government, were listed.³⁸⁵ The members of the Foreign Group may well have felt that they had achieved their aim of cooperation with the Bolsheviks.

It was, therefore, only with Vynnychenko's return to the emigration that the Foreign Group adopted a new stance. Though Vynnychenko had left Moscow on 21st September, it was not until October that news of the final collapse of negotiations reached Vienna. The Austrian government would not allow Vynnychenko to re-enter their country, so his account of his mission had to be delivered to the group by post. This was read out and discussed in a meeting of 20th October. The description covered the main events set out in his diary. However, because it was written following the collapse of the talks in Moscow and Kharkiv, it naturally did not contain any of the hopes, which can be found in Vynnychenko's daily journal, that the negotiation could end positively. Vynnychenko depicted the situation in the Ukraine: there was no Ukrainian state – everything was ruled from Moscow; the KP(b)U was not an independent party, but rather a branch organisation of the RKP; the proletariat had escaped to the villages; there was no class struggle in the villages; only the

383 *Nova doba*, No.24, 14 August 1920, pp.2-4.

384 *Nova doba*, No.28, 11 September 1920, p.2.

385 *Nova doba*, No.31, 2 October 1920, p.6.

Russian language was used in government, and the economic life of the Ukraine was in ruins. These failings destroyed the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and the Soviet system was hated and distrusted by Ukrainians. In Russia there was no dictatorship of labour, but rather that of commissarism and bureaucratism. On the other hand, though the UKP was a small party, its members were honest, ideologically sound Ukrainians. They were persecuted by the RKP, but this did not prevent them from pursuing a genuinely Communist line.³⁸⁶

As clear as Vynnychenko's condemnation was, there was some dissent within the Foreign Group on the appropriate response. The majority adopted a resolution which stated that though they had not changed their position – they still supported the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition from capitalism to socialism under the aegis of the Soviet form of government – they could no longer side with the RSFSR and the RKP. The declaration repeated Vynnychenko's attacks on the Soviet republics and denounced the RKP for pursuing a policy of creating a 'one and indivisible' Russia. The Foreign Group stated that it now considered itself to be a part of the UKP and called upon all Communists in Europe and America to support this party only.³⁸⁷ However, Tovmachiv, the SR who had joined the group, voted against the resolution. He claimed that in principle he shared the position of the UKP and that he would enter the party if its activity was not against Bolshevik Russia and the Ukraine. 'In practice', wrote the secretary of the faction, Palamar, 'he is proposing a policy of loyal opposition, but is against publishing various documents because at this time we would support reaction and counter-revolution'. The Foreign Group ruled that Tovmachiv should travel to meet Vynnychenko in order to clarify his 'unsteady' position.³⁸⁸ On 11th November, Tovmachiv's audience with Vynnychenko was discussed. The dissenter claimed that Vynnychenko agreed with his position. Levynskyi, in turn, maintained that Vynnychenko's views were not different from that of the majority and called on Tovmachiv to set out his views in writing. Tovmachiv

386 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 20.10.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.30-32.

387 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 20.10.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.31a.

388 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 20.10.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.32.

remained unrepentant and on 27th November he was expelled from the group.³⁸⁹ As we will see, Tovmachiv was not the only member of the Foreign Group to leave due to opposition to the new, anti-Bolshevik course.

The Foreign Group made its change of course public in the 34th issue of *Nova doba*, which appeared on 23rd October. The paper opened with an article by Levynskyi describing Vynnychenko's mission to Moscow and Kyiv based on the account which the group had received. The two failures of the Bolshevik regime were highlighted. On the one hand, the dictatorship of the proletariat had not been introduced in either Russia or the Ukraine. On the other, Russia had resurrected the policy of the tsars towards the non-Russian nations. 'With aching heart', he concluded, 'we have been forced to undertake a struggle against Russian Communism. But this struggle is not conducted in the name of Ukrainian nationalism, but rather in the name of international socialism and the purity of Communism because nothing in our ideological position has changed – it is against the chauvinism and national greed of the Russian Communists'. The resolutions from 20th October were also published,³⁹⁰ as was Vynnychenko's letter to Ukrainian peasants and workers, which explained the collapse of his negotiations with the Bolsheviks and again set out the failings of the Soviet system.³⁹¹ The struggle against the RKP was continued over the next 21 issues, which came out between October 1920 and March 1921. *Nova doba* drew the attention of its readers to the errors of the RKP and the KP(b)U. It argued that the only real Communist party in the Ukraine was the UKP and called upon all Communists abroad to support this party alone. The group claimed to be the representatives of the UKP abroad and to speak in its name.³⁹²

The change of course threw up a new dilemma for the members of the Foreign Group of the UKP: they had to find concrete proposals through which the Soviet system could be changed while avoiding any actions that would put

389 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 06.11.1920 and 27.11.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.33, 35-6.

390 *Nova doba*, No.34, 23 October 1920, pp.1-2. The quotation is on p.2.

391 *Nova doba*, No.34, 23 October 1920, pp.2-5. A copy can also be found in Vynnychenko, *Publitsystyka*, New York-Kyiv: 2002, pp.64-72.

392 See for example Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Ukrainska Komunistychna Partia (UKP) i Komunistychna Partia (bolshevykiv) Ukrainy (KP(b)U)*, Vienna: Nova Doba, 1921. This was published in *Nova doba*, No.47, 22 January 1921, pp.1-2 and No.48, 29 January 1921, pp.2-4.

them in the same camp as the Ukrainian 'reactionaries' whom they also despised. In 'The Revolution in Danger!' (*Revoliutsiia v nebezpetsi!*), which was originally published in *Nova doba* in November 1920 and translated into a number of West European languages, Vynnychenko appealed to the parties of the Third International to challenge the RKP. They should take charge of the events in Russia and the Ukraine by forming a commission to oversee the methods and tactics of the Russian Communists, and they should take on responsibility for the nationalities policy of the RKP.³⁹³ Thus the Foreign Group turned to a Bolshevik-dominated organisation for help against the Bolsheviks! By February 1921, the Foreign Group had clearly abandoned its hopes of improving the situation in the Soviet republics. *Nova doba* argued that it was impossible to expect the Bolsheviks to rectify their own errors and that due to these failures the Soviet republics were on the verge of collapse. Nevertheless, the Foreign Group still opposed any attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime by force because this would only allow the Russian and Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries to return. Ukrainian Communists therefore needed to formulate clear slogans of genuine socialist revolution and to organise the masses in favour of this; they had to explain to the masses that the present Soviet regime was collapsing due to the bankruptcy of the RKP and not because there was anything wrong with revolution itself. At the same time, Ukrainian Communists must still struggle against Ukrainian, Russian and international counter-revolution. The last task was to create a united Ukrainian revolutionary front, which should become the government in the Ukraine and implement the genuine socialist revolution. Suitable collaborators in this front were the UKP, the federalist current in the KP(b)U, the former *Borotbisty* (also a part of the KP(b)U), the democratic centralist group in the KP(b)U and those revolutionary agrarian socialists who genuinely believed in the power of the Soviets and the dictatorship of the proletariat.³⁹⁴

Despite these attempts to avoid accusations of siding with counterrevolution, dissent against the new course of the group grew. In November, the section of the Foreign Group in Berlin wrote to the organ of the German Communist Party, *Die Rote Fahne*. It reported a decision of 4th November to disassociate

393 Vynnychenko, *Die Revolution in Gefahr*, pp.42-6.

394 *Nova doba*, No.52, 26 February, 1921, p.1.

itself from Vynnychenko's letter to Ukrainian peasants and workers. It noted that his comments had been reprinted with much jubilation in *Die Freiheit*. 'The real Communists in the Foreign Group', proclaimed the letter, 'distance themselves from Vynnychenko, the abuser of the Russian comrades. Such renegades can happily be left to the wide-open arms of the *Dittmänner*'.³⁹⁵ Vynnychenko's group in Vienna was, therefore, little better than the German Social Democrats who had refused to join the German Communist Party. The group in Berlin clearly had the same reservations as Tovmachiv: it feared that to criticise the Bolsheviks so openly and sharply only helped opponents of the Bolsheviks attack the principle of Soviet government itself.

In this it had the support from the Central Committee of the UKP, who wrote to the Foreign Group in Berlin in November 1920 to call on the organisation in Berlin to enter the UKP officially and accept its entire program. In a letter from December the Central Committee set out the differences between itself and Vynnychenko more clearly. Whereas the UKP had merely opposed the RKP's policy in the Ukraine, Vynnychenko had attacked the RKP in general. He had therefore taken up a petty bourgeois, nationalist position, which the TsK of the UKP compared to that of the Mensheviks and Petliurists. The letter stressed that it was necessary to know what one should say at party meetings, what one should say to the proletariat and what one could say to the bourgeois press. The information provided by the UKP to the Foreign Group had been intended for European socialists and not for use in a war against the RKP and the Third International. Vynnychenko had, therefore, crossed the line between friendly criticism and the criticism of friends.³⁹⁶ On 10th December 1920, the Central Committee wrote to the Executive Committee of Comintern denying that Vynnychenko was the foreign plenipotentiary of the party. His claim to hold the party's mandate had harmed the UKP by associating it with his counter-revolutionary and nationalist attacks on the Bolsheviks. The Central Committee stressed that it only disagreed with the RKP on the Bolsheviks' 'colonial' policy in the Ukraine and had nothing to do with the position occupied by Vynnychenko.³⁹⁷

395 *Die Rote Fahne*, 12 November 1920, p.3.

396 Pisotskyi to Vysotskyi, 03.11.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.44 ark.37, 45-6.

397 A. Drahomiretskyi and Iurii Mazurenko to the editorial boards of *Nasha pravda* and *Boritiesia-poborete!*, 10.12.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.85 ark.18

Inside the Viennese faction there was also dissent. Vasyl Mazurenko, who had been appointed deputy leader of the Foreign Group and deputy editor of *Nova doba* on 3rd January 1921, turned against the new line. In November 1920, the organ published the first in a series of articles written by Mazurenko entitled the 'Economic Independence of the Ukraine in Numbers'.³⁹⁸ However, not all instalments were printed. The paper explained this by saying that it did not want to burden readers with too much analysis of statistical material or the different trends in Russian Communist thought. Consequently, in the paper itself only a number of conclusions would be published; specialists who were interested in the subject could read the complete work in a separate brochure.³⁹⁹ A perusal of this pamphlet suggests an alternative reason for the interruption of the series. Though Mazurenko firmly criticised the increasing economic centralism followed by elements of the Russian Communist Party,⁴⁰⁰ unlike the rest of the *Nova doba* group he continued to believe that the Bolshevik leadership could solve these errors: 'not all Russian comrades, as a rule, belong to this centralist tendency and we find in Moscow itself comrade Communists who stand close to our position of the organisation of the state'.⁴⁰¹ Mazurenko clearly trusted Lenin. He concluded the main section of his booklet with an extract from a letter by the Communist leader in which Lenin asserted the necessity of combating Great Russian nationalism and making concessions to Ukrainian Communists.⁴⁰² By 21st January, the differences between Mazurenko and his colleagues had grown too great. He resigned the positions assigned to him only two and a half weeks before without explanation. He did not tell the rest of the group that he was leaving it entirely and on 4th March the Foreign Group decided to turn to him with a request that he explain his relationship to the organisation.⁴⁰³

Mazurenko met Vynnychenko twice to discuss his position. He told Vynnychenko that he was 'not "for struggle using all means", but for friendly opposi-

398 See *Nova doba*, Nos.36 to 39.

399 *Nova doba*, No.43, 25 December 1920, p.3.

400 See for example V. Mazurenko, *Ekonomichna samostiinist Ukrainy v chislakh*, Vienna-Kyiv: Nova Doba, 1921, pp.3, 49.

401 Mazurenko, *Ekonomichna samostiinist*, p.19.

402 Mazurenko, *Ekonomichna samostiinist*, p.48.

403 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 21.01.1921, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.39-41.

tion and creative, comradely criticism, if such was necessary for the development of the revolution in the Ukraine and on the world scene'. Vynnychenko could not persuade Mazurenko that the Foreign Group's new line corresponded to the stance adopted by the UKP. Mazurenko formally broke with the group and published a declaration to this effect in *Nasha pravda*, the paper of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia. On 8th May, he wrote to Anatol Pisotskyi, the chief ideologue of the UKP, announcing his departure from the Foreign Group. He expressed the hope that following the expulsion of Petliura from the Ukraine the time for reconciliation and close cooperation between all Communists would come. He asked if there was a chance that the UKP and KP(b)U would merge and pointed out that if the party could come to an agreement with the Soviet government, many émigrés would be encouraged to return to take part in cultural work in the Ukraine. On his own fate, he mentioned that he did not want to join the editorial board of *Nasha pravda* as its members were too passionately for the Bolsheviks, and he did not believe there was any real chance of a Communist movement developing in Austria. He therefore said he intended to return to the Ukraine.⁴⁰⁴

Most damaging for the Foreign Group was the refusal of the UKP to recognise the émigré organisation as its foreign representative. In March, news arrived in Vienna of the letter from the UKP's Central Committee to Comintern. On the 19th, the Group met to discuss this information and decided that the position taken by the Central Committee removed the basis for further action and that the last issue of *Nova doba* should be published.⁴⁰⁵ Indeed after that date only one more edition of the newspaper appeared. This was despite an attempt by Vynnychenko to prolong the life of the group. At a later sitting of 8th May, Vynnychenko reported that the UKP had not criticised the Foreign Group. He said that the Central Committee could not make a declaration supporting the Foreign Group because of the danger it was in and that criticism of the group by Semen Mazurenko had been made under pressure from Moscow. There was no reason for the group in Vienna to dissolve. This statement opened a long debate which not only dealt with the question of

404 V. Mazurenko to Pisotskyi, 08.05.1921, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.85 ark.8-9zv. The quotation is on ark.8.

405 Minutes of a meeting of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 19.03.1921, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.43.

whether the group should split up, but also the future of Bolshevism and the possibility of forming a bloc with other socialist parties. The discussion displayed the differences within the group: for example, Ivan Kalynovych,⁴⁰⁶ who was in charge of the group's publishing activity, was against disbanding the group and used the opportunity to attack Levynskyi's leadership. Levynskyi himself doubted whether the group should continue to exist. He did not believe that the Bolsheviks would fall and even suggested that they had the ability to evolve; as a Communist one must wait patiently to see how events developed. He reported that through illness he would step down as leader of the group. Vynnychenko won the vote and the Foreign Group resolved that it should continue to exist. However, an amendment put forward by Tyshchenko was also accepted whereby the faction would suspend its activities until it received news from the Central Committee of the UKP that the party was not against being represented by the Foreign Group.⁴⁰⁷

A final answer came to *Nova doba* on 30th June in a letter from Pisotskyi. He accused Vynnychenko and the Foreign Group in Vienna of adopting a nationalist and counter-revolutionary position: by calling for the creation of an independent Ukraine, the dominance of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainianisation of the KP(b)U. Unlike the UKP, the Foreign Group did not meet the 21 conditions for joining the Third International; instead of defending the Soviet republics from the international bourgeoisie, they worked to discredit Lenin and Comintern. Pisotskyi wrote that the Central Committee was not opposed to criticism of Communist parties, but that this criticism must remain Communist criticism. He denied that Vynnychenko possessed the mandate of the Central Committee. If the group wanted to rectify the damage it had done it should publish the letter. Those who wanted to work for the revolution should return to the Ukraine.⁴⁰⁸ As a result of the failure of the Foreign Group to respond, the Central Committee of the UKP wrote to *Nasha pravda* and *Borite-*

406 Kalynovych, Ivan (1885-1927): a Ukrainian publisher, who also produced a number of bibliographies on Ukrainian historical themes. He was a deputy to the Ukrainian National Council of the ZUNR in 1919. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.407.

407 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 08.05.1921, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.44-7.

408 The TsK of the UKP to the *Nova doba* group, 30.06.1921, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.85 ark.10-1.

sia-poborete!, the journal of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR, reiterating the points of its letters to Comintern and the Foreign Group.⁴⁰⁹

The Foreign Group's further existence was now untenable and at a sitting of 5th October 1921 it declared its own dissolution.⁴¹⁰ This was announced in one last issue of *Nova doba* from 22nd October. The tone of the paper was, however, unrepentant. Vynnychenko ridiculed the claim that the Foreign Group had not held the UKP's mandate and Levynskiy defended the line taken by the publication following Vynnychenko's return from Moscow.⁴¹¹ Vynnychenko and many of his supporters from *Nova doba* now formed a common front with the SRs led by Mykyta Shapoval. Together they brought out the journal *Nova Ukraina*, which adopted an anti-Soviet stance.⁴¹² The Foreign Group of the UKP had not been able to combine its dual goals of national and social liberation. Vynnychenko and his allies abandoned the formula, put forth in *Nova doba* before Vynnychenko's journey to Moscow and Kharkiv, that the construction of socialism would solve the Ukrainian question. Those who split with the Foreign Group and went back to the Ukraine remained true to this belief, hoping that the sincerity of the Bolsheviks' socialist convictions would help them overcome their failings in the national sphere.

Vynnychenko and the Soviet Ukraine after the closure of *Nova doba*

It has been claimed that following the closure of *Nova doba*, Vynnychenko retired from political life.⁴¹³ However, this is not entirely accurate. Vynnychenko remained an avid observer of developments in the Soviet Ukraine and continued to publish his opinions on the subject. It would also be incorrect to claim that Vynnychenko's experiences of the Soviet system had made him an implacable opponent of the Bolsheviks. This chapter has described how Vyn-

409 A. Drahomiretskyi and Iurii Mazurenko to the editorial boards of *Nasha pravda* and *Boritesia-poborete!*, 10.12.1920, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.85 ark.18. See also *Boritesia-poborete!*, No.9, July-September 1921, pp.27-32.

410 Minutes of the Foreign Group of the UKP, 05.10.1921, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.43 ark.49-50.

411 *Nova doba*, No.56, 22 October 1921, pp.1-5.

412 See Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.52-6.

413 Hryhoryi Kostiuik, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko ta ioho ostannii roman', in id., *Vynnychenko ta ioho doba. Doslidzennia, krytyka, polemika*, New York: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1980, pp.23-84 (p.60).

nychenko conducted an anti-Soviet campaign in *Nova doba*, which split the Foreign Group of the UKP. However, not long after the closure of the journal, Vynnychenko again began considering cooperation with the Soviet regime.

The first evidence of this comes from a letter dated 1st March 1922 to the historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi, with whom Vynnychenko had formed the pro-Soviet bloc in 1920. In the letter Vynnychenko describes how Petro Diatliv, who had been a member of the Foreign Group, had approached him with the suggestion that Vynnychenko organise a pro-Soviet émigré group which would issue a declaration recognising the Soviet Ukraine. Vynnychenko admitted that he would gladly take part in any efforts to unite the socialist and revolutionary camp in the Ukraine, but added he would only recognise a Ukrainian Soviet government if more Ukrainians were drawn into it. The Ukrainian writer dismissed Diatliv's hints that Vynnychenko himself should take on such a role – he had no intention of travelling to the Ukraine in the near future, let alone taking up a governmental position; instead he had suggested Hrushevskyyi. Vynnychenko claimed that Hrushevskyyi's recent letter to Rakovskii (see Chapter Four) had shown that they both occupied a very similar position. Diatliv was at this time working as an agent for the Soviet Ukrainian institutions abroad and Vynnychenko assumed that the offer originated in Soviet circles. Vynnychenko was distrustful of the proposal, fearing that it might be part of a Russian plan to split the oppositionist forces in the Ukraine, an attempt to create a Ukrainian *Smena vekh*. However, he had not yet rejected it. If his conditions were met, it would be possible to do useful work for the Ukraine, whatever Moscow's motivations in approaching him. Nevertheless, his experiences with the Bolsheviks had taught him great caution when dealing with them and he wanted to hear Hrushevskyyi's opinion on the matter. Referring to the offer, he wrote: 'I do not assign any serious meaning to it and do not expect anything to come of it, but an indirect, further meaning may also come of it'. Vynnychenko was naturally sceptical of the Bolsheviks. At one point he underlined to Hrushevskyyi that he did not talk of the Soviet regime because it was not Soviet. Nevertheless, he had not ruled out coopera-

tion with the Bolsheviks under different circumstances and he continued to hope for a unification of all 'revolutionary' forces in the Ukraine.⁴¹⁴

Vynnychenko's scepticism towards the Soviet regime was evident in the fact that in January 1923 he joined the editorial board of the anti-Bolshevik journal *Nova Ukraina*. Vynnychenko's first contribution to the journal was an article entitled 'A United Revolutionary-Democratic Front', in which he called for the unification of all revolutionary, socialist and democratic Ukrainians into one front. It repeated the attacks made on the Bolsheviks regime in *Nova doba* and portrayed the party as the inheritors of the 'historical task' of 'gathering in the lands of Russia'. Moreover, he condemned the NEP as a restoration of capitalism. However, the united revolutionary-democratic front would not try to overthrow the Bolsheviks through intervention, but rather oppose Muscovite centralism by taking part in all organs of political, administrative, state and cultural life in the Ukraine. He stressed that their opponent was not the Soviet system itself, but rather the current dominance of Muscovite centralism within it. Thus, even when he was such an opponent of Bolshevism, Vynnychenko believed that the Soviet system could be changed from the inside.⁴¹⁵ In 1924, he created the Democratic National Front with the aim of bringing this about. Its political activity, however, was limited to the cafés of Europe.⁴¹⁶

However, in 1925 Vynnychenko received a second opportunity to go back to the Ukraine. Between January and April 1925, the possibility of Vynnychenko's return arose in talks between Oleksander Badan, the Galician Social Democrat who had travelled to Moscow with Vynnychenko in 1920, and Antin Prykhodko, the Ukrainian representative at the Soviet embassy in Prague. When Badan first told him of these discussions, Vynnychenko was pessimistic, but his diary entry for 11th March 1925 tells us that he was 'more and more beset by thoughts of cooperation with the Bolsheviks'.⁴¹⁷ From April to October 1925, an exchange of letters took place between Vynnychenko, who

414 Vynnychenko to Hrushevskiy, 01.03.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.384 ark.43-6. The quotation is on ark.46.

415 *Nova Ukraina*, 1923, No.1-2, pp.56-8, 61, 63-5, 67-9.

416 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.54-6. Note how Motyl gives a very different interpretation of 'A United Revolutionary-Democratic National Front'.

417 Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk. Tom druhyi. 1921-1925*, ed. Hryhoriy Kostyuk, Edmonton and New York: CIUS and the Vynnychenko Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of the Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1983, pp. 508, 517, 528. The quotation is on p.528.

was at that time living in Paris, and Prykhodko. Vynnychenko wrote that he had heard that the nationalities policy, the failures of which he said had prevented any agreement in 1920, had improved. However, he was only willing to return if this really was the case and he would be able to undertake useful work for the construction of socialism and national reawakening in the Ukraine. Prykhodko's first answer disappointed him, because it stressed that the Soviet Ukraine would not turn to Vynnychenko with a request that he come to the Ukraine, but rather that the writer should turn to it; Prykhodko's letter simply praised 'non-existent achievements' in the nationalities policy.⁴¹⁸ However, as in 1920, Vynnychenko's desire to take part in events in the Ukraine overcame his disappointment, and he wrote again. According to his diary, Vynnychenko put a lot of effort into finding a formulation by which he could remain true to his position but which would also be acceptable to the Bolsheviks. The letter, sent 10th October, did not make too many concessions to tact for Vynnychenko demanded that he be sent real evidence in the form of party and government documents so that he could convince himself of the real state of the nationalities question.⁴¹⁹

Meanwhile, Vynnychenko had told his *Nova Ukraina* colleagues Mykyta Shapoval and Nykyfor Hryhoriiv of the negotiations and worried rumours were spreading through left-wing circles in the Ukrainian emigration. Vynnychenko sought to placate the two with letters explaining his motives.⁴²⁰ He also published one of his early letters to Prykhodko in the paper *Hromadskiy holos* on 25th September. In an accompanying letter to the editor he wrote that if the Bolsheviks really had changed their nationalities policy they should offer proof of this so that Ukrainian socialists would know how to align themselves.⁴²¹ However, to Vynnychenko's surprise, in October an article was published in

418 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1921-1925*, pp.535, 540, 555, 558, 620-1. For the full text of one letter from Vynnychenko to Prykhodko (from 04.05.1925), see TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.250-1.

419 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1921-1925*, pp.621, 623, 628-31. For the text of the letter, see R.S. Mishchuk, 'Do istorii spilkuvannia Ukrainskoi emihratsii z radiakoiu krainoiu (Lysty V. Vynnychenka), *Slovo i chas*, 1990, No.2, pp.23-33 (pp.28-31).

420 Mykyta Shapoval, *Shchodennyk. Vid sichnia 1925 r. do 22 liutnoho 1932 r.. II Chastyina*, ed. Sava Zerkal New York: Ukrainska Hromada im M. Shapoval, 1958, p.9; Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1921-1925*, p.571.

421 Vynnychenko to *Hromadskiy holos*, 21.09.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.250-1.

Izvestiia accusing Vynnychenko of hoping to return to the Ukraine in order to attack the Soviet system within; by way of proof it published letters by Hryhoriiv and Vynnychenko, supposedly sent to émigrés to calm fears about Vynnychenko's return. In his diary, Vynnychenko expressed shock, and denied that he had ever written the letter referred to. He feared it would harm his attempts to return. Handwritten copies of the letters, translated into Russian, certainly exist in the former party archive in Kyiv. Perhaps they were forgeries created to prevent Vynnychenko's return to the Ukraine, as he himself claimed – if he did write the letters, the surprise expressed in his diary can only be understood as a deception for the sake of posterity.⁴²² Vynnychenko protested to Prykhodko that the letters were falsified and called on the Soviet representative to publish a letter by him to counter the defamation against him in the Soviet press. Again, he put a lot of effort into writing a letter acceptable to the Soviet authorities, even receiving advice from Levan Gogberidze, a Georgian Bolshevik serving at that time as a Soviet diplomat in Paris, on how to improve it.⁴²³

Unsurprisingly, the Soviet authorities were not willing to give in to Vynnychenko's demands that they turn to him personally with proof of the sincerity and efficacy of their policies. Prykhodko's discussions seem to have been conducted without the knowledge of the Ukrainian Politburo for on 11th November it resolved that no correspondence should take place without its knowledge. From Vynnychenko's diary it is clear that Prykhodko had to refer to his 'centre' for instructions, so presumably Moscow, rather than Kharkiv, oversaw the exchange of letters.⁴²⁴ The Politburo then composed a letter to Vynnychenko which claimed that all the answers to Vynnychenko's questions could be found in the laws of the Ukrainian republic, the Soviet constitution and the program of the Communist party. It welcomed anyone who wanted to return to take part in the construction of socialism, but would not bargain with

422 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1921-1925*, pp. 632-5. For the incriminating letters, see TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.248-248zv.

423 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1921-1925*, pp.633-5. The letter was published in Mishchuk, 'Lysty V. Vynnychenka', pp.31-3.

424 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 11.11.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.280; Mishchuk, 'Lysty V. Vynnychenka', pp.31, 33.

any individuals. At the same time, a public statement was drawn up repeating the points made in the resolution.⁴²⁵

Vynnychenko did not record his response in his diary; however, by December he seems to have been convinced that he would not return. He believed Moscow had decided to stymie the negotiations by publishing the 'falsified letters' in *Izvestiia*. He wrote a couple of times in the same month, and even met Rakovskii in Paris, in order to protest his innocence against the *Izvestiia* article.⁴²⁶ However, the main cause of the failure was that the positions of the two sides had hardened in such a way that agreement was no longer possible. Vynnychenko would only return if the Soviet Ukrainian government sent him proof for the implementation of Ukrainianisation; the Ukrainian Politburo did not feel that it was under any obligation to provide evidence of its sincerity to an individual émigré. In July 1926, the Ukrainian Politburo resolved that the question of Prykhodko's negotiations with Vynnychenko had been 'settled'.⁴²⁷

Despite his efforts to make his letters acceptable to the Bolsheviks, Vynnychenko maintained the high-handed attitude evident in 1920. He was so convinced of his usefulness that he believed the Bolsheviks should provide him with evidence so that he could grace them with his support. Throughout 1925, Vynnychenko wavered, exactly as five years before, on whether he was following the right course.⁴²⁸ Despite his reservations about the Bolsheviks, and his doubts about the genuineness of the new nationalities policy, he pursued the possibility of returning; though he felt the Bolsheviks needed to prove their sincerity, he still believed that they had genuinely honest aims and that they would allow socialists to return when they saw that this was good for socialism. In defending his demand for evidence he asked Prykhodko what was better for socialism: 'to win over uncritical [...] people, who from compulsion, from personal difficulty, or from moral weakness or vileness stand on their knees and do not check anything [...], cringe, carry out orders and sing praises. Or attract those people who without compulsion, voluntarily, with all

425 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 11.11.1925 and undated, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.280, 287-8.

426 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1921-1925*, pp.649, 651, 654, 656-7, 659-62.

427 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 09.07.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.86 ark.5.

428 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1921-1925*, pp.580, 621-2, 631.

of their conviction stand in your ranks [...] with belief, with conviction, with a readiness to give their life for it [socialism]?'.⁴²⁹ We, of course, know that such 'yes-men' were much more preferable to the Bolsheviks than troublemakers like Vynnychenko. However, Vynnychenko's arguments reveal that he still held the supposition the Bolsheviks really wanted to find the best way to construct socialism, and thus were open to reason. Much of Vynnychenko's exasperation at the Bolsheviks was that he could not understand why they did not accept his reasoning.

Vynnychenko was clearly hurt by the *Izvestiia* article, for his next public statement on the situation, *Povorot na Ukrainu* ('Return to the Ukraine') opened with a denial of the charges against him.⁴³⁰ The brochure, published after Petliura's murder in 1926, argued that the socialists in the emigration should go back to the Soviet Ukraine in order to take part in the construction of a socialist society there. He admitted that the Soviet Union was under the dictatorship of the All-Union Communist Party (VKP). However, he relativised this by claiming that any attempts to overthrow the regime would only lead to the creation of a bourgeois dictatorship, which would bring about the restoration of capitalism and Russian control of the Ukraine. Foreign intervention could not bring any benefit to the Ukraine.⁴³¹ Most importantly he wrote that 'the Communist party has vocally recognised its mistakes in the national question and really stands, it seems, on the path to correcting them'. It had now moved towards the position which Vynnychenko himself had taken in 1920. The Ukrainian national 'element' had grown in strength over the last six years and the Communist party was now trying to take a lead in this process. It was now no longer possible to describe the Communists as an occupying force: they had started to defend the interests of the Ukraine from the demands of the centre and the number of conscious Ukrainians in leading Communist circles had increased.⁴³² Vynnychenko accepted that there were still many failings and deficiencies in the areas of national liberation and the construction of socialism; however, he argued, for this very reason it was

429 Mishchuk, 'Lysty V. Vynnychenka', p.32.

430 Volodymyr Vynnychenko, 'Povorot na Ukrainu', in id., *Publitsystyka*, ed. Viktor Burbela, New York and Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 2003, pp.146-81 (pp.146-7).

431 Vynnychenko, 'Povorot', pp.154-6, 165-8.

432 Vynnychenko, 'Povorot', pp.161-4. The quotation is on p.162.

necessary for committed Ukrainian socialists to return in order to ensure that both goals were achieved.⁴³³ He condemned the Ukrainian '*smenovekhovtsy*', who praised the system in the Ukraine unreservedly, and he wrote that they were not real socialists, but rather adventurers and people who would say anything for money. He therefore preferred to call the socialists who went back *povorottsy* (returnees) in order to distinguish them from the *smenovekhovtsy*.⁴³⁴

Vynnychenko was certainly still sceptical of the Bolsheviks, especially the Russians. However, he believed that conditions had changed enough that Ukrainian socialists could make a useful contribution to the Ukraine to create the type of society that he yearned for. He also continued to use the argument that the Communists, who wanted to introduce socialism, would come round to seeing the reason of allowing other socialists to participate in this task. He even suggested that though, through some bureaucratic arbitrariness, they might forbid a socialist from returning, if that socialist did return anyway, and performed useful work for the revolution, they would accept him.⁴³⁵ However, Vynnychenko himself had no intention of returning. According to a diary entry in April 1926 he desired less and less to travel to the Ukraine. In August, he wrote that he could not come to an agreement with the Russian Communists because he would have to sacrifice his convictions and he could not imagine joining their party.⁴³⁶ In contrast, in 'Povorot na Ukrainu' Vynnychenko claimed that he did not return because he could also serve his country through his literary work and this could be done anywhere. In fact, in the brochure he argued that other socialists should join the Communist party, despite their ideological reservations, for this was the only way to be involved concretely in the construction of socialism.⁴³⁷ On the matter of his personal fate, then, there seems to be considerable divergence between his privately and publicly expressed opinions.

433 Vynnychenko, 'Povorot', pp.152-4, 157, 159, 171.

434 Vynnychenko, 'Povorot', pp.170-1.

435 Vynnychenko, 'Povorot', p.159.

436 Volodymyr Vynnychenko, 'Shchodennyky', *Kyivska staryna*, 2000, No.3, pp.153-66 (pp.154-5).

437 Vynnychenko, 'Povorot', p.160.

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Vynnychenko continued to toy with the idea of return to the Ukraine and reconciliation with the Bolsheviks.⁴³⁸ Though he criticised the Bolsheviks, he also expressed his optimism about developments in the Ukraine. Even after the Ukrainian famine and suicides of Mykola Khvylovyi and Mykola Skrypnyk, Vynnychenko argued that the Bolsheviks' commitment to Communism would allow the Ukrainian school system to survive so that when a change in leadership took place, the nation's culture would begin to develop once more; worse yet, he still believed the 'grandiosity' of the socialist task justified the suffering inflicted on his countrymen.⁴³⁹ Only in the mid-1930s did Vynnychenko abandon this position, albeit somewhat belatedly, in response to the growing terrors of Stalinism.⁴⁴⁰ Therefore, despite the disappointments he had suffered again and again, Vynnychenko kept on believing that the Bolsheviks might see their errors and overcome them. Each time he assumed that the Bolsheviks' would have to do this if they were genuinely interested in creating a socialist society. As Rudnytsky has observed, Vynnychenko saw the world as an antagonistic dichotomy between the rich and poor.⁴⁴¹ For Vynnychenko the Bolsheviks, with all their many faults, fell into the latter camp and for this reason he was able to keep alive the hope that they would recognise their errors much longer than other former Sovietophiles.

Conclusion

This chapter has already sought to argue that Vynnychenko's mission failed not only due to the Bolsheviks' insincerity in their treatment of the Ukraine, but also because of the writers' obstinacy and inflated sense of his own importance. At the same time, the episode, and indeed the entire relationship of the Foreign Group of the UKP to the Bolsheviks, highlights a problem which

438 In November 1931, for example, Vynnychenko wrote that he planned to return to the Ukraine. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, 'Shchodennyky', *Kyivska staryna*, 2000, No.5, pp.50-76 (p.62)

439 See the extracts from Vynnychenko's letters to Iu. Tyshchenko quoted in V.F. Soldatenko, *Volodymyr Vynnychenko na perekhresty sotsialnykh i natsionalnykh prahen*, Kyiv: Svitohliad, 2005, pp.246, 248.

440 S.V. Kulchytskyi, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko: svitohliadna evoliutsiia', *Ukrainskyi istroychnyi zhurnal*, 2005, No.4, pp.47-70 (p.59f); Rudnytskyi, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko', pp.430-1.

441 Rudnytsky, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko', pp.420-1.

had plagued the Ukrainian Social Democratic movement since its inception, namely the need to reconcile the demands of the international revolution with Ukrainian national aspirations. Vynnychenko and the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party had hailed the Bolsheviks as the leaders of the international socialist revolution and adopted a pro-Soviet stance accordingly. The Foreign Group was interested in the national liberation of the Ukraine, but believed that this could only come through the victory of the world revolution and the construction of socialism. In this sense, the national question had a secondary importance in their thought and propaganda. Vynnychenko's mission to Moscow and Kharkiv revealed to the Foreign Group the Bolsheviks' shortcomings in their treatment of the Ukraine: it was forced in the name of the 'national' to change its position, which above all had been based on the 'social'. While in the Soviet republics, Vynnychenko himself described an internal conflict between the Ukrainian and the revolutionary within him. In their opposition to the Bolsheviks, the Foreign Group still sought to maintain the delicate balance between the 'national' and the 'social' by keeping its distance from the Ukrainian nationalists and conducting 'socialist' opposition. The central tension of Ukrainian Marxism also became entwined with the debate over the extent to which Ukrainian socialists could criticise the leaders of the world revolution. The Foreign Group split between those, like Tovmachiv and Mazurenko, who disapproved of the Bolsheviks' nationalities policy, but felt that public criticism of the party harmed the world revolution, and those, following Vynnychenko, who condemned the Bolsheviks openly.

The Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party had itself been a product of a split among the old USDRP over the direction taken by Petliura's government and their views on the principle of Soviet government. The argument created by Vynnychenko's return to the emigration therefore continued the dissolution of this party. Many of Vynnychenko's opponents returned to the Ukraine. Serhii Vikul and Marko Bardakh travelled to the Ukraine following the Treaty of Riga. Vikul served for a certain time as an advisor to the Ukrainian mission in Warsaw and later taught in colleges in Kharkiv.⁴⁴² Following his return, Vasyi Mazurenko worked as director of the Chamber of Weights and

442 Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, p.418.

Measures in Kharkiv.⁴⁴³ Diatliv worked in a Communist publishing house in Vienna until his return in 1925. In the Ukraine he worked for the DVU, the state publishing house.⁴⁴⁴ During his time in emigration, Diatliv seems to have approached Sovietophile émigrés on behalf of the Soviet authorities, as in the case with Vynnychenko described above. Zinovii Vysotskyi joined the UKP and then the KP(b)U. He supported Trotskii and was excluded from the party.⁴⁴⁵ H. Tovmachiv remained abroad until 1928, working for the Soviet government and as a correspondent for Kyivan daily *Proletarska pravda*.⁴⁴⁶

Vynnychenko's Galician companion on his mission, Oleksander Badan, also settled in the Ukraine. He had continued to work closely with Vynnychenko until 1923. He helped set up the Communist Party of Transcarpathia and in 1925 he travelled to Kharkiv in order to attend the 9th Congress of the KP(b)U. After his return to Czechoslovakia, he was put under surveillance by the Czechoslovakian police. His passport was removed and he was threatened with deportation to Poland, where he had been sentenced to death. He therefore escaped to the Soviet Ukraine in 1926, where he applied to and was accepted into the KP(b)U. He worked closely together with M. Skrypnyk, holding the post of learned secretary of the People's Commissariat of Education. In addition, he became an associate of the Chair of the National Question at the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism and Leninism.⁴⁴⁷ All of the former members of the Foreign Group who returned were arrested in the purges of the 1930s and none lived to see the end of the decade.

For his part, Vynnychenko lived in France until his death in 1951, during which time he continued writing novels, including *Slovo za toboiu, Staline!*, and started working out a new philosophy, called Concordism.⁴⁴⁸ His attempt to negotiate with the Bolsheviks had, in part, failed due to his stubbornness

443 *Encyclopedia of the Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.356.

444 *Encyclopedia of the Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.667; Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, pp.420-1.

445 Ivan Maistrenko, *Istoriia moho pokolinnia. Spohady uchasnyka revoliutsiinykh podii v Ukraini*, Edmonton: CIUS, 1985, p.164.

446 *Encyclopedia of the Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.18.

447 Appendices of the Orgbiuro and Sekretariat KP(b)U on the acceptance of new members to the party from other parties or who had been abroad, 15.09.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2209 ark.66-7; *Encyclopedia of the Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.158.

448 See Kostiuk, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko ta ioho ostannii roman', p.61f.; Rudnytsky, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko', pp.431-3.

and inflated sense of self-importance, but in the end these unattractive characteristics saved his life; had he remained in Kharkiv or Moscow in 1920, he would most likely have been one of the first victims of the purges of the late 1920s and early 1930s.

4 Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries

Hrushevskyyi and the UPSR

The previous chapter dealt with the afterlife of the USDRP in emigration; this chapter will deal with another émigré extension of one of the parties active in the Central Rada: the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, headed by the historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi, was the official representative of the UPSR outside the Ukraine and in 1920 adopted a pro-Soviet line.

Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi is central to the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: as a historian he helped establish Ukrainian history as a separate discipline and posited a scheme of Ukrainian history which to this day provides the basis for the writing of Ukrainian history; he was extremely active in the organisations which spread a Ukrainian national consciousness before the First World War; following the fall of the Romanovs he became the head of the Central Rada and is therefore often regarded as the first president of the Ukraine.⁴⁴⁹ The return of this figure to the Soviet Ukraine is therefore one of the most controversial episodes of his life: it was the subject of debate between Soviet⁴⁵⁰ and diaspora historians,⁴⁵¹ and produced a plethora of articles and interpretations fol-

449 On the importance of Hrushevskyyi to present-day Ukrainians' view of history, see V.V. Masnenko, 'Formuvannia obrazu M.S. Hrushevskoho v masovii svidomosti suchasnoho Ukrainskoho suspilstva', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, No.5, pp.19-34.

450 F.P. Shevchenko, 'Chomu Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi povnuvsia na radiansku Ukrainu?', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1966, No.11, pp.13-30.

451 Leo Bilas, 'Geschichtliche und ideologische Voraussetzungen der geschichtlichen und politischen Konzeption Hrushevskyyis', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol.4, 1956, pp.262-292; Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi. The Politics of National Culture*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987; Matvii Stakhiv, 'Chomu M. Hrushevskyyi povnuvsia v 1924 rotsi do Kyieva? Zhmot faktiv i uryvok iz spohadiv', in id. (ed.), *Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi u 110 rokovyny narodzhennia 1876-1976*, New York, Paris, Sydney, Toronto: Sentsiia Istoriiia Ukrainy, 1976, pp.109-47 and id., 'Deiaki dokumenty pro diialnist Hrushevskoho na emigratsii', in op. cit., pp.148-74.

lowing the opening of the former Soviet archives after independence.⁴⁵² Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, diaspora historians saw it as an inconvenient occurrence which somehow had to be explained away in order to rescue Hrushevskyyi from the charge of being pro-Soviet. Often they uncritically accepted the extremely dubious account in a memoir by the Hrushevskyyiphile Matvii Stakhiv, who met Hrushevskyyi shortly before the historian returned to the Ukraine and argued that he went back to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks.⁴⁵³ The great specialist on Hrushevskyyi, Liubomyr Vynar, believed that Hrushevskyyi returned in order to continue his work on his *History of the Ukraine-Rus*, which was impossible in the difficult conditions of emigration, and out of his wish to share the fate of Ukrainians living in their native land and contribute to the further development of their culture. Still, the idea that Hrushevskyyi may have at any point actually supported the Soviet regime is rejected out of hand.⁴⁵⁴

The articles and monographs which appeared after 1991 were useful in that they made public the materials in the former Soviet archives. However, many only answered the question of 'how' Hrushevskyyi returned and not 'why'. They did not use any of the sources available in the West, for example the journal edited by Hrushevskyyi between 1920 and 1921, *Boritiesia-poborete!*

452 Iryna Matiash, 'Ukrainskyi sotsiolozhichnyi instytut M.S. Hrushevskoho: Osnovni napriamy ta etapy diialnosti', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, 2000, No.4, pp.44-56; Oleksander Ohloblyn, 'Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi na tli doby: dumky pro tretiu i ostanniu dobu istoryka (1924-1934)', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, Vol.33, 1996, No.1-4, pp.80-7; R.Ia. Pyrih *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho. Ostannie desiatyllittia (1924-1934)*, Kyiv: Instytut Ukrainkoï Arkheohrafii AN Ukrainy, 1993 and id. 'M.S. Hrushevskyyi: mizh istorieiu i politykoïu (1924-1934rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1991, No.4, pp.54-66; Valentyna Piskun, 'Povernennia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho v Ukrainu iak zvaba bilshovyzmom i spodivannia na dii', *Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi – naukovets i polityk u konteksti suchasnosti*, Kyiv: Kyivskyyi Natsionalnyi Universytet Imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, 2002, pp.45-55; V.A. Potulnytskyi, 'Naukova diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho v emihratsii (1919-1924rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1992, No.2, pp.48-57; Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval *Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi i GPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatyllittia: 1924-1934*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 1996, pp.16-35; Leonid Reshodko, 'Povernennia na Ukrainu', in *Velykyi Ukrainets: Materialy z zhyttia ta diialnosti M.S. Hrushevskoho*, Kyiv: Veselka, 1992, pp.381-91; V.M. Severyniuk 'Istoriia i polityka v publitsystytsi M.S. Hrushevskoho', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2000, No.5, pp.18-31; Arkadii Zhukovskyyi, 'Politychna i publitsystychna diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho na emihratsii 1919-1924 rr.', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2002, No.1, pp.96-125.

453 Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi*, pp.204-5.

454 Liubomyr Vynar, *Syluety epoch: Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi. Istorychni rozvidky*, Lviv: Vidrozhennia, 1992, p.85.

('Struggle and You Will Overcome').⁴⁵⁵ Conversely, those articles which were based on the published sources often failed to make use of the archival materials.⁴⁵⁶ Either way, none of them adequately placed Hrushevskyyi's decision within the context of the activities and writings of the other members of the Foreign Delegation, which itself has only received two short treatments.⁴⁵⁷ Most recently, Ruslan Pyrih has acknowledged that Hrushevskyyi adopted a Sovietophile position because he saw the Bolsheviks as the leaders of the world revolution. This represents a remarkable step forward, but Pyrih fails to discuss how Hrushevskyyi's opinion of the Bolsheviks changed following the closure of the émigré journal he edited.⁴⁵⁸ The most sensitive account so far appears in Serhii Plokhyy's biography of the Ukrainian historian.⁴⁵⁹ However, this chapter will argue that Hrushevskyyi's political thinking in emigration displayed a greater degree of continuity than Plokhyy allows for. It will also view Hrushevskyyi's return not as a single event in one man's life, but part of the broader trend of Ukrainian Sovietophilism.

The pro-Soviet stance of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR represented a development in and continuation of the Ukrainian populist tradition. The UPSR had been the Ukrainian party which was mostly thoroughly seeped in the legacy of thinkers like Drahomanov described in Chapter One. It played a leading role in the attempts to create a Ukrainian state: Hrushevskyyi, who had not professed socialist views before the war, became closely associated with it while he was president of the Central Rada and in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly it won sixty percent of the votes in the Ukraine. The UPSR advocated the socialisation of the land and its distribution among the peasants. On the national question it was in favour of the creation of a federal Russia in which the Ukraine gained some form of autonomy. Although the Bolshevik invasion forced the party to become a supporter of

455 See for example Pyrih 'M.S. Hrushevskyyi: mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu (1924-1934rr.)', pp.54-66 and Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi i GPU-NKVD*, pp.16-35.

456 See for example Zhukovskyyi, 'Politychna i publitsystychna diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho', pp. 96-125.

457 *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy*, pp. 176-90 and pp.213-225, which largely draws on Troshchynskyyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, pp.99-121.

458 R.Ia. Pyrih, 'Ideino-politychni pidstavy kompromisu Mykhaila Hrushevskoho z bilshovytskoiu vladoiu', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, No.5, pp.4-19.

459 Serhii Plokhyy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp.216-31.

Ukrainian independence, the UPSR continued to see this as a step towards the creation of an international socialist federation. As the party organ *Narodna volia* stated, in 'satisfying the demand for independence, Ukrainian democracy has not deviated an inch from the idea of world brotherhood, from plans for a free union of all countries'.⁴⁶⁰

For the left of the party, even this was too great an emphasis on independence, and in May 1918 it split off from the rest of the party to form the *Borotbisty*. They condemned what they believed to be the excessive nationalism of other Ukrainian parties, denounced artificial borders between states and called for an end to the war between the brother workers of Russia and the Ukraine. Over the next two years, the *Borotbisty* increasingly presented themselves as a genuinely Marxist party and tried to cooperate with the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine (KP(b)U). Finally, in March 1920, the party joined the KP(b)U.⁴⁶¹

The rest of the UPSR continued to fragment. As Serhii Plokyh has argued, Hrushevskyyi responded to Skoropadskyyi's coup, which removed the historian from the helm of the Ukrainian state and forced him into hiding, with a shift to the left: he reaffirmed the need for a social revolution to accompany the national as a reaction to the new conservative government's use of Ukrainian independence to frustrate the social desires of the peasantry.⁴⁶² He began to advocate the creation of conciliar government based on the power of 'toilers' Soviets'. Despite his opposition to Skoropadskyyi, he was not involved in the revolt against the Hetman and was not invited to play a role in the Directory led by the Social Democrats Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura. The historian became a firm opponent of the Directory and advocated his version of Soviet government as an alternative. This created conflict within the UPSR, some of whose members supported the Directory. The quarrel came to a head at the Toilers' Congress of January 1919, to which delegates of workers, peasants and soldiers had been called in order to lend the Directory's takeover of power the seal of their approval. A part of the party sided with the prominent SR Mykyta Shapoval, who wanted to retain power in the

460 See Borys, 'Political Parties in the Ukraine', pp.135, 137-40. The quotation is on pp.137-8.

461 Mace, *Communism*, pp.53-62.

462 Plokyh, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp.216-7.

hands of the Directory, and others with Hrushevskiy and the Soviet principle. Hrushevskiy reminded the party that the Soviet form of government was not a Bolshevik invention and argued that the Bolsheviks had in fact perverted the Soviet principle. Nevertheless, the congress, no doubt influenced by the advance of the Red Army on Kyiv, supported the Directory.⁴⁶³

Unable to play a role in the political life of the Ukraine, Hrushevskiy suggested to the Central Committee of his party at the end of 1918 that he be sent abroad as a representative of the UPSR in order to establish links to foreign socialist organisations, for the mutual exchange of information and the control of the UNR representatives abroad. In February 1919, the Directory agreed to fund this plan and Hrushevskiy was granted money and given a mandate as the foreign representative of the UPSR. In March, the historian crossed the border.⁴⁶⁴ Though he had not yet become a supporter of the Bolsheviks, his belief that government should be based on the power of the Soviets represented the first step towards his 'Change of Signposts'.

The Creation of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR

Hrushevskiy later described the period following his emigration before he settled down in Vienna as an attempt to seek 'a middle road between Entente-Russian reaction and Bolshevik occupation' in the form of the socialism of the Second International.⁴⁶⁵ The first important stop on this path was Prague. Here he met the new president of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk, and the English authority on Eastern Europe, Robert Seton-Watson. Both told Hrushevskiy that 'an Independent Ukraine could not expect either recognition or support from the powers of the Entente'. This convinced Hrushevskiy of the hopelessness of the Directory's orientation towards the western countries.⁴⁶⁶ In June, the historian moved on to Paris where he met the Ukrainian SR Dmytro Isaievych and the Social Democrats Petro Didushok⁴⁶⁷ and Borys Mati-

463 For an impression of the historian's views at this time and the conflict within the UPSR, see Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp.187-9.

464 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, pp.47-8.

465 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.7, February-March 1921, p.53.

466 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, pp.51-2.

467 Didushok, Petro (1892-?): a member of the USDRP. After a period of emigration in Vienna, he returned to the Ukraine, where he worked in education. He was arrested

ushenko. Together they agreed on the necessity of forming a common front with socialists of other nations of the former Russian empire in order to resist Russian centralism jointly. At the end of June, the Ukrainians held meetings with socialists from other republics formerly ruled by Russia and on 20th and 21st July they published a manifesto which condemned intervention in Russia. This union of socialists decided to start publishing a journal together, in French and English, *L'Europe Orientale*. The journal would avoid questions of disagreement among the groups involved and would not publish polemics. The first issue of the new publication appeared in September.⁴⁶⁸ In the French capital Hrushevskiy also had talks with French socialists and he applied for seats on the Second International for his delegation.

The historian then went to Lucerne, where alongside Isaievych, Didushok and Matushenko he took part in the conference of the Second International in August 1919. Two issues divided the European socialists gathered in Lucerne: the rights of smaller nations and the International's relationship to the Bolsheviks. On the second question the UPSR was on the left of the International and advocated solidarity with the Soviet republics. Despite these splits, Hrushevskiy believed in the future of the International and continued to try to set up contacts with other European socialist parties, travelling, for example, to Berlin for talks with the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany. At the end of 1919, he went to Geneva for the next socialist conference. Because of this, and the imminent establishment of the League of Nations there, he also moved the paper *L'Europe Orientale* to the Swiss city. However, the departure of the German Independents from the congress over the issue of the recognition of Soviet Russia meant that the meeting of the Second International was over before it had even begun.⁴⁶⁹ The journal *L'Europe Orientale* was also subject to tensions between the contributors, for example over its relationship to the Entente.⁴⁷⁰ Finally, due to lack of funds the paper closed in

in 1934, and his further fate is unknown. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, p.418.

468 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, p.55-7; No.7, February-March 1921, p.35-6.

469 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, pp.58-60; No.7, February-March 1921, pp.28-35, 38, 45.

470 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.7, February-March 1921, pp.41.

January 1920.⁴⁷¹ The end of the congress and the failure of his paper meant that Hrushevskyyi had no more reason to stay in Geneva, and he left at the beginning of April for Prague. As he later wrote, it had become clear to Hrushevskyyi that the middle road of the Second International had 'deceived us [...] the tragedy of world socialism in general had become our tragedy. With it, it became necessary to look for another way.'⁴⁷²

The quote from Hrushevskyyi should serve as a reminder that he and the other members of the UPSR abroad were, like the Foreign Group of the UKP, not only responding to the Bolshevik revolution as Ukrainians, but also as socialists; Hrushevskyyi clearly states that the position which they came to adopt in their journal *Boritiesia-poborete!* was formed by the development of and tensions within the European socialist movements, which were also trying to come to terms with the Bolshevik takeover of power in the former Russian empire. However, one cannot say that the collapse of the Second International in itself was the cause behind Hrushevskyyi's 'Change of Signposts', although it no doubt strengthened it. The historian himself admitted that in the Second International the UPSR belonged to those groups which were in favour of solidarity with the Bolsheviks.

Indeed, Hrushevskyyi had first begun to establish links with the Soviet government at the Lucerne conference. Here he came into contact with the German socialist Oscar Kon, who was the legal consultant of the Soviet mission in Berlin. Through the mediation of Kon, at the end of January 1920, Hrushevskyyi met Victor Kopp, a Soviet representative in the German capital. The government in the Ukraine was at this time in negotiations with Soviet Russia, and Hrushevskyyi thought it would be useful to open another channel for discussion. Kopp expressed the hope of cooperation between Russia and the Ukraine on the basis of the creation of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic and pointed to the collaboration between the Bolsheviks and the left SRs immediately after the October revolution as a possible model for this. Hrushevskyyi replied that the UPSR also wanted the Ukraine to be Soviet, and they both agreed that they had the same understanding of what Soviet government was. However, according to Hrushevskyyi, they disagreed in the matter of tac-

471 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.7, February-March 1921, p.51.

472 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.7, February-March 1921, p.53.

tics: the Russians sought to introduce the Soviet principle from Moscow, not allowing the Ukrainian Soviet parties to follow this principle themselves; Hrushevskiyi claimed that only by taking her own path could the Ukraine become Soviet. Kopp agreed that the Russians had made mistakes in the Ukraine, but argued that the adoption of the Soviet principle in itself would lead to the removal of these problems. Despite these disagreements, the two parted expressing hopes that an agreement could be reached and Kopp promised to approach his government on the matter. However, when Hrushevskiyi's group tried to find out whether the Soviet Russian government had given an answer to Kopp's inquiry, they were told that there had been no reply. Still, the initial discussions with the Soviet representative convinced them that the possibility of compromise existed.⁴⁷³

The orientation towards a Soviet form of government was strengthened at the first conference of the UPSR abroad, which took place in Prague between 14th and 19th February 1920. The conference confirmed Hrushevskiyi as head of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR. Oleksander Zhukovskiyi, Mykola Shrah and Mykola Chechel were chosen as further members of the delegation. Zhukovskiyi had been a member of one of the UNR governments, but had left the Ukraine as the foreign emissary of the Central Committee (TsK) of the UPSR. He was appointed secretary of the Foreign Delegation. Shrah had been Hrushevskiyi's deputy when the historian had led the Central Rada and had come abroad as part of the delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic to Budapest. Chechel had been one of Hrushevskiyi's secretaries in the Central Rada and one of the UNR's representatives in Paris. Other prominent SRs in emigration were also present at the conference, for example Pavlo Khrystiuk, I. Shtefan and Mykyta Shapoval. Khrystiuk had been a leading member of the UPSR during the revolution and had served in three of the UNR governments.⁴⁷⁴ Shapoval was Hrushevskiyi's greatest rival within the UPSR and had supported the Directory. At the end of 1919, he moved to

473 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, p.48; No.7, February-March 1921, pp.49-51. When Hrushevskiyi wrote to the TsK KP(b)U in July 1920, he cited the meetings in Berlin as having given him confidence that the UPSR and KP(b)U could cooperate. See below.

474 For more on Khrystiuk's life and activity see Iurii Shapoval, *Liudyna i systema (shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraini)*, Kyiv: Instytut Natsionalnykh Vidnosyn i Politolohii NANU, 1994, pp.108-28.

Prague, which under his aegis became a centre of the UPSR in emigration. Shtefan had been post and telegraph minister under the UNR. He was the first member of the UPSR to cooperate openly with the Soviet Ukraine, taking up a role in the All-Ukrainian Association of Consumer Cooperative Organisations (Vukopspilka).⁴⁷⁵

The conference called for 'the speedy implementation of the dictatorship of the labouring people' in order to transform the UNR into a Soviet republic. This would help end war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia; a war which harmed the socialist revolution and which contradicted the desires of the working people of the Ukraine, 'who have so many times strived towards an immediate end to the fratricidal war'. The introduction of the Soviet principle would also remove the bitterness from all political and economic disagreements between Soviet Russia and the Ukraine. The conference called on the party's Central Committee to use all of its influence to bring the UNR to sign a treaty with Soviet Russia establishing military and economic links between the two separate states. They hoped that with Russian help the Ukrainian state could retrieve the lands it had lost and strengthen its statehood. The conference ruled out 'any orientation on the imperialist politics of the Entente'. On the Socialist International the conference stated that the creation of a real International in which Communists, revolutionary socialists and Social Democrats of the reformist type were represented would be very beneficial for the interests of the socialist movement⁴⁷⁶.

Hrushevskiy then settled down near Vienna, which became the centre for the Foreign Delegation's activity. Another of Hrushevskiy's projects in emigration, the Ukrainian Sociological Institute, was also moved to the Austrian capital. The institute had been set up in Geneva in October 1919 and moved with the historian to Prague and then Vienna. Its purpose was to study socio-political movements in different countries and disseminate the results of this research among the various Ukrainian communities. At the same time, it should also inform foreign organisations and parties about socio-political developments in the Ukraine and about Ukrainian history and literature. Behind these aca-

475 For more on Shtefan's relationship with the Bolsheviks see the reports by the Soviet representative in Prague from May to December 1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.3, 52, 78, 81.

476 *Boritiesia-poboretel*, No.1, September 1920, pp.57.

demic aims, there were political goals: this exchange of information was a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of relations between the Ukraine and other governments or foreign oppositional movements which might take power. The institute saw its task as a response to 'the struggle of the old with the new, of the old militarist and bourgeois governments with socialist and radical currents' and the search for 'the basis for a new organisation of social and political relations'. Moreover, the institute was dominated by members of the Ukrainian left, and the UPSR in particular. In addition to the émigré SRs (Chechel, Khrystiuk, Shapoval, Shtefan and Shrah), the project's collaborators included Volodymyr Starosolskyi,⁴⁷⁷ Dmytro Antonovych,⁴⁷⁸ the leading Social Democrat Vasyl Mazurenko, the Galician publicist Mykhailo Lozynskyi and Hrushevskyi's own daughter Kateryna.⁴⁷⁹ The institute published in total 13 monographs written by its members. From February 1921, the group organised lectures in the Ukrainian workers' organisation in Vienna, *lednist*, on subjects ranging from an introductory course on sociology (given by Chechel) and the construction of a socialist economy (Mazurenko) to the history of the Ukrainian revolution (Khrystiuk) and cooperativism and socialism (Shtefan).⁴⁸⁰ Despite the importance of Vienna as a centre for the émigré SRs, it was in Prague that party conferences took place. The second conference, between 24th and 26th April, damned the 'so-called' Ukrainian governments of Symon Petliura, Ivan Mazepa⁴⁸¹ and Ievhen Petrushevych for abandoning the cause

477 Starosolskyi, Volodymyr (1878-1942): a Galician and leading member of the USDP, who served as UNR deputy minister of foreign affairs. In the emigration he taught law in the Ukrainian educational institutions in Prague. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.15.

478 Antonovych, Dmytro (1877-1945): son of the famous historian Volodymyr. He was one of the founders and leaders of the RUP and the USDRP; during the revolution, he served both the Central Rada and the Directory. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, pp.84-5.

479 Hrushevskyi, Kateryna (1900-1953): daughter of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and an ethnographer and sociologist. She accompanied her father into emigration, returned to the Ukraine with him and joined him in exile in Moscow at the end of his life. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.249-50.

480 Matiash, 'Ukrainskyi Sotsioloichnyi Instytut', pp.46-50; Potulnytskyi 'Naukova diialnist M.S Hrushevs'koho', pp.49-51; P..S. Sokhan, V.I. Ulianovskyi and S.M. Kirzhaiev *Hrushevskyi i academia. Ideia, zmahannia, diialnist*, Kyiv: Instytut Ukrainskoi Arkheohrafii AN Ukrainy, 1993, pp.199-204. The quotation is on p.199 of Sokhan, Ulianovskyi and Kirzhaiev.

481 Mazepa, Isaak (1884-1952): a member of the USDRP. In 1919, he became secretary of the party's Central Committee, minister of internal affairs and later prime

of the 'Ukrainian labouring people' and becoming the stooges of foreign capitalists and aristocrats.⁴⁸² On the Socialist International the position of the conference had changed somewhat. Whereas at the first conference the Foreign Delegation had favoured the creation of a new International including reformist socialists, now the Delegation declared 'its solidarity with the Third, and not the Second International, considering that in the coming decisive struggle of the international proletariat with capital for the sake of the achievement of a socialist order only the way of the dictatorship of the labouring masses can lead it to victory over its opponents'. It therefore pronounced that it would no longer take part in the Second International, but would rather work on the basis of the platform of the Third International and try to gain acceptance into it.⁴⁸³ News of the Polish attack on the Ukraine had not reached the Foreign Delegation during their second conference. However, at the third conference of 22nd to 24th of May this was the main topic of discussion. Here, the delegation denounced the Poles' invasion of the Ukraine as 'a shameful, wicked attack on the Ukraine' and Petliura, the Ukrainian leader who had allied with the Poles, as 'a Ukrainian traitor'.⁴⁸⁴

The UPSR was becoming even more radical, abandoning any idea of solidarity with moderate socialists and responding with revulsion to the alliances made by the various Ukrainian governments (many of whose members subscribed to such a form of socialism) with non-Ukrainian powers. In this way, it was undergoing a similar journey to that of the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP) with which it formed the 'Soviet-Revolutionary Bloc' in February 1920, described in the previous chapter. The Marxists in the Foreign Group of the UKP saw this as a natural transition from Social Democracy to Communism. The SRs, whose socialism was not derived from Marx, occupied a more complex position, as will be seen in the next section.

minister of the UNR. In 1920, he emigrated to Lviv, and then in 1923 to Prague, where he worked in the Ukrainian educational institutions. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.353.

482 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.59.

483 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.60.

484 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.61.

Boritiesia-Poborete!

With the publication of the first issue of *Boritiesia-poborete!* in September 1920, the Foreign Delegation began to set out their stance in more detail. The journal included contributions from Hrushevskyyi, Chechel, Shrah, Shapoval and Khrystiuk. However, the historian set the tone for the organ and his articles expounded the program of the group most fully. Though this program underwent a number of changes, the first six issues, published between September 1920 and March 1921, maintained a consistent standpoint and can be treated together.

The journal began by reaffirming the populist heritage of the UPSR. As Hrushevskyyi wrote in the opening article of the first issue, 'The Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries and their Task': 'I was raised in the old tradition of Ukrainian radical populism which derived its ideology from the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius and which was convinced that in conflicts between the people and the state, the blame always lay on the side of the state, because the good of the labouring people is the highest law for every social organisation'.⁴⁸⁵ He presented the UPSR as being the bearer of this tradition and identified the essence of its program as a combination of socialism and national liberation.⁴⁸⁶ However, he also argued that this dictated reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. As populists the UPSR must 'be with the people and under no circumstances separate from the people',⁴⁸⁷ who, he argued elsewhere, desired 'to come to a sincere and lasting understanding with the Bolsheviks' because they respected the Bolsheviks' 'decisive, ruthless, strict punishment of the bourgeois'.⁴⁸⁸ This desire, he claimed, could be seen in the Toilers' Congress's call to turn the Ukraine into a Soviet republic and the defection of the *Borotbisty* to the Bolsheviks.⁴⁸⁹ The UPSR should therefore fulfil the traditional role of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, to follow the desires of the people, but also lead them by reconciling the goals of the peo-

485 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.12.

486 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, pp.8-9, 19.

487 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.2.

488 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, p.5.

489 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.5-7.

ple in the social and economic spheres with those in the realm of the national and political, and so help them achieve them.⁴⁹⁰

At the same time, to take the side of the people meant to support the cause of the world socialist revolution. In the article 'Between Moscow and Warsaw', written in June 1920 at the height of the Polish-Petliurite campaign against the Soviet Ukraine, Hrushevskiy argued that the Bolsheviks had 'grown into the leaders of the world socialist movement, on whom the whole of the labouring world, all those wronged and short-changed by the present capitalist regime, looks with trust and love. Whatever the mistakes of the Bolshevik leaders in Ukrainian politics [...] it is necessary to avoid conflict with Bolshevism in every way, respecting the universal meaning of the socialist revolution which it leads.' Consequently, though the Bolsheviks had followed policies unfavourable to the Ukraine, in the choice between Moscow and Warsaw, the UPSR must support Moscow; opposition to the Bolsheviks while the Poles were attacking the Soviet republics with the help of the Ukrainian 'petty bourgeoisie' was a 'stab in the back' against the revolution.⁴⁹¹ In this way, Hrushevskiy redefined populism as having its logical conclusion in support for the Third International.

With these arguments Hrushevskiy was going against the intellectual trend which came to dominate the Ukrainian emigration in the 1920s. As Chapter Two has shown, this ideology stressed that class and party differences should be subordinated to the interests of the nation and the state. Hrushevskiy argued the opposite: that it was better to ally with revolutionary Russians than to be on the side of reactionary Ukrainians. The historian expressed his contempt for the doctrine of partylessness and national unity in another article, 'A Letter to Youth', published in *Nash shtiah*, the organ of socialist Ukrainian youth in Vienna. This 'Letter' was addressed to the young people of Galicia and dealt primarily with Galician politics. 'The system of apoliticism, partylessness, blind service and the repetition without consideration of all manner of other principles in the name of national solidarity', wrote Hrushevskiy, 'has given rise to the worst of consequences'. He complained that the Galicians had refused to adopt firm party principles; consequently,

490 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, pp.16-7.

491 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.12-3.

the Galicians had regularly changed sides during the revolution. First they had gone over to Denikin, then to the Bolsheviks, and after that, as the servants of the Entente, to the Poles.⁴⁹² Clearly, for Hrushevskiyi it was better to choose a side than to sacrifice one's political conscience to the dubious aim of achieving statehood for the Ukraine. For the historian this meant taking the side of world revolution led by Russia.

Indeed, reconciliation with Soviet Russia represented a continuation of the pre-war populist rejection of Ukrainian independence and emphasis on federation. In his article on the 'Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party and its Task', Hrushevskiyi stressed 'that we never were supporters of independence in the popular, vulgar understanding of this word', as they had never been enthusiastic about possessing their own army, police, prisons and all the other distasteful attributes bound up with statehood, preferring instead that responsibility for these areas be transferred to the level of federal government. Ukrainian populists had met Iuliiian Bachynskiyi's call for an independent Ukraine 'with extreme scepticism, fearing that from this egg of independence would hatch chauvinist reaction and all kinds of nationalist adventures'. During the revolution, he claimed, such fears had materialised when the slogan of an independent Ukraine became a call to struggle against socialism and democracy.⁴⁹³

Hrushevskiyi did admit that in the war against Russia the call for Ukrainian independence had also become intertwined with the healthy idea of the sovereignty of the labouring Ukrainian people and their struggle against colonial exploitation. However, after three years of struggle between the slogans of an independent Ukraine and a federal Soviet Russia, such phrases had become so contorted, containing both positive and negative elements, that it was necessary to separate the good and bad within them. It would be impossible to rebuild Ukrainian life without reconciliation and understanding with Russia, due to their common historical experience and because the Bolsheviks were the leaders of the world revolution.⁴⁹⁴ However, the Bolsheviks had themselves discredited the old idea of a federal Russia by treating the Ukraine as a province of Moscow. The Ukraine must have genuine autonomy and control

492 Zhukovskiyi 'Politychna i publitsystychna diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho', p.118.

493 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.46-8. The quotation is on p.46.

494 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.48.

over her own affairs. For Hrushevskyyi, the only solution was that the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia both enter, as equal members, a European federation of socialist states.⁴⁹⁵ It is true that some of the contributors to *Boritiesia-poborete!* sometimes described their goal as being an independent, Soviet Ukraine. However, Shrah, for example, made it clear that independence should only be temporary: it would allow individual countries to develop sufficiently that they could enter into a federation as equal partners.⁴⁹⁶

As can be seen from the previous paragraph, the journal's pro-Soviet stance did not prevent *Boritiesia-poborete!* from drawing attention to the failures of Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine. Hrushevskyyi's main charge against the Bolsheviks was that of centralism. Above all, the Bolsheviks had not fulfilled their promise to recognise the rights of nations to national self-determination and had tied the Ukraine ever more closely to Moscow, which continued to control the commissariats dealing with diplomacy, war, economy, finance and communications. The Bolsheviks had inherited the old regime's suspicion towards the Ukraine, as could be seen in the fact that the Russian language continued to dominate the business of government. A second element of Bolshevik centralism was the refusal to tolerate in the Ukraine those non-Bolshevik parties which supported the Soviet system, the *Borotbisty* and the *Ukapisty*: the former had been forced to disband their party and join the Bolsheviks and the latter were prevented from working openly. Thirdly, the Bolsheviks had not understood the need to ally with the Ukrainian village. The countryside remained foreign to the Bolsheviks; a place where they did not dare to venture. The Ukrainian peasant viewed the Bolsheviks as aliens and were therefore susceptible to the anti-Semitic gossip against them. Bolshevik rule was not based on popular consent but rather on the bayonets of the occupying Red Army.⁴⁹⁷

The charge of centralism against the Bolsheviks was central to the stance taken in *Boritiesia-poborete!*. Shrah's analysis of the constitution of the RFSFR argued that the idea of federation between Russia and the Ukraine was a fiction because in reality the Ukraine was ruled directly from Mos-

495 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.49.

496 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.35-7.

497 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.7-12.

cow.⁴⁹⁸ According to Chechel, this centralism was echoed in Bolshevik economic policy, which excluded the peasants from industrial planning and ruined the peripheries.⁴⁹⁹

When *Boritiesia-poborete!* criticised the national policy of the Bolsheviks, it did not merely do so out of concern for Ukrainian national sensibilities, but also because it harmed the socialist revolution. Hrushevskyy feared that the disregard for the Ukraine would push genuine supporters of the revolution into the hands of nationalists like Petliura and increase the likelihood of the victory of counter-revolution in the Ukraine.⁵⁰⁰ As a consequence of these mistakes, 'under the Bolshevik regime the Ukrainian revolution among the masses has gone backwards in comparison with the times of the Central Rada'.⁵⁰¹ Shrah expressed similar thoughts, saying that if the Russian Bolsheviks would not end its policy of centralisation, 'not only will it further put a break on the movement of the socialist revolution, but it will possibly cause the loss of its achievements'.⁵⁰² Thus, the Foreign Delegation's critique remained internal criticism within the socialist camp. It did not hope to bring about the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, but rather to achieve the goals of the Bolsheviks themselves. This is also evident in the language in *Boritiesia-poborete!*. The journal, for example, talked not of the sovereignty of the Ukraine, but rather that of 'the labouring people of the Ukraine'.⁵⁰³ The Foreign Delegation had come up with a particularly socialist redefinition of the Ukraine: only those who laboured, including the labouring intelligentsia, belonged to the nation.

The Foreign Delegation posited their agrarian socialism as a corrective to the Bolsheviks' Marxism. The journal stressed that the Bolsheviks' failings were a result of their adherence to this doctrine and not merely an expression of Russian chauvinism. 'The tragedy', wrote Shrah, 'is that the Russian Bolsheviks in practice followed the national postulates of Marx'.⁵⁰⁴ The refusal of many Russian Communists even to recognise the existence of the Ukraine

498 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.7, February-March 1921, pp.5-6.

499 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.4, November-December 1920, pp.25-6.

500 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, p.16.

501 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.23.

502 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.8, April-June 1921, p.10.

503 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, p.48. This is just one example of the turn of phrase, which appears repeatedly on the pages of the journal.

504 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.38-9.

was therefore not merely a Russian error, 'but also [one] of great power socialists in general' towards smaller nations.⁵⁰⁵ The Bolsheviks had also accepted the Marxist claim that the revolution could only be created on the back of the proletariat. They had failed to see that the peasants were the revolutionary force in the Ukraine.⁵⁰⁶

In contrast, Hrushevskiy invoked a populist call of 'to the village', which also provided the title for an article which described how the Ukraine should develop: 'the autonomous village community, as it was established in the fire of revolution, the small republic which inside its boundaries legislates, judges and directs all affairs through its chosen organs – this is the basic, firm, safe cell of social and economic organisation which the Ukrainian revolution gave us and on which it is necessary to found all other construction'. The villages would elect *volost* and higher Soviets, and would thus be the root of the future political administration of the Ukraine. Economic planning would be transferred as near to the village as possible. The historian believed that with the introduction of mechanisation in the village, the peasant would have more time for intellectual pursuits, making the villages cultural centres as well.⁵⁰⁷ In seeking to decentralise power to the lowest level, Hrushevskiy was again adapting the idea of Soviet government to the populist tradition: his outline of future Ukrainian society seems to be a development of Drahomanov's claim that 'it is only small states, or, better, communities and associations that can truly be free'.⁵⁰⁸

The group therefore rejected any suggestion that the UPSR should enter the KP(b)U. The point of departure of Hrushevskiy's article 'The Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries and its Task' was not the question of whether the UPSR should cooperate with the Bolsheviks; this was taken as read. Rather, Hrushevskiy asked what form this cooperation should take – whether the UPSR should join the Communist party completely or retain the UPSR's separate existence by forming a bloc with the KP(b)U. He concluded that only

505 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, p.27.

506 *Boritiesia-Poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.58-9.

507 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.4, November-December 1920, pp.6-7, 9-11. The quotation here is to be found on p.6. The economic aspects of the argument were put in more detail by the article written by Chechel, which followed Hrushevskiy's contribution. See *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.4, pp.21-39.

508 Quoted in Rudnytsky, 'First Ukrainian Political Program', p.265.

a separate Ukrainian Soviet party representing the peasants could bring about the necessary revisions in the Bolsheviks' policy. The Bolsheviks themselves were too deeply rooted in the proletariat to be able to do this: 'A Ukrainian Soviet party has to exist because only they can guarantee the active participation of the Ukrainian labouring people in the socialist revolution'. The Russian and Ukrainian Soviet parties should form a common front against counter-revolution and reaction.⁵⁰⁹ One could describe this argument as 'Soviet pluralism'. Indeed, if one takes the Foreign Delegation's argument to its logical conclusion, the party representing the peasantry would take on the more prominent role in the Soviet bloc in the Ukraine. Because the peasantry was the largest class in the Ukraine, far outnumbering that of the urban proletariat, and the main bearer of revolutionary ideology in the country, the Ukrainian Soviet state would acquire more of a peasant character. This would mean that the party representing that class, the UPSR, would come to head it. In this scenario, the KP(b)U, as the representative of the urban proletariat, would only have a supporting function.

This position determined the relationship of the Foreign Delegation with the other pro-Soviet Ukrainian parties. Chechel criticised the *Borotbisty* for becoming the 'tools' of the Russian Communists in the Ukraine and praised the *Ukapiisty* for maintaining their independence. This was also the point of divergence with the Foreign Group of the UKP. When the Group wrote to the Foreign Delegation suggesting that together they merge with the KP(b)U, the Foreign Delegation rejected the proposal. In their reply, the SRs stressed that they supported the Bolsheviks' struggle against capitalism. However, they added that their party was socialist, not Communist, because it saw the peasants as the leading revolutionary class in the Ukraine. They therefore reiterated their support for a common revolutionary front over amalgamation. It was as a result of this disagreement that the Soviet-Revolutionary Bloc formed by the two émigré groups dissolved in July 1920.⁵¹⁰

In view of these tensions, it is unsurprising that *Boritiesia-poborete!* was highly critical of Vynnychenko's mission to Moscow and Kharkiv (see Chapter Three). Shrah felt that Vynnychenko's criticism of the Soviet system following

509 *Borietsia-poborete!*, No.1, September 1920, pp.2-3, 25-6; The quotation here is to be found on p.26.

510 *Borietsia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.53-6, 58-9.

his return to the emigration confirmed the position of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR. The charges levelled by Vynnychenko had all been referred to on the pages of *Boritiesia-poborete!*. The critical stance which the UPSR journal had always maintained was in stark contrast to that of Vynnychenko before he left for Moscow; the writer had 'believed unreservedly at that time, believed in the sincerity and irreproachable Communism of the Russian Bolsheviks, in the necessity of going to any concessions, in unscrupulous cooperation with them, in the necessity of even going to the sacrifice of the interests of the Ukrainian working people for the development of the world revolution'.

However, Vynnychenko's new position also came in for criticism. Shrah pointed out that Vynnychenko also admitted that there were moments when he thought that he was wrong, that centralism was weakening and that there was a genuine chance for democratic federalism. Thus, wrote Shrah, 'maybe he really did make a mistake, maybe in a short time a more favourable atmosphere will be created, maybe it was not necessary to abandon the Ukraine, but rather make further preparations, gather forces, conduct further the struggle for the implementation of the foundations for a truly Soviet and truly Ukrainian regime'. As Shrah observed, nobody was in a more favourable position than Vynnychenko to create a powerful, united revolutionary-Soviet front in the Ukraine. Shrah was convinced of the possibility of achieving this, because 'from the many announcements and works of prominent Russian Communists it is obvious that they also see, know and understand well their mistakes, faults and errors, but are not in the position to correct them at once'.⁵¹¹

One can find many such affirmations of the Bolsheviks' good intentions on the pages of *Boritiesia-poborete!*. 'There is no doubt about the Bolsheviks' good will' wrote Hrushevskyi in 'Between Moscow and Warsaw'.⁵¹² According to Shrah, to criticise the policy of the Bolsheviks did not mean to oppose them: 'If we highlight the national policy of the Russian Bolsheviks which they still at this moment mistakenly conduct in the Ukraine and condemn it, then this does not mean that all the same we do not also see those steps forward in the national question, which according to the iron dictate of life the Russian

511 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.4, November-December 1920, pp.39-41.

512 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, p.11.

Bolsheviks, and not only their leaders but also broader circles, have made.' He listed these advances. Ukrainians were no longer hated and persecuted, as they had been in 1917. There could be no doubt that the existence of the Ukrainian nation was now a fact. The Ukrainian language was no longer suspected to be counter-revolutionary. New commissariats which federation had not envisaged had been created in the areas of post, transport and finance. The declaration of the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian nation was being increasingly used in the phraseology and vocabulary of the Soviet Russian government. The most demonstrative example of this phenomenon was the position of the Ukrainian Communists and even certain Russian comrades who were, in Shrah's opinion, creating a healthy tendency which defended the new principles of Communist policy in the Ukraine.⁵¹³

The Attempt to Legalise the UPSR

The contributors to *Boritiesia-poborete!* identified three main errors of Bolshevik centralism: its disregard for the Ukrainian nationality, its exclusion of the village from the revolution and its refusal to allow non-Bolshevik parties to work in the Ukraine. As mentioned above, they believed that only the UPSR could overcome the national and peasant problems. Consequently, they were convinced that it was necessary that the party be allowed to function openly in the Ukraine. The correction of the last fault would lead to the rectification of the other two. One of the first tasks for the Foreign Delegation, therefore, was to achieve the legalisation of the UPSR.

In July 1920, Hrushevskiy and Zhukovskiy had written to the Central Committee of the KP(b)U in a letter setting out their party's program. They began by acknowledging that the Bolsheviks were the leaders of the world socialist revolution. This was accompanied by an admission of the UPSR's error in trying to isolate the Ukraine from the world revolution by seeking to acquire Ukrainian independence in a bloc with the bourgeois parties. On the other side, they pointed to the 'unfavourable consequences for the world socialist revolution' of the struggle between the Ukrainian people and Soviet Russia and to the fact that this 'still has not been liquidated due to mistakes committed by both sides'. Consequently, the Foreign Delegation declared that 'the

513 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.2, October 1920, pp.46-7.

UPSR has abandoned struggle with Soviet Russia, refused to support the nationalist attempts based on the support of the European bourgeoisie and accepted the principles of the Third International'. They went on to express their confidence that the two parties could cooperate: 'since the UPSR shares the tasks of the Third International and your party has not abandoned the slogan of the free self-determination of nations, we are certain of the attainability of full agreement and coordination of the activity of the UPSR with the plenum of the KPB, united with the general interests of the socialist revolution'. The Foreign Delegation's meetings with the Soviet representative in Berlin had convinced them of this.⁵¹⁴

The letter then made a number of observations on the situation in the Ukraine. It criticised Bolshevik centralism, the Communists' alienation from the villages, the Bolsheviks' undermining of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and their refusal to allow other Soviet parties to work openly in the Ukraine. Hrushevskyyi and Zhukovskyyi concluded that 'in its present form the Soviet regime does not have any chances of attaining a foothold in the Ukraine' and that if it did not introduce reform, the regime threatened 'to bury both itself and [its] Communist slogans'. Consequently, in order to preserve the Soviet system, the KPB 'must strive towards transferring power in the Ukrainian SS Republic to Ukrainian Soviet parties, and that as quickly as possible'. This could only be achieved by cooperating with these parties. In addition, Hrushevskyyi and Zhukovskyyi condemned the recent directives on the federation of the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics which seemed to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. 'This mistake must be corrected, [and] independence restored', demanded the two authors of the letter. They declared that the Ukrainian Soviet parties were in favour of a federation of socialist republics, but were against any attempt to treat the Ukraine as a region which must be tied to Russia more closely than any other republic. Lastly, the two representatives of the Foreign Delegation called on the Bolsheviks to help the Ukrainians in Galicia.⁵¹⁵ This last point was an especially pressing issue, as at the time when the letter was written, the Red Army was

514 Hrushevskyyi and Zhukovskyyi to the TsK of the KP(b)U, 19.07.1920, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.194 ark.33-4.

515 Hrushevskyyi and Zhukovskyyi to the TsK of the KP(b)U, 19.07.1920, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.194 ark.34-6.

about to advance into the West Ukrainian province: it seemed that the Foreign Delegation's twin goals of national and social liberation might be achieved in tandem, in that the spread of revolution to the rest of Europe could bring about the unification of the Western and Eastern Ukraine.

Though the letter opened with an admission of the mistakes of the UPSR by Hrushevskiyi and Zhukovskiyi, the tone was clearly one of admonishment. One might wonder at the audacity of two émigrés writing to the ruling party with demands that it change its policy and the composition of its government. Plokhy, puzzled by the letter, has suggested that this was a bargaining strategy, aimed at the more realistic goal of achieving the legalisation of the UPSR.⁵¹⁶ However, if one takes Hrushevskiyi and Zhukovskiyi at their word, namely that they genuinely believed that if the Soviet regime did not begin to cooperate with Ukrainian parties like the UPSR or the UKP then it would collapse due to lack of support in the villages, then one can see why the Foreign Delegation felt that their calls would be heeded: the very conditions in the Ukraine would force the Soviet regime to make compromises. Hrushevskiyi and his allies were not the only émigrés to believe that the Soviet state did not have a long future before it; it was an émigré commonplace that the Bolsheviks could fall at any moment.⁵¹⁷ This may have been the reason for the somewhat highhanded attitude evident in the letter. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the letter went unanswered and it was only in 1921 that the Politburo began to deal with the question of the legalisation of the UPSR and the return of its émigré members.

Not all members of the UPSR in the emigration supported the line taken by Hrushevskiyi and Zhukovskiyi. One of the leading opponents of the Foreign Delegation's position was Mykyta Shapoval. He wrote a couple of articles for *Boritiesia-poborete!*, one of them, on the 'Socialist Revolution in Russia and the Ukraine', setting out his position towards the Bolsheviks. Shapoval held many of the beliefs to be found in the rest of the journal: he stressed that the Bolsheviks were the leaders of the world revolution; he saw the service which they had rendered for the Ukraine in fighting capitalism there; he criticised them for following the doctrine of Marxism, which underestimated both the

516 Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp.223-4.

517 Frank Golczewski, 'Deutschland und Ukraine-Politik 1918-1926', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.25, 1997, No.2, pp.285-299 (pp.293, 299).

national question and the role of the village in the revolution; he felt that the peasants of the Ukraine were being pushed away from participation in the revolution because of the mistakes in Bolshevik policy and that this was harming the world socialist revolution.⁵¹⁸ However, he went further in his condemnation of the Bolsheviks and was much more sceptical about their ability to reform: 'There is no independent Ukraine; there is no independent government of it; there is no economic, trade union, administrative, diplomatic [or] military independence. There is not even federation. There are certain fictions which are used by Muscovite diplomats with the aim of the full incorporation of the Ukraine into the structure of a one and indivisible Russia, implementing the "behest of their forefathers", the historical mission of the Russian people, realising the spirit and postulates of Muscovite culture'.⁵¹⁹ It was Shapoval's conviction that 'the Bolsheviks are first Russians and then revolutionaries'⁵²⁰ which distinguished him from the other contributors to the journal: the Russian mentality of the Bolsheviks meant that they would not allow the Ukraine to follow her own path to socialism once counter-revolution had been defeated. Shapoval even wrote that Hrushevskiy encouraged the Bolsheviks to take this stance when he expressed his support for the Soviet system.⁵²¹ Though Shapoval felt that Lenin himself had recognised the dangers for the revolution of Russian chauvinism in the Ukraine, he wrote that 'we fear that Lenin and his followers do not have in Russia that strength and importance necessary to liquidate with one stroke the historical bourgeois psychological inheritance which consciously or unconsciously the oppressed mass of Russians flaunt'.⁵²²

The split in the UPSR abroad was fuelled by personal animosity between Shapoval and Hrushevskiy which went back to the revolution. As one can see from Shapoval's diary, there were regular arguments within the two émigré groupings of the UPSR about the revolution. Shapoval, who had supported the Directory, stressed its centrality to the Ukrainian revolution, whereas the Hrushevskiy camp argued that it had undone the work of the Central Rada.

518 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, pp.1-44.

519 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, p.30.

520 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, p.17.

521 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, p.16.

522 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.3, November 1920, pp.42-3.

Shapoval also accused Hrushevskiyi of having invited the Germans into the Ukraine during his time as head of the Central Rada. Even at those meetings of the UPSR at which there were no direct confrontations, Shapoval described the atmosphere as 'heavy'. At the end of November and beginning of December 1920, these disagreements heated up with the return of Vynnychenko to the emigration and the report he gave to the UPSR in Prague about his visit to the Ukraine. The dismal picture of the situation there confirmed Shapoval's critical stance towards the Bolsheviks. However, it also brought about further polarisation in the group. Zhukovskiyi opposed the version given by Vynnychenko and read out another report on the situation in the Ukraine by the pro-Soviet Social Democrat Serhii Vikul, who had left the Foreign Group of the UKP and returned to the Soviet Ukraine. This gave a far more positive picture of conditions in the Ukrainian SSR and indeed Shapoval claimed that it was based on information passed on by the Bolshevik Dmytro Manuilskiy, who was at that time in Riga for the peace negotiations with the Poles. In his diary, Shapoval expressed his disgust for both Vikul and Zhukovskiyi, calling them a 'poor Bolshevik gramophone' and a 'neophyte of Muscovite Bolshevism' respectively. Shapoval's resolution on the reports was accepted against Zhukovskiyi's opposition. A further issue of disagreement was whether the various socialist Ukrainian factions abroad should consolidate as one party. On this matter Shapoval was in favour of forming a common front with Vynnychenko, whereas Hrushevskiyi and Zhukovskiyi were opposed to this. Shapoval believed that Hrushevskiyi's opposition to a united front was motivated by nothing more than personal hate for Vynnychenko.⁵²³

The fourth conference of the UPSR in emigration, which took place in Prague between 18th and 23rd January 1921, brought these tensions to a head. According to Shapoval, in the run up to the conference the members of the Prague group were becoming increasingly impatient with Hrushevskiyi and Zhukovskiyi.⁵²⁴ The conference was characterised by controversies and protest: a meeting of Shapoval's supporters during the break on the matter of Khrystiuk's report on the government in the Ukraine caused objection, as did

523 M. Shapoval, *Shchodennyk. Vid 22 liutnoho 1919r. do 31 hrudnia 1924r. I. Chastyna*, ed. Sava Zerkal, New York: Ukrainska Hromada im. M. Shapoval, 1958, pp.44-6.

524 Shapoval, *Shchodennyk I*, p.49.

Shapoval's charge that Chechel's contribution on the economic program was different to the text which he had been shown previously. Of Khrystiuk's report itself, Shapoval wrote that it was 'not to the point [...] the [Ukrainian Soviet] government is not a government, [rather they are] Russifiers, nominated from Moscow, retarding the revolution of social and national liberation, ruining economic life and destroying the proletariat'. On the 21st, two more SRs, Nykyfor Hryhoriiv and a certain Rzhepetskyi, arrived from Paris. Hryhoriiv informed the conference that the TsK of the party was against the line being taken by the Foreign Delegation. This had a dramatic effect on the conference, and even Khrystiuk had to modify the text of his speech.⁵²⁵

The resolution which appeared in *Boritiesia-poborete!* very much bore the mark of Shapoval's group. Though the conference renounced any efforts to overthrow the present government in the Ukraine, the KP(b)U was damned as being nothing more than a regional organisation of the Russian Communist Party, the power of which rested on commissars sent by Moscow and the strength of the Red Army; the Bolsheviks were roundly condemned for following a 'one and indivisible, Great Russian, Muscovite policy' which retarded the revolution of social and national liberation. The conference called on the Soviet government and the Russian proletariat in the Ukraine to abandon this policy for the good of the world socialist revolution. Instead, they should support the independence of a Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, which would, the conference believed, enter a union with Soviet Russia. The system of commissariats should be abandoned and peasant and worker Soviets organised in the regions as the only organs of power. Lastly, the conference demanded that all Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian Soviet parties, including the UPSR, be allowed to conduct their work among peasants and workers legally to strengthen Soviet power in the Ukraine.⁵²⁶

Following this divisive conference, the Prague SRs formed their own organisation, the Foreign Committee of the UPSR. It included Shapoval himself and another member of the Prague group, H. Hrytsai. The new group also re-

525 Shapoval, *Shchodennyk I*, pp.51-2.

526 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.7, February-March 1920, pp.58-60.

ceived the support of members of the UPSR in exile in Poland, and two of these, Nykyfor Hryhoriiv and Oleksander Mytsiuk, joined the new body.⁵²⁷

As a result of the polarisation inside the UPSR abroad, the eighth issue of *Boritiesia-poborete!*, from April-June 1921, bore witness to a marked change in the position of the Foreign Delegation. The issue contained, for example, the second instalment of Shrah's article on federalism and the Ukraine's relationship to Soviet Russia. The article had been written in January 1921 and stayed true to the principles which the Foreign Delegation had held at that time. He wrote that federation with Soviet Russia was desirable, but that at the moment the Russian Communist Party was following too centralist a policy towards the Ukraine. He warned that the mistakes of the RKP threatened the achievements of the revolution, called for the correction of these errors and argued that a federation could only be attained on the basis of equality and voluntary consent.⁵²⁸ The article was followed by a note which stated that since the article had been written, the situation in the Ukraine had changed. The independence of the Ukraine had been affirmed in international treaties, for example that with Poland; in this way, the Ukraine had made an appearance on the world stage of international relations. 'The independence, if one can put it like that, of the Ukraine had formally taken one enormous step forward' the note concluded. The appendix also quoted a report from a Soviet paper which indicated that in a revised Russian-Ukrainian federation the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would be given control over its own economic affairs. *Boritiesia-poborete!* therefore felt 'certain that under the pressure of life the "constitution of mutual relations between both republics" is approaching all the closer and closer genuine socialist realities, towards the type of socialist state union which we have tried to outline in our sketch'.⁵²⁹

The change in the Foreign Delegation's position can also be seen in an article by Hrushevskyyi comparing the forceful suppression of the Paris Commune of 1871 to the revolution in the Ukraine. Though the journal *Boritiesia-poborete!* had repeatedly criticised the Bolsheviks' refusal to allow other socialist parties to operate freely in the Ukraine, Hrushevskyyi now praised the very ruthlessness with which the Soviet regime persecuted these parties. The article did

527 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.9, July-September 1921, p.5.

528 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.8, April-June 1921, pp.8-35.

529 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.8, April-June 1921, p.36.

say that the present slogan of Communist dictatorship, which resembled the bourgeois' own methods of repression, might do more harm to the cause of revolution than the terror against the Paris Commune had done, and admitted the possibility that the 'present sectarian exclusion and intolerance towards socialist non-Communist parties weakens the success of Communism more than the disunity of the Paris Commune'. However, he went on to remind his readers that 'the bourgeois, who are not obliged to worry about the interests of socialism and collectivism, must bow its head before the present Communist revolution and its leaders as people [...] who have sufficiently demonstrated their ability to take power through the display of the capability to use its [the bourgeois'] methods with even more unscrupulousness and force'.⁵³⁰

The anniversary of the Paris Commune was not the only occasion for Hrushevskiy's article. The Central Committee of Hrushevskiy's own party had been convicted by a Soviet court and was sitting in a Bolshevik prison feeling the full brunt of the Soviet regime's 'unscrupulousness and force'. A condemnation of this sentence appeared in the same issue of the journal. The KP(b)U's dictatorship and the damage it did to the revolution were denounced. However, this did not turn the Foreign Delegation against the government in the Ukraine. Rather, they called for the correction of these fatal mistakes and the transition to genuine and sincere cooperation between the different Soviet parties in the Ukraine. The resolution ended by addressing the party in the Ukraine, in particular the imprisoned members of the Central Committee. The Foreign Delegation expressed its 'deep sympathy and comradely greetings', but also called on the TsK 'not to give in to the impressions [created by] the mistakes of the present Communist regime and to stand firmly on the position taken: the reinforcement with all [their] strength of the party, the Soviet system and the deepening of the socialist revolution in the Ukraine'.⁵³¹ On 3rd July, Hrushevskiy articulated similar thoughts in a private letter to the TsK. He reported that the Foreign Delegation was sending Chelchel to negotiate with Shumskiy and that the arrest of the TsK would be the first issue of discussion.⁵³² The point to note here is not that the Foreign Delegation denounced the imprisonment of its own party leadership, which is

530 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.8, April-June 1921, p.7.

531 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.8, April-June 1921, p.64.

532 Hrushevskiy to the TsK of the UPSR, 03.06.1921, TsDAHO f.8 op.1 spr.85 ark.31.

not in itself surprising, but rather that even under these circumstances it hoped to come to an agreement with the Bolsheviks.

As the UPSR abroad began to split, the KP(b)U started considering the Foreign Delegation's desire to return more seriously. In January 1921, Shumskyi reported to the Politburo of the KP(b)U that the Ukrainian historian wanted to come to the Ukraine. This was rejected.⁵³³ According to the historian himself, in February, at the time of the Riga conference, he was asked by the Soviet delegation to return to the Ukraine to undertake cultural work, but refused due to the uncertainty about the imprisoned Central Committee.⁵³⁴ In the same month, the Politburo met to discuss Vynnychenko. At the end of the discussion, the matter of Hrushevskyi was raised, but then, according to the Politburo resolutions, postponed.⁵³⁵ In April, the Politburo considered the return of the historian and other SRs, but rejected it as inopportune at that time.⁵³⁶ By 4th June, this position had changed somewhat. The Politburo refused to legalise the UPSR, but would allow individual members of the party to enter the Ukraine for private or Soviet work if they left the party and condemned it.⁵³⁷ Thereafter, contact between the two groups intensified. In July 1921, the Foreign Delegation established links to the newly arrived Soviet plenipotentiary in Prague, Mykhailo Levytskyi. In the same month, Chechel was sent to Kharkiv to conduct negotiations with the Soviet government.⁵³⁸

Towards the end of August, the Soviet trade mission in Prague turned to Hrushevskyi with a request that he take part in a campaign to buy and publish schoolbooks and belles-lettres for the Ukraine in order to meet the shortfall there. A number of meetings between Hrushevskyi and the Soviet plenipotentiary took place at the end of August and beginning of September, in the

533 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 25.01.1921, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.13 ark.12.

534 Hrushevskyi to Mykhailo Ostanovych, 02.03.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.63 ark.32zv.

535 Pyrih, 'M.S.Hrushevskyi: mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu (1924-1934rr.)', p.60.

536 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 26.04.1921, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.13 ark.86.

537 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 04.06.1921, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.13 ark.112zv.

538 Report by Mykhailo Levytskyi, the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Prague, 06.07.1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.44.

course of which the latter also suggested that the Ukrainian historian take a role in organising aid for those Ukrainians suffering from famine.⁵³⁹

In this way, Levytskyi achieved an impression of the aims of Hrushevskyyi and other members of the Foreign Delegation. His report gives an interesting picture of the Soviet view of the group. He described their goal of the legalisation of the UPSR and return as a party as being impossible because it would give them the 'opportunity to develop their demagoguery about their correct point of view on the revolution and also about the correct line taken by the Central Rada and so on.' He also recognised that it was impossible to allow them all to join the KP(b)U because, with two or three exceptions, they were far from being Communists. He did believe, however, that some members of the group would be 'prominent and valuable' Soviet workers. As an alternative to the two impossible options of allowing the SRs to return as a party or to join the KP(b)U, he suggested that they be temporally allowed to form a party of 'revolutionary Communism'. He referred to the precedent of 1919 by which the *Borotbisty* formed the Ukrainian Communist Party (borotbist), after which they entered the KP(b)U. The new party should be subject to the condition that they would not come out against the Soviet power, that they would not support the UKP and that they would work towards strengthening the Soviet state. This party would act as a 'transitory stage' towards joining the party. He believed that even those who were not prepared to join could be accommodated in the Ukrainian SSR as partyless workers. He also warned against the dangers of not allowing them to return, for this would 'give a trump in the hands of Petliurite agitation' by undermining the Bolshevik rhetoric on the Ukraine.⁵⁴⁰

Despite the progress in coming to an agreement with the Bolsheviks, the arrival in Prague of an SR called M. Balash as the representative of the Central Committee of the UPSR created new problems for the Foreign Delegation. On 11th July 1921, Zhukovskyyi met Balash in the Czech capital where he informed the emissary that the Foreign Delegation stood 'on a position of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks'. Balash replied that 'the TsK and the party in

539 Iu. Novakivskyyi, Soviet trade representative in Prague, to Hrushevskyyi, 23.09.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.94 ark.11; the minutes of the meeting on publishing and buying books for the Ukraine, 14.09.1921, are on ark. 24.

540 M. Levytskyi to Rakovskii, 16.08.1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.60-1.

the Ukraine do not stand on such a position' and that Chechel's negotiations with Kharkiv were taking place without the permission of the TsK. When Zhukovskiy pointed out that in a letter from 20th March 1921 the TsK ordered all foreign groups of the UPSR to subordinate themselves to the Foreign Delegation, Balash answered that at the time the letter was written, the TsK did not know what the platform of the Foreign Delegation was.⁵⁴¹ Balash therefore represented a significant challenge to the authority of the Foreign Delegation, which rested on the claim that it alone held the mandate of the party's leadership. Consequently, *Boritiesia-poborete!* denied that Balash was an emissary of the TsK.⁵⁴²

In response to this opposition, the Foreign Delegation attempted to reassert its right as the sole representative of the UPSR abroad in a number of meetings over the summer. At a sitting of the group of 20th July 1921, the Foreign Delegation accused Shapoval's Foreign Committee of being a separatist group which hoped to destroy the unity of the UPSR in emigration. The Foreign Committee was also charged with failing to comply with the resolutions of the conference and the Foreign Delegation declared the opposing body dissolved. On 3rd August, a further meeting took place at which the Foreign Delegation resolved to disband the Prague group of the UPSR. Shapoval especially came in for attack for his 'intrigue', 'careerism' and 'lack of political principles'.⁵⁴³ In order to reaffirm their authority among the UPSR, Hrushevskiy's group published a letter from the TsK from the 5th of August in which the TsK confirmed the Foreign Delegation's position as its representative abroad, condemned separatism among its party members in the emigration and called on them not to take part in any groups working against the present government of the Ukraine.⁵⁴⁴

At the end of August 1921, Chechel returned from the Ukraine. His description of his negotiations there strengthened the Foreign Delegation's feeling that the position which they had adopted was correct. As a result of the information which Chechel brought back, the Foreign Delegation asserted, in a

541 Minutes of the meeting between Zhukovskiy and Badan, 11.07.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.62 ark.58.

542 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.9, July-September 1921, p.19.

543 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.9, July-September 1921, pp.17-23.

544 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.9, July-September 1921, pp.25-6.

meeting of the 5th of September, that they recognised 'the socialism of the present Soviet government of the Ukraine and the absence within it of anti-nationalism towards Ukrainian tendencies' and saw as a result of this a confirmation of the position which they had adopted. The Foreign Delegation continued to criticise the regime for its refusal to legalise other socialist, Soviet parties because it prevented a broadening of the social base of the revolution, which in turn was a 'serious danger for the Soviet republics'. However, the Foreign Delegation repeated that it had 'not lost hope that under the influence of the requirements of life the RKP and KP(b)U will in time change its view'.⁵⁴⁵

Chechel's own description of his meetings with members of the Soviet government in Kharkiv (Oleksander Shumskyi, Khristiiian Rakovskii and Dmytro Manuil'skyi) does not seem to provide much basis for this optimism. Though Shumskyi was in favour of allowing the return of the members of the UPSR, especially of Hrushev'skyi, as individuals to cooperate in the reconstruction of the Ukraine, he felt that the legalisation of the party was impossible. Shumskyi argued that the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the rule of one party: to shift the social base of this dictatorship towards the peasants by allowing the UPSR into government would weaken it by diluting it with petty bourgeois elements. Chechel felt that he had convinced Manuil'skyi of his group's sincerity and he parted with Manuil'skyi with the impression that he would support legalisation; however, even in Chechel's account, the Soviet minister made no definite statement in favour of this. Like Shumskyi, Rakovskii would only allow the Foreign Delegation to return if they left the UPSR, but he also sought to convince Chechel of the sincerity of the Soviet government in satisfying the national needs of the Ukrainian labouring people.⁵⁴⁶

Other information arriving from the Ukraine gave evidence that the Foreign Delegation's hopes would not be fulfilled. By August 1921, Zhukov'skyi had replaced Chechel as the Foreign Delegation's negotiator with the Ukrainian Soviet government. On the 24th of that month, he sent a letter to Hrushev'skyi containing more dispiriting news. The secretary of the Foreign Delegation passed on an Agitprop report in which the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR was characterised as counter-revolutionary. He told Hrushev'skyi that reading

545 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.9, July-September 1921, p.27.

546 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.9 July-September 1921, pp.10-3.

the document had the effect that one's 'desire to continue further to conduct negotiations with them [the Bolsheviks] disappears'.⁵⁴⁷ The document described how the group around Hrushevskiyi claimed to be a Soviet party and stood on the general platform of the Third International, but interpreted this general platform not as the dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather the dictatorship of the labouring masses. The group aimed to return to the Ukraine as a legal, Soviet party, and to work as a loyal opposition. Perhaps most hurtfully for Hrushevskiyi, the author characterised this position as a version of the slogan 'Soviets without Communists' put forward by the Russian Kadet Pavel Miliukov.⁵⁴⁸ The author therefore accused Hrushevskiyi of wanting to castrate Soviet power and adapt it to their petty bourgeois interests.⁵⁴⁹ Presumably, the letter had not reached Vienna in time for the discussion on the information brought back by Chechel. However, by 10th September, the historian, at least in private, was not showing the optimism of the recent resolution. He wrote to Vasyl Kuziv, a Ukrainian activist in New York, telling him that 'we are not going to the Ukraine because the Soviet government has not agreed to legalise the party of USSR', and that they had received instructions from their TsK to continue working abroad.⁵⁵⁰

As can be seen from Mykhailo Levytskyi's letters to his superiors, the question of the legalisation of the UPSR was the major stumbling block in negotiations between the Foreign Delegation and the Soviet representatives abroad. However, he continued to hope that the group could be of use to the Soviet regime. On 10th September 1921, he wrote that Chechel's return was beginning to polarise Hrushevskiyi's group of SRs: though all parts of the group were calling for the legalisation of their party, in fact they held very different

547 Zhukovskiyi to Hrushevskiyi, 24.07.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.64 ark.10.

548 A reference to Miliukov's 'New Tactic'. See Chapter One, footnote 77.

549 Agitprop report on 'counter-revolutionary' groups, author and date unknown, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.761 ark.186-7.

550 Hrushevskiyi to Kuziv, 10.09.1921/2, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.144zv. There seems to have been a mistake in the dating of this letter. The date actually says that the letter is from 1922; however, the second '2' is written in a lighter hand than the rest of the date and seems to have been added later. The reference to the legalisation of the UPSR only makes sense if the letter comes from 1921, as in 1922 this had ceased to be an issue. Moreover, in the letter Hrushevskiyi says that he cannot send the sixth issue of *Boritiesia-poborete!* to Kuziv as it hasn't been published yet. This issue was published out of order, in February 1922. Hrushevskiyi's statement is therefore true if the letter were written in 1921; by September 1922, however, the issue had been released.

points of view, such that 'the group is breaking up; part of them are for joining the KP(b)U and a part are for the legalisation of the party'.⁵⁵¹ On the 21st, Levytskyi reported that the Foreign Delegation had passed the above-mentioned resolution demanding the legalisation of the UPSR and that they intended to publish it. This was unpalatable to the Soviet authorities, and Levytskyi told his superiors that if the members of the delegation did publish their resolution, he would 'enter into a decisive struggle against them'. Despite these problems, the Soviet plenipotentiary still believed that some members of the party could be won over to cooperation with the Bolsheviks. In December, he told Rakovskii: 'a part of the group, for example Shtefan, is already working as part of Vukopspilka, [...]. Others, such as Shrah, Khrystiuk and Zhukovskiy would also like to join Vukopspilka in order to work'.⁵⁵²

The plan of publishing schoolbooks for the Ukraine was also facing problems. Though Hrushevskiy had not declined to be involved in the editorial board, he insisted on organising the enterprise in Vienna through an academic committee which would be a local branch of the Kyivan Academic Society. Levytskyi, however, wanted to organise the venture through a publishing department subordinated to the Soviet delegation.⁵⁵³ Although an agreement was signed on 14th September, it reflected the wishes of Hrushevskiy rather than those of the Soviet plenipotentiary.⁵⁵⁴ Consequently, the concord did not last long. As early as the 23rd of that month, Levytskyi wrote to the historian telling him that the schoolbook matter would be organised through the Soviet trade mission, thereby going back on the decision made less than two weeks before. Attempts to clear up the differences through negotiations between Zhukovskiy and Iu. Novakivskiy of the Prague Soviet trade mission proved fruitless. The materials and mandate necessary for the project were not sent to Hrushevskiy.⁵⁵⁵

As a result of these setbacks, Hrushevskiy had, by autumn 1921, given up hope of returning to the Ukraine soon. Still, he remained convinced of the necessity of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. He told Kuziv in a letter from 25th

551 M. Levytskyi to Rakovskii, 10.09.1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.68-68zv.

552 M. Levytskyi to Rakovskii, December 1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.76-8.

553 M. Levytskyi to Rakovskii, December 1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.78.

554 Minutes of the meeting on publishing and buying books for the Ukraine, 14.09.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.94 ark.24.

555 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.10, October-December 1921, p.29.

October that he wanted to build an independent socialist movement in the Ukraine which the Bolsheviks would have to take into consideration and compromise with. The historian was 'convinced that an understanding with the Bolsheviks is very necessary for us, but not their *fall*, which would inflict new ruin and reaction on the Ukraine'. He did not think that he and his group would be able to return immediately to the Ukraine and that at the moment it was better to do literary work abroad.⁵⁵⁶

These opinions were echoed in an open letter sent to the Galician journal *Vpered* four days later. The letter was intended as an answer to rumours of Hrushevskiy's return to the Ukraine. He reported that he had refused the requests from the Soviet authorities to return to the Ukraine to take up academic work because he was not prepared to renounce political activity; Chelch's visit to Kharkiv had strengthened this feeling, as had the failure in the matter of the schoolbooks. Therefore, in accordance with the wishes of the TsK of the UPSR, he would remain abroad and continue his activity as a member of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR and organiser of the Ukrainian Sociological Institute. However, he also wrote that he remained convinced 'that in the interests of the Ukrainian people, Ukrainian society regardless of differences of opinion must devote its strength to cultural building within the framework of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, filling this framework of proclaimed Ukrainian independence with a living content, and on the other hand, that the ruling Communist party, in order to save [its] social-revolutionary achievements, must bind itself as closely as possible to Ukrainian socialist Soviet parties, to summon them to work and to make [them] partners in state and social Soviet construction'. His negotiations with the ruling party in the Ukraine had shown that it was not ready for this, which meant that all those who had abandoned struggle with the Bolsheviks must 'once more arm themselves with patience and hand the matter over to the only negotiator – time'.⁵⁵⁷ Even this late, Hrushevskiy remained convinced that an acceptance by the Bolsheviks of other Ukrainian socialist parties was inevitable.

However, the government in the Soviet Ukraine had given up the idea of cooperation with the Foreign Delegation. On 18th October, the Politburo of the

556 Hrushevskiy to Kuziv, 25.10.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.5-5zv.

557 *Boritesia-poborete!*, No.10, October-December 1921, pp.30-1. The quotation is from p.31.

KP(b)U decided to end the activity of the organisation for famine relief in the Ukraine headed by Hrushevskiy.⁵⁵⁸ Levytskyi also reported the failure of the schoolbook project with the explanation that 'it was only a project, we did not finally come to an agreement and I personally declared to him that if he published his resolution, which was triggered by the arrival of Chechel from the Ukraine, then we would sever whatever relationship there might be, and act towards him as we acted towards Vynnychenko'. The Soviet representative concluded that 'we have not attracted Hrushevskiy's group of Ukrainian SRs to work, with the exception of Shtefan'.⁵⁵⁹ One should not be too surprised that a resolution which actually represented the commitment of the Foreign Delegation to compromise with the Bolsheviks should bring about the collapse of these attempts: the Bolsheviks and Foreign Delegation had entirely different understandings of the prerequisites for cooperation. The Foreign Delegation felt that an agreement would have to be between two equal, socialist parties. For the Bolsheviks, the only basis for cooperation was the subordination of the individual members of the UPSR to Soviet authority.

In response to these disappointments, Hrushevskiy wrote an angry letter to Rakovskii on 5th November, which was published in the 10th issue of *Boritiesia-poborete!*. The historian began by describing the hopes for successful cooperation that he and his comrades had entertained following Chechel's visit to the Ukraine. Believing this, he had entered into the agreement of 14th September on publishing schoolbooks.⁵⁶⁰ However, the plan had not been implemented because the Bolsheviks wanted the Foreign Delegation to abandon politics completely, to renounce their support for the imprisoned TsK and to serve merely as bureaucrats under the commissariats. Hrushevskiy stressed that one cannot see this as an individual incident, but rather evidence of the Bolsheviks' refusal to make peace with the Ukrainian intelligentsia in preference for a policy of attacking them.⁵⁶¹ Hrushevskiy condemned, as *Boritiesia-Poborete!* had done throughout its existence, the KP(b)U's bureaucratism, isolation from the Ukrainian people and lack of independence

558 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 18.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.30 ark.81.

559 Levytskyi to Rakovskii, 31.12.1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.81.

560 *Mykhailo Hrushevskiy: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu (1920-1930-ti roky). Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, Kyiv: Instytut Ukrainkoï Arkheohrafii AN Ukrainy, 1997, pp.19-21.

561 *Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, pp.21-2.

from the RKP, which all drove supporters of the revolution from the socialist camp and placed the government 'under the perpetual threat of a cataclysm'.⁵⁶² Hrushevskiy ended by stressing that he had 'never wanted "the Bolsheviks to fall" because they could not survive their own system, and drag along with them the achievements of the revolution and the prospects of socialism into obscurity'. He appealed to Rakovskii 'as a socialist to a socialist, in the name of the common interests of the world revolution' to renounce party exclusivity and to introduce into the construction of the Soviet state what the historian called living content and living forces, which he believed would enable it to defend itself from the impending disaster.⁵⁶³

The letter told the Soviet Ukrainian leader that only concessions by his side could create the possible conditions for cooperation; the UPSR had done everything it could. Several months later, Hrushevskiy explained this to the émigré poet Oles. In February 1922, he wrote: 'I do not have any intention of seeking a meeting with Rakovskii following this open letter, to which I cannot add anything, especially due to your conjecture that "he deigns to be angry"'. After such an original ending to the negotiations on cooperation, started by *their* side, what can I propose? Only they, or he, can revive them.⁵⁶⁴ The letter to Rakovskii therefore marked the end of Hrushevskiy's active attempts to seek common ground with the Bolsheviks; it did not, however, rule out future cooperation in principle, but placed the onus on the Bolsheviks to make the first move.

Indeed, elsewhere in the 10th issue of *Boritiesia-poborete!* the picture of the Soviet Ukraine was less negative. Khrystiuk's analysis of the introduction of the NEP reminded the reader that the 'majority of the points of the Communist resolution completely coincided with the position which our party formulated almost a half a year before the above-mentioned Communist conference'.⁵⁶⁵ Khrystiuk repeated the argument that the exclusion of the other Soviet parties in the Ukraine was creating apathy among the workers and opposition among the peasants and that this was endangering the new policy.

562 *Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, pp.23-5.

563 *Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, pp.25-6. The quotation is on p.26.

564 Liubomyr Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho*, Vol.1, Kyiv and New York: Ukrainske Istorychne Tovarystvo, 1997, pp.236-7.

565 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.10, October-December 1921, p.17.

Nevertheless, he added that though the ruling Communist party had not seen this, 'we are convinced that the best elements of the Bolshevik-Communists themselves will recognise on cold reflection that such "indiscrimination" is dangerous as a method of political struggle'.⁵⁶⁶ The NEP and other changes in the Bolshevik policy were confirmation that the UPSR had adopted the correct stance towards the Bolsheviks.⁵⁶⁷

In private the historian had not abandoned hope of returning to the Ukraine. He told Kuziv in December 1921 that he hoped to go back the following June. In another letter from that month, he repeated this, though he felt that it would be difficult to carry out: 'As I wrote to you, I would be glad to travel to the Ukraine in June if there were no hindrances. The last rising [referring to Tiutiunnyk's winter raid] very much damaged the situation there, but perhaps somehow [the situation] will level out before that time'.⁵⁶⁸ Thus, according to Hrushevskyyi it was not merely the position taken by the Soviet government which prevented him from returning; the Ukrainian opposition to the Bolsheviks was also making this difficult.

After the publication of Hrushevskyyi's open letter, only one more issue of *Boritiesia-poborete!* came out. In February 1922, the long overdue manifesto of the UPSR, which was numbered as the sixth instalment of the journal, appeared. The most notable thing about the program was that it barely mentioned the Bolsheviks at all.⁵⁶⁹ This is probably an indication of the uncertainty of the group's position towards the Soviet Ukraine following Hrushevskyyi's open letter to Rakovskii. The closure of the paper marks a watershed in Hrushevskyyi's relationship with the Soviet Ukrainian government for it signalled the end of his hope to achieve the legalisation of the UPSR. Indeed, the lack of a reply to Hrushevskyyi's letter may have meant that the journal was now redundant. Alternatively, the publication may have shut down due to a lack of funds, as Hrushevskyyi later claimed.⁵⁷⁰

566 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.10, October-December 1921, pp.24-5.

567 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.10, October-December 1921, pp.25-6.

568 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 22.12.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.35.

569 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.6, February 1922.

570 M. Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty M. Hrushevskoho do Pochynka', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, 1969, No.4, p.78-98 (p.82).

Hrushevskiy's Return to the Ukraine

The closure of *Boritiesia-poborete!* also ended Hrushevskiy's political activity in the emigration. He stopped making public statements on the Soviet system. He withdrew from émigré political life, concentrating instead on his academic work. At the same time, with other émigrés he organised a committee for famine relief in the Ukraine, which sent supplies from the West to their homeland.

One result of this withdrawal from open politics is the fact that the main source for the further development of Hrushevskiy's position over the next two years is the historian's correspondence during this period. This included prominent members of the Ukrainian community, such as Kyrilo Studynskiy, the head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, and the radical poet Oles (Oleksander Kandyba). He also wrote to Ukrainian booksellers and figures in the Ukrainian émigré community in North America (for example Tymotei Pochynok, Emil Faryniak and the Protestant minister Vasyl Kuziv) who distributed his books and therefore were his main source of income during this period. Hrushevskiy wrote extensively on a number of topics, including the coordination of famine relief in the Ukraine and book sales. The passages in which he gave his opinions on the situation in the Ukraine therefore were often only shorter parts of longer letters. Hrushevskiy was not trying to expound his stance towards the Soviet regime and all the nuances involved (as he had been doing in *Boritiesia-poborete!*). Instead, he was either reacting to news he had just heard or opinions put forward by his correspondent, or simply expressing the fears and hopes which occupied him at the time of writing. Consequently, the opinions one finds in these letters can vary greatly from day to day. It is impossible simply to quote one passage from one letter, as indeed some other historians have done, and take this as symptomatic of Hrushevskiy's views for the period. Rather, one must draw from a number of letters to show the full complexity of his feelings towards the Soviet Ukraine.

Despite the disappointment over the legalisation of the UPSR, Hrushevskiy still maintained the hope of travelling to the Ukraine with the Foreign Delegation as a group, rather than as individuals. Now he wanted to transfer the activity of the Ukrainian Sociological Institute to the Ukraine. He had been fostering this idea at least since August 1921, when he wrote to Vasyl

Mazurenko in Kyiv asking the Social Democrat for help in realising the plan.⁵⁷¹ Following the open letter to Rakovskii, he began to see it as a means of forming, as he told Kuziv in a letter from May 1922, a 'national and cultural centre in the Great Ukraine'.⁵⁷² Though the transfer of the Institute to the Ukraine would not bring any material benefits, since it possessed no funds, it would provide a means of keeping the group together.⁵⁷³ This represented a reorientation by Hrushevskyyi from political engagement to cultural and academic work as a means of helping the post-revolutionary reconstruction of the Ukraine. Indeed, in another letter the historian told the Protestant minister that 'I really do assign more importance to the moral and cultural education of our people than to the political question, in which our intelligentsia is absorbed'.⁵⁷⁴ Chechel and Zhukovskyyi were entrusted with the implementation of the new tactic. They travelled to the Ukraine in May 1922 to take part in a conference there in June as representatives of the Institute.⁵⁷⁵ In July and October, Hrushevskyyi posted to Kuziv optimistic reports of the establishment of a branch of the Institute by Chechel and Zhukovskyyi in Kyiv.⁵⁷⁶ The idea does not seem to have progressed any further than this. Only after Hrushevskyyi's return did he try to resuscitate the project. However, this was without success.⁵⁷⁷

For most of 1922, Hrushevskyyi continued to talk of his imminent return to the Ukraine.⁵⁷⁸ He was under no illusions about the difficulties facing his country and his letters to Kuziv from 1922 are full of reports of famine and terror.⁵⁷⁹ However, he did not place all the blame for this situation on the Bolsheviks. In February 1922, he attacked the attempts by the Poles and Petliura to sustain the uprising because they 'made the Communists even more suspect and

571 Hrushevskyyi to V. Mazurenko, 15.08.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.269 ark.1.

572 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 25.04.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.83-83zv.

573 Draft letter from Hrushevskyyi to unknown, undated, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.63 ark.70-70zv.

574 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 22.12.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.35

575 Applications for travel to the Soviet Ukraine, 02.06.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.795 ark.31; Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 06.05.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.88zv.

576 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 14.07.1922 and 25.09.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.124, 148.

577 Matiash, 'Ukrainskyi sotsiologichnyi instytut', pp.51-2.

578 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 08.02.1922, 16.04.1922, 25.04.1922 and 14.07.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.49, 78-9zv, 82zv, 96zv.

579 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 08.02.1922, 25.02.1922, 25.03.1922 and 25.09.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.50v, 57, 71, 149zv.

harbour prejudices against all Ukrainians whoever they are; it is possible that they will simply come to look on the Ukraine as a colony'.⁵⁸⁰ He repeated here the argument set out in *Boritiesia-poborete!* that Petliura's opposition to the Soviet regime was one of the causes of the Bolshevik errors in the Ukraine because it tainted the defence of the interests of the Ukraine with the charge of reaction.⁵⁸¹ Moreover, despite the fact that he was well aware of the difficulties facing the Ukraine, he still felt that the revolution had unleashed positive forces. He wrote to Oles on 1st October complaining of the emigration's hostility towards the Soviet Ukraine, for 'beyond the boundaries of the creation of the present occupation there is something living, powerful, constructive, and at the same time, from what reaches it, it [the emigration] only sees endless strife and ruin'.⁵⁸² Hrushevskyy's commitment to the revolution had not waned and he hoped to return to the Ukraine to be a part of it.

It was only towards the end of the year that he lost the hope that he would be able to return soon. In September 1922, he wrote to Studynskyy several times saying that he would be unable to return in that year.⁵⁸³ On 17th October, Hrushevskyy told Kuziv that 'there is no hope [of going] to the Ukraine. Comrades are being stifled, so that there is no writing. The Bolsheviks, it is said, would use my arrival with the aim of provocation'.⁵⁸⁴

It was around this time that his criticism of the Ukraine became the sharpest. He told Faryniak on 11th November 1922 that 'from the Ukraine the news is all the worse. It was expected that the so called "New Economic Policy" would yield Ukrainians [better] conditions of life, but it turned out to be the opposite. The Bolsheviks ingratiate themselves with the world bourgeoisie, the Muscovite-Jews are making all kinds of concessions, the Ukraine on the contrary is being stifled worse than ever before: they send Ukrainian public figures who demonstrate any kind of organisational ability out of the Ukraine, they are winding up the Ukrainian posts and institutes which still exist, they do not al-

580 Hrushevskyy to Kuziv, 08.02.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.50zv.

581 *Boritiesia-poborete!*, October 1920, No.2, p.17.

582 Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, p.238.

583 Halyna Svarnyk (ed.), 'Lysty Mykhailo Hrushevskoho do Kyryla Studynskoho za 1922 Rik', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, Vol.34, 1997, No.1-4, pp.288-323 (pp.296-7, 300).

584 Hrushevskyy to Kuziv, 17.10.1922, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.161zv. In December, Hrushevskyy gave Faryniak exactly the same reasons for being unable to return. See M. Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty M. Hrushevskoho do E. Faryniaka', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, 1976, No.1-4, pp.121-130 (p.130).

low any Ukrainian books to be printed abroad, [while] at the same time Russian [books] are floating down the river – and afterwards they say that due to a lack of Ukrainian books in schools they have to teach with Russian textbooks'.⁵⁸⁵ Hrushevskyyi may have referred here to be the expulsion from the Ukraine in October 1922 of seventy professors and members of the intelligentsia on the charge that they were spreading the ideology of *smenovkehovstvo*.⁵⁸⁶ Otherwise, he did not make any reference to a specific occurrence that may have changed his mind about going back, although in his correspondence he referred to letters which he had received from his comrades in the Ukraine describing the poor conditions there. Perhaps the impression given to him by his colleagues had convinced him that, at least for the moment, the difficult conditions in the country ruled out the historian's return.

Extracts like that from the letter to Faryniak are often quoted as being characteristic for Hrushevskyyi's feelings about the Soviet Union during his period in emigration as evidence that the historian constantly opposed the Soviet system.⁵⁸⁷ This does not describe the complexity of Hrushevskyyi's perceptions of the situation in the Ukraine. On the very same day that he wrote such a damning account to Faryniak, he defended the return of the other members of the Foreign Delegation in a letter to Oles. By rejecting public roles which were of no national or political worth in favour of more modest positions in cooperatives, he felt that they had found 'a deserving form of return', something he would wish to anyone. About himself he wrote: 'I, unfortunately, am in a worse position with regards to this, [and] therefore I am sitting while I can'.⁵⁸⁸ This quotation seems to suggest that he still supported the principle of return- ing and had only given up the idea of moving to Kyiv in the near future.

The crisis through which Hrushevskyyi was going also affected his relationship with the party whose Foreign Delegation he led. 24th November 1922, he wrote to the TsK of the UPSR in Kyiv announcing that he was laying down his post as a member of the party's Foreign Delegation. In his letter he described the difficult moral and material situation in which he found himself and the

585 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1976, No.1-4, p.129.

586 See Heorhii Kasianov, 'Vlada ta inteligentsiia na Ukraini v roky NEPu', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* Vol.15, 1990, No.2, pp.19-32 (pp.23-4).

587 Vynar, *Syluety*, p.85.

588 Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, p.240.

pain which the numerous attacks and insinuations against him had caused. He condemned on the one hand the Directory, Petliurists and émigré mischief, which 'compromised the Ukraine in the eyes of Europe'. He attacked Shapoval and other members of the UPSR abroad for bringing the party into disrepute, but also the TsK for not sending information or providing a guiding role in order to counter these tendencies. In such conditions, wrote the historian, it was impossible to represent the UPSR any longer. Moreover, the overall line taken by the party came in for condemnation: 'to represent a party, which leads such an apocryphal existence, which does not have a voice, which wavers between cooperation with the Ukrainian SSR and revolt [...], to speak in their name, to enter into relations with other socialist parties is impossible'.⁵⁸⁹

Hrushevskiy's doubts about returning did not last long. In January and February 1923, he told both Kuziv and Faryniak that he hoped to be in the Ukraine soon. This was despite the fact that it is clear from other letters of the same period that his perception of conditions in the Ukraine had not improved. He told Faryniak that the 'independence' of the Ukraine was 'pure irony': the country, gripped by need and famine, was governed by a handful of Bolsheviks who terrorised the population with shootings and arrests. He informed Kuziv that the situation in the Ukraine was very doubtful and that an 'intellectual famine' reigned there.⁵⁹⁰ It is therefore unclear why Hrushevskiy again started writing about returning to the Ukraine. It may well be that he had never abandoned the idea of going back, but rather at the end of 1922 merely lost hope of doing so in the near future. Certainly, at the beginning of 1923 he still felt that work could be conducted in the Ukraine even under the Soviet system and that open confrontation with the Bolsheviks was dangerous. In a letter to Pochynok from 23rd February 1923, he noted with approval the warning made at a meeting of SRs in the Ukraine against a conflict with the Bolshevik government. At this moment, the results of such action would be a restoration of reaction. Therefore, it was necessary to maintain influence among the politically active masses, until that time when the threat of reaction had

589 Zhukovskiy, 'Politychna i Publitsystychna Diialnist M.S. Hrushevskoho', pp.108-9.
 590 M. Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty M. Hrushevskoho do E. Fayniaka', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, 1977, No.1-2, pp.118-31 (p.119); TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.277, 278, 279zv, 281-81zv, 282.

passed and 'an intellectual elevation among the masses, under other, favourable conditions, will guarantee the progressive political activity of the masses'. Until this date, the SRs should undertake political preparation and national-cultural work among the masses, spreading the Socialist Revolutionary ideology.⁵⁹¹

Though Hrushevskiy remained abroad, his comrades from the Foreign Delegation and *Boritesia-poborete!* continued to find their way back to the Ukraine. By April 1923, all of the other members of Hrushevskiy's group of SRs had returned. Khrystiuk was one of the last to do so, leaving Vienna on 10th April.⁵⁹² The following month, the matter of Hrushevskiy's return came up again before the Politburo. On the 23rd, they decided that Rakovskii should resolve the matter with Kvirin.⁵⁹³ Negotiations between Chechel and Rakovskii were renewed. According to the account which Hrushevskiy received from Chechel, in one meeting Rakovskii asked why the historian had not already returned to the Ukraine. Chechel had answered that this was impossible after no reply to the open letter had been received, to which the Communist leader answered that he could not respond because he did not want to enter into a polemic. He also said that Hrushevskiy's 'peasantophilism', that is his overestimation of the role of the peasants in the revolution, was too great. During the meeting, Rakovskii tried to convince Hrushevskiy's former secretary that the Soviet government would follow the new course on nationalities policy firmly.⁵⁹⁴ Indeed, according to Hrushevskiy, Chechel claimed that there was even a chance that Rakovskii would publish a reply to the historian's open letter.⁵⁹⁵ On May 23rd, the matter of the historian's return came up again before the Politburo. It decided that Rakovskii should resolve the matter.⁵⁹⁶

Another product of these talks may have been the letter from the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in May asking Hrushevskiy whether he was

591 Antonovych (ed), 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1969, No.4 pp.85-6.

592 Report by Kaliuzhnyi on the activity of the Soviet Ukrainian mission to Austria from 01.10.1922-01.04.1923, dated 11.04.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.798 ark.6.

593 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 23.05.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.57.

594 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1969, No.4, p.96; Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, pp.125-6.

595 Vynyar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, p.249.

596 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 23.05.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.57.

willing to join the body. Hrushevskiy delayed in giving an answer. This was not merely a sign of his distrust of Bolshevik policy in the Ukraine, though this certainly played a role. His relationship with the Academy had been troubled since its creation in 1918 under Skoropadskiy. He suspected it of possessing a Russian and reactionary character, and he described Ahatanel Krymskiy, who was the Academy's academic secretary, as a dictator. Because of these doubts, Hrushevskiy only gave his consent in August, after he had received the official request from the Academy⁵⁹⁷

Nevertheless, at this time Hrushevskiy was considering alternatives to travelling to Kyiv. Both Kuziv and Faryniak suggested that the historian come to the United States. Hrushevskiy does not seem to have really ever thought about accepting the invitation: he told Kuziv that he would only go to America 'if there was no other way to avoid starving to death'.⁵⁹⁸ Hrushevskiy was also reluctant to return to Galicia, even though he still possessed a cottage near Lviv. He had made clear his conviction that the Poles were thoroughly opposed to Ukrainian national aspirations in *Boritiesia-poborete!* and he doubted that they would allow him back.⁵⁹⁹ He did not trust the Ukrainians in the province either, especially as a result of the developments in Galician politics following the ambassadors' decision of March 1923. Above all, he condemned the attempt led by Volodymyr Bachynskiy to achieve reconciliation with the Poles. As he wrote in July 1923, 'in the region there is fatigue and apathy, a lack of leadership and shameless courtship of the Poles'.⁶⁰⁰

He spent more time thinking over the offer to teach in Prague and Pödebrady which he received at the end of July 1923. The offer originated in the SR circles in Czechoslovakia which dominated the Ukrainian educational institutions there. As is clear from his letters to Oles, Hrushevskiy remained in negotiations with the Ukrainian institutions in Czechoslovakia during the summer and autumn of that year. However, he was sceptical about the opportunity. He did not believe the salary was sufficient. He also felt that he was not being offered the place to carry out academic work, but rather to prevent his

597 Halyna Svarnyk (ed.), *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevskoho do Kyryla Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, Lviv and New York: Kots, 1998, pp.103, 113, 119.

598 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, p.126; TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.17-8.

599 Svarnyk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, p.125.

600 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, p.125.

return to the Ukraine. Most importantly, it is doubtful whether the historian actually saw a move to Prague as a permanent alternative to Kyiv. He told Oles that going to Prague 'would not hinder my return to the Ukraine [...]. But if now the opportunity to leave for the Ukraine soon arises, to go through one more terrible upheaval – to go to Prague, to establish relationships there, and afterwards again to the Ukraine, this is beyond my strength'.⁶⁰¹ In several letters to Studynskiyi, Hrushevskiyi also made it clear that Prague was a second choice, which he would only take if there were difficulties in travelling to the Ukraine.⁶⁰²

The question of finances was an important reason behind Hrushevskiyi's wish to leave Austria, whether it be for Prague or Kyiv. On 21st August, he wrote to Kuziv saying that due to a collapse in the book market he could no longer live from selling his books as he had hoped. He would either have to take up the offer to go to the Czech capital or return to the Ukraine. At the time, he found neither prospect particularly encouraging.⁶⁰³ Despite Hrushevskiyi's determination that he would not be forced to return to the Ukraine through poverty,⁶⁰⁴ the fact that this was such a concern in the months before he accepted the Bolsheviks' offer to go to Kyiv indicates that it undoubtedly played an important part in his decision. Nevertheless, though financial problems may have determined the timing of his return, they had not forced upon him his original stance towards the Bolsheviks. Indeed, his desire to go back had remained almost unbroken since 1920.

The introduction of Ukrainianisation, over the summer of 1923, offers another possible explanation for Hrushevskiyi's return to the Ukraine. However, Hrushevskiyi's assessment of the new course was ambivalent. In August and September, he told Kuziv that the condition of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had not improved, but rather worsened. He criticised the new Soviet policy on the nationalities, saying that ' "Ukrainianisation" might force Jews or Muscovite functionaries to acquire a smattering of the Ukrainian language, but it does

601 Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, pp.254, 257, 259, 261. Both quotations are on p.261.

602 Svarnyk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, pp.114, 129.

603 Hrushevskiyi to Kuziv, 02.01.1923 and 21.07.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.188, 285zv.

604 Hrushevskiyi to Kuziv, 23.11.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.175zv.

not bring gains for Ukrainians!'.⁶⁰⁵ He feared that the basic struggle for everyday existence which the difficult economic circumstances in the Ukraine forced upon the Ukrainian intelligentsia prevented them from taking part in intellectual and spiritual pursuits.⁶⁰⁶ Consequently, at times he was unsure whether he intended to return soon. On 6th August, he told Oles that 'news about "hastened Ukrainianisation" does not really encourage an immediate departure' for the Ukraine.⁶⁰⁷ As Hrushevskiyi himself acknowledged, the collapse of the negotiations between the Foreign Delegation and the Soviet authorities had made him cautious about any claims made by the Bolsheviks.⁶⁰⁸ However, at other times Hrushevskiyi praised those very elements which he criticised in his letter to Kuziv. In July 1923, he told Pochynok that 'Ukrainianisation is running all the same; they did not only declare it: officials really must take up Ukrainian grammar books and dictionaries, which a state publisher is issuing for them. It is necessary to wait in order to judge'.⁶⁰⁹ In other letters, too, Hrushevskiyi indicated that he hoped the Bolsheviks would implement Ukrainianisation firmly and consistently, although he was clearly aware that the policy would remain confined to the cultural sphere. In a letter to Faryniak, for example, he wrote that 'in the Ukraine (and in Russia) the Bolsheviks really seriously care about, or even want, Ukrainianisation if this of course does not weaken the power of their party and the position of those ruling party circles'.⁶¹⁰

The progress of Ukrainianisation was of personal interest to Hrushevskiyi in that it would determine his ability to undertake academic research unhindered. It became intertwined with one of the constant themes of Hrushevskiyi's letters: the question of where he could be of most use to the Ukrainian people. Hrushevskiyi wrote again and again that he wanted to go to

605 Hrushevskiyi to Kuziv, 27.09.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.254. See also the letter from Hrushevskiyi to Kuziv, 21.08.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.250zv.

606 Other examples include the letters from Hrushevskiyi to Kuziv, 14.2.1923, 21.08.1923 and 20.03.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.281, 286zv, 312-3zv.

607 Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, p.254.

608 Svarnyk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, p.99.

609 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1969, No.4, p.96.

610 The quotation is from Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, p.130. See also Svarnyk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, p.114 and the letter from Hrushevskiyi to O.O. Hrushevskya, 26.06.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.1394 ark.36.

the Ukraine in order to continue his *History of the Ukraine-Rus*.⁶¹¹ Whatever reservations he had towards Ukrainianisation, he began to feel that in comparison to the opportunities for this in the emigration, this could only be done in the Ukraine. In October 1923, Hrushevskyyi told Kuziv that he had the impression 'that the process of ruin has not ended there [the Ukraine], and it is useless to start constructive work'. Still, he felt 'although I do not have great hopes to conduct productive work there, for all that it may be necessary to go there soon, because, ultimately, I can no longer do anything here'.⁶¹² A prerequisite to such work was the feeling that it could be done without interference from the Bolsheviks. In a letter to Pochynok from December, after Hrushevskyyi's return had been arranged, he said that though he was expected in the Ukraine, 'I will not hurry – the real opportunity to write freely about anything will not come more quickly. But it will come to this'. In another passage he wrote that though in the worst case the opportunity to work might not be great, it would still exist.⁶¹³ Hrushevskyyi repeatedly claimed, both before the closure of *Boritiesia-poborete!* and after, that only the Ukrainians could give the Soviet Ukraine a genuinely Ukrainian content.⁶¹⁴ By taking up work in Kyiv, he hoped to contribute to this himself.

Despite his censure of the Soviet system, Hrushevskyyi continued to draw the distinction, set out in *Boritiesia-poborete!*, between criticism of the Bolsheviks and opposition to them. In a letter to Pochynok from July 1923, Hrushevskyyi expressly condemned the idea of armed conflict with the Bolsheviks: 'It is necessary in criticising the Bolsheviks, in the struggle with them, not to cross boundaries beyond which an anti-socialist union begins'.⁶¹⁵ The greatest danger was, as Hrushevskyyi told Faryniak in August, that 'in the place of the Bolsheviks comes reactionary Russian monarchism – this is more merciless and hopeless for the Ukraine'.⁶¹⁶ The claims that Hrushevskyyi returned to the Ukraine in order to continue the fight against the Bolsheviks therefore contra-

611 See for example *Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, p.30.

612 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 15.10 1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.286zv.

613 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka z dodatkom dvokh lystivok do D. Ostrovs'koho', *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, 1970, No.1-3, pp.168-83, (pp.176-7).

614 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, pp.129-3; *Boritiesia-poborete!*, No.10, October-December 1921, pp.30-1; Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, p.262.

615 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1969, No.4, p.96.

616 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, p.127.

dict the written records of Hrushevskyy's opinions. In fact, he described Vynnychenko's apparent call to follow this course as 'an extremely unfortunate arousal of interest and suspicion [on the part] of the Bolsheviks towards any returnees'.⁶¹⁷

Hrushevskyy also continued to assert the argument put forward in *Boritesia-poborete!* that it was the duty of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to work with the Bolsheviks because this was the course chosen by the Ukrainian people. In a letter to Faryniak in August 1923, Hrushevskyy wrote that on the basis of the information he had from the Ukraine it was clear that 'neither the peasantry nor the intelligentsia want either a rising or a foreign invasion against the Bolsheviks. They desire much more that the Bolsheviks come to reason, search for genuine ties [...] with the Ukrainian village, with the Ukrainian people, with the Ukrainian intelligentsia'. Those 'who spilled their blood for Ukrainian statehood and regard it seriously feel that, however it may be, the present Soviet Ukraine is all the same a Ukrainian State, if only in name'.⁶¹⁸ The qualification at the end of this quotation shows that even in defending the Soviet system Hrushevskyy could not avoid expressing some of the doubts he felt. Nevertheless, he did defend the regime in the Ukraine.

As 1923 progressed, Hrushevskyy increasingly began to argue that the Bolsheviks were a useful ally against the Ukraine's traditional enemies, the Poles and the Russians. In a letter to Studynskyy from October, he quoted approvingly a Socialist Federalist who claimed that the Bolsheviks had helped the Ukraine by attacking the Great Russian element there.⁶¹⁹ Shortly before hearing that the Bolsheviks had agreed to allow him to return, Hrushevskyy wrote: 'I think that in the given situation, in which I do not foresee imminent change, we can only free the Western Ukraine and defend ourselves from the Muscovite onslaught with the help of the Bolsheviks. Our own forces, on which we should orient ourselves above all, are insufficient for this because we are going through a period of weakness. For this reason, I will try to return to the

617 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1969, No.4, p.98.

618 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, p.127.

619 Svarnyk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, p.125.

Ukraine despite everything'.⁶²⁰ In a letter to Faryniak from December, he expressed the belief that the Soviet Ukraine could become the basis of a genuinely Ukrainian state: 'the immediate task is still to tear the Western Ukrainian lands from Poland and to join them to the Soviet Ukraine. It will come to this. Some think [it will happen] very quickly, [but] I think it is not necessary to hurry. It is necessary to prepare the Great Ukraine and Galicia. It is necessary that there are people in Galicia who are ours, who would be able to take the Soviet regime in their hands, so that it is not occupied by Jews and Poles. It is necessary that the Soviet Ukraine be Ukrainian'.⁶²¹

Thus, there is much contradictory evidence on Hrushevskyyi's perception of the Soviet Ukraine. He was highly critical of the conditions in the country and was scathing of the Bolsheviks and their policies. He still responded to the claims made by the Bolsheviks with great caution: his disappointment at the attempt to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and legalise the UPSR was still strong. However, at the same time he felt that as bad as the Bolsheviks may be, Russian and Entente reaction posed a greater threat to the Ukraine. Hrushevskyyi's awareness of the Bolsheviks' failings did not preclude the hope that the situation might improve and he certainly expressed the opinion that evolution was possible under the Bolsheviks. He did not believe that the Bolsheviks themselves would necessarily bring about the changes – only nationally conscious Ukrainians, such as himself, could do this by taking part in cultural work inside the Ukraine. Hrushevskyyi believed that by again taking up his work on the *History of the Ukraine-Rus* he would be able to contribute to the development of Ukrainian culture himself. In this way, the Soviet Ukraine might be transformed into a truly Ukrainian state.

It is true that in his letters from 1922-4 Hrushevskyyi's justification for his stance towards the Bolsheviks was different to that which he had put forward while he was head of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR: in *Boritesia-poborete!* he had advocated reconciliation with the Bolsheviks for the good of the international socialist revolution; now he spoke of the benefits they brought the Ukraine. In other words, there was a shift in emphasis from the

620 Svarynk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, p.133. The same argument appears in a letter to Faryniak. See Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, pp.129-30.

621 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, p.129.

social to the national. This reflected not only the disappointment following the open letter to Rakovskii, but also a change in circumstances. While Hrushevskiy was editing *Boritiesia-poborete!*, the spread of revolution to Western Europe seemed to be a real possibility. By 1924, this was not the case, but the introduction of Ukrainianisation made it easier to reconcile national goals with acceptance of the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, even after 1921 Hrushevskiy continued to use some of the arguments employed in *Boritiesia-poborete!*. For example, he still felt that it was dangerous to oppose the Bolsheviks as this could bring about a restoration of the Russian monarchy, and that the Ukrainian intelligentsia should follow the direction shown by the Ukrainian people themselves. Moreover, Hrushevskiy's private criticism of the Bolsheviks after 1921 did not in itself represent a marked change in his opinion of the Soviet Ukraine; all the failings referred to in his correspondence had been exposed in the undoubtedly Sovietophile *Boritiesia-poborete!*.

In the Soviet Ukraine itself, the disintegration of the UPSR, which had begun during the revolution with the desertion of the *Borotbisty*, continued. In September 1923, in response to a plenum of the UPSR's Central Committee in July, Chechel, Khrystiuk, Shrah, Zhukovskiy and Volodymyr Zalizniak⁶²² wrote a letter condemning the line taken by the Central Committee of the party. They described the UPSR as having become split between genuine socialists, represented by themselves, and petty bourgeois, nationalist and opportunist groups, which included the Shapovalists and the TsK itself. They declared that their platform was one of decisive struggle with the bourgeoisie in order to achieve a worker-peasant dictatorship and they emphasised the importance of the Ukrainian SSR to this struggle. They called upon the UPSR to protect the republic from the attacks of internal and external counter-revolution and to take an active part in the construction of the Soviet state. Though they admitted that the Soviet Ukraine had made mistakes, they claimed that recently the KP(b)U had taken 'a direction, which in its time the UPSR pointed to and strived towards'. They accused the TsK of holding a position of Menshevism, that is claiming that the time was not right for revolu-

622 Zalizniak, Volodymyr (1895-?): the younger brother of fellow SR Mykola Zalizniak. Between 1918-20, he had been on the staff of the UNR embassy in Vienna. He returned to the Ukraine in 1924, where he worked as a chemist until his arrest in the 1930s. See Surovtsova, *Spohady*, p.390.

tion in Eastern Europe. Those signing the letter therefore declared that they no longer owed any allegiance towards the TsK.⁶²³

With the onset of autumn, rumours about Hrushevskyy's return to the Ukraine began to circulate in the Ukrainian emigration. This especially worried the SRs in Prague, who, despite their disagreements with the historian, still recognised his authority among the Ukrainian national movement, and felt that his return would help legitimise the Soviet regime. In September, they sent a young Socialist Revolutionary, Matvii Stakhiv,⁶²⁴ to visit Hrushevskyy in Austria in order to dissuade him from returning to the Ukraine. In 1976, Stakhiv, who later became an émigré academic, gave an account of this meeting in the article 'Why did M. Hrushevskyy Return to Kyiv in 1924?'. The account is highly unreliable, but it is necessary to take a look at it because it has been referred to by a number of historians.⁶²⁵

Stakhiv claims to have spent a whole day trying to convince the historian not to return to the Ukraine. Hrushevskyy argued that he was returning as a private individual and that his act was apolitical: he only wanted to continue his *History of the Ukraine-Rus*. Stakhiv disputed this so stubbornly that after much discussion the historian changed direction. Hrushevskyy said that the young Ukrainian had strongly shaken his academic reasons for returning. He told him that he would now disclose the main reason for wanting to go back, but only if Stakhiv promised on his word of honour to repeat to no-one this part of the conversation so long as Hrushevskyy himself lived. Hrushevskyy said that the real reason behind his plan was that he believed that a new revolution was about to shake the Ukraine and that he wanted to prepare the ground so that the Ukraine could profit from this. This did not convince the young Ukrainian, who believed that the prerequisites for such a rising did not

623 Open letter to the TsK of the UPSR, 2/3.09.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.62 ark.54-7zv. The quotation is on ark.56.

624 Stakhiv, Matvii (1895-1978): a Galician political organiser and academic. Stakhiv studied at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague after having served in the Ukrainian Galician Army. He returned to Lviv, where he was involved in the anti-Soviet Ukrainian Radical Party. After the Second World War, he settled in the United States, where he became a leading member of the diaspora community there. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.3.

625 Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp.204-5; Frank E. Sysyn, 'Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus*' in Mykhailo Hrushevskyy, *History of Ukraine-Rus*. Volume 1. *From Preshistory to the Eleventh Century*, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1997, pp.xxii-xlii (p.xxxi).

exist. According to Stakhiv, he was able to convince Hrushevskyyi not to travel to Kyiv, but rather to Prague. When he heard that the historian had in fact returned to the Ukraine, Stakhiv assumed that the historian had done so because he had received secret information from the Masons that the revolution referred to by Hrushevskyyi was about to take place.⁶²⁶

Stakhiv wrote the article with the clear intention of refuting the charge that Hrushevskyyi was pro-Soviet,⁶²⁷ and it is surprising that a number of historians have accepted Stakhiv's account so uncritically. There does not seem to be any other written evidence supporting Stakhiv's description of Hrushevskyyi's aims; quite the contrary, the historian explicitly ruled out taking such a course of action in his letters from the period. In fact, if we really take Stakhiv at his word, he persuaded Hrushevskyyi that one should not return in the hope of a further revolution. Even if the conversation did go exactly as Stakhiv claims it did, one might be tempted to think that Hrushevskyyi was prepared to say anything to end a tiresome meeting with a dogged interlocutor.

The renunciation of the UPSR by Hrushevskyyi's former colleagues may have helped clear the way for a positive decision by the Bolshevik leadership. On 2nd November, 1923 the KP(b)U's Politburo finally agreed to allow him back into the country. Twelve days later it sent a letter to Levytskyi informing him of the decision and asking him to pass on the news to the historian. Though Hrushevskyyi had already consented to submit his candidature for the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in August, it was this Politburo resolution which at last settled the issue of where he would go. On the 23rd, Hrushevskyyi told Kuziv that the matter of his return had in principle been decided, although the questions of 'how' and 'when' remained yet to be resolved. Three weeks later, the historian wrote again, this time claiming that he expected to leave after 20th January.⁶²⁸ By this stage, the negotiations with Prague and Po-debrady had finally broken down. One reason was the failure of the Ukrainians in Prague to finance his move to the Czech capital. Hrushevskyyi had also

626 Stakhiv, 'Chomu M. Hrushevskyyi povernuvsia?', pp.131-44.

627 See for example his article 'Diaki dokumenty pro diialnist Hrushevskoho' in the same volume.

628 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 02.11.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.135zv; letter to Levytskyi from Kharkiv, 14.11.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.69; Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 23.11.1923 and 14.12.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.267zv, 268zv; Svarynk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, p.119

been told that the sociology course which he should have taught was to be postponed for a year, which confirmed his fears that the offer was of a political and not an academic nature.⁶²⁹

Even after hearing of the Politburo's decision, Hrushevskyyi displayed a certain degree of ambivalence in his stance towards the Bolsheviks. In his letters to Pochynok and Faryniak, who criticised his decision to return because they feared it would help legitimise the Soviet regime, he robustly defended his choice.⁶³⁰ However, in a letter to Oles, he wrote that he could not advise anyone to travel there until he had seen conditions in the Ukraine for himself. It was not a question of whether one should trust the Bolsheviks, as it was doubtful that so foreign an element would take care of the Ukraine. Rather, it was a question of where one could be useful.⁶³¹ Oles, too, was at that time considering going back. It is perhaps natural that Hrushevskyyi was more willing to share his doubts with someone who was considering taking the same step as himself. Nor should it be any surprise that Hrushevskyyi was uncertain about his fate. He had headed a government which had been at war with the Bolsheviks and did not know how he would be treated when he went back. For this reason he requested, and received, a letter granting immunity from persecution from the Ukrainian government.⁶³² This uncertainty perhaps explains many of the contradictions which appeared in Hrushevskyyi's correspondence. However, one should not confuse such doubts with opposition to the regime in the Ukraine.

The return to Kyiv must have required considerable practical organisation, for Hrushevskyyi did not leave Vienna until 2nd March. Five days later he arrived in the Ukrainian capital. From Kyiv he wrote several more letters which give an insight into his reasons for his decision. He had not ceased to criticise the limitations of Ukrainianisation. On 20th March, he told Kuziv that the theatre, books and concerts were all inaccessible to the Ukrainian intelligentsia.⁶³³

629 Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, p.262. See also Svarnyk (ed.), *Lysty do Studynskoho (1894-1932rr.)*, p.135, where Hrushevskyyi expressed the fear that the Shapoval group would use his arrival in Prague for their political ends.

630 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1970, No.1-3, pp.176-7; id., 'Lysty do Faryniaka', 1977, No.1-2, pp.129-30.

631 Vynar (ed.), *Lystuvannia*, p.262.

632 Plokhyy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p.228.

633 Hrushevskyyi to Kuziv, 20.03.1923, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.266 ark.312zv.

However, he continued to believe that even in these reduced conditions, he was more useful to the Ukrainian people in the Ukraine. In September 1924, he penned a furious reply to a letter from Pochynok, in which the bookseller had accused Hrushevskiyi of giving in to the Bolsheviks for material gain and rubbished his desire to conduct cultural work in the Ukraine. Hrushevskiyi responded that he had devoted forty years of his life to such cultural work, and that during this time 'our misfortune was that political opportunities closed before firm cultural national foundations were created. You rightly complain of the lack of national consciousness among the emigrants from the Ukraine. But what can give them that consciousness if not cultural work!'.⁶³⁴ He saw the Soviet Ukraine not as the completion of state-building, but rather a point in the process of achieving Ukrainian statehood. Indeed, he went as far as to present it as an heir to the UNR, which had been the first stage in this national construction. 'Here, despite all the defects', he wrote, 'I feel that I am in the Ukrainian Republic which we began to build in 1917, and I expect that with time the defects will iron out and it will unite those Ukrainian lands which at present remain beyond its borders'.⁶³⁵

The departure of Hrushevskiyi and his colleagues, who had been based in Austria, from the emigration left Prague as the main émigré centre for Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries. They were organised within the Foreign Committee of the UPSR and led by Mykyta Shapoval, Hrushevskiyi's main opponent in the debates over the Soviet Ukraine. The Foreign Committee took a decidedly anti-Soviet line; in a resolution from July 1922 it damned the Soviet government in the Ukraine as an occupying regime and condemned the return of members of the Foreign Delegation, saying that 'the Foreign Delegation, in returning to the Ukraine not only renounces the party programme, but also political work in general'.⁶³⁶ Shapoval and his colleagues propagated their views in the journal *Nova Ukraina* and controlled the Ukrainian educational institutions which had been created in Czechoslovakia with support of the government in Prague.⁶³⁷

634 Antonovych, 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1970, No.1-3, p.181.

635 Antonovych (ed.), 'Lysty do Pochynka', 1970, No.1-3, p.182.

636 Troshchynskiyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, p.121.

637 For more on Shapoval and his wing of the UPSR see Troshchynskiyi, *Mizhvoienna Ukrainska emihratsiia*, pp.121-30 and *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy*, pp.190-200.

However, the debate within the UPSR abroad about the Soviet system did not end with Hrushevskiy's departure. The apparent successes of Ukrainianisation had an impact on the émigré Socialist Revolutionaries and by the middle of 1925 Shapoval's leadership of the Prague SRs and his stance towards the Soviet Ukraine was being challenged. In particular, a certain Pyrkhavko started meeting the Soviet Ukrainian representative in the Soviet mission in Prague Antin Prykhodko. Pyrkhavko was excluded from the party in July 1925 for spreading 'zminovikhovskiy' propaganda. With other Socialist Revolutionaries he formed a Sovietophile circle. Over the next two years, more and more Socialist Revolutionaries defected to this group; in his diary, Shapoval gave a list of these: Sumnevych, Kovhan, Postolovskiy,⁶³⁸ Tymchenko, Rudenko, Ivanenko and Oleksander Mytsiuk.⁶³⁹

Another SR to split with Shapoval was Dmytro Isaievych, who with Hrushevskiy had taken part in the meetings of the Second International. In September 1927, the Sovietophile paper in Paris *Ukrainski visti* published an open letter from Isaievych in which he explained his new stance on the Soviet Ukraine. He wrote that his refusal to join the left (i.e. pro-Soviet) SRs earlier was not due to differences in political opinion, but rather because he felt that the Soviet regime had disregarded the national factor. However, the development of Ukrainianisation in the Soviet Union had convinced him that this was no longer the case. 'In this moment', he concluded, 'convinced socialists, and in particular Ukrainian socialists, cannot renounce their great social obligation and have to stand on the side of the defenders of the threatened social-proletarian republic'.⁶⁴⁰ The Soviet Ukrainian emissary to Czechoslovakia Antin Prykhodko described the new mood among the émigré Socialist Revolutionaries in a similar way: 'The majority of Ukrainian SRs have to a great degree moved away from their basic program, although they still have not fully arrived at Marxism. According to the declaration of the local leadership of the Ukrainian SRs, they all already support Soviet power and many even accept the Communist platform. They only diverge from the Communists on the

638 Possibly Antin Postolovskiy (1889-1990), who was a secretary of the Central Rada in 1917. V. Verstiuk and T. Ostashko, *Diachi Ukrainskoi Tsentralnoi Rady*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, pp.151-2.

639 Shapoval, *Shchodennyk II*, pp.8, 12, 18, 37, 48.

640 *Ukrainski visti*, No.45, 10 September 1927, p.3.

national question. But in their opinion these divergences are also gradually decreasing in connection with the U[krainian] S[ocialist] S[oviet] R[epublic]'s firm course on Ukrainianisation'.⁶⁴¹

Conclusion

The introduction to this chapter stated that the relationship of Hrushevskyi and the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR with the Bolsheviks must be understood as a continuation and development of the Ukrainian populist tradition. This can be most clearly seen in the journal *Boritiesia-poborete!*, which stressed many of the elements of the populists' thought: an enthusiasm for the 'people', the need for a joint national and social revolution, the realisation of Ukrainian national aspirations within a federation with Russia and the creation of a decentralised form of government. At the end of the nineteenth century, Drahomanov, who was highly critical of Russian socialism, had advised Ukrainians to cooperate with the Russian Social Democrats in the name of the struggle against tsarist absolutism,⁶⁴² similarly, Hrushevskyi and his colleagues argued that one should side with the Bolsheviks for the sake of the world revolution, despite their terrible errors in the Ukraine. At the same time, the Foreign Delegation also sought to redefine populism in such a way as to prove that its logical conclusion was support for the Third International, for example by claiming that the fate of the Ukrainian people would be decided by the international socialist revolution. These ideas were especially appropriate for the period of the Polish-Soviet war, for the conflict promised to resolve both the national and socialist goals of the Foreign Delegation: as the Red Army advanced into Galicia it seemed that the Western Ukrainian lands could be unified with the Soviet Ukraine, and that the revolution would be spread to the rest of Europe.

Hrushevskyi travelled to the Ukraine later than the other members of the Delegation, by which time the political aims set out in *Boritiesia-poborete!* were no longer feasible. In his letters Hrushevskyi clearly stated that he hoped to return in order to continue writing his history of the Ukraine. In Vi-

641 Report by Antin Prykhodko on the period 1st October to 20th December 1925, written 16.05.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1986 ark.195.

642 Rudnytsky, 'Drahomanov as a Political Theorist', p.234.

enna he could not support himself and his family materially, let alone conduct academic research. However, Hrushevskyyi's return should not be seen as an apolitical act. Hrushevskyyi saw his historical writing as a contribution to the development of the Ukrainian national consciousness, which alone could provide the foundation upon the Ukrainian Soviet republic could be transformed into a genuinely Ukrainian state. For this reason, he placed such importance on cultural work. Secondly, a prerequisite to Hrushevskyyi's return was the belief that it was possible to undertake his research within the framework of the Soviet system. Hrushevskyyi often expressed his doubts about the new policy of Ukrainianisation and was very sceptical of the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, he saw the alternatives as worse, and indeed believed that with time the situation in the Ukraine could improve. Any improvements, he argued could only be achieved through the active participation of nationally aware Ukrainians. Of course, Hrushevskyyi still feared the possible consequences of his return and was not certain whether the Soviet Ukraine really would change for the better. This was only natural given his past relationship with the party ruling the Ukraine. However, he still saw it as his duty to make the attempt. Most importantly, there are no written sources which support the claim that he hoped to form a sort of cultural underground, aimed at the downfall of the Soviet state. It is an émigré misconception that an effort to strengthen Ukrainian national consciousness automatically meant opposition to the Bolsheviks. In fact, Hrushevskyyi explicitly warned against any attempts to try to destroy the Ukrainian SSR.

Once they had returned to their homeland, Hrushevskyyi and his colleagues put this programme of cooperation and reconstruction into practice. Hrushevskyyi became head of the Archeographic Commission of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and professor of modern Ukrainian history. The other members of the delegation took on academic and administrative posts within the Soviet Ukraine's universities and bureaucracy. In this way, they were able to contribute to the implementation of Ukrainianisation. However, when the Bolsheviks started to reconsider the efficacy of the policy, they became the first victims of the purges against the supporters of Ukrainianisation. Hrushevskyyi was forced into exile in Moscow after a state-orchestrated

campaign to discredit him.⁶⁴³ The other SR returnees were implicated in fictitious plots against the Soviet Union; they were all imprisoned or shot. The only exception was Mykola Shrah, who was released shortly after his conviction for 'belonging' to the imaginary Ukrainian National Centre, perhaps on account of his older brother's contacts with the OGPU. Shrah wrote a doctoral thesis in economics and taught in a number of Soviet universities. He lived until 1970.⁶⁴⁴ In this sense he was lucky; none of his comrades from the Foreign Delegation survived the 1930s.

643 Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp.264-77; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp.227-246.

644 T. Demchenko and H. Kurbas, 'Netypova dolia Mykoly Shraha', *Problemy istorii Ukrainy*, 2004, No.12, pp.389-399 (pp.395-7).

5 The Change of Signposts in the Ukrainian Emigration

When the groups led by Vynnychenko and Hrushevskiy first appeared at the end of 1919, the Soviet Ukraine lacked a diplomatic apparatus to respond to the new orientation; not until March 1921 was a trade mission set up in Prague under Mykhailo Levytskyi. This was almost half a year after *Nova doba* had begun its campaign against the Soviet system and seven months after the appearance of the first issue of *Boritiesia-poborete!*. The other missions appeared even later, in Germany in September 1921 under Volodymyr Aussem, in Poland in October under Oleksander Shumskiy and in Austria in December under Iurii Kotsiubynskiy. Consequently, the Soviet authorities only came to discuss the formulation of a general policy towards the Sovietophile tendency in 1922, by which stage neither Vynnychenko nor Hrushevskiy were openly advocating reconciliation with the Soviet regime. Therefore, Vynnychenko and Hrushevskiy were barely mentioned in the debate on the Soviet response to Sovietophilism. In October 1922, M. Levytskyi explained why: 'Hrushevskiy remains completely alone. The current of Vynnychenko is now tied to Shapoval'.⁶⁴⁵ Rather, the Soviet authorities developed their policy towards Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* in response to the appearance of other factions in the Ukrainian emigration. This chapter will describe these groups and present the Soviet response.

The Growth of *Smenovekhovstvo* in Berlin

A Change of Signposts in the Ukrainian emigration was first noticed in Berlin at the end of 1921 and the beginning of 1922. According to a report drawn up by the German mission, from early 1922 disillusionment with Petliura was prompting many émigrés either to turn to Skoropadskiy or to seek reconciliation with the Soviet regime. This included the rank and file of the emigration, that is workers in the UNR embassy, students, who had set up a pro-Soviet Drahomanov society, and even members of the officers' associations. They,

645 Minutes of the Orgbiuro KP(b)U, 06.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.7 spr.20 ark.36.

said the report, 'underlined their partylessness and intention to work in the Ukraine, as if they are mice who anticipate the rocking of the boat'. It was not only among the lower echelons of the Ukrainian emigration that a change in direction was taking place. From July 1921, Roman Smal-Stotskyi, the head of the UNR embassy in Germany, had been making diplomatic advances to Aussem, the Soviet representative in Berlin, through Mykola Porsh and Baranovskyi,⁶⁴⁶ who both worked in the UNR's embassy. Negotiations did not take place, however, as Aussem would only talk to Smal-Stotskyi if the UNR ambassador appeared in the Soviet mission with concrete proposals, whereas the UNR representatives preferred to meet on neutral ground. The Soviet representatives saw Smal-Stotskyi's aims as two-fold: on the one hand to preserve his position whatever political eruptions took place, and on the other to demonstrate to the Germans the unity of all Ukrainians from the Hetmanites to the Bolsheviks.⁶⁴⁷

The overtures from Smal-Stotskyi also continued into the next year. In February 1922, Aussem wrote that Volodymyr Temnytskyi, a member of the Central Committee of the Galician Social Democrats, had visited him. He had just returned from Moscow, where he had talked to Comintern. Temnytskyi discussed with Aussem the work of bringing about the dissolution of the emigration. He suggested to the Soviet representative that a group be formed in order to publish a journal similar to the Russian *Smena vekh*. Temnytskyi eventually admitted that he had come on behalf of Smal-Stotskyi and Baranovskyi and that they still wanted to come to an agreement with the Soviet representative. Aussem turned this down, pointing out that the demands of the UNR ambassador were not new, 'but in general it was possible to talk'. However, the Soviet plenipotentiary did say his government had nothing against a journal and that it would give some money, 'but it is necessary to know names and the conditions of control'.⁶⁴⁸

646 Possibly Khrystofor Baranovskyi, a leader of the cooperative movement in the Ukraine before the First World War, and secretary of finance in two Ukrainian governments during the revolutionary period. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.176.

647 Report by the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Germany, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.24zv-25zv.

648 Report by Aussem sent to Rakovskii, 22.02.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.549 ark.21. According to the East Galician Social Democrat Antin Chernetskyi, during his visit to the Soviet Republics Temnytskyi also met Rakovskii, who promised aid to the

In response to Smal-Stotskyi's attempts to create a united Ukrainian front in Berlin, Aussem, who refused to take part in such a plan, gathered around him 'the flower of the intelligentsia', including the poet Oles, Nataliia Doroshenka,⁶⁴⁹ some 'partyless' members of the intelligentsia and Porsh. Oles was considered to be a good catch for the Soviet regime as his cooperation was thought to impress the rest of the emigration. The Berlin mission believed that Oles 'fears that as a *poet* he will fall behind that [which has taken place] already in the Ukraine, [and] he wants [to make] preparations towards returning there'.⁶⁵⁰ At the end of 1919, Oles had founded the leftwing journal *Na perelomi* (At the Turning Point) with the radical Galician writer Antin Krushelnytskyi, who himself came to adopt a pro-Soviet position.⁶⁵¹ The tone of the publication was generally anti-Bolshevik; Krushelnytskyi described the Bolsheviks as opponents of Ukrainian statehood.⁶⁵² However, there were also more positive tones in the paper. One report described how 'people who have arrived from Kyiv have described the Bolsheviks' very favourable stance towards Ukrainians'.⁶⁵³

Porsh had first come into contact with the Soviet mission as an emissary from Smal-Stotskyi. However, he became increasingly pro-Soviet and started conducting negotiations with the Soviet plenipotentiary on his own account. Porsh approached Aussem with a proposal to win over collaborators for work with the Soviet embassy. In order to prove his loyalty, he made a speech at a student meeting in January 1921 calling on the émigrés to end their adventures by returning to the Ukraine, recognising the Soviet regime and cooperating with it. He stressed that the risings taking place in the Ukraine and Russia were part of a plan by the Entente to gain control of the raw materials in the two countries. According to the Soviet representative, the speech was

Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in Galicia. See Antin Chernetskyi, *Spomyny z moho zhyttia*, London: Nashe Slovo, 1964, p.60.

649 Doroshenka, Nataliia (1888-1970): the wife of Dmytro Doroshenko – editor of the Hetmanite paper *Ukrainske slovo*, an actress and prominent figure in Ukrainian theatre. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.746.

650 Report by the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Germany, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.25zv.

651 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, p.45.

652 *Na perelomi*, March 1920, No.3, p.10.

653 *Na perelomi*, March 1920, No.3, p.52.

well received by the student audience, although most of the questions were hostile.⁶⁵⁴

The inclusion of the wife of Dmytro Doroshenko among the circle of Sovietophile intellectuals is extremely interesting. Doroshenko was a conservative and supporter of the Hetman. However, it is quite possible that the position taken by Doroshenko's wife was not simply an expression of intra-marital political differences. According to the Berlin mission, the Hetmanite organ, *Ukrainske slovo*, had turned to them, asking for information. He wrote that naturally the Soviet mission had not replied, but that if it turned out to be necessary to provide them with materials, it would be possible to do so through other channels.⁶⁵⁵ By March 1922, rumours that Dmytro Doroshenko had applied to return to the Ukraine were rife among the Ukrainian emigration. Aussem told Kharkiv that Doroshenko had indeed approached the Soviet representative 'through the back door'. Petro Diatliv, a former member of Vynnychenko's Foreign Group of the UKP, had been acting as an intermediary between Doroshenko and the Soviet mission. Diatliv had 'seriously been ready to accept the declaration by Doroshenko of his sympathy to us'. However, due to the 'talkativeness and naïve credulity' of Diatliv this had become public, giving rise to the rumours about Doroshenko's intentions and ending the discussions. Of course it is possible that Aussem overestimated Doroshenko's willingness to reconcile himself to the new regime, and without looking at Doroshenko's own account we do not know what his aims were. Nevertheless, it does raise the possibility that émigrés on the right were considering return to their county, if only due to homesickness.

Not only was Doroshenko scared off. Other émigrés who had approached Aussem tried to distance themselves from the Soviets as a result. For example, a certain Vasylo⁶⁵⁶ had made overtures to the Soviet mission and had received a cold response from Aussem. Later, in order to cover up his own

654 Report by the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Germany, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.24zv-25. An account of Porsh's speech by a Soviet agent attending the meeting is on ark.26.

655 Report by the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Germany, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.25-25zv.

656 Possibly Mykola Vasylo, the diplomatic representative of ZUNR in Austria 1918-19 and UNR representative in Switzerland and Germany 1919-1924. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.564.

willingness to reconcile with the Soviets, Vasylo had given an interview in a German paper in which he claimed that Petliura himself had been ready to serve the Bolsheviks. This had caused such an uproar among the emigration with accusations of Soviet lies and provocation that the plenipotentiary in Berlin had felt it necessary to refrain from open statements for some time.⁶⁵⁷ The incident is a reminder that allegations of collaboration with the Bolsheviks were rife in the emigration because they were an effective means of discrediting political opponents: the historian of Ukrainian Sovietophilism must therefore treat them with great caution. Equally, it demonstrates that the Soviet missions' attempts to win over members of the emigration could easily fail if they became public. Indeed, when the Bolsheviks did start considering the organisation of pro-Soviet groups in the emigration, they explicitly stated that this should be done in such a way that the émigrés could not later renounce their position.

These reports did not lead to the formulation by Kharkiv of a general policy towards the Ukrainians who wanted to return. In a letter from July 1922, Aussem wrote that the mission in Berlin had received no guidance in the matter and therefore it had maintained contacts with the emigration on its own initiative. According to Aussem, the other foreign representatives had responded coolly to the proposal of forming a Ukrainian Sovietophile publication. Iurii Kotsiubynskyi had turned the idea down and Oleksander Shumskyi had claimed that 'in the Ukrainian emigration not only is there no Change of Signpost, but it is also impossible'.⁶⁵⁸ As we will see, Shumskyi later rephrased his position on Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*. Nevertheless, clearly at the end of 1921 and the beginning of 1922 most of those working in the Soviet Ukrainian foreign service were not interested in using the emerging movement. Even the report sent by Berlin in January 1922 was sceptical of the usefulness of the pro-Soviet tendency. On the one hand, it stressed that 'the emigration is at present experiencing a turning-point, [and] feels itself to be at a crossroads'. The report argued that it was necessary to 'assist its speedy dissolution and coming over to us'. However, it was against general actions 'because the majority are scum, of little use for us'. The overall aim

657 Report by Aussem, 24.03.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.8.

658 Aussem to the TsK KP(b)U, 07.07.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.152.

was to 'draw over the healthy elements voluntarily, one-by-one and prepare [them] for dispatch to the Ukraine'.⁶⁵⁹

Therefore, in addition to those who actually returned to the Ukraine, there were many different groups which were interested in establishing contacts with the Soviet missions abroad; by no means all of these were Sovietophile. Smal-Stotskyi, for example, may well have been trying to organise a common front of all Ukrainian institutions abroad. Moreover, some of those in Berlin who moved towards the Bolsheviks later recanted. Both Porsh⁶⁶⁰ and Oles⁶⁶¹ applied to return to the Ukraine and were given permission by the Politburo of the KP(b)U to do so; neither in fact went back, despite the fact that Porsh had made public statements in favour of returning and Oles had sought funding from the Soviet missions.⁶⁶² In the early 1920s, a certain level of ideological indeterminacy seems to have existed during which figures, such as Porsh, Doroshenko and Smal-Stotskyi, who later became definite opponents of the Soviet system, were able to consider cooperation at some level with their enemies from the revolution and civil war. Following the polarisation which took place in the Ukrainian emigration, this became increasingly difficult.

The Ukrainian National Committee

Another group which appeared in 1922 was the Ukrainian National Committee in Paris led by S. Morkotun. In May 1922, Morkotun turned to Rakovskii with two letters in which he set out the political stance of the group and their proposal for cooperation with the Soviet regime. The committee claimed to believe that the Ukraine's national interest lay in a federation between Russia and the Ukraine, whatever the social programme of the ruling government. Only by guaranteeing international recognition of Russia's sovereign rights could the stability of the international order be achieved. They condemned all intervention by foreign powers and any attempt to tear the Ukraine away from Russia, pointing to the damage wrought upon the country by Petliura in con-

659 Report by the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Germany, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.25zv.

660 Minutes and materials of the Politburo KP(b)U, 05.01.1923 and 30.01.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.1, 13zv; spr.44 ark.1-2; the Ukrainian representative in Germany to the TsIK, undated, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.216.

661 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 06.03.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.58 ark.29zv.

662 Prykhodko to Maksymovych, 17.09.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.254.

tinuing the civil war. They stressed the need for closer links between France and what they called the 'Russian-Ukrainian federation'. The group proposed that it work to facilitate this rapprochement. Unlike left-wing Sovietophiles such as Hrushevskiy or Vynnychenko, for the Ukrainian National Committee federation was a goal in itself because it continued the link with Russia: it claimed that 'the recognition of the existing Soviet Ukrainian government as the government of the Ukraine is the only means of guaranteeing in international relations the inviolability of the links uniting the free republics entering into the Russian federation and in particular of protecting the national interests of the Ukraine, entering into that federation'.⁶⁶³ Thus, on the basis of these letters at least, one might characterise the position of the Committee as a Little Russian version of the *Smena vekh* group. Considering the fact that reports from the Soviet secret police, the GPU, claimed that Morkotun had served the Provisional Government, Skoropadskiy, Denikin and Wrangel, the Little Russian epithet does not seem misplaced. Indeed, the Committee's goal of achieving international recognition for the new Russian government was identical to one of the major interests of the *Smena vekh* group and of Kliuchnikov in particular.

Rakovskii did respond to the letters. As his replies show, he was especially interested by the idea of establishing financial and commercial links with France, and expressed his willingness to work with the group. He suggested that it send representatives to the Ukraine for discussions and guaranteed their safety on arrival in the Ukraine.⁶⁶⁴ Rakovskii's almost instantaneous offer of freedom of movement seems extremely generous, especially given the fact that only a month later the Politburo was stressing the undesirability of allowing Sovietophiles to come to the Ukraine, saying that any negotiations must be conducted abroad.⁶⁶⁵ This may reflect the importance attached to the issue of international recognition. Alternatively, it might be an indication of the fact that there was as yet no clear line on how to handle pro-Soviet groups in the Ukrainian emigration.

663 Morkotun to Rakovskii, 03.05.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.5.

664 Rakovskii to Morkotun, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.9, 14.

665 Manuil'skiy to Kotsiubyn'skiy, Aussem, M. Levytskiy and Shum'skiy, 27.06.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.148; minutes of a meeting between Manuil'skiy and Kotsiubyn'skiy, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.149.

Between May and August 1922, Morkotun wrote a number of letters to Rakovskii in which he gave the impression of great activity while managing to keep the details of this work shrouded in a veil of vagueness. Despite the lack of particulars, Morkotun remained positive, whether it be describing the receptivity of French financial circles to the idea of commercial links with the Ukraine, or assessing the chances of using his supposed contacts in the French Ministry of War to counter the interventionist elements in the French government.⁶⁶⁶ Morkotun was not shy in advising the leader of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic on how to conduct foreign affairs, outlining for example the three principles on which Russian policy should be based at the Hague conference. One of these was the recognition of Russia's foreign debts,⁶⁶⁷ a policy which the Soviet government had no intention of following. Morkotun was not always very adept at predicting the desires of the Soviet regime.

After the first two letters, Rakovskii's direct correspondence with Morkotun seems to have ended, and the Soviet links with the Ukrainian National Committee were maintained through the Ukrainian plenipotentiary in Berlin. However, Morkotun continued to address himself to Rakovskii, and tried to impress on Aussem the necessity of personal contacts between the Ukrainian National Committee and the leader of the Soviet Republic.⁶⁶⁸ Morkotun certainly hoped to expand his role in the Ukrainian SSR's foreign policy. On 31st July, he wrote to Rakovskii saying that Mykhailo Levytskyi, the representative in Prague who at that time was standing in for Aussem in Berlin, had suggested that the Ukrainian National Committee set up a branch in Prague which would be responsible for the Sovietophile paper which the Bolsheviks hoped to publish there.⁶⁶⁹ Levytskyi, who passed the letter on to Rakovskii, commented that he had by no means suggested that the Ukrainian National Committee take control of the publication, but had only mentioned the new journal to Morkotun as an example which he could use in France of an Entente-friendly country cooperating with the Soviet Union. Levytskyi pointed out that Morkotun's political direction was entirely out of place in left-wing Prague,

666 Morkotun to Rakovskii, 25.05.1922, 15.06.1922, undated and 31.07.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.18, 21, 23, 62-62zv.

667 Morkotun to Rakovskii, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.23.

668 Morkotun to Aussem, 20.06.1922, 02.07.1922 and 15.06.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.29, 51-51zv, 123.

669 Morkotun to Rakovskii, 31.07.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.62-62zv.

and that if he moved his organisation, it would underline its own weakness to the Entente.⁶⁷⁰

There were plenty of GPU reports to back up Levytskyi's reservations about Morkotun and the Ukrainian National Committee. Although some of the lurid details differed, the reports gave a similar picture. Morkotun had worked in succession for the Provisional Government, Skoropadskiy, Petliura, Denikin and Wrangel. He had been involved in a number of scandals and had been publicly disowned by Petliura. 'In general', concluded one of the documents on the Ukrainian National Committee, 'Morkotun tries to play a risk-free game, working for all at the same time and assuring each side: "I act on YOUR command" '. A further characteristic was his capacity for exaggerating the importance of his activities. He had set up, for example, a number of parties, one which turned out to have no members; another had only enough supporters to fit into the back of a taxi. One report thought that Morkotun was working for the French Foreign Ministry, another for the White Movement. Yet one more described the Ukrainian National Committee as an invention of the Russian embassy in Paris created with the aim of bringing about the disintegration of the Ukrainian emigration; not one member actually spoke Ukrainian as his native language. The Ukrainian National Committee only had a handful of other members and their reputation was not much better than that of the body's chairman. One, a certain Tsyteovich, had managed to obtain 5,000 francs from a Russian lady in the guise of 'Prince Tsyteovich Shapanovskii'. According to the GPU, all of Morkotun's collaborators were either officers or had been officials in Skoropadskiy's government. The Soviet representative in Berlin was also suspicious of the Ukrainian National Committee. Aussem felt that Morkotun had a tendency to meddle in affairs which had nothing to do with him and suggested to Rakovskii that the activities of the group should be better regulated.⁶⁷¹

Certainly, the self-important tone of Morkotun's letters seems to back up some of the information which the GPU reports provided about him. His

670 M. Levytskyi to Rakovskii, 04.08.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.63-4.

671 GPU reports, 16.06.1922 and 09.08.1922 TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.26, 70-1; Aussem to Rakovskii, 10.10.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.75; report from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 30.06.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.94. The quotation is on ark.94.

clumsy attempt to go behind Levytskyi's back by suggesting his group should be responsible for the Soviet Ukraine's Sovietophile journal is perhaps the most obvious example of his attempt to aggrandise drops of influence. However, Rakovskii still found it useful to maintain relations with the group. He passed Morkotun's as usual immodest report on his activities at the Lausanne Conference on to Stalin and Chicherin with the comment that it contained some interesting information about the French position.⁶⁷² Although, given the other information about the Ukrainian National Committee, it is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the group's Change of Signposts, it is interesting to note that one GPU report did believe it to be a genuine organisation of the Ukrainian emigration, which offered a 'Russian solution' to the Ukrainian question.⁶⁷³

The Ukrainian National Committee seems to have met an end as ignominious as the rest its career. On 29th March 1923, the Ukrainian National Committee wrote to Aussem that it had expelled Morkotun and that the three remaining members, Navashin, Tsytevich and Marinovich, had disbanded the Committee.⁶⁷⁴ On 16th May, Morkotun wrote to Aussem saying in fact it had been Navashin, Tsytevich and Marinovich who had been expelled, and that the Committee was still functioning.⁶⁷⁵ Navashin later poked fun at the idea of having been expelled from a committee which no longer existed,⁶⁷⁶ and he seems to have been right, for this spelled the end of the relationship between the Ukrainian SSR and the Ukrainian National Committee. In May and April, he turned to the missions in Prague and Vienna in a vain attempt to obtain permission to travel to the Ukraine.⁶⁷⁷ The file on Morkotun and the Ukrainian National Committee does not give any indication of the Soviet response, although it is unlikely that it would have been keen on allowing such an obvious adventurer into the country. Certainly, the Soviet government made use of the relationship for the purposes of propaganda, producing a number of articles in

672 Morkotun to Rakovskii, 26.02.1923, and from Rakovskii to Chicherin, 08.05.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.76-77zv, 81-81zv.

673 Report by M. Levytskyi, 19.05.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.57.

674 The Ukrainian National Committee to Aussem, 20.03.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.86.

675 The Ukrainian National Committee, 16.05.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.93.

676 Extract from a letter from D.S. Navashin, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.96.

677 Report by M. Levytskyi, 19.05.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.89; Soviet mission in Vienna to Aussem, 27.04.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.166.

which the Ukrainian National Committee was portrayed as an intermediary of the French government and the negotiations were used as a sign of France's willingness to reconsider its refusal to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Extracts from Morkotun's letters were published as evidence of the relationship.⁶⁷⁸

The Amnesty for Interned Petliurists

The restoration of diplomatic contacts with the rest of Europe was only one goal of Soviet Ukrainian foreign policy in this period. A second, equally important, aim was to neutralise the threat supposedly represented by the Ukrainian military organisations which were held in internment camps in Poland.

Following the declaration of a truce between the Poles and Bolsheviks in October 1920, the Ukrainian and Russian forces which had fought alongside the Poles in their war against the Bolsheviks were ordered to leave Polish territory. The UNR army crossed into Podolia, but were soon forced to retreat back into Poland by the Red Army. At the border the Polish authorities disarmed the Ukrainians and sent them to internment camps. Many Ukrainians feared internment and escaped to the Soviet side of the river Zbruch or deserted. According to Polish military sources, most of these were Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia. Among those left, accommodation had to be found for about 15,500 Ukrainian soldiers. The only solution was to place them in the camps which had been set up for the POWs from the First World War returning to the Soviet republics from Germany and for those captured during the Polish-Soviet war. Ukrainians were sent to camps in Wadowice, Łańcut, Pikułice Kalisz, Aleksandrów Kujawski, Częstochowa and Piotrków Trybunalski. Between May and October 1921, they were moved to three camps: Strzałków, Kalisz and Szczygiorno. Conditions in the camps were difficult and the reorganisation of the internees created even greater problems. Food supplies were sometimes delayed and there was a shortage of fuel. Many of the camps were not equipped to withstand the Polish winter – in some the internees slept in dugouts filled with water; there was a shortage of doors and windows, and the roofs leaked. There were also few opportunities for the intern-

678 Typed copies of German-language newspaper articles, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.112-4, 119-21.

ees to work and earn money. Consequently, morale was low. Some internees escaped, going either to the Polish cities to find work or crossing into Czechoslovakia. Attempts were therefore made to raise the mood of the internees. Cultural and educational institutions were set up and in April 1921 Petliura visited the camps.⁶⁷⁹

At first, the Bolsheviks were not interested in taking advantage of this mood. In October 1920, an agreement was signed between Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine on the one hand and the Poles on the other on the exchange of prisoners of war. A similar settlement was made with the Germans in February 1921. In the same month, a mixed Polish-Russian-Ukrainian mission was set up to organise the return of the prisoners to their home countries. However, the aim of these measures was not to allow the return of groups which had fought against the Bolsheviks during the civil war, but rather the POWs from the recent world war and the Polish-Soviet conflict. Indeed, on 25th March 1921 the Politburo of the RKP forbade the return of members of Wrangel's army to Russia.⁶⁸⁰

However, the foreign representatives of both the Russian and Ukrainian governments started arguing that the soldiers of the anti-Bolshevik formations should be allowed to travel home. In June 1921, the Ukrainian representative in Prague put forward proposals to enable 'repentant Petliurists' from the Eastern Ukraine to return to their country and even drew up a questionnaire which those wishing to go back would have to fill in. He also reported that the military units in the camps were maintaining their discipline and were acting as a basis for operations in the Ukraine.⁶⁸¹ In the same month, I.S. Unshlikht, the deputy head of the Cheka, wrote to Molotov in favour of issuing an amnesty to the White Guardists (by which he also meant the Ukrainian forces) interned in Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to undermine the attempts by Boris Savinkov⁶⁸² to attack Belarus and Petliura to take the Ukraine. The

679 Zbigniew Karpus, *Russian and Ukrainian Prisoners of War and Internees Kept in Poland in 1918-1924*, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2001, pp.83-5, 131-52.

680 *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, p.57.

681 Reports by M. Levyskyi, December 1921, 03.06.1921, 12.06.1921 and undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.4, 7, 10, 52.

682 Boris Savinkov (1879-1925): a Russian Socialist Revolutionary, who in 1920 organised on Polish soil the 'Third Army' to fight against the Bolsheviks. Between 1921 and 1923, he led espionage activity against the Soviet Union, but was captured in

Russian Politburo, too, was beginning to change its mind on the subject, recognising at the sitting of 19-20th June that in principle it was possible to allow former Wrangelists back into the country. A commission should be formed to look at the subject.⁶⁸³ However, this did not immediately lead to the proclamation of an amnesty. A number of the foreign representatives, including Aussem, complained that Moscow was not allowing them to take advantage of the desire of the Petliurists to return.⁶⁸⁴ Again on 24th September, at the request of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the question of an amnesty was discussed. The Politburo resolved that Chicherin should immediately announce an amnesty for anti-Soviet forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania. On 3rd November 1921, the amnesty was issued and news of it reached the internment camps the following month.⁶⁸⁵

The response of the interned UNR soldiers was at first unenthusiastic, despite the difficult conditions they faced in the camps. In March 1922, the official Soviet delegation responsible for registering those who wished to return travelled to the camps, visiting the internment camp in Strzałków. In response to the announcement made by the delegates, the UNR soldiers sang the patriotic 'Shche ne vmerla Ukraina' ('The Ukraine has not died' – it is now the national anthem of the Ukraine) and applauded 'a free, independent Ukraine and the Hetman Petliura'. Only 123 Ukrainians enrolled, although among them was Petro Lypko, the head of the interned Ukrainian army's general staff. In comparison, more than 2,000 Russians signed up to the offer. The leaders of the UNR army actively campaigned against repatriation in the hope of keeping their military forces intact for further campaigns against the Soviet Union.⁶⁸⁶

This lack of success convinced the Ukrainian Politburo that it was necessary to issue a further amnesty specifically for Ukrainians. The new Ukrainian am-

1924 and later killed himself in prison. *Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsia*, p.527.

683 *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, p.68-70.

684 Report by Aussem, 24.09.1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.549 ark.9.

685 Jan Jacek Bruski, *Petlurowcy. Centrum państwowe Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej na wychodźstwie (1919-1924)*, Kraków: Arcana, 2004, p.498; *Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia. Tom 3*, pp.70-1. Indeed, there were complaints from the Ukrainian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the slowness of the implementation of the amnesty. TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.107.

686 Bruski, *Petlurowcy*, pp.498-501; Karpus, *Prisoners of War*, pp.152-3.

nesty of 12th April 1922 was not, however, a simple reiteration of that proclaimed by the Russian Politburo five months earlier: whereas the RKP amnesty had been limited to rank-and-file soldiers, the new document now offered a pardon to all officers up to the rank of general.⁶⁸⁷ The Politburo of the Russian party described the actions of its Ukrainian counterpart as a 'mistake' and instructed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to take steps to limit the use of the amnesty.⁶⁸⁸ Despite the Russian attempts to interfere with the implementation of the plan, the Ukrainian Soviet authorities did seek to encourage Petliura's soldiers to return. Indeed, in June 1922 Manuilskyi told the Soviet Ukraine's representatives abroad that the 'special attention of the missions must be turned to the dissolution of the Petliurist units in the camps', for up to that point not enough had been done to achieve this.⁶⁸⁹

Nevertheless, the amnesty was implemented differently by the various Soviet Ukrainian missions. In Austria, for example, the Soviet representatives executed the plan in a very casual fashion. The Ukrainian mission in Vienna had only been established in March 1922, after both amnesties had been announced. As soon as the Soviet representatives arrived in the Austrian capital, they published the text of the first amnesty. However, the second amnesty was not published because the staff of the mission feared being overrun by émigrés wishing to return home; the mission did not have the resources to deal with the applications of all the Ukrainians at that time in Vienna. Unsurprisingly, this lukewarm approach did not produce great results, as the consular reports of the mission admitted. By June 1922, for example, only three people had taken up the amnesty.⁶⁹⁰

There were also problems in Poland. Much to the consternation of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Kharkiv, Oleksander Shumskyi, the

687 Report from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Czechoslovakia, 14.08.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 ark.15-18. The text of the second amnesty was published in *Nakanune*, No.27, 28th April, 1922.

688 Efim A. Dinerštejn, ' "Feindbeobachtung": Russische Verlage in Berlin im Blick der Sowjetmacht', in Karl Schlögel (ed.), *Russische Emigration in Deutschland 1918 bis 1941. Leben im europäischen Bürgerkrieg*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995, pp.411-38 (p.414).

689 Manuilskyi to Kotsiubynskyi, Aussem, M. Levytskyi and Shumskyi, 27.06.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.148.

690 Reports from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Austria, June 1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.797 ark.21-5, 48-58.

Soviet representative in Warsaw, was against the plan drawn up by Moscow to bring about the liquidation of the internment camps in Poland. This slowed down the carrying out of the scheme. He was also accused of hampering Moscow's efforts to bring about the peaceful dissolution of the camps because following the speeches given by Shumskiyi, the Russian actions would be understood as military aggression. Khurgin, Shumskiyi's deputy, also came in for criticism because he had told Chicherin that the camps had already been liquidated and posed no military threat.⁶⁹¹

The plenipotentiary in Germany does not seem to have understood the aim of the amnesty at all. In a letter to the TsK of 7th July 1922, he wrote that there was a constant stream of Petliurists leaving the camps. These had been moved to a Soviet-run camp, and could be sent off to the Ukraine. However, he continued by saying that according to his understanding of the instructions, the amnesty did not foresee the admission of these groups into the Ukraine.⁶⁹²

In contrast, the mission in Czechoslovakia seems to have pursued the policy of reconciliation more actively. As mentioned above, Levytskyi had been arguing in favour of the return of Petliurists since June 1921. Following the introduction of the amnesty, the consular section of the Prague legation petitioned the government in Kharkiv for changes in the regulations of the amnesty which would enable more soldiers to return. It highlighted the poverty of the interned soldiers as one of the major impediments to the successful implementation of the amnesty: all applications for pardon required two photographs of the candidate; a stipulation which for many was too expensive. The consular section in Prague suggested that this requirement be reduced to one photograph or that the photographs be replaced entirely by a written description of the applicant's appearance. The section also complained that the mission itself lacked the funds to reply to inquiries about repatriation by post. Another letter attacked the necessity of charging consular fees to those wanting to return and described the payments as an obstacle to the declared policy of bringing about the dissolution of the emigration.⁶⁹³ In October, Prague re-

691 Iakovlev to Khurgin, 17.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.201-3.

692 Aussem to TsK KP(b)U, 07.07.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.152-3.

693 Reports from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Austria, 03.08.1922, 14.08.1922, and 02.10.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 ark.24, 25, 35.

ported that it had up to that point sent back 284 Ukrainians who had taken up the amnesty. 619 had also turned to the mission with requests to take up the amnesty and Ukrainian citizenship.⁶⁹⁴

The Czechoslovak mission's activity among the internees was also aided by Ukrainian Communist groups inside the camps, including the Ukrainian section of the Czechoslovakian Communist party and the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (KPSH). Their influence among the internees is difficult to gauge. One report from the KPSH was made up of exaggerations which moved into the realm of fantasy: it claimed that half of those interned in Czechoslovakia were under its influence and 90% of the internees were pro-Soviet.⁶⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the existence of these groups may have given the Soviet mission a means to disseminate propaganda in the camps.

Clearly, there were a number of obstacles to the successful implementation of the amnesty. Towards the end of 1922, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR started to question the efficacy of its continuation. According to one report 'the amnesty has up till now not achieved the desired results, namely the disintegration of the Petliurists – they are different from the White Guardist group such as the Wrangelist groups in Germany and Turkey (who "display a desire to return home") – this is a result of the efforts of Petliura's government and the Polish support, especially from the Polish general staff'. Moreover, many soldiers had the impression that 'the Bolsheviks will always accept them' and that it was therefore 'better to wait [the development of] events' to see if 'anything will come of them'. Therefore, the report suggested ending the amnesty on 1st January 1923: 'we would strengthen the prestige of the Soviet government in the eyes of hesitant Petliurists' and force them 'to seek forgiveness from the Soviet regime'. Late applications could also be considered individually. If the number of people applying for repatriation reached mass proportions, the amnesty could be reissued.⁶⁹⁶ The mission in

694 Reports from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Austria, 02.10.1922 and 09.10.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 ark.39zv-40.

695 Report from the Ukrainian section of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, 17.07.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.66; undated report from the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia in Czechoslovakia, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.563 ark.11-4.

696 Report from diplomatic section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 06.03.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.133-3zv; spr.613 ark.2-2zv.

Warsaw was also in favour of this course of action, arguing that it was counter-productive to give the emigration the impression that the amnesty would be continued indefinitely.⁶⁹⁷ On 18th October 1922, the Ukrainian Politburo decided that in view of the failure to bring back the mass of the emigration so far, the formal requirements demanded of those seeking repatriation should be reduced; at the same time, however, the deadline of the amnesty should be shortened. The question of the deadline was then passed on to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁹⁸

The proposal to end the amnesty provoked vigorous opposition from the Russian and Ukrainian side of the joint delegation for repatriation. It argued that past problems were a result of deficiencies in the first set of instructions regulating the implementation of the amnesty; however, the most recent guidelines had overcome these. As a consequence 'in *practice* we are only now getting down to the repatriation of Petliurist officers'. Moreover, the number of those wanting to return had increased in the autumn. The joint delegation pointed out that there were two separate amnesties for rank-and-file soldiers and for officers. It made no sense to cancel the amnesty for the former group, while allowing the second to take advantage of the pardon as the return of officers often influenced the private soldiers to take the same step. Ending both amnesties would put those who had already registered in a very difficult position and it would cause bewilderment. It would end the dissolution of the camps and send many internees back into the arms of Petliura. The report did suggest putting a time limit on the amnesty, for example either 1st or 12th May 1923.⁶⁹⁹

In the face of these arguments, at a session of 19th January 1923, the Politburo took back its decision to shorten the amnesty. Before it made a final decision on the question of whether the amnesty should be continued, it would find out how many émigrés had actually returned and classify them.⁷⁰⁰ According to the GPU, between January 1922 and June 1923 3,552 people had arrived in the Ukraine, of whom 2,541 were soldiers who had taken up the

697 Report from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Poland for the period 01.11.1922-01.12.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.875 ark.3.

698 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 18.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.30 ark.81zv-82.

699 Report from the Russian and Ukrainian Delegation for Evacuation, 07.01.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.134-5.

700 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 19.01.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.7zv.

amnesty; the rest were civilian émigrés. Among the soldiers were 2 generals, 258 officers, 58 officials and 2,223 privates. The majority, 1408, had served with Petliura: 2 generals (Iliia Martyniuk and Petro Lypko), 147 officers and 1,261 privates. The rest had served with Wrangel and Denikin or the Russian forces which had fought alongside the Poles.⁷⁰¹ The Russian and Ukrainian joint delegation gave slightly different figures; it reported that for the period April to December 1922 1,575 Petliurists had returned from Poland. More than two thirds of these had come back between September and December, clear evidence supporting the delegation's claim that the effects of the amnesty were only beginning to be seen.⁷⁰² On the basis of this information the Politburo decided in March 1923 to continue repatriating Ukrainian émigrés with the aim of bringing about the disintegration of the Petliurist emigration.⁷⁰³

Again the extension of the amnesty was implemented very differently by the various Soviet Ukrainian missions. In Poland the Soviet representatives were reluctant to continue the repatriation of Petliurists and felt that given the closeness of the new deadline it made no sense to proclaim the extension of the amnesty. They also complained that the Poles were trying to hinder the mission's efforts by refusing to send candidates for return to the Soviet depots. The mission said that it did not have enough money to pay for the transport and maintenance of those wishing to go back. Nevertheless, by 15th March, when the Ukrainian mission in Poland seems to have stopped repatriating soldiers, another 140 had applied to be sent back. The consular section put its argument against continuing the repatriation thus: 'After 15th March we ended the repatriation. Those who register will soon be very few and principally those who worked. It is very rare that someone from the camps indicates that he acutely feels the need to continue repatriation; moreover, those

701 GPU report for the period June 1922 to January 1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.149-50.

702 Report from the Russian and Ukrainian Delegation for Evacuation, 24.01.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.151-22. The mission in Warsaw, interestingly enough, described the movement of returnees among Ukrainian civilians as 'small and wretched'; the only exception was that of the Petliurite soldiers. See the report by the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Poland for the period 01.11.1922-01.12.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.875 ark.3.

703 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 02.03.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.25.

who are still registering are a very doubtful crowd'.⁷⁰⁴ The compiler of the report was proved wrong, for in October 1923 the Polish army reported that 1,000 Ukrainian internees returned to the Soviet Ukraine. It is possible that this swell of interest in going back to the Ukraine was caused by the prospect of spending another winter in the camps, which were not properly equipped for the cold. There may also have been a greater willingness on the part of the Polish authorities maintaining the camps to encourage the Ukrainians to return to their homeland. The cost of supporting the internees was rising due to the inflation in the country, and the Poles were keen to close down the camps in order to remove this strain on their budget.⁷⁰⁵

In Czechoslovakia reports that the transports would stop at the end of 1922 had provoked an upsurge in applications to return: between the middle of October and the middle of December, 609 applications for pardon were received, although this number also included some Ukrainians from Sub-Carpathian Rus who did not want to live under foreign rule. On 21st December, the legation placed an announcement in the Czechoslovakian press and *Nakanune* that the transports would be extended to 1st April 1923 in order to allow those Ukrainians who had not yet managed to apply to do so; the statements said that this would be the last extension of the amnesty. Although the mission continued sending back repatriates until this date, even after the end of the deadline the Prague mission felt that there were still many émigrés who desired to go back to their country. Consequently, the Russian consulate had turned to the Czechoslovakian foreign office with the suggestion that the transports be continued; the Czechs agreed and the Ukrainian representatives in Prague wrote to Kharkiv asking for permission to continue sending back Ukrainian soldiers. However, the Soviet Ukrainian legation decided against publishing the extension of the amnesty because it felt that this would discredit the mission after it had already extended the amnesty with the claim that this was the last occasion that extra time would be granted. The liquidation of the UNR mission in Prague increased again the number of Ukrainians wanting to return home, but the Soviet mission had by this stage

704 Reports from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Poland, February 1923 and 14.04.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.875 ark.12-6, 20-21. The quotation is on ark.21.

705 Karpus, *Prisoners of War*, pp.155-6.

ended the organised system of transports and was telling those turning to it that they would now have to travel back at their own cost. Many of these did not have sufficient funds to do so, and the representatives in the Czechoslovakian capital called on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to give their attention to this.⁷⁰⁶

Perhaps one of the most important UNR soldiers to go back to the Ukraine was Iurii Tiutiunnyk, the leader of the winter raid against the Soviet Ukraine at the end of 1921. Tiutiunnyk's return is also one of the most inexplicable. It is unclear how Tiutiunnyk ended up in the Ukraine. The date of his arrival is also uncertain, though it seems that by summer 1923 Tiutiunnyk was being held in Kharkiv by the GPU.⁷⁰⁷ In October 1923, *Proletarska pravda* and *Komunist* reported that Iurii Tiutiunnyk had turned to the Central Committee of the KP(b)U with a request for pardon. The Communists, of course, portrayed Tiutiunnyk as a repentant sinner who had returned to the Ukraine because he had come to see the error of opposing the Soviet Ukraine. The official documents published in the Soviet press were so formulated as to support this impression. For example, in his letter to the Central Committee Tiutiunnyk recognised that the Soviet Ukraine truly was a Ukrainian state and that it was combating Russophile tendencies in the bureaucracy and introducing Ukrainianisation; at the same time, he claimed that the war against the Soviet Ukraine was only a struggle in favour of Polish imperialism. Other accounts, which are understandably preferred by Ukrainian historians today, maintain that Tiutiunnyk was tricked into returning by the GPU. According to the memoirs of Grigorii Besedovskii, a member of the Soviet mission in Warsaw, the GPU had taken control of a Ukrainian underground organisation called the Supreme Military Council. As part of a ploy to entice him back into the Ukraine, Tiutiunnyk was asked to become head of the organisation. Tiutiunnyk accepted and he was arrested after crossing the border.⁷⁰⁸

706 Reports by the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Czechoslovakia for the period October 1922 to June 1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.879 akr.2-2zv, 5, 18, 24, 27, 30zv, 39zv.

707 There is a short discussion of Tiutiunnyk's return in Bruski, *Petlurowcy*, pp.512-3.

708 For the text of Tiutiunnyk's declaration to the VTsVK and his accompanying letters to Shumskiy and Zatonskiy see *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.153-4; Besedovskii's account is mentioned in Oleh Romanchuk, 'Supernyk holovnoho otamana', *Dzvin*, 1991, No.7, p.80.

A more detailed account of the events leading up to Tiutiunnyk's return will only be possible after access has been given to the relevant documents in the secret service archive in Kyiv. However, it is difficult to believe the Communist version of 'repentance'. None of Tiutiunnyk's writings in emigration indicate any softening of his position towards the Bolsheviks; indeed, he contributed to the anti-Russian, right-wing extremist journal *Zahrava*, which was edited by the ideologue of Ukrainian integral nationalism Dmytro Dontsov. Tiutiunnyk was also specifically named in the amnesty as one of the generals who would not be allowed pardon.⁷⁰⁹

Whatever the reason for it, Tiutiunnyk's arrival in the Ukraine was seen as a great opportunity by the Soviet authorities to discredit the UNR government in emigration and bring about the dissolution of the internment camps. In November 1923, an appeal purportedly from Tiutiunnyk to the interned UNR soldiers was circulated among the Soviet representatives for distribution among the emigration.⁷¹⁰ It was also published in the Sovietophile journal *Nova hromada*. In the plea Tiutiunnyk called on the soldiers to return. He commended their heroic struggle for a united Ukraine, but wrote that it had now led them to misery in the Polish internment camps and into slavery under Polish imperialism. The only true bearer of the idea of Ukrainian unity was the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, to which the people of Galicia and Volhynia looked for their liberation. Clearly, the appeal itself was directed more towards the national aspirations of the internees. However, Tiutiunnyk's letter to the editor of *Nova hromada*, which was published alongside this declaration, praised the Soviet Ukraine in both national and social terms. Though it emphasised the Soviet Ukraine's role in bringing about the unification of the Ukrainian lands, it also talked of a coming clash between bourgeois and proletarian dictatorship and argued that the Ukraine benefited more from proletarian dictatorship because it was a land of workers.⁷¹¹ It is perhaps astounding that the KP(b)U distributed a document which spoke so favourably of the UNR army's struggle. The party's willingness to make such a concession is perhaps an indication of the importance which they attached to the dissolution of the military camps.

709 See the text of the amnesty in *Nakanune* No.27, 28th April, 1922.

710 Shlikhter to M. Levytskyi and Kaliuzhnyi, 24.11.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.83-4.

711 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, p.152-4.

Tiutiunnyk also aided Soviet propaganda by giving up his archive to the GPU. Although these documents were not considered to be particularly useful for intelligence, they were seen as containing information which discredited the emigration and proved the link between the Poles and 'banditry' in the Ukraine. Rather than publish individual documents, the Soviet authorities decided that Tiutiunnyk should write his memoirs under supervision. These would be used as propaganda against both Poland and the UNR.⁷¹² Indeed, in 1924 such a book appeared under the title *Z Poliakamy proty Vkraini* (With the Poles against the Ukraine).

As the treatment of Tiutiunnyk shows, even after the end of the amnesty the Soviet Ukrainian authorities hoped to encourage Petliurite soldiers to return to the Ukraine. On 18th February 1924, for example, the Politburo decided that the Petliurists should be allowed to return to the Ukraine.⁷¹³ Almost exactly a year later, the Ukrainian Politburo sent a protest to Moscow, which accused the Russian Politburo of not providing the funding for the repatriation of Petliurists, although it was giving money to send Wrangel's soldiers home.⁷¹⁴ It may have been the lack of support from Moscow rather than a shortage of will in Kharkiv which prevented the reintroduction of a comprehensive plan for the transportation of former Petliurists back to the Ukraine. Whatever the reason, after the end of the amnesty in 1923, the Ukrainian Politburo did not bring in a second blanket amnesty. In May 1925, the Politburo resolved that it was impossible for émigrés to return without thorough checks beforehand and a decision by the Ukrainian government in every case.⁷¹⁵

Ivan Kobza and the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party

Tiutiunnyk was one of the more prominent of the returnees whom the Soviet authorities hoped to use to encourage the rank and file of the Petliurite army to return. However, there were others. One example was Ivan Kobza. He had

712 Reports from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 21.08.1923 and 21.12.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.3-6, 127.

713 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (including information from the special file), 18.02.1924, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.48 ark.26zv; op.16 spr.1 ark.23.

714 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 26.02.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark. 156.

715 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 22.05.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.2 ark.216.

been a member of the conservative, nationalist Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party, who had, unlike the rest of his party, opposed Skoropadskyi during the revolution. He had also been an adversary of Petliura, even following the Directory's rising against the Hetman. In the emigration he was expelled from the party by Lypynskyi for supporting Basil the Embroidered, the Habsburg scion who had become deeply involved in Ukrainian politics. In mid-1922, he turned to Shumskyi with a request to return to the Ukraine. Shumskyi described Kobza's bearing as that of a defeated and capitulating enemy, and quoted him as saying 'hang me or spare me, but let me in, I cannot live like this anymore'. Shumskyi believed that Kobza's motives for returning were the bankruptcy of the anti-Soviet adventure and the recognition of the strength and permanence of the Soviet regime. The Soviet representative claimed that Kobza had several thousand sympathisers in the camps and some of these might follow his example. For this reason, he was in favour of allowing Kobza to return if the émigré declared his willingness to abstain from politics.⁷¹⁶ On 29th August 1922, the TsK KP(b)U decided to allow Ivan Kobza back into the country.⁷¹⁷

The Polish historian Jan Bruski sees Kobza's return as apolitical and, referring to the quote from Shumskyi, motivated mainly by homesickness.⁷¹⁸ Certainly, Kobza's statement is testimony to the despair induced by émigré life, such that it was worth risking execution for a chance to return home. However, further evidence for Kobza's motivation can be found in the form of a resolution by his group of the Agrarian Democrats in the emigration. This resolution started by stating the group's approval of their leader's attempts to return and condemned the 'Polish-Petliurite provocateurs'. It asserted 'the fact that the Soviet regime really is the only power capable of productive work towards the creation of a state and that the Polish-Petliurite provocation and the murky politics of supporting groups may again throw the Ukraine into a state of anarchy'. The rest of the resolution called on all soldiers to return to the Ukraine in order to take part in the reconstruction of the country, and

716 Shumskyi to the TsK KP(b)U, 18.05.1922, 21.08.1922 and 14.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.132,136,162.

717 The secretariat of the TsK KP(b)U to the deputy commissar for foreign affairs, 29.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.145.

718 Bruski, *Petlurowcy*, p.510.

made a plea to that part of Ukrainian society which shared the ideology of the Agrarian Democrats to reconcile themselves with the Soviet regime and deepen their work for the development of agriculture and industry. Equally those 'honest citizens' intimidated into serving the 'Polish-Petliurite provocation' should cast aside fear and deception and cooperate with the Soviet regime. The resolution declared its struggle against Poland and Petliura, who wanted to bring ruin to his own country for the good of the Polish nobility. It finished by expressing sympathy for their brother Ukrainians who found themselves under the Polish yoke, and expressed its trust in the creation of a united Ukraine. The resolution was signed by Mykola Baier, Ivan Kobza, Pavlo Didusenko, Mykola Kekalol, Trokhym Didusenko, Tymokhvii Kovalenko and Viktor Kolisnyk.⁷¹⁹

The group also prepared for publication an appeal which concentrated on the failings of Petliura during the revolution, condemning his inability to create a state, pointing to his military defeats and accusing him of selling the Ukraine out to the Poles. The appeal claimed that the uprisings in the Ukraine were inspired by the Polish nobility in order to keep the Ukraine in a state of anarchy by provoking the Soviet regime to punish the Ukraine for its participation in the insurgent movement. It ended by claiming that only the Soviet regime could save the country from anarchy and guarantee the ideals of the Agrarian Democrats, namely the creation of an independent and united Ukraine and the redistribution of the land. Consequently, it called on the émigrés to return to the Ukraine and help rebuild the country; those who could not work for the Soviet regime directly should at least contribute to the happy future, welfare and cultural development of Ukrainian workers and peasants. The appeal went on to echo the group's resolution in condemning the Polish-Petliurite alliance and expressing its support for the Ukrainians under Polish rule.⁷²⁰

It is, of course, difficult to assess the how far the opinions expressed in the resolution and appeal really reflect the views of this group of Agrarian Democrats. Certainly, the published appeal was a factor which was taken into account when the decision of whether Kobza should be allowed to return to the

719 Resolution by the Democratic Agrarians, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.119-119zv.

720 Appeal from the Democratic Agrarians, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1spr.15 ark.122-4.

Ukraine was being made.⁷²¹ Kobza and his cosignatories very likely tailored the appeal to the desires of the Ukrainian Soviet government in order to influence the acceptance of Kobza back into the country. As mentioned above, Shumskyi wanted to use Kobza's example to encourage others to return, and indeed, the text of the appeal, in the condemnation of Petliura, neatly fits the main goals of the Ukrainian government, namely the discrediting and dissolution of the Petliurite movement. Yet one cannot simply dismiss all that is written in the texts. Kobza and his group expressed themselves in a manner fully in keeping with Ukrainian populist nationalism as it had developed during the revolution. They stressed the need for an independent and united Ukraine, a call which the Bolsheviks actually discouraged in Sovietophile propaganda, and the redistribution of land among the peasants. There were no 'Soviet additions' in the sense of an appeal to the world proletariat. If the group had written what it believed the Bolsheviks wanted to hear, it was still doing so on its own terms. Moreover, Kobza had been an opponent of Petliura even during the rising of the Directory against the Hetmanate, that is at the apex of the Directory's popularity, and following the alliance with the Poles it was even easier for Ukrainians to dislike Petliura. It is perfectly plausible that the Polish war had convinced Kobza of the dangers of continued opposition to the ruling government in the Ukraine and this may well have also been a cause of the despair which Shumskyi observed.

It is interesting that Kobza made this statement as a representative of a political party, and not as a private individual: on the one side this might indicate that his group of Agrarian Democrats really had worked out a pro-Soviet platform; alternatively, it could have been seen as a way of carrying more weight with the Soviet government, or as a way of opening the door for the other signatories to return. What one can say is that, in the question of returning to the Soviet Ukraine, a Ukrainian politician could not remain fully apolitical, for to go back meant to recognise the regime against which that person had fought; moreover, as one might expect, the Soviet officials were determined to use any former opponent who was prepared to accept the Soviet regime as an example for others to do likewise.

721 Note from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1spr.15 ark.120-121zv.

The Hrekov Group and the Creation of a Ukrainian *Nakanune*

The return of prominent émigrés was seen as one way of encouraging the soldiers of the UNR to go home. In summer 1922, the Ukrainian Politburo started considering another method: the creation of Sovietophile groups which would advocate re-immigration to the Soviet Ukraine. On 23rd June 1922, the Politburo decided to take action to create a Ukrainian version of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*.⁷²² Four days later, Manuilskyi wrote to the leaders of the Ukrainian missions abroad saying that the Genoa Conference was promoting a noticeable pro-Soviet mood in the emigration. Although he warned against exaggerating the importance of this change, he argued that it was 'essential to use the *smenovekhovskii* mood among the emigration for the creation of groups from former Ukrainian political actors'. These groups would defend the Soviet government abroad and struggle as partyless activists against the 'slander' of the Petliurists. They should do this by publishing compromising material about the UNR government, especially any financial support it might receive from bourgeois governments. He stressed that the sincerity of the applicants must be ascertained, and that discussions with them should be carried out in such a way that they could not later change their mind. They would be allowed to return to the Ukraine, but this would be delayed until they had been fully used abroad. Indeed, as will be seen, throughout the 1920s a number of applications by *smenovekhovtsy* to return to the Ukraine were initially rejected, only to be later accepted. This would suggest that the principle laid down in 1922 remained true throughout the decade. Lastly, as mentioned above, Manuilskyi wrote that the main task of the missions was the dissolution of Petliura's units in the camps and that up to that point not enough had been done to achieve this.⁷²³

Despite the decision to make use of the new pro-Soviet current, the Bolsheviks still maintained a rather cautious stance towards *smenovekhovstvo*. Throughout the period in which the Soviet authorities were discussing how to promote *smenovekhovstvo* in the emigration, they were also taking measures to reduce its influence within the Ukraine itself. *Visti TsK KP(b)U*, an information bulletin published by the Bolsheviks' Central Committee, described

722 Bruski, *Petlurowcy*, p.506.

723 Manuilskyi to Kotsiubynskyi, Aussem, M. Levytskyi and Shumskyi, 27.06.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.148.

Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* as an extremely dangerous tendency which had 'weaved for itself a sturdy nest among Ukrainian professors, among whom one finds elements which desire to actively put their beliefs into practice. These attempts are a double danger for Soviet power when they come from Ukrainian nationalists; this forces the TsK to issue a decisive directive for struggle with the above-mentioned phenomenon'. In summer and autumn 1922, Dmitrii Lebed, the second secretary of the TsK of the KP(b)U, organised a campaign in which around 70 lecturers and professors were expelled from the country because they had supposedly spread the ideas of *smenovekhovstvo*.⁷²⁴ As much as the Bolsheviks hoped to use *smenovekhovstvo* abroad, they were always suspicious of it because it represented an independent intellectual current which might spread nationalist ideas within the Ukraine.

The immediate cause of the decision to promote a Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* was the appearance in Vienna of a group led by General Hrekov which had turned to the Soviet Ukrainian representative there with a proposal of cooperation. It claimed to consist of four parts: members of the Directory and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independents represented by Opanas Andrievskiy⁷²⁵ and Oleksander Makarenko;⁷²⁶ Social Democrats represented by Borys Matiushenko and Mykola Halahan;⁷²⁷ a number of Socialists-Federalists led by Oleksander Lototskyi⁷²⁸ and Serhii Shelukhyn,⁷²⁹ and the

724 Kasianov, 'Vlada ta inteligentsiia', pp.23-4. The quotation appears on p.23.

725 Andrievskiy, Opanas (1878-1955): a lawyer and member of the Party of Socialists-Independents who joined the Directory of the UNR in November 1918. In the emigration he taught law at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.69.

726 Makarenko, Oleksander (1882-?): the brother of Andrii Makarenko, who created a rival UNR government to Petliura, and leader of the Socialists-Independentists. *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, p.1437.

727 Halahan, Mykola (1882-?): a member of the RUP, the *Spilka* and the USDRP who led the Ukrainian diplomatic mission to Hungary under the Directory. He settled in Prague where he became involved in the Ukrainian émigré organisations there. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.115.

728 Lototskyi, Oleksander (1870-1939): a member of the moderate Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists, and government minister under the Central Rada and Hetmanate. He emigrated in 1920, later teaching at the Ukrainian Free University and becoming minister of internal affairs and deputy prime minister in the exile UNR government. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.191-2.

729 Shelukhyn, Serhii (1864-1938): a member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists, and minister of justice under two Central Rada governments. He

military group around the paper *Ukraina*, led by Serhii Chernushenko (who also used the name Sahaidachnyi) and Hrekov himself.⁷³⁰ Alongside Hrekov, the only members of the group directly involved in talks were Chernushenko-Sahaidachnyi, who had in the past moved in Russian monarchist circles, Andrievskiy, a former member of the Directory, and Shelukhyn, who had led the UNR delegation which had in 1918 sought peace with Soviet Russia.

Before turning to the Bolsheviks, Hrekov, Andrievskiy, Makarenko and Chernushenko-Sahaidachnyi had organised an opposition faction to Petliura in the émigré UNR. Since autumn 1920, they had been negotiating with the Poles in the hope that Warsaw would switch its support from Petliura to themselves. As part of the negotiations, in March 1921 the group signed a secret declaration calling for closer military, political and economic links with Poland and France and underlining the need to free the Ukraine from Bolshevik occupation. It condemned Petliura for his inability to defend the Ukraine from the Bolsheviks and declared their lack of interest in the matter of Galicia, seeing it as an internal Polish affair. This declaration was leaked, thereby souring the group's relationship to the UNR and the Galicians and paralysing its activity. In April, it set up the Ukrainian National-Political Committee, which followed a pro-French/Polish, anti-Petliura line. In November 1921, the Committee started publishing a bilingual organ, in French and Ukrainian, *Ukraina*, with the help of Polish funds. According to Soviet intelligence reports, the group aimed to replace Petliura and create a Directory headed by Andrievskiy and Makarenko.⁷³¹

It is unclear from the existing evidence why this group appealed to the Soviet representative. One GPU report suggested that the group's members were little more than adventurers, looking for money from any source. They had had the misfortune to acquire an editor for *Ukraina* who did not agree with the opinions of the group. Instead of distributing their paper, he had burned al-

headed the Ukrainian delegation in the peace negotiations with Soviet Russia in 1918. In 1921, he went into emigration, and settled in Prague. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.636.

730 Minutes of a meeting between Manuilskiy and Kotsiubynskiy, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.149.

731 Bruski, *Petlurowcy*, pp.345-52. The full text of the group's declaration was published in *Ukrainskyi prapor*, 30th April 1921, p.1. For the Soviet assessment of the group, see TsDAHO f.4 op.1 spr.567 ark.17.

most all the copies which had been published, sending a few to the Poles to convince them that their money was not being wasted. He managed to get away with this for five months before anyone noticed that something was amiss. Chernushenko-Sahaidachnyi then took over the role of editor, but due to the financial problems which the group now faced was reduced to selling photos of Soviet figures and members of the Petrushevych government in order to keep the publication afloat.⁷³² Maybe these difficulties did indeed force the group around *Ukraina* to seek a new source of funding. Of course, the GPU was suspicious of most émigrés and often charged them with adventurism and opportunism, although it is also true the conditions of émigré life often encouraged the development of these characteristics. At the same time, the group's opposition to Petliura may have offered an area of common ground with the Soviet regime which provided a basis for cooperation.

Manuilskyi was willing to fund a journal run by the Hrekov group if they made a declaration of loyalty; the group would work abroad and would only be allowed to go back to the Ukraine after its task had been completed. Discussions would only be held in Vienna, not in Kharkiv. According to Kotsiubynskyi, Hrekov and his associates had already asked for an amnesty, but they wanted it to be signed by only one member of the party's presidium. Kotsiubynskyi was against this because it would allow members to apply for an amnesty and then disavow involvement if they had a change of heart. On 21st June, Hrekov, Shelukhyn, Andrievskyi and Chernushenko-Sahaidachnyi told Kotsiubynskyi that they were all prepared to make a declaration of loyalty to the Soviet regime in the press and to campaign for the return of the emigration. The group wanted a speedy decision on whether it would receive Soviet support because the Polish government had become suspicious of it and was beginning a campaign against it in the press. Kotsiubynskyi was convinced that the group had mass support and hoped that following the declaration of loyalty it would be possible to start repatriating the group's followers.⁷³³

732 Report on Sahaidachnyi based on German sources, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.169.

733 Kotsiubynskyi to TsK KP(b)U, undated, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.36 ark.86; minutes of a meeting between Manuilskyi and Kotsiubynskyi, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.149-150.

In July 1922, Kotsiubynskiy reported that discussions with the '*smenovkehovskii*' group had reached a high point. The group had come to an agreement on its platform. Firstly, that the Soviet government alone represented the national dignity of the Ukraine. Secondly, that the past struggle against the Soviet Union had only been in the interests of Poland and Rumania. This had been a particularly thorny issue, and had raised much opposition from the military members of the group. Thirdly, that although the Ukraine was not fully independent, the Soviet regime was 'following a line towards the independence of the Ukraine'. Lastly, that if the Soviet regime were to collapse, the Ukraine would cease to exist, because a Russian monarchy would be restored. Thus, the group expressed its support for the Soviet system in purely national terms. The group promised to support the Soviet regime, to work among the emigration to bring about its disintegration and agitate in favour of returning to the Ukraine. In return it wanted a full amnesty and the right to return once it had completed its work. Again, it requested a prompt decision from the Ukrainian capital as it feared being exposed by the Poles. Kotsiubynskiy had put forward the suggestion that the group work together with either Morkotun and the Ukrainian National Committee or Petrushevych. Hrekov and his colleagues were against this as they believed Petrushevych was no longer important and that it would be difficult to form a group with him because his demands would be too great. Morkotun they dismissed as a swindler.⁷³⁴

Back in Kharkiv the mood was optimistic. On 10th July 1922, Manuiskiy told Kotsiubynskiy that recent events in Poland meant that it was all the more essential that the emigration be dissolved and that money be given for the publication. He again stressed that Hrekov and Shelukhyn would not be allowed to return to Kharkiv for discussions, for fear of a repetition of the 'Vynnychenko story'. Though they would be granted an amnesty, they would not be allowed to take part in politics in the Ukraine or act as a party; the group should make a statement acknowledging this. Referring to the four points drawn up by the group, Manuiskiy stated that the declaration must not describe the independence of the Ukraine as being one of its aims, but rather simply express its support for the current Soviet policy. Nevertheless, he also

734 Report by Kotsiubynskiy, July 1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.151.

stressed that the paper must have an independent character, and that Soviet involvement should be hidden.⁷³⁵ The value of the new publication was to be that it was a Sovietophile, and not, at least for all appearances, a Bolshevik organ.

Though it seemed the negotiations with the Hrekov group were going well, the matter caused some controversy among the Ukrainian plenipotentiaries. The question of Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* was not a new one, and had indeed generated a certain amount of debate among the heads of the Ukrainian missions abroad. Indeed, in a letter to Shumskyi in August 1922, Levytskyi referred to the matter having been drawn out over a long time and given rise to many differences of opinion.⁷³⁶ For example, Aussem was angry that Kotsiubynskyi was now taking a lead in the question of Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*, despite the fact that the Austrian consul had turned down Aussem's own proposal for a Ukrainian *Nakanune*. On 7th July 1922, he wrote an irritated letter to the other foreign representatives pointing out that it was he who had first observed the development of a pro-Soviet tendency in the emigration at the end of 1921, and that at this time he had suggested the creation of a Ukrainian Sovietophile publication. He claimed that he had been in a position to draw on the talents of Andrii Zhuk,⁷³⁷ Oleksander Oles, Volodymyr Temnytskyi, Mykola Porsh and Dmytro Doroshenko, and that the paper *Ukrainske slovo* had closed 'as a preliminary to placing itself under our full command', but that the idea had been quashed by Shumskyi and Kotsiubynskyi with the claim that a '*Smena vekh*' could not take place in the Ukrainian emigration. He observed dryly that Kotsiubynskyi appeared to have changed his mind, and found a ' "a genuine Change of Signposts" '. Aussem complained that he had received no guidance in dealing with the growth of Sovietophile sentiment and on his own initiative had maintained contacts with Sovietophile émigrés. He claimed that he had loosened the grip of Petliura and Skoropadskyi on the emigration in Germany, paralysed the émigré student groups in Berlin and made progress in bringing about the dissolution of the internment

735 Manuilskyi to Kotsiubynskyi, 10.07.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.158.

736 M. Levytskyi to Shumskyi, 17.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.166.

737 Zhuk, Andrii (1880-1968): a member of the USDRP who fled the Russian empire to escape trial. During the First World War, he co-founded the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, which lobbied the Central Powers in favour of Ukrainian interests. In 1930 he returned to Lviv. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.852.

camps. He booked Porsh's speeches in favour of returning to the Ukraine as a major success.⁷³⁸

Of course, Aussem was engaged in an inter-departmental polemic, and one must treat his claims with caution. Clearly, the Ukrainian foreign representatives in Vienna, Berlin, Prague and Warsaw were competing for influence over the emerging movement, and Aussem was piqued that his early suggestions had been ignored. In the letter from July 1922, Aussem appears to have been a strident proponent of using the Sovietophile groups. However, as can be seen in the first section of this chapter, the mission's letters had been more cautious at the beginning of the year. Moreover, he undoubtedly exaggerated the successes of his handling of the pro-Soviet groups in Germany.

This reference to the earlier discussion of Ukrainian *smenovokhovstvo* intensified the debates on the subject. As mentioned above, Aussem claimed that Shumskyi had supposedly objected to the suggestion of creating a Ukrainian *Smena vekh* because no such movement could not exist among the Ukrainians. In response to these allegations, Shumskyi wrote that he had not turned down the Berlin representative's proposal; rather he had understood that Aussem would take practical steps to create an organisation of Ukrainian *smenovokhovstvo*. He claimed to grant this organ 'sufficiently serious attention' and indeed he put forward some suggestions on its formation. However, he continued to maintain that 'in essence among the Ukrainian intelligentsia there is no "Change of Signposts"'. His refusal to use the term *Smena vekh* did not mean that he did not believe there was not a movement among the Ukrainian intelligentsia which advocated reconciliation with the Bolsheviks and return to the Ukraine; rather, it resulted from his specific understanding of this movement. He preferred to talk of '*povorottsy*', or 'returnees'. On the one hand, *povorot* was the 'war cry of all the weary émigré masses to return home'. On the other, 'in the understanding common to the Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie this slogan will mark a return to the mood of their [past] thoughts and also from struggle with the Soviet regime to loyal cooperation and support for it'. For Shumskyi this was a form of mental 'return': a recognition that the UNR's war against the Bolsheviks, in a period in which tensions between capital and labour were so great, was a declaration of hostility against the

738 Aussem to TsK KP(b)U, 07.07.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.152-3.

proletariat and harmed both socialism and nationalism, the two doctrines which all the intelligentsia had believed in.⁷³⁹ In other words, unlike the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, who were changing their signposts in that they were adopting a completely new ideology, the Ukrainian *povorottsy* were returning to their traditional positions, of which the Soviet regime was the natural representative.

Shumskyi, who as a former *Borotbist* had emerged from the Ukrainian national movement to join the Communists and thus had undergone a journey similar to that of many Sovietophiles, was aware of the dangers of applying the term *smenovekhovstvo* to the Ukrainian movement. In the Soviet Ukraine *smenovekhovstvo* had only negative connotations – national Communists like Skrypnyk and Shumskyi used it as a term of abuse to refer to other Bolsheviks who they accused of possessing the prejudices of Great Russian chauvinists.⁷⁴⁰ At the same time, it was also used to describe 70 Ukrainian professors expelled from the country in October 1922.⁷⁴¹ Shumskyi clearly hoped to preserve the Ukrainian Sovietophiles from the connotations of counter-revolution which for him the word *smenovekhovstvo* carried. Maybe he hoped that they could take the same route he had towards full cooperation with the Bolsheviks. *Smenovekhovtsy* was, however, the term which stuck. Levytskyi seems to have dismissed Shumskyi's insistence on the term *povorottsy* as semantic quibbling.⁷⁴² This perhaps underlines the way which most Bolsheviks saw the Ukrainian Sovietophiles: like the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* they were useful tools, but they remained class enemies who could still pose a danger to Soviet interests.

Indeed, Levytskyi warned extreme caution in dealing with the Sovietophiles. He told Shumskyi that it was possible that sponsoring the pro-Soviet groups might allow the emergence of organisations in the emigration and the Ukraine hostile to the Soviet Union. They might move from illegal, underground struggle to open confrontation, and 'in this way want to become a legal opposition',

739 Shumskyi to Iakovlev, M. Levytskyi, Kotsiubynskyi and Aussem, 14.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.154, 157. The quotations are on ark.154. Note how in *Povorot na Ukrainu*, which appeared four years later, Vynnychenko also preferred to use the phrase *povorottsy*. Vynnychenko, 'Povorot na Ukrainu', pp.170-1.

740 Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, pp.110, 115.

741 Kasianov, 'Vlada ta inteligentsiia', pp.23-4.

742 M. Levytskyi to Shumskyi, 17.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.166.

possibly with support from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* needed to be approached 'with great caution, because whereas the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* believed in the idea of a Great Russia, the Ukrainians had fought for Ukrainian independence'. By this Levytskyi may have meant that whereas Russians could accept the creation of the Soviet Union as an expression of Great Russian power, for Ukrainians the Union represented an impediment to their goal of achieving Ukrainian independence. Certainly, negotiations with Hrekov had been hampered by the Ukrainian's desire to include the creation of an independent Ukraine as one of the slogans of the Sovietophile group. Levytskyi also pointed out that though some of the Ukrainian *smenovekhovtsy* were involved in negotiations, others were creating their own movement under the wings of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*. He believed that this was an effort to use Soviet funding without making a formal declaration of loyalty to the Soviet Union. He said such a course was not a Change of Signposts, especially as many would continue to question the Ukraine's relationship with the Russian Soviet Republic. Moreover, it would not produce the desired effect among the emigration. The group needed a clear ideology and must make an open declaration of loyalty to the Soviet Ukrainian government.⁷⁴³

The debate also revealed other potential collaborators for the new Sovietophile journal. Both Shumskyi and M. Levytskyi proposed that A. Kharchenko, who had links to Baranovskyi, one of Smal-Stotskyi's intermediaries during the UNR ambassador's negotiations with Aussem, be involved.⁷⁴⁴ Kharchenko had worked with the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* on *Nakanune*. One article of 9th August 1922 praised the 'new forms of state and national-cultural life' emerging as a result of the revolution, as well as the growth in the number of schools, the development of agriculture, the strengthening of cooperatives, the rising productivity in industry and the development of railways. Whereas the Ukraine had once been dependent on Russia, 'the Ukraine is now beginning to live its own cultural and economic life'. At the same time, he called for the strengthening and improvement of relations between Russia

743 M. Levytskyi to Shumskyi, 17.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.166-7.

744 Shumskyi to Iakovlev, M. Levytskyi, Kotsiubynskyi and Aussem, 14.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.154; M. Levytskyi to Shumskyi, 16.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.165.

and the Ukraine. Indeed, in one passage he attacked that part of Ukrainian psychology which distrusted everything Russian. Though he admitted that the relationship between Russia and the Ukraine had not yet been completely normalised, he stressed that it provided a good basis for work. He contrasted the opportunities in the Ukraine to carry out useful work for the reconstruction of the country with the 'inactivity' or 'criminal activity' of the emigration, such as the émigré campaign against the Soviet attempts to combat the famine in the Ukraine and Russia. He concluded by calling on the emigration to return, to work to rebuild the Ukraine, to strengthen its achievements in the cultural and economic spheres and to struggle against any attempts at restoring the old monarchy. Returning Ukrainians should support the union of Russia and the Ukraine, while also working to help the Russians overcome their prejudices towards the Ukraine.⁷⁴⁵ The references to the need to work with Russia cannot have been lost upon the Soviet Ukrainian representatives, who were willing to use the national attraction of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic on many Ukrainian émigrés to bring about the dissolution of the emigration, but did not want this to rebound on them in the expression of calls for Ukrainian independence.

Through Kharchenko, Levytskyi had come into contact with Andrii Nikovskiy, a former minister of foreign affairs in the UNR and vice-prime minister. Nikovskiy wanted to attack Petliura and claimed to have connections with the Hrekov group in Vienna already.⁷⁴⁶ Nikovskiy later claimed that he adopted a pro-Soviet position following the March decision of 1923. In 1928, he told the Soviet newspaper *Proletarska pravda* that following the decision the entire emigration 'understood that the Entente would not solve the fate of Galicia [...]. For me personally this meant that I began to consider returning home, believing that the only true government of the Ukraine was the government of the U[krainian] S[ocialist] S[oviet] R[epublic], and that the Soviet Ukraine provided the only basis for the liberation and unification of all Ukrainian lands'.⁷⁴⁷ The archival sources show, however, that Nikovskiy was already discussing

745 Copy of an article from *Nakanune* by A. Kharchenko, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.159-62.

746 M. Levytskyi to Shumskiy, 16.08.1922 and 17.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.165, 167.

747 Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, p.16.

cooperation with the Soviet authorities before the recognition of Polish sovereignty over Galicia, although Nikovskyi may well have been motivated for the reasons he named in the article. Shumskyi also put forward the names Koliukh⁷⁴⁸ and Filipovich, but it is unclear whether they actually did become involved in the Sovietophile journal.⁷⁴⁹

After reviewing the debate described above, the Politburo decided on 8th September that the creation of a *smenovekhovskii* journal was 'essential'. The publication should come out two to four times a month. Its editorial committee should consist entirely of *smenovekhovtsy* who should be under the control of Levytskyi.⁷⁵⁰ Despite the fact that a decision had been made, this was only the beginning of the work on setting up the journal. Even by 25th September, the Hrekov group were still working out its declaration of support for the Soviet Ukraine. Levytskyi had now taken command of the negotiations with the group, which he was conducting with the help of the Russian diplomat Grigorii Besedovskii. Another open issue was a decision on the place of publication. Levytskyi argued that of the three options, Berlin, Vienna and Prague, Vienna was the best. Berlin he ruled out almost immediately because it contained very few members of the Ukrainian emigration. Of the two serious options, Prague was undesirable because it was the centre of Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries. In contrast, Vienna contained more members of the Ukrainian emigration; from here it would be possible to distribute the paper in Hungary and Yugoslavia and the cost of publishing was lower than in Prague. Levytskyi also argued that the proximity of the Czechoslovakian and Austrian capitals meant that it would be possible for the plenipotentiary in Prague, by which he probably meant himself, to keep a close eye on the activity on the journal.⁷⁵¹ The Politburo accepted this recommendation, but the journal would be run by the mission in the Austria, not Czechoslovakia: on 11th October 1922, the Politburo named Levytskyi its representative in Vienna, and noted

748 Koliukh, Dmytro (1882-1937): cooperative leader, who served as minister of food supplies in one of the UNR governments and took part in the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Union. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.587.

749 Shumskyi to Iakovlev, M. Levytskyi, Kotsiubynskyi and Aussem, 14.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.154.

750 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 08.09.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.30 ark.64.

751 M. Levytskyi to TsK KP(b)U, 14.09.1922 and 25.09.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.122, 131-2.

that this would mean he should be entrusted with the management of the newspaper of the *smenovekhovtsy*.⁷⁵²

On 29th October 1922, the question of the Ukrainian emigration and the new publication were again discussed in Kharkiv. Levytskyi read out a report which stressed that the Czechoslovakian capital was the main centre of the Ukrainian emigration: it was therefore necessary that pro-Soviet propaganda be conducted among them. There was also a centre of sorts in Vienna, mainly because of Hrushevskiy's presence in the city. Again, the question of whether the journal should be based in Prague or Vienna was raised. Levytskyi admitted that due to the size of the emigration there was much in favour of establishing the journal in Prague; however, he also pointed out that the main representatives of Ukrainian *smenovekhovtsy* were in the Austrian capital. At this stage, the Hrekov group were still obviously involved in the project, despite the fact that GPU reports were circulating about their murky past,⁷⁵³ Shelukhyn, Chernushenko-Sahaidachnyi, Hrekov and Andrievskiy were all mentioned by name during the meeting. However, far more important for Levytskyi was Nikovskiy, who 'essentially is the only authority' among the Ukrainian *smenovekhovtsy*. The status of the *smenovekhovskii* collaborators was quite clear. They would not be allowed to return, but rather their loyalty would be preserved with promises that they could do so; after the *smenovekhovtsy* had been used to dissolve the emigration they would be 'thrown away'.⁷⁵⁴ This represented a change to the promises made by Manuilskiy and reflected the fears which Levytskyi had expressed in August about the danger that Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* would create a Trojan horse within the Soviet republic. Another change in emphasis is also evident. In June, Manuilskiy had stressed that the primary aim of the journal was to bring about the dissolution of the Petliurist military units. Levytskyi now argued that most of the Petliurists had either been repatriated or had dispersed. Only the intelligentsia remained. The meeting also sought to draw up an ideology for the new publication. There was agreement that it should call for return to the Ukraine and

752 Minutes of Politburo KP(b)U, 11.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.30 ark.75.

753 Report on Sahaidachnyi based on German sources, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1035 ark.169.

754 In an earlier letter to the TsK of the KP(b)U M. Levytskyi made it clear that he thought that the *smenovekhovtsy* were useful for the dissolution of the emigration and nothing else. See TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.150-1.

participation in the reconstruction of the country. Moreover, there should be no calls for the creation of an independent Soviet republic; the unification of the Soviet republics should, however, also not be stressed, but rather emphasis should be placed on the federal aspects of the Union. The committee decided to suggest to the Politburo that the paper be moved from Vienna to Prague because the latter was the centre of the nationalist Petliurist currents. Moreover, the students in Prague should be involved in the paper.⁷⁵⁵ Indeed the Politburo twice, in June and July 1923, decided in favour of moving the publication of the journal to Prague.⁷⁵⁶

The discussion over where the Sovietophile publication should be produced is important because it is of significance for the historiographical question of where the centre of Ukrainian Sovietophilism was. It has been claimed by historians that Prague was the centre of Ukrainian Sovietophilism,⁷⁵⁷ and this argument was also made by the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiaries at the time.⁷⁵⁸ However, as this chapter will show, though there were Sovietophiles based in the city, and the Soviet Ukrainian authorities repeatedly declared their desire to move the Sovietophile journal to Prague, the periodical was published in Vienna. This fact undermines the assertion that Prague was the centre of Ukrainian Sovietophilism; indeed, one should remember that both *Nova doba* and *Boritiesia-poborete!* were Viennese publications, suggesting that in fact the Austrian capital was the home of the pro-Soviet movement. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.

Among some Ukrainian Bolsheviks there was already a growing feeling that the process of forming a Sovietophile group had begun to drag on too long. From Berlin, Rakovskii wrote on 2nd October 1922 that 'the citadel of Ukrainian counter-revolution is strengthening in Prague' under the sponsorship of the Czechoslovakian government. He pointed particularly to the support given to the Shapoval group. Its cooperation with Vynnychenko was a sign for him

755 Minutes of the Secretariat TsK KP(b)U, 06.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.7 spr.20 ark.34zv-8.

756 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 18.06.1923 and 13.07.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.69, 77.

757 See for example Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, p.20.

758 Report by Kaliuzhnyi of the state of the Ukrainian emigration, 06.02.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1735 ark.13; report on Ukrainian émigré groups, 01.05.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2238 ark.2.

of the consolidation of Ukrainian counter-revolution. He complained that the Ukrainian missions had been writing to the TsK about the need to use the *smenovekhovskii* current in the Ukrainian emigration to bring about the dissolution of the Ukrainian emigration for a long time. However, the TsK had only finally given permission to do something about this after the situation had fundamentally changed. The problem was the difference between the statements made abroad and the reality back in the Ukraine. The Russian *smenovekhovtsy* were ready to believe in the rebirth of Great Russia and the NEP. In contrast, the Ukrainian emigration was made up of left-wing peasants and democratic socialist intelligentsia with a 'fetish' for the national question; they were not interested in the NEP and indeed would have preferred a form of War Communism in a national guise. He therefore concluded 'we must do something without fail', but repeated that this would be very difficult. He also said it was necessary for the Soviet republic to undertake work to defend the NEP from attacks by Vynnychenko and Shapoval, and to publish statistics which would disprove émigré claims that the Bolsheviks did not allow Ukrainian books to reach the schools or villages.⁷⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in another letter written later in the same month, Rakovskii was extremely pessimistic about the possibility of such efforts succeeding, saying 'I fear that nothing will come of "the Change of Signposts" – we have started too late'.⁷⁶⁰

This pessimism seemed to be justified. On 28th November, Levytskyi reported that 'we cannot come to an agreement with the *smenovekhovtsy*'. He had met Nikovskyi in Berlin and decided that 'Nikovskyi is not a *smenovekhovets* at all, but a typical senile member of the intelligentsia dreaming about a united Ukraine. The truth is that he has already been convinced, he has split from the Warsaw Petliurists, but fallen at the foot of Vynnychenko, so that it is not possible to count on him'. Moreover, the Viennese group of Hrekov and Chernushenko-Sahaidachnyi had split up and no-one remained to take part in the new journal. This left only Kharchenko in Berlin, whom Levytskyi had advised to go to Prague and, together with the Association of Student Citizens of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, to start publishing a newspaper or journal aimed at the students there. Kharchenko had agreed and was due to

759 Rakovskii to TsK KP(b)U, 02.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.136-7.

760 Rakovskii to TsK KP(b)U, 20.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.153.

arrive in the next few days. Levytskyi ended by saying 'we must begin work and organise our small organ for the dispersal of the student body and tear it from the Shapovalists and co. regardless of whether the *smenovekhovtsy* are "prominent figures" or not. For this reason, as soon as Kharchenko arrives we will go to work'.⁷⁶¹ Clearly, the plans to found a Ukrainian *Nakanune* had received a severe shock by the dispersal of the group which should have published it, and the new Prague journal had obviously much more limited goals than the original publication.

The Association of Student Citizens of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic had first appeared in July 1922 when seven students from Eastern Ukraine in Prague, who were inspired by the declaration of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, formed a pro-Soviet group. They had considered making a declaration similar to that of *Smena vekh*, but abandoned the idea: they felt that seven people could not have a great effect on the emigration and they feared that they would be subject to repressive measures from other émigrés. They therefore decided to concentrate on increasing their numbers and by the beginning of 1923 claimed to have 30 members in Prague and 25 outside the Czechoslovakian capital. However, only in March 1923 did they begin to meet regularly, as before then they had had no room in which to come together. In the same month, they registered themselves with the Czech authorities under the innocuous name of the Shevchenko Association of the Ukrainian Library-Reading Room; according to the group, this marked the beginning of a new period in the life of the Sovietophile students. They now saw their main task as being the acquisition of a proletarian class consciousness. They tried to achieve this by collecting books on Marxism and organising a programme of self-education on Marxist thought. Though the group did think about producing their own journal, they again shied away from this task. They felt that it would be better to publish an organ of a more general character, which was not specifically aimed at students. Such an organ did not yet exist in the emigration and the Association did not have the resources at its disposal to produce such a publication. If it were given the resources to do this, however, it would start work in the following summer vacation. This may have been a reference to the suggestion that the student organisation take part in the publi-

761 M. Levytskyi to TsK KP(b)U, 28.11.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.159.

cation of the new Sovietophile journal. Indeed, a report on the students' activities sent to the Ukrainian plenipotentiary in Prague, dated 31st May, may have been requested by the Ukrainian authorities with a view to finding out what contribution the Association could make to the planned publication. The report does not give the impression that the Association was a suitable centre for the publication. It had shrunk back from making public statements of its views and seemed to be content to meet in small discussion groups to talk about Marxist writings and the acquisition of a proletarian identity. Moreover, its activities were clearly limited by the academic obligations of the group's members.⁷⁶²

The unflattering portrayal of the group presented here was not reflected in the opinions of the Soviet representatives about the student association. In October 1922, Levytskyi had written that the students were helping the Soviet Ukrainian mission filter those applying to return.⁷⁶³ In another report the Soviet Ukrainian representative described the appearance of the group as extremely significant; he was impressed by their 'selfless' offers of cooperation with the Soviet regime to combat counter-revolution.⁷⁶⁴ In his report from February 1923, Kaliuzhnyi presented the student organisations as one of the driving forces behind *smenovekhovstvo* in Prague. Indeed, it was the existence of this group which seemed to underline his claim that Prague was the centre of Sovietophilism in the Ukrainian emigration.⁷⁶⁵ In September 1923, he also argued that the students were providing useful work by gathering materials against the Petliurists which showed their connections with the Poles. In order to do this, they had needed to overcome a number of difficulties: the Czechs were reducing the grants given to members of the Sovietophile student organisation and telling them to get Soviet passports. The Soviet plenipotentiary could give them no help other than to advise them to wait on events.⁷⁶⁶

762 Report by the Sovietophile students in Prague on their activities drawn up for the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Czechoslovakia, 31.05.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.22-8.

763 Report by the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Czechoslovakia, 05.08.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 ark.40.

764 Report by the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Czechoslovakia, 15.01.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.879 ark.3.

765 Report by Kaliuzhnyi of the state of the Ukrainian emigration, 06.02.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1735 ark.13.

766 Report by Kaliuzhnyi, 29.09.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1738 ark.146.

The Sovietophile student organisation was one of the longest-lived in the emigration. It was also the most unreservedly Soviet: the desire of the group to adopt a 'Soviet mentality' was repeated in everything its members wrote. The Soviet authorities often claimed that Prague was the centre on Sovietophilism; this was despite the fact that most of the Sovietophile journals were actually published in Vienna. The existence of the Association of Student Citizens of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was one reason for this apparent discrepancy.

Given the problems inherent in basing the planned journal around the Association of Student Citizens, it is perhaps unsurprising that as late as spring 1923 a publication still had not appeared in Prague. In the meantime, Levytskyi had again turned to Nikovskyi to ask him to be the editor, despite the misgivings voiced by the Soviet representative in the previous year. Nikovskyi had refused, although he had promised to write for the publication. In May, Levytskyi announced that Semen Vityk would be in charge of the publication. Apart from Nikovskyi, other émigrés from Berlin would take part, including Kharchenko and Siryi (the pseudonym of Iurii Tyshchenko), who had worked on *Nova doba* with Vynnychenko, as well as the pro-Soviet students in Prague.⁷⁶⁷ It does seem that the Soviet representatives were encountering difficulties finding prominent émigrés to work on their organ. The Politburo decision in June of that year confirming Vityk's position as editor supports this impression. The Politburo entrusted Kaliuzhnyi, who had become the secretary of the consulate in Vienna and was now in charge of the running of the project, to 'publish the journal with those forces which he has at his disposal'.⁷⁶⁸ A report on parties in Russia and in the Ukraine from around this period supports this dismal picture: 'Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* is developing very weakly. There are no energetic and strong workers who could take the leadership [of it] upon themselves. Nikovskyi wavers and continues to orientate himself. The main obstacle is the group of Vynnychenko, which publishes the thick journal "Nova doba", around which the main literary forces of the Ukrainian emigration have grouped. Candidates [to become] *smenovekhovtsy* fear to enter into a duel with such powerful forces. All the same, an action commit-

767 Report by M. Levytskyi, 19.05.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.89.

768 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 01.06.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.62zv.

tee is working and will soon be able to publish the first edition of the Ukrainian *smenovekhovskii* collection'.⁷⁶⁹

Kaliuzhnyi, too, was sceptical. In February 1923, he wrote that 'the [Sovietophile] movement, after having barely begun to take shape, has come to a halt under the influence of the creation of the USSR and the question connected with it of the liquidation of the representatives of the Ukrainian SSR abroad. Strictly speaking, the movement came to a halt in the form of an intellectual tendency, but in essence, one must suppose that it would continue, no longer in the form of a prominent social movement of "repenting and reconciling with the Soviet regime" or recognising its existence, but in the form of the penetration of these elements into the Soviet Ukraine'. For Kaliuzhnyi, *smenovekhovstvo* had therefore become a threat more than an opportunity, especially given the removal of the Ukrainian Soviet missions, which had been in a much better position to monitor the return of émigrés than those of the Russians. He did admit that there were 'sincere' *smenovekhovskii* groups among the émigré students and 'old' intelligentsia, but wrote that they had adopted a more cautious stance towards the Soviet authorities.⁷⁷⁰

The apparent decline of the Sovietophilism so soon after it had appeared is remarkable. One of the reports quoted above suggested that Vynnychenko's opposition was the main cause. This almost certainly overestimates the émigré's influence, for by this stage he had become the object of general derision. Rakovskii's belief that the Ukrainian emigration was not interested in the NEP is also difficult to believe, given the importance of the peasant question to Ukrainian émigrés. Kaliuzhnyi may have been nearer the mark in suggesting that the proposed amalgamation of the Soviet Ukrainian missions with their Russian counterparts dampened Ukrainian Sovietophilism: on the one hand, the decision removed the Soviet Ukrainian Republic of some of its outward trappings of statehood; on the other, it threatened to make contact between the Soviet Ukrainian authorities and those Ukrainian émigrés who sought reconciliation more difficult. In her memoirs, Nadiia Surovtsova, who had left the Ukraine in 1919 as a foreign representative of the UNR and set-

769 Report on parties in Russia and the Ukraine, in a file dated 09.01-09.11.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1642 ark.36.

770 Report by Kaliuzhnyi of the state of the Ukrainian emigration, 06.02.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1735 ark.12zv-13.

tled in Vienna to study history, described how contact with the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Austria had been instrumental in her conversion to a pro-Soviet position. The mission brought her into contact for the first time with the physical signs of Ukrainian statehood and Soviet support for Ukrainian culture: for the first time, she saw a Ukrainian passport and the Ukrainian-language books published in the country. Above all, Iurii Kotsiubynskyi, the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Vienna, made a great impression on Surovtsova, convincing her that ‘“us” and “them” did not exist because we desired the same things’.⁷⁷¹ Clearly, the existence of the Soviet Ukrainian missions had been an essential component in the promulgation of a pro-Soviet ideology, and their disappearance could only harm the development of Ukrainian Sovietophilism.

This was not the only cause for the apparent retreat of pro-Soviet sentiment. Some émigrés, for example Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyi, had already had their hopes of cooperation with the Soviet authorities dashed. As the previous two chapters have shown, it was very difficult to come to an agreement with the Bolsheviks on terms other than those set out by the Bolsheviks. Indeed, the failure of Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyi to cooperate with the Bolsheviks as equals may have provided examples of the hopelessness of Sovietophilism and dissuaded others from taking the same route. On the other hand, many émigrés who wanted to return had already done so: for example, by April 1923 the only member of the Foreign Group of the UPSR not to have gone back was Hrushevskyi himself. In this way, Sovietophilism was a movement whose ideology actually hindered its development: by putting their own ideals into practice and returning to their homeland, the Sovietophiles reduced their own number in the emigration. Both these factors diminished the pool of Sovietophile émigrés who could contribute to the planned journal.

This decline was, however, halted by the March decision in 1923. The Entente’s recognition of the occupation of Eastern Galicia by Poland unleashed a surge in sympathy for the Soviet Ukraine among Western Ukrainians. In his report from the month of the decision, the director of the police in Lviv wrote that ‘in connection with the decision by the Council of Ambassadors a much

771 Nadiia Surovtsova, *Spohady*, ed. Lesia Lukianova, Kyiv: Oleny Telihiy, 1996, pp.109, 139, 142. The quotation appears on p.139.

greater interest in the Soviet Ukraine, towards which more and more are beginning to orient themselves, has been observed among the local Ukrainians'.⁷⁷² To a certain extent, after March 1923, Sovietophilism emerged more as a movement of the Western Ukraine than one of the East. Moreover, whereas before 1923 Sovietophilism had been strongest among the left, after the March decision the Soviet Ukraine began to exercise a broader appeal among the Ukrainian emigration. Characteristic of this trend was a letter from one Ukrainian living in Rumania to a young Sovietophile Mykola Leontovych saying that they should not fall out of contact merely because Leontovych had adopted a pro-Soviet orientation: 'the time is such that we all have to be just Ukrainians, Ukrainians and Ukrainians, and to the devil with any party differences! [...]. It will be so between us when we hear only "Ukrainian" and "Ukraine" and we do not hear "Soviet", "Hetmanite" or "Petliurite" [...] for a brother must not sell or kill a brother, as do all our parties'.⁷⁷³ The extract shows how the common émigré demand to place national interests above those of the party could, in the right circumstances, actually benefit the Soviet regime in that it accepted the Soviets into the Ukrainian national fold. Indeed, after 1923 it became easier to support the Soviet regime for national reasons. It was typical of the growth of Sovietophilism among West Ukrainians that whereas before the March decision the Soviet authorities had sought collaborators on the planned publication from among émigrés from the Eastern Ukraine, Semen Vityk, the man who was finally chosen to become the editor of the journal, was from Eastern Galicia. Vityk had been a founding member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in Eastern Galicia and had achieved some popularity as a peasant agitator. He had been a leader of the pro-Polish wing of the party which sought to coordinate the activity of the Ukrainian Social Democratic movement with that of the Polish sister party. He served as the USDP's representative in the Reichsrat. However, in 1913 he was forced out of the Social Democratic club in Vienna following a financial scandal. During the revolutions, he had been a fervent supporter of the complete unification of the ZUNR with the UNR. This position brought him into conflict with the head of the ZUNR Petrushevych; a conflict which intensified after Vityk was

772 Quoted in Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', No.6, p.42.

773 Russian translation of a letter from P. Horbun to M. Leontovych, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1738 ark.147; TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.145.

appointed head of the UNR's Ministry for the Affairs of the Western Part of the Republic.⁷⁷⁴ In the emigration he had led *Iednist*, the Ukrainian workers organisation in Vienna. Many of *Iednist*'s members were East Galician Ukrainians who had travelled to the Habsburg capital before the war; others had fled the Polish occupation. From an early stage *Iednist* had begun to display signs of Sovietophilism. For example, in October 1920, it had hosted a meeting of Ukrainian Social Democrats, Communists and Socialist Revolutionaries who had made a declaration calling for the creation of an independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in union with the Russian Soviet Republic. Many members of *Iednist* immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine and applied for membership of the KP(b)U.⁷⁷⁵

The archives do not reveal exactly when the Soviet authorities started considering Semen Vityk as a prospective candidate for the post of editor of the new journal. Certainly, in March 1923 Vityk's appeal 'To the workers and peasants of Galicia, Kholm, Volhynia, Polissia and Pidliasha' had come to the attention of the Soviet authorities, for it was translated into Russian for the members of the Central Committee. The declaration was issued in response to the ambassadors' decision on Eastern Galicia, and took the opportunity to damn the past attempts to seek a solution to the Ukrainian question with the help of the West. Like Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyi, Vityk remained very much in the tradition of Ukrainian populism which saw the national and social oppression of the Ukraine as linked, and requiring the same solution: 'only the further march of the revolution will free the Ukrainian nation from the yoke of foreign domination and only the social revolution can bring about its complete liberation in the towns and villages from the yoke of capitalist and aristocratic bondage'. The bulk of the text concentrates on the perfidy of the capitalist Entente and feudal Poland and Rumania, and though revolution is described as the only salvation for the Ukraine, the exact role which the Soviet Union

774 On Vityk's role in the UPSD before the First World War see Jobst, *Zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus*; for his activity during the revolution see Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.167-8, 232-3, 235.

775 Copy of the resolutions of the *Ukrainske robotnyche viche u Vidni*, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.14 ark.33; appendices of the Orgbiuro and Sekretariat KP(b)U on the acceptance of new members to the party from other parties or who had been abroad, 16.01.1926, 03.07.1926 and 15.09.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2209 ark.22, 42, 69. For more on *Iednist* also see *Nova hromada*, February-April 1924, II-IV, pp.122-3.

should play in this is not dealt with; indeed the new state is barely mentioned in the appeal. However, Vityk did claim that only 'the power of the armed Ukrainian proletariat' could defeat Poland and Rumania, and to illustrate this he drew the contrast between the Bolsheviks and Petrushevych: while the Red Army was fighting, and indeed defeating, Poland and the Petliurists, Petrushevych was negotiating with the Poles, trying to maintain his neutrality during the campaign against Poland in the belief that independence should be gained by diplomacy.⁷⁷⁶

It is unclear whether it was this declaration that convinced the Soviet authorities that Vityk was suitable for the post of editor of the *smenovekhovskii* journal, or whether Vityk was already cooperating with the Bolsheviks when he made this appeal. Either way, the March decision clearly encouraged Western Ukrainians to take part in the journal. Apart from Vityk, another important East Galician émigré to contribute to the journal was the modernist writer Antin Krushelnytskyi, who before the war had been a member of radical circles in Eastern Galicia and during the revolution had served the UNR government as minister of education. From the areas of the former Romanov empire occupied by Poland there was Marko Lutskevych, the cooperative and political leader who was elected to the Polish Sejm in 1922 only to be expelled shortly afterwards for attacking the Polish state in his speeches. There were also contributors who had been members of the Ukrainian workers' organisation in Vienna *lednist*.

Despite the prominent role taken by Western Ukrainians, there were still Eastern Ukrainians who worked on the journal. The most prominent member was Mariian Melenevskyi, who before the war had been one of the first members of the old Ukrainian emigration to adopt Marxism. He had been a member of the RUP, the *Spilka* and the USDRP, had fled the tsars to Lviv and during the First World War had been a member of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine. Many of the writers wrote under a penname. One, S-i, might have been Siryi, that is Iurii Tyshchenko, the friend of Vynnychenko's who had been mentioned before as a possible contributor. Another contributor to *Nova hromada*, who later rose to prominence within the Ukrainian intellectual

776 'To the Ukrainian workers and peasants of Galicia, Kholm, Volhynia, Polissia and Pidl'iasha' by Vasyl Pyrih and Semen Vityk, 24.03.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.36-40.

community, was Nadiia Surovtsova. Surovtsova had left the Ukraine as a foreign representative of the UNR. She settled in Vienna, where she wrote a doctoral thesis on Ukrainian history and became the first East Ukrainian woman to receive a PhD. In the Austrian capital she was involved with Hrushevskiy's committee for famine relief in the Ukraine. Through this work she came into contact with the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Austria, which, as has already been mentioned, allowed her to witness at first hand the evidence for Soviet Ukrainian statehood and Bolshevik support for the Ukrainian culture. Presented with exemplars of the Ukrainian press, Ukrainian books and Ukrainian passports she began to believe that the Bolsheviks really had seen their mistakes and had come to care about the national question. To Surovtsova, the Communists seemed to be doing practical work, while the émigrés were impotent.⁷⁷⁷

With the question of the editor of the journal solved, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks set about establishing the principles along which the journal should be run. One of the most important was that of control: the journal should be closely overseen by the Soviet authorities. The Orgbiuro of the KP(b)U suggested that the methods of control should be similar to those established for *Nakanune*.⁷⁷⁸ The central party organs should remain informed of the content of the paper and twelve copies should be set aside for the Politburo and Orgbiuro. However, for some reason, there seem to have been problems with this, and complaints were sent to Kaliuzhnyi that he did not send enough copies of the journal.⁷⁷⁹ The Soviet Ukrainian authorities were also very keen to ensure that no-one who was compromised by their past activity should work on the journal. New contributors should be vetted by Kaliuzhnyi, Levytskyi and Aussem.⁷⁸⁰

777 Surovtsova, *Spohady*, pp.109, 139, 141-2.

778 Minutes of the Orgbiuro TsK KP(b)U, 29.08.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.7 spr.28 ark.119zv.

779 Minutes of the Orgbiuro TsK KP(b)U, 22.09.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.7 spr.28 ark.137; Shlikhter to Kaliuzhnyi, 05.07.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.111; Liubchenko to Kvirring, 19.12.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.121-2.

780 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 23.11.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.144zv.

Nova Hromada

The Sovietophile journal was named *Nova hromada* (The New Community), perhaps a reference to the émigré socialist organ *Hromada*, which was published by Drahomanov in Geneva in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The first issue of *Nova hromada* appeared in July 1923. It had been created to bring about the dissolution of the Ukrainian emigration, including the military units interned in Poland and the intelligentsia community. It should not call for the independence of the Ukraine, or even suggest that Bolshevik policies aimed to promote this in the future; instead, the advantages of the union with Russia should be stressed. No criticism of the Soviet Ukraine, even 'well-intentioned', should appear on the organ's pages. The organ had to respond to the 'lies' about Bolshevik hostility to Ukrainian culture by pointing to Ukrainianisation. It was especially important to counter the claims by left-wing émigrés like Shapoval and Vynnychenko that the NEP was a retreat from socialism. While doing this, *Nova hromada* should maintain an outward appearance of independence: its worth should lie in the fact that it was not an official organ, but rather an example of the Ukrainian intelligentsia's desire to come to terms with the Bolshevik regime. Both Shumskyi and Rakovskii had argued that the mass of the Ukrainian emigration was left wing, and *Nova hromada* clearly had to take account of this. At the same time, there was a lot of suspicion in the Soviet government and among the foreign representatives towards the émigrés cooperating in the project. The Bolsheviks had repeatedly stressed that close monitoring of the journal was essential in order to avoid it being turned into a Trojan Horse in which unsympathetic elements could return to the Soviet Ukraine. It is therefore unsurprising that *Nova hromada* lacked the tensions and contradictions which had plagued *Nova doba* and *Boritiesia-poborete!*. Nevertheless, despite the apparent simplicity of the new publication, an analysis of *Nova hromada* is interesting and worthwhile because it shows both how the Ukrainian Sovietophiles continued to express and adapt their pre-war populist heritage and how the changes which took place in post-war political thought also affected the Ukrainian left in the emigration.

Vityk continued to stress the ideas he had stated in the March appeal to West Ukrainian workers and peasants: that the victory of the proletariat could only

be founded on the support of an independent nation, and that equally the liberation of the nation and the preservation of its cultural achievements could only be based on the victory of the proletarian mass; now, of course, he made it clear that the successes of the Soviet Union were also those of the world proletariat.⁷⁸¹ On the national liberation of the Ukrainian people, *Nova hromada* emphasised two elements: the acquisition of Ukrainian statehood and the development of Ukrainian culture. In the opening article of the first issue of *Nova hromada* 'Ukraina i svitovi podii' (The Ukraine and World Events) Vityk wrote: 'The Soviet Ukraine, as a state organism, has its own government and constitution, which have been fully formed, is entering international relations with other powers, [and] is therefore a state unity'.⁷⁸² *Nova hromada* regularly reminded its readers that the Bolsheviks had recognised the equality and sovereignty of peoples and the right of self-determination up to secession and the creation of a new state.⁷⁸³

Nova hromada was therefore especially concerned to refute the accusation that the relationship with Russia in any way detracted from the independent statehood of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Vityk and Kharchenko provided a number of arguments in favour of the Union between Russia and the Ukraine: for example, it was a natural consequence of the two countries' geographical position, and it was a response to the threat from world-wide capitalism and reaction. More fundamentally, the solidarity of Soviet republics based on the unity of the labouring masses offered a new solution to the national question. The bourgeois ideology of the nation state had shown its redundancy: in Poland and Rumania it had led to further colonisation and imperialism; in the Balkans it threatened to be the cause of new wars. In contrast, a union of socialist republics represented a concentration of general consumption and the preservation by separate nations of their own cultures, while also creating a power which was capable of defeating its enemies and maintaining its internal freedom. Lastly, the Union gave the Ukraine added weight in the world and increased the likelihood of the unification of the Western Ukrainian territories

781 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.12, 19; May-September 1924, V-VI, p.13.

782 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, p.8.

783 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, p.2; January 1924, I, p.8; February-April 1924, II-IV, pp.3-5.

with the Soviet Ukraine.⁷⁸⁴ *Nova hromada* regularly highlighted how Russia supported the Soviet Ukraine in protecting the rights of the Ukrainians in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, for example publishing notes and statements by Rakovskii and Chicherin condemning Poland's treatment of her Ukrainian subjects.⁷⁸⁵ The Soviet authorities had, of course, emphasised the need to stress the advantages of the Union during their discussions on the creation of a Sovietophile journal.

Nova hromada also argued that the Union guaranteed the free development of Ukrainian culture. *Nova hromada* was a journal written by members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and was therefore very interested in the development of Ukrainian culture under the Soviet regime. Following the introduction of Ukrainianisation it was not difficult for the writers of the journal to find examples of Soviet support for Ukrainian culture. Two elements were especially important for the *Nova hromada* group: the development of a Ukrainian system of education, from primary school to university level, and the achievements in Ukrainian high culture. *Nova hromada* hoped to prove not only that this new Ukrainian culture was Ukrainian, but also that it was proletarian. In the first issue of the journal, Antin Krushelnytskyi argued that the Soviet Ukraine had successfully Ukrainianised the school program of Ukrainian schools by making it relevant to Ukrainian workers and peasants; thus, for him, Ukrainianisation went hand in hand with proletarianisation.⁷⁸⁶ Semen Vityk described how within the Ukraine 'a new revolutionary literature of labouring Ukraine' created by 'wholes Pleiades of young proletarian and peasant writers, who came to literature from the plough and the mineshaft, from the factory line and from the Red Army barracks – all this has grown against the background of the October revolution and Soviet life'. He also recounted how theatre in the Ukraine had taken on a new lease of life and was 'conquering the denationalised town and the urban masses of the Ukraine for Ukrainian culture'. The Soviet Ukraine, not Eastern Galicia, was now the Ukrainian cultural Piedmont.⁷⁸⁷ The journal sought to acquaint its reader with these developments, through, for example, articles on industrial motifs in rural

784 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.10-11, 20; October-November 1923, III-IV, p.9.

785 *Nova hromada*, May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.11, 83-4, 103-7.

786 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.71-2.

787 *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, p.15-7. The quotation is on p.16.

poetry,⁷⁸⁸ detailed statistics on the Ukrainianisation of schools⁷⁸⁹ and reports on the development of a scientific Ukrainian language.⁷⁹⁰ This had also been an important point for the Bolsheviks; as mentioned above, at the end of 1922 Rakovskii had called for the proposed journal to publish statistics which would disprove émigré claims that the Bolsheviks did not allow Ukrainian books to reach the schools or villages.⁷⁹¹

With respect to social liberation, *Nova hromada* put forward arguments which have already been encountered in *Nova doba* and *Boritiesia-poborete!*. Like these two journals, *Nova hromada* contended that one could either stand on the side of revolution or on that of reaction: support for the revolution entailed support for Soviet Russia; anything else would mean helping the powers of reaction and world capitalism.⁷⁹² As a number of contributors to the journal argued, the Ukrainian revolution had been made possible by the Russian revolution, and the Union with Russia ensured the preservation of the achievements of the Ukrainian revolution in a hostile world.⁷⁹³ Therefore, the Ukrainian state owed its existence to the Russian proletariat, for by overthrowing the tsar and the Russian bourgeois it had made the creation of such a state possible.⁷⁹⁴ Moreover, the Russian proletariat was the leader of the world proletariat. Even the British Labour Party criticised the preparations made by its country's bourgeoisie and capitalists against the Soviet Union, while at a Socialist Congress in Hamburg the parties of the Second International said that in the event of war they would stand on the side of the Soviet republics.⁷⁹⁵

However, the real measure of the social liberation of Ukrainian peasants and workers had to be the material benefits which they gained through economic development in the Soviet Union. Melenevskyyi argued that the Bolsheviks' policy towards the village had combined 'the correct synthesis of the new socio-economic relations and the old cultural-ideological remnants of the vil-

788 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.79-83.

789 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.167-9; May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.125-8.

790 *Nova hromada*, May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.128-9.

791 Rakovskii to TsK KP(b)U, 02.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.136-7.

792 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.13, 18; February-April 1924, II-IV, p.29.

793 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.6-7, 20-1; May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.10-1.

794 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, p.11.

795 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.7-8.

lage, coming to a purely *revolutionary* and not a utopian socialist program: "all land to the peasants without compensation *to the division of property*."⁷⁹⁶ The first stage of the revolution had been achieved through the redistribution of the land. However, this was only a stage towards a higher level of collectivisation, and the basis of this development would be the existing peasant cooperatives.⁷⁹⁷ Peasant cooperatives had been a mainstay of the Ukrainian national movement, and in presenting collectivisation as a simple extension of the cooperative movement, Melenevskyi sought to show how the Soviet regime addressed traditional Ukrainian concerns in a manner familiar to his readers.

Indeed, the populist interest in the peasantry was evident throughout *Nova hromada*. Vityk stressed how 'the organisations of poor peasants [... had been] drawn into the circles of state interests and into participation in power itself on all its levels from the lowest to the highest',⁷⁹⁸ and *Nova hromada* sought to prove that this newfound influence was showing its results. The 'Khronika' section carried detailed reports and statistics on the rebuilding of the Ukrainian economy, but paid special attention to the advantages which the peasants received from Soviet economic planning. At the same time, one of the Bolsheviks' concerns had been that the journal should refute the charges made by Vynnychenko and Shapoval that the NEP was a retreat from Communism.⁷⁹⁹ Consequently, *Nova hromada* clearly spelled out that the policy was an attempt to rebuild the Ukrainian economy and that capitalism was not being allowed back into the country.⁸⁰⁰

According to *Nova hromada*, these developments in the Ukrainian economy promoted not only the social liberation of the Ukrainian masses, but also their national freedom. The Soviet Union was praised for creating a Ukrainian national economy. Vityk argued that the Soviet regime had overcome the old imperialist structure of production, whereby the regions provided the centre with raw materials for finishing work, 'abolishing also those privileges and in-

796 *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, p.29.

797 *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, p.34. Separate articles were also devoted to the cooperatives themselves. See *Nova hromada*, January 1924, I, pp.21-32.

798 *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, pp.14-5.

799 Rakovskii to TsK KP(b)U, 02.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.136-7.

800 *Nova hromada*, February-April 1924, II-IV, pp.17-8. See also *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, p.15.

roducing factories to where there are raw materials'.⁸⁰¹ Again, the theme of the interconnectedness of social and national liberation is evident: the Soviet organisation of the economy along national lines strengthened Ukrainian statehood, and brought direct material benefits for Ukrainian workers and peasants.

This was not the only way in which *Nova hromada* drew on the populist tradition. The foundation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was described as the culmination of centuries of struggle by the Ukrainian people for social and national liberation. A commonplace of the Sovietophile journal was that these Ukrainian working masses had a long tradition of fighting against national and social oppression, stretching throughout the centuries: 'If the Ukrainian elites lost hope in the independent life of the Ukraine, then the popular masses themselves maintained the, albeit, it is perhaps true, inexactly and unclearly formulated, Ukrainian state tradition and defended it with its own strength, because it is only possible thus to understand correctly the content of the Ukrainian popular movements: the *Haidamaky*, *Kolyvshchyna*, the flight of the *Zaporozhians* in Turkey and the peasant disturbances in the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, which erupted again with such unheard-of force at the beginning of the twentieth century and were the clearest popular protest against their subjugation'. In this way, the creation of the Soviet Ukraine was an expression of the true character of the Ukrainian people. As Vityk rhetorically asked, 'is it possible within the creation of such a Ukrainian state from below, from the peasants and workers of the Ukraine, to talk of a Muscovite-Bolshevik occupation?'.⁸⁰²

The juxtaposition of the treacherous elites with the betrayed masses, evident in the above quotation, was common to the populist school of historiography dominant among Ukrainian historians in the second half of the nineteenth century, as can be seen in the works of Volodymyr Antonovych. In *Nova hromada* the Ukrainian elites were regularly accused of accommodating themselves to the oppressing powers and thereby of letting down the people

801 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, p.5-6.

802 May-September 1924, V-VI, p.2-3. *Nova hromada*, February-April 1924, II-IV, p.15.

whom they should have led.⁸⁰³ In the same vein, the Central Rada and leadership of the ZUNR were charged with being counter-revolutionaries: in resisting the October revolution they had betrayed the wishes of the Ukrainian people and sought to bring the country under the imperial yoke of first Germany and then the Entente.⁸⁰⁴ Thus the populist tradition merged easily with the Bolshevik desire to bring the leaders of the UNR and ZUNR into disrepute.

In this way, the contributors to *Nova hromada* were continuing the tradition of Ukrainian populism. However, though many of the commonplaces of the pre-war populist intelligentsia were ingrained in the thinking of the *Nova hromada* group, they publicly renounced the representatives of that tradition who had served in the UNR and ZUNR governments. One reason for this apparent paradox is the fact that several of *Nova hromada*'s leading contributors, including Vityk and Krushelnytskyi, were actually members of the pre-war intelligentsia and had served in the governments of which the journal was so critical. Some had been bitter opponents of the more conservative elements in these governments, as can be seen in the feud between Vityk and Petrushevych. The condemnation of the 'pre-war' intelligentsia was often specifically an attack on former colleagues and rivals.

In criticising the old West Ukrainian intelligentsia, the language and arguments used by *Nova hromada* often resembled those of the far-right nationalist groups which were emerging in this period. Both groups attacked, for example, the Galician tradition of parliamentarianism fostered during the Habsburg period. In one article in *Nova hromada* with the title 'Rozval i bahno (Dopys iz Lvova)' (Ruin and Swamp [A Letter from Lviv]), the author wrote of the Galician politicians that 'their psychology is as tame and obedient as the calf which drew its inspiration from Lviv or Vienna through their deputies-representatives'.⁸⁰⁵ Similarly in *Zahrava*, the journal of the new extremist right edited by Dmytro Dontsov, the Galician parties were described as 'considerably incriminated [in the original in German: *erheblich belastet*] by the fact that

803 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, p.4. See also *Nova hromada*, May-September 1924, V-VI, p.16, which deals with the situation in Sub-Carpathian Rus and pointed to the willingness of the intelligentsia there to become assimilated by the Magyars.

804 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.5-6, 19-20, 35-8; August 1923, II, pp.8-9; October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.7-9; February-April 1924, II-IV, p.12-3.

805 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, p.123.

they were instructed in the Viennese parliament and on the *Ballhausplatz* over the course of many years'.⁸⁰⁶ Both journals saw the willingness of some parts of Galician society to cooperate with the Poles after the war as a product of this political education. The renunciation of moderation caused by the March decision had benefited both the extreme left and the extreme right, and consequently their criticism of the centre used very similar language.

Indeed, the character of *Nova hromada* was fundamentally shaped by the March decision. The journal both expressed and capitalised on the disenchantment caused by the decision. As Kharchenko wrote, in response to the recognition of Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia 'our old national ideals, old worldviews, former methods of struggle, ancient and recent, have become bankrupt'. The Western Ukraine could not be freed by her own forces or with the aid of the Western powers – only the Soviet Ukraine could now liberate the territories under Polish rule.⁸⁰⁷ This was a theme which ran throughout all six issues of the journal. 'All the subjugated masses of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine', claimed one article on the Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, 'desire unification with the Ukrainian masses of the whole Ukraine, seeing in them their liberation from ancient feudal servitude'.⁸⁰⁸ The intelligentsia, argued the journal, should take a leading role in the struggle to fulfil this yearning.⁸⁰⁹ One consequence of this was that the journal devoted more space to the problems of the West Ukrainian lands under Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia than to the emigration which it had been created to combat. *Nova hromada* gave lengthy descriptions of how the Polish, Rumanian and Czechoslovakian governments oppressed their Ukrainian population, promoting for example Russification in the school system or using land reform to increase the number of peasants of the titular nationality in Ukrainian areas.⁸¹⁰ It repeatedly condemned the Ukrainian national elites in these areas for being either incapable of resisting the attacks or of being complicit in them, in that they col-

806 *Zahrava*, 15 March 1923, No.4, p.50.

807 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp. 42, 44. The quotation is on p.42.

808 *Nova hromada*, May-September 1924, V-VI, p.49. Similar statements can also be found in *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, pp.12-4 and October-November 1923, III-IV, p.41.

809 *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, p.22.

810 *Nova hromada*, August 1923, II, pp.78-83; October-November 1923, III-IV, p.70; May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.47-9.

laborated with the foreign governments in order to maintain their own social position.⁸¹¹

Poland, which held the largest tract of Ukrainian land outside the Soviet Ukraine, came in for the greatest criticism. As A. Kharchenko observed, Poland 'was always a fateful neighbour, an enemy of its [the Ukraine's] independence and culture'. Although Russia under the tsars and provisional government had played a similar role in the past to that of Poland, the new Russia under the Soviets was not the same.⁸¹² Thus, though both Russia and Poland had been national enemies of the Ukraine, only the latter continued to be so, because it remained a bourgeois state. Every issue of the journal contained articles describing the plight of the Ukrainians under Poland, and a sub-section of the 'Khronika' was dedicated to Poland and its Ukrainian lands.⁸¹³ *Nova hromada* was always keen to show how the Polish state oppressed not only its national minorities, but also its own working classes, and it regularly reported the arrest of Polish Communists.⁸¹⁴ The journal emphasised that Poland was a product of the Versailles peace settlement. In this way, *Nova hromada* used the country as an example of how the capitalist form of state organisation was not a solution to the national question; only the creation of a federation of Soviet socialist republics could satisfy national desires.⁸¹⁵

Nova hromada did not entirely neglect the emigration. A number of contributors called on the Ukrainian émigrés to return to their country; in the words of Kharchenko 'the one conclusion for all of us who for this or that reason find themselves abroad is: *everyone [must go] home, everyone [must go] to live and work!*'⁸¹⁶ Nadiia Surovtsova ridiculed the idea of a 'task' among the emigration, for example, in preserving Ukrainian cultural values. She pointed to

811 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp. 92-3, 124; May-September 1924, V-VI, p.37.

812 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, p.19.

813 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.9, 51-4, 75-7; October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.72-8, 92-100; May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.87-8.

814 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, 176- 86; May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.132-8.

815 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.24-6.

816 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.21, 33, 39-40; October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.101-2; May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.6-7. The quotation appears at July 1923, I, p.21.

the poverty of Ukrainian schools in the emigration and accused them of imparting nothing more than a pseudo-patriotism. Those who received grants to study in foreign universities lost their national identity. It was far better for Ukrainian youth to return home and study in the universities of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Equally, Ukrainian academics in the emigration were unable to make a contribution to the development of Ukrainian culture because they could achieve very little when deprived of their archives. It would be better for them to return home for there were many students and few professors to teach them.⁸¹⁷

Nova hromada also published articles which attacked the Ukrainian émigré groups, above all the Petliurists (that is, the followers of Petliura) and the group led by Shapoval and Vynnychenko. These attacks dealt with the émigrés' failings as both Ukrainians and socialists. 'Petliurism' was damned as 'the most shameless adventurism': it had conceded Ukrainian ethnic territory to the oppressive regimes of Poland and Rumania; it aided Russian reaction, the only force which could profit from the collapse of the Soviet Union, by advocating intervention in the Soviet Ukraine; it had delivered the UNR army into Polish internment camps.⁸¹⁸ *Nova hromada* sought to prove that Shapoval and Vynnychenko were no longer socialists. Vityk, for example, quoted passages from *Boritiesia-poborete!* to show that Shapoval had been disowned by his own party. For Vityk, Shapoval and Vynnychenko were no better than Petliura; the only difference was that whereas Petliura received support from Poland, Shapoval and Vynnychenko were maintained by Czechoslovakia.⁸¹⁹

During the debate on the creation of a Sovietophile journal, the Soviet Ukrainian authorities had stressed the need to disperse the Petliurite soldiers interned in Poland. Given the perceived threat posed by these military units along the border of the Soviet Ukraine, the many attacks against Petliura and his supporters in *Nova hromada* are understandable. The concentration on Shapoval and Vynnychenko requires, perhaps, more explanation. *Nova hromada* itself noted that Vynnychenko's Democratic National Front 'never ex-

817 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.101-2.

818 *Nova hromada*, February-April 1924, II-IV, pp.89-100. The quotation is on p.99.

819 *Nova hromada*, January 1924, I, pp.2-6; February-April 1924, II-IV, pp.19-20.

tended beyond the doors of the bars of Prague and Vienna',⁸²⁰ and therefore did not pose the same threat as the Petliurists. However, Vynnychenko and Shapoval were seen as dangerous because the Soviet authorities thought that the Ukrainian emigration was made up of left-wing peasants and democratic socialist intelligentsia who were susceptible to the attacks by Vynnychenko and Shapoval on the NEP.⁸²¹ Indeed, it seems that both the Soviet authorities and *Nova hromada* found their condemnation of the New Economic Policy as a retreat from Communism especially irksome because it cast aspersions on the authenticity of the Bolsheviks' socialism; this was infuriating for a party which claimed to be the only correct interpreter of Marx.

Nevertheless, the greater emphasis given by *Nova hromada* to questions concerning the West Ukrainian lands is evident. In total, there were roughly fifty percent more articles on the Western Ukraine than on the emigration. The long debate among the Soviet authorities over the establishment of a Sovietophile journal meant that when the first issue of the publication came out, over a year after the idea had been first raised, the situation had fundamentally changed. Following the March decision, it was natural for the Ukrainian Sovietophiles to write about the iniquities in Eastern Galicia, and therefore also in the other West Ukrainian territories. The resolution on the province had also encouraged Western Ukrainians to work on the journal. Semen Vityk, the journal's editor, was from Galicia; many other prominent contributors to the journal, for example Antin Krushelnytskyi and Marko Lutskevych, also came from the territories then outside the Soviet Ukraine. At the same time, according to Rakovskii, Levytskyi and Kaliuzhnyi, Sovietophilism among the Eastern Ukrainian emigration was in decline. The difficulties of founding a group of East Ukrainian Sovietophiles have been described above: many of those from the Eastern Ukraine who had been willing to cooperate with the Soviet regime had either already returned or they had argued with the Bolsheviks in such a way that cooperation was impossible. In these circumstances, the greater concentration on the affairs of the Western Ukraine is understandable.

820 *Nova hromada*, February-April 1924, II-IV, p.43.

821 Rakovskii to TsK KP(b)U, 02.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1029 ark.136-7.

This emphasis also reflected the direction which Soviet Ukrainian foreign policy was taking. This may be seen in a document prepared by Shumskyi in May 1923 called 'The Theses of our Politics towards the Ukrainian Regions occupied by Poland and Rumania'. He noted that the Ukrainian nationalist movement in these areas was experiencing a pronounced attraction 'towards the Soviet Ukraine as the only saviour from the szlachta-boyar yoke after the final collapse of the illusory hope in the League of Nations'. The Soviet Ukrainian government should therefore refuse to recognise the occupation of these territories and support the national movements within them in order to destabilise the Polish and Rumanian states.⁸²² The Bolsheviks hoped that Ukrainianisation would make the Soviet Ukraine attractive to the Western Ukrainians as a centre for their national aspirations, the Ukrainian 'Piedmont' which would be the agent of unification.⁸²³ At the same time, the Soviet Ukrainian government began to view the East Ukrainian emigration as less threatening than it had been. On 28th November 1924, the Politburo decided that the 'work with regards to the dispersal of the Ukrainian emigration is considered completed, with the exception of the work among the Ukrainian youth, which will continue'.⁸²⁴ The change in emphasis became fully evident in the Politburo's resolutions of August 1925 on the tasks of Soviet Ukrainian foreign policy. The Politburo decided 'that the basic work of Ukrainian advisors abroad is the work among the emigration from the Western Ukrainian lands in the direction of the creation of an irredenta'. At the same time, it was considered necessary 'to continue as secondary work the dissolution of the Eastern Ukrainian emigration, achieving the crossing over of its best part to the side of the Soviet regime'.⁸²⁵ The Ukrainian Politburo had not lost all interest in the East Ukrainian emigration, but it had assumed a subordinate role in Kharkiv's considerations.

It is unclear whether this change in policy also led to the closure of the Sovietophile journal. There are some indications that the journal was never quite

822 'Theses of Soviet Foreign Policy towards the Ukrainian Lands of Poland and Rumania', May 1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.47-8. The quotation is on ark.47.

823 Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, p.9.

824 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 28.11.1924, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.144.

825 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 21.08.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.221.

what the Ukrainian Bolsheviks had hoped it would be. When the project had first been discussed, the Bolsheviks had wanted to produce a weekly or bi-monthly publication.⁸²⁶ In fact, only six issues appeared between July 1923 and September 1924; the last issue was dated May-September 1924. A lack of funds may have been one reason for this. On 23rd November 1923, the Politburo resolved that it was necessary to continue publishing *Nova hromada*, but that Kaliuzhnyi and Levytskyi should be given the opportunity to reduce the costs.⁸²⁷ The decision certainly gives the impression that financial problems had called the further existence of the journal into question even at that very early stage in its activity. *Nova hromada* had been established with the aim of bringing about the dissolution of the Ukrainian emigration; now that the émigrés were no longer viewed as a threat, perhaps the publication was no longer needed. This view is, however, difficult to reconcile with the fact that *Nova hromada*, too, gave more attention to the West Ukrainian lands than it did to the emigration. It is, however, possible that because the journal was set up as a émigré organ the Soviet authorities always viewed it as such, despite the emphasis it placed on West Ukrainian affairs, and that it was, therefore, a victim of the change in Soviet Ukrainian policy. It must also be remembered that *Nakanune*, the Soviet-supported journal of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, was shut down in June 1924 because the recognition of the Soviet Union by the Western powers in the first half of the year had deprived the organ of its primary purpose, to campaign for the acknowledgement of the USSR.⁸²⁸ Perhaps the closure of the Russian *Nakanune* made the survival of its Ukrainian counterpart untenable.

However, there is also reason to believe that even if the Soviet authorities had wanted to continue publishing the journal in order to promote Sovietophilism among the population of the West Ukrainian territories, *Nova hromada* was not a suitable tool for such a task. During the debate on creating a Sovietophile journal within the emigration, the Bolsheviks had stressed that the new organ should not be Bolshevik: it should at least outwardly seem independent. Moreover, when the Bolsheviks came to review their policy towards the Western Ukrainian lands, they stressed the need of working with all

826 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 08.09.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.30 ark.64.

827 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 23.11.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.144zv.

828 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, pp.159-60.

anti-Polish parties, including those which represented the petty bourgeoisie.⁸²⁹ However, the contributors to *Nova hromada* increasingly began to present themselves as Soviet, albeit in an understanding which gave a very high priority to national liberation; indeed, they began to attack the appearance of Sovietophilism among the West Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie. Contempt for this sort of Sovietophilism can be seen clearly in an article written by Ivan Horodynskyy: 'The bankruptcy of the orientation towards the Entente, the certain decadence in the politico-social life in our region and the Polish state's intolerable policy of extermination – these are the main causes of that hang-over which under the name of "Sovietophilism" has taken hold of the heads of the Galician patriots. Not a change in world view under the influence of the whole series of events of historical importance in the last decade, but rather hopelessness, despair, deficiency in strength of character and an education in the old Greek Catholic [sviatoiurskii] schools compel the contemporary Ukrainian petty bourgeois intelligentsia to cast their gaze towards red Kyiv'. In contrast, the Ukrainian labouring masses did not turn to the East out of a tactical manoeuvre, but rather because they saw the Soviet Union as the means of their liberation.⁸³⁰ A number of contributors to *Nova hromada* wrote that such 'petty bourgeois' Sovietophiles had misunderstood the true nature of Ukrainianisation by hoping that it would lead to the achievement of nationalist goals: they saw only the form of Ukrainianisation and not its content. According to *Nova hromada*, the substance of the policy was the creation of a new form of social life, the distribution of land to the poor peasants and the transfer of all power to the labouring workers and peasants; those who feared revolution should also be afraid of Ukrainianisation.⁸³¹ By attacking the very class which the Soviet Ukrainian government wanted to use to destabilise the Polish state, *Nova hromada* did not really match the requirements of Soviet Ukrainian foreign policy in the mid-1920s.

Unlike the groups around *Nova doba* and *Boritiesia-poborete!*, which were independent party organisations, the contributors to *Nova hromada* were dependent upon the Bolsheviks: the organ was created and funded by Kharkiv

829 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 21.08.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.221.

830 *Nova hromada*, February-April 1924, II-IV, p.55.

831 *Nova hromada*, January 1924, I, p.38; February-April 1924, II-IV, p.28.

as a tool to bring about the dissolution of the Ukrainian emigration. However, as *Nova hromada's* stance on Sovietophilism demonstrates, Vityk and his colleagues had a very different image of themselves than that held by Kharkiv: whereas the émigrés portrayed themselves as genuine converts to the Soviet system, the Bolshevik leadership saw them as nothing more than a temporary instrument. This can also be seen in the differing understandings of the relationship of *Nova hromada* to *smenovekhovstvo*. As we have seen, the Bolsheviks understood *Nova hromada* to be a Ukrainian *Nakanune*; they described the organ as a *smenovekhovskii* journal and its contributors as *smenovekhovtsy*. For its part, *Nova hromada* denied the émigré accusations that it had anything in common with *smenovekhovstvo*. It damned the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* as Russian chauvinists who failed to understand that the true nature of the 'East European revolution' was the triumph of the workers and peasants. The journal rejected the *smenovekhovtsy's* desire for the evolution of the Soviet system. In contrast, *Nova hromada* described itself as the response by the émigré Ukrainian intelligentsia to the new life being created by the labouring masses in the Ukraine. Émigré allegations that the journal's writers were *smenovekhovtsy* were an attempt by Ukrainian 'counter-revolutionaries' to slander the group with the slur that it served a 'one and indivisible' Russia.⁸³²

Another possible source of conflict was the attempt towards the end of 1923 or the beginning of 1924 by the *Nova hromada* group to create a civic committee of '*povorottsy*' with the journal as its organ. This could be understood as plan by Vityk and his colleagues to establish a broader, more independent, political movement. The Bolsheviks, who as this chapter has shown were suspicious of any signs of autonomy among the Sovietophiles, gave an ambiguous response to the proposal: though the Politburo refused to subsidise the project, it said it had nothing against *Nova hromada* becoming the organ of the civic committee.⁸³³ Even if the committee was founded, it does not seem to have made any noticeable mark on the development of Ukrainian

832 See the series of articles on 'Smienoviekhovshchyna' by A. Prutskyi in *Nova hromada*, February-April 1924, II-IV, pp.54-67 and May-September 1924, V-VI, pp.1-13.

833 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 18.02.1924, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.23.

Sovietophilism – most probably because of the Bolsheviks' lukewarm response to the idea.

It still remains to be seen to what extent such differing positions limited the work of *Nova hromada* and whether they contributed to the closure of the journal. Certainly for some contributors to the journal, their activity on *Nova hromada* did represent an opportunity to prove their loyalty to the Soviet regime. Several of the *Nova hromada* group went to the Soviet Ukraine. One of the first to return was Kharchenko, whose letters describing the Soviet Ukraine from the inside were published in *Nova hromada*.⁸³⁴ The journal's editor Semen Vityk immigrated later and was accepted into the KP(b)U on 16th January 1926.⁸³⁵ Nadiia Surovtsova travelled back to the Ukraine in 1925. She had joined the Austrian Communist party in 1924 and following her return she applied to enter the KP(b)U.⁸³⁶ Both suffered the fate of many other Ukrainian returnees. Vityk worked for a time in a number of important journalistic posts until 1933, when he was arrested; he disappeared in prison. Surovtsova held a number of positions, for example working at the as the editor of the press office of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, but was arrested in 1927 and spent most of the following quarter-century in the Gulag.⁸³⁷

Nevertheless, participation in *Nova hromada* did not give the contributors to the paper an automatic right to enter the Soviet Ukraine. Marko Lutskevych had expressed his desire to travel to the Ukrainian SSR as early as 1923. There was some disagreement among those responsible for Ukrainian foreign policy as to how to respond to his request. In autumn 1923, Kviring received a report quoting a letter from Kaliuzhnyi in which the Soviet representative argued that Lutskevych should be allowed into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. He argued that Lutskevych was popular among Ukrainians and Belarusians for his opposition to the Polish state, had given Sovietophile lec-

834 *Nova hromada*, II, August 1923, p.89; I, January 1924, pp.48-54.

835 Appendices of the Orgbiuro and Sekretariat KP(b)U on the acceptance of new members to the party from other parties or who had been abroad, 16.01.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2209 ark.22.

836 Appendices of the Orgbiuro and Sekretariat KP(b)U on the acceptance of new members to the party from other parties or who had been abroad, 03.07.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2209 ark.42.

837 *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, pp.112, 621.

tures in Berlin and Prague and had contributed to a number of Sovietophile journals. According to the letter, he still had influence upon the left-wing groups in the Polish Sejm. However, the compiler of the report disagreed with Kaliuzhnyi. He argued that Lutskevych had lost his popularity in his homeland because he had left the land because of the prospect of a trial – this was against the advice of the Soviet representative in Poland, who had wanted him to stay as a means of strengthening his reputation. The report added that Lutskevych had become involved in a number of dubious adventures while in the emigration which had caused trouble even among the group he belonged to. This meant that his pro-Soviet speeches were worthless as propaganda. The report concluded that Lutskevych should not be allowed into the Ukraine; although Lutskevych could work as an agronomist, there was nothing special about such skills, and there were plenty of people who could do this work. This was followed by a letter from the Ukrainian representative in Poland, who denied having supported Lutskevych. Despite this opposition, Kaliuzhnyi's positive appraisal of Lutskevych seems to have decided the émigré's fate. In January 1924, the Politburo approved Lutskevych's request to take up Soviet citizenship.⁸³⁸

Most of the Sovietophile students from the Association of Student Citizens of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, who had collaborated on *Nova hromada*, remained in Prague. In March 1924, they formed a common student organisation with the Union of Russian Student Citizens of the RSFSR, which became known as the Union of Student Citizens of the USSR. In creating the new body, the Russian and Ukrainian groups claimed that one of the tasks of the October revolution had been to solve the national question – only in the USSR could all nations live in harmony; the formation of the joint student association should mirror this achievement.⁸³⁹ Certainly, the group's journal, *Our Banner*, had titles both in Ukrainian (*Nash prapor*) and Russian (*Nashe znamia*); however, almost the entire content was in Russian. The main goal of the students remained the acquisition of a Soviet consciousness so that they

838 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 21.01.1924, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.50 ark.9zv; report from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 14.11.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.86-7, and the Soviet Ukrainian representative to the TsK KP(b)U, undated, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.88-91.

839 *Nashe znamia/Nash prapor*, No.1, October 1924, pp.31-2.

could return to their country and take part in its reconstruction. *Nashe znamia* admitted that most of its members were not from the working class, but they had only been 17 or 18 at the time of the revolution and had needed to experience the pains of civil war and exile in order to come to a true understanding of the events they had witnessed. Thus, they were not *smenovkehovtsy* because they were not changing their signposts but rather choosing signposts for the first time.⁸⁴⁰

Despite their desire to become truly Soviet, the students had great difficulty travelling to the Soviet Union or acquiring Soviet citizenship. In 1927, the Ukrainian representative in the Soviet embassy in Prague complained to Kharkiv that it was not doing enough to support the students: of the 150 members of the Association of Student Citizens, only 8 had received a Soviet passport. The plenipotentiary therefore demanded that the achievement of citizenship be made easier, that the students receive the right to return to the Ukraine after they had finished their courses and more be done to publicise cultural life in the Soviet Ukraine.⁸⁴¹ The position of the pro-Soviet students was made even worse by persecution at the hands of the Czechoslovakian government. In November 1927, the Shevchenko Association of the Ukrainian Library-Reading Room, the organisation under which the Sovietophile Ukrainian students in Prague were officially registered, was banned because it had tried to undertake political work. In March 1926, the Ukrainian students had set up their own journal *Nova zhyttia* (The New Life) which purportedly had a educational and literary character, but strayed into the realms of politics in that it also dealt with the situation in Soviet Russia and the Ukrainian emigration in Europe. In September 1926, the students published an 'information bulletin', which was purely political, and criticised conditions in Rumania, Poland, Hungary and Sub-Carpathian Ukraine. This was followed in January 1927 by a collection of articles, which was confiscated by the police. This was the final straw leading to the prohibition of the organisation.⁸⁴²

840 *Nashe znamia/Nash prapor*, No.2, November 1924, pp.3-4.

841 Kaliuzhnyi to Kaganovich, Skrypnyk and Popov, undated, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2484 ark.104-5.

842 Consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Czechoslovakia to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, November 1927, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2484 ark.101-2.

Perhaps the Ukrainian plenipotentiary's appeal for more support for the Sovietophile students made an impression on Kharkiv. In both 1929/1930 and 1930/1931, the Ukrainian student organisation received 100 dollars. The Politburo believed this payment to be very important, as it was necessary to disperse the Ukrainian emigration in Czechoslovakia. It added that once 'the union acted as an accumulator for elements of the *smenovekhovskii* type; after that *smenovekhovstvo* as such disappeared and it turned completely into a Soviet organisation with educational functions. Its task now is to educate the students studying in the Czech higher schools who have received the rights of citizenship and are returning to the U[krainian] SSR to finish school'. This was deemed useful as it provided the Ukraine with educated cadres.⁸⁴³ In the eyes of the Politburo, the students' desire to adopt a Soviet consciousness had clearly been successful. How many students actually returned, however, remains unclear.

Conclusion

This chapter has revealed a number of possible motivations for turning to the Soviet authorities with either requests for return or proposals of cooperation. At the beginning of the 1920s, there were many individuals and groups seeking contacts with the Soviet representatives abroad. For those like Roman Smal-Stotskyi and Dmytro Doroshenko, these efforts were short-lived and did not crystallise into the adoption of a Sovietophile position. Others, for example Mykola Porsh, made open declarations of support for the Soviet regime and worked to encourage the Ukrainian émigrés to end their opposition to the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, even some of these later abandoned the pro-Soviet stance and later become involved in the far-right movements of the Ukrainian emigration. At the start of the decade, the émigrés were still orientating themselves ideologically; the right and left had not yet become polarised.

Some were certainly reacting to the shock of defeat and the difficulties of émigré life, which were perhaps at their greatest in the years immediately after the wars in Russia and the Ukraine: separated from home and family, liv-

843 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), outlining expenditure abroad in 1929/1930 and 1930/1931, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.28, 186.

ing in difficult material conditions and suffering the psychological stress of having taken part in a failed war, for some the only solution was return, even if this was to a land ruled by the enemy. This was a feeling expressed by Ivan Kobza, and one can imagine that many of the interned soldiers of the UNR felt in a similar way. This sentiment also had a political aspect in that one cause of the demoralisation was disenchantment with the leadership of the UNR, in particular Petliura. Petliura had made an alliance with the hated Poles and given up Ukrainian land to them; the bankruptcy of this agreement was exacerbated by the failure of the Polish-UNR campaign, the internment of the Ukrainian army by the Poles and the Polish government's refusal to take Ukrainian interests into account at the peace negotiations in Riga. Kobza's political statement expressed this anger, and the Soviet authorities hoped to use this mood to bring about the dissolution of the camps. Opposition to Petliura may have also provided the common ground between the Hrekov group and the Bolsheviks; the group's statement of support for the Soviet Ukraine also presented the Soviet Ukraine as an embryonic nation state. At the same time, the Bolsheviks suspected other, more material motives behind the approaches of Hrekov and his colleagues: the Bolsheviks represented a useful source of funding for hard-up émigrés. To what extent this is the case for Hrekov is unclear. Certainly, Morkotun and the Ukrainian National Committee seem to have been adventurers, interested above all in gaining influence and money.

None of these individuals or groups offered the Soviet foreign representatives a centre around which to form a Ukrainian *Nakanune*. By the beginning of 1923, several of those responsible for Kharkiv's foreign policy were expressing despair at the chances of setting up a Ukrainian Sovietophile faction. The grouping led by Hrekov and Chernushenko disintegrated during its discussion with the Soviet plenipotentiaries. The two groups which had undoubtedly adopted Sovietophilism out of conviction, the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries, had been split over their stance towards the Bolsheviks. Some had had their hopes of cooperation dashed; others had followed the tenets of their ideology anyway and returned home. The project was saved by the March decision. Following the recognition of Polish sovereignty over Eastern

Galicia it became much easier to attract Ukrainians from the province to the prospective publication. The East Galicians had become disillusioned with the attempts of their government to seek help from the Western powers and had begun to see the Poles as the main obstacle to the national and social liberations of the Ukraine. East Galicians, for example Semen Vityk and Antin Krushelnytskyi, took on leading positions in *Nova hromada*.

The character of *Nova hromada* was moulded by two events: the March decision and the introduction of Ukrainianisation. As a result of the former, the paper took on a distinctly West Ukrainian character. Though the journal dealt with issues of the East Ukrainian emigration, there was a perceptible weighting towards matters which affected the West Ukrainian lands and the émigrés who had fled them. The policy of Ukrainianisation made it much easier for the contributors to the journal to unify the slogans of national and social liberation than had been the case for Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyyi. In accordance with the guidelines established by the Soviet authorities, *Nova hromada* stressed that the union with Russia actually promoted the national liberation of the Ukraine. Though the journal made it its duty to attack the old Ukrainian intelligentsia, it continued to display beliefs which may be traced back to the pre-war tradition of populism. Indeed, many of those who wrote for *Nova hromada*, including Vityk, Melenevskyyi and Krushelnytskyi, had been politically active before the First World War and could therefore be said to belong to the generation which they were attacking. This was also a result of the renunciation of moderation caused by the March decision, which benefited the extreme left as well as the right. In *Nova hromada* this 'turn to the left' was evident in the desire to portray itself as a truly 'Soviet' organ which condemned 'opportunistic' Sovietophilism. The fact that this was the type of Sovietophilism that Kharkiv hoped to exploit may have actually undermined the journal's usefulness and led to its closure.

The foundation and activity of *Nova hromada* provoke some interesting parallels with the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*. Most of the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiaries referred to those seeking reconciliation with the Bolsheviks as *smenovekhovtsy*. Those responsible in the Soviet administration for the creation of the journal saw *Nova hromada* as a Ukrainian version of *Nakanune*, the newspaper of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*. Like *Nakanune* it was an in-

strument of Bolshevik foreign policy whose outward independence should conceal the aims behind its creation. Although some contributors to *Nova hromada* were accepted into the KP(b)U, on the whole the Bolsheviks viewed the staff of the journal with distrust as former class enemies. Not all Bolsheviks saw Ukrainian Sovietophilism in this way. Shumskyi claimed that there was no such thing as a 'Change of Signposts' in the Ukrainian emigration as far from adopting a new position, as the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* had done, the Ukrainian Sovietophiles were returning to an old one; for Shumskyi, the traditional desires of the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia chimed perfectly with the Soviet system. However, the adoption by the Soviet representatives of the term *smenovekhovtsy*, rather than Shumskyi's preferred term *povorottsy* shows that most in the Soviet regime preferred to see the Ukrainian Sovietophiles in the same way as they saw the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*, as temporary allies who could be used for Soviet goals, but who could also represent a danger if not properly supervised.

Shumskyi was right in that the Ukrainian Sovietophiles and the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* had very different political backgrounds: before 1923 most Ukrainian Sovietophiles were socialists, whereas the *Smena vekh* group initially was made up of opponents of socialism; the Ukrainians, of course, hailed the creation of the Ukrainian SSR as an achievement of their national desires, whereas the Russians saw the Soviet Union as a new form of Russian state. However, *Nakanune* and *Nova hromada* were both organs of Soviet propaganda. This put constraints on the opinions they could express. *Nova hromada* and *Nakanune*, for example, denied that the NEP represented an abandonment of the ultimate social aims of the Bolsheviks. The differences between the Russian and Ukrainian *smenovekhovtsy* were to a certain extent reduced by the intellectual compromises imposed upon them through subordination to the Bolsheviks.

6 West Ukrainian Sovietophilism

So far this book has concentrated on the return of Eastern Ukrainians to their homeland under Soviet rule. However, there were also many Western Ukrainian émigrés, above all those from Eastern Galicia, who were attracted by the Soviet Ukraine. Because of the fact that before the war they had not lived in the territories which now formed the Soviet Ukraine, one cannot talk of their 'return'. Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore whether the attraction which the Soviet Ukraine exerted over them was the same as that which the state did over the Eastern Ukrainians. This chapter will look at the emergence of West Ukrainian Sovietophilism in the emigration and in the territories ruled by Poland. On the whole, it will deal with those who supported the Soviet Ukraine, but did not settle in the Ukrainian SSR. This will provide the background for the following chapter, which will look in more detail at the immigration of East Galician intellectuals to the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. The pro-Soviet movement in Canada, which was also mainly made up of Western Ukrainians, will not be examined because most of its members had left their homeland before the First World War and did not take part in the struggle against the Bolsheviks. A study of this movement would also have to take into account the conditions for immigrants to Northern America, which is beyond the scope of this book.

The greatest surge of Sovietophilism among Western Ukrainians came following the March decision on Galicia in 1923. However, there had been Western Ukrainians drawn to Bolshevism ever since the outbreak of the revolution in the Russian empire. Many West Ukrainian prisoners of war, who had fought in the Austro-Hungarian army and been captured by the Russians, had come into contact with Bolshevism during their incarceration. A number of these went on to join the KP(b)U and take up positions in the government apparatus in the Soviet Ukraine. For example, Mykhailo Levytskyi, who has already been mentioned due to his work in the various foreign missions of the Soviet Ukraine, joined the KP(b)U in this way. Other Galicians had gone over to the Bolsheviks when the army of the ZUNR, the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), joined the Red Army in February 1920 following the collapse of Deni-

kin's army. Although two of the three brigades which had joined the Bolsheviks later crossed sides again to help the joint Polish-UNR offensive against Kyiv, a number of UHA soldiers later entered the KP(b)U and took up positions in the Soviet Ukrainian state and society. Mykhailo Kozoris, a member of the peasant writers' organisation *Pluh* and official in the Ministry of Education, had defected to the Bolsheviks with the UHA. Both Kozoris and Levyskyi served in Galrevkom, the revolutionary committee created during the Red Army's advance into Galicia in 1920. Indeed, most of those in the Galician Soviet had experienced a fate similar to that of either Kozoris or Levyskyi: I.M Siiak,⁸⁴⁴ F.M. Konar and V.A. Hadzinskyi had gone over to the Red Army with the UHA; Mykhailo Baran,⁸⁴⁵ M.S. Havryliv and V.I. Poraiko had been prisoners of war under the Romanovs.⁸⁴⁶ Thus, at the beginning of the 1920s there were already Galicians working in the state apparatus of the Soviet Ukraine and contributing to the cultural life of the country. Over the course of the decade this number would increase.

Ievhen Petrushevych and the Government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic

One of the most important Western Ukrainians to turn to the Bolsheviks in the 1920s was Ievhen Petrushevych, the head of the West Ukrainian People's Republic created in Eastern Galicia following the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. The history of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) between 1918 and 1923 has been investigated by Torsten Wehrhahn.⁸⁴⁷ It is

844 Siiak, Ivan (1887-?): a leading member of the Galician USDP who crossed over to the Bolsheviks with the UHA and fought for the Red Army. He later taught in the Soviet Ukraine, worked in the Soviet embassy in Warsaw and sat on the KP(b)U's Central Committee. He was arrested in 1933. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, pp.708-9.

845 Baran, Mykhailo (1884-1937): commander of the first brigade of the Red Ukrainian Galician Army, a member of the KPZU's Politburo and later a research associate of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was arrested in 1933 during the purges. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.175.

846 O.S. Rublov, 'Mykhailo Kozoris: dolia intelihenta', *Ukrainskyi arkhеohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, Vol.5, 1993, No.2, pp.104-22; M.Iu. Mukhina, 'Halrevkom i Halychany. Do pytannia pro mistse intelihentsii v suspilnomu zhytti Ukrainy 1920-1930rr.', *Ukrainskyi arkhеohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, Vol.4, 1992, No.1, pp.383-400.

847 Torsten Wehrhahn, *Die Westukrainische Volksrepublik. Zu den polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen und dem Problem der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit in den Jahren 1918 bis 1923*, Berlin: Weißensee, 2004.

therefore unnecessary to go into all the details of Petrushevych's policy during these years. Instead, this section will concentrate on the process by which Petrushevych came to adopt a pro-Soviet position. Though this account draws on Wehrhahn's work, it also adds to it by using the correspondence and reports of the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiaries abroad. Another useful secondary source for the ZUNR's policy before the March decision is provided by two articles by O. Pavliuk, which specifically look at the question of Petrushevych's Sovietophilism.⁸⁴⁸ Pavliuk uses the ZUNR documents preserved in the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome, to which Wehrhahn did not have access. There has been very little research on Petrushevych after 1923. At the time of writing, Petrushevych's papers in the *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan* (the former party archive in Kyiv) were still in preparation. Before these documents are available, it is impossible to look at Petrushevych's Sovietophile period in greater detail. This account will therefore only briefly present the Central Committee decisions and plenipotentiary reports concerning the later activities of the ZUNR leader.

Petrushevych turned to the Soviet government as a result of the conflict over Eastern Galicia between the Western Ukrainians and the Poles which had broken out following the Western Ukrainians' declaration of independence in November 1918. Although the ZUNR's armed forces, the Ukrainian Galician Army (the UHA), were able to score a number of military successes, the war went badly for the Western Ukrainians. As early as 21st November 1918, they were expelled from Lviv, their capital city. The armed struggle continued until July 1919, when, with the help of the 100,000-strong army led by Józef Haller, the Poles forced the ZUNR to abandon Eastern Galicia. Petrushevych, who in the course of the conflict had been proclaimed dictator with total legislative and executive power, moved to Kamianets-Podilskyi, where the UNR had its seat of government. Since January 1919, the ZUNR and the UNR had officially been unified in a single Ukrainian state. Despite this rhetoric, the ZUNR government and the UHA had continued to act independently of the UNR and its armed forces. Moreover, the UNR had been unable to provide much support against the Poles. At the same time, the amalgamation in-

848 O.V. Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha: perekonannia chy vymushenist?', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.3, pp.109-18 and No.4, pp.95-102.

volved the ZUNR in the UNR's war against the Bolsheviks. This participation revealed fundamental difference in the two governments' geopolitical approach to the national questions: whereas the Eastern Ukrainians saw the Russians as the main adversary to Ukrainian statehood, the Galicians believed the Poles occupied this role; consequently, the UNR viewed the Polish Republic as a potential ally in the war against the Bolsheviks and the ZUNR hoped to fight the Poles with Russian, even Bolshevik, help.⁸⁴⁹

This process began as early as spring 1919. Following the failure of a UHA campaign against the Poles in March 1919, the ZUNR government discussed a proposition by Bela Kun to act as a mediator in negotiations between the Western Ukrainians and Soviet Russia. Both Lonhyn Tsehelskyi, the foreign minister of the ZUNR, and Mykhailo Lozynskyi, his deputy, wanted to accept the offer. According to Tsehelskyi, discussion with the Bolsheviks was possible if they recognised Ukrainian sovereignty and drew a line of demarcation which the Red Army would not cross. However, Petrushevych's opinion that talks with the Bolsheviks would wreck the discussions with the Entente was accepted. On 7th May 1919, the question again came up when the Ukrainian Soviet leader Khristian Rakovskii wrote to the ZUNR suggesting an end to their conflict and declaring that the future of Eastern Galicia should be determined by the workers and peasants living in it. Three days later this was discussed in a joint sitting of the two Ukrainian governments. Borys Martos, the UNR premier and finance minister who represented the Directory at the meeting, counselled against an armistice with the Bolsheviks because this would make activity at the Paris peace conferences impossible. Tsehelskyi, on the other hand, felt that the front against the Bolsheviks was the only one which could be removed because the Poles would never agree to talks. He was therefore in favour of negotiations with the Bolsheviks, even though this was reprehensible from the all-Ukrainian perspective. This approach was abandoned, however, when Petliura ordered UHA units to take part in the struggle with the Bolsheviks.⁸⁵⁰

The launch of Józef Haller's campaign against the UHA in April 1919 also further exposed the rifts between the ZUNR and UNR. His advances meant that

849 See Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, pp.513-6 and Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.127ff, 235-7.

850 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.228, 230-1.

by the end of May and beginning of June the Western Ukrainians could not hope to come to an agreement with the Poles, as they had nothing to offer in negotiations. However, the government of the UNR saw a ceasefire with the Poles as a way of preparing their own campaign against the Bolsheviks. They entered into talks with the Poles at the beginning of July, further straining relations with the ZUNR. In response to their difficult position, the Western Ukrainians sent a delegation to the leadership of the Soviet 12th Army. Talks took place in Berdychiv. The Soviet negotiators were conscious of their position of strength and demanded that the West Ukrainian government break with Petliura and declare that they supported the Bolsheviks. The Eastern Galicians should join an alliance against Poland and Rumania. The UHA would be placed under a unified command and Kyivan commissars would join the East Galician army. Petliura's troops in Eastern Galicia would be disarmed. Although the Bolsheviks promised not to interfere in internal East Galician matters, this guarantee was probably only a sweetener for the otherwise bitter conditions. Petrushevych rejected the terms, possibly in the hope that the Entente might still preserve East Galician independence. However, he continued to waver between a pro-Bolshevik course and cooperation with the UNR. Only on 15th July did Petrushevych promise Petliura that he would fight against the Bolsheviks; a few days later he moved to Kamianets-Podilskiyi with his government and the remnants of his army.⁸⁵¹

However, Petrushevych's later Sovietophilism did not emerge from an orientation towards the Bolsheviks, but rather towards the present rulers of Russia, whoever they might be. In August 1919, for example, Kost Levytskyi, the head of the state secretariat of the ZUNR, argued in favour of an alliance with Denikin and the creation of a federation with Russia. Levytskyi admitted that the East Galician Ukrainians had been enemies of Russophilism,⁸⁵² but he saw a pact with the Whites as the best means of combating Polish and Rumanian designs on the West Ukrainian lands. The ZUNR representative in Paris Vasyl Paneiko⁸⁵³ sought contacts with Russian circles in the French

851 Wehrhahn, *Westukranische Volksrepublik*, pp.233-4.

852 Russophilism was the belief that the 'Ukrainian' population of the Habsburg lands was part of the Russian nation. See Chapter Two.

853 Paneiko, Vasyl (1883-1956): a member of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party who served as ZUNR state secretary for foreign affairs and represented the ZUNR at the Paris peace conferences. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.766.

capital. Indeed, in November 1919 the high command of the East Galician army, without Petrushevych's knowledge, signed a ceasefire with Denikin and placed the UHA under his command. At a joint meeting with the UNR government, Petrushevych later defended the alliance with the Russian general not because he believed Denikin could overcome the Bolsheviks; on the contrary, he was convinced that the Volunteer Army would be defeated. Instead, he argued that by allying with the White movement the Ukrainians would be able to maintain the integrity of their army with the help of the Entente. Following the Bolsheviks' likely victory, the Ukrainians could then fight for their statehood. He ruled out an alliance with the Bolsheviks because this would irreparably harm the Ukraine's relationship with the Entente. The UHA's defection marked the final split between the ZUNR and the UNR. Petrushevych moved his government to Vienna, clearing the way for an agreement between the UNR and the Poles by which the former gave up Eastern Galicia to Poland.⁸⁵⁴

Following the emigration of the ZUNR government to Vienna, the awareness that a geopolitical orientation towards Russia might necessitate an understanding with the Bolsheviks began to grow. In an article in the ZUNR organ *Ukrainskyi prapor* from January 1920, Lonhyn Tsehelskyi argued that Eastern Galicia could either turn to the West or to the East: the first option meant an alliance with the Poles; the second alternative could be achieved through a pact either with the Soviet republics or with the Russian Whites. Tsehelskyi ruled out an agreement with the Poles because their imperialist and reactionary mentality prevented a positive policy towards the Ukrainians. He felt that the second option had deeper roots in the Ukrainian people and was more promising. He praised Vynnychenko, who he believed had followed the Eastern orientation towards the Bolsheviks or Denikin.⁸⁵⁵ In looking for an ally against the Poles, Kost Levytskyi had first suggested anti-Bolshevik Russia; following the White defeats in the Civil War, Tsehelskyi had acknowledged that the Bolsheviks could also take on this role no less so than Denikin. Thus the pro-Bolshevik stance originated in an orientation towards Russia, which-ever government ruled the country. This impression is strengthened by the

854 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.236, 238-9, 241-3.

855 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp. 271-2.

fact that Tsehelskyi did not present working with the Bolsheviks and the Whites as alternatives, but rather as aspects of the same course. Indeed, he fully misunderstood Vynnychenko's views, falsely ascribing to Vynnychenko geopolitical motivations and a willingness to work with Russia, even if it was represented by Denikin.

In the Ukraine itself the UHA also found itself having to resolve similar dilemmas. As a result of Denikin's failures against the Red Army, the UHA defected to the Bolsheviks in February 1919. Many Galician soldiers saw cooperation with the Bolsheviks as a temporary necessity subordinated to their overall goal of creating a Ukrainian state. As one almanac published by the UHA put it, 'wherever we are, whichever organisation we belong to, one star will always shine above us, lighting the way, the one and only road: to our own state, to independence, to the complete freedom of the Ukrainian nation'.⁸⁵⁶ Indeed, during the joint Polish-UNR campaign against the Soviet Republics, two of the three brigades of the UHA crossed over to the forces under Piłsudski and Petliura. However, as mentioned above, a number of former UHA soldiers later joined the KP(b)U and took up prominent roles in Soviet Ukrainian society.

It should be stressed that the West Ukrainian government continued to concentrate its diplomatic efforts on the Western powers. Petrushevych was convinced that the British and French would not place Eastern Galicia under Polish rule. Representatives were sent to London, Paris and other Western capitals in order to lobby the Entente for support for the creation of a West Ukrainian state.⁸⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the discussion mentioned above demonstrates that a pro-Bolshevik course was under discussion in ruling ZUNR circles. Indeed, Osyp Nazaruk,⁸⁵⁸ one of Petrushevych's closest advisors at this time, was instructed to travel to Copenhagen in order to meet the Soviet Russian ambassador there, Maksim Litvinov. In June, before Nazaruk left, a meeting took

856 Quoted by Vasyliiv in 'Evolutsiia pohliadiv kerivnytstva RKP(b) ta KP(b)U', p.158.

857 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.272-3, 276-7.

858 Nazaruk, Osyp (1883-1940): a Galician who was a member of the Galician Ukrainian National Rada and later served in the Directory. He joined the ZUNR government in exile in Vienna, but then travelled to North America, where he became a proponent of the Hetmanite ideology. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.569-70.

place at which Lev Petrushevych,⁸⁵⁹ the dictator's nephew, suggested forming an alliance with the Bolsheviks. He argued that they should stress East Galicia's geographical importance to Russia as a stepping stone to the West. He was against the forceful incorporation of the province into the Soviet system. He stressed that East Galicia had evolved in such a way that now it represented a nation in its own right, formed by the peasants and an intelligentsia which originated in the peasantry. Consequently, an independent East Galician state would not have a bourgeois character, but would rather be founded on the basis of the peasant class. Accordingly, laws expropriating land from the large landowners and nationalising the forests would be introduced. Lev Petrushevych argued that in return for granting the province its independence, the East Galicians should offer to create a legion to fight against the Poles. This formula represented his maximum demands. The minimum requirement was the incorporation of Eastern Galician into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with no less autonomy than it had possessed under the Habsburgs. The areas of transport and finance would be jointly run by Eastern Galicia and the Soviet Ukraine. An East Galician unit would be formed within the Red Army to protect the province against the Poles. Laws would be introduced nationalising large industry and redistributing land among the peasants; however, the right of peasants to possess their own land would be protected.⁸⁶⁰

Nazaruk himself does not seem to have been enthusiastic about these plans, describing them as 'fantasies' in his notebook. Nevertheless when he travelled to the Danish capital in July he asked Litvinov to make a declaration about the independence of Eastern Galicia. This, however, was more than the Russian diplomat was prepared to do. The moment for open ZUNR-Bolshevik cooperation had not yet come. Petrushevych remained confident that the Entente would make a decision favourable to the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The Sovietophile course was being followed secretly for fear of harming the ZUNR government's standing with the Western powers. Moreover, East Galicia's bargaining power with the Bolsheviks had been under-

859 Petrushevych, Lev (1880-1940): levhen Petrushevych's nephew; he worked in the office of the ZUNR dictator and later returned to Lviv. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.868.

860 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.279-80.

mined by the defection of the East Galician units in the Red Army to Petliura in April 1920.⁸⁶¹

Over the summer, the joint Polish-UNR offensive came to a standstill. Piłsudski's armies were forced out of Kyiv and the Red Army began to march on Galicia. As a result of the Bolsheviks' entry into the province, *Ukrainskyi prapor*, the paper of the ZUNR, adopted an increasingly pro-Soviet position in July and August 1920. In particular, the editor of the paper, Pavlo Lysiak, argued that the East Galician Ukrainians should cooperate with the advancing Red Army. Their interests lay in the East, as only the East could help the Ukrainians overcome the Poles' dominant position in Galicia. Ukrainians should welcome a Soviet regime in the province, he argued, as the Bolsheviks would attack the large land owners and industrial capitalists, who were primarily Poles and Jews. In another article the ZUNR organ described the Red Army's advance into the province as a destruction of the French conception of a Greater Poland. It presented the creation of an East Galician state by the Bolsheviks as being no less desirable than a favourable decision by the Entente. *Ukrainskyi prapor* claimed that the interests of the Bolsheviks and of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia coincided as the Soviet military successes restored East Galician statehood.⁸⁶²

These hopes were not realised, however, for the Poles were able to beat back the Soviet advance. In September 1920, peace negotiations between the Poles and the Soviet republics began in Riga. Petrushevych sent an East Galician delegation to observe the conference. It should not actually take part because this could be understood as evidence that the ZUNR recognised the conference's authority to make a decision in the East Galician question. However, the delegation was instructed to establish contacts to the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations. Though there were two meetings with the Soviet representatives, the Soviet side saw these merely as a means of putting pressure on the Poles. They had no intention of endangering the peace agreement by supporting the East Galician desire for national self-determination. The ZUNR delegation at Riga were powerless observers. In October 1920, an armistice was proclaimed and in March 1921 a peace treaty

861 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.279-80.

862 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.281-2.

was signed by which the Soviet republics recognised the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia.⁸⁶³

Following the armistice in October, the ZUNR government again returned the emphasis of its politics towards the search for aid from the powers of the Entente. ZUNR representatives in the major Western capitals undertook extensive work lobbying for the creation of a West Ukrainian state.⁸⁶⁴ However, at Riga the Bolsheviks had, according to ZUNR accounts, said in private that they would continue to support the independence of Eastern Galicia. On this basis it was possible to continue seeking Soviet help.⁸⁶⁵ In October 1921, one of Petrushevych's agents Aleksei Fral visited Mykhailo Levytskyi in order to explore further the Soviet attitude towards East Galician independence. Fral tried to convince the head of the Soviet trade mission that there were a number of governments who were already in favour of this. M. Levytskyi told Fral that civil war in Galicia was not in the interests of the Soviet republics and they had no intention of breaking the Treaty of Riga. The Soviet representative also wrote that he would not allow any official talks to take place with Petrushevych's representative in Prague levhen Levytskyi. From the meeting M. Levytskyi received the impression that Petrushevych feared the attachment of Eastern Galicia to the Soviet Ukraine and the Sovietisation of the province.⁸⁶⁶ Relations between the ZUNR and the Soviet authorities after the Treaty of Riga seem to have begun very coolly.

Nevertheless, despite the public orientation towards the Entente, during 1922 representatives of the ZUNR government continued to approach the Soviet Ukrainian foreign representatives with requests for help. On 6th March 1922, M. Levytskyi reported that levhen Levytskyi had asked him to help enable Petrushevych's government to take part in the upcoming Genoa conference. The Soviet plenipotentiary gave a cautious response, stressing his government's desire to retain its ability to act freely.⁸⁶⁷ In Berlin, too, Petrushevych's representative Iaroslav Biberovych sought to find out what position the Soviet

863 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.283-4; Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo le. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.3, pp.114-5.

864 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.294-302.

865 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo le. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.3, p.115; Vasyliev, 'Evolutsiia pohliadiv kerivnytstva RKP(b) ta KP(b)U', p.167.

866 M. Levytskyi to Rakovskii, 21.09.1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark. 70-1.

867 M. Levytskyi to Rakovskii, 06.03.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.10.

government would take at the coming conference. He met regularly with the head of the trade mission in Berlin Volodymyr Aussem. Aussem promised him that the Soviet Ukrainian government would maintain the position privately stated at Riga and would support the East Galician matter at Genoa. Biberovych had hoped to meet Rakovskii, who had to travel through Berlin on his way to Genoa. However, the Soviet Ukrainian leader refused.⁸⁶⁸

Petrushevych himself travelled to Genoa at the head of an unofficial ZUNR delegation. At the conference he was able to talk to Rakovskii. Petrushevych wanted to send representatives to Moscow or Kharkiv and to receive financial support (five million German marks), arms, the creation of a military base beyond the Zbruch and Soviet support for a Galician legion.⁸⁶⁹ Though we do not have any evidence of Rakovskii's response, from the later actions of the ZUNR agents it would seem that they at least believed that Rakovskii had agreed to the establishment of ZUNR representatives in one of the Soviet capitals and funding. Following the conference, Biberovych tried to follow up this success by getting Aussem to commit himself to the pledges the ZUNR believed had been made at Genoa. According to Biberovych, at two meetings in the middle of June Aussem promised to provide support for Petrushevych. He said he would give the ZUNR information about the coming Hague conference. He agreed in principle to grant material help to the ZUNR, but admitted that the details would have to be worked out in Kharkiv. He also asked the Galician government to name the agents it wanted to send to Kharkiv. He did not envisage any difficulties in accepting them into the Ukraine.⁸⁷⁰

Despite these promising signs, as summer drew on, Petrushevych's circle began to feel that the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet governments were no longer interested in aiding them. In July 1922, Biberovych received instructions to arrange a meeting with the Russian ambassador in London. However, he also heard that the Russian foreign minister Chicherin, who was at that time in the German capital, was against such a meeting: any contacts with the ZUNR should be through the Ukrainian mission in Berlin. Moreover, Chicherin had not provided any new information about the ZUNR's requests to the Soviet governments. These facts disquieted Kost Levytskyi, who was

868 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo le. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.95.

869 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo le. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.96.

870 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo le. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.96.

now in charge of the West Ukrainian government's foreign affairs; he felt that Soviet policy had undergone a change which was disadvantageous for the ZUNR. He instructed Biberovych to approach the Soviet Ukraine's representatives to find out where they stood.⁸⁷¹

This alteration in policy coincided with a change in personnel in the Berlin mission. In July, Aussem had a heart attack and Biberovych's new partners in the negotiations were less amenable to the ZUNR proposals. When Biberovych talked to Naum Kaliuzhnyi, Aussem's deputy, the Soviet diplomat refused to tie down the Soviet government to a concrete position. Unlike Aussem, he was against using Petrushevych as he questioned the ZUNR dictator's importance; Kaliuzhnyi argued that Ievhen Konovalts, the leader of the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO), was more useful. Moreover, according to Kaliuzhnyi, in Eastern Galicia itself there was a genuinely revolutionary mass which unarguably sympathised with the Soviet Ukraine.⁸⁷² Biberovych's accounts of the meeting with Kaliuzhnyi were more positive: the ZUNR agent claimed that Kaliuzhnyi supported the plan of sending agents to Kharkiv.⁸⁷³

Aussem's replacement, Mykhailo Levytskyi, was no more compliant than Kaliuzhnyi. Biberovych met M. Levytskyi on 16th August to find out the Soviet decision on sending their representative to Moscow. Five days before, the ZUNR agent had received a note from Kost Levytskyi naming the three members of the proposed ZUNR delegation to Kharkiv. The question of funding was also brought up again and Biberovych voiced his concerns provoked by rumours of a rapprochement between Poland and the Soviet regime. M. Levytskyi responded by suggesting that Rakovskii's intentions had been misunderstood: he had not proposed that the ZUNR maintain a permanent representative in the Russian capital, but rather that someone be sent to discuss concrete questions; similarly material help would only be granted if Petrushevych undertook tangible action. He did reassure Biberovych, however, that the Soviet republics would never in spirit recognise the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia and that the ZUNR would receive a reply on the matter of the representatives by 25th or 26th August. Following the meeting,

871 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, pp.96-7.

872 Aussem to TsK KP(b)U, 14.07.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.11.

873 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.97.

Biberovych wrote that there were foundations for the Galician doubts about the Soviets. This indeed was the case: in his report to Kharkiv M. Levytskyi warned his superiors against allowing the ZUNR representative into Moscow, as it would help Petliurist counter-revolution and harm Soviet relations with Poland. He argued that it was possible to grant support for the ZUNR without establishing a permanent representative in Kharkiv or Moscow. Levytskyi also complained that the ZUNR was trying to work directly with the Russian republic. This should not be allowed, he wrote; they should only deal with the Ukrainian government. He interpreted it as an attempt by the ZUNR to underline that the Ukraine did not exist as a state. For this reason, he advocated caution when dealing with Petrushevych.⁸⁷⁴

Clearly, no decision was made by the date promised by M. Levytskyi. At the end of August, M. Levytskyi wrote again to Kharkiv. He asked for a decision on Petrushevych, because the dictator's representatives were visiting him daily, asking about financial support and the dispatch of a representative to Moscow. It seems that though M. Levytskyi was worried about the consequences of *open* support for Petrushevych, he was keen to use the East Galician question to undermine Poland. In August, he sent an unsigned letter to the German press which stated that the recognition at Riga of the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia was merely an acknowledgement of the status quo; the Soviet republics still supported the independence of the Ukrainian province on the basis of the principle of national self-determination.⁸⁷⁵

While the negotiations in Berlin were continuing, Petrushevych sent his agent in Prague Fral to talk to the Russian representative in the city P. Mostovenko. Petrushevych was worried by rumours of an understanding between Poland and Russia. The Russian diplomat assured Fral that Russia had not given up its desire to overcome the barrier on its western border. However at the moment, due to internal considerations, it could not do anything and did not want to establish official relations with the ZUNR. He therefore advised that Petrushevych should not insist on sending his agents to Moscow as official

874 M. Levytskyi to Iakovlev, 16.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.12. The meeting is described from the point of view of Biberovych in Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo le. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, pp.97-8.

875 Extracts from letters from M. Levytskyi, 03..08.1922, 28.08.1922 and 31.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.13.

representatives; neither should the Galicians make the opening of talks on military help for the ZUNR a prerequisite to sending their agents to the Russian capital as this could be discussed after they arrived. The Russian diplomat told Fral that the ZUNR should conduct their relations with the Soviet Union through M. Levytskyi, but that if there was a situation for which the Ukrainian plenipotentiary lacked the necessary authority or influence, they should turn directly to Moscow. When Fral suggested that Rakovskii might not be pleased that the ZUNR was circumventing his government, Mostovenko replied that he would make sure there were no misunderstandings in this matter.⁸⁷⁶ Thus, despite his claim that M. Levytskyi was the main contact for the ZUNR, Mostovenko seems to have given Petrushevych ample leeway to try to play the Russian government off against the Ukrainian. This, of course, had been one of the fears expressed by M. Levytskyi in his report from the end of August.

In autumn 1922, the personnel of the Ukrainian missions once again changed. Aussem returned to his post in Berlin, while Kaliuzhnyi moved to Vienna. Biberovych continued to meet Aussem and Fral established contact with the Russian representative in Berlin Maksim Litvinov.⁸⁷⁷ In the middle of October, Aussem wrote to Kharkiv complaining that a decision had not yet been made on aiding Petrushevych. He argued that the dictator enjoyed support among the population of Eastern Galicia, as could be seen at a meeting of the Ukrainian National Democrats in August at which the party reiterated that Petrushevych was their leader. In contrast, according to Aussem, support for Ievhen Konovalets was fading. The ZUNR leader was encouraging a growth in pro-Soviet sentiment in the province and the terrorist campaign against the Poles was turning into a genuinely popular movement. Aussem warned that if the popular hope of help from the Soviet republics were disappointed, Petrushevych and the pro-Soviet platform would be compromised.⁸⁷⁸ Against this, at the beginning of 1923 Kaliuzhnyi continued to claim that Petrushevych's influence in the Ukraine was waning. He believed that

876 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.98.

877 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.98.

878 Report by the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Germany on Eastern Galicia, 16.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.20-3; Aussem to TsK KP(b)U, 17.10.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.25.

Petrushevych was following the Galician peasants and workers, who were attracted by Soviet slogans, rather than leading them. In this way, he was an opportunist, trying to use the strength and authority of the Soviet Union for his own ends. Kaliuzhnyi was therefore against entering into talks with Petrushevych.⁸⁷⁹

In December 1922, a decision was finally made allowing the ZUNR government to send its delegates. On 4th January 1923, Petrushevych signed a mandate naming Ernest Breiter⁸⁸⁰ and Ivan Kossak⁸⁸¹ as his representatives in Moscow and Kharkiv. They were instructed to present the ZUNR's aim of achieving East Galician independence and to work out a common position with the Soviet governments. The two envoys set off for the Soviet republics immediately. On 7th March, K. Levytskyi told Biberovych that the discussions with the Soviets were proceeding well.⁸⁸²

The defining event in the relationship between the ZUNR and the Soviet government came, however, later in the year. On 15th March 1923, the Council of Ambassadors, made up of representatives from the Entente, recognised Poland's annexation of Eastern Galicia. The decision had a profound effect on Petrushevych's policy by ending his hopes that the Entente would create a West Ukrainian state. In May, Ievhen Levytskyi informed M. Levytskyi that 'their orientation was now exclusively towards the Soviet Ukraine'. Ie. Levytskyi assured the Soviet representative that at a coming meeting of the Galician parties, Petrushevych would argue for the adoption of a Sovietophile stance. He also hoped to receive Soviet funding to start the evacuation of Galician internees to the Soviet Ukraine.⁸⁸³ Following the decision, Petrushevych moved his government to Berlin, where he established contacts with the Soviet Russian plenipotentiary there, Nikolai Krestinskii. Indeed,

879 Report by Kaliuzhnyi on the state of the Ukrainian emigration, 06.02.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1735 ark.13zv-14.

880 Breiter, Ernest (1865-1935): a Polish politician from Galicia who supported Ukrainian sovereignty and joined the government of the ZUNR. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1 p.294.

881 Kossak, Ivan (1876-1927): a Galician and member of the Sich Rifleman organisation created under Austrian auspices during the First World War. He fought in the ZUNR's war against the Poles, and served as UNR military attaché to Rome. In 1925, he immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.624-5.

882 Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.99.

883 Report by M. Levytskyi, 19.05.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.88.

Petrushevych is said to have promised the Soviet representative, in negotiations in Copenhagen, that in return for support for the Bolsheviks he would remove Konovalts as the supreme commander of the UVO and place it at the Soviets' disposal.⁸⁸⁴ At the beginning of November, a conference took place in Vienna organised by émigré members of the Ukrainian National Labour Party (UNTP), the successor to the UNDP led by Petrushevych. The conference was also attended by members of the Galician Radical and Social Democratic parties. The conference asserted that it was impossible to fight against both the Poles and the Bolsheviks and that the Eastern front should therefore be liquidated. Both revolutionary and parliamentary means should be used to achieve the unification of the West Ukrainian lands with the Eastern Ukraine.⁸⁸⁵

At the same time, as the previous chapter demonstrated, the Soviet Ukrainian government was becoming more interested in gaining influence among nationalist and 'petty bourgeois' groups in the Galician emigration and the province itself in the hope of using the Ukrainian question to undermine the Poles.⁸⁸⁶ Following the introduction of Ukrainianisation the government in Kharkiv hoped that the Soviet Ukraine would become the 'Piedmont' of Ukrainian unification. The March decision undoubtedly created more favourable conditions in which the Soviet Ukrainian government could exploit anti-Polish feeling. In this matter there seems to have been some disagreement between the Russian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks, whereby the former had fewer reservations about supporting the head of the ZUNR. In contrast, the Soviet Ukrainian government continued to treat the ZUNR leader with caution. For example, on 13th November 1923, the Central Committee of the RKP decided to award Petrushevych a subsidy of 1,500 dollars on condition that his staff include a Bolshevik representative. After checks this amount could be increased.⁸⁸⁷

However, in the following month, the Ukrainian Politburo gave a negative answer to Aussem's inquiry about the possibility of accepting six former mem-

884 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.35-6, 119-20.

885 Vasiuta 'Natstionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', 2001, No.6, pp.42-3.

886 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 21.08.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.221.

887 *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy*, p.484.

bers of the Petrushevych government into the Ukraine for work there.⁸⁸⁸ A year later, on 7th December 1924, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks resolved 'to reject the proposition by Konovalts and others (the Petrushevych group) about their receiving a subsidy, but with the aim of their further dissolution to draw on talks in different directions, to propose to them to give detailed information about what they have'.⁸⁸⁹ It would seem that the Politburo saw the talks less as a means of establishing links with the émigré groups and more as a ruse to weaken them. Despite this, the talks ended positively for Petrushevych. On 4th September 1925, the Ukrainian Politburo resolved that it was expedient to offer Petrushevych temporary support. He should provide a statement of his position on Soviet power and explain his relationship to the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, the conservative, moderately nationalist party which dominated Ukrainian politics in Eastern Galicia between the wars.⁸⁹⁰

The KP(b)U continued to support and direct Petrushevych for at least the rest of the decade. In a report from 31st May 1927, the Soviet Ukrainian consul in Lviv Iurii Kotsiubynskiy described a meeting with Petrushevych in Vienna. The Soviet representative wrote that Petrushevych only had a few supporters, 'but it is an unsullied group, and his orientation towards the East is receiving a response among the peasantry'. Indeed, Kotsiubynskiy seemed more convinced of Petrushevych's political importance than did the dictator himself: he reported that Petrushevych was not confident of his own strength and as a result wanted to form a bloc with the Communist front organisation Selrob, while at the same time hoping to compete with them on the national question, given the Russophile leanings of the organisation. Kotsiubynskiy strictly forbade any such competition and advised that Petrushevych develop good relations with the organisation. He also promised to help Petrushevych publish his newspaper daily; up till that point it had only come out twice a week. Kotsiubynskiy was less impressed by Petrushevych's underground military organisation, which at that time was Petrushevych's main interest: it consisted only of the local intelligentsia and its members were young and inactive. Nevertheless, he wrote that the dictator was now very much oriented to the left

888 TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.165.

889 Kentii, *UVO*, p.45; TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.40.

890 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 04.09.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.252.

and concluded that 'Petrushevych is now very valuable as a person who has strongly bound his fate with us'.⁸⁹¹ Interestingly, whereas before the question of whether Petrushevych should receive funding had hinged on his usefulness, now just as important was his loyalty to the Soviet regime.

In fact, the second half of the decade saw Petrushevych's importance in East Galician politics decline. His Sovietophile stance and refusal to take part within the Polish political system split the UNTP, many members of which, led by Volodymyr Bachynyki, increasingly wanted to cooperate with the Polish government in return for Galician autonomy. The different currents in the UNTP finally overcame their differences to form the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) in July 1925. Petrushevych maintained ties with the UNDO, but in November 1926 the party condemned him for his excessive orientation towards the Soviet Ukraine and his policy of boycotting the Polish elections. In early 1927, the UNDO ended its remaining links with Petrushevych; his supporters left the UNDO and formed the relatively unimportant Ukrainian Party of Work (UPP).⁸⁹²

The UPP's main programme was the union of the Western and Eastern Ukraine. Though this goal was more important than the type of state organisation that would exist in the country, the party claimed that a unified Ukraine was only possible in a federation with the other parts of the former Russian empire. The social and political order in the West Ukrainian lands would be determined by that in power in the Central and Eastern Ukraine. One must presume that this meant the Soviet system. However, it was a clumsy and unclear formulation that allowed the party to present itself as a supporter of the Soviet system to its paymasters in Kharkiv while leaving an opening to deny this position. The party saw the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as the 'Ukrainian Piedmont' – an 'achievement of the Ukrainian people's liberation struggle and the realisation of its desires that is a foundation for the completion of the Ukrainian people's main political goal which it pursues through the development of this state and the unification with it of the other Ukrainian territories'. The party, therefore, supported the Ukrainian Soviet Republic for national reasons. At the same time, it adapted its programme to suit the con-

891 Kotsiubynskyi to Kulik (NKID), 31.05.1927, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2484 ark.11.

892 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.42-3.

cerns of its Soviet funders, underlining the importance of the federation with Russia and expressing its support, albeit in a roundabout way, for the Soviet system.⁸⁹³

Petrushevych also clashed with Konovalets, the leader of the UVO. Petrushevych sought to remove Konovalets as the head of the UVO and turn it into a Sovietophile organisation. For a short period at the end of 1923, the ZUNR leader was able to place his own man at the top of the organisation. However, Konovalets soon reasserted his influence. In January 1925, Petrushevych's supporters were expelled from the UVO. Petrushevych formed the West Ukrainian National-Revolutionary Organisation, which published its own journal *Ukrainskyi revoliutsioner*. This organ expressed its Sovietophilism in national terms, proclaiming that the Russian empire had been replaced by the 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which the Ukraine occupies an equal place – this is a Ukrainian state and not some kind of Russian, Muscovite or, as some spitefully say, Bolshevik colony'. The group survived until 1928-9, but was unable to compete with the UVO.⁸⁹⁴

Despite these failures, the Ukrainian Soviet government must have remained pleased with Petrushevych's work. In 1929/30, he received 1,200 dollars, one of the larger sums granted by the Politburo to Ukrainian organisations abroad.⁸⁹⁵ The next year this fell slightly to 1,000 dollars, but it was claimed he was continuing to play a leading role in the UPP.⁸⁹⁶ Nevertheless, even after the Bolsheviks had decided to fund Petrushevych, they continued to keep him at arm's length. On 4th May 1926, the KP(b)U's committee on foreign affairs resolved that Petrushevych should not be allowed to come to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic because if he left Berlin his position as representative of the UNDO would be occupied by a group who were more hostile to the Soviet Union.⁸⁹⁷ It is not stated whether Petrushevych wanted to travel to the Ukraine for talks or whether he intended to settle there permanently. Either

893 Quoted in Soliar, 'Radianofilstvo', p.58.

894 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.119-22; Soliar, 'Radianofilstvo', pp.56-7. The quotation is from Soliar, 'Radianofilstvo', pp.56-7.

895 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), outlining expenditure abroad in 1929/1930, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.28.

896 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), outlining expenditure abroad in 1930/1931, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.185.

897 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 04.05.1926, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.2 ark.219.

way, clearly the Bolsheviks would not accede to any of Petrushevych's demands which might hinder the overall purpose behind the support given to him, the goals of destabilising the Polish state and splitting the Ukrainian emigration.

Petrushevych openly adopted a Sovietophile position after the ambassadors' decision of March 1923; however, this course had deeper roots in that his government had already been discussing this option for several years. As Wehrhahn stresses, Petrushevych's hatred for the Poles made him look to the East, despite the contradictions between the conservative inclinations of the East Galician elite and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary goals.⁸⁹⁸ Petrushevych's Sovietophilism was a product of geopolitical considerations, which had necessitated an orientation towards Russia, whether it be represented by Denikin or the Bolsheviks. However, Petrushevych accommodated his ideology to Bolshevism in order to obtain Soviet support. Petrushevych and his circle had been a product of the traditions of Habsburg parliamentarianism and in 1918 had held correspondingly conservative social opinions; by 1927 the Bolsheviks described him as left wing. Clearly, geopolitics forced Petrushevych to adopt new positions, even if only for outward show. One example presented here was the discussion before Osyb Nazaruk's journey to Copenhagen in which Lev Petrushevych sought to work out guidelines for a ZUNR policy which would make the government seem attractive to the Soviet governments. Any future research must concentrate on this interplay between geopolitical imperatives and ideological accommodation if it is to give an accurate picture of the Sovietophilism of the ZUNR government in exile.

Émigré Military Organisations and Galician Internees

Another organisation to seek support from the Bolsheviks was the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO). As Chapter Two has described, the UVO emerged in 1920/1921 out of a number of organisations created by émigré Galician soldiers. Its leading member was Colonel Ievhen Konovalts, who had led the Sich Sharpshooters (the military unit formed from Galician and Bukovinian prisoners of war held in the Russian empire during the First World War) during the revolution. It was nominally under the authority of the ZUNR

898 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, p.282.

government, but relations between Konovalts and Petrushevych were rocky, probably because the latter rightly saw the Colonel as a challenge to his authority. A power struggle went on within the organisation until January 1925, when Konovalts finally expelled Petrushevych's supporters within the group at a UVO conference in Uzhhorod. Petrushevych and Konovalts differed over a number of issues. Above all, Konovalts favoured an all-Ukrainian approach, whereas Petrushevych concentrated on Galician affairs. However, Petrushevych's Sovietophilism is also often cited as one of the points of disagreement between the leader of the ZUNR and the head of the UVO. Many of its members were attracted by the new brand of radical, right-wing Ukrainian nationalism which emerged between the two world wars. Indeed, Konovalts aided Dmytro Dontsov, the prophet of this ideology, in setting up the journal *Zhrava*. With other nationalist organisations, the UVO was instrumental in founding the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which during the Second World War collaborated with the National Socialists.⁸⁹⁹ Given this information it would seem incongruous that such an organisation would seek support from the Bolsheviks.

However, during the Bolshevik invasion of Galicia the Ukrainian soldiers in exile had also expressed the belief that the Soviet annexation of the province would promote Ukrainian statehood and unity. At a conference of officers organised by a number of Galician soldiers' organisations in August 1920, a resolution was passed which stated that the 'the congress considers it correct not to offer military resistance to the unification of the Ukrainian lands that is currently taking place as a result of the Bolshevik advance and simultaneously calls upon all officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army to further steadfast struggle for the independence of the Ukraine'.⁹⁰⁰ These sentiments were repeated in the resolutions of the conference at which the UVO was founded, which saw unification of the Ukraine under the Bolsheviks as a prerequisite for the recreation of the UNR.⁹⁰¹ Similarly, in a letter to the UVO in Galicia from May 1921 Ievhen Konovalts reported that part of the emigration which represented Galicia and to a certain extent the Sich Sharpshooters thought that 'it is not necessary to attack the Bolsheviks too sharply in matters

899 See Chapter Two.

900 Quoted in Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.98-9.

901 Kentii, *UVO*, p.16.

which affect Galicia because the Bolsheviks not only recognise the independence of Galicia, but even more, its present government (of the dictator) [referring to Petrushevych] too'.⁹⁰²

According to the Polish Ministry of Defence, in autumn 1921 individual members of the UVO started to establish relations with the Soviet missions in Paris, Berlin and Vienna and close contacts with Galician commanders in the Soviet Ukraine. Polish agents reported that a plan had been drawn up between Galician soldiers and the head of the Red Army in the Ukraine, M.V. Frunze,⁹⁰³ whereby the Bolsheviks would grant military and material support to a rising in Galicia. Supposedly, a formal pact had been signed between the governments of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (represented by M. Levytskyi) and the ZUNR in Prague. The Soviets would allow the East Galician émigré formations to mobilise on the borders of Galicia. From the south the remnants of the Red Ukrainian Galician Army (ChUHA), which had defected to the Bolsheviks in February 1920, would attack the province, while an invasion from the north by units of Polish Communists and internationalists would take place. Ten military units posing as members of agricultural communes would infiltrate the province through settlements along the Zbruch. Their goal would be to coordinate actions with revolutionary and Ukrainian nationalist groups in the Ukraine. Though the Polish sources did not claim that such a plan came to fruition, they did report that before the middle of November 1922 eight partisan units of the ChUHA led by V. Poraiko crossed from the Soviet Ukraine into Galicia to support the uprising taking place there. The Foreign Division of the KP(b)U (Zakordot) supported the risings in other Ukrainian regions occupied by Poland, above all in Volhynia.⁹⁰⁴

It is unclear to what extent some of the information on contacts between the UVO and the Bolsheviks were a product of speculation or accurate intelligence. Certainly, as has been discussed above, the representatives of the

902 Quoted in Kentii, *UVO*, p.42.

903 Frunze, Mikhail (1885-1925): Soviet military leader who commanded the southern front against General Wrangel from September 1920. From February 1922, he was plenipotentiary representative of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Ukraine and Crimea and deputy chairman of the Supreme Ukrainian Economic Council. Between 1921 and 1924, he was a member of the Politburo of the KP(b)U. In 1924, he took up work in Moscow. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, pp.947-8.

904 Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', 2001, No.6, p.40; Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.14-5.

ZUNR were regularly meeting officials of the Soviet government at this time. In 1921, the UVO was still nominally under the authority of the ZUNR, so such contacts may really have existed. However, in the documents of the Ukrainian foreign plenipotentiary representatives seen by this author, no such agreement was mentioned. Nevertheless, there were certainly Galician military groups turning to the Bolsheviks for support in a possible rising against the Poles, and there were Soviet officials who unquestionably espoused such a venture. In July 1922, a group of Galicians asked Aussem for ½ million marks to support an insurrection against the Poles. Aussem was in favour of giving them help, but in the form of arms rather than cash. He called for a speedy decision because the group intended to start their rising in September. Kaliuzhnyi also wrote to Kharkiv calling for a resolution on the matter. He claimed that a peasant terror was taking place in the province and that this was a sign of a coming outburst.⁹⁰⁵ Shumskyi mentioned on 14th August 1922 that a Colonel Z. Suliatskyi had turned to him saying that he represented an underground organisation of Galician officers which wanted to put themselves under Soviet command. They advocated the union of Eastern Galicia with the Soviet Ukraine and opposed Petrushevych.⁹⁰⁶ It was not mentioned whether any of these groups had anything to do with the UVO. At the end of August 1922, a rising took place in the province, and the soldiers who approached the Soviet representatives may have been involved in this.

The international recognition of Poland's annexation of Eastern Galicia in March 1923 offered a new opportunity for rapprochement between the Ukrainian military groups and the Bolshevik government in Kharkiv. Following the March decision, a report was sent to Petrushevych claiming that pro-Soviet feeling was growing among the UVO: 'Reports of the spread of Communist activity are arriving from all sections of the VO [military organisation][...]. In certain centres of the VO the best members have gone over to the Communist camp'.⁹⁰⁷ Even the leadership of the organisation was prepared to turn to the Bolsheviks for help. Either at the end of 1923 or beginning of 1924, Konovalets asked the Politburo for financial support. Konovalets's re-

905 Aussem to TsK KP(b)U, 14.07.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.11.

906 Extracts from letters from M. Levytskyi, 03.08.1922, 28.08.1922 and 31.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.13.

907 Kentii, *UVO*, p.34.

quest for funding was discussed on 7th December 1924 at the same time as that made by Petrushevych. As mentioned above, at that time both applications were rejected and Petrushevych only later received financial support.⁹⁰⁸ Though there is no evidence that the UVO received funding, even as late as spring 1927 there were rumours among Petrushevych's circle that the UVO was looking for help from the Bolsheviks to create a legion in the event of a Polish-Soviet war.⁹⁰⁹

The UVO's tentative approval of and abortive cooperation with the Bolsheviks were products of the centrality of the concept of *derzhavnist* – statehood – to the émigré right: the failure during the revolutionary period to create a unified Ukrainian state had made the struggle for statehood the fundamental tenet of the Ukrainian soldiers' political thought; anything that might promote it had to be supported, even the actions of the ideological enemy. Nevertheless, the UVO's failure to secure funding from the Soviets might be an indication that shared geopolitical interests were not enough to enable cooperation with the Soviet regime. Perhaps a certain degree of ideological affinity, or at least a willingness to accommodate one's beliefs to the Bolsheviks' world view, was a prerequisite to receiving support from the Soviet governments. Until more documents are uncovered on the relationship between the two, and in particular on the reasons for the Bolsheviks' refusal to support the UVO, it is impossible to make more precise conclusions.

In addition to these political manoeuvres, many of the former soldiers of the Galician army wanted to come to terms with the Soviet regime in that they hoped to immigrate to the Soviet Ukraine. Though Ievhen Levytskyi's conversation with Mykhailo Levytskyi following the March decision seems to be the first occasion at which the matter of transporting large groups of the UHA to the Soviet Ukraine arose, individual members of the Galician army had been petitioning the Soviet authorities for permission to immigrate for some time. In August 1922, the consular section of the mission in Prague reported that a number of former ZUNR soldiers had turned to them with applications to enter the country because they could not return to Polish-occupied Galicia. One was quoted as being representative: 'We are not Bolsheviks, but it is better

908 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 07.04.1924, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.40; Kentii, *UVO*, p.45.

909 Kentii, *UVO*, p.36.

for us to live with the Bolsheviks than with the Poles'. Others claimed to have fought in the Red Army against the Poles, to have been captured and to have escaped to Czechoslovakia. Both groups were hampered in their applications by their lack of documents.⁹¹⁰ Moreover, the Galician officers campaigned against the immigration of Galician soldiers to the Soviet Ukraine in the hope of maintaining their military units intact.⁹¹¹

This was part of a wider movement among Western Ukrainians to seek the opportunity to immigrate to the Soviet Ukraine in order to escape their new rulers. Ukrainians from Volhynia and Kholm also turned to the consular section because they did not want to live under Polish rule, while Ukrainians from Bessarabia hoped to acquire Ukrainian citizenship in order to escape the Rumanians.⁹¹² According to Kaliuzhnyi in Vienna, the Galicians who had turned to him towards the end of 1922 and beginning of 1923 were mainly students who wanted to travel to the Soviet Ukraine in order to find work as they could not go to Poland for this.⁹¹³

In all of these communiqués it was clear that the Ukrainian representatives did not have any instructions from Kharkiv on how to deal with the Western Ukrainians turning to them for help as they regularly asked for directives on how to handle the applications. For example, in summer 1921 M. Levytskyi wrote to Kharkiv asking for instructions. He claimed that there were party courses taking place within the camps; however, the emphasis of these courses was more on sending able propagandists back to the Polish-occupied province than allowing Galician Ukrainians into the Soviet republic, although M. Levytskyi did mention that this might happen.⁹¹⁴

Therefore, before the March decision, Galician immigration was not given priority: the main goal was to create a network of Communist agents within the

910 Report from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Czechoslovakia, 05.08.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 ark.6.

911 M.I. Pavlenko, 'Perebuвання uhrupovan Ukrainskoi halytskoi armii na terytorii Chekhoslovachchyny (1919-1923 rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1999, No.2, pp.112-24 (pp.120, 122).

912 Report from the consular section of the Soviet Ukrainian mission in Czechoslovakia, 02.10.1922, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 akr.35zv.

913 Report by Kaliuzhnyi on the activity of the Soviet Ukrainian mission to Austria from 01.10.1922-01.04.1923, dated 11.04.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.798 ark.3.

914 M. Levytskyi to TsK KP(b)U, 12.06.1921 and 06.07.1921, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.10, 43zv.

province. Only at the beginning of March, shortly before the ambassadors' decision, did the Politburo start looking at procedures for allowing Galicians to come to the Ukraine. On the 2nd, the Politburo decided to work out a concrete proposal for the organisation of Ukrainians arriving from Poland and Galicia. It hoped to come to an agreement with Moscow whereby some Galicians would be sent to the Russian Soviet Republic. The arrival of Galicians coming from Germany, who on the whole were there as individuals, would be regulated in agreement with the GPU.⁹¹⁵

The ambassador's decision, however, changed the situation. In a report of 11th April 1923, Kaliuzhnyi wrote that applications for entry to the Ukraine might now take on a mass character. It was therefore imperative that he receive directions in this matter.⁹¹⁶ In fact, the day before the Politburo resolved that it was essential to allow Galicians into the Ukrainian SSR and suggested using them in the Donbas.⁹¹⁷ However, Kharkiv's leeway for action was somewhat limited by opposition from the Russian government. On 3rd April, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow wrote to Kharkiv complaining that the Ukrainian representatives had been too lenient in dealing with people applying to come to the Soviet Ukraine; an objection which was accepted in the Ukrainian capital. Despite this, on the 26th the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Kharkiv decided that it was possible to allow East Galician émigrés to come to the Ukraine following the necessary checks. Under certain conditions, financial support would also be granted to them. Special care should be taken in distributing them among different regions.⁹¹⁸

On 17th September, the Politburo first discussed a plan to bring 1,000 Galicians to the Soviet Ukraine.⁹¹⁹ A few days later the Ukrainian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs reported receiving a declaration from interned Galicians announcing their wish to enter the Ukraine as a 'Galician Legion'. This may well have been the same group under discussion. However, the compiler of the report was against using the Galician soldiers: they were a 'hopeless

915 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 02.03.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.25.

916 Report by Kaliuzhnyi on the activity of the Soviet Ukrainian mission to Austria from 01.10.1922-01.04.1923, dated 11.04.1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.798 ark.4-5.

917 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 10.04.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.44.

918 Correspondence between the NKID in Moscow and Kharkiv, April 1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.873 ark.17-8, 22.

919 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 17.09.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.112.

element'; their officers were characterised as being Shapovalists⁹²⁰ or fascists. It would also harm Soviet relations with Poland and make it harder to criticise Polish support for the Petliurists. Those wishing to immigrate to the Soviet Ukraine should do so individually following extensive checks. Kaliuzhnyi, who was now in Prague, agreed; he argued against using the soldiers of the UHA, saying that many of their officers were reactionary. Yet another report from this period advised against using the Galicians, describing the majority as 'trash'. It felt that the use to be got from them was small, whereas the possible harm they could inflict was great. Despite the clear reservations which existed within the Soviet foreign service, the Politburo continued to argue in favour of accepting the group, but promised that the necessary inspections would be made.⁹²¹ In November, a plan was put forward on the use of the 1,000 Galicians: 400 should be used for work abroad; the rest would join the Red Army or administration in Terchast, in the Left-bank Ukraine. Political reasons dictated that only here would they be acceptable. A few days later a Politburo member, M. Frunze, was instructed to establish the 'physiognomy' of the military organisations and look into financing the project. However, on 20th June 1924 it was decided that as a result of the difficult conditions, drought, unemployment and rejection by the war department, the Galicians could not be accepted into the Ukraine.⁹²²

Nevertheless, the plan was soon revived, albeit in a truncated form. On 1st August 1924, the Russian Politburo accepted a proposal put forward by the Ukraine according to which 150 Galicians and 50 Ukrainians would be allowed into the Soviet Union. One group would join the army. A second would be made up of qualified workers who would be sent to Baku in Azerbaijan. In addition, 200 families of agriculturalists would be settled in Cherkasskyi Okrug, in the Eastern Ukraine. The OGPU was instructed to conduct checks on the applicants. 11 days later a commission of three, including M. Levytskyi, was formed to deal with the Galicians coming from Czechoslovakia. Some should be sent to work in the Donbas, while others should be sent to Sovk-

920 Supporters of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Mykyta Shapoval.

921 Correspondence between Kaliuzhnyi and the NKID, August-October 1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.20-1, 29, 31 zv, 34-5.

922 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 12.11.1923, undated and 20.06.1924, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.5, 10, 51.

hozy and Kolkhozy. The Ukrainian government would turn to the Russian Central Committee for financial support for this project. In August of the next year, the matter was discussed once more. Again it decided that 200 Galicians should be accepted, who should be qualified professionals. Funding should come from the Union.⁹²³

It is not recorded whether these plans were enacted. Clearly there were groups of Galicians being transported to the Ukraine. Rublov and Cherchenko, in their book on Stalinism and the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, mention three transports bringing former troops of the UHA from Prague to the Ukraine. They arrived in December 1924, November 1925 and summer 1926 and each carried about 500 people. In addition, a further convoy from Vienna arrived in the Ukraine in October 1925.⁹²⁴ The Soviet representative in Prague Prykhodko mentioned the successful movement of Galicians to the Ukraine in a report of September 1925 and he talked of a further 100 Galicians who still hoped to travel to the Ukraine.⁹²⁵ However, the Politburo later put a stop to the mass transportation of whole groups. In June 1927, the Politburo acknowledged that it was impossible to transport all the Galicians; rather, checks should be conducted to find out who could arrive individually.⁹²⁶ In the same month, for example, 29 Galician graduates of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy in Podebrady crossed into the Soviet Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian GPU allowed them in because he believed that they might undertake practical work and be useful citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.⁹²⁷

The Soviet authorities' considerations in the matter of the interned Galicians demonstrate the contradictions of the stated desire to turn the Soviet Ukraine into a Ukrainian Piedmont. The Galicians' hatred of the Poles was a tempting weapon in any possible conflict with the Soviet Ukraine's neighbour. However, the Bolsheviks were highly suspicious of the Galicians' political loyalties.

923 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 12.08.1924, 01.08.1924 and 21.08.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.97, 99, 222.

924 Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, p.26. Unfortunately, Rublov and Cherchenko only give a reference for the first of the convoys from Prague.

925 Prykhodko to Maksymovych, 17.09.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.256.

926 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 03.06.1927, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.3a ark.122.

927 Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, p.26.

Even when they were allowed into the Soviet Ukraine, much effort was made, at least in theory, to screen them politically and to dispatch them to provinces in which they could not conduct activities harmful to the Soviet regime. In so far as one can make out the motives of the Galician soldiers themselves from the Soviet documents, for some the Polish occupation of their homeland ruled out a return to the province. Though not Bolsheviks themselves, it was the reprisals from the Poles that they feared. In addition, the Polish state had closed many avenues to the Ukrainian soldiers. For example, the stipulation that university applicants had to have served in the Polish army prevented the former soldiers of the UHA from studying in their homeland: in order to attend a university they either had to enter one of the émigré institutions or travel to the Soviet Ukraine. The relationship between the Soviet Ukraine and the Ukrainian Military Organisation is, at the moment, even more inscrutable and perhaps can only be made clearer when it is possible to read the relevant materials in the secret service archives in Moscow and Kyiv.

Sovietophilism in the Western Ukraine

The Ukrainians living within the lands occupied by Poland also closely followed the events taking place in the Soviet Ukraine. These developments inspired interest and even support among the people observing them, many of whom were far from being socialists, let alone Communists. Nevertheless, Sovietophilism in the Western Ukraine was clearly strongest among the left. This may be seen through a short review of the intertwining history of four organisations: the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine (KPZU), the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP), the People's Will Party and Selsoiuz. The USDP first worked closely with founders of Selsoiuz and later joined the KPZU en masse. In 1926, the KPZU brought the People's Will Party together with Selsoiuz to create the organisation Selrob as a front for its activities.

The KPZU itself was the successor to the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (KPSH), which was formed in Stanyslaviv in February 1919. The KPSH brought together various sections of the Ukrainian left, mainly from Galicia, but also from the Eastern Ukraine. Many of its members, including the future leader Osyp Krylyk (later pseudonym Vasylykiv), had been members of youth

circles which supported the form of socialism advocated by Drahomanov. There were also *Borotbisty* from the Eastern Ukraine present at the founding conference of the KPSH, for example Karlo Savrych (pseudonym Maksymovych) who became the KPZU's representative to the KP(b)U. Others who joined were Galicians who had been exposed to Bolshevik propaganda while they were prisoners of war in Russia. In this way, Mykhailo Levytskyi, who later as a full member of the KP(b)U was one of the foreign representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic during the 1920s, was involved in the formation of the East Galician Communist movement. The Communist Workers' Party of Poland also sent emissaries into the province and founded Communist organisations there. Under the name of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, the KPSH became an autonomous section of the Polish Communist Party.⁹²⁸

Considering the emergence of the party from the left wing of the Ukrainian national movement, it is unsurprising that in addition to its support for the achievement of socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the KPZU advocated the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. The Galician Communists regularly stressed that social divisions in Galicia between landlord and peasant mirrored the national division between Pole and Ukrainian. The national question was therefore, it argued, a powerful tool for the achievement of revolution and the Ukrainian peasants were a great source of revolutionary potential. Though this position brought it into conflict with the Polish Communists, both within the KPZU and the Polish Communist Party, the RKP and Comintern, the KPZU often occupied a similar position to that taken by Shumskyi and Skrypnyk in the KP(b)U.⁹²⁹ The KPZU therefore combined both national demands with the social goals and had the potential to attract nationally conscious, landless peasants. Indeed, there are indications that it was among such peasants that support for the KPZU was greatest.⁹³⁰

928 On the creation of the KPZU see Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.1-20 and Roman Solchanyk, 'The Foundation of the Communist Movement in Eastern Galicia, 1919-1921', *Slavic Review*, Vol.30, 1971, No.4, pp.774-94.

929 See Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.60-3, 69.

930 See Alexander J. Motyl, 'The Rural Origins of the Communist and Nationalist Movements in Wołyn *Województwo*, 1921-1939', *Slavic Review*, Vol.37, 1978, No.3, pp.412-20.

Most of the Galician Sovietophiles already mentioned in the preceding chapters (Semen Vityk, Volodymyr Levynskyi and Oleksander Badan) had been members of the Galician USDP. This is no coincidence. As a socialist party, the USDP was understandably attracted to the Bolsheviks. When the Red Army advanced into Galicia during the Soviet-Polish war, the party began to express its support for the Soviet republics. At a meeting of 10th June 1920, the Social Democrats adopted a resolution in which they stated that they could not support the UNR's war against Soviet Russia because the Bolsheviks were also a socialist party.⁹³¹ An article in *Vpered*, the organ of the party, explained the Sovietophile sentiment more fully. Although it condemned the Bolsheviks as occupiers of the Ukraine, it also stated: 'At the moment of incessant struggle between world reaction and the socialist camp of the proletariat, in the moment when the fate of the whole subjected and exploited masses is being decided, the proletariat cannot be indifferent to the predicament in which Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine find themselves. Against them today is turned the sharp blade of worldwide reaction's hate. They are compelled to conduct an unequal struggle on almost all fronts, they are ruined with a blockade. And despite this, Soviet power has not fallen; on the contrary, it is from day to day stronger [...]. The proletariat of Moscow and the Ukraine understand that their retreat is simultaneously the fall of all the achievements of the revolution [...]. The European proletariat understands that the overthrow of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine is the victory of European capital, a halt for a long time to the process of proletarian struggle, a step to the victory of socialism'.⁹³²

However, before the ambassadors' decision the Galician Social Democrats did not consistently follow a pro-Soviet line. On the same day as the above-mentioned resolution, a member of the party Lev Hankevych⁹³³ held a secret conference with Andrii Livytskyi,⁹³⁴ at that time minister for justice in the UNR

931 Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, p.268.

932 Kvirino to Rakovskii and Chicherin, 27.11.1920, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.14 ark.6.

933 Hankevych, Lev (1881-1962): a prominent activist in the Galician USDP, who headed its executive in 1921-3 and 1930-4. He became notorious as the defence lawyer for members of the OUN and UVO brought to trial in Polish courts. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.122.

934 Livytskyi, Andrii (1879-1954): a leading member of the USDRP, who served as UNR minister of justice, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. He was responsible for negotiating the April 1920 Treaty of Warsaw with Poland. Following Petli-

government. The USDP continued to express reservations about the consequences of a Soviet invasion of Galicia. Before the ambassadors' decision, the USDP worked alongside the other parties which had formed the ZUNR as part of the Interparty Council.⁹³⁵

Only at the party's 6th congress (18th March 1923) did the USDP adopt a pro-Soviet platform in response to the official recognition of the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into Poland. In a declaration on the new position, the USDP claimed that the Ukrainian proletariat was not bound by the decisions of capitalist-imperialist diplomats and that they would continue to fight for liberation from the imperialist yoke through the common struggle of the world proletariat. They also condemned the Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie, who had placed their hopes in the Entente, whose hate for the Socialist Soviet Republics, arising from their class interests, had delivered Eastern Galicia into the hands of the Polish nobility and bourgeoisie. Within the struggle against imperialism, the USDP asserted that 'the Ukrainian proletariat [in Eastern Galicia] feels itself to be in complete unity with the proletariat of the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine and the Union of Soviet Republics'.⁹³⁶

The party was increasingly subject to repression from the Poles, who wanted to prevent the spread of Communist activities. By January 1924, the Polish authorities had dissolved the party. The entire left wing of the USDP joined the KPZU, becoming the largest single group within the party. On 23rd February 1924, the USDP's representatives in the Polish parliament (Iakiv Voitiuk, Andrii Pashuk, Osyp Skrypa and Toma Prystupa) left the Ukrainian socialist club, forming their own group which was under the control of the KPZU. By 7th November 1924, it had become clear that any activity by the Ukrainian socialists was impossible, and they joined the Communist faction in parliament.⁹³⁷

This party's activities had drawn the attention of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U and the matter of funding the party was discussed, albeit somewhat

ura's death he headed the exile UNR government. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.176-7.

935 Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.37, 59; Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, p.268.

936 *Tysiacha rokiv Ukrainskoi suspilno-politichnoi dumky. Tom VII (20ti-40vi roky XXst.)*, Kyiv: Dnipro, 2001, p.53.

937 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, p.31; Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', 2001, No.6, p.48.

belatedly. 15th December 1924 the Central Committee decided to turn to the TsK of the RKP with the suggestion that the USDP be sent 1,500 dollars.⁹³⁸

The East Galician Russophiles also began to take interest in the Bolsheviks. In August 1922, the GPU reported that at the most recent congress of the Russophiles there was a split. The minority advocated coming to an understanding with the Poles. However, the majority (which was headed by Kyrylo Valnytskyi)⁹³⁹ favoured adopting a Soviet platform. According to the agent, this faction 'conducts propaganda for the unification of Eastern Galicia to Soviet Russia. It is very likely that the driving reason was not in the first place the preference for Soviet power before other forms of state organisation, but the striving towards a unification with Russia, whatever [government] she has (even black-hundred)'.⁹⁴⁰ He doubted their claims to be socialists and believed that they were certainly opportunists because they contained people of very diverse views. Nevertheless, the report's compiler argued that the group's organ *Volia naroda* (The People's Will) had spoken in favour of the Soviet system as early as 1920 and there could be no doubt that they wanted to serve the Soviets. Though they were not a military organisation, he believed they might be useful due to their connections with the peasants. He suggested giving them material support.⁹⁴¹ Given the Bolsheviks' misgivings about the socialism of most non-Bolshevik parties, perhaps one should be careful about accepting the Bolshevik agent's understanding of the motivations of the pro-Soviet Russophiles: it is quite possible that they were attracted by the Bolsheviks' social program. However, the suggestion that the Russian character of Bolshevism which attracted the Russophiles offers an intriguing line of research on these groups and hints at another possible basis for Sovietophilism in Eastern Galicia.

938 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 15.12.1924, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.146.

939 Valnytskyi, Kyrylo (1889-?): Galician Russophile, who founded the People's Will party and edited its paper. Became a pro-Soviet Marxist and helped set up the Communist front organisation Selrob. In 1930 he fled Poland for the USSR, where he died in a Soviet prison camp. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.552.

940 'Black hundred' refers to a number of anti-Semitic nationalist Russian organisations which appeared in the Romanov empire at the beginning of the twentieth century and were responsible for pogroms. After the revolution, the term was used in left-wing and Soviet literature as a synonym for 'reactionary'.

941 Undated GPU report, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.15.

Whatever the case may be, the programmatic pamphlet *Vremennyi regulamin Galitsko-Russkikh sotsialistiv* (The Provisional Statutes of the Galician-Russian Socialists), which was published by the *Volia naroda* group in the early 1920s, contained both socialist and Russophile elements. It called for the economic and national liberation of the Galician-Russian people, denounced capitalism as the source of social and national oppression and called for the introduction of the socialist system through class struggle in solidarity with the working classes of other nations. At the same time, it condemned 'narrow' nationalism for weakening working class unity and for contaminating workers with bourgeois ideology. This internationalism had a distinct Russophile character: the group condemned the attempt to create separate nations from the Russian tribes as retrograde. It described the Russian language and culture as the property of all Russian tribes and proclaimed that there was no reason to give it up. However, as the People's Will group moved towards the Sovietophile camp it came to reassess its Russophilism. In 1924, the group created the *Partii narodnoi voli* (The People's Will Party). It declared itself ready to work with the Ukrainian parties and stopped publishing the Russian-language version of *Volia naroda*. Valnytskyi did not immediately abandon the tenets of Russophilism. He adopted a 'two-in-one' theory on the relationship between the Russophile and Ukrainophile movements, according to which Russophilism was the second phase of the same movement as Ukrainophilism.⁹⁴²

At its first congress in April 1926, the party declared that it was a party of the peasants with little or no land, the workers and the labouring intelligentsia. The foundations of its principles were scientific socialism and the belief that they had reached the stage of history in which the class struggle for the imminent introduction of socialism was underway. The program adopted at the congress did not take a stand on the nationality of the Eastern Galicians. However, later articles in the organ of the People's Will Party demonstrate how far the party had travelled from its Russophile roots. As a result of the war and revolution, claimed the newspaper, the Ukrainian movement had emerged triumphant, as could be seen in the achievement of a Ukrainian national state in the form of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Russophil-

942 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.83-5.

ism had become outdated. The paper began to express a strictly Leninist understanding of the national question. It opposed all national oppression, but would only support those national movements which were objectively progressive. The experience of the war and revolution had proved that the Ukrainian movement was of this sort.⁹⁴³

Galicia was of course not the only predominantly Ukrainian province to come under Polish rule. There were also large numbers of Ukrainians in Volhynia, Kholm and Polissia, which before the war had belonged to the Russian empire and had become part of the Polish Republic as a result of the peace treaty signed in Riga. The Ukrainians from these areas also started looking to the Soviet Ukrainian Republic for support. In a report from 26th June 1922, Shumskyi, the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Warsaw, described how a representative of the Electoral Committee of Kholm, Pidiashshia and Volhynia had asked him whether the Soviet government would advise them to take part in the elections to the Polish Sejm; in case of a positive reply, he also wanted to know if the Soviets would fund the committee. Two months later, Shumskyi reported that the committee would enter the elections and ask the Soviet government for funds.⁹⁴⁴

In these elections twenty Ukrainian deputies were elected from the above-mentioned provinces. In May 1923, nine of these formed the Socialist Faction within the Ukrainian bloc in the Sejm. They started working with the USDP from Galicia and at the suggestion of the USDP left the group of Ukrainian representatives entirely in order to form a joint parliamentary group. As the USDP was becoming ever more pro-Communist, the members of the Socialist Faction were forced to define their position towards the Bolsheviks. The leader of the group, Petro Vasylichuk, argued that Communism neglected the needs of small nations. 'We cannot be Communists', he wrote, 'if for no other reason than because we are Ukrainians'. He opposed the slogan of attaching the Western Ukrainian provinces to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and wanted to create a socialist movement which would be independent of the Communists. Nevertheless, he did believe that this movement should loyally cooper-

943 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.85-7. The program of *Partii Narodnoi Voli* can be found in *Tysiacha rokov VII*, pp.135-7.

944 Extracts from letters by Shumskyi, 26.06.1922 and 20.08.1922, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.14.

ate with them. Another member of the group Stepan Makivka⁹⁴⁵ said that it was wrong 'to be led by a party which does not know our needs'. In December 1923, the demands of the former to support the Communist program were met, despite Vasylichuk's opposition, at a joint conference of the USDP and the Socialist Faction. Following the repression of the USDP by the Poles, the two groups split. The USDP deputies joining the Communist-led faction. Vasylichuk and his supporters formed their own grouping, the Ukrainian Socialist Peasants' Union – Selsoiuz.⁹⁴⁶

Solsoiuz's program declared that it was a party of the Ukrainian peasantry which sought to combat the exploitation of poor peasants. Its immediate task was to distribute land to the peasants without compensation and implement other agrarian reforms. Other more general policies included the struggle against clericalism and the creation of a national and secular system of education. Its ultimate goal was the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. This program gave a rather misleading picture of the group's ideology. The party organ *Nashe zhyttia* (Our Life) was more moderate. It certainly espoused a pro-peasant program, criticising the government's policy of agricultural reform, attacking Polish colonisation and advocating the development of peasant cooperatives. However, it was less interested in class than the party's program would imply and more concerned with nationalism, for example espousing the creation of a united national front. Indeed, it joined with the right in a coalition of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation. Moreover, it was not an anti-clerical party. It defended the rights of Orthodoxy against the Polish government and emphasised its ties with the Orthodox tradition over that of socialism. Thus, Selsoiuz remained perfectly within the tradition of Ukrainian peasant populism which had begun developing before the First World War.⁹⁴⁷

The party grew rapidly in Volhynia and Polissia, where, unlike in Galicia, it faced little opposition from other Ukrainian parties. At first, Selsoiuz refrained

945 Makivka, Stepan (1889-1966): Ukrainian from Podlachia, which before 1917 had been part of the Russian empire, but which following the peace of Riga became a part of Poland. Between 1922 and 1928, he was a deputy to the Polish Sejm. He helped found Selsoiuz and Selrob. After the Second World War, he moved to the Soviet Ukraine. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.280.

946 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.88-9.

947 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.89-91.

from judgement on the Soviet Union and the Soviet Ukraine; however, it increasingly began to see the Soviet Ukrainian Republic positively. At a conference in March 1926, the group resolved that the Ukrainian masses were turning the Soviet Ukraine into a true state of the Ukrainian labouring masses. The conference seems to have marked the beginning of a turn to the left by the party. It developed the slogan of a 'national front of the Ukrainian toiling masses against the front of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and clergy'. It was also prepared to join a united front with the labouring masses of other nationalities if these recognised the national and social demands of the Ukrainian people. Despite these slogans, the party decided to remain in the coalition with the Ukrainian right in parliament in order to better defend the interests of the Ukrainian nation. In early 1926, Vasylchuk was removed from the leadership of the party and a Presidium of the Central Committee was formed by Maksym Chuchmai, Stepan Makivka and Andrii Bratun. This initiated a more pro-Soviet direction for Selsoiuz. The party moved even closer to the KPZU and initiated bitter polemics with the moderate nationalist Galician party, the UNDO.⁹⁴⁸

In autumn 1926, these various strands of Ukrainian Sovietophilism came together with the formation of Selrob. By 1926, the KPZU was experiencing a crisis: there had been a decline in 'party discipline' and contact with grassroots membership had been made difficult through the repressive measures against it. The KPZU therefore sought to establish contacts to the other increasingly pro-Soviet organisations in the Western Ukraine, Selsoiuz and the People's Will Party. Negotiations began at the beginning of 1926. Though the move of the former to the left and the latter towards a Ukrainophile stance, described above, made such a coalition possible, there were a number of difficulties in forming a new party. People's Will were avowedly Marxist and believed that the national question was only of secondary importance, whereas Selsoiuz had been attracted to cooperation with the Communists by the nationalities policy in the Soviet Ukraine. Consequently, it was only in October of that year that through the mediation of the KPZU Selsoiuz and the People's Will Party unified to create the *Ukrainske seliansko-robotnyche obiednannia* (The Ukrainian Peasant-Worker Union), commonly referred to as Selrob. In

948 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.90-92.

the introductory chapter to the new party's program the national demands of Selsoiuz and the social demands of the People's Will Party were listed. In the municipal elections of summer 1927, Selrob was the largest party in Volhynia and Kholm, although it had much less success in Eastern Galicia. Though at the party's founding congress Selrob had decided to form a common front against the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and clergy, the Selsoiuz members continued to work with the other Ukrainian parties in the Ukrainian parliamentary club.⁹⁴⁹

As one can see from the above account, with the exception of the former Russophiles of People's Will, the Sovietophiles in the Western Ukraine had emerged from the left wing of the Ukrainian national movement. Again with the exception of People's Will, they continued to see the national question as important. Consequently, the success of the policy of Ukrainianisation in the Soviet Ukraine was an important reason for the attractiveness of the KPZU and its front organisation Selrob. Indeed, the sensitivity of the KPZU to events in the Soviet Ukraine can be seen in the debate over Ukrainianisation initiated by Oleksander Shumskyi.⁹⁵⁰ Maksymovych had represented the West Ukrainian party at the June 1926 plenum at which Shumskyi had been condemned and he had sided with the former *Borotbist*. In April 1927, a plenum was called by Skrypnyk with the aim of finding out whether the KPZU shared the views of Maksymovych. The Central Committee of the Western Ukrainian party rejected Skrypnyk's resolution condemning Shumskyi and Maksymovych, passing instead a resolution defending their position, which they sent to Comintern. Both the Polish Communist Party and the KP(b)U sent their own memoranda to Comintern attacking the position of the KPZU's leadership and in August Comintern made a decision, criticising the leaders of the KPZU, but refusing to dismiss them.⁹⁵¹

This conflict became entangled with a disagreement within Selrob. The very different characters of Selsoiuz and People's Will made cooperation difficult. There were a number of disputes, for example because the Selsoiuz faction continued to work with the other Ukrainian parties in parliament and because

949 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.82, 92-3, 97. See also the declaration of the creation of Selrob by 'People's Will', published in *Tysiacha rokiv VII*, pp.158-61.

950 See Chapter Two.

951 Mace, *Communism*, pp.95-119; Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, p.127-44.

it sent a delegate to a church conference on the Ukrainianisation of the liturgy. In October 1927, Selrob split into Selrob-Left, the core of which was People's Will, and Selrob-Right, based around Selsoiuz. The KPZU was accused by the Polish and Soviet Ukrainian Communist parties of sympathising with the 'nationalists' from Selsoiuz. A minority group in the KPZU supported the line taken by the KP(b)U and the Polish Communists and in January 1928, two rival KPZU congresses were held, one led by the KPZU leadership, the other by the party minority. There were attempts to bring the two factions together, but in the 1928 elections to the Polish parliament, Selrob-Right, supported by the KPZU majority, refused to cooperate with Selrob-Left. The two sides entered into a bitter polemic and the opposing lines hardened. Finally, in February 1928 the leadership of the KPZU was expelled from Comintern.⁹⁵² Sovietophilism in the Ukrainian lands under Polish rule had suffered a severe blow from which it never really recovered.

Interest in the Soviet Ukraine could also be found in more unexpected quarters. Both the UNDO and *Dilo* (The Deed), the daily which stood closely to it, were representatives of moderate conservative nationalism, in the tradition of the movement which had grown up under the conditions created by the Habsburg parliamentary system. The party had been founded in 1925 by a number of Ukrainian figures who had played leading roles in Galician political life before the war and was in many ways a continuation of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party. It hoped to create an independent Ukrainian state, but also sought to bring about improvements for the Ukrainian population in Poland through legal means. Nevertheless, following the introduction of Ukrainianisation, some members of the UNDO started expressing ever greater interest in the developments taking place in the Soviet Ukraine; a Sovietophile wing emerged, especially among those close to Ievhen Petrushevych. This change became most evident in 1925, by which stage, two years after the introduction of the Ukrainianisation, it was already possible to see some of the apparent successes of the policy.⁹⁵³

952 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, pp.140-4, 152-9, 170-3.

953 See Iurii Shapoval, "*Dilo*" (1880-1939rr.): *postup ukrainskoi suspilnoi dumky*, Lviv: NAN Ukrainy, 1999, pp.252, 258; see also Soliar, 'Radianofilstvo', p.57.

In January 1925, Fedor Fedortsev,⁹⁵⁴ the editor of *Dilo*, described the Soviet Ukraine as an expression of Ukrainian statehood. 'In the Union of Soviet Republics', he wrote, 'the Ukrainian nation has not only its natural cultural centre, but also its statehood. However legal relations, the social order, cultural-propagandistic speculation are judged – then all the same one cannot close one's eyes to those state frameworks, to those beginnings of Ukrainian statehood, that slowly but inevitably are creating better, more certain and more permanent conditions of life and fully rounded development for the Ukrainian nation'. The writer did not see this as the result of policies introduced by the Bolsheviks. Indeed, he had no sympathy for the Bolsheviks, whom he referred to as 'red, revolutionary-imperialist Moscow' and as occupiers of Ukrainian land. Rather, the Ukrainian people, by continuing their struggle, had forced the Muscovite regime to recognise their state-building achievements and even to adjust its position on the national question. As a consequence, the fiction of Soviet statehood was gradually becoming the reality of Ukrainian national statehood, albeit in Soviet form. He admitted that this state was in many ways limited, but warned against identifying Ukrainian Soviet statehood with the Communist party. All states, he argued, maintain a compromise between its citizens and the interests of the centre. Even an all-powerful party cannot create the state alone, but rather a variety of elements and interests exist, which often oppose the ruling party. In order to retain power, even a dictatorial party must make concessions; in this case the Bolsheviks had been forced to abandon the theory of class struggle in order in order to cope with the real conditions in the country. The two years following the introduction of Ukrainianisation proved that this was happening in the Ukraine. He hailed this as a great step, a move towards statehood.⁹⁵⁵

A month later, Dmytro Levytskyi⁹⁵⁶ wrote an article which sought to combat accusations that *Dilo* had become pro-Bolshevik. He repeated all of the arguments present in Fedortsev's earlier piece, but made more explicit the fact

954 Fedortsev, Fedor (1889-1930): Galician journalist who was chief editor of *Dilo* between 1925 and 1927 and a founding member of the UNDO. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, pp.874-5.

955 *Tysiacha Rokiv VII*, p.95-6. The quotation is on page 95.

956 Levytskyi, Dmytro (1877-1942): a Galician lawyer who edited *Dilo* from 1923 to 1925. He was a co-founder of the UNDO and served as its leader between 1925 and 1935. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.98.

that they continued to view the Bolsheviks as foreign occupiers. It was not the ruling party that was sponsoring the growth of the Ukrainian national idea in the Ukraine; rather, the nationally conscious Ukrainian masses were forcing the Bolsheviks to make concessions. He expressed the hope that these forces would take more and more of the running of the Ukrainian state apparatus into their hands.⁹⁵⁷ Indeed, though members of the UNDO defended many of the developments in the Soviet Ukraine, it was never accepted as Sovietophile by other Sovietophiles, who attacked the party for its opposition to the Soviet system.

These moderate nationalists in Galicia therefore welcomed Ukrainianisation not as sign of the Bolsheviks' good intentions, but rather as evidence that in the face of nationalist pressure, the Bolshevik regime felt itself to be weak. By 1926, it seemed to many members of UNDO that this pressure was getting stronger as a result of the affairs over Shumskyi and Khvylovyi. An article in *Dilo* from June 1926, 'The Dams are Breaking', which was a response to the arguments over Khvylovyi, expressed this optimism: 'One dam on the cultural front has been torn down! It is being patched up! But it will surely collapse at the same place again, and then under pressure from the spontaneous flood, the other dams will also break; the current will crush them, submerge them and travel its own natural course'.⁹⁵⁸ Soon, it was hoped, the Ukrainians would take power in the Soviet Republic into their own hands. At its second party congress in November 1926, the UNDO resolved that 'beyond the border created by Riga in the Ukrainian Soviet lands, great national progress is taking place. National culture is growing there; national forces are stronger; processes are being revived there that sooner or later will restore sovereign rights in the Ukraine to the whole Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people under Poland turn to these national forces and to these national successes which are growing beyond the Dniπρο'.⁹⁵⁹

However, such an orientation was only possible while the Bolsheviks were still seen to be making concessions to Ukrainian nationalism. As a result of Shumskyi's resignation in March 1927 and Khvylovyi's public self-denunciations at the end of 1926 and in February 1928, *Dilo* strengthened its

957 *Tysiacha Rokiv VII*, pp.97-8.

958 Quoted in Shkandrij, *Modernists*, p.139.

959 *Tysiacha Rokiv VII*, p.165.

criticism of Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine, claiming that these events proved that the state independence of the Soviet Ukraine was a fiction. Nevertheless, it continued to hope that the Ukraine was on the threshold of a nationalist revolution.⁹⁶⁰ At the same time, the Sovietophile current in the UNDO grew weaker. In November 1926, the UNDO condemned Petrushevych's excessive Sovietophilism and in May 1927 his remaining supporters left to form the UPP.

The Bolshevik purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that started in 1929 and the famine of 1932-3 caused by Soviet agricultural policies killed off *Dilo's* last remnants of optimism. From 1929, the paper concentrated on the mass arrests of Ukrainian cultural figures in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and following the outbreak of the famine it sought to document the crimes taking place across the border.⁹⁶¹ Clearly, by the 1930s it was impossible to praise the Soviet Ukraine as a form of Ukrainian statehood. At the UNDO's congress in 1932, the situation in the Soviet Ukraine was condemned thus: 'In the URSR⁹⁶² a merciless liquidation of all creative national forces, and at the same time a systematic limitation of its rights in favour of red Muscovite centralism, is taking place. Moreover, through its experiments the Communist dictatorship is leading the entire Ukrainian population to certain economic ruin; in particular it is destroying the Ukrainian village – the natural basis of the Ukrainian nation [...]. With this in mind, the People's Congress calls on all of Ukrainian society and in particular all party organs and the entire Ukrainian national press to struggle with Communism in all of its public and hidden (Sovietophile) forms'.⁹⁶³

Thus, the March decision and the introduction of Ukrainianisation enabled parties on both the left and the right to adopt a Sovietophile position. Some Ukrainian socialists, like the KPZU, had become supporters of the Soviet system before 1923 for the good of the international revolution. However, others on the Ukrainian left required more convincing. During the Polish-Soviet war, the East Galician Social Democrats became enamoured of the Bolsheviks as the leaders of the world revolution; however, it was only with the March deci-

960 Shkandrij, *Modernists*, pp.139-40.

961 Shapoval, *Dilo*, pp.274, 280-1, 287, 297, 300-1.

962 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

963 Quoted in Shapoval, *Dilo*, pp.296-7.

sion that the party decisively turned to Moscow and Kharkiv for help against the Poles. The introduction of Ukrainianisation made it easier for some Ukrainians to reconcile their national aspirations with the Bolsheviks' program; doubters in Selsoiuz were won over to a Sovietophile platform. The UNDO, too, was interested in Ukrainianisation; however, in contrast to the left-wing parties, it believed the policy was being introduced despite the Bolsheviks, not by them. It supported not the ruling party, but rather the autonomous forces which it believed were shaping developments in the Soviet Ukraine.

Despite these differences, the Sovietophilism of both the left and right depended on the continuation of the policy in the Soviet Ukraine. The argument over Shumskyi led to disagreements within the KPZU, and between the leadership of the West Ukrainian Communists and the KP(b)U. In turn, this fuelled disagreements within Selrob between 'nationalists' and Marxists. After the defeat of the Shumskyiite wing of the KPZU, the party could no longer present itself as a Soviet solution to the national question; rather, its platform became indistinguishable from the rest of the parties in Comintern.⁹⁶⁴ Equally, the attacks on ardent Ukrainianisers within the KP(b)U, the purge of Ukrainian intellectuals and finally the man-made famine made it impossible for some members of the UNDO to believe that the Soviet Ukraine was becoming the basis of a Ukrainian nation state.

The Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France

These problems also affected the West Ukrainian Sovietophile organisations in the emigration. The Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France (*Soiuz ukrain-skykh hromadian u Frantsii* – SUHUF), which published the newspaper *Ukrainski visti* (Ukrainian News), provides a very good example of the dilemmas faced by Sovietophile groups in the late 1920s.

The origins of the SUHUF went back to the end of 1924 when eight Ukrainian intellectuals in France, who had already come to see the Soviet Ukraine as a Ukrainian state and supported the unification of the West Ukrainian lands with the Ukrainian SSR, decided to found a Sovietophile organisation. The new group was intended as a counterbalance to the Petliurite emigration. Petliura

964 Radziejowski, *Communist Party*, p.203.

had arrived in Paris in October 1924 and the following December the Petliurists had held their first congress in the French capital, at which they had claimed that the Ukrainian emigration was united behind it. The small group of Sovietophiles, who later founded the SUHUF, attended the congress and created a scandal by calling on the emigration to support the Soviet Ukraine. On 11th January 1925, the Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France was set up. 31 delegates signed a declaration in which they proclaimed that they were citizens of the Ukrainian SSR and called for the unification of the West Ukrainian lands with the Soviet Ukraine. Its members should raise the consciousness of Soviet Ukrainian statehood, both among themselves and the emigration, and promote understanding between France and the Ukraine. Over the next two years, branches of the SUHUF were established in a number of French cities and in Belgium and Luxembourg, and the Union created a Sovietophile organ *Ukrainski visti*. In January 1927, *Ukrainski visti* stated that the SUHUF had 800 members. By April 1927, when the organisation held its first congress, this had allegedly risen to 1,400.⁹⁶⁵ Both the SUHUF and *Ukrainski visti* received funding from the Soviet Ukrainian government – in 1929 this amounted to 500 dollars.⁹⁶⁶

Ukrainski visti named its leaders as I. Borshchak, A. Halip,⁹⁶⁷ M. Novrych-Dzikovskiy, N. Okhrym, O. Savchyn, O. Sevriuk and I. Zhahaidak. Ilko Borshchak was a historian from the Kherson gubernia who had been secretary of the UNR delegation to the Paris peace conference in 1919. He remained in the French capital where he devoted himself to the study of the Ukraine in the eighteenth century and Franco-Ukrainian relations. His conversion to Sovietophilism may have come following the March decision; certainly, an article of his ('Polish Plans against the Ukraine at the Time of Napoleon in the Light of Current Events'), which attacked 'Polish imperialism', appeared in the Sovietophile journal *Nova hromada* in 1923.⁹⁶⁸ Another prominent mem-

965 *Ukrainski visti*, No.17, 1 January 1927, p.1; No.25, 16 April 1927, p.4.

966 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), outlining spending abroad in 1929/1930, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.30.

967 Halip, Artem (1887-?): a lawyer and associate of the minister of foreign affairs under the Hetman who later as an émigré adopted a Sovietophile position. *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, p.351.

968 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.45-50. For more on Borshchak see *Encyclopaedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.277.

ber of the group, Oleksander Sevriuk, had been a member of the UPSR and led the UNR delegation which negotiated the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between the UNR and the Central Powers.⁹⁶⁹ In addition, Marko Lutskevych, who had written for *Nova hromada*, wrote for *Ukrainski visti*. Pinkhas Krasnyi,⁹⁷⁰ the former UNR minister for Jewish affairs, contributed a series of articles damning Petliura as a pogromist.⁹⁷¹

Despite the East Ukrainian provenance of many of those who led the group, the SUHUF was a predominantly West Ukrainian body. *Ukrainski visti* repeatedly stated that the SUHUF's membership was made up of West Ukrainian workers, who according to the organ constituted the majority of the Ukrainian emigration in France. The paper contended that most had left their homeland to flee Polish rule; however, many may have simply been economic migrants forced to find work abroad due to the difficult conditions in their country.⁹⁷² The West Ukrainian character was evident in the fact that a lot of the SUHUF's meetings dealt with the fate of the West Ukrainian lands. In May 1925, for example, the SUHUF passed a resolution thanking the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR for defending the rights of the Ukrainians subjected to the rule of 'aristocratic Poland' and 'boyar Rumania'.⁹⁷³

Above all, *Ukrainski visti* expressed support for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in *national* terms. As Oleksander Sevriuk argued, during the revolution that part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia which understood that national and social liberation were interdependent had not joined the Communist party because it was dominated by people who rejected the rights of nations to self-determination. However, as a result of the introduction of Ukrainianisation, 'any hesitation by the Ukrainian intelligentsia to cooperate [with the Soviet regime] could only be conscious or unconscious treachery against the Ukrain-

969 *Encycloedpia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.604.

970 Krasnyi, Pinkhas (1891-1939): a Jewish activist in the Ukraine who in 1919 became the minister for Jewish affairs under the UNR Directory. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p. 660.

971 *Ukrainski visti*, No.30, 28 May 1927, p.3; No.31, 4 June 1927, p.3; No.32, 11 June 1927, p.3; No.33, 18 June 1927, p.4.

972 *Ukrainski visti*, No.1, 1 May 1926, p.1, 4; No.2, 17 May 1926, p.4.

973 *Ukrainski visti*, No.17, 1 January 1927, p.1.

ian people, treachery against the idea of a Sovereign, United Ukraine'.⁹⁷⁴ Another article, which asked what benefits the October revolution had brought the Ukraine, gave an answer in purely national terms: the revolution had saved the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian question in general; the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had become a free and independent state, entering the USSR as an equal among equals; it had its own government, own worker-peasant parliament and was conducting Ukrainianisation in order to remove the legacy of Russification.⁹⁷⁵ Therefore, the Soviet Ukraine had become 'the present Piedmont for all the suppressed Ukrainian lands, to which the eyes of all those subjugated beyond the Zbruch and the Styr are turned and from which the Western Ukrainians expect help and liberation'.⁹⁷⁶ In this way, *Ukrainski visti* was typical of the Sovietophilism which emerged from 1923 onwards in response to the March decision and Ukrainianisation, which saw the Ukrainian SSR as a truly Ukrainian state and the saviour of the western territories from foreign domination.

However, as a workers' organisation, the SUHUF could not help but be attracted to the rhetoric of the construction of a Communist society. *Ukrainski visti* could also fall easily into a socialist idiom when praising the Soviet Union: 'The great union of worker-peasant states, which is building the magnificent edifice of socialism, has already triumphed on one sixth of the globe's surface', it proclaimed.⁹⁷⁷ For many Ukrainian workers in the SUHUF, calls for Ukrainian national unity, belief in the bright socialist future and pride in the achievements of the Soviet republics merged seamlessly. This can be seen in the wording of a resolution passed by one of the branches of the SUHUF in August 1927: 'We West Ukrainian workers are proud of the fact that our brothers in the Soviet Ukraine are raising and developing the economic life of the country themselves, without any help or loans from the Western imperialists and even despite the attempts of hostile powers, which have strained with all their might to destroy the USSR which they hate! Luckily, they have not succeeded – the labourers of the first worker-peasant states have already stepped on the path of the construction of a new life themselves! Long live

974 *Ukrainski visti*, No.7, 1 August 1926, p.3.

975 *Ukrainski visti*, No.14, 15 November 1926, p.1.

976 *Ukrainski visti*, No.3, 1 June 1926, p.1.

977 *Ukrainski visti*, No.88, 27 April 1929, p.1.

the Soviet Union! Love live the unification of all Ukrainian lands in one United Ukrainian Soviet Republic!'.⁹⁷⁸ Of course, as we have already seen, there was a long tradition in Ukrainian political thought of stressing that the social structure of the Ukrainian nation meant that social and national liberation were inextricably linked. The contributors to *Ukrainski visti* explicitly stated their adherence to this belief; Marko Lutskevych, for example, repeated the familiar argument that redistribution of the land in the Western Ukraine would strengthen the Ukrainian nation, as it would remove the economic power of the landowners, who were Polish, transferring it to the predominantly Ukrainian peasantry.⁹⁷⁹

Though the social and economic aims of the Soviet regime did appeal to the workers of the SUHUF, *Ukrainski visti* constructed an image of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic which ascribed the state a national rather than socialist nature. *Ukrainski visti* repeatedly described the creation of a United Ukraine through the liberation of the West Ukrainian territories as the 'historical mission' of the Ukrainian SSR and presented the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as a successor to Volodymyr the Great, Danylo of Galicia and Bohdan Kmelnyskyi, thereby placing it in the nationalist pantheon of statehood. The attempts by certain members of the KP(b)U to incorporate the predominantly Ukrainian areas in the RSFSR into the Ukrainian SSR were also understood as evidence that this 'historical mission' was being realised.⁹⁸⁰ For the Bolshevik leadership the stated aim of Ukrainianisation was to eradicate non-Russian nationalism by removing the injustices of the old Russian regime; for the contributors to *Ukrainski visti* it was an expression of the true national character of the Ukrainian SSR. It is true that in one article the SUHUF organ denied Ukrainianisation was a goal in itself and portrayed it as a means of achieving closer cooperation between nations.⁹⁸¹ However, this statement was highly atypical. In general, the paper celebrated Ukrainianisation for the gains it made for Ukrainian culture. Indeed, in its praise of the policy, *Ukrainski visti* often used language which directly contradicted the public objectives set out

978 *Ukrainski visti*, No.44, 3 September 1927, p.4.

979 *Ukrainski visti*, No.42, 30 August 1927, p.3.

980 *Ukrainski visti*, No.31, 4 June 1927, p.1; No.35, 2 July 1927, p.1; No.55, 19 November 1927, p.1; No.60, 27 January 1928, p.1.

981 *Ukrainski visti*, No.6, 18 July 1926, p.1.

by the Bolsheviks. One lead article happily noted a rise in national consciousness taking place in the Soviet Ukraine.⁹⁸² Elsewhere, the paper praised 'de-Russification' as the 'forced Ukrainianisation of the state apparatus',⁹⁸³ in the Soviet Union 'forced Ukrainianisation' was understood as a nationalist deviation. Although *Ukrainski visti* defended the Union with the RSFSR on the grounds that it guaranteed the independence and freedom of the Ukraine against hostile powers, the paper also pointed out that the constitution was not fixed and was still in development: clearly it hoped that the Ukraine would acquire more autonomy in the future.⁹⁸⁴

Moreover, *Ukrainski visti* was especially concerned to avoid the impression that it was a Communist organ. Following a split in the group in 1928, a number of former SUHUF members attacked the organisation, saying that it was full of 'Bolshevik agents' and 'agents of Comintern'. *Ukrainski visti* refuted these allegations by claiming that it was an organ for Ukrainians 'who care for their national cause, an organ for Ukrainians who struggle for the national independence of all Ukrainian lands, for the rebirth and reconstruction of a United Ukraine' and believed that 'only under the flag of the Soviet Ukraine, which is conducting national-cultural, economic [and] political-state construction, can the idea of a United Ukraine be reached'.⁹⁸⁵

For the SUHUF the apparent national successes of the Ukrainian SSR raised the question of how the émigré organisation could best contribute to the developments taking place in the Soviet republic and bring about the unification of the West Ukrainian lands with the East. In its declaration of aims at the founding of the organisation, the SUHUF had stressed the need to strengthen its members' consciousness of Soviet Ukrainian statehood and improve relations between France and the Ukraine. These remained constant goals throughout the SUHUF's existence. However, changes in emphasis took place. At the group's conference in April 1927, one of the main tasks was defined as informing the French public of the great 'renaissance' taking place in the Soviet Ukraine and the subjugation of the Ukrainian population in the West Ukrainian territories. This was necessary because France's support un-

982 *Ukrainski visti*, No.55, 19 November, 1927, p.1.

983 *Ukrainski visti*, No.6, 18 July 1926, p.1.

984 *Ukrainski visti*, No.72, 19 July 1928, p.1.

985 *Ukrainski visti*, No.73, 1 September 1928, p.1.

derpinned the survival of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania; without it, they would present no danger to the Ukraine.⁹⁸⁶ *Ukrainski visti* sought to reach a French audience by sometimes including a French article on its first page. Many of these were also printed as separate leaflets, perhaps for the purpose of distribution among French workers. The French additions to the paper described the oppression of Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and, above all, Poland. They also attacked the Petliurites, who they claimed were engaged in underhand manoeuvres to bring about a war with the Soviet Ukraine. The arguments were specially adapted for the intended audience: they played to French Anglophobia by portraying Britain as the main force behind Poland's preparations for war against the Soviet Union.⁹⁸⁷ The French, in contrast, were depicted as unresponsive to the Petliurite overtures. One extract quoted the French general Nollet, on hearing that Jan Tokarzhevskiy⁹⁸⁸ had claimed that the French commander supported a Polish-Petliurite campaign against the Soviet Ukraine, as saying that this was 'calumny against France'.⁹⁸⁹

The trial of Petliura's killer, Schwartzbard,⁹⁹⁰ signalled the highpoint of this campaign to reach the French public, and issues 49-53, from 8th to 29th October 1927, all contained French articles damning the Petliurites as pogromists. However, after Schwartzbad's acquittal, *Ukrainski visti* stopped publishing pieces in French. Clearly, the paper had ceased trying to influence French opinion directly. This change can be seen in an article, 'Our Task', published in June 1928. Here, the goal of the SUHUF was presented as the preparation of its members for their return to the homeland so that they could contribute to the construction of socialism. Just as the Soviet regime was combating illiteracy and lack of education and culture, so must the émigré organisation work to eliminate these among the emigration. The SUHUF there-

986 *Ukrainski visti*, No.25, 16 April 1927, p.4.

987 See for example *Ukrainski visti* extract to No.25, 16 April 1927.

988 Tokarzhevskiy-Karaszewicz, Jan (1885-1954): a Ukrainian diplomat, who in January 1922 became the director of External Affairs for the UNR government-in-exile. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.232.

989 *Ukrainski visti*, extract to No.26, 30 April 1927.

990 Schwartzbard, Samuel (1886-1935): the Jewish watchmaker in Paris who in 1926 killed Symon Petliura in revenge for the pogroms carried out in the Ukraine under the Directory. Schwartzbard was acquitted by a French court on the grounds that the pogroms had justified his actions. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.556.

fore set up a number of cultural-educational courses to achieve this. Providing the French with information on the Ukraine was not mentioned.⁹⁹¹ At the moment, it is only possible to speculate about the reason for this change in emphasis. Perhaps *Ukrainski visti* had decided that the campaign had been unsuccessful. Alternatively, it is possible that the organ's pro-Soviet stance had attracted the attention of the authorities, and the attempts to address the French were interpreted as interference in French politics; certainly, the paper repeatedly expressed its thankfulness for France's hospitality and tried to assure its hosts that it had no intention of meddling in the country's internal affairs.⁹⁹²

A third task of the group the SUHUF was to help Ukrainian workers in France cope with the daily problems of finding work. *Ukrainski visti* gave much practical advice on employment in French industry, agriculture and viticulture. The SUHUF also set up organisations to help its members who were unemployed and a Union of Ukrainian Drivers.⁹⁹³

Like many other Sovietophile organs, *Ukrainski visti* was filled with denunciatory articles. The organ attacked the Polish, Rumanian and Czechoslovakian governments as subjugators of the Ukrainian nation. Piłsudski and Poland were the special target of the paper's vitriol: 'the brutal and bloody terror exercised by the Polish nobility passes all limits' declaimed one article in French.⁹⁹⁴ Poland, of course, had the largest West Ukrainian population, and therefore was the land from which presumably most of the émigrés in France had come. Piłsudski's overthrow of the parliamentary regime and assumption of power in May 1926 was interpreted in the Soviet Union as the prelude to an attack by the forces of international capitalism on the Soviet republics.⁹⁹⁵ *Ukrainski visti* was also convinced that Piłsudski aimed to attack the Soviet Ukraine in order to regain the borders of the 1772 republic. One cartoon showed Piłsudski looking at a map of the Ukraine, crossing out the words 'Ukrainian SSR' and replacing them with 'Greater Poland'.⁹⁹⁶ Although it ad-

991 *Ukrainski visti*, No.69, 5 June 1928, p.4.

992 *Ukrainski visti*, No.1, 1 May 1926, p.1; No.17, 1 January 1927, p.1; No. 25, 16 April 1927, p.4; No.73, 1 September 1928, p.4.

993 *Ukrainski visti*, No.4, 17 June 1926, p.4.

994 *Ukrainski visti*, No.19, 1 February 1927, p.1.

995 Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, p.226.

996 *Ukrainski visti*, No.31, 4 June 1927, p.1.

dressed itself to all Western Ukrainians, *Ukrainski visti* was clearly most concerned with the fate of Eastern Galicia. Eastern Galicia was the most populous of Poland's Ukrainian provinces; it was also where Ukrainian national consciousness was the strongest. The paper argued that Eastern Galicia was the most important of the West Ukrainian provinces: its attachment to the Soviet Ukraine would provide the springboard from which the other West Ukrainian territories could be entered and it would deny the Poles the base from which they hoped to launch their own attack on the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; with it, the Soviet Ukraine would become a great power.⁹⁹⁷ The central place accorded to Eastern Galicia corresponded to the Bolsheviks' geopolitical considerations, which also identified the province as the corridor between the Soviet Union and Central Europe.⁹⁹⁸

Alongside Piłsudski, *Ukrainski visti's* main figure of hate was Petliura. Although the paper despised him for supporting Piłsudski's 1920 campaign in the Ukraine, his greatest crime in its opinion was that he had ceded Ukrainian territory to Poland, thereby bringing several million Ukrainians under foreign rule.⁹⁹⁹ It therefore devoted many pages to attacking 'Petliurite putridity, which hidden behind the mask of love for the Ukrainian people stands in the service of the Polish secret police and laughs at the fate of the subjugated millions'.¹⁰⁰⁰ *Ukrainski visti* made the most of the Schwartzbard trial to point to the crimes of the Directory. It condemned the murder of Petliura, saying that it could play into the hands of those who wanted to exploit national antagonisms, although it also implied that the act was a natural consequence of Petliurism's crimes in the Ukraine. During the trial itself, the paper repeatedly stated that not all Ukrainians supported Petliura. Though it mentioned the pogroms against Jews, it also claimed that just as great were Petliura's 'pogroms' against Ukrainians: his failure to preserve a united Ukrainian state, his alliance with Poland and his willingness to place the West Ukrainian lands under foreign rule. Following Schwartzbard's acquittal, the paper wrote: 'the

997 *Ukrainski visti*, No.35, 2 July 1927, p.1.

998 Vasyliiev, 'Evolutsiia pohliadiv kerivnytstva RKP(b) ta KP(b)U', p.167.

999 *Ukrainski visti*, No.1, 1 May 1926, p.2; No.63, 10 March 1928, p.1.

1000 *Ukrainski visti*, No.66, 7 April 1928, p.1.

judgement was on Petliurism, not on Schwartzbard. *And the verdict on Schwartzbard is a condemnation of Petliurism*.¹⁰⁰¹

After Piłsudski and Petliura, *Ukrainski visti* also regularly attacked the UNDO, which it described as 'Petliurist' because, the organ argued, the party's hostility to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic made it a *de facto* supporter of the Polish state.¹⁰⁰² Although the paper did polemicise against the Shapovalists, Hetmanites and the various Russian émigré groups, these did not receive the same level of attention as the Petliurites and the UNDO. Interestingly, Dontsov and the new radical nationalists were only very rarely mentioned.¹⁰⁰³ *Ukrainski visti* only referred to the UVO when its members were brought before the Polish courts; the paper did so in order to provide examples of Polish repression.¹⁰⁰⁴ This might indicate that the paper tacitly approved of the organisation's campaign against the Polish Republic, regardless of the ideological differences between the SUHUF and the UVO.

Although the paper naturally preferred to concentrate on the failings of its enemies, *Ukrainski visti* was sometimes forced to deal with aspects of the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine which contradicted its image of the Ukrainian SSR as a Ukrainian national state. There were a number of ways by which *Ukrainski visti* sought to dismiss such impressions. In April 1926, Iurii Larin, one of the most outspoken critics of Ukrainianisation in the Soviet Ukraine, launched a scathing attack on Ukrainianisation at the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union, accusing the Ukrainian Soviet government of repressing the Russian population and language and comparing it to the policies of Petliura. *Ukrainski visti* called Larin a hopeless chauvinist and claimed that his speech proved that Ukrainianisation was opposed by petty bourgeois Soviet functionaries and 'Russophiles' (Rusotiapy). However, the robust answer given by the Soviet Ukrainian government to Larin provided the paper with confirmation that the leaders of the KP(b)U took Ukrainianisation seriously; it quoted Volodymyr Zatonskyi saying that if the government in

1001 *Ukrainski visti*, No.3, 1 June 1926, p.1; No.51, 22 October 1927, p.1; No.53, 29 October 1927, p.1. The quotation is from No.53, p.1.

1002 *Ukrainski visti*, No.4, 17 June 1926, p.1; No.15, 1 December 1926, p.1; No.58, 31 December 1927, p.1.

1003 One of the few examples is *Ukrainski visti*, No.85, 9 March 1929, p.1.

1004 See for example *Ukrainski visti*, No.72, 19 July 1928, p.2.

Kharkiv was guilty of anything, it was of not Ukrainianising enough.¹⁰⁰⁵ In recasting the Bolshevik Larin as a petty bourgeois functionary, *Ukrainski visti* drew on the Soviet regime's own standard explanation for the failure of its policies to achieve the desired results: to blame the bureaucrats who had been entrusted with implementing them. In this the paper could use many statements made by leading Ukrainian Bolsheviks. In an interview with *Ukrainski visti*, for example, Mykola Skrypnyk pointed to former tsarist officials who could not abandon their Great Russian chauvinism as the main opponents of Ukrainianisation. Kharkiv, he assured *Ukrainski visti*, treated such people as counter-revolutionaries.¹⁰⁰⁶ The paper reported the conviction of one such official, Oleksander Malytskyi, for holding chauvinist views as evidence that the Ukrainian government was seriously combating this tendency.¹⁰⁰⁷ Ukrainianisation was hotly debated in the Soviet Union, but while it remained part of the official rhetoric of the Bolshevik party it was possible to present the views of Skrypnyk and his allies as those which defined policy in the Soviet Union, even when they were not uncontested.

The affairs over Shumskyi, Khvylovyi and the KPZU provided even greater challenges to the paper. On 15th March 1927, *Ukrainski visti* reported without comment that Shumskyi had resigned. The loss of power of one of the leading forces in favour of Ukrainianisation could not be ignored by an organ whose support for the Soviet Ukraine rested so strongly on the belief in the sincerity of that policy. In the following issue the paper denied that Shumskyi's transfer indicated disagreement between members of the Soviet Ukrainian government, or that a change in ministers signalled a change in policy; this was a false interpretation made by those who were used to the politics of bourgeois countries. Those who served as people's commissars received directions from the worker and peasant masses through the Communist party of which they were members. They carried out these orders regardless of whether they agreed with them or not. Shumskyi had done his job, that is the introduction of party directives on Ukrainianisation. Now the matter required not political work, but rather good organisation. Shumskyi did not feel inclined to undertake organisational work, and was ill after all the ef-

1005 *Ukrainski visti*, No.1, 1 May 1926, p.3.

1006 *Ukrainski visti*, No.50, 15 October 1927, p.1.

1007 *Ukrainski visti*, No.62, 25 February 1928, p.1.

forts he had made. Therefore, Skrypnyk, a conscious Ukrainian, party member and successful organiser, had taken on Shumskyi's job in the Commissariat of Education to build on the work started by Shumskyi.¹⁰⁰⁸ The semantic equivocation over 'political' and 'organisational' work and the assertion that Communist politics are different to those in the bourgeois world recall Bolshevik tactics of dissembling; however, they also seem to indicate an uncertainty with how to deal with the episode, as well as an understandable reluctance to abandon a past hero.

Yet this position became untenable in the light of the condemnations made against Shumskyi by the Bolsheviks, including his successor, the 'conscious Ukrainian' Skrypnyk. The denunciation of Khvylovyi by the Ukrainian Politburo, which the paper reported without comment in May,¹⁰⁰⁹ and the dispute between the KPZU and the KP(b)U aggravated this. *Ukrainski visti* therefore changed its stance. In July, the paper wrote that the growth of capitalism in the Soviet Ukraine had allowed anti-Soviet feelings to develop among the bourgeoisie, which in turn had influenced certain parts of the Bolshevik party: above all, Khvylovyi in the realm of literature and Shumskyi in that of politics. Shumskyi did not disagree with the KP(b)U's line of de-Russifying Russified Ukrainians or promoting the development of Ukrainian culture. However, he deviated from the party line in that he wanted accelerated Ukrainianisation. This, claimed the SUHUF organ, could only harm the policy: 'forced Ukrainianisation' would increase suspicion towards the measure among workers and threaten its success. Shumskyi's call in fact showed his lack of faith in the commitment of the KP(b)U towards the Ukrainianisation of non-Ukrainians; especially at a time when, according to the article, Kharkiv was making clear achievements in this area. The paper expressed astonishment at Maksymovych's support for Shumskyi and attacked him for splitting the KPZU and thereby helping the UNDO at a time when the Ukrainian bourgeoisie was preparing an attack on the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.¹⁰¹⁰ The incident shows how the Bolshevik attempts to limit the extent of Ukrainianisation forced the émigré supporters of the Soviet Ukraine to make uncomfortable about-turns. Not only did *Ukrainski visti* have to disown Shumskyi, who it had

1008 *Ukrainski visti*, No.22, 15 March 1927, p.2; No.23, 1 April 1927, p.2.

1009 *Ukrainski visti*, No.30, 28 May 1927, p.2.

1010 *Ukrainski visti*, No.38, 23 July 1927, p.1.

initially sought to defend; it also began to attack 'forced Ukrainianisation', the very measure which in the past it had called for.

The conflict within the KPZU and Selrob also created problems for *Ukrainski visti* and the paper maintained a fairly steady silence on these developments. This might either be taken as a reluctance to air divisions within the Soviet camp or a certain level of ambivalence towards the two sides involved, an uncertainty about which position was correct. *Ukrainski visti* did break this silence by criticising the secessionists within the KPZU and Selrob-Right during the 1928 Polish elections. In one article the paper briefly attacked Selrob-Right for their 'anti-socialism' and described them as a *kahal* (an assembly of Jewish elders); it claimed that the inclusion of the word 'Ukrainian' in the groups official name was proof that it was trying to cover up its non-Ukrainian character.¹⁰¹¹ However, this is about the only example of such strong abuse. After the elections, *Ukrainski visti* noted simply that the Ukrainian parties had been unsuccessful due to the split within the worker-peasant organisations of Selrob and the KPZU. It did not take the opportunity to apportion blame to either side.¹⁰¹² Indeed, sometimes the paper seemed to blame the discord on the left on the machinations of other émigré groups. In the run-up to the elections, the organ warned that the Petliurists were using agents to bring about the dissolution of other parties, particularly those on the left.¹⁰¹³

When news of the trial of technical staff at the Shakhty mine for participation in a counter-revolutionary plot, which turned out to be the first of the show trials, reached the emigration in 1928, *Ukrainski visti* accepted the official Soviet account; however, at the same time it sought to adapt the episode to its own nationalised image of politics in the Soviet Ukraine. The SUHUF organ accepted that those charged were counter-revolutionaries who hoped to inflict economic sabotage within the Ukraine. Moreover, it used the occasion to remind its readers that there were also counter-revolutionary conspiracies in the realm of culture, by which it clearly meant Russian opponents of Ukrainianisation. *Ukrainski visti* expressed its confidence that the governments in Moscow and Kharkiv would be able to counter any such attempts.¹⁰¹⁴ Two weeks later

1011 *Ukrainski visti*, No.62, 25 February 1928, p.1.

1012 *Ukrainski visti*, No.64, 24 March 1928, p.1.

1013 *Ukrainski visti*, No.59, 14 January 1928, p.2.

1014 *Ukrainski visti*, No.69, 5 June 1928, p.1.

the paper reported the measures taken against 'cultural sabotage', by which it meant the official attacks on the academic secretary of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) Ahatanhel Krymskyi. However, the official charge against Krymskyi was one of Ukrainian nationalism. Therefore, though *Ukrainski visti* still claimed that the VUAN was full of 'Russophiles' (Rusotiapy), it now had to acknowledge that a part of the body was 'ideologically Petliurite', and was consciously 'sabotaging' Ukrainianisation because in the name of their class interests they would prefer to make an alliance with the 'Russophiles'.¹⁰¹⁵ Again, the actions of the government had forced *Ukrainski visti* to revise its interpretation of the situation in the country. Whereas it had once understood 'cultural sabotage' as a purely Russian activity, the Soviet persecution of members of the Ukrainian community forced the paper to grant that there were also Ukrainians guilty of this 'crime'.

These intellectual about-turns clearly show that maintaining a Sovietophile position while supporters of Ukrainianisation and members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were subject to official Soviet criticism required a number of intellectual concessions, if not complete reversals. Nevertheless, if one judges Ukrainianisation quantitatively, that is in terms of the number of schools in which the teaching was in Ukrainian, the number of Ukrainian newspapers or the number of Ukrainian speakers in the Communist party and in government, then the late 1920s actually appear to be the highpoint of the policy. Though there were clear reasons for the SUHUF to worry about the fate of Ukrainianisation, they could also point to evidence which seemed to show that the policy was running successfully. The group did this in *Ukrainski visti* in a section called 'The Soviet Ukraine', which appeared on the second page of every issue of the paper and gave an exhaustive list of the social and cultural achievements of Ukrainianisation. The paper also celebrated the apparent economic accomplishments of the Ukrainian SSR, describing the First Five Year Plan as a 'new stage in Soviet economic construction in our fatherland'.¹⁰¹⁶ Consequently, many members of the SUHUF were able to put aside any doubts they may have had about the genuineness of Ukrainianisation.

1015 *Ukrainski visti*, No.70, 16 June 1928, p.1.

1016 *Ukrainski visti*, No.91, 30 June 1929, p.1.

At the same time, there were indications that many in the SUHUF were unhappy with the developments in the Soviet Ukraine. As mentioned above, in September 1928 *Ukrainski visti* described how members of the SUHUF had left the organisation and were attacking their former comrades as agents of Bolshevism and Comintern. The divisions within the SUHUF had also affected the paper's funding for the article made an appeal to SUHUF members for material and moral support.¹⁰¹⁷ Certainly, since November 1927 *Ukrainski visti* had ceased being a weekly, coming out every two weeks instead. Between July and September 1928, no issue had been published, and following the return to print the quality of the paper on which it was printed had declined noticeably. Perhaps this evidence of a financial crisis in the paper really does indicate that subscriptions and members' dues had fallen thanks to a decline in support for both the Union of Ukrainian Citizens and its organ. According to the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* the SUHUF split in 1929, with a part of the organisation, which included Ilko Borshchak and Oleksander Sevriuk, renouncing its former pro-Soviet stance, and the rest going on to found a new Sovietophile organ *Vistnyk SUHUF*. The new paper survived into the next year, and the SUHUF itself to 1932.¹⁰¹⁸ However, it would seem that divisions had already begun to appear in the first half of 1928, perhaps in response to the affairs over the KPZU and Selrob. Indeed, it is interesting to note that no articles bearing Borshchak's name appeared after September 1927, possibly indicating that he, too, was unhappy with the line taken by the paper.

The SUHUF was a predominantly West Ukrainian organisation, many of whose members adopted a pro-Soviet position out of the hope that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would liberate the West Ukrainian territories from Polish, Rumanian and Czechoslovakian rule and bring about Ukrainian unification. It believed that Ukrainianisation provided evidence that the Soviet Ukraine was a truly Ukrainian state. At the same time, it was an organisation of the left-wing intelligentsia and workers, who were undoubtedly attracted by the promise of a bright, socialist future; nevertheless, the national aspect remained foremost in the SUHUF's organ. The attacks on proponents of extensive Ukrainianisation, like Shumskyi and the KPZU, put a strain on this

1017 *Ukrainski visti*, No.73, 1 September 1928, p.1.

1018 *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, Vol.5, p.504.

stance: the paper was forced to adopt positions which clearly contradicted opinions that it had previously expressed. For some this seems to have been too much. They left the organisation and came to portray it as a cabal of Communist agents. While gains were being made in Ukrainianisation, it was still possible to maintain a Sovietophile position, despite the challenges to the policy in the late-1920s. However, by the early 1930s, this standpoint had become untenable, and the SUHUF ceased to exist.

Conclusion

Clearly, many West Ukrainians saw in the Bolsheviks, who had recently emerged from a war with the Polish Republic, a potentially useful ally with whom they shared a common enemy. As early as March 1919, the ZUNR government under Petrushevych began to consider an alliance with the Bolsheviks. It was only rejected out of consideration for the Ukrainian People's Republic and a preference for a solution by the Entente. The split between the ZUNR and UNR removed the first impediment to a pro-Soviet orientation and Petrushevych's government increasingly cultivated links with the Soviet Ukrainian representatives abroad. However, it did so clandestinely because it still hoped to achieve the creation of an East Galician state with the help of the Entente. The ambassadors' decision in March removed any possibility of this and Petrushevych openly adopted a Sovietophile position. However, his courtship of the Bolsheviks forced Petrushevych to undergo an ideological 'turn to the left'; by 1927 even the Bolsheviks saw Petrushevych as politically sound.

In the early 1920s, some members of the Ukrainian Military Organisation also saw the Bolsheviks as a possible supporter in their struggle against the Poles. However, it seems that the group failed to receive funding from the Soviet Ukrainian government and by the end of the 1920s the UVO had rejected a pro-Soviet orientation. This might be an indication that the coincidence of geopolitical goals alone was not enough to underpin cooperation between the Soviet Ukraine and émigré Ukrainian nationalists. The social composition and political background of the UNDO also made it another unlikely supporter of the Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, some of its members expressed their admiration for the national achievements made in the Soviet

Ukraine, but believed that these been achieved by national forces independent of the Bolsheviks. This orientation could only survive while it seemed that such 'forces' were making gains; it ended with the reversal of Ukrainianisation and the famine.

The Soviet Ukraine, understandably, exercised the most powerful attraction over left-wing Ukrainian parties. Some, like those who joined the KPZU, became pro-Soviet before the introduction of Ukrainianisation. The Bolsheviks' leading position in the international revolution was enough to win them over to a pro-Soviet stance. Others, for example those in the USDP, Selrob and the SUHUF, required the March disappointment and the introduction of Ukrainianisation before they changed their stance on the Soviet regime. However, the debate about the policy in the Ukrainian SSR directly influenced the development of these groups' Sovietophilism, as can be most clearly seen in the KPZU split. Such occurrences, which ran against the 'nationalised' image which many left-wing groups had of the Soviet Ukraine, could be explained away for a time. However, as the 1920s drew to a close, the pro-Soviet groups were having to contort their views more and more, and many had already abandoned the Sovietophile organisations. By the 1930s, even for the left, support for the Soviet Ukraine was impossible if it was based on national grounds.

The Soviet authorities were suspicious of both the left-wing and right-wing Sovietophiles. On the one hand, they feared that those Eastern Galicians who immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine could prove to be subversive, spreading nationalism among Ukrainians in the Soviet republic. Those who travelled to the Ukrainian SSR were therefore subject to rigorous checks. However, there were also doubts about supporting East Galician nationalists in the emigration and in Poland. Some of the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiaries, for example Mykhailo Levytskyi and Naum Kaliuzhnyi, were reluctant to give aid to Petrushevych. They distrusted his intentions and doubted his influence. Others, especially the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Berlin Volodymyr Aussem, were much more willing to support East Galician and émigré groups as a means of undermining Poland. The dualism in the Bolsheviks' policy towards Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*, described in the previous chapter, was also evident in its handling of West Ukrainian Sovietophilism – the desire to

use Sovietophilism as a foreign policy weapon was accompanied by the fear that it could backfire and actually harm Bolshevik goals.

7 The Immigration of East Galician Intellectuals to the Ukraine

The previous chapter has sought to demonstrate that a broad section of West Ukrainian society, both in the emigration and in the occupied provinces themselves, supported the Soviet Ukraine in some way. There were basic reasons for this: a number of those on the West Ukrainian left looked to the Bolsheviks as the leader of the international socialist revolution; others turned to the Soviet Ukraine following the disappointment of the Entente decision over Eastern Galicia, while yet others were attracted by the apparent successes of Ukrainianisation. Of course, in the case of many West Ukrainian Sovietophiles all three elements were present. They were also to be found among those members of the East Galician intelligentsia who immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine in the second half of the 1920s, to which this book will now turn.

Following the introduction of Ukrainianisation, the Soviet authorities were faced with the problem that they lacked qualified Ukrainian-speaking staff to occupy the positions once taken by Russophones. For example, one report on the agricultural institute in Kyiv from 1926 divided the professors working there into two groups: the first were old, Russian, highly qualified and bitter opponents of both the new methods of teaching and Ukrainianisation; the second were young, Ukrainian, favourably disposed towards the Soviet system and were happy to implement the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Education – however, they were less qualified than the first group and had less academic authority.¹⁰¹⁹ Under the Romanovs the restrictions on the Ukrainian language had meant that Russian was the passport to a higher education; university institutions in the Ukraine were dominated by Russian speakers. However, in Eastern Galicia the Habsburgs' relative tolerance of the Ukrainian national movement had allowed the development of a relatively large Ukrainian intelligentsia. The province therefore represented a large pool of well-educated Ukrainian speakers and the Soviet Ukrainian authorities

1019 Secretariat TsK KP(b)U to the investigation into the Kyivan agricultural institute, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2210 ark.41.

were keen to encourage East Galician intellectuals to take up positions in the Ukraine in order to overcome the shortfall there. On 6th August 1925, in a sitting which looked at the implementation of Ukrainianisation, the Politburo decided to use the West Ukrainian intelligentsia for this purpose.¹⁰²⁰

A number of Western Ukrainians took the opportunity to travel to the Soviet Ukraine and take up academic posts there. As a consequence, a small intellectual community of Western Ukrainians began to appear in the Soviet Ukraine. Several organisations were established for them. At the beginning of 1925, a club for political émigrés from the Western Ukraine was created in Kharkiv. Its head was Matvii Iavorskyi, a Galician who had helped bring about the defection of the Ukrainian Galician Army to the Bolsheviks in 1920, and who later became the chief ideologue of a Ukrainian-Marxist version of history.¹⁰²¹ In April 1925, a West Ukrainian section of the peasant writers' organisation *Pluh* was formed. In 1927, this was then reformed into a separate group called 'Western Ukraine', which had over fifty members, including the Galician writer Mykhailo Kozoris.¹⁰²²

Stepan Rudnytskyi, who is accredited as being the founder of Ukrainian geography as a subject, was one of the more prominent academics to receive a post in the Ukraine. Rudnytskyi had served the ZUNR as an advisor on economic and politico-geographic affairs. In this post he had prepared several texts which were sent to the Paris peace congresses in favour of the independence of Eastern Galicia from the Poles. He continued to serve the ZUNR when it went into exile. For example, in 1922 he was part of Petrushevych's unofficial delegation to Genoa. As the previous chapter has shown, at this time the ZUNR was already engaged in talks with the Soviet republics, de-

1020 Circular of minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U, 06.08.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1976 ark.127.

1021 Iavorskyi, Matvii (1885-1937): an officer in the Ukrainian Galician Army who joined the K(b)U after crossing over to the Bolsheviks in February 1920 with the UHA. From 1926, he headed the historical section of the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism, although he was not a historian by training. Despite his creation of a Marxist version of Ukrainian history, towards the end of the 1920s he was attacked by the party for his alleged attempt to separate Ukrainian historical processes from those of Russia. He was arrested, exiled and executed in the 1930s. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.761-2.

1022 Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, p.30-2. For more on Iavorskyi see Mace, *Communism*, pp.232-63; for more on Kozoris see Rublov, 'Mykhailo Kozoris', pp.104-22.

spite its public orientation towards the Entente. This activity on behalf of the ZUNR may have begun Rudnytskyi's conversion to a Sovietophile position. After the opening of the Ukrainian Free University in Prague in 1921, Rudnytskyi was appointed dean of the faculty of philosophy. He worked at the university until he immigrated to the Ukraine in 1926. He then settled in Kharkiv where he became professor of geography at the Kharkiv Institute of People's Education. He also set up the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Geography and Cartography and became the first professor of geography in the VUAN. In 1933, he was arrested for 'fascism' and sent to a prison camp where he was executed in 1937.¹⁰²³

Rudnytskyi is perhaps one of the more surprising Sovietophiles. His public political views do not seem to provide a natural basis for cooperation with the Bolsheviks. Although he was no supporter of Dontsov or Konovalts, his works during the inter-war period do not seem to deviate greatly from the dominant trend of integral nationalism; it would not be unfair to call Rudnytskyi a racist. In his *Do osnov Ukrainskoho natsionalizmu* (On the Foundations of Ukrainian Nationalism) of 1923, Rudnytskyi included among the characteristics which must provide the basis for the new Ukrainian national culture 'purity of race', 'eugenics', 'the cult of individualism' and 'aristocracy of the spirit'.¹⁰²⁴ Moreover, Rudnytskyi attacked 'socialist-Communist universalism' for denying the 'scientific reality' according to which mankind was divided into nations. Because of the hold which socialism had exercised over Ukrainian youth, this form of universalism had been especially damaging to Ukrainian nationalism by weakening Ukrainian national consciousness.¹⁰²⁵ Perhaps it is therefore understandable that Rudnytskyi was not entirely open about his decision to return to the Ukraine. Though there were clearly rumours about his departure for the Ukraine, Rudnytskyi did not tell the Free University about his

1023 There are a number of accounts of Rudnytskyi's life, none of which is keen to explain his immigration to the Soviet Union. See O.S. Rublov, 'Fundator Ukrainskoi heohrafichnoi nauky (S.L. Rudnytskyi)', in *Represovane kraieznastvo (20-30ti rokov)*, Kyiv: Instytut Istorii Ukrainy, 1991, pp.121-9; Oleh Shablui, 'Peredmovna' in Stepan Rudnytskyi, *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoi Ukrainy*, Lviv: Svit, 1994, pp.5-34; Pavlo Shtoiiko, *Stepan Rudnytskyi 1877-1937. Zhyttiepysno-bibliohrafichnyi narys*, Lviv: Naukove Товариство імені Шевченка, 1997.

1024 Stepan Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov Ukrainskoho natsionalizmu', in id., *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoi Ukrainy*, Lviv: Svit, 1994, pp.272-348 (p.348).

1025 Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov', pp.284-9.

intentions. Dmytro Doroshenko, one of Rudnytskyi's colleagues at the Free University, claimed in a letter to Viacheslav Lypynskyi that right up until the end Rudnytskyi 'denied that he was travelling and only made an announcement on this on 2nd October, because on the 1st he had received his salary for the month of October from the University. Then a few days later he packed and left'.¹⁰²⁶

Nevertheless, one can find expressions of admiration for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in Rudnytskyi's work. In *Halychyna ta soborna Ukraina* (Galicia and a United Ukraine), he wrote that 'the appearance and promising development of the Soviet Ukraine must also be seen as a positive step. It could become a bud from which in the future a United Ukraine might grow'.¹⁰²⁷ Rudnytskyi's hope that the Soviet Ukraine could unify the Ukrainian provinces outside its borders emanated from his geographic understanding of nationality. Rudnytskyi believed that national territory was the basis of the nation in that it determined the character of the people who lived on it. For this reason, he opposed any renunciation of Ukrainian national territory by Ukrainians, as for example in Petliura's willingness to give up the West Ukrainian territories to Poland. '*National territory*', wrote Rudnytskyi, 'the basis of our state-building, must nevertheless always be an *untouchable inviolability*'.¹⁰²⁸ The only defender of this inviolability at that time was the Soviet Ukraine, which repeatedly protested against the actions of the Poles in the occupied territories. In this way, Rudnytskyi's Sovietophilism fitted coherently with his nationalism.

In fact, some of the elements of Rudnytskyi's thought which would seem to place him on the right of the political spectrum could have contributed to the geographer's Sovietophilism. Rudnytskyi's conviction that nationalism was an essential part of human nature seems to have given him the belief that even the Bolsheviks would eventually have to take the nation into account. After explaining his 'scientific' understanding of Ukrainian nationalism in *Do osnov Ukrainskoho natsionalizmu*, Rudnytskyi sought to impress on the reader 'that the genuinely new Ukrainian nationalism is not a party matter; this means that

1026 Quoted in Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalins'hchyna*, p.35.

1027 Stepan Rudnytskyi, 'Halychyna ta soborna Ukraina', in id., *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoi Ukrainy*, Lviv: Svit, 1994, pp.350-411 (p.359).

1028 Stepan Rudnytskyi, 'Ohliad natsionalnoi terytorii Ukrainy', in id., *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoi Ukrainy*, Lviv: Svit, 1994, pp.210-70 (pp.210-2; the quotation is on p.212).

all Ukrainians regardless of party must think and act nationally: from anarchists and Communists to the far right. Because even genuine cosmopolitanism [and] internationalism is impossible without nationalism. A future, general unification of mankind in one, uniform community can, out of scientific necessity, under no circumstances take place outside the nations [...]. The cosmopolitan future is the powerful harmony of the great choir of nations, in which every people raises its voice'.¹⁰²⁹ One should not be deceived by Rudnytskyi's idyllic metaphor for he was also a firm believer in the biological inequality of different nations.¹⁰³⁰ Nevertheless, this belief did offer a sort of common ground, allowing Rudnytskyi to cooperate with the Bolsheviks.

Moreover, Rudnytskyi explicitly appealed to the commonplace that all Ukrainians should work together for the good of the nation. In this way, the call to place the interests of the nation above those of party and class in order to obtain Ukrainian *derzhavnist* (statehood) could also bridge the gap between right-wing nationalism and Communism. Rudnytskyi hoped to return to the Ukraine in order to devote himself to the reconstruction of the country and he believed that this work was possible under the Soviet regime. After his arrest in 1933, Rudnytskyi gave an explanation for this immigration to the Ukraine which would seem to support this thesis: 'I am an old nationalist-cultural worker who happily came to serve the Soviet Ukraine on the cultural front, in which the Ukraine, thanks to the new national policy, [had] received some autonomy. I did not pretend to be an enthusiastic Soviet, but adopted a position of an objective, partyless Ukrainian.'¹⁰³¹ Thus, Rudnytskyi exemplifies the willingness of some Ukrainians to cooperate with the Bolsheviks for purely national reasons.

Mykhailo Lozynskyi

Mykhailo Lozynskyi, too, was attracted to the Soviet Ukraine by its apparent national achievements. Before the First World War, Lozynskyi had worked in Eastern Galicia as a publicist, contributing to the Ukrainian paper *Dilo*. Following the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy and the outbreak of hostilities

1029 Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov', p.346.

1030 Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov', pp.276-9.

1031 Quoted in Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, p.35.

between the Polish and Ukrainian populations of Eastern Galicia, Lozynskiy became a negotiator for the Ukrainians with the Poles. In March 1919, he was appointed the ZUNR's deputy secretary of foreign affairs, and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, at this time supported the idea of coming to an agreement with the Bolsheviks. The next month he travelled to Paris as part of the West Ukrainian government's delegation to the peace conference there. In accordance with the tactic followed by Petrushevych at the time, he petitioned the Entente in the hope that they would refuse to recognise Poland's annexation of Eastern Galicia. Following a reshuffle of the ZUNR's delegation to the peace conferences, Lozynskiy left Paris and ceased to work for the West Ukrainian government. He was involved in setting up the Ukrainian Free University in Vienna and after its transfer to Prague he became professor of international law at the university. He held this post until his return to the Ukraine in 1927.¹⁰³²

Following his departure from the ZUNR diplomatic mission to Paris, Lozynskiy began to write a history of the Galician revolution with Mykhailo Hrushevskiy's support and encouragement. In this way, he came in contact with the Sovietophile position which Hrushevskiy was at that time propagating in his journal *Boritiesia-poborete!*. On 14th September 1920, Lozynskiy sent a letter to Hrushevskiy about the line taken by the UPSR journal. He wrote that he understood Hrushevskiy's goal to be the consolidation of active Ukrainian forces in the country on the basis of Ukrainian statehood in Soviet form. 'If there is really such a possibility', concluded Lozynskiy, 'then this can only be welcomed'.¹⁰³³

Nevertheless, as his history of the revolution in Galicia shows, Lozynskiy had not yet adopted a pro-Soviet stance himself. He concluded the work with the

1032 A brief description of Lozynskiy's life can be found in Oleksii Sukhyi, *Mykhailo Lozynskiy: vchenyi, hromadskiy diiach, polityk*, Lviv, 1995. Lozynskiy himself gives a more tendentious account in the autobiography he wrote following his arrest by the GPU. The sketch is an attempt to refute the charges of belonging to an anti-Soviet underground organisation and seeks to assert Lozynskiy's lifelong commitment to socialist revolution. Nevertheless, there are some interesting details which are supported by other evidence. The autobiography is published at the end of an article by Rublov. See O.S. Rublov, 'Shliakhmy na Solovky: radianske desiatyrichchia Mykhaila Lozynskoho', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.4, pp.103-35 (pp.118-35).

1033 Lozynskiy to Hrushevskiy, 15.09.1920, TsDIA f.1.235 op.1 spr.611 ark.4-4zv.

assertion that only through help from the Entente or from a powerful state in the Eastern Ukraine could Eastern Galicia acquire statehood. The Treaty of Riga, by which the Soviet regime had accepted Poland's annexation of the province, showed that the Soviet Ukraine was too weak to fulfil this role. The objections to the Soviet Ukraine expressed in the history were therefore more practical than ideological: his belief in the weakness of the Soviet republics ruled out a pro-Soviet orientation, not opposition to Bolshevism. Lozynskiy's argument that the Entente was unlikely to agree to attaching Eastern Galicia to the rest of the Ukraine under its present form of government is again more a functional argument than one based on political principles. Moreover, Lozynskiy expressed the belief that the Eastern Ukraine found itself in a state of national and socio-political flux and it might begin to develop as a Ukrainian state.¹⁰³⁴ Lozynskiy probably therefore gave an accurate account of his views at this time in the autobiography which he wrote for the GPU after he had been arrested: he described himself as following a 'decisive line against the Poles and a non-decisive one against the Bolsheviks' and believing that the course taken by Petrushevych should be carried to its end.¹⁰³⁵

As for many others, the March decision on Eastern Galicia ended Lozynskiy's orientation towards the Entente and redoubled his opposition to the Poles. According to Lozynskiy's autobiography, in around June 1923, Petrushevych turned to him with the suggestion of cooperation. The dictator informed Lozynskiy of his contacts with the Soviet governments and of his belief that the Ukrainian territories could only be liberated from Poland with the help of the Soviet Union. Petrushevych claimed he was not a Communist himself and that it was unimportant what type of system appeared in Eastern Galicia in the future, even if it was Soviet. Petrushevych also maintained links to the UVO at that time and as a representative of the ZUNR dictator Lozynskiy came into contact with the group, which just had sent emissaries to Moscow and Kharkiv. In addition, Lozynskiy was involved in setting up the Committee of Peoples Enslaved by Poland, which included Belarusians and Lithuanians alongside Ukrainians and sought to conduct propaganda against the Polish regime. It was as a representative of Petrushevych that at the end of 1923 or

1034 Mykhailo Lozynskiy, *Halychyna v rr.1918-1920*, New York: Chervona Kalyna, 1970, p.218f.

1035 Rublov, 'Shliakhamy na Solovky', 1997, No.4, p.126.

beginning of 1924 Lozynskyi first met the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiary in Prague Naum Kaliuzhnyi. According to his autobiography, Lozynskyi kept up the acquaintance.¹⁰³⁶

Lozynskyi's views on the Soviet Ukraine at this time can be seen in a brochure from January 1924, *Z novym rokom 1924. Teperishnii stan budovy Ukrainskoi derzhavy i zadachi zakhidno-ukrainskykh zemel* (Happy New Year, 1924. The Present State of the Construction of a Ukrainian State and the Task of the West Ukrainian Lands). The pamphlet did not argue that the Soviet Ukraine had already come to represent a form of Ukrainian statehood, but rather that developments within the Ukrainian SSR provided the departing point for the creation of a united, independent Ukraine. If one looked at how the Soviet form of statehood was established in the Ukraine, Lozynskyi admitted, then one must say that it was a form of Muscovite occupation. Moreover, whereas the Soviet Ukraine had enjoyed formal independence before 1923, following the creation of the Soviet Union 'according to a *legal point of view*, the Soviet Ukraine as a constitutive part of the Soviet federation is a *non-sovereign state*'.¹⁰³⁷ Thus, though the Soviet Ukraine was a state, it 'is not the expression of Ukrainian statehood which would answer our aspirations', for the federal form of statehood 'is not the form in which a separate nation would be able to find [...] state independence'. Lozynskyi believed that federal states tended to become increasingly centralised and their constituent parts gradually lost what independence they did have. He therefore warned against the danger of the Soviet Union providing the basis for a future European federation of socialist republics while the inclination towards centralisation was so strong.¹⁰³⁸

At the same time, Lozynskyi argued that the Ukraine had taken a great step forward. The Ukraine had once been a part of a one and indivisible Russia. It had struggled for independence and acquired the status of a state, albeit within the Soviet federation; this meant not only that the country had entered onto the field of international politics, but also provided opportunities for fur-

1036 Rublov, 'Shliakhamy na Solovky', 1997, No.4, pp.126-7.

1037 Mykhailo Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom 1924. Teperishnii stan budovy Ukrainskoi derzhavy i zadachi zakhidno-ukrainskykh zemel*, Geneva: published at the expense of the author, 1924, p.4.

1038 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.4-6. The quotation is on p.5.

ther development. Ukrainians must recognise the fact that they had acquired statehood and bring the rest of the world to acknowledge what the Ukraine had achieved in order to use it as a starting point from which a united, independent Ukrainian state could be created. Lozynskyi stressed that the Soviet constitution 'finds itself in the process of creation' and thus it could move in the direction of either centralisation or decentralisation. Moreover, he saw a number of indicators that would allow positive developments. For example, unlike other federal constitutions, the Soviet constitution granted its separate parts the right to leave the federation. Although he admitted that under present conditions the ability to use this right was illusory, he felt that future developments might make it important.¹⁰³⁹

Within the Soviet Ukraine Lozynskyi observed a growth in national and state consciousness among the Ukrainian masses which was forcing Moscow to make concessions to it. The revolution itself had done the Ukraine a service in destroying the ruling social classes in the Ukraine, which had been non-Ukrainian and had provided the foundation for Moscow's rule. At the same time, it had strengthened the Ukrainian peasantry through the redistribution of landowners' land. He predicted that the towns, surrounded by a nationally conscious and economically powerful peasantry, would have to become Ukrainian. Lozynskyi stressed the difference between the aims of the Soviet state and these developments taking place within it: the regime, '[by] making concessions to these tendencies for its own interests, causes developments which are outgrowing it'. One of these Bolshevik compromises with the Ukraine was the Ukrainianisation of state power, which represented an end to the Muscovite character of power which had existed up to that time. Though he admitted that it was unclear how complete this break with the past had been, Lozynskyi stressed that it was obvious that Ukrainianisation meant that the Soviet regime was having to meet the growth of the national and state consciousness among the Ukrainian popular masses and that they were looking to acquire the sympathy of Ukrainians living beyond the borders of the Ukrainian SSR. Lozynskyi conceded that up to now Ukrainianisation had been merely 'mechanical' in that officials could easily return to speaking Russian despite the requirement to learn Ukrainian and use it in state organs.

1039 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, p.4-7.

Only by including Ukrainians in the state executive could organic Ukrainianisation take place. However, he warned against disdaining mechanical Ukrainianisation. People had to go to Ukrainian schools and were becoming accustomed to hearing it in state life. These were also 'organic' achievements.¹⁰⁴⁰

Lozynskyi summed up his feelings on the Soviet Union thus: 'And so legal and real dependence on Moscow on the one hand, [and] a process of the growth of Ukrainian national and state consciousness and the Ukrainianisation of state life as a consequence of this on the other – this is what characterises the present state of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. It does not fulfil the desires of the Ukrainian people to statehood; however, it is a *stage* on the way to the achievement of these hopes'.¹⁰⁴¹ Lozynskyi did not go into detail on what direction this path would lead. Although he did not explicitly say this, it does seem that on the basis of his analysis Ukrainian statehood could only finally be achieved outside the Soviet Union. The reference to the possible future usefulness of the clause on leaving the Soviet Union hints at this; so does the distinction between the Soviet regime and the developments taking place within the Soviet Ukraine: the prediction that the latter would outgrow the former could be understood as a prediction of the end of Bolshevik rule.

Lozynskyi dealt with the developments in the Soviet Ukraine only as a form of introduction to the pamphlet. As one can see from its title, the focus of the work was the West Ukrainian lands under Poland and their task in creating a Ukrainian state. Throughout the pamphlet he defended the line taken by the ZUNR government. He supported the efforts to create a West Ukrainian state as an interim stage towards the achievement of the unity of the Ukraine¹⁰⁴² and attacked those in the Ukrainian National Labour Party who hoped to achieve autonomy within the Polish state.¹⁰⁴³ He described the post of president of the Ukrainian National Council, held by Petrushevych, as an important link to the previous forms of statehood in the West Ukrainian lands and he warned against excessive criticism of the West Ukrainian government, which

1040 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.7-9. The quotation is on p.8.

1041 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, p.9.

1042 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.17-8.

1043 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.21-35.

he believed in the conditions of struggle under which Ukrainians now found themselves detracted from the very idea of West Ukrainian statehood. One might read some dissatisfaction with Petrushevych into the claim that 'it is sometimes even necessary to serve silently under wanting people out of respect for the institutions which are connected with their name and activity, and not destroy these institutions because one does not like the people who are connected with them'.¹⁰⁴⁴ Despite this possible criticism of the ZUNR dictator, the overall impression of *Z novym rokom* is that Lozynskyi was still loyal to Petrushevych and the ZUNR; he summed up his analysis on the West Ukrainian government with the statement that 'the leading political line was correct'.¹⁰⁴⁵

According to his autobiography, Lozynskyi's break with Petrushevych took place at the end of 1924 and was a result of Petrushevych's fear that Lozynskyi's efforts to create an organisation of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians in the territories occupied by Poland were an attempt to undermine his presidential authority. The grounds for the split may well have been purely personal, for both men continued to follow a pro-Soviet line. Indeed, Lozynskyi's Sovietophilism strengthened and he started thinking about immigrating to the Ukraine.¹⁰⁴⁶ As can be seen from the spending plans of the Ukrainian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for 1925/6, Lozynskyi was receiving funding from the Soviet Ukrainian government for his activities as a propagandist in the European press.¹⁰⁴⁷ At about this time, Lozynskyi suggested setting up a committee of West Ukrainian émigrés in Prague to undermine the Polish state through underground work in the province and campaign for the unification of the Western Ukraine with the Soviet Ukrainian Republic.¹⁰⁴⁸ However, at a meeting of 26th February 1925 the Politburo rejected this proposal.¹⁰⁴⁹ The Bolsheviks were against the creation of any organisation that might exhibit even a trace of independence. Nevertheless, they clearly believed that Lozyn-

1044 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.58, 60-5, 74-5. The quotation is on p.75.

1045 Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, p.58.

1046 Rublov, 'Shliakhamy na Solovky', 1997, No.4, p.128.

1047 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 06.02.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.202.

1048 Soliar, 'Radianofilstvo', pp.59-60.

1049 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 26.02.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.156.

skyi was much more use to them in emigration than in the Soviet Ukraine. In August 1925, the Politburo turned down Lozynskyi's application to enter the Soviet republic.¹⁰⁵⁰

In September 1925, Lozynskyi met the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Prague Antin Prykhodko. According to the Ukrainian plenipotentiary, Lozynskyi approached him with a request for further funding. Prykhodko demanded the same condition that he had required of Petrushevych, an open admission of support for the Soviet system. Prykhodko reminded the Politburo of Lozynskyi's articles for the German and French press describing the Polish abuse of the national minorities in their country. Prykhodko considered this work useful and was in favour of continuing the funding to Lozynskyi. The two men discussed whether Lozynskyi should join the UNDO, presumably with the intention of strengthening the Sovietophile element emerging within the party, but decided it was not a good idea.¹⁰⁵¹ Lozynskyi received the funding, which he used to pay for the publication of articles in the Paris journal *Revue Internationale*. In autumn 1926, he took part in the First Pan-European Conference in Vienna where he called for the unification of Eastern Galicia with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. He had received approval from Kaliuzhnyi for his speech in an earlier meeting.¹⁰⁵²

Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist (Comments on Ukrainian statehood), which was published in 1927, may well have been the open declaration of Sovietophilism which Prykhodko demanded. In the pamphlet Lozynskyi proclaimed: 'The de-Russification and Ukrainianisation of the state and social life in the Ukraine are nearing completion. More and more, rapprochement, mutual understanding and cooperation between the regime and society are developing. A broad circle of *Ukrainian Soviet Intelligentsia*, which maintains the position that the Soviet regime best corresponds to the national and state interests of the Ukraine, is now being created'. According to Lozynskyi the majority of the leaders and groups which had supported the Central Rada and the initial period of the Directory were now for Ukrainian Soviet statehood. He pointed to

1050 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), 21.08.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.222.

1051 Prykhodko to Maksymovych, 17.09.1925, TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.252-3.

1052 Rublov, 'Shliakhmy na Solovky', 1997, No.4, pp.127-8. As can be seen from the above, Lozynskyi's description in the autobiography of his work for the Soviets in emigration tallies with the information from the former party archives.

Hrushevskiy, Vynnychenko and other leaders of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries who were all either serving in the party or working as Soviet intellectuals. In doing so, they 'connect[ed] the traditions of the Ukrainian national movement with the Ukrainian Soviet state': 'The extraordinary development of Ukrainian intellectual culture, of literature, science and art, is marked against the background of the general consolidation of the state and social life of the Ukraine. In short, the Soviet Ukraine will become the national and state centre of all the Ukrainian lands, the basis for the realisation of a United Ukrainian statehood'.¹⁰⁵³ Thus many of the questions which for Lozynskiy had been open in 1924, namely the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, its relationship with Russia and its national character, were now being answered, mainly as a result of the achievements of Ukrainianisation.

However, in *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist* Lozynskiy explored new areas, for example the nature of the revolution in the Eastern Ukraine. He argued that Russia and the Ukraine formed a single revolutionary unit because the weakness of Ukrainian national development had meant that many of the key social classes, for example the urban proletariat, in the Ukraine were Russian or Russified. Thus all of the governments of the Ukraine turned to Russian governments or foreign powers who were interested in restoring the old Russia: for example, whereas Skoropadskiy aimed for the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, the Directory sought help from the Entente, which also hoped to recreate a one and indivisible Russia.¹⁰⁵⁴ Equally, the left turned to the Bolsheviks. However, the difference was that all other Russian parties or foreign powers were in favour of restoring the unity of the old Russia; in contrast, 'the Bolsheviks alone proclaimed the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination up to separation' and sought 'the destruction of those classes on which the Russian domination of the Ukraine rested'. In this way, 'the Bolsheviks were the natural ally of the Ukraine in its struggle for statehood'. The Bolsheviks aimed to create their conception of statehood on the entire territory of the former Russian empire, which was a single revolutionary unit. As a result, a Ukrainian Bolshevik government was set up in Kharkiv, leading to war with the Central Rada in Kyiv: 'this in principle was a civil war

1053 Mykhailo Lozynskiy, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, Vienna: Iednist, 1927, pp.4-5.

1054 Lozynskiy, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.9-12.

between two governments of the same country'.¹⁰⁵⁵ It was only as a result of the peculiarities of the Ukraine's historical development that this seemed to be a war between Russia and the Ukraine: for example the Bolsheviks relied on the support of the Russified proletariat; this had been necessary at that time because the process by which the Ukrainian left began to turn to Bolshevism only began later.¹⁰⁵⁶ Returning to the point that Russia and the Ukraine formed one revolutionary unit, Lozynskyi saw a further cause for the war in the Ukraine in the fact that the opponents of the Bolsheviks, the Whites, fought on Ukrainian territory. Indeed, by working with the Entente, the Directory had created a base for the all-Russian, anti-Bolshevik struggle. Consequently, the collapse of Bolshevism in the Ukraine would not have meant a strengthening of the Directory, but rather the triumph of Russian reaction.¹⁰⁵⁷ Thus, Lozynskyi sought to deny anti-Bolshevik nationalists the right to speak in the name of the nation alone by implying that the nationalists, not the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, had collaborated with foreign powers.

A major problem for all Ukrainian Sovietophiles when discussing the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to explain the relationship between Russia and the Ukraine. Lozynskyi dealt with this thorny issue by arguing that the constituent parts of the Soviet Union were sovereign because they had entered freely into the Union and had the right to leave it. This right to leave the Soviet Union not only underlined the sovereignty of the Soviet republics; it also gave the constitution the character of an international treaty in which the different states transferred the execution of a part of their sovereign rights to the Union level.¹⁰⁵⁸ Thus, the Ukraine and Russia were two equal powers, independent of each other, and sharing equal rights on the basis of the Soviet constitution. Lozynskyi recognised that some might say that this was a purely juridical answer, and that in reality Russia might have more power, making the Ukraine dependent upon it. Lozynskyi's response to this argument was that elsewhere small, legally independent states were politically dependent on larger ones; the relationship between the Little Entente and France and Britain was just one example. If the Ukraine was not Soviet, it

1055 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.12.

1056 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.12-3.

1057 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.14.

1058 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.16.

might be a democratic, legally independent state belonging to the League of Nations, but its legal independence would not preserve it from dependence on other powers. Indeed, Lozynskyi argued that there was a general tendency towards closer state unions. If it left the Soviet Union, the Ukraine might be forced to join a union of bourgeois European states. In this way, Lozynskyi relativised the importance of the Ukraine's membership of the Soviet Union. He also argued that the political relationship between Russia and the Ukraine in the Soviet Union was not something permanent and unchanging, but rather subject to a contingent relationship of forces. One should therefore not speak of the dependence of the Ukraine on Russia, but rather the excessive power of the Russian element in the whole Union. This situation would change: because the Ukraine was still suffering under the legacy of tsarist rule, any evolution could only go in the favour of the Ukraine, especially if she could unite all of the Ukrainian lands. The Ukraine must be in the position to execute her sovereignty to its greatest extent, and the size of her territory, natural wealth, population and geographical position gave her a good basis from which to achieve this.¹⁰⁵⁹

The national character of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic lay 'in its foundations and in the direction of its development'. Its power was based on the popular masses, and therefore in the interests of self-preservation, the state must meet their material and spiritual needs. The destruction of the old Russified landed aristocracy and bourgeois, the redistribution of land to the peasantry and the organisation of trade and industry along new principles, which made the popular masses the chief agent within them, increased the power of the popular masses. Because this class in the Ukraine was overwhelmingly Ukrainian, the state, too, would become Ukrainian. Only the Bolsheviks could have destroyed the Russian ruling caste; if the Directory had remained in power the Entente would have forced them to make concessions to the privileges of non-Ukrainians.¹⁰⁶⁰ As Lozynskyi argued, in 'striving towards its social aims, the revolution helped the subjugated peoples of Russia achieve their national aims'.¹⁰⁶¹

1059 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.20-4.

1060 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.17-8.

1061 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.15.

Lozynskiy, of course, also pointed to Ukrainianisation. Lozynskiy rejected the arguments of Ukrainian critics of Ukrainianisation that it was slow, artificial and opposed by the Soviet bureaucracy. The cause of these difficulties lay, argued Lozynskiy, in the extreme level of Russification of Ukrainian society before the revolution which required a long time to be overcome. A whole generation must go to Ukrainian schools before this could be achieved. The only way to speed up the process was to work with the Soviet regime. The more educated Ukrainians who did so, the quicker this de-Russification would take place. Lozynskiy sidestepped the argument that Ukrainianisation was a 'spontaneous' process arising out of the popular masses and not the policies of the ruling party. He agreed that it was 'spontaneous' and added that this was the origin of its strength and the guarantee of its success. He warned against ignoring the role played by the Soviet government, which met it, supported, removed barriers to it and gave it state sanction – 'in a word, playing a leading role in it'. In this way, the Soviet regime took a 'spontaneous' process and turned it into a state-building element.¹⁰⁶² This represented a change to the position taken in the earlier pamphlet *Z novym rokom*, in which Ukrainianisation was presented more as an unwilling compromise by the Bolsheviks than something in which they were playing an important part.

Summing up at the end of the pamphlet, Lozynskiy wrote that the Soviet Union had been accused of a whole range of deficiencies. He admitted that 'no-one denies these deficiencies', but pointed out that 'the Soviet press writes about them, [and] the Soviet regime tries to remove them'. He reminded the reader of the 250 year gap in Ukrainian state-building and added that what was taking place in the Ukraine was 'a beginning, and not the completion of the construction of Ukrainian statehood'.¹⁰⁶³ This statement in itself does not contradict Lozynskiy's opening claim that the processes of de-Russification and Ukrainianisation were nearing completion: obviously these two developments were only a stage towards the realisation of Ukrainian statehood; indeed, in the text it is followed by the prediction that the Ukraine *will* become the national and state centre. More problematic for the coherency of Lozynskiy's argument is his claim at the beginning of the pamphlet that de-

1062 Lozynskiy, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.18-9.

1063 Lozynskiy, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.84.

Russification and Ukrainianisation were nearing completion and his forecast later on that Russification would require a whole generation to overcome. Lozynskyi had worked himself into a corner by his bombastic statement in favour of the Soviet Ukraine and his attempts to sidestep criticism, which forced him to make potentially contradictory statements.

Perhaps the most important issue for Lozynskyi was the basis which the Soviet Ukrainian state provided for the future work in building a united Ukraine.¹⁰⁶⁴ He believed that 'the West Ukrainian lands cannot free themselves from Poland only with their own forces'.¹⁰⁶⁵ Therefore, they must look to the Soviet Ukraine, which gave those Ukrainians living in the West Ukrainian lands a clear goal and path in their struggle for liberation.¹⁰⁶⁶ By turning to the Soviet Ukraine, the West Ukrainians would also deprive people like Levytskyi and Skoropadskyi of the right to depict themselves as the true Ukraine, thereby robbing Poland of its ability to present itself as the guardian of Kyiv. In turn, this would weaken Polish and Rumanian imperialism and European hopes of intervention in the Soviet Ukraine, forcing it to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Ukraine. He stressed that the concessions made to Poland in the Treaty of Riga did not amount to a proclamation of the Soviet Ukraine's lack of interest in the West Ukrainian territories; instead they were an indication that the Soviet republics had at that time been too weak to help the Western Ukrainians.¹⁰⁶⁷ However, the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had protested against the March decision and Polish oppression. Indeed, the Treaty of Riga, in guaranteeing the rights of Ukrainians and Belarusians within Poland, gave the Soviet Union a diplomatic means by which to protest against infringements of these rights. Lozynskyi ruled out war for the time being, blaming the UNDO for creating a situation in which the Soviet Ukraine was seen as a foreign force and thereby weakening it in relation to the West Ukrainian lands. However, the non-aggression pact with the Ukraine was only valid as long as conditions made it worthwhile. Though the liberation of the West Ukrainian lands could only take place through the strengthening of the Soviet Union, Lozynskyi warned

1064 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.84.

1065 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.44.

1066 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.5.

1067 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.44-6.

against passivity among the Ukrainians living under Poland and Rumania. They should prepare the ground, strengthening their own forces, undermining Polish and Rumanian imperialism and creating a wall through which the Soviet Ukraine could not be attacked. Equally, the Soviet Ukraine must support their brothers beyond their borders and establish links with them.¹⁰⁶⁸

Lozynskyi also repeated his argument that the social goals of the Bolsheviks would benefit Ukrainian national aims, this time in connection with the Ukrainians under Polish and Rumanian rule: 'those classes against which the Soviet regime turned are foreign to the West Ukrainian lands'. By removing the foreign ruling class in Galicia, the Soviet regime would free the Ukrainian nation from both social and national oppression.¹⁰⁶⁹ The Ukrainians in the West Ukrainian lands were peasants, workers and members of the labouring intelligentsia. The first would gain land from the Soviet regime, the second control of the factories, and the third, the opportunity to work in all levels of state and social construction. These three classes would be the basis of the new state order and become the bearers of Ukrainian statehood. Ukrainianisation would replace Polonification, the Ukrainian language would become the state language and Ukrainian culture would have the right to free development. 'Whatever one's position towards Ukrainian Soviet statehood', claimed Lozynskyi, 'if the unification of the West Ukrainian lands were to bring about these national achievements, which parties like the UNDO also wanted, then one should do all in one's power to bring this about.'¹⁰⁷⁰

Indeed, Lozynskyi severely criticised the ideology and policies of other West Ukrainian parties. In doing so, he sought to combat some of the commonplaces of inter-war Ukrainian politics, above all the call to place national and state interests over those of class and party: 'Every group obviously maintains that it represents the interests of the nation and the state and that all other groups must subordinate themselves to it [and] create a united national front under its leadership. In order that they themselves are not subordinated, they claim that only they represent "the pure national state ideal"'.¹⁰⁷¹ The UNDO's claim to represent a 'pure national-state ideal', as oppose to the

1068 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.56-9.

1069 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.59.

1070 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.59-60.

1071 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.80.

class-based Soviet order, was in fact an expression of the party's own class interests.¹⁰⁷² It was wrong to deny that the Soviet Ukraine was a Ukrainian state because it was Communist; this, he said, echoed the Ukrainian politician who said that unless the Ukraine is Social Democratic, it is not the Ukraine. Other countries had undergone changes in state form, had been absolute monarchies or democratic republics at different points in their history – 'is it possible to deny them the character of a national state?' Lozynskyi asked.¹⁰⁷³ Nor, argued Lozynskyi, was socialism inherently a more internationalist doctrine than democracy or Christianity. He wrote that 'every idea is internationalist', even fascism: all of these ideas, when 'planted on a national ground, will give a specific variation, which becomes the property of the national culture'.¹⁰⁷⁴

Lozynskyi also attacked the widespread slogan of achieving a Ukrainian state through 'our own forces' for falsely categorising the Ukrainian SSR as 'foreign'. This motto helped Poland, which knew that the West Ukrainian lands could not liberate themselves on their own.¹⁰⁷⁵ Equally, he sought to present the anti-Bolshevik parties as collaborators. Although the UNDO did not explicitly follow a policy of conciliation towards Poland, by denying the Ukrainian character of the Ukrainian SSR, it 'contributes to the spread and strengthening of a conciliatory mood among Ukrainian society'. By claiming that the only way to bring about a Ukrainian state was through the collapse of the Soviet Union, it in fact justified Poland's opposition to the Soviet Ukraine. It put liberation for the West Ukrainian lands so far in the future that most Ukrainians would prefer to seek a compromise with Poland.¹⁰⁷⁶

Nevertheless, though Lozynskyi criticised many of the commonplaces of Ukrainian nationalist thought in the 1920s, his writings were primarily concerned with the attainment of the nationalists' most sacred of goals, a united Ukrainian state. He therefore belongs to that group of Sovietophiles which supported the Soviet Ukraine for national reasons. Even when he praised the Bolsheviks' social policies, he did so by pointing to how they benefited the

1072 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.50-1.

1073 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.81.

1074 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.82-3.

1075 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.55-6.

1076 Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.54-5.

Ukrainian national cause. Following the introduction of Ukrainianisation, Lozynskyi increasingly saw the Soviet Ukraine as the basis for this state. Though he also presented the Soviet Ukraine as a useful ally against the Poles, he did so because he believed that as a result of Ukrainianisation the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was becoming truly Ukrainian. If this was a geopolitical orientation towards the East, it was not despite the Bolsheviks' policies in the Ukraine, but rather because of them. As Ukrainianisation progressed, so did his support for the Soviet Ukraine increase, as can be seen in *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, which represented the high point of Lozynskyi's Sovietophilism.

It appeared in 1927, actually after he had returned to the Ukraine. In autumn 1926, Lozynskyi had again applied to immigrate to the Ukraine, at the height of the policy of Ukrainianisation. This request was granted and in September Lozynskyi travelled to Kharkiv. His sons had already gone to the Soviet Ukrainian capital and his wife followed him the next year.¹⁰⁷⁷ He settled in Kharkiv where he chaired the law department at the Institute of National Economy and worked at the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Lozynskyi's fate was bound to the policy of Ukrainianisation which had brought him to the Soviet Ukraine and he became a victim of Moscow's efforts to restrict the policy. In 1930, he was deported to the Northern Urals and shot in 1937 for his alleged participation in a 'conspiracy' against the Soviet Union.

Iulian Bachynskyi

Lozynskyi's support for the Soviet Ukraine was typical of the Ukrainian Sovietophilism which emerged after 1923 in that it was expressed in national terms. This was also true of Iulian Bachynskyi. However, Bachynskyi's socialist background meant that he approached an analysis of the Soviet Ukraine from a slightly different starting point, the nature of the revolution in the Romanov empire.

Bachynskyi had been a founding member of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. He belonged to the Social Democratic wing of the party and in 1899 was one of those who left the Radicals to form the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, which, as we have seen, provided a political education to many

¹⁰⁷⁷ Rublov, 'Shliakhamy na Solovky', p.108.

who later became Sovietophiles. He has gone down in Ukrainian history as the first proponent of an independent Ukrainian state in his seminal text *Ukraina irredenta*, published in 1895/6. Consequently, Ukrainian writers have been at a loss to explain why this supposed prophet of Ukrainian independence defended the Soviet Ukraine's federal relationship with Russia in the mid-1920s and immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s. For this reason, Ukrainian historians have sought to reject the label of Sovietophilism, either by claiming Bachynskiy was actually an opponent of the Bolsheviks or writing off his support as 'pragmatic'.¹⁰⁷⁸ However, this apparent inconstancy between Bachynskiy's pre- and post-war thought is merely the product of a misunderstanding of *Ukraina irredenta*.

As Kerstin Jobst has convincingly argued in her examination of *Ukraina irredenta*, Bachynskiy must be understood as a Marxist thinker, not a nationalist. In *Ukraina irredenta* Bachynskiy rejected the idea of a romantic resurrection of the Ukrainian nation; instead, he defended the formation of national structures not on the basis of historical or linguistic rights but rather on a Marxist analysis of economic relations: he argued that national struggles were only a cover for conflicts between different groups of the bourgeoisie. Thus the debate about the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy was a conflict between the German bourgeoisie, who supported centralism in order to take advantage of the resources of subjugated nations, and the Slavic bourgeoisie, who were proponents of federalism as a means of protecting themselves from the Germans. According to Bachynskiy, Social Democrats should support a federal and democratic reorganisation of the monarchy because this would remove the national conflicts which hindered the introduction of their social principles. Consequently, the Ukrainian SDs should campaign alongside the Polish petty bourgeoisie and workers for an extension of the franchise. They should also campaign for the federalisation of the monarchy, not on the basis of the crown lands, but rather on that of nationality – this would mean a Ukrainian federal unit made of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, Sub-Carpathia and the Lemko region.¹⁰⁷⁹

1078 Saltovskiy, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti*, p.289; Behei, *Iulijan Bachynskiy*, p.53.

1079 Kerstin S. Jobst, 'Marxismus und Nationalismus: Julijan Bačyns'kyj und die Rezeption seiner "Ukraina irredenta" (1895/96) als Konzept der ukrainischen Unabhängig-

It was only for that part of the Ukraine which was ruled by Russia that Bachynskyi advocated the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Again, he based this not on the particularity of the Ukrainian nation, but rather on the conflict between Russian, Polish and Ukrainian capitalism within the Russian empire. However, following Marx and Engels, Bachynskyi believed that with the development of international capitalism the state would become meaningless: capitalism would undergo a general crisis of overproduction and the intensification of class antagonisms, the only solution to which would be the replacement of nation states with an international organisation which would co-ordinate production and distribution. The Ukrainian nation state about which Bachynskyi wrote was therefore only a transitional phase on the path towards socialism. Indeed, the different nationalities would also disappear. With the development of the international centre 'each and every nation will denationalise. National particularities, which until then characterised the nation and distinguished them from others, will begin to disappear more and more. In the end, civilised societies will be so similar that they will merge into a single anthropological-cultural type'. Though it is quite possible that Bachynskyi rejected independence for the Habsburg Ukrainian lands out of expediency, it is clear that he did not see the nation state as a good in itself, but rather a means of achieving socialism.¹⁰⁸⁰ In this light, Bachynskyi's later Sovietophilism is less of a break with his pre-war thinking than has been thought.

During the First World War, Bachynskyi served in the Austro-Hungarian army; in October 1918 he joined the Ukrainian National Council which set up the ZUNR in November. Following the unification of the ZUNR and UNR, Bachynskyi was appointed head of the UNR's mission to the USA on the recommendation of the ZUNR's foreign minister. By June 1921, it was clear that the purpose of the mission had failed because the USA continued to refuse to recognise the UNR. The UNR government ordered the mission to move to Vienna. On arriving in the Austrian capital he ceased to work for the UNR and

keit?', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol.45, 1997, No.1, pp.31-47 (pp.35-38). For a detailed summary of the contents of the *Ukraina irredenta*, see Sal-tovskiy, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti*, pp.277-88. This account should, however, be treated with caution as the author sees Bachynskyi as a nationalist thinker.

1080 Jobst, 'Marxismus und Nationalismus', pp.38-9. The quotation is on p.39. Sal-tovskiy, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti*, pp.283-8.

became a member of the ZUNR's diplomatic mission. In 1923, he moved to Berlin, where he spent the next ten years.

Like many other Ukrainian émigrés at the time, Bachynskyy seems to have maintained links to groups from different political spectrums of the emigration. In Austria these included Hrushevskyy and Social Democrats like Oleksander Kandyba and Volodymyr Levynskyy, who all adopted Sovietophile positions; in Germany he seems to have taken part in meetings with German figures interested in the Ukrainian question alongside the leaders of the UVO. In summer 1924, Bachynskyy was present at a conference in Königsberg at which an agreement was made for a joint German-UVO attack on Poland. During the period of ideological flux at the beginning of the 1920s, such different contacts do not seem to have been anything unusual. In 1925, however, Bachynskyy broke with Konovalts. He wrote to *Ukrainskyi prapor* condemning the program of the UNDO, which had been written by an UVO member, and defending the Soviet Ukraine as beneficial to Ukrainian national interests.¹⁰⁸¹ This article, 'Na rozstainii dorozh' (At the Fork in the Road) was published in the same year alongside another, 'Pohovorim raz na rozum!' (Let's Talk Reasonably!) in a pamphlet entitled *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi* (The Bolshevik Revolution and the Ukrainians).¹⁰⁸² Three years later the book was re-issued, this time with four more articles published in 1926 and 1927.¹⁰⁸³ The arguments of these different articles remained consistent and they may be treated together.

In *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi* Bachynskyy argued that the Bolsheviks had had two aims: the first to overthrow the old order, the second to build socialism. The first of these goals had been successful. Only the Bolsheviks could bring down the tsars as this had required a left-wing movement as extreme as the right-wing regime of the Romanovs. However, the Bolsheviks had not achieved their second objective. He asked rhetorically whether it was possible to expect a country which was behind all the other countries of the capitalist world in terms of the development of capitalism, the state and cul-

1081 Behei, *Iulian Bachynskyy*, pp.41-5, 48-9.

1082 Iulian Bachynskyy, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi. Krytychni zamitky*, Berlin: Ukrainskyi Prapor, 1925.

1083 Iulian Bachynskyy, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi. Krytychni zamitky*, Berlin: published at the author's expense, 1928. The following references refer to this version of the text.

ture to make the transition to socialism. The Bolsheviks had only been able to socialise the means of production in the cities; they had been forced to introduce the New Economic Policy, which left agriculture in private hands. He even seemed to think that further concessions to capitalism were possible. Bachynskyi denied that the time for the international revolution had arrived. In order to prove this, he claimed that the Third International had adopted the same stance once held by the Second International, and that in turn the Second International was moving closer to the ruling classes. For the same reason, the USSR was seeking to establish normal diplomatic relations with capitalist countries. On these grounds Bachynskyi characterised the Russian revolution as 'not socialist, but capitalist': 'The Russian revolution is gradually approaching its culmination, that is [...] a democratic, bourgeois order'. Bachynskyi argued that all who believed in such an order should help in the Bolshevik task of state building, in order to promote the evolution of the Bolshevik regime. He therefore condemned military intervention in the Soviet republics. A victory for Bolshevism would be followed by a punitive Red terror, whereas if the opponents of Bolshevism won, the old reactionary order would be restored.¹⁰⁸⁴ Either way the developments which Bachynskyi described would be interrupted. Bachynskyi's appeal to supporters of the bourgeois democratic state may have been intended for the readership of *Ukrainskyi prapor*, in which the original article appeared. However, his defence of the bourgeois state was not a departure from his pre-war views. In *Ukrainska ir-redenta*, too, Bachynskyi had advocated the creation of such a state as a prerequisite for the implementation of socialism. Bachynskyi may have hailed the Russian revolution as a capitalist revolution, but he could do so for orthodox Marxist reasons: as a stage towards the achievement of socialism.

Bachynskyi also disagreed with opponents of Bolshevism on the national character of the Communist party. The Bolshevik revolution, he wrote, 'does not have anything in common with the "Muscovite" national psyche'. Bachynskyi stressed the leading role played by non-Russians in the Bolshevik party. Not only did he point to the Jews, Poles and Georgians in the leadership of the Bolsheviks; he also argued that Lenin was of Tatar origin. In contrast, the

1084 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.27-8, 52, 120-2. The quotations are on p.27.

'Muscovites' had formed the White movement to fight against Bolshevism.¹⁰⁸⁵ Therefore, Bachynskyi saw the Bolshevik revolution 'as a spasmodic cry of pain from the abused and oppressed peoples of Russia'.¹⁰⁸⁶ The Central Rada had not aspired to independence, but rather towards territorial autonomy within Russia. Consequently, the desire of the subjected nations towards freedom expressed itself in enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks, despite the fact that the party was primarily interested in introducing socialism, because the methods of creating socialism which it advocated were the most revolutionary and therefore the best tool in the non-Russians' struggle for liberation: whereas other Russian parties only struggled against the tsarist regime, the Bolsheviks fought to overthrow Russia itself. For example, the Bolsheviks had replaced the name 'Russia' with that of the USSR, declared the right of national self-determination up to independence and created a federation of national republics.¹⁰⁸⁷

Bachynskyi also stressed that only under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat could the Russified bourgeoisie and aristocracy in the Ukraine, which had in the past hindered the achievement of Ukrainian national goals, be swept away.¹⁰⁸⁸ Indeed, the weakness of national consciousness in the Ukraine meant that the country could not acquire statehood on its own account. It was 'necessary to organise the Ukrainian state without Ukrainians and without the Ukrainian language': the rural population, which spoke Ukrainian, was only interested in acquiring land and not in state building; and the urban population, which was the group capable of creating such a state, did not speak Ukrainian. Only the Bolsheviks could overcome these hurdles and achieve that which the Ukrainians were not in a position to do.¹⁰⁸⁹

Ukrainianisation was therefore a natural product of the non-Russian Bolshevik revolution and Bachynskyi defended the policy against its detractors. He claimed that Ukrainianisation was being introduced at all levels of the education system and the administration, including the highest organs of power. In response to the claim by the UNDO that Ukrainianisation was not aimed at

1085 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.41-3. The quotation is on p.41.

1086 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.43.

1087 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.44-5.

1088 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.64-5.

1089 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.50, 81, 130. The quotation is on p.130.

strengthening the Ukrainian nation politically, Bachynskyyi asked the following rhetorical questions: 'But what does it mean when all laws in the Ukraine are adopted and proclaimed by the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviet Deputies in the name of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and in all schools, beginning with the lowest, the young learn that they study in the schools of the Ukrainian Republic and live in the Ukrainian Republic? Does not such an education of the young, growing Ukrainian generation in an atmosphere of Ukrainian statehood and the continuation of Ukrainianisation in all administrative-state institutions strengthen the Ukrainian nation politically?'.¹⁰⁹⁰ Above all, Bachynskyyi praised how this changed the way in which Ukrainians saw themselves. As a result of Ukrainianisation, Ukrainian workers and peasants 'are now beginning to feel that they are not just individuals, each to his own, but rather also one community – a people, and they see that the state in which they live is their state'.¹⁰⁹¹ Yet Bachynskyyi did not only stress the national achievements of Ukrainianisation. The Ukrainian labouring masses now had the opportunity to develop their own form of high culture, which up to that point had only expressed the ideology of the bourgeoisie. He accepted that for some representatives of bourgeois culture this might seem like a destruction of culture. Against this he argued that bourgeois culture had not been eternal, but rather the expression of a particular phase of general human development. Likewise, proletarian culture represented the next stage of human development.¹⁰⁹²

Because of the claim that the Ukrainian state truly was Ukrainian, Bachynskyyi had to counter the suggestion that the federal structure of the Soviet Union impinged on the sovereignty of the Ukraine. In doing so, he echoed many of the arguments put forward by Lozynskyyi. Bachynskyyi claimed that all four national republics of the Soviet Union ran their own internal affairs. The similarities in their policies were merely a result of the fact that they accepted the same principle of socialism. The exclusion of certain areas from the republics' authority did not infringe upon their sovereignty in any way. All the republics had their representatives at the union level, and each of these had equal rights. Therefore, Moscow did not occupy a leading position in the federation

1090 Bachynskyyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.21-2, 38-40. The quotation is on p.22.

1091 Bachynskyyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.133.

1092 Bachynskyyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.123-5.

for without the agreement of the other national republics, it could do nothing. Naturally, there were disagreements between republics. The fact that Russia sometimes emerged triumphant from these did not mean that the Ukraine was not sovereign, but rather that Russia's arguments in this case had been stronger. Bachynskiy saw this as a product of the centuries of state experience which the Russians had, but which the non-Russians lacked. Indeed, he felt that if one argued that the federal structure of the USSR detracted from the sovereignty of the individual republics, one could perfectly well argue that the other Soviet republics, including the Russian, were not sovereign. Bachynskiy compared this structure to the relationship between Austria and Hungary under the Habsburgs.¹⁰⁹³ However, unlike Austria or Hungary, the Soviet Republics possessed the right to secede.¹⁰⁹⁴ Bachynskiy stressed that this was only of theoretical importance, at least for the time being. Nevertheless, the fact that it was in the constitution of the USSR was a sign that the liberation of the non-Russian peoples was 'one of the main, fundamental principles of the Bolshevik revolution, showing [its] end and foundation'.¹⁰⁹⁵

Like Lozynskiy, Bachynskiy also threw doubt on the sovereignty of supposedly independent Western states. He argued that in Western countries capitalism had advanced to the last stage of its development before the transition to socialism. The economic interests of these countries were so dependent on the interests of other states that their merger would be beneficial. East European countries were behind the West economically, and therefore each state regulated its own economy. However, Bachynskiy predicted that the East European countries would also have to merge in order to resist the West European Union. The Ukraine must enter this union as an independent and voluntary member. Given the backwardness of the country, only the structure of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would help her develop to this point.¹⁰⁹⁶ Here, again, it is possible to see how the themes discussed in *Ukraina irredenta* appeared in Bachynskiy's post-war writings: independent states were not a goal in themselves, but rather the stages towards the achievement of an international federation of socialist states.

1093 Bachynskiy, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.83-90.

1094 Bachynskiy, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.91.

1095 Bachynskiy, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.45.

1096 Bachynskiy, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.47-50.

Bachynskyi dismissed criticism of the Bolsheviks' cruelty by pointing to the importance of the task which they had undertaken. After calling on the émigrés to return, he warned potential returnees thus: 'do not be disheartened by the mistakes and errors in one experiment; something is taking place which is not small, but rather complicated and great; under difficult conditions, a new construction on a new socialist basis is being laid in accordance with the slogan of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", to which the Bolshevik revolution owes its victory and through which the Ukrainian people achieved the first requirements of their national and state rebirth'.¹⁰⁹⁷ He admitted that the Bolsheviks had dealt with their political opponents mercilessly, but recalled that the recent world war had been much more merciless. Whereas the world war had been about strengthening capitalism and increasing the oppression of workers and peasants, the ruthlessness of the Bolsheviks had been aimed at liberating the labouring masses and the subjected peoples. The aim therefore justified the means.¹⁰⁹⁸

Of course, such a willingness to ignore the brutality of the Bolsheviks for the good of the international socialist revolution was a common characteristic among many Sovietophiles. However, interestingly enough, even after Communist policy began to change to the detriment of Ukrainian interests, Bachynskyi continued to defend the Bolsheviks. During the Shumskyi affair, Bachynskyi naturally took the side of Shumskyi. He criticised the leadership of the KP(b)U for attacking only the 'Ukrainian nationalist deviation' and not Great Russian chauvinism, which it had also recognised as being a danger. Indeed, Bachynskyi argued that Shumskyi better represented Leninist teaching on the nationalities than did the Central Committee of the KP(b)U and that his stance was more appropriate for the Ukrainian population. He also suggested that the Central Committee had acted against Shumskyi because they feared that this tendency would grow stronger and stronger. Bachynskyi indicated that he himself believed that this would be the case.¹⁰⁹⁹ In the Shumskyi affair Bachynskyi certainly criticised the leadership of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. However, he did so from what he believed was a Leninist standpoint in the hope that Shumskyi's understanding of the nationalities' policy would

1097 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.99-100.

1098 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.134-5.

1099 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.103-13.

be adopted. Even after the Shumskyi affair, Bachynskyi wrote a very pro-Soviet assessment of the past ten years of Bolshevik rule.¹¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, more research is needed on Bachynskyi's views in the late 1920s and the early 1930s to see how his views developed under the impact of the end of Ukrainianisation and introduction of collectivisation in the Ukraine. Especially important is the journal *Vilna trybuna* which Bachynskyi started editing in 1933 in Prague.

In the introduction to the 1928 edition of *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi*, Bachynskyi had declared his intention 'to travel to the Soviet Ukraine and to the other Soviet republics in order to convince myself there on the spot to what extent that which I have written about the Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union in these articles corresponds to reality'. He also promised to write a further set of articles when he had seen for himself the situation in the country.¹¹⁰¹ However, it was not until November 1933 that Bachynskyi finally entered the USSR. Bachynskyi spent most of his period in emigration in Berlin, but in March 1931 he travelled to Lviv. He was carrying with him 21 copies of *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi*, for which he was arrested by the Polish authorities. He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and after serving his punishment he returned to the German capital. In 1933, he began editing the monthly journal *Vilna trybuna*, but on 15th November he applied for a visa to the Soviet Union at the Soviet consulate in Prague. Ten days later he was already in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.¹¹⁰² Here he worked on the editorial board of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia, but in 1934 he was arrested and imprisoned on the Solovets Islands.

Antin Krushelnytskyi

Bachynskyi emigrated to the Ukraine after the Bolsheviks had begun to halt Ukrainianisation, inflicted famine on the Ukraine and initiated purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and KP(b)U. Without being able to see his work in 1933 for *Vilna trybuna* it is impossible to say how he accommodated his support for the Soviet system to these events. However, the writings of Antin

1100 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.111-35.

1101 Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.3.

1102 Behei, *Iulian Bachynskyi*, pp.49, 51.

Krushelnytskyi in the Galician pro-Soviet journal *Novi shliakhy* do allow one to analyse the beliefs required to preserve one's Sovietophilism at a time when the Bolsheviks' policies caused many Sovietophiles to despair of the Soviet Union.

Antin Krushelnytskyi was an important Galician writer heavily influenced by West European modernism. Before the First World War, he had worked alongside the Galician radical and writer Ivan Franko and played a prominent role in the Ukrainian Radical Party. In 1919, he joined the UNR cabinet as minister of education under Borys Martos. He then emigrated to Vienna where he was involved in the pro-UNR journal *Volia*. However, at the end of 1919 he and the East Ukrainian poet Oleksander Oles left the paper to found their own journal *Na perelomi* (At the Turning Point). While working on *Na perelomi*, Krushelnytskyi was still an opponent of the Bolsheviks, describing them in one article as wanting to resurrect the old idea of a united Russia. However, elements of his later thought were already evident; for example he was highly critical of the older generation of Ukrainian leaders, who he believed had been equivocal in their desire to create an independent Ukrainian state.¹¹⁰³

Krushelnytskyi's opposition to the Bolsheviks gradually began to change. In September 1921, Krushelnytskyi was involved in a meeting between Mykhailo Hrushevskiy and the Soviet plenipotentiaries in Vienna on the publication and acquisition abroad of Ukrainian-language textbooks for Ukrainian schools.¹¹⁰⁴ By 1923, he was cooperating on the Sovietophile journal *Nova hromada*. The March decision may have been an important moment in Krushelnytskyi's conversion to Sovietophilism; nevertheless, he had clearly begun to rethink his position on the Bolsheviks before 1923. Krushelnytskyi contributed a number of articles on the school system in various parts of the Ukraine to *Nova hromada*. He praised the Soviet Ukrainian school system because it had Ukrainianised not only the language of instruction, but also the content of the school curriculum.¹¹⁰⁵ In contrast, in Sub-Carpathian Rus he saw increasing Russification within the school system: a detrimental process which the

1103 *Na perelomi*, March 1920, No.3, pp.5-11.

1104 The minutes of the meeting on publishing and buying books for the Ukraine, 14.09.1921, TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.94 ark.24.

1105 *Nova hromada*, July 1923, I, pp.54-75.

Czechoslovakian government was not interested in stopping.¹¹⁰⁶ He returned to Galicia in 1925, but was not able to take up his pre-war profession of teaching. Between 1929 and 1933, he edited the pro-Soviet journals *Novi shliakhy*, which received funding from the Soviet Ukrainian government,¹¹⁰⁷ and *Krytyka*. In 1934, he immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine.

Krushelnytskyi described one of the aims of *Novi shliakhy* as being 'to acquaint the reader with the achievements of the Soviet Ukraine in the realms of science and art'.¹¹⁰⁸ In addition to articles on this subject, *Novi shliakhy* also devoted much space to Galician politics. In particular, many articles attacked the UNDO, the leading mainstream Ukrainian nationalist party, and sought to defend the Soviet Union from charges made by the UNDO against it. Criticism of the Poles was, however, circumscribed and many articles had passages removed by the censor. Some were banned entirely.¹¹⁰⁹

Krushelnytskyi's political writing during his period as editor of *Novi shliakhy* centred around the contrast between what he called 'romantic nationalism' and 'state nationalism'. By 'romantic nationalism' Krushelnytskyi understood the form of nationalism which had been current before the world war and which remained dominant in Galicia. He described this as 'the uncritical enthusiasm for the past [...] this is the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian songs, Ukrainian folk clothes, this is Ukrainian folk theatre, the Ukrainian (Greek-Catholic) church' and so on.¹¹¹⁰ As a result, the politics of the pre-war Ukrainian nationalists had been aimed towards the creation of Ukrainian schools or competition with the Poles for places in the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy. It was therefore above all cultural nationalism and Krushelnytskyi believed it was incapable of creating a state: 'the field of state-building economics did not enter into the sphere of interest of Ukrainian romantic nationalism'. This form of nationalism retained its hold after 1918, with one variation in that the recent past replaced distant history in the affections of the East Galician nationalists: thus, for example, the Ukrainian Galician Army took the place of the

1106 *Nova hromada*, October-November 1923, III-IV, pp.51-71.

1107 Minutes of the Politburo KP(b)U (special file), outlining expenditure abroad in 1930/1931, TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.185.

1108 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, p.284.

1109 See for example Krushelnytskyi's article on the UNDO congress in *Novi shliakhy*, 1932, No.5, pp.105-52.

1110 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, p.281.

Cossack tradition.¹¹¹¹ However, this change was not accompanied by an increased interest in the role of the economic sphere, especially as national economic institutions such as the credit cooperatives passed out of the control of Ukrainian hands.¹¹¹² He concluded that whereas for nationalists 'under Austria it was enrapturing to wear embroidered shirts, now Ukrainian caps and tridents are enough for them and at most [the formation of] conspiratorial groups for not completely responsible acts'.¹¹¹³

Because it remained beholden to this form of nationalism, West Ukrainian society denied that the Soviet Ukraine was anything more than a form of Muscovite occupation and called for intervention in order to overthrow the Soviet regime and establish a nation state more in keeping with its idea of the nation.¹¹¹⁴ The error of this 'romantic nationalism' was to try to copy West European nationalism. For Krushelnytskyi Western nationalism was the nationalism of the bourgeoisie who set up colonies which they could exploit in order to maintain control over their own working class. Krushelnytskyi argued that it was ridiculous for the Western Ukraine to attempt to imitate such a nationalism because it lacked its own bourgeoisie and was itself a colony of Poland. As a result it and its interventionist aspirations were nothing more than tools in the hands of the imperialist, bourgeois states.¹¹¹⁵

The opposite of this was the form of nationalism to be found in the Soviet Ukraine. This was the nationalism of state building. According to Krushelnytskyi, following the collapse of the Directory, the Ukraine began to experience a cultural renaissance which encompassed all areas of life. Through the establishment of Ukrainian universities and technical schools a new cadre of Soviet leaders was being created. Ukrainian culture in the form of literature, science, art and the press flourished.¹¹¹⁶ However, he claimed that 'one must name the industrialisation of the Ukraine, both in industry and agriculture, and its decolonisation as the most important attributes of the contemporary Ukraine'.¹¹¹⁷ The Bolsheviks had transformed the Ukraine from being a colony

1111 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, pp.209-10.

1112 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, p.211.

1113 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, p.212.

1114 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, pp.208-9.

1115 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, pp.212-5.

1116 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, pp.283-4.

1117 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.7-8, p.219.

providing raw materials for Moscow into a centre of industrial manufacturing in its own right. In the realm of agriculture, advances towards collectivisation had been made, while the right of private land ownership had been recognised in order to secure the supply of grain.¹¹¹⁸ Krushelnytskyi believed that all of these developments would find completion in the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan, which would see the further improvement of industry and the final transition within agriculture to collectivisation.¹¹¹⁹

According to Krushelnytskyi, the fundamental differences between romantic and state nationalism emanated from class differences. Although nationalism was a nation's aspiration towards the formation of itself in a state, a state was always the expression of the power of the ruling class within that nation. This meant that nationalism always had a class content. The October revolution and the creation of the Soviet Ukraine had created a state in the Ukraine which replaced the bourgeois understanding of the state with a socialist one by proclaiming all power to the proletariat. This new form of state expressed the will of the labouring masses, removed the bourgeoisie from power, freed oppressed nations from national chauvinism, subordinated all cultural values to the service of the workers and peasants and liberated the economy from the domination of foreign capital.¹¹²⁰ Thus, in the Soviet Ukraine nationalism was 'formed on the social restructuring of the nation and state power'.¹¹²¹ In comparison, the Western Ukraine had been returned to the pre-war situation through the restoration of agricultural capitalism and the transfer of Ukrainian industry into the hands of international capital, reducing it once more to the status of a colony. Thus, the upper classes had consolidated their position in order to protect themselves from the workers, peasants and labouring intelligentsia and to serve international capital. West Ukrainian nationalism was the expression of this consolidation.¹¹²²

This critique was extended in Krushelnytskyi's review of the politics of the Galician political parties, which accounted for much of his political writing on the pages of *Novi shliakhy*. The UNDO, especially, came in for the most criti-

1118 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, pp.284-5; July-August 1930. No.7-8, p.219.

1119 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, p.286.

1120 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, pp.220-1.

1121 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, p.222.

1122 *Novi shliakhy*, July-August 1930, No.7-8, p.222.

cism, which is unsurprising given the fact that it was the dominant legal Ukrainian party in Poland and had adopted a decidedly anti-Soviet course after 1929. For Krushelnytskyi, the greatest sin of the Galician political parties was that they were conciliators and opportunists.¹¹²³ The reason for this was that they were 'UNRist'. By this he meant that they hoped to create a Ukraine independent of the Bolsheviks: an aim which for him always meant the recreation the Ukrainian People's Republic as envisaged by the Warsaw treaty of 1920 by invading the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with the aid of the Poles. He claimed that some parties, such as the UNDO, openly cooperated with the Poles. He admitted that other parties, for example the OUN, rejected the Warsaw treaty as such, but argued that as the only way to create a UNR Ukraine was through Warsaw, they were no less conciliatory than those who publicly worked with the Poles.¹¹²⁴ Krushelnytskyi saw the UNDO's servility and opportunism as part of the party's pre-war heritage of Ukrainian national democracy.¹¹²⁵ As mentioned in Chapter 5, this was a theme which both *Nova hromada* and *Zahrava* had explored extensively.

A further reason for his dislike of the UNDO and OUN was that he believed both parties to be infused with the principles of international Catholic clericalism. Consequently, as the bearers of an internationalist doctrine, they were not truly national parties, as could be seen by their willingness to work with Polish Catholicism.¹¹²⁶ Though Krushelnytskyi opposed clericalism from a national standpoint, he also did so from a socialist perspective. He believed that clericalism served capitalism by 'reconciling the labouring class to the subjugation of financial, industrial and agrarian capital'.¹¹²⁷ In this way, Krushelnytskyi, like Lozynskyi, sought to counter the claim made by the Galician parties that only they represented the Ukrainian nation and that the Soviet Ukraine was not national because it was founded on an international doctrine. Indeed, opposition to the Soviet Union deprived them of their claim to represent the national interest. He wrote of West Ukrainian nationalism that 'it rejects the Soviet Ukrainian reality, denies the right to all who do not go with them in the

1123 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, pp.97-101.

1124 *Novi shliakhy*, October 1930, No.10, p.101.

1125 *Novi shliakhy*, January 1931, No.1, pp.65-109.

1126 *Novi shliakhy*, October 1930, No.10, pp.107-8.

1127 *Novi shliakhy*, December 1931, No.12, p.351.

struggle against the Soviet Ukraine to talk of the nation. It forgets that their way to the UNR lies under the patronage of internationalist capitalism, to the overthrow of the Ukrainian SSR with all its achievements, to the political and economic subjugation of the *Ukrainian labouring masses* by international interventionist capital, even to the oppression of *Ukrainian national culture* on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR by the interventionists'.¹¹²⁸ Only Selrob, the Communist front organisation, was a truly nationalist organisation because it was oriented towards the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian state being created within it.¹¹²⁹

The critique of 'romantic nationalism' also informed his commentary on the trial of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU), a fictional organisation invented by the Bolsheviks for the purposes of conducting a show trial against a number of members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Krushelnytskyi believed the official Soviet account according to which those under trial belonged to a secret underground organisation called the SVU which had aimed to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union and to place the Ukraine under the imperialist yoke of foreign capital. He unquestioningly quoted the admissions made by the accused to prove their guilt. He damned those standing trial as an 'internal Petliurite emigration', which like the emigration abroad was unable to reconcile itself to the Soviet Ukrainian state. Krushelnytskyi attacked the accused for the same failures he observed in the West Ukrainian romantic nationalists. He repeatedly accused them of being men of the past, calling them for example 'the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the old Russian type' or 'old, romantic Ukrainian figures'. Their understanding of the Ukraine was limited to folklore, popular literature, history and lexicography and at the beginning of the First World War their maximal demands had merely consisted of the creation of Ukrainian primary schools inside the Russian empire. During the revolution, they had found the task of creating a Ukrainian state thrust upon them, and, as a result of their psychological incapability of understanding this task, had failed. Following the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, they had taken up cultural work in the Soviet Ukraine, but in doing so they remained removed from those peasants and workers doing political and 'real'

1128 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, pp.109-110.

1129 *Novi shliakhy*, December 1930, No.10, p.109.

work. Consequently, they could not see that their desires did not coincide with those of the rest of the Ukrainian nation.¹¹³⁰

The SVU trial was but one of the events signalling the end of Ukrainianisation that made it increasingly difficult for Sovietophiles to maintain their stance. By the beginning of the 1930s, it was almost impossible for Ukrainians to express critical support for the Bolsheviks. Only those, like Krushelnyskyi, who were willing to believe unconditionally remained. At the same time, Krushelnyskyi's emphasis on economic state-building meant that the cultural accomplishments of Ukrainianisation were less important for him than the economic 'successes' promised by industrialisation and collectivisation; his Sovietophilism was perfectly suited to the period in which the Five Year Plans were replacing *korenizatsiia* and the NEP. For this reason, Krushelnyskyi, who had been subject to persecution and arrest by the Polish authorities, immigrated with his family to the Soviet Ukraine in 1934, by which time many other Sovietophiles and even Communist supporters of Ukrainianisation had already been imprisoned or executed. However, the Krushelnyskyi family soon suffered the same fate as those whom Krushelnyskyi had damned in *Novi shliakhy*. He was sent with his wife to a prison camp, where he died in 1941; their two sons, Ivan and Taras, were executed.

Conclusion

A number of prominent East Galician intellectuals were converted to Sovietophilism. They were not simply looking for allies against the Poles; they argued that the Bolsheviks' social and national policies had benefited the Eastern Ukraine and would help the West Ukrainian lands. This was the case for both Lozynskyi and Bachynskyi. Lozynskyi started from the question of whether the Soviet Ukrainian Republic offered a suitable basis for the achievement of Ukrainian unity. Bachynskyi began with an analysis of the Bolsheviks' aims and achievements during the revolution. Despite these differences, they often used very similar arguments to support their Sovietophilism. Unsurprisingly, both stressed the sincerity of Ukrainianisation and the formal rights of the Soviet Ukraine as a Soviet republic; at the same time, they argued that the developments in the Ukraine were incomplete and represented merely a stage

1130 *Novi shliakhy*, April 1930, No.4, pp.286-91, 297.

towards greater achievements. Bachynskyi, like Lozynskyi, relativised the Soviet Ukraine's dependence on Moscow as a part of the Soviet Union by claiming that no state was truly independent of others. Another common argument was that the social policy of Bolshevism had benefited the Ukraine because in the Ukraine the classes which the Bolsheviks attacked were non-Ukrainian and were responsible for the Ukraine's national subjugation. Thus, both Lozynskyi and Bachynskyi couched their support for the Soviet Ukraine in national terms. There was, however, a more socialist side to Bachynskyi's argument. He believed that the revolution had created bourgeois capitalist states in Russia and the Ukraine, which in the past he had described as being the precursors to the introduction of socialism. He also welcomed the appearance of proletarian culture, claiming that this was the next step in human development.

However, in the 1930s it became very difficult to support the Soviet Ukraine in the belief that it benefited the cultural and state interests of the Ukrainian nation. Sovietophiles, like Krushelnytskyi, who continued to defend the Soviet Ukraine in this period used rhetoric of a very different kind. Krushelnytskyi was interested in the national development of the Ukraine, and like Lozynskyi sought to defend the Soviet Ukraine from charges that its internationalist doctrine prevented it from having a national character. However, Krushelnytskyi's arguments in favour of the Soviet Ukraine were much more grounded in socialist thought than those put forward by Lozynskyi. Though he praised the Bolsheviks' supposed cultural achievements in the Ukraine, Krushelnytskyi understood the good of his people to be promoted primarily by industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture. This represented a change in emphasis to the articles written for *Nova hromada*, when Krushelnytskyi had written about cultural issues, in particular the Ukrainianisation of the school system. Unlike Bachynskyi or Lozynskyi, he was not interested in the constitutional relationship between the Soviet Ukrainian and Russian Republics. Whereas Lozynskyi had spoken of the popular masses, Krushelnytskyi talked of the industrial and agricultural proletariat. Krushelnytskyi was also far more bitter in his attacks on Western democracy than either Bachynskyi or Lozynskyi. Above all, Krushelnytskyi refused to question the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and KP(b)U, accepting the Soviet line that these people were

traitors who had intended harm to the Soviet Union. By this stage, unquestioning faith was the prerequisite for a Sovietophile orientation.

Interestingly, all these thinkers shared a central goal with the Ukrainian far right, namely the achievement of Ukrainian *derzhavnist*, or statehood. Krushelnyskyi's juxtaposition of the good 'state-building nationalism' with the bad 'romantic nationalism' is the clearest example of this. Certainly, the Sovietophiles used the language of the left in describing the construction of *derzhavnist* under the Bolsheviks; they believed that socialism promoted Ukrainian statehood rather than hindered it. Nevertheless, like the far right, the failures of the revolutionary period had convinced the East Galician Sovietophiles to reject, at least symbolically, the pre-war generation of Ukrainian activists in favour of a new, apparently successful ideology of state-building – in the Sovietophiles' case, the Soviet regime. Unlike the far right, however, many Sovietophiles continued to owe an ideological debt to this older generation, above all through the influence of Ukrainian populism.

8 Ukrainian *Smenovekhovstvo* and the 'Turn to the Right'

The inter-war Ukrainian emigration was a community primarily made up of individuals who had served in governments and armies which had been at war the Bolsheviks. Even the West Ukrainian People's Republic, through its alliance with the UNR, had been involved in this struggle. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the majority of those in the emigration were opponents of the Bolsheviks, seeing them as the occupiers of their home country. Consequently, the call to return was rejected by the majority of the emigration. 'Taking into account the fact that up till now the Ukraine is still in a state of occupation', resolved a conference of the Ukrainian emigration in Rumania in 1923, 'and that any action in the direction of legal demands for her state independence are understood by the occupiers to be evil deeds, which carry the greatest punishment – the death penalty, return to the homeland of any émigré is undesirable, and that of the political elements of the Ukrainian emigration is absolutely senseless'.¹¹³¹ Thus, for many émigrés, the call for reconciliation with the Bolsheviks was a call to collaboration with the subjugators of the Ukraine and a form of national betrayal. The Petliurite *Trybuna Ukrainy* called the contributors to *Nova hromada* 'Judases' for supporting the Bolshevik occupiers of the Ukraine.¹¹³² Petliura himself claimed that 'the new pilgrims to the Bolshevik Canossa do not inspire anything other than contempt and distrust, both there in the Ukraine and here in the emigration'.¹¹³³ *Zahrava*, the journal of the new Ukrainian far right edited by Dmytro Dontsov, regularly referred to the Sovietophiles as 'Little Russians', thereby accusing the Sovietophiles of renouncing their nationality just as, according to the nationalist interpretation, those 'Ukrainians' who saw their nation as a branch of the Russian nation had relinquished their own claim to national particularity.¹¹³⁴

1131 Quoted in *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy*, p.34.

1132 *Trybuna Ukrainy*, July-August 1923, No.5-7, p.111.

1133 Quoted in Zhukovskiyi, 'Symon Petliura i zavdannia emigratsii', p.181.

1134 *Zahrava*, 1 August 1923, No.9, p.142; 1 February 1924, No.3, p.47.

For the left, many of whom had been former party colleagues of the Sovietophiles, the betrayal was against both the Ukraine and against socialism. Mykyta Shapoval, who had led the opposition to Hrushevskyyi in the debates within the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR over the Soviet regime, wrote that 'Hrushevskyyi, the Shrahs, the Khrystiuks the Chechels, the Mazurenkos, the Nikovskyyis calmly went to serve the most implacable enemy'. However, Shapoval also saw this betrayal as especially acute when it was committed by a socialist. In an article entitled 'The Political Death of M. Hrushevskyyi', Shapoval presented being a '*smenovekhovets*' as incompatible with being a socialist, and thus with being on the side of the Ukrainian people. 'It was not necessary', he wrote 'for a socialist to lower himself to "*smenovekhovstvo*", to the Slashchovyis, the Morkotuns, the Porshs, the Tiutiunnyks and other Ukrainian politicians. The fact that Hrushevskyyi agrees with the interpretation of himself from the side of the Bolsheviks as a "*smenovekhovets*" (the Moscow *Izvestiia* also calls him a *smenovekhovets* and not a socialist!) is fatally characteristic for him. *Smenovekhovstvo* is an evil, anti-Ukrainian concept, and for this reason he who stands on its basis does not have any hopes of being acknowledged by the Ukrainian people'. Hrushevskyyi, the first citizen of an independent Ukraine, had accepted the title of a *smenovekhovets*, and in doing so had separated himself from those who struggled for the Ukraine; he had become a political corpse.¹¹³⁵

Indeed, the fact that the original Russian *smenovekhovtsy* were such ardent nationalists made it very easy to label the Ukrainian returnees as traitors, especially when the Soviet press used this term for both Russians and Ukrainians. The Ukrainian émigrés were aware of the contradictions between the views of the Russian and Ukrainian reconcilers. Dmytro Dontsov, writing in *Zahrava*, pointed to the fact that Russian patriots saw Soviet Russia as 'the gatherer of Russian lands' and pointed to the irony that Kliuchnikov 'glorified the Soviets exactly for their "patriotic deed" – the building of a one and indivisible Russia [...]. Our "*smenovekhovtsy*" glorify it for [...] the building of the Ukraine! How can they explain this contradiction to themselves? I explain this only with the fact that our patriots [...] have become Russian patriots, re-

1135 Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi i GPU-NKVD*, pp.31-2. For the full text of 'The political death of M. Hrushevskyyi', see M. Shapoval, 'Politychna smert M. Hrushevskoho', *Rozbudova derzhavy*, 1994, No.3, pp.58-9.

nouncing the idea of independence'.¹¹³⁶ *Trybuna Ukrainy*, too, wrote that the 'new neophyte Soviets from *Nova hromada* or *the sociological institute*' should listen to the words of the Russian émigrés who saw the new constitution of the USSR as a recreation of the empire of the tsars, for 'these lecturers know better than our Soviet neophytes the genuine intentions of Communist Moscow'.¹¹³⁷ *Ukrainskyi student*, the Ukrainian student paper in Prague, also drew comparisons between Russian and Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*. It argued that the Russian group was a genuine movement among the 'Muscovite, feudal and bureaucratic emigration' based on the realisation that Bolshevism was not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather the dictatorship of a small group of swindlers over the proletariat. In contrast, 'Ukrainian "*smenovekhovstvo*" is not organic, but rather a mechanical repetition of Muscovite *smenovekhovstvo*', created by the Soviet government for the purpose of claiming that the Soviet occupation is a national government and praising it with the aim of bringing about the collapse of the Ukrainian student organisations.¹¹³⁸

The opponents of the reconcilers also sought to cast doubt upon the moral character of those who advocated returning by accusing them of opportunism and a lack of sincerity. The Sovietophiles were charged with being willing to serve any person in power. In response to the appearance of *Nova hromada*, *Zahrava* noted that one of the contributors was Mariian Melenevskiy, a former member of the Russian Social Democrats, who, it claimed, had written a grovelling letter to the German Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1915 calling on him to save the Ukraine from the Russian tsar. The paper went on to exclaim: 'What a cunning Little Russian! When the Bolsheviks sat in prison and Wilhelm on the throne, he sent telegrams to the Kaiser. Now, when the Kaiser is behind bars and Lenin is in the Kremlin, he courts the red tsar and his government'.¹¹³⁹ For *Trybuna Ukrainy* the appearance of *Nova hromada* was merely due to the fact that the Ukrainian *smenovekhovtsy* had received the 'corresponding money, naturally in foreign currency' from their 'master' in order to

1136 *Zahrava*, 1 December 1923, No.17, pp.277-8.

1137 *Trybuna Ukrainy*, July-August 1923, No. 5-7, p.91.

1138 *Ukrainski student*, December 1923, No.5, p.2-3. The quotation is on p.2.

1139 *Zahrava*, 1 August 1923, No.9, p.142.

publish a journal.¹¹⁴⁰ The Ukrainian reconcilers were also accused of lacking the courage to follow their own advice. *Trybuna Ukrainy* pointed to the irony that 'the colleagues of *Nova hromada*, lurking abroad in hotels and bars, in one voice call on the emigration "to go home"'.¹¹⁴¹ In the same vein, *Zahrava* wrote of the 'self-satisfied grunting of the *smenovekhovskii* hyenas, who all cry "go home", but themselves remain abroad'.¹¹⁴²

At the same time, many were convinced that Sovietophilism was a very dangerous phenomenon. The SR Nykyfor Hryhoriiv wrote in *Nova Ukraina* that the Ukrainian emigration was an army which was still engaged in a war with the Bolsheviks for the liberation of the Ukraine. By calling on the émigrés to return and cooperate with the Bolsheviks, the Sovietophiles were encouraging mutiny. Moreover, the Ukrainian emigration was, he claimed, the living proof to the rest of the world that the Ukraine rejected Soviet rule and that the Bolsheviks were foreign occupiers. The Sovietophiles were explicitly aiding the Bolshevik attempt to fool the world that the Ukrainian population supported the regime in the country.¹¹⁴³ Thus, for Hryhoriiv the Sovietophiles undermined the emigration's reason for existing, detracting from its power as a symbol of continued resistance to the Bolsheviks. Hryhoriiv did praise those already in the Ukraine who cooperated with the Bolsheviks, saying that by taking on a leading role in Ukrainianisation they advanced the Ukrainian cause. However, Hryhoriiv believed that those inside the country and those in the emigration had different tasks to fulfil – the first to extract as much as possible from the regime in the Ukraine, the second to voice opposition to the occupation. This allowed him to praise those Ukrainians in the Ukraine involved in Ukrainianisation, yet condemn the émigrés who wanted to return in order to take up similar work. Indeed, Hryhoriiv argued that the émigré Sovietophiles made the work of Ukrainians in the Ukraine even more difficult. By claiming that the Ukrainian Soviet state possessed true statehood, they made it harder for the conscious Ukrainians in the KP(b)U who were struggling for a genuinely independent Ukrainian worker-peasant state to point to the defi-

1140 *Trybuna Ukrainy*, July-August 1923, No.5-7, p.111.

1141 *Trybuna Ukrainy*, July-August 1923, No.5-7, p.112.

1142 *Zahrava*, 1 August 1923, No.9, p. 142.

1143 *Nova Ukraina*, January-February 1927, No.1-2, pp.14-16

ciencies of the present system; the Russians could just answer that even people from Galicia were praising the Soviet Ukraine as a Ukrainian state.¹¹⁴⁴

Symon Petliura was also worried about the impression that the appearance of Sovietophilism would make on foreigners, especially given the fact that those who had chosen to support the Soviet system had been such prominent members of the Ukrainian nation. In a letter from June 1925, he condemned the actions of Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyi thus: 'I think that the steps of these two individuals, who have been of such importance for the Ukraine's recent history, have caused more trouble than anything else and have undermined the resistance of the Ukrainian community in this crucial moment [...]. A nation that advanced such leaders to the foreground of its life cannot impress foreigners because they cannot be certain of its endurance in its struggle for those ideals without which it cannot consider it self to be a nation'. This was not to mention, added Petliura, the 'colossal damage' which Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyi had inflicted within the nation itself. Petliura, like the rest of the anti-Bolshevik emigration, was very concerned about the creation of national unity. In his programmatic statement *Suchasna Ukrainska emihratsiia ta ii zavdannia* (The Present Ukrainian Emigration and its Task), he wrote that 'disunity and separate work cannot exist here [in the emigration]. Those who call for it unconsciously work towards weakening and ruining us'.¹¹⁴⁵ Clearly, the most damaging form of 'separate work' was to separate oneself from the emigration completely and cooperate with the occupiers of the Ukraine.

Ukrainian Sovietophilism provoked, therefore, extremely hostile reactions among the anti-Bolshevik emigration. Indeed, the Sovietophiles very much went against the current of émigré thought in the 1920s. As Chapter Two argued, the dominant intellectual trend in the Ukrainian emigration was a 'turn to the right', a renunciation of socialist goals and moderate, parliamentary methods in favour of an unending struggle for a nation state under the leadership of a national executive. In contrast, Ukrainian Sovietophiles before 1923 reaffirmed their social goals. Though they never abandoned their na-

1144 *Nova Ukraina*, January-February 1927, No.1-2, p.13.

1145 Quoted in Serhii Lytvyn, *Sud istorii: Symon Petliura i Petliuriana*, Kyiv: Oleny Telihiy, 2001, pp.464-5. For an account of Petliura's *Suchasna Ukrainska emihratsiia ta ii zavdannia* see Zhukovskyi, 'Symon Petliura i zavdannia emigratsii'.

tional aims, some, like Vynnychenko, explicitly declared that these would have to wait until the social revolution had taken place. Both Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyyi restated their opposition to the goal of a nation state and their preference for some form of federation. They argued that it was better to ally with revolutionary Russians than reactionary Ukrainians, a belief which directly contradicted the Ukrainian nationalists' call to place national unity over party and class loyalties. Though the later Sovietophiles defended the Soviet Ukraine in national terms, many still refused to countenance an alliance with the Ukrainian right. *Ukrainski visti*, for example, was attracted to the Soviet Ukraine by the apparent achievements of Ukrainianisation, but it was also a self-consciously class-based organ, which denounced Petliura as a 'black hundred'. Although they did not state it as explicitly as had the early Sovietophiles, *Ukrainski visti* was not prepared to ally with its 'class enemy' in the name of national unity.

The criticism of the Sovietophiles by the radical right was therefore closely intertwined with its exposition of the new ideology. One characteristic of Ukrainian 'integral nationalism' was the rejection of the values of pre-war Ukrainian nationalism, the proponents of which had led the Ukrainian states created during the revolution. The radical right saw Sovietophilism as a continuation of the pre-war tradition. Dontsov wrote that by supporting Soviet power the Sovietophiles encouraged Ukrainian peasants to adore a foreign state and forget their own history of struggle and state-building. For him, this was 'exactly as in the good old times, when Kostomarov, Kulish and Draho-manov renounced the state aspirations of the nation, harnessing it to the cart of foreign state thought'.¹¹⁴⁶ Another article in *Zahrava* dealt with Hrushevskyyi's attacks on the non-socialist youth for ignoring class interests and only striving towards Ukrainian statehood. The historian's criticism caused particular indignation among young Ukrainians, who had respected him as a national hero. *Zahrava*, referring to Hrushevskyyi's own leading role during the revolution, protested that 'if Hrushevskyyi accuses the youth that it does not want to be interested in party life and only wants "the Ukraine" without parties then this is exactly because at the head of the parties stood people who did not have clear goals and in the course of a number of years flew

1146 *Zahrava*, 1 December 1923, No.17, p.277.

from left to right and back again with their “progressive” and “revolutionary” oscillations’.¹¹⁴⁷ Placed against the background of inconsistency during the revolution, the conversion to Sovietophilism was but one further about-turn characteristic of party politics. For the far right it was a further example of the redundancy of such politics and the necessity of subordinating everything to the national cause.

The Ukrainian integral nationalists also argued that the future Ukrainian state must be based on a genuinely Ukrainian ideology; consequently, the Ukraine must rely on its own forces for its liberation. *Zahrava* argued that the Sovietophiles followed a foreign ‘state tradition’ and undermined the unity of the nation; it was an example of exactly how not to achieve a united, liberated Ukraine: ‘The fist always impresses villains and phrases, fools. For this reason it is possible to find among us so many supporters of Soviet politicians, who have such a mighty fist and such beautiful phrases about the “self-determination of nations” on their lips. But we must put an end to such foolery as quickly as possible. Unity – this means common action which neither recognises the status quo here or there, which does not dig a chasm between parts of the one and the same nation. Unity means the nursing of one’s own, not a foreign, state tradition; it means one tactic and one front of the whole nation’.¹¹⁴⁸ *Zahrava* interpreted the reliance on outside forces as a sign of psychological weakness and Sovietophilism as an expression of despair. For example, in one article, Dontsov quoted an article from *Visti VUTsK*, the organ of the government in Kharkiv, which claimed that as a result of the failure of attempts with foreign help to overthrow the Soviet regime the emigration was beginning to rethink its position on the Bolshevik regime. From these he concluded that ‘those who do not think about the liberation of the Ukraine without foreign help are beginning with thoughts about the revision of their positions. This is the political basis of our “*smenovekhovshchyna*”: psychospiritual tiredness and exhaustion which cannot come to terms with the thought of a long struggle’.¹¹⁴⁹

The far right’s disillusionment with the pre-war nationalism, socialism and gradualist politics stemmed from the failure of those brought up in these tradi-

1147 *Zahrava*, 1 February 1924, No.3, p.39.

1148 *Zahrava*, 1 April 1923, No.1, p.27.

1149 *Zahrava*, 1 December 1923, No.17, p.277.

tions to create a Ukrainian state during the revolutions of 1917-21. Many of those, like Hrushevskyy and Vynnychenko, who were involved in these attempts exacerbated their crimes in the eyes of the nationalists by turning to the Soviet regime. It provided the far right with further evidence of the bankruptcy of party and class politics and the failure to rely on one's own forces. 'Integral nationalism' did not appear in response to Sovietophilism. However, Sovietophilism provided part of the ideological landscape in the emigration which enabled its spread.

By the end of the 1920s, Ukrainian Sovietophilism, in the sense of non-Bolshevik support of Ukrainian Soviet system, had virtually disappeared. The 'integral nationalism' of Dontsov and his supporters had come to dominate the emigration. It was no accident that the rise of the far right was paralleled by the decline of Sovietophilism. Sovietophilism fundamentally weakened the left in the emigration. Chapters Three and Four described how it split the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, the two left-wing parties which had been prominent during the Ukrainian revolution. Many from the Sovietophile camp returned to the Ukraine. This reduced the number of socialists in the emigration, decreasing the number of opponents to 'integral nationalism'. However, even after the return of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR, the Socialist Revolutionaries repeatedly faced the threat of further schism, as the SR defections to the Soviet camp in the mid-1920s show. Vynnychenko's oscillations between condemnation of the regime in the Ukraine and praise deprived him of any authority in the emigration.¹¹⁵⁰ Socialists who worked with Vynnychenko were tarred with the brush of Sovietophilism through their mere association with the writer. For example, in March 1924 *Zahrava* suggested that Mykyta Shapoval, like Vynnychenko, 'refuses to fight for independence and is looking for something positive from the Russian occupying regime',¹¹⁵¹ despite the fact that Shapoval had always been a convinced opponent of the Sovietophile tendency within Ukrainian socialism. The reputation of the left, which had been severely damaged by the failure to create a Ukrainian state between 1917-21, was further harmed by its association with Sovietophilism.

1150 See the sarcasm heaped on Vynnychenko in *Zahrava*, 1 April 1923, No.1, p.13.

1151 *Zahrava*, 15 March 1924, No.6, p.87.

With reference to Sovietophilism, the sociologist Vic Satzewich has suggested that the 'deep divisions and disagreements about the ancestral homeland, the purpose of being in the diaspora and the interpretation of developments in the Soviet Ukraine' raises the question of whether one can really talk about a single Ukrainian diaspora which saw itself as part of the same imagined community.¹¹⁵² However, he misses the fact that both opponents and supporters of the Soviet Ukraine were taking part in the same debate about the future of their native country. They may have had different visions of the political structures which should exist in their homeland, but they were still talking about the same homeland. This was a point explicitly addressed by Ukrainian Sovietophiles in their writings, who tried to dispel the impression that the Soviet system was alien to the Ukraine. For example, *Boritesia-poborete!* sought to present the Soviet Ukraine as compatible with the Ukrainian tradition of populism, while *Ukrainski visti* depicted the country as the successor to Rus, the Galician-Volhynian principality and the Zaporozhian Sich. Equally, the anti-Sovietophile writings did not describe the Sovietophiles as external enemies (such as the Russians or the Poles), but rather as traitors within their own ranks. For this very reason the opponents of the Soviet system saw Sovietophilism as dangerous and rejected it so completely.

1152 Satzewich, *Ukrainian Diaspora*, p.85.

Conclusions

The Development and Importance of Ukrainian Sovietophilism

In his seminal study on the rise of integral nationalism in the Ukrainian emigration, Alexander Motyl wrote that the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists was not the only political group to exhibit the characteristics of the 'turn to the right': 'A xenophobic hatred of the Ukraine's national enemies, in particular the Russians and the Poles, a tendency to think in exclusively national terms, the desire for all-Ukrainian political and social unity and for the abolition of unnecessary party and class strife, and the recognition of the need for strong leadership and some degree of coordination were notions which also figured prominently in the post-war political thought of virtually the entire Ukrainian emigration, including the UNR, ZUNR, V. Vynnychenko, M. Shapoval, S. Vityk and many others'.¹¹⁵³ This work has sought to argue that quite a few of those who appear in Motyl's list did not possess all the attributes he ascribes to them. Though Motyl is undoubtedly correct to say that the predominant ideological trend in the Ukrainian emigration was 'integral nationalism', there were also those who resisted the seduction of the right. They either reaffirmed the unity of national and social liberation, or saw their national goals being realised under a left-wing regime in a federal union with Russia. For many, this meant a 'turn to the left': whereas during the revolution they had rejected Bolshevism and the Soviet state, now they supported it, albeit in their own way and for their own reasons. Support for the Soviet system did not always mean an enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks, and even those who defended the Bolsheviks were often critical of at least some of their actions or parts of their ideology. Nevertheless, their position had clearly changed.

This phenomenon, Ukrainian Sovietophilism, had two distinct phases in the 1920s. In the early period, lasting between 1919 and 1923, the Sovietophiles were mainly émigrés from the Ukrainian lands ruled by the Romanovs before

¹¹⁵³ Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, pp.172-3.

the war. Above all they came from the two parties which had played a leading role during the revolution – the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party. Many had already become prominent within Ukrainian society before the war, in particular Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi. They supported the Soviet system because they believed that the Bolsheviks were the leaders of the international revolution. Though the two groups adopted their position before the Polish invasion of the Soviet Ukraine, much of their activity coincided with the Polish-Soviet war: at this time not only did it seem likely that the revolution could be transported to the rest of Europe; the Red Army march into Eastern Galicia also promised the unification of the province with the rest of the Ukraine. However, the national question was interpreted differently by the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR and the Foreign Group of the UKP. Although it was not the only matter in which they believed the Bolsheviks were making mistakes, the Socialist Revolutionaries showed their concern about the failings of the Bolsheviks' in this area. It was, therefore, one of the questions which encouraged the SRs to maintain their critical distance from the Bolsheviks. By contrast, the national question was often accorded secondary importance in the propagandistic writings of the Foreign Group of the UKP: socialism, they argued, must be constructed first; after that, national tensions would automatically be resolved. Sometimes the members of the Foreign Group did not mention the Ukrainian issue at all, and when they did, they praised the Soviet regime for making improvements. However, the national question was not unimportant to them. When Vynnychenko travelled to Moscow and Kharkiv, he was above all disappointed by the Bolsheviks' attitude to and treatment of the Ukraine, although he was also angered by their failings as socialists.

Far from turning to the right, and placing the good of the nation above that of class and party, the early Sovietophiles reiterated that the goals of national and social liberation were intertwined. However, they did not simply repeat their pre-war ideology, but rather reinterpreted it. Now the Soviets were the basic political unit through which social liberation would be achieved. Equally, instead of promulgating national hatred against Russians, the early Sovietophiles advocated the achievement of Ukrainian national goals within a union

of Soviet republics with Russia. The federalist concept, which had dominated Ukrainian political thought before 1917, was revived, albeit in Soviet form; therefore, Ivan Rudnytsky is wrong to state that 'Bolshevik aggression delivered the death blow to this traditional Ukrainian ideology'.¹¹⁵⁴ Again, the Sovietophiles sought to reformulate the pre-war federalist heritage by presenting the union of Soviet republics as a different form of state organisation to 'bourgeois' federalism. However, the differences were only vaguely defined – 'bourgeois' federalism was exploitative; a union of Soviet republics was not; in effect the renunciation of the claim to a fully independent state entity was a call for federation. Therefore, far from being dragged along in the 'turn to the right', the early Sovietophiles followed a very different path.

By the beginning of 1923, this form of Sovietophilism was waning. The Foreign Group and the Foreign Delegation had split and most of those who were willing to return had done so. However, the March decision on the future of Galicia and the introduction of Ukrainianisation revived and reshaped Ukrainian Sovietophilism. Though there were still Eastern Ukrainians who supported the Bolsheviks, Sovietophilism became a primarily West Ukrainian, especially East Galician, phenomenon. These later Sovietophiles saw the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as an embryonic Ukrainian nation state and hoped that the Bolsheviks would help them drive the Poles from the West Ukrainian lands. Arguments in this vein were put by Ievhen Petrushevych, Mykhailo Lozynskyi, Iuliian Bachynskyi, Stepan Rudnytskyi and the Paris paper *Ukrainski visti*. For some this was a geopolitical decision – the Western Ukrainians sought allies against the Poles, and after the West had supported Poland in the East Galician question, they turned to the only possible partner left. However, many Western Ukrainians only considered the Bolsheviks to be a suitable ally because they thought that Ukrainianisation showed a change in attitude among the Bolsheviks towards the national question, such that Eastern Galicia had nothing to fear if it came under their rule. Often they required time to witness the improvements brought about by Ukrainianisation, and in many cases the new policy did not win converts to Sovietophilism until the mid-1920s. For example, Lozynskyi's pamphlet from 1924, *Z novym Rokom 1924*,

1154 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Fourth Universal and its Ideological Antecedents', in id., *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Harvard: HURI, 1987, pp.389-416 (p.407).

still viewed the policy with some scepticism, and he only started singing the its praises later.

Although these later Sovietophiles were attracted to the Soviet Ukraine for broadly the same reason, they did have different stances on the social question. The contributors to *Ukrainski visti*, while concentrating on the Bolsheviks' nationalities policy, praised the construction of a socialist society taking place in the Soviet Union. Others, for example Stepan Rudnytskyi, took a more neutral stance towards socialism, saying they would support the creation of a united Ukraine, whatever political system reigned within it. Ievhen Petrushevych seems to have adapted his social ideas to suit his Soviet benefactors, while Lozynskyi, writing during the period of the NEP, presented the Soviet agricultural policy as the fulfilment of traditional Ukrainian peasant goals. Bachynskyi believed the Bolsheviks were constructing a bourgeois economy, which, following the traditional Marxist scheme of history, was the prerequisite to the construction of socialism. Thus, even those who, like Petrushevych, turned to the Bolsheviks for primarily tactical reasons, had to come to terms with the content of Bolshevik ideology, either by changing their own social ideas, or interpreting Bolshevik aims in such a way that it accorded with their own beliefs. Consequently, even after Ukrainianisation and the March decision, Sovietophilism was, unsurprisingly, strongest on the left of the Ukrainian emigration.

Nova hromada represents a crossover point between the first and second periods of Ukrainian Sovietophilism in the 1920s. From summer 1922 onwards, the Soviet authorities sought collaborators for the journal among the East Ukrainian emigration and hoped that it would be a tool to bring about the dissolution of the 'Petliurite' emigration. However, as a result of the difficulties in finding a stable cadre around which to base the publication, the Bolsheviks turned to Western Ukrainians for the journal, most prominently Semen Vityk, who became the editor. The decision on Eastern Galicia had only recently been made and Ukrainians from the Polish lands were especially susceptible to the Bolsheviks' overtures. Although *Nova hromada* did cover matters concerning the East Ukrainian emigration, there was a noticeable shift to West Ukrainian questions. As an organ which had been founded by the Soviet authorities, and which was subject to close supervision, *Nova hromada* praised

unreservedly both the Bolsheviks' construction of socialism and their nationalities policy.

The unifying element in all the Sovietophiles' thought, whether they belonged to the early or late period, was that they advocated a similar course of action – return or immigration to the Ukraine, and cooperation with the Bolsheviks in rebuilding the country. All the Sovietophile émigrés felt that the emigration was impotent; even if the émigré call for further struggle against the Bolsheviks was successful, which they doubted, this could only bring more harm to the Ukraine; only in the Soviet Ukraine could they make a contribution to the cultural and economic life of their people. Moreover, there were common arguments in the thought of the Sovietophiles. One argument which was repeated throughout the 1920s was that the social structure of the Ukraine, which was a land of the 'labouring masses', ensured that the Bolsheviks' social policy would help the Ukraine nationally – for example, by removing the non-Ukrainian bourgeoisie and landowners.¹¹⁵⁵ All the Sovietophiles portrayed the Bolsheviks as the only alternative to a Russian restoration under the aegis of the Entente, and they all shared a hatred of Petliura.

There were also exceptions to this periodisation. Some Eastern Galicians did support the Soviet regime before 1923. These included Volodymyr Levynskiy, who led the Foreign Group of the UKP while Vynnychenko was in Moscow and Kharkiv, and Oleksander Badan, who travelled with Vynnychenko on that mission. The ZUNR started secret discussions with the Bolsheviks in the hope of gaining help long before the decision on Galicia. There were also Eastern Ukrainians who became Sovietophile after 1923. Ilko Borshchak, the editor of *Ukrainski visti*, was from the Kherson gubernia. Many members of the UPSR in Prague defected to the Soviet camp after the introduction of Ukrainianisation. They stated that they had always admired the Bolsheviks as socialists, but had not joined the ruling party due to its failings in the nationalities policy – Ukrainianisation, however, had changed this. Even those who had fallen out with the Bolsheviks during the early period of Sovietophilism continued to exhibit Sovietophile traits after 1923. Mykhailo Hrushevskiy returned to the Ukraine in order to take part in the development of Ukrainian

¹¹⁵⁵ This argument was not, however, quite so present in the work of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR, who stressed that the Bolsheviks could not understand the Ukraine due its peasant culture.

culture under the conditions of Ukrainianisation. Vynnychenko, too, flirted with Sovietophilism in the mid-1920s and early 1930s.

In addition, there were those whose reasons for turning to the Bolsheviks do not easily fit the dichotomy between revolutionary and nationalist Sovietophilism. There were motivations for reconciliation which had nothing to do with politics, for example the difficult physical and mental conditions imposed by émigré life, which certainly affected Hrushevskyyi and Ivan Kobza, and probably many of the interned UNR soldiers. There were also those who sought Bolshevik support because the new rulers in Moscow and Kharkiv could provide them with funds, as in the case of Morkotun and the Ukrainian National Council, and perhaps the Hrekov group as well. A further stimulus for the growth of Sovietophilism in the Ukrainian emigration was disappointment in Petliura, who had allied with the Poles and given up Ukrainian land to their rule; indeed, as mentioned above, Petliura was a hate figure for all the Ukrainian Sovietophiles. The Hrekov group's statement of support for the Soviet Ukraine also presented the Soviet Ukraine as an embryonic nation state, in much the same language common after 1923; however, the group disintegrated before the Sovietophile journal was founded, suggesting that prior to the March decision and the introduction of Ukrainianisation it was difficult to cooperate with the Soviet Ukrainian authorities on national grounds alone. One must remember that Morkotun, Kobza and Hrekov did not bring out a Sovietophile publication; all of the pro-Soviet journals or pamphlets which appeared in the 1920s fall into the categories outlined above: before appealing to the world revolution, and thereafter concentrating on the support for Ukrainian culture and statehood.

Within the West Ukrainian lands occupied by Poland there was a similar trend to that evident in the emigration. Before 1923, Ukrainian Marxists were most clearly attracted by the Bolsheviks. The Communist Party of Eastern Galicia and the Marxist Russophiles adopted a pro-Soviet position before 1923, while the Galician Social Democrats had expressed admiration for the Bolsheviks, despite continuing to cooperate with non-socialist Ukrainian parties. The decision on Galicia convinced some waverers on the left, for example the Galician Social Democrats, to become Sovietophile; the progress of Ukrainianisation persuaded others, above all Selsoiuz. At the same time,

Ukrainianisation also made the Soviet Ukraine attractive for those indifferent or hostile to socialism. Most noticeably, the UNDO, which continued to condemn the Bolsheviks as occupiers of the Ukraine, hoped that as a result of Ukrainianisation the regime in the Ukraine might evolve and eventually overwhelm the Bolsheviks, leading to the creation of a united Ukrainian state. Again, the UNDO required a couple of years after the introduction of the policy, by which time the measure had started showing results, before it could see Ukrainianisation as positive.

The second period of Ukrainian Sovietophilism remained strong while the Bolsheviks pursued Ukrainianisation; however, the increasing attacks on the policy from the mid-1920s onwards made it ever harder for Ukrainians to maintain a pro-Soviet position which was not explicitly Communist. The purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and Ukrainian Communists, the return to requisitioning, collectivisation and dekulakisation, and finally the terrible famine of 1932-3, gradually killed off support for the Soviet Ukraine among those who had seen it as the beginnings of a nation state. Vynnychenko was one of the few who could still find positive things to say about the Bolsheviks, but he was on the margins of émigré politics and did not organise any pro-Soviet groups. Those who consistently maintained a Sovietophile position had to defend the attacks on Ukrainianisation and the Ukrainian intelligentsia and National Communists who had carried it out. As the 1920s drew on, *Ukrainski visti* was forced to make about-turns on a number of issues. In the early 1930s, Antin Krushelnytskyi simply accepted the Bolshevik line on the SVU trials, the end of Ukrainianisation and the Five Year Plan. Indeed, a considerable change in emphasis is noticeable between Krushelnytskyi's Sovietophile writing in the mid-1920s and in the early 1930s. In his contributions to *Nova hromada*, Krushelnytskyi had argued that the Soviet regime helped the Ukraine through its promotion of Ukrainian culture and education. Although he continued to praise the apparent achievements in this area in *Novi shliakhy*, he argued here that the Soviet regime had benefited the Ukraine above all through its pursuit of industrialisation. In this way, he adapted his Sovietophilism to the Ukraine of the Five Year Plan.

These developments were also, to a certain extent, reflected in the Bolsheviks' position towards Sovietophilism. When the groups led by Vynnychenko

and Hrushevskyi turned to the Soviet Ukrainian government with proposals of cooperation and requests to return, the Bolsheviks hoped that by attracting these prominent national figures to their camp they could increase support for their regime in the Ukraine. At this time, the Bolsheviks had only recently conquered the Ukraine and were beginning to realise that in order to solidify their rule in the country they required more local support. In addition, in the middle of 1920, the Bolsheviks were still fighting Poland and the UNR in the Ukraine; Ukrainian opposition to the Bolsheviks could have hindered this campaign. For the rest of the 1920s the Bolsheviks continued to look at the Sovietophiles as a mere instrument of their foreign policy, although the purpose of this tool changed with time. By mid-1922, the immediate threat posed to the Soviet Ukraine by Poland and internal insurrection had diminished. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks remained worried about the 'Petliurite' emigration, especially the UNR military units interned in Poland. They hoped to use the 'Ukrainian *Smena vekh*' to bring about the dissolution of the military emigration and for this reason sought to found a 'Ukrainian *Nakanune*'. In the mid-1920s, the emphasis shifted to undermining the Polish state by encouraging opposition among its non-Polish, above all Ukrainian, population; Kharkiv even expressed its willingness to support petty bourgeois organisations in order to achieve this goal. This remained the main concern for the rest of the decade. Throughout the 1920s the Bolsheviks refused to countenance the support of groups which acted independently of its wishes. When discussing the Ukrainian 'Change of Signposts', the Soviet authorities repeated again and again the fear that support for the Sovietophiles could rebound on them. After the introduction of Ukrainianisation, Sovietophilism was also seen as a means of attracting educated Ukrainian cadres to the country in order to meet the shortfall there. Despite these changes in emphasis, one point remained constant in Soviet policy making: the Sovietophiles were always seen by the Bolsheviks as a implement for the realisation of their domestic and foreign policy.

The early Sovietophiles understood their relationship with the Bolsheviks very differently. Both Vynnychenko and Hrushevskyi hoped to cooperate with the Bolsheviks as equal partners. They began their negotiations with the Bolsheviks on the assumption that the Bolsheviks, as committed socialists, were

primarily concerned with the good of the revolution; if they could be convinced that their actions harmed that revolution they would be prepared to include other pro-Soviet socialists in government or in a coalition. The Bolsheviks and the early Sovietophiles therefore had irreconcilable views of their relationship. This led to the disagreements which ended the attempts of the Foreign Delegation and Foreign Group to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. In the first case, this signalled the end of the political activity of the Foreign Delegation, and in the second, it split the Foreign Group and provoked *Nova doba's* campaign against the Bolsheviks.

All the groups and individuals that adopted a pro-Soviet position from this time onwards accepted that in their relationship with the Soviet Union, they were in the subordinate role. There were no more negotiations. The Sovietophiles had to follow Soviet instructions if they were to receive Soviet funding. They might make suggestions, but these were often rejected. Nevertheless, they did have their own goals, which they hoped to achieve through support for the Soviet regime, but which did not entirely correspond to those of the Bolsheviks. This is very clear when one looks at the different interpretations of Ukrainianisation. The Bolsheviks' official justification for the introduction of Ukrainianisation was to weaken Ukrainian nationalism. They proclaimed that Ukrainian nationalism was a reaction to Great Russian chauvinism; therefore in order to reduce the attractiveness of Ukrainian nationalism, it was necessary to combat Great Russian chauvinism and promote the Ukrainian culture and language. Many Sovietophiles, however, saw Ukrainianisation as a good in its own right. Far from hoping for a reduction in Ukrainian national consciousness, a lot of Ukrainian Sovietophiles wanted it to grow. Though these Sovietophiles supported the Bolshevik policy, they often did so for reasons directly contradicting the considerations behind the policy's introduction. Consequently, the relationship between Sovietophiles and the Bolsheviks stood on very shaky foundations. As opposition to the policy within the Bolshevik party grew, reinforced by an ever stronger perception among some sections of the party that *korenizatsiia* was strengthening, not weakening, non-Russian nationalism, the Soviet leadership introduced measures to curb Ukrainianisation. As the 1920s drew on, an ever greater number of Sovietophiles became disappointed in the situation in the Soviet Ukraine.

These are two of the reasons why Sovietophilism had pretty much disappeared from the intellectual scene in the Ukrainian emigration in Europe by the beginning of the 1930s. Another can be found within the nature of Sovietophile ideology itself. The Ukrainian *smenovkehovtsy* called on émigrés to return to the Ukraine and take part in the reconstruction of the Ukraine. Many heeded their own cry and went back to their homeland, reducing the number of Sovietophiles in the emigration. The realisation of the ideology of Sovietophilism therefore brought about the evaporation of the movement itself in the emigration. The very nature of the movement condemned it to a short life.

Despite all these problems, Sovietophilism was an important feature of inter-war political thought, and an understanding of it provides us with a more complete picture, not only of intellectual developments in the Ukrainian emigration in the 1920s, but also of Ukrainian intellectual history as a whole. The 'turn to the right' described by Motyl was a more complicated process than previously thought. Firstly, Sovietophilism contributed to the 'turn to the right' by weakening the émigré left. It split the émigré offshoots of the two most important parties of the revolutionary period, which had both been socialist. Many supporters of the Soviet regime returned to the Ukraine, reducing the number of socialists in the emigration. Equally, Sovietophilism helped further discredit socialism in the eyes of many émigrés, who had already been disillusioned by the perceived failures of the Ukrainian socialist parties during the revolution: Sovietophilism gave them the impression that socialism naturally led to Sovietophilism, and thus collaboration with Russia, the Ukraine's national enemy. Secondly, neither the 'turn to the right' nor the 'decline of the left' was a simple, linear process, going in only one direction. By 1923, it seemed that Sovietophilism was disappearing; however, the March decision and the introduction of Ukrainianisation made Sovietophilism a viable alternative to integral nationalism. Indeed, as the analysis of *Nova hromada* in Chapter Five sought to prove, many of the contributors to *Nova hromada* were drawn to Sovietophilism for similar reasons to those attracted to integral nationalism: above all in their disappointment following the March decision and the rejection of the ideals of the pre-war generation. In mid-1923, therefore, a resurgence in Sovietophilism took place. Even the UVO, whose creation and development constitutes part of the 'turn to the right', discussed collaboration

with the Bolsheviks. It was only with the onset of the 1930s that it is really possible to say that the doctrine had lost its attraction for Ukrainians outside the Soviet Ukraine.

Sovietophilism's fluctuating level of support has caused some confusion in the existing literature on the nature of the movement. Some historians have mistakenly asserted that Prague was the centre of Ukrainian Sovietophilism.¹¹⁵⁶ It is true that there were Sovietophiles in Prague: the Association of Student Citizens of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was based there; many of the Socialist Revolutionaries who became pro-Soviet after the introduction of Ukrainianisation also lived in the Czechoslovakian capital, where after the return of the Viennese SRs to the Ukraine the UPSR had had its stronghold; there were also a number of academics at the Ukrainian Free University who were pro-Soviet, for example Stepan Rudnytskyi. However, on the basis of this book's findings, Vienna was really the major centre of Ukrainian Sovietophilism. Three pro-Soviet journals were published there, *Nova doba*, *Boritiesia-poborete!* and *Nova hromada*. The Hrekov group also appeared in Vienna. It is rather strange, therefore, that Prague is so often identified as the centre of Ukrainian Sovietophilism.

Such claims rest on two reports by foreign representatives of the Soviet Ukraine, one from February 1923, the other from May 1926, both of which make this assessment.¹¹⁵⁷ The report from 1923 was written after the dissolution of the *Nova doba* and *Boritiesia-poborete!* groups, at the low point of Sovietophilism, when the Soviet authorities were having problems finding collaborators for the 'Ukrainian *Nakanune*'. One of the few Sovietophile organisations still in existence, therefore, was the student group in Prague, who are explicitly mentioned in the text. The document from 1926 was penned after the closure of *Nova hromada*, but before the appearance of *Ukrainski visti* in Paris. Again, the stable Sovietophile organisations at that time were in Prague – the Sovietophile students and SRs. Therefore, the statements about Prague as the centre of Sovietophilism do not reflect the overall picture of the movement, but are only true of the moment in which they were written. The

1156 See, for example, Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, p.20.

1157 Report by Kaliuzhnyi of the state of the Ukrainian emigration, 06.02.1923, TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1735 ark.13; report on Ukrainian émigré groups, 01.05.1926, f.1 op.20 spr.2238 ark.2.

Sovietophile student organisation was one of the longest-lived in the emigration, partially due to their failure to return to the Soviet Ukraine, and for this reason for most of the 1920s there was a pro-Soviet presence in the city. It is nevertheless clearly inaccurate to speak of Prague as the centre of Ukrainian Sovietophilism.

The failure to track the development of Ukrainian Sovietophilism throughout the 1920s has also led too many writers to describe Sovietophilism simply as a response to the March decision and the introduction of Ukrainianisation,¹¹⁵⁸ failing to see that it had existed as long as the Ukrainian emigration itself. Consequently, Sovietophilism has been portrayed as a movement motivated by national concerns, albeit, in the eyes of Ukrainian nationalists, misguided ones; the Sovietophiles who turned to the Bolsheviks for the good of the international socialist revolution have been largely ignored, or their socialist motives played down. For example, the fact that Hrushevskyyi returned to the Soviet Ukraine in 1924, after the introduction of Ukrainianisation, has been interpreted by those who have not read his writings in *Boritiesia-poborete!* as evidence that he went back simply as a response to the events of 1923, forgetting that he actually first adopted a Sovietophile stance in 1920.¹¹⁵⁹ This work has sought to overcome this deficiency by looking at Sovietophilism from its emergence in the early 1920s to its decline at the end of the decade.

A proper understanding of Sovietophilism should also change some of the more general assumptions about the Ukrainian intellectual tradition of populism and its relationship to Communism. Rudnytsky is right to claim that the inter-war period saw a decline in populism. He also correctly observes that repression in the Soviet Ukraine, and the rise of the extreme right and left in the West were the reasons for this.¹¹⁶⁰ However, to this one must add that many of the traditional populist beliefs provided a starting point for a conversion either to a Sovietophile position or to that of Communism. *Boritiesia-poborete!*, *Nova hromada* and Mykhailo Lozynskyyi especially sought to show how the Soviet regime addressed long-established Ukrainian concerns, both

1158 Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy*, pp.174, 196-7; Mace, *Communism*, p.92; Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, pp.19-20; Shapoval, *Liudyna i systema*, p.120.

1159 Mace, *Communism*, p.92; Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, p.542.

1160 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Trends in Ukrainian Political Thought', in id., *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Harvard: HURI, 1987, pp.91-122 (p.98).

in the social and the national spheres. The decline of populism was facilitated by the ease with which one could move from Ukrainian populism to Sovietophilism and/or Communism.

This study has concentrated on the importance of Ukrainian Sovietophilism for the intellectual history of the Ukrainian emigration. However, it is also worth noting that Sovietophilism had a profound influence on the history of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. One of the Bolsheviks' aims in supporting the return of former Ukrainian opponents of the regime and the immigration of East Galician intellectuals had been to find a qualified cadre to carry out Ukrainianisation. Equally, those who travelled to the Ukraine hoped to take part in the social, economic and cultural reconstruction of the country. This indeed happened. Almost all of the returnees took up posts in the Soviet Ukrainian administration or the academic institutions of the country, and in this way made profound contributions to the economic and cultural development of the Ukraine. To name quickly but a few examples, Hrushevskyy became head of the Archeographic Commission and the historical section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and professor of modern Ukrainian history in Kyiv – in these capacities he oversaw the emergence of a whole new generation of Ukrainian historians. Rudnytskyi set up the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Geography and Cartography and made significant contributions to the study of Ukrainian geography. From this point of view, both the Bolsheviks and the Sovietophiles can be seen to have achieved the aims which they had set out for themselves.

However, in his fascinating study of nationalism and nationalities policy in the Soviet Union between 1923 and 1939, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, Terry Martin underlines how the activity of the Ukrainian *smenovekhovtsy* actually contributed to the abandonment of Ukrainianisation. Many Bolsheviks viewed the *smenovekhovtsy* with suspicion. The *smenovekhovtsy* were non-Bolsheviks who had, and in many cases still, professed the 'bourgeois' ideology of nationalism. In 1926, Lazar Kaganovich pointed to the number of former UNR politicians at large in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic: 'In Kharkov and Kiev we have a whole series of governments. For instance, Golubovich'¹¹⁶¹

1161 A reference to Vsevolod Holubovych, a member of the UPSR who served as prime minister and foreign minister of the UNR between January and April 1918; he was

walks about perfectly freely. These are people who not only have passed through the school of political battle but also served in a series of governments. Take Hrushevskiy, who had legalized himself as a *smenovekhovets*. Kaganovich had met Hrushevskiy and other returnees, and their self-confidence convinced him that they had to be placed under strict surveillance.¹¹⁶² The findings of the GPU confirmed that the *smenovekhovtsy* represented a danger. According to one GPU report from 1926, the Ukrainian nationalists had, following their failure to overthrow the Bolsheviks by arms, been forced to adopt the new tactic of 'cultural work'. 'Ukrainianisation', argued the report, 'is used to place supporters of the national idea in all the important parts of the state organism. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was created, which is a powerful stronghold of nationalism and an excellent weapon for agitation. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences has gathered around itself a compact mass of formerly important figures from the UNR. In general, the representatives of Ukrainian nationalism work indefatigably in order to inculcate nationalist feelings in the masses. They think that the Ukrainian people lost its struggle for liberation because of its insufficient national unity, and are trying to correct this basic deficiency'.¹¹⁶³

Therefore, argues Martin, elements of the Soviet state and Bolshevik party came to view Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo* not only as an opportunity to be exploited, but also as a threat in that it would help spread nationalist views, both in the Ukraine as a whole, and, as the Khvylovyi affair proved, among members of the party. As Chapter Five has argued, this possibility had already been discussed by the Soviet Ukrainian representatives abroad during the debate around the creation of a 'Ukrainian *Nakanune*'. With the *smenovekhovtsy* playing an ever greater role, this feeling spread through many of the organs of state and party, but above all in the GPU. Thus, the perception of *smenovekhovstvo* as a Trojan Horse, trying to smuggle Ukrainian nationalism into the Soviet Ukrainian Republic through participation in

deposed by the Skoropadskiy coup. In 1921, he was one of the defendants in the show trial of the leadership of the UPSR, but was soon amnestied and until his second arrest in 1931 was chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.212-3.

1162 Quoted in Terry Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, pp.223-4.

1163 Shapoval, ' "On Ukrainian Separatism" ', p.293. See also Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, p.224.

Ukrainianisation, was one of the factors which led to the abandonment of the policy.¹¹⁶⁴ In this way, Ukrainian *smenovekhovstvo*, like Russian *smenovekhovstvo*, became part of the political rhetoric within intra-party debates on the future of the Soviet Union. In the Ukrainian case, it was used by opponents of Ukrainianisation to discredit the policy and those who were responsible for carrying it out.

Russian and Ukrainian *Smenovekhovstvo*

The fact that the Ukrainian and Russian returnees suffered a similar fate in the Soviet Union should not come as a surprise. The Bolsheviks saw the Ukrainian Sovietophiles as part of the same phenomenon as the Russian *smenovekhovtsy*. This is most evident in the fact that most Bolsheviks referred to those Ukrainian émigrés wanting to return to the Ukraine or cooperate with the regime as *smenovekhovtsy*. Bolsheviks in Russia and the Ukraine hoped to use the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Ukrainian Sovietophiles for similar purposes. Lenin and Trotsky believed that the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* could be useful in their attempts to encourage 'bourgeois specialists' to work with the regime and bring about the disintegration of the emigration. For this reason, they funded *Nakanune* and allowed it to be distributed inside Soviet Russia. Similarly, the Ukrainian Politburo hoped to convince Ukrainian-speaking specialists to return home and cooperate with the party, to increase support for the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine as a whole and bring about the disintegration of Petliura's army interned in Poland.

However, there were differences. There are indications that the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were more ready to allow émigrés to return than their colleagues in the RKP. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the separate Ukrainian amnesty, granted in April 1922, went further than the general amnesty announced by the government in Moscow in that it was extended to Ukrainian officers. This may have been one of the reasons why the Russian Politburo criticised the Ukrainian amnesty as a 'mistake' and called upon the government in Kharkiv to limit its implementation by issuing a special instruction.¹¹⁶⁵ The Ukraine, of course, had a much smaller pool of intellectuals to draw from than did Russia,

1164 Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, pp.224-5.

1165 Dinerštejn, 'Feindbeobachtung', p.414.

meaning that the return of émigrés, and the immigration of well educated East Galicians, was of greater importance for the Ukrainian government. The introduction of *korenizatsiia* and Ukrainianisation heightened the differences. The stated aim of the policy was to combat the elements of 'Great Russian chauvinism' which the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* so admired, and it signalled the beginning of the Bolshevik campaign against Russian *smenovekhovstvo*. At the same time, the new policy heightened the need to attract the support of Ukrainian intellectuals among both the East and West Ukrainian emigration. The Czechoslovakian government, which in the mid-1920s was trying to encourage émigrés on its territory to return to their home country, believed that Russian and Ukrainian émigrés were treated differently by their respective governments: 'Interested parties welcome those intellectual émigrés who wish to return to the Ukraine. This is the result of the rise of Ukrainian nationalism and the reduction, which is clearly felt, of the number of intellectuals in the country'.¹¹⁶⁶

Perhaps another reason for the different treatment of the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and the Ukrainian Sovietophiles can be found in the ideological differences between the two groups. Most of the Russians praised Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union for their services to the Russian nation, while they welcomed the Bolsheviks' retreat from Communism. In contrast, the Ukrainians either emphasised the Soviet republics' leadership of the international revolution or claimed that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was turning into a genuinely Ukrainian state. Though the Ukrainian Sovietophiles believed that the Bolshevik party did contain 'Great Russian chauvinist' elements, they argued that such people were in a minority in the party and that this tendency was in decline. Thus on certain key issues, the Russian and Ukrainian Sovietophiles had directly contradicting interpretations on the nature of the Soviet regime. The Ukrainians, especially those who advocated reconciliation in the name of the world revolution, believed that the regime was genuinely socialist, whereas the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* stressed that Bolshevism and Communism were different. The Russians saw the concessions to the non-Russian peoples as a clever ruse to ensure that the non-Russian territories

1166 Quoted in Catherine Andreyev and Ivan Svický, *Russia Abroad. Prague and the Russian Diaspora 1918-1938*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004, pp.71-2.

remained within the resurgent Russian empire. In contrast, the Ukrainians had to argue that the efforts to promote Ukrainian culture were a sincere attempt to combat past Russification.

For this reason, the Ukrainians' interpretation of Bolshevik intentions often more closely represented Soviet propaganda, although it is certainly true that both the Russian and Ukrainian Sovietophiles presented to a greater or lesser degree a distorted picture of the aims of the Bolsheviks. The contributors to the Prague *Smena vekh*, and also later groups like the *Mladorossy* that hoped to adopt the Soviet form of government, claimed to be able to see an inner, hidden truth behind the outer appearance of Bolshevism, dialectically opposite to what was apparent on the surface. This allowed, indeed compelled them, to interpret the Bolsheviks, who claimed to possess an internationalist doctrine, as ardent Russian nationalists. It was an interpretation which the Russian Bolsheviks themselves rejected.¹¹⁶⁷ In contrast, the main argument put forward by the Foreign Group of the UKP and the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR chimed well with the Bolsheviks' self-image because the Bolsheviks certainly did see themselves as the leaders of international revolution. Like the *Smena vekh* group, the Ukrainian Sovietophiles after 1923 supported the Bolsheviks for national reasons, but with the difference that the Bolsheviks had proclaimed their desire to support Ukrainian culture. Certainly, as discussed above, the Sovietophiles understood the aim of the policy in a very different way to the Bolsheviks; the Sovietophiles saw Ukrainianisation as an end in itself, whereas the official Bolshevik line interpreted it as a means to reduce Ukrainian nationalism. However, on the whole they did not claim to see an inner truth to the Bolsheviks or Ukrainianisation. Instead, they simply interpreted the direction which Ukrainianisation was taking rather optimistically.

Consequently, Ukrainian Sovietophilism seems to have exercised a stronger grip on the Ukrainian emigration than did *smenovekhovstvo* on that of the Russians. The contributors to the original *Smena vekh* collection were not men of standing in Russian politics or society: Ustrialov himself denied that he had much influence in the Kolchak government, claiming that he only ever

¹¹⁶⁷ *Odinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, pp.27-8.

saw Kolchak himself at a distance in the theatre;¹¹⁶⁸ though Kliuchnikov had occupied the impressive title of foreign minister, he actually possessed very little authority within the Kolchak government.¹¹⁶⁹ Those who later joined the *Smena vekh* group were also not in the first rank of émigré society; the only really well known émigré to return was Alexei Tolstoi.¹¹⁷⁰ As the historian of Russian *smenovekhovstvo* writes, 'to be susceptible to the *smenovekhovtsy's* argumentation a most peculiar cast of mind was needed, the basic component of which was unconditional and imperialistic patriotism, mixed with elements such as economic determinism or a view of world history as "*das Weltgericht*," and a considerable amount of wishful thinking, opportunism, or an amalgam of both. Clearly, this particular combination of factors in the right proportion did not occur frequently'.¹¹⁷¹

In contrast, some of the most important figures of Ukrainian society and politics either adopted a Sovietophile position or returned to the Ukraine. In all, three heads of separate Ukrainian governments (Mykhailo Hrushevskyy, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Ievhen Petrushevych) adopted a Sovietophile position; Hrushevskyy and Vynnychenko had also made enormous contributions to the development of Ukrainian national consciousness, the former as the apparent father of modern Ukrainian historiography, the later as one of the leading writers of his generation. Many other Ukrainian Sovietophiles had held prominent party and state posts during the revolution: Pavlo Khrystiuk had been a leading member of the Central Committee of the UPSR and served as both general chancellor and minister of internal affairs in the UNR; Mykola Porsh had not only been a leading member of the USDRP, but also minister of defence and labour in the UNR; Andrii Nikovskyy had been a minister of foreign affairs and Vasyl Mazurenko had served as a minister of finance. Bachynskyy had written a seminal pre-war text widely seen as the first call for an independent Ukrainian state. Whether or not more Ukrainians actually returned than did Russians is irrelevant here; this study has not undertaken a statistical analysis of the returnees, but rather is a contribution to the history of the Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia. The point is that the

1168 Romanovskii, 'Ustrialov', p.87.

1169 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.63.

1170 Williams, ' "Changing Landmarks" ', pp.591-2.

1171 Hardeman, *Coming to Terms*, p.192.

Ukrainian Sovietophiles represented a far more important section of the Ukrainian émigré community than did their Russian counterparts.

Of course, this difference is partially a consequence of the fact that the politically active Ukrainian class was considerably smaller than its Russian equivalent. However, it also seems to indicate that the Soviet regime had more to offer Ukrainians than it did Russians. The Russian emigration was dominated by monarchists, who had an emotional attachment to the pre-war regime. With the possible exception of Skoropadskyi, this was not the case for the Ukrainian emigration: after the events of the revolutionary years 1917-21 had so raised Ukrainian expectations, there were few who could feel nostalgia for the old order. The Ukrainian émigrés therefore had less of a barrier to overcome in order to accept the Bolshevik regime than most Russian exiles. Moreover, there were many Bolshevik policies which, for those who were willing to accept that the Bolsheviks were acting in good faith, satisfied the desires of the Ukrainian emigration: the creation of a Ukrainian state in the form of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the support for the Ukrainian language and culture, and the introduction of the NEP and policies to help peasants.

For Frank Golczewski the central difference between the Russian and Ukrainian emigrations was the fact that the former directed its attention towards 'preservation' and 'continuity', while the latter saw its task as 'creation' and a 'new start'. Whereas the Russian émigrés belonged to a centuries-old culture, with a long tradition of statehood, the Ukrainians had possessed neither an established culture nor a stable state – the Ukrainians, whatever their political persuasion, therefore found themselves in the process of nation-building. Consequently, the Russians sought to safeguard their heritage for the day when the 'wreckers' of Russian culture and statehood had fallen and they could go home. In contrast, the Ukrainians hoped to realise their dream of their own state through political or cultural activity. For some, this meant the creation of émigré organisations and cooperation with Western powers like Poland or Germany.¹¹⁷² For others, it meant return to their homeland in order to take part in the construction of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The willingness of many Sovietophiles to recognise the Soviet Ukraine as a step towards Ukrainian statehood was strengthened by the fact that in modern times

¹¹⁷² Golczewski, 'Die ukrainische und die russische Emigration', pp.81-3.

they had not had their own state. The appearance of the Soviet Ukraine therefore represented a historic opportunity and as a result, the 'Change of Signposts' in the Ukrainian emigration was stronger than its Russian counterpart.

For all the differences between the Russian and Ukrainian Sovietophiles, there were certain common themes that appeared in their thought. Though they had very different motivations and political ideologies, both groups sought an answer to very similar problems. The White and the Ukrainian military campaigns against the Bolsheviks had both failed; neither the Russian or Ukrainian emigrations could hope to wield any real political influence beyond the coffee houses of Central and Western Europe, while in their home country the Bolshevik regime appeared to be taking on a milder form. Moreover, the response by the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and Ukrainian Sovietophiles was the same. They both called for reconciliation with their former enemy and return to their homeland in order to take up active work in the reconstruction of their country. The two separate movements therefore played the same role in Russian and Ukrainian politics: as an ideology which provided a bridge between the non-Bolshevik intelligentsia and the new rulers in Moscow and Kharkiv over which the Russian and Ukrainian émigrés could cross, moving from the banks of the emigration to the shores of their homeland.

One consequence of the fact that they were responding to the same situation was that both the Russians and the Ukrainians began their argument from the same starting point – that to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks could only bring more bloodshed to their countries, and, whatever the mistakes the Bolsheviks might have made, could not be justified. Nevertheless, both shared a willingness to accept a great deal of suffering and death in the name of a higher cause. Almost all the articles in the *Smena vekh* collection excused the red terror on the grounds that all events which brought great change also inflicted great destruction. Equally, Hrushevskyyi praised the Bolsheviks' ability to make the bourgeois world cower through its use of terror, while both Vynnychenko and Bachynskyyi wrote that the Bolsheviks had used violence for noble ends, namely the liberation of workers and peasants from capitalist exploitation. Of course, not only Sovietophiles were willing to defend such misery. This preparedness was perhaps a reoccurring theme in the po-

litical ideologies which appeared in the 1920s, a product of the eschatological, millenarian character of the times. However, the tension between the desire to avoid future death through war while also affirming the meaning of the suffering which their countries had already experienced, was a feature common to the thought of both the Russian *smenovekhovtsy* and Ukrainian Sovietophiles.

The Russian and Ukrainian Sovietophiles also faced a similar dilemma: that the desire to cooperate with the Bolsheviks for the good of the homeland could lead to sycophantic support for the Soviet governments. Ustrialov called on the Russian reconcilers to retain a critical distance from the Bolsheviks and condemned the *smenovekhovtsy* for their 'revolutionary romanticism'. Nevertheless, the publications of the *smenovekhovtsy* increasingly became mouthpieces for pro-Soviet propaganda and even Ustrialov himself succumbed to revolutionary romanticism in the 1930s. Equally, Hrushevskyyi and the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR sought to retain their independence from the KP(b)U. They condemned both the Foreign Group of the UKP and the *Borotbisty* for their willingness to dissolve their own organisations and merge with the Bolsheviks. Despite its initial desire to join the KP(b)U, Vynnychenko's Foreign Group was also wracked by the question of to what extent it was permissible to cooperate with the Bolsheviks while their policy was mistaken, and to what extent Communist solidarity limited criticism of one's comrades. This debate split the group. All the Sovietophile groups, whatever the details of their ideology, were faced with the problem that the Soviet Union was a regime which did not welcome criticism, even if it was well intended. In order to remain independent, Sovietophile émigrés had to abandon their Sovietophilism; in order to remain Sovietophile, they had to give up their independence, or at least renounce the right to express their reservations publicly. The obsequious Sovietophilism of *Nakanune* and *Nova hromada* in the mid-1920s, and that of Antin Krushelnytskyi's writings at the beginning of the 1930s, was typical of the latter choice.

Finally, the Ukrainian and Russian returnees shared the same fate. As part of the campaign against Ukrainianisation at the end of the 1920s, the Ukrainian '*smenovekhovtsy*' were among the first who were arrested, imprisoned and executed on charges of anti-Soviet sabotage. Their Russian counterparts

only remained free for a few years longer; almost all were caught up in the Great Terror of the 1930s. The word '*smenovekhovstvo*' became a term of abuse, often synonymous with counter-revolution. In this way, the *smenovekhovtsy*, both Russian and Ukrainian, became victims of the regime which they had once praised and whose ruthlessness they had applauded.

Appendix

Biographical Details of Prominent Figures in the Ukrainian National Movement and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

Antonovych, Volodymyr (1834-1908): a populist historian. He founded the Kyivan school of historians, which amongst others included Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi. This group of historians laid the foundations of modern Ukrainian historiography. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, pp.85-6.

Aussem, Volodymyr (1879-?): a member of the *Spilka* between 1904 and 1906 who in 1918 joined the first Soviet government in the Ukraine. Between 1921 and 1923, he represented the Soviet Ukraine in Berlin. He later returned to serve in the Ukraine, and was caught up in the purges of the 1930s. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.137.

Bachynskyyi, Iulian (1870-?): a leading member of the Ukrainian Radical Party in Eastern Galicia and author of *Ukraina irredenta*, which is widely credited as being one of the first calls for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.156.

Bachynskyyi, Volodymyr (1880-1927): represented the UNDP in the Galician diet and the Austrian parliament before the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. In 1923, he formed the faction of the UNDP which declared its willingness to work within the Polish political system in order to achieve East Galician autonomy (though he did not renounce independence from the Poles as a final goal). *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.156.

Badan, Oleksander (1895-1933): a Galician who helped found the Communist party in Transcarpathia during the 1920s. He emigrated to the Soviet Ukraine after being expelled from Czechoslovakia. Here he worked under Skrypnyk in the Commissariat of Education, and was purged in the 1930s. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.158.

Bandera, Stepan (1909-1959): a Galician who joined the UVO in 1927 while still a student. Following the creation of the OUN, he rose through the organisation's ranks, in 1933 becoming head of the national executive in Galicia. Following the split in the OUN, he led the more radical Galician faction. He sought to cooperate with the Germans during the Second World War, but was imprisoned in 1941 after his supporters proclaimed the creation of a Ukrainian state in Lviv following the Soviet evacuation of the city. He also led the OUN after the war until his death at the hands of a Soviet assassin. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.169.

Bardakh, Marko: member of the Foreign Group of the UKP in Berlin, who was expelled from the Foreign Group for his contacts with 'counter-revolution'. He later travelled to the Soviet Ukraine. See Chapter Three.

Biberovych, Iaroslav (?-1948): a commander of the Ukrainian Galician Army, who was the ZUNR diplomatic representative in Hungary and then Austria. *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, p.124

Borshchak, Ilko (Elie) (1892-1959): the secretary of the UNR delegation to the Paris peace conference in 1919. After the conferences, he remained in France and wrote historical works on the eighteenth-century Ukrainian emigration and on Franco-Ukrainian relations. He edited a number of Paris-based journals and newspapers, including the Sovietophile *Ukrainski visti* (1926-9). *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.277.

Chechel, Mykola (1891-?): a member of the Central Committee of the UPSR and the Central Rada. After returning to the Ukraine from the emigration, he worked at the Ukrainian Scientific-Technological Society in Kharkiv and the Ukrainian State Planning Committee. He was arrested in the 1930s. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.406.

Chernushenko, Serhii: Ukrainian lieutenant-colonel; he was a member of the Hrekov group which opposed Peltiura and edited their Polish-financed journal *Ukraina*. Chernushenko also used the name Sahaidachnyi. See Chapter Five.

Diatliv, Pavlo(1880-1933): a member of the RUP and the USDRP, who emigrated to Austria in 1908. He was a member of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine during the First World War. After the war he worked

with a Communist publishing house in Vienna, and returned to the Soviet Ukraine in 1925. He was arrested in the 1930s and died in prison. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.667.

Dontsov, Dmytro (1883-1973): Dontsov started his political education on the left, joining the RUP and USDRP before the First World War. He was forced into exile in Austria-Hungary through persecution for his political activities. In 1913, he broke with the Ukrainian left, and during the First World War he sought to interest the Central Powers in Ukrainian affairs. He held a number of bureaucratic posts under the Hetmanite government, and after the end of the revolution became the ideologue of the Ukrainian far right. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, pp.742-3.

Doroshenko, Dmytro (1882-1951): a moderate conservative who served as minister of foreign affairs under Skoropadskyi, then emigrated in 1919, and while in exile continued to take part in the Hetmanite movement. He also was a historian and held a number of academic posts, for example at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague and the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, pp.745-6.

Drahomanov, Mykhailo (1841-95): a leading Ukrainian socialist. He had pursued an academic career, but this was cut short when he was dismissed from Kyiv university for leading a Ukrainian secret society. In 1876, he emigrated to Geneva, where he became interested in socialism. Here he published the first modern Ukrainian political journal *Hromada* (Community) and sought to make Europe aware of the Ukraine's problems. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.1, pp.753-5.

Faryniak, Emil (1886-1956): an immigrant Ukrainian worker who became active in the Ukrainian socialist movement in the USA. Antonovych (ed.), *Lysty do Faryniaka*, 1976, No.1-4, p.122.

Fral, Aleksei: An agent of Ievhen Petrushevych who conducted negotiations between the leader of the ZUNR and the Soviet plenipotentiary representatives in the 1920s. See Chapter Six.

Hrekov, Oleksander (1875-1958): served in the Russian army during the First World War. After the outbreak of the revolution, he joined the Ukrainian army, receiving steady promotion, rising to the post of minister for military affairs in the UNR. Between 9th June and 5th July, he

commanded the Ukrainian Galician Army. From 1920, he lived in Vienna. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.240-1.

Hrushevskiy, Mykhailo (1866-1934): widely regarded as the father of Ukrainian historiography and the first Ukrainian president. Hrushevskiy was born in Kholm, then under Russian rule, but in 1894 he travelled to Eastern Galicia to become the first professor of Ukrainian history at the University of Lviv. In Eastern Galicia he was extremely active in the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the patriotic organisations in the province. In 1898, he published the opening volume of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (History of the Ukraine-Rus), the first comprehensive account of Ukrainian history. Following the start of the First World War he returned to the Russian empire and was imprisoned. With the outbreak of revolution, he was elected chairman of the Central Rada, but left politics after Skoropadskiy's coup. He emigrated in 1919, returning to his homeland in 1924. Here he became head of the Archeographic Commission of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and professor of modern Ukrainian history. He continued writing his groundbreaking history of the Ukraine, until an official campaign against his 'nationalist' interpretation of history at the end of the 1920s led to his exile in Russia. His health deteriorated following this episode and he died in 1934. See *Encyclopedia of the Ukraine*, Vol.1, p.250-2.

Hryhoriiv, Nykyfor (1883-1953): member of the UPSR and Central Rada, and, briefly, minister of education. He emigrated to Prague in 1921, where he was involved in the Ukrainian civic and educational institutions set up there. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.254-5. Not to be confused with the partisan leader of the same name.

Isaievych, Dmytro (1889-1973): one of the leaders of the UPSR and a member of the Central Rada. In 1919, he served in the UNR delegation to the Paris peace conferences. He later moved to Prague, worked in the Ukrainian Sociological Institute and joined the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR. In 1930, he returned to Volhynia for family reasons. *Diiachi Ukrainskoi tsentralnoi rady*, pp.98-9.

Kaganovich, Lazar (1893-1991): born in Kyiv *gubernia* of Jewish decent. He joined the Russian Bolsheviks in 1911 and served in a number of party

posts before joining the KP(b)U in 1925. Between 1925 and 1928, he was first secretary of the KP(b)U's Central Committee. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.400.

Kaliuzhnyi, Naum (Sheitelmann) (1885-?): a *Borotbist* of Jewish decent who was involved in the formation of Ukrainian Soviet Republic. He edited *Borotbist* and KP(b)U papers. Between 1921 and 1926, he worked at the Ukrainian consulate in Prague and the Soviet embassy in Prague, where he was active in the campaign aimed at Ukrainian students in Prague to return. He was arrested in 1933 as part of the purges. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.404.

Kharchenko, A.: a Ukrainian émigré who wrote for the Russian organ *Nakanune*. He was also discussed as a potential collaborator for the Ukrainian *smenovekhovskii* organ. He contributed a number of articles, and returned to the Ukraine in 1923. See Chapter Five.

Khrystiuk, Pavlo (1880-?): during the revolution a leading member of the TsK of the UPSR and the Peasant Association, deputy of the Central Rada and a member of the Little Rada. He held a number of portfolios in successive UNR governments, including general chancellor, minister of internal affairs, state secretary and deputy minister of internal affairs. In 1919, he emigrated to Vienna, but he returned to the Ukraine in 1924 and worked in the Society of Scientific and Technical Workers for the Promotion of Socialist Construction (1928-31). He was arrested in 1931 and his fate is unknown. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.496.

Khvylovyi, Mykola (1893-1933): a member of the KP(b)U and the leading Ukrainian writer of the 1920s, whose influence can be found in the work of most young Ukrainian writers of the period. In the mid-1920s, he started a literary discussion which became entangled with the inner-party debate over the aims and methods of Ukrainianisation. He was twice forced to recant his views publicly and committed suicide in 1933. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.500-2.

Kobza, Ivan: member of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party who opposed both Skoropadskyi and the Directory. In mid-1922, he turned to the Soviet representative in Poland for permission to return to the Ukraine, which was granted. See Chapter Five.

Konovalets, Ievhen (1891-1938): Konovalets served in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War. He was captured and interned in a Russian POW camp until the outbreak of the revolution. He helped organise and came to head the First Battalion of Sich Riflemen, made up of West Ukrainians POWs, which intervened repeatedly in the Ukrainian revolution. Following his emigration, he founded and led two of the most important Ukrainian nationalist organisations of the period, the UVO and the OUN. In 1938 he was assassinated by a Bolshevik agent. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.599-600.

Kotsiubynskyi, Iurii (1896-1937): son of the leading Ukrainian writer Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi who joined the Bolsheviks in 1914. Between 1917 and 1918, he was a member of first Soviet government in the Ukraine. He was the representative of Soviet Ukraine in Austria in 1921-2 and consul in Poland 1927-30. During the 1930s, he served in the Soviet Ukraine. He was arrested and shot as a supporter of Trotskii in 1936. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.637.

Kozoris, Mykhailo (1882-1937): Galician writer who settled in the Soviet Ukraine after the First World War, where he was a leading member of the West Ukrainian Writers' Union from 1925. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.645.

Krilyk, Osyp (1898-?): better known under the pseudonym Vasylykiv, Krilyk was the co-founder of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (KPSH). He became a leader of the 'secessionist' wing, which sought to keep the KPSH independent from the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. From 1923 he was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine. In 1928, he was expelled from Comintern due to his support for Shumskyi, but in 1932 he immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.563.

Krushelnytskyi, Antin (1878-1941): an East Galician writer influenced by West European modernism. He was also politically active, joining the Ukrainian Radical Party in Eastern Galicia. During the revolution, he served as minister of education under one of the UNR governments. He adopted a pro-Soviet position in the 1920s and immigrated to the Soviet

Ukraine in 1934; shortly after arriving in the country, he was imprisoned. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2 p.676.

Krymskyi Ahatanhel (1871-1942): Ukrainian Orientalist who under the title of permanent secretary directed the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences from its creation until 1929. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, pp.680-1.

Kuziv, Vasyl (1887-1958): Ukrainian Presbyterian minister based in the United States. In 1935, he returned to Eastern Galicia, where he became head of the Ukrainian Evangelical Reformed Church in the Western Ukraine. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.725.

Kviring, Emmanuil (1888-1937): a Bolshevik, who had been a member of the party since before the revolution. In 1918, he opposed the creation of the KP(b)U as a separate Ukrainian Communist party. Between 1925 and 1927, he served as first secretary of the KP(b)U. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.2, p.728.

Larin, Iurii (1882-?): a Russian Social Democrat of Jewish decent who helped found the *Spilka*. Before 1917, he was a Menshevik, but he joined the Bolsheviks and became a friend of Lenin. He was an economist by training and opposed Ukrainianisation. He was later arrested and executed as a supporter of Trotskii. *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, p.1257.

Levynskyi, Volodymyr (1880-1953): a Galician political theorist who left the Ukrainian Radical Party in 1900 in order to found the USDP. He edited the party's papers *Volia*, *Zemlia i volia* (1907-12) and *Vpered* (1912-13). During the First World War, he worked in Vienna and Geneva. He remained abroad until his return to Lviv in 1930. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.96.

Levytskyi, Ievhen (1870-1925): cofounder of the RUP in Eastern Galicia and later the UNDP. He was elected in 1907 and 1911 as a deputy to the Austrian parliament. During the First World War, he lobbied the Central Powers to support Ukrainian independence. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.105.

Levytskyi, Kost (1859-1941): one of the most influential Ukrainian politicians in Austro-Hungary before the First World War. He headed the Ukrainian National Democratic Party and chaired the Ukrainian parliamentary

clubs in the Austrian parliament and Galician diet. Following the creation of the ZUNR, he became the first head of the State Secretariat of the republic. He went with the ZUNR in exile, serving first as secretary for press and propaganda and then as minister for foreign affairs. He returned to Galicia in 1923. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.100.

Levytskyi, Mykhailo (1891-1933): Galician, who during the First World War was interned by the Russians as a POW in Central Asia. There he joined the Bolsheviks in 1918. In 1919, he was sent to Lviv as a member of the Central Committee of the KPSH. In 1920, he was elected to the KP(b)U's Galician Organising Committee and then to the Politburo of the KPSH and the Galician Revolutionary Committee. After 1921, he served as Soviet Representative in Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia. He took up a position in the Central Control Committee in 1925, but was later accused of being a member of a fictional Ukrainian nationalist organisation. He was arrested and probably shot. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.101-2.

Lozynskyi, Mykhailo (1880-1937): a lawyer and publicist who held a minor post in the UNR ministry for West Ukrainian affairs during the revolution and later was part of the ZUNR's delegation to the Paris peace conferences. He went on to teach international law at the Ukrainian Free University. He adopted a Sovietophile position in the 1920s, and emigrated to the Soviet Ukraine in 1926. Here he chaired the law department in the Institute of the National Economy and worked at the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Kharkiv. In 1930, he was arrested, deported and shot. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.194.

Lutskevych, Marko (1882-1934): Volhynian cooperative leader. In 1922, he was elected to the Polish Sejm, but was expelled for making speeches which attacked the Polish state. He escaped to Czechoslovakia and in 1924 immigrated to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, where two years later he was arrested and sent to a labour camp. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.215.

Lypko, Petro (1876-?): officer in the Russian army who later served on the General Staff of the UNR army. In 1920, he became the UNR chief of staff. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.245.

Lypynskiy, Viacheslav (1882-1931): descendant of a Polonised family of Ukrainian nobles. He adopted a Ukrainian national consciousness, writing historical studies on the Ukraine. He began rejecting many of the assumptions of the populists, arguing that the nobility had an important role to play in the construction of the Ukrainian nation. He played a leading role in the conservative Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party, which supported the Hetmanate. As an émigré, he became the ideologue of Ukrainian monarchism. He continued writing on Cossack history and became the founder of the statist school of Ukrainian historiography. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.246-7.

Lysiak, Pavlo (1887-1948): editor of the ZUNR paper *Ukrainskyi prapor* in Vienna between 1919 and 1921. He returned to Galicia, where he became a UNDO deputy and contributor to the Ukrainian national press in the province. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.254.

Makhno, Nestor (1889-1934): an anarchist who after the fall of the Romanovs became the leader of a large insurrectionary army, which at its strongest numbered 40,000 and controlled about one-third of the territory of the present-day Ukraine. He entered into an on-off alliance with the Bolsheviks in order to fight the White armies of Denikin and Wrangel, but refused to allow his forces to be subsumed into the Red Army and was eventually crushed by the Bolsheviks. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.278-9.

Maksymovych, Karlo see Savrych, Karlo.

Manuil'skiy, Dmytro (1883-1959): a member of the Social Democratic Workers' Party who was involved in the KP(b)U's activity in Kyiv during the revolution. He served as a delegate to the Polish-Soviet peace talks in Riga, commissar for agriculture, first secretary of the KP(b)U's Central Committee, editor of *Komunist*, the organ of the Central Committee, and, after 1922, in the Communist International. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.303-4.

Martos, Borys (1879-1977): member of the RUP and then USDRP who served as prime minister and finance minister under the Directory. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.322.

Matiushenko, Borys (1883-1944): active in the RUP and USDRP before the war who organised a Ukrainian healthcare system under the Central Rada and the Hetman government. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.346-7.

Mazurenko, Semen (1879-?): a member of the USDRP who in 1919 became head of a UNR diplomatic mission to normalise relations with Soviet Russia. In 1925, he was arrested in the Ukraine. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.356.

Mazurenko, Vasyly (1877-?): a member of the RUP and USDRP. He held several posts in the governments created during the Ukrainian revolution: deputy finance minister, general secretary of finance and minister of finance. He later headed the UNR's diplomatic mission to Italy. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.356.

Melenevskyy, Mariian (1878-?): founder of the RUP, and later member of the *Spilka* and the USDRP. He was one of first members of Ukrainian intelligentsia to become a Marxist. He emigrated to Lviv before the First World War and later joined the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine. In 1923, he adopted a pro-Soviet position and later immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.369-70.

Morkotun, S.: head of the Ukrainian National Council in Paris, which turned to the Soviet authorities with a proposal of cooperation in May 1922. See Chapter Five.

Mytsiuk, Oleksander (1883-1943): member of the RUP and then USDRP. He served as minister of internal affairs and deputy minister of the national economy under the Directory. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.522.

Nikovskyy, Andrii (1885-1942): editor of a number of publications in the Eastern Ukraine before the revolution. In 1920, he served as UNR foreign minister. He returned to the Ukraine in 1924 and was involved in the creation of a Ukrainian dictionary. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, p.600.

Oles, Oleksander (pseudonym of Oleksander Kandyba) (1878-1944): radical poet from the Eastern Ukraine; in 1919 he travelled to Budapest, then Vienna, and in 1924 to Prague. In the Austrian capital he edited

the left-wing journal *Na perelomi* and headed the Union of Ukrainian Journalists and Writers Abroad. His poetry dealt with the Ukrainian revolution and his longing for his homeland, but also satirised émigré life. His work was popular in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, although it was banned from the 1930s to the end of the 1950s. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.682-3.

Palamar, Hryhorii: Ukrainian worker and Social Democrat based in Vienna who joined the Foreign Group of the UKP in 1920. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, p.382.

Petliura, Symon (1879-1926): a member of the RUP and the USDRP. Following the outbreak of the Ukrainian revolution, he helped organise the Ukrainian armed forces for the Central Rada. Under the title of supreme *otaman*, he led the military forces of the uprising against the German puppet, Pavlo Skoropadskyi, and in 1919 he became the president of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and thus head of the Ukrainian state. Following his defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks, he emigrated, first to Poland, then to Paris. He was murdered in 1926 by Samuel Schwartzbard in revenge for the pogroms committed by Ukrainian troops during the revolution. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.855-7.

Petrushevych, Ievhen (1863-1940): a leading member of the UNDP and representative in the Galician Diet and Austrian parliament before the First World War. In 1918, he was named the president of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. During the ensuing war against the Poles, he was invested with the title of dictator. The Polish victory forced him and his government into exile, first to the Eastern Ukraine, then to Vienna. In the Austrian capital he lobbied the Entente in favour of the creation of a separate East Galician state, but following the 1923 decision on the province adopted an openly Sovietophile position. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.3, pp.868-9.

Piddubnyi, Hryhorii: see Tovmachiv, Hryhorii.

Pisotskyi, Anatolii: see Richytskyi, Andrii.

Pochynok, Tymotei (1885-1962): a Galician who emigrated to the United States in 1908. He became a leading organiser in the Ukrainian social-

ist movement in the United States, opposing the Communist elements within it. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.48.

Poraiko, Vasyi (1888-1937): a Galician POW who converted to Bolshevism during his internment in Astrakhan. He joined the KP(b)U and became the commander in chief of the Red Ukrainian Galician Army. Afterwards he held a number of positions in the Soviet Ukrainian government, before he was arrested and shot in 1937. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.156.

Porsh, Mykola (1879-1944): a leading member of the RUP and the USDRP before the First World War. He served as the UNR minister of defence and labour and in 1919 went to Germany as the UNR envoy to the country. He stayed in Germany, where he published works on the Ukrainian economy. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, pp.157-8.

Prykhodko, Antin (1892-?): a *Borotbist*, who in 1920 with the other *Borotbisty* joined the KP(b)U. After serving as the Ukrainian representative at the Soviet embassy in Prague, he also held a number of posts in the Soviet Ukrainian government in the 1920s, for example deputy commissar of education and of justice. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.259.

Pylypenko, Serhii (1891-1934): a member of the UPSR and the Ukrainian Communist Party. He published several collections of short stories and was Khvylovyyi's opponent in the so-called literary discussion. In 1933, he was accused of being a member of a counter-revolutionary organisation and sentenced to execution. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.286.

Rakovskii, Khristiiian (1873-1941): was born in Bulgaria and was active in the Bulgarian and Rumanian socialist movements before the First World War. He joined the Bolshevik party in 1918. From January 1919 to January 1923, he headed the Soviet Ukrainian government, with a number of short intermissions. Before 1921, he had stood more on the internationalist wing of the party, but afterwards started arguing vigorously in favour of an accommodation with Ukrainian national feelings. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.315.

Richytskyi, Andrii (1890-1934): the pseudonym of Anatolii Pisotskyi, the chief ideologue of the *Nezalezhnyky* (Independentists), which split with

the USDRP in 1919 and later formed the basis of the UKP. Following the disbandment of the UKP in 1925, he joined the KP(b)U and was elected a candidate member of its Central Committee. He was a vocal critique of Shumskyi, but himself fell to the Stalinist purge following Skrypnyk's suicide. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.367.

Rudnytskyi, Stepan (1877-1937): the founder of Ukrainian geographic studies. He acted as a geographic advisor to the Ukrainian parliamentary group in the Habsburg Monarchy and to the ZUNR. In the 1920s, he was a co-organiser and geography professor of the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. In 1926, he immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine, where became professor of geography at the Kharkiv Institute of People's Education and director of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Geography and Cartography. In 1933 he was arrested, imprisoned and eventually executed. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.428.

Savrych, Karlo (1892-1937): Galician involved in the creation of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (KPSH). His pseudonym was Maksymovych. He founded the Foreign Committee of the KPSH in Vienna and its newspaper *Nasha pravda*. Between 1922 and 1924, he was secretary of the Soviet Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Warsaw. In 1924, he became director of the Foreign Office of Aid for the Revolutionary Movement in Western Ukraine and represented the KPZU on the KP(b)U's Central Committee. He was a supporter of Vasylykiv and Shumskyi and fell from grace at the same time as them. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.545.

Sevriuk, Oleksander (1893-1941): a member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, who led the UNR delegation which negotiated the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between the UNR and the Central Powers and took part in the Ukrainian delegation at the Paris peace conferences. Between 1920 and 1931, he lived in France where he wrote for the Sovietophile paper *Ukrainski visti*. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.604.

Shapoval, Mykyta (1882-1932): a member of the RUP and the UPSR, whose Central Committee he led. He served in a number of the Ukrainian governments created during the revolution and took part in the re-

volt against Hetman Skoropadskyi. He moved to Prague in 1920, where he became a central figure of the Ukrainian emigration: he headed the Ukrainian Civic Committee, which gave aid to Ukrainian émigrés in Czechoslovakia, and he was instrumental in founding the Ukrainian educational institutions in Czechoslovakia. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, pp.616-7.

Shrah, Mykola (1894-1970): vice-president of the Central Rada and member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries. In the emigration he joined Hrushevskiy's group of SRs and returned to the Soviet Ukraine. He was imprisoned during the Stalinist terror, but was later released and taught in a number of Soviet Universities. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.674.

Shtefan, I.: a member of the UPSR, who was post and telegraph minister under the UNR. He was one of the first émigré Socialist Revolutionaries to cooperate with the Bolsheviks, and received a post in Vukospilka. See Chapter Four.

Shumskiy, Oleksander (1890-1946): a leading *Borotbist*. He served a commissar for education in Rakovskii's government in 1920 and following the accession of the *Borotbisty* into the KP(b)U he joined the Ukrainian Politburo, becoming commissar for internal affairs. Between 1921 and 1923, he served as the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Poland. In 1924, he was appointed commissar for education. Following an argument with Stalin over the extent Ukrainianisation could go, he was relieved of his post in 1927. In 1933, he was arrested and imprisoned. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, pp.686-7.

Siryi, Iurii: see Tyshchenko, Iurii.

Skoropadskyi, Pavlo (1873-1945): descendant of a noble family, which in the eighteenth century had included one Hetman. He grew up speaking Russian and served in the Russian army as a cavalry officer, during the First World War rising to the rank of lieutenant general. Following the outbreak of the February Revolution he organised a Ukrainian corps out of former tsarist units. However, he opposed the socialist leanings of the Central Rada government and in April 1918 overthrew the Central Rada with the help of the Germans. Skoropadskyi's conservative re-

gime collapsed in December 1918 after the disintegration of the German army. He emigrated to Germany where he established the émigré Hetmanite movement. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, pp.731-2.

Skrypnyk, Mykola (1872-1933): a Bolshevik of Ukrainian descent, who joined the party before 1917. In April 1918, he was instrumental in the creation of a separate Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine. He held a number of positions in the Ukrainian commissariat, most importantly the Commissariat of Education (1927-33), where he was responsible for the policy of Ukrainianisation. He came into conflict with Stalin over Moscow's attempt to curb the powers of the Ukrainian republic and limit the extent of Ukrainianisation. He was condemned, removed as commissar of education and in 1933 he committed suicide. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, pp.737-8.

Smal-Stotskyi, Roman (1893-1969): represented the ZUNR and UNR in Berlin from 1918-19 and 1921-3 respectively. He then taught at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague and held a number of posts in the UNR government-in-exile. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.4, p.771.

Studynskyi, Kyrylo (1868-1941): a Galician literary scholar who headed the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) 1925-1931. During this time, he helped set up links between the NTSh and the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the Soviet Ukraine. During the first Soviet occupation of Galicia, he was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.84.

Surovtsova, Nadiia (1896-1985): headed one of the departments of the UNR's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. She left the Ukraine in 1919 as part of the delegation to the Paris peace conferences. She settled in Vienna, where she became the first Eastern Ukrainian woman to finish a PhD. In 1925, she returned to the Ukraine, but was arrested two years later. She was sent to a prison camp and was only released from the Gulag in 1954. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, pp.112-3.

Temnytskyi, Volodymyr (1879-1938): Galician and member of the USDP, which he led 1914-1921. He became the UNR foreign minister in April 1919. He returned to Galicia in 1922 to take part in the province's poli-

tics, for example attempting to revive the USDP in the 1930s. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.186.

Tiutiunnyk, Iurii (1891-1929): a senior military commander in the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic. He was promoted to brigadier general following the failed Polish-UNR campaign against the Soviet Ukraine and led the so-called Second Winter Campaign in 1921. He went back to the Ukraine in 1923, where he taught in the Kharkiv Red Officer School and wrote film scripts. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.226.

Tovmachiv, Hryhorii (1882-1937): UPSR member who wrote under the pseudonym of Piddubnyi. He co-edited the UPSR organ *Trudova respublika* (1918-19). Between 1919 and 1920, he was a member of the Foreign Group of the UKP. He later worked for Soviet intelligence and as a correspondent for the Kyiv daily *Proletarska pravda*. In 1928, he returned to the Ukraine, and in 1935 was imprisoned on the Solovets islands. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.18.

Tsehelskyi, Lonhyn (1875-1950): secretary for internal affairs in the ZUNR in 1918; in January 1919, he became responsible for the ZUNR's foreign policy. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.299.

Tyshchenko, Iurii (1880-1953): a member of the USDRP who also used the pseudonym Siryi. During the revolution he edited the official organ of the Central Rada government. He emigrated in 1919 to Vienna, where he became a member of Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party. He remained in Vienna following the collapse of the group and during the 1920s he published textbooks for elementary schools in the Soviet Ukraine. After the Second World War, he settled in the USA. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.334.

Vasylkiv, Osyp see Krilyk, Osyp.

Vityk, Semen (1876-1937): co-founder of the USDP and one of the leaders of the wing which advocated cooperation with the Polish socialists. During the revolution, he headed the Ministry for the Affairs of the Western Part of the Republic, which oversaw relations between the UNR and the ZUNR. As an émigré he was leader of the Ukrainian workers' organisation in Vienna *Iednist* and edited the Sovietophile journal *Nova hro-*

mada. After his return to the Ukraine, he worked as a journalist until his arrest in 1933. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.621.

Vikul, Serhii (c.1893/4-?): a member of the USDRP and its Central Committee. He went to Berlin as a member of staff of the UNR's embassy. Vikul returned to the Ukraine around 1921, after which he worked at the Soviet Ukrainian consulate in Warsaw and taught in Kharkiv. He was arrested in the 1930s. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk 1911-1920*, p.418.

Vynnychenko, Volodymyr (1880-1951): Vynnychenko achieved fame as both a politician and writer. His plays, novels and short stories, which were translated into a number of European languages during his lifetime, dealt with the working classes and revolutionaries, and described the revolutionary life. He himself was a member of first the RUP and then the USDRP, of which he became the leader. In 1917, he became the first president of the General Secretariat, the government of the autonomous Ukraine, and in 1919 he headed the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, pp.666-7.

Vysotskyi, Zinovii: a member of the USDRP and the Central Rada. He emigrated to Berlin, where he joined the Foreign Delegation of the UKP, but he split with Vynnychenko over the group's relationship to the UKP in the Ukraine in 1921 and returned to the Ukraine. *Diiachi Ukrainiskoi tsentralnoi rady*, p.74.

Zatonskyi, Volodymyr (1888-1938): a Ukrainian who joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. He was a member of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U (1918-27) and the party's Politburo (1924-7). He headed the All-Ukrainian Association of Consumer Cooperative Organisations (1921-2) and was commissar for education (1922-3). In 1937, he fell foul of the Stalinist purges and was executed. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.826.

Zhukovskiy, Oleksander (1925-?): a member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries who shortly served as UNR defence minister in 1918. He joined Hrushevskiy's group of SRs and became secretary of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol.5, p.855.

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