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The “Change of Signposts” in the Ukrainian emigration: Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries

Introduction: Hrushevs’kyi, the UPSR and the populist tradition

For students of the Russian emigration in the 1920s, the concept of *Smenovekhovstvo* is well-known. In July 1921 a collection of articles appeared, written by six Russian émigrés, five of whom had taken part in the White struggle against the Bolsheviks. Its authors called upon the Russian émigrés to end their opposition to the Bolsheviks and go back to their homeland in order to help the Soviets in the reconstruction of the Russian state. The title of the book was *Smena vekh*, or “Change of Signposts”. This position became known as *Smenovekhovstvo* and it advocates *Smenovekhovtsy*.¹ Less familiar is the analogous phenomenon in the post-revolutionary Ukrainian emigration, whereby many figures central to Ukrainian culture and political life, who had played leading roles in the attempts to create a Ukrainian state between 1917 and 1921, began to advocate reconciliation with the Bolsheviks and return to Ukraine. One such group was the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR), which was led by the prominent historian and president of the Central Rada Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi.

Though there has been one short treatment of the Foreign Delegation,² historians’ attention has quite naturally centred upon Hrushevskyi. The return of this figure, who is central to the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, to Ukraine in 1924 is one of the most controversial episodes of his life. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Diaspora historians saw it as an inconvenient occurrence which somehow had to be explained away in order to rescue Hrushevs’kyi from the charge of being pro-Soviet. Often they uncritically accepted the extremely dubious account in a memoir by the Hrushevs’kyiphile Matvii Stakhiv, who met Hrushevs’kyi shortly before the historian returned to Ukraine and argued that he went back to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks.³ The great specialist on Hrushevs’kyi, Liubomyr Vynar, believed that Hrushevs’kyi returned in order to continue his work on his *History of Ukraine-Rus*, which was impossible in the difficult conditions of emigration, and out of his wish to share the fate of Ukrainians living in their native land and contribute to the further development of their culture. Still, the idea that Hrushevs’kyi may have at any point actually supported the Soviet regime is rejected out of hand.⁴ After 1991 a number of useful monographs appeared in Ukraine based on the materials from the newly opened Soviet archives. However, they only answered the question of “how” Hrushevs’kyi returned and not “why”.⁵ They did not use any of the

¹ See HILDE HARDEMAN *Coming to Terms with the Soviet Regime. The “Changing Signposts” Movement among the Russian Émigrés in the early 1920s*. Dekalb 1994.

² *Politychna Istoriia Ukrainy XX Stolittia*. T. 5. Kyiv 2003, pp. 176–192.

³ THOMAS M. PRYMAK *Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The Politics of National Culture*. Toronto 1987, pp. 204–205.

⁴ LIUBOMYR VYNAR *Syluety Epokh*. Lviv 1992, p. 85.

⁵ See R. IA. PYRIH *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs’koho. Ostannie desiatylyttia (1924–1934)*. Kyiv 1993 and IDEM M. S. *Hrushevs’kyi: mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu (1924–1934r.)*, in: *Ukrains’kyi Istorychnyi*

sources available in the West, for example the journal edited by Hrushevs'kyi between 1920 and 1921, *Boritiesia-Poborete!* ("Struggle and You Will Overcome"). Most recently, Serhii Plokhy's biography of the Ukrainian historian has made a great achievement in recognising the complexity of Hrushevs'kyi's views on Soviet Ukraine.⁶ However, this article will argue that Hrushevs'kyi's political thinking in emigration displayed a greater degree of continuity than Plokhy allows for. Moreover, one achieves a better understanding of Hrushevs'kyi's position by placing his views in the context of the activities and writings of the other members of the Foreign Delegation.

The pro-Soviet stance of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR represented a development in and continuation of the Ukrainian populist tradition. The populists had stressed that the Ukrainians were a peasant nation and that the peasant was the bearer of Ukraine's national particularity and traditions. They believed that as a nation of peasants Ukraine suffered under the double burden of national and economic oppression. One of the leading proponents of this tradition was Mykhailo Drahomanov. He proposed a form of Proudhonian socialism and the reorganisation of the Russian empire into a Slavic federation as the solution to this two-fold subjugation. He explicitly renounced the goal of creating a Ukrainian state.⁷ Drahomanov had great influence on all the Ukrainian parties to emerge during the revolution, including the UPSR. This party played a leading role in the attempts to create a Ukrainian state. Hrushevs'kyi joined it while he was president of the Central Rada and in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly won sixty percent of the votes in Ukraine. The UPSR advocated the socialisation of the land and its distribution among the peasants. On the national question it was in favour of the creation of a federal Russia in which Ukraine gained some form of autonomy. Although the Bolshevik invasion forced the party to become a supporter of Ukrainian independence, the UPSR continued to see this as a step towards the creation of an international socialist federation. As the party organ *Narodna Volia* stated, in "satisfying the demand for independence, Ukrainian democracy has not deviated an inch from the idea of world brotherhood, from plans for a free union of all countries".⁸ For the left of the party, even this was too great an emphasis on independence. In May 1918 the left wing of the UPSR, called the *Borot'bisty* after the name of the organ they controlled, *Borot'ba*, split off from the rest of the party. They condemned what they believed to be the excessive nationalism of other Ukrainian parties, denounced artificial borders between states and called for an end to the war between the brother workers of Russia and Ukraine. Over the next two years, the *Borot'bisty* increasingly presented themselves as a genuinely Marxist party and tried to cooperate with the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (KP(b)U).

Zhurnal (1991) No. 4, pp. 54–66; VOLODYMYR PRYSTAIKO, IURII SHAPOVAL Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i GPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924–1934. Kyiv 1996.

⁶ SERHII PLOKHY *Unmaking Imperial Russia. Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History*. Toronto 2005.

⁷ Ivan Rudnytsky has written a number of articles placing the populist tradition within the development of Ukrainian political thought. See his *Trends in Ukrainian Political Thought* in: IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY *Essays in Modern History*. Edmonton 1987, pp. 91–122, and *The Intellectual Origins of Modern Ukraine* in the same volume, pp. 123–141. The same collection contains a number of studies of Drahomanov. See, for example, *Drahomanov as a Political Theorist*, pp. 203–253, and *The First Ukrainian Political Program: Mykhailo Drahomanov's "Introduction to Hromada"*, pp. 255–281.

⁸ See JURII BORYS *Political Parties in Ukraine*, in TARAS HUNCZAK (ed.) *Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass. 1977, pp. 128–158 (pp. 135, 137–140). The quotation is on pp. 137–138.

Finally, in March 1920, the party joined the KP(b)U and some members, for example Oleksandr Shums'kyi, took up roles in the Soviet Ukrainian government.⁹

Hrushevs'kyi, too, undertook a "turn to the left" as a result of Hetman Skoropads'kyi's coup in April 1918. The historian believed that the new conservative government was using Ukrainian independence as a means to frustrate the social desires of the peasantry and in response he reaffirmed the need for a social revolution to accompany the national.¹⁰ He began to advocate the creation of a conciliar government based on the power of "toilers' soviets".¹¹ Despite his opposition to Skoropads'kyi, he was not involved in the revolt against the Hetman and was not invited to play a role in the Directory led by the Social Democrats Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura. The historian became a firm opponent of the Directory and advocated his version of soviet government as an alternative. This created conflict within the UPSR, some of whose members supported the Directory. The quarrel came to a head at the Toilers' Congress of January 1919, to which delegates of workers, peasants and soldiers had been called in order to lend the Directory's take-over of power the seal of their approval. A part of the party sided with the prominent SR, Mykyta Shapoval, who wanted to retain power in the hands of the Directory, and others with Hrushevs'kyi and the soviet principle. Hrushevs'kyi reminded the party that the soviet form of government was not a Bolshevik invention and argued that the Bolsheviks had in fact perverted the soviet principle. Nevertheless, the congress, no doubt influenced by the advance of the Red Army on Kyiv, supported the Directory.¹²

Unable to play a role in the political life of Ukraine, Hrushevs'kyi suggested to the Central Committee of his party at the end of 1918 that he be sent abroad as a representative of the UPSR in order to establish links to foreign socialist organisations, for the mutual exchange of information and the control of the foreign representatives of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). In February 1919 the Directory agreed to fund this plan and Hrushevs'kyi was granted funds and given a mandate as the foreign representative of the UPSR. In March the historian crossed the border.¹³ Though he had not yet become a supporter of the Bolsheviks, his belief that government should be based on the power of the soviets represented the first step towards his "Change of Signposts".

The creation of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR

Hrushevs'kyi later described the period following his emigration before he settled down in Vienna as an attempt to seek "a middle road between Entente-Russian reaction and Bolshevik occupation" in the form of the socialism of the Second International.¹⁴ The first im-

⁹ JAMES E. MACE *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933*. Cambridge, MA 1983, pp. 53–62.

¹⁰ PLOKHY *Unmaking Imperial Russia* pp. 216–217.

¹¹ Where Hrushevs'kyi uses the Ukrainian word "radians'kyi", this has been translated as "Soviet". Thus "Radians'ka Ukraina" becomes "Soviet Ukraine". The historian did use the word "Soviets'kyi", but only to describe Soviet Russia. However, the adjective "radians'kyi" also described the principle of government based on local soviets, not necessarily that set up by the Bolsheviks. When the word is used in this sense, it has been written without a capital letter.

¹² For an impression of the historian's views at this time and the conflict within the UPSR, see PRYMAK Mykhailo Hrushevsky pp. 187–189.

¹³ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 3, pp. 47–48.

¹⁴ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 7, p. 53.

portant stop on this path was Prague. Here he met the new president of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk, and the English authority on Eastern Europe, Robert Seton-Watson. Both told Hrushevs'kyi that "an Independent Ukraine could not expect either recognition or support from the powers of the Entente". This convinced Hrushevs'kyi of the hopelessness of the Directory's orientation towards the Western countries.¹⁵ In June the historian moved on to Paris where he met the Ukrainian SR Isaievych and the Social Democrats Didushok and Matiushenko. Together they agreed on the necessity of forming a common front with socialists of other nations of the former Russian empire in order to resist Russian centralism jointly. At the end of June the Ukrainians held meetings with socialists from other republics formerly ruled by Russia and on 20th and 21st July they published a manifesto which condemned intervention in Russia. This union of socialists decided to start publishing a journal together, in French and English, *L'Europe Orientale*. The journal would avoid questions of disagreement among the groups involved and would not publish polemics. The first issue of the new publication appeared in September.¹⁶ In Paris Hrushevs'kyi also had talks with French socialists and he applied for seats on the Second International for his delegation.

The historian then went to Lucerne, where alongside Isaievych, Didushok and Matiushenko he took part in the conference of the Second International in August 1919. Two issues divided the European socialists gathered in Lucerne: the rights of smaller nations and the International's relationship to the Bolsheviks. On the second question the UPSR was on the left of the International and advocated solidarity with the Soviet republics. Despite these splits, Hrushevs'kyi believed in the future of the International and continued to try to set up contacts with other European socialist parties, travelling, for example, to Berlin for talks with the German Independents. At the end of 1919 he went to Geneva for the next socialist conference. Because of this, and the imminent establishment of the League of Nations there, he also moved the paper *L'Europe Orientale* to the Swiss city. However, the departure of the German Independents from the congress over the issue of the recognition of Soviet Russia meant that the meeting of the Second International was over before it had even begun.¹⁷ The journal *L'Europe Orientale* was also subject to tensions between the contributors, for example over its relationship to the Entente.¹⁸ Finally, due to lack of funds the paper closed in January 1920.¹⁹ The end of the congress and the failure of his paper meant that Hrushevs'kyi had no more reason to stay in Geneva, and he left at the beginning of April for Prague. As he later wrote, it had become clear to Hrushevs'kyi that the middle road of the Second International had "deceived us [...] the tragedy of world socialism in general had become our tragedy. With it, it became necessary to look for another way."²⁰

However, Hrushevs'kyi's search for reconciliation with the Bolsheviks was not merely a response to the failure of the Second International. He had already begun to establish links with the Soviet government at the Lucerne conference. Here he came into contact with the German socialist Oscar Kon, who was the legal consultant of the Soviet mission in Berlin. Through the mediation of Kon, at the end of January 1920, Hrushevs'kyi met Victor Kopp, a Soviet representative in the German capital. The government in Ukraine was at this time in negotiations with Soviet Russia, and Hrushevs'kyi thought it would be useful to open an-

¹⁵ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 3, pp. 51–52.

¹⁶ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 3, pp. 55–57; No. 7, pp. 35–36.

¹⁷ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 3, pp. 58–60; No. 7, pp. 28–35, 38, 45.

¹⁸ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 7, pp. 41.

¹⁹ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 7, p. 51.

²⁰ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 7, p. 53.

other channel for discussion. Kopp expressed the hope of cooperation between Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the creation of a Ukrainian soviet republic and pointed to the collaboration between the Bolsheviks and the left SRs immediately after the October revolution as a possible model for this. Hrushevs'kyi replied that the UPSR also wanted Ukraine to be soviet. However, according to Hrushevs'kyi, they disagreed in the matter of tactics: the Russians sought to introduce the soviet principle from Moscow, not allowing the Ukrainian soviet parties to follow this principle themselves; Hrushevs'kyi claimed that only by taking her own path could Ukraine come to be soviet. Kon agreed that the Russians had made mistakes in Ukraine, but argued that the adoption of the soviet principle in itself would lead to the removal of these problems. Despite these disagreements the two parted expressing hopes that an agreement could be reached and Kopp promised to approach his government on the matter. However, when Hrushevs'kyi's group tried to find out whether the Soviet Russian government had given an answer to Kopp's inquiry, they were told that there had been no reply. Still, the initial discussions with the Soviet representative convinced them that the possibility of compromise existed.²¹

The orientation towards a Soviet form of government was strengthened at the first conference of the UPSR abroad, which took place in Prague between 14th and 19th February 1920. The conference confirmed Hrushevs'kyi as head of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR. Oleksandr Zhukovs'kyi, Mykola Shrah and Mykola Chechel' were chosen as further members of the delegation. Zhukovs'kyi, who had been a member of the UNR government, became the secretary of the group. He had left Ukraine as the foreign emissary of the Central Committee (TsK) of the UPSR. Shrah had been Hrushevs'kyi's deputy when the historian had led the Central Rada and had come abroad as part of the UNR delegation to Budapest. Chechel' had been one of Hrushevs'kyi's secretaries in the Central Rada and one of the UNR's representatives in Paris. Other prominent SRs in emigration were also present at the conference, for example Pavlo Khrystiuk, I. Shtefan and Mykyta Shapoval. Khrystiuk had been a leading member of the UPSR during the revolution and had served in the Central Rada government. Shapoval was Hrushevs'kyi's greatest rival within the UPSR and had supported the Directory. At the end of 1919 he moved to Prague, which under his aegis became a centre of the UPSR in emigration. Shtefan was the first member of the UPSR to cooperate openly with Soviet Ukraine and received a post in the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Union.²²

The conference called for "the speedy implementation of the dictatorship of the labouring people". This would give the basis for an end to the war between Ukraine and Soviet Russia; a war which harmed the socialist revolution and which contradicted the desires of the working people of Ukraine. The introduction of the soviet principle would also remove the bitterness from all political and economic disagreements between Soviet Russia and Ukraine. The conference called on the party's Central Committee (TsK) to use all of its influence to bring the UNR to sign a treaty with Soviet Russia establishing military and economic links between the two separate states. They hoped that with Russian help the Ukrainian state could retrieve the lands it had lost and strengthen its statehood. The conference ruled out "any orientation on the imperialist politics of the Entente". On the Socialist Inter-

²¹ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 3, p. 48; No. 7, pp. 49–51. When Hrushevs'kyi wrote to the TsK KP(b)U in July 1920, he cited the meetings in Berlin as having given him confidence that the UPSR and KP(b)U could cooperate. See below.

²² For more on Shtefan's relationship with the Bolsheviks, see Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vykonnykh Orhaniv (TsDAVO) f. 4, op. 1, spr. 560, ark. 3, 52, 78, 81.

national, the conference stated that the creation of a real International in which Communists, revolutionary socialists and social democrats of the reformist type were represented would be very beneficial for the interests of the socialist movement.²³

Hrushevs'kyi then settled down near Vienna, which became the centre for the Foreign Delegation's activity. Another of Hrushevs'kyi's projects in emigration, the Ukrainian Sociological Institute, was also moved to the Austrian capital. The institute had been set up in Geneva in October 1919 and moved with the historian to Prague and then Vienna. Its purpose was to study socio-political movements in different countries and disseminate the results of this research among the various Ukrainian communities. At the same time, it should also inform foreign organisations and parties about socio-political developments in Ukraine and about Ukrainian history and literature. Behind these academic aims, there were political goals: this exchange of information was a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of relations between Ukraine and other governments or foreign oppositional movements which might take power. Moreover, the institute was dominated by members of the Ukrainian left, and the UPSR in particular. In addition to the émigré SRs (Chechel', Khrystiuk, Shapoval, Shtefan and Shrah), the project's collaborators included Volodymyr Starosols'kyi, a specialist in law and politics and a member of the Galician Social-Democratic Party, Dmytro Antonovych, founder of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, the leading Social Democrat Volodymyr Mazurenko, the Galician publicist Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi and Hrushevs'kyi's own daughter, Kateryna. The institute published in total 13 monographs written by its members. From February 1921 the group organised lectures in the Ukrainian workers' organisation in Vienna, *Iednist'*, on subjects ranging from an introductory course on sociology (given by Chechel') and the construction of a socialist economy (Mazurenko) to the history of the Ukrainian revolution (Khrystiuk) and cooperativism and socialism (Shtefan).²⁴

Despite the importance of Vienna as a centre for the émigré SRs, it was in Prague that party conferences took place. The second conference, between 24th and 26th April, damned the "so-called" Ukrainian governments of Petliura, Mazepa and Petrushevych for siding with international capital, the Polish gentry and Rumanian boyars against the Ukrainian labouring people. The conference adopted a new position on the Socialist International. Whereas at the first conference the Foreign Delegation had favoured the creation of an International including reformist socialists, now the Delegation unreservedly declared its solidarity with the Third International, arguing that in the coming struggle between the international proletariat and capitalism only the dictatorship of the labouring masses could ensure the victory of socialism. It therefore pronounced that it would no longer take part in the Second International, but would rather work on the basis of the platform of the Third International and try to gain acceptance into it.²⁵ News of the Polish attack on Ukraine had not reached the Foreign Delegation during their second conference. However, at the third conference of 22nd to 24th of May this was the main topic of discussion. Here, the delegation de-

²³ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 1, pp. 57.

²⁴ IRYNA MATIASH *Ukrains'kyi Sotsiologichnyi Instytut M. S. Hrushevs'koho: osnovni napriamy ta etapy diialnosti* in: *Ukrains'kyi Istoryk* (2000) No. 4, pp. 44–56, here pp. 46–50; V. A. POTULNYTS'KYI *Naukova diialnist' M. S. Hrushevs'koho v emihratsii [1919–1924 rr.]* in: *Ukrains'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* (1992) No. 2, pp. 48–57, here pp. 49–51; P. S. SOKHAN', V. I. ULIANOV'S'KYI, S. M. KIRZHAIEV *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i Academia*. Kyiv 1993, pp. 199–204.

²⁵ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 1, pp. 59–60.

nounced the Poles' invasion of Ukraine as "a shameful, wicked attack on Ukraine" and Petliura, the Ukrainian leader who had allied with the Poles, as "a Ukrainian traitor".²⁶

The UPSR was becoming even more radical, abandoning any idea of solidarity with moderate socialists and condemning the alliances made by the various Ukrainian governments (many of whose members subscribed to such a form of socialism) with Western states. In this way, it was undergoing a similar journey to that of the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP). This grouping was made up of former members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which like the UPSR had played a central role in the revolution. It was led by the prominent writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko. The Foreign Group of the UKP also claimed to stand on the platform of the Third International and like the Foreign Delegation advocated reconciliation with the Bolsheviks and return to Ukraine. On the basis of this common ground, the two groups formed the "Soviet-Revolutionary Bloc" in February 1920. The Bloc aimed to create an independent Ukrainian socialist soviet republic within its ethnic boundaries and to achieve socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat. They refused to make any concessions or agreements with the bourgeois powers.²⁷ The Marxists in the Foreign Group of the UKP saw this as a natural transition from Social Democracy to Communism. The SRs, whose socialism was not derived from Marx, occupied a more complex position, as will be seen in the next section.

Boritiesia-Poborete!

With the publication of the first issue of *Boritiesia-Poborete!* ("Struggle and You Will Overcome") in September 1920, the Foreign Delegation began to set out their stance in more detail. The journal included contributions from Hrushevs'kyi, Chechel', Shrah, Shapoval and Khrystiuk. However, the historian set the tone for the organ and his articles expounded the program of the group most fully. Though this program underwent a number of changes, the first six issues, published between September 1920 and March 1921, maintained a consistent standpoint and can be treated together.

The journal began by reaffirming the populist heritage of the UPSR. As Hrushevs'kyi wrote in the opening article of the first issue, "The Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries and its task": "I was raised in the old tradition of Ukrainian radical populism which derived its ideology from the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius and which was convinced that in conflicts between the people and the state the blame always lay on the side of the state, because the good of the labouring people is the highest law for every social organisation".²⁸ He presented the UPSR as being the bearer of this tradition and identified the essence of its program as a combination of socialism and national liberation.²⁹ However, he also argued that this dictated reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. As populists the UPSR must "be with the people and under no circumstances separate from the people",³⁰ who, he argued elsewhere, desired "to come to a sincere and lasting understanding with the Bolsheviks" because they respected the Bolsheviks' "decisive, ruthless, strict punishment of the

²⁶ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, p. 61.

²⁷ *Nova Doba*, No. 1, p. 2. For the Foreign Delegation's understanding of the word "independent", see below.

²⁸ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, p. 12.

²⁹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, pp. 8–9, 19.

³⁰ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, p. 2.

bourgeois".³¹ However, the fate of the Ukrainian labouring classes would also be determined by the development of the revolution in the rest of the world. The Bolsheviks had "grown into the leaders of the world socialist movement, on whom the whole of the labouring world, all those wronged and short-changed by the present capitalist regime, looks with trust and love. Whatever the mistakes of the Bolshevik leaders in Ukrainian politics [...] it is necessary to avoid conflict with Bolshevism in every way, respecting the universal meaning of the socialist revolution which it leads." As Hrushevs'kyi made clear in the article "Between Moscow and Warsaw", written in June 1920, opposition to the Bolsheviks while the Poles were attacking the Soviet republics with the help of the Ukrainian "petty bourgeois" was a "stab in the back" against the revolution.³² In this way, Hrushevs'kyi defined populism as having its logical conclusion in support for the Third International.

Hrushevs'kyi's argument went against the intellectual trend which came to dominate the Ukrainian emigration in the 1920s. This ideology stressed that class and party differences should be subordinated to the interests of the nation and the state. Hrushevs'kyi was arguing the opposite: that it was better to ally with revolutionary Russians than be on the side of reactionary Ukrainians. The historian expressed his contempt for the doctrine of partylessness and national unity in another article, "A Letter to Youth", published in *Nash Stiah*, the organ of socialist Ukrainian youth in Vienna. This "Letter" was addressed to the young people of Galicia and dealt primarily with Galician politics. He complained that the Galicians had refused to adopt firm party principles in the name of national solidarity. Consequently, during the revolution the Galicians had regularly changed sides. First they had gone over to Denikin, then to the Bolsheviks, and after that, as the servants of the Entente, to the Poles.³³ Clearly, Hrushevs'kyi believed the subordination of party affiliations to the dubious goal of creating an independent Ukrainian state was a recipe for political fickleness; this could only be avoided by remaining true to a political platform. For the historian this meant taking the side of world revolution led by Russia.

Indeed, reconciliation with Soviet Russia represented a continuation of the pre-war populist rejection of Ukrainian independence and emphasis on federation. In his article on the "Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party and its Task", the historian stressed "that we never were supporters of independence in the popular, vulgar understanding of this word", as they had never been enthusiastic about possessing their own army, police, prisons and all the other distasteful attributes bound up with statehood, preferring instead that responsibility for these areas be transferred to the level of federal government. Ukrainian populists had met Iuliian Bachyns'kyi's call for an independent Ukraine "with extreme scepticism, fearing that from this egg of independence would hatch chauvinist reaction and all kinds of nationalist adventures"; indeed he claimed that during the revolution the slogan for an independent Ukraine became a call to struggle against socialism.³⁴ Hrushevs'kyi did admit that in the war against Russia the call for Ukrainian independence had also become intertwined with the healthy idea of the sovereignty of the labouring Ukrainian people and their struggle against colonial exploitation. However, after three years of struggle between the slogans of an independent Ukraine and a federal Soviet Russia, such phrases had become so contorted, containing both positive and negative elements, that it was necessary to separate the good and

³¹ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 2, p. 5.

³² Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 2, pp. 12–13.

³³ ARKADII ZHUKOV'S'KYI Politychna i publitsystychna diialnist' M. S. Hrushevs'koho na emihratsii, 1919–1924 rr. in: *Ukrains'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* (2002) No. 1, pp. 96–125, here p. 118.

³⁴ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 1, pp. 46–48. The quotation is on p. 46.

bad within them. It would be impossible to rebuild Ukrainian life without reconciliation and understanding with Russia, in part because the Bolsheviks were the leaders of the world revolution.³⁵ However, the Bolsheviks had themselves discredited the old idea of a federal Russia by treating Ukraine as a province of Moscow. Ukraine must have genuine autonomy and control over her own affairs. For Hrushevs'kyi, the only solution was that Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia both enter, as equal members, a European federation of socialist states.³⁶ It is true that some of the contributors to *Boritiesia-Poborete!* sometimes described their goal as being an independent, soviet Ukraine. However, Shrah, for example, made it clear that independence should only be temporary: it would allow individual countries to develop sufficiently that they could enter into a federation as equal partners.³⁷

Clearly, the journal's pro-Soviet stance did not prevent *Boritiesia-Poborete!* from drawing attention to the failures of Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. Hrushevs'kyi's main charge against the Bolsheviks was that of centralism. Above all, the Bolsheviks had not fulfilled their promise to recognise the rights of nations to national self-determination and had tied Ukraine ever more closely to Moscow, which continued to control the commissariats to do with diplomacy, war, economy, finance and communications. The Bolsheviks had inherited the old regime's suspicion towards Ukraine, as could be seen in the fact that the Russian language continued to dominate the business of government. A second element of Bolshevik centralism was the refusal to tolerate in Ukraine those non-Bolshevik parties which supported the soviet system, the *Borot'bisty* and the *Ukapisty*.³⁸ The former had been forced to disband their party and join the Bolsheviks and the latter were prevented from working openly. Thirdly, the Bolsheviks had not understood the need to ally with the Ukrainian village. The countryside remained foreign to the Bolsheviks; a place where they did not dare to venture. The Ukrainian peasant viewed the Bolsheviks as aliens and were therefore susceptible to the anti-Semitic gossip against them. Bolshevik rule was not based on popular consent but rather on the bayonets of the occupying Red Army.³⁹ The charge of centralism against the Bolsheviks was central to the stance taken in *Boritiesia-Poborete!*. Shrah's analysis of the constitution of the RFSFR argued that the idea of federation between Russia and Ukraine was a fiction because in reality Ukraine was ruled directly from Moscow.⁴⁰ As Chechel' argued, this centralism was echoed in Bolshevik economic policy, which was based on the idea of Moscow as the centre, thereby excluding the peasants from industrial planning and ruining the peripheries.⁴¹

When *Boritiesia-Poborete!* criticised the national policy of the Bolsheviks, it did not merely do so out of concern for Ukrainian national sensibilities, but also because it believed this harmed the socialist revolution. Hrushevs'kyi feared that the disregard for Ukraine would push genuine supporters of the revolution into the hands of nationalists like Petliura and help the victory of counterrevolution in Ukraine.⁴² Therefore, wrote Shrah, "not only

³⁵ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, p. 48.

³⁶ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, p. 49.

³⁷ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, pp. 35–37.

³⁸ The term *Ukapisty* denotes the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP), which had broken off from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party and advocated the creation of an independent, Ukrainian soviet state. They resisted the Bolsheviks until they were forced to dissolve in 1925. See *MACE Communism* pp.74–83.

³⁹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, pp. 7–12.

⁴⁰ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 7, pp. 5–6.

⁴¹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 4, pp. 25–26.

⁴² *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, p. 16.

will it [centralisation] put a further break on the movement of the socialist revolution, but it will possibly cause the loss of its achievements".⁴³ Thus, the Foreign Delegation's critique remained internal criticism within the socialist camp. It did not hope to bring about the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, but rather to achieve the goals of the Bolsheviks themselves. This is also evident in the language in *Boritiesia-Poborete!*. The journal, for example, talked not of the sovereignty of Ukraine, but rather that of "the Labouring People of Ukraine".⁴⁴ The Foreign Delegation had come up with a particularly socialist redefinition of Ukraine: only those who laboured, including the labouring intelligentsia, belonged to the nation.

The Foreign Delegation posited their agrarian socialism as a corrective to the Bolsheviks' Marxism. Shrah argued that the Bolsheviks did not understand the national question because they had adopted the postulates of Marx, which were hostile to the rights of smaller nations. The refusal of many Russian Communists even to recognise the existence of Ukraine was therefore not merely an expression of Russian chauvinism, but rather an error committed by the socialists of great powers in general.⁴⁵ The Bolsheviks had also accepted the Marxist claim that the proletariat was the leading revolutionary class. They had failed to see that in Ukraine the peasants played this role.⁴⁶ In contrast, Hrushevs'kyi invoked the slogan of the Russian populists with his call "to the village". He argued that the village was "the basic, firm, safe cell of social and economic organisation which the Ukrainian revolution gave us and on which it is necessary to found all other construction". The villages would elect *vo-lost'* and higher soviets, and would thus be the root of the future political administration of Ukraine. Economic planning would be transferred to the lowest level so that it was as close to the village as possible. The historian believed that with the introduction of mechanisation in the village, the peasant would have more time for intellectual pursuits, making the villages cultural centres as well.⁴⁷ Here Hrushevs'kyi continued to emphasise the decentralisation which had been at the core of the populist tradition.

The group therefore rejected any suggestion that the UPSR should enter the KP(b)U. Hrushevs'kyi argued in "The Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries and its Task" that only a separate Ukrainian soviet party representing the peasants could bring about the necessary revisions in the Bolsheviks' policy. The Bolsheviks themselves were too rooted in the proletariat to be able to do this: "A Ukrainian soviet party has to exist because only they can guarantee the active participation of the Ukrainian labouring people in the socialist revolution". The Russian and Ukrainian soviet parties should form a common front against counterrevolution and reaction.⁴⁸ One could describe this argument as "soviet pluralism". However, what was left unsaid was that the Foreign Delegation clearly believed that the party representing the peasantry would take on the more prominent role in the soviet bloc in Ukraine. Because the peasantry were the largest class in Ukraine, far outnumbering that of the urban proletariat, and the main bearer of revolutionary ideology in the country, the

⁴³ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 8, p. 10.

⁴⁴ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, p. 48. This is just one example of the turn of phrase, which appears repeatedly on the pages of the journal.

⁴⁵ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, pp. 27, 38–39.

⁴⁶ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, pp. 58–59.

⁴⁷ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 4, pp. 6–7, 9–11. The quotation here is to be found on p. 6. The economic aspects of the argument were put in more detail by the article written by Chechel', which followed Hrushevs'kyi's contribution. See *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 4, pp. 21–39.

⁴⁸ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 1, pp. 2–3, 25–26; The quotation is on p. 26.

Ukrainian Soviet state would take on more of a peasant character. This would mean that the party representing that class, the UPSR, would come to head it. The KP(b)U, as the representative of the urban proletariat, would presumably only have a supporting function.

This position determined the relationship of the Foreign Delegation to the other Ukrainian soviet parties. Chechel' criticised the *Borot'bisty* for becoming the "tools" of the Russian Communists in Ukraine and praised the *Ukapisty* for maintaining their independence. This was also the point of divergence with the Foreign Group of the UKP. When the Group wrote to the Foreign Delegation suggesting that together they merge with the KP(b)U, the Foreign Delegation rejected the proposal. In their reply, the SRs stressed that they supported the Bolsheviks' struggle against capitalism. However, they added that their party was socialist, not Communist, because it saw the peasants as the leading revolutionary class in Ukraine. They therefore reiterated their support for a common revolutionary front over amalgamation. It was as a result of this disagreement that the soviet bloc formed by the two émigré groups dissolved in July 1920.⁴⁹

In view of these tensions, it is unsurprising that *Boritiesia-Poborete!* was highly critical of the visit by the leader of the Foreign Group of the UKP, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, to Moscow. Vynnychenko had travelled to the Russian capital in May 1920 in order to put his program of reconciliation into practice. He was disappointed by his efforts and returned to the West in September a critic of the Soviet system. Shrah felt that Vynnychenko's letter damning the Soviet regime, published in the organ of the Foreign Group, confirmed the position of the UPSR journal. The criticisms levelled by Vynnychenko (centralism, Russo-centrism, bureaucratism, and hostility towards the Ukrainian village from the part of the Muscovite-Jewish leaders of the Ukrainian town) had all been referred to on the pages of *Boritiesia-Poborete!*. The critical stance which the UPSR journal had always maintained was in stark contrast to Vynnychenko's unreserved support for the Bolsheviks before he left for Moscow. However, Vynnychenko's new position also came in for criticism. Shrah pointed out that in his letter Vynnychenko admitted that there were moments when he thought that he was wrong, that centralism was weakening and that there was a genuine chance for democratic federalism. Thus, wrote Shrah, "maybe it wasn't necessary to abandon the Ukraine, but rather to make further preparations, gather forces, conduct further the struggle for the implementation of the foundations of a truly soviet and truly Ukrainian regime". As Shrah observed, nobody was in a more favourable position than Vynnychenko to create a powerful, united revolutionary-soviet front in Ukraine. Shrah was convinced of the possibility of achieving this, because "from the many announcements and works of prominent Russian Communists it is obvious that they also see, know and understand well their mistakes, faults and errors, but are not in the position to correct them at once".⁵⁰

One can find many such affirmations of the Bolsheviks' good intentions on the pages of *Boritiesia-Poborete!*. "There is no doubt about the Bolsheviks' good will" wrote Hrushevs'kyi in "Between Moscow and Warsaw".⁵¹ Moreover, Shrah argued that to criticise the policy of the Bolsheviks did not mean to oppose them: "If we highlight the national policy of the Russian Bolsheviks which they still at this moment mistakenly conduct in Ukraine and condemn it, then this does not mean that all the same we do not also see those steps forward in the national question, which according to the iron dictate of life the Russian Bolsheviks, and not only their leaders but also broader circles, have made." He listed these ad-

⁴⁹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, pp. 53–56, 58–59.

⁵⁰ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 4, pp. 39–41. The quotations are both on p. 41.

⁵¹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, p. 11.

vances. Ukrainians were no longer hated and persecuted, as they had been in 1917. There could be no doubt that the existence of the Ukrainian nation was now a fact. The period in which the Ukrainian language was suspected to be counterrevolutionary was over. New commissariats, which federation had not envisaged, had been created in the areas of post, transport and finance. The declaration of the sovereign rights of the Ukrainian nation was being increasingly used in the phraseology and vocabulary of the Soviet Russian government. A group had appeared within the KP(b)U of Ukrainian and Russian Communist who supported these new principles of Communist rule.⁵²

The attempt to legalise the UPSR

The contributors to *Boritiesia-Poborete!* identified three main errors of Bolshevik centralism: its disregard for the Ukrainian nationality, its exclusion of the village from the revolution and its refusal to allow non-Bolshevik parties to work in Ukraine. As mentioned above, they believed that only the UPSR could overcome the national and peasant problems. Consequently, they were convinced that it was necessary that the party be allowed to function openly in Ukraine. The correction of the last fault would lead to the rectification of the other two. One of the first tasks for the Foreign Delegation, therefore, was to achieve the legalisation of the UPSR.

In July 1920 Hrushevs'kyi and Zhukovs'kyi wrote to the Central Committee of the KP(b)U in a letter setting out their party's program. They began by acknowledging that the Bolsheviks were the leaders of the world socialist revolution. This was accompanied by an admission of the UPSR's error in trying to isolate Ukraine from the world revolution by seeking to acquire Ukrainian independence in a bloc with the bourgeois parties. On the other hand, they pointed to the fact that the war between Ukraine and Soviet Russia harmed the world socialist revolution. Consequently, the Foreign Delegation declared that "the UPSR has abandoned struggle with Soviet Russia, refused to support the nationalist attempts based on the support of the European bourgeois and accepted the principles of the Third International". They went on to express their confidence that the two parties could cooperate: "Since the UPSR shares the goals of the Third International and your party has not abandoned the slogan of the free self-determination of nations, we are certain that full agreement and coordination of the activity of the UPSR with the plenum of the KPB, united in the general interests of the socialist revolution, are attainable". The Foreign Delegation's meetings with the Soviet representative in Berlin had convinced them of this.⁵³

In the letter, the two representatives of the Foreign Delegation then made a number of observations on the situation in Ukraine. They criticised (as they later did in *Boritiesia-Poborete!*) Bolshevik centralism, the Communists' alienation from the villages, their undermining of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and their refusal to allow other soviet parties to work openly in Ukraine. They concluded that "in its present form the Soviet regime does not have any chances of attaining a foothold in Ukraine" and that if it did not introduce reform, the regime threatened "to bury both itself and [its] Communist slogans". Consequently, in order to preserve the Soviet system, the KPB "must strive towards transferring power in the Ukrainian SSR to the Ukrainian soviet parties, and that as quickly

⁵² *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, pp. 46–47.

⁵³ Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads'kykh Obednan' (TsDAHO) f. 1, op. 20, spr. 194, ark. 33–34.

as possible". This could only be achieved by cooperating with these parties. In addition, Hrushevs'kyi and Zhukovs'kyi called for the restoration of Ukrainian independence following recent directives on the federation of the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics which seemed to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. They were in favour of a federation of socialist republics, but were against any attempt to treat Ukraine as a region which must be tied to Russia more closely than any other republic.⁵⁴

Though the letter opened with an admission of the mistakes of the UPSR by Hrushevs'kyi and Zhukovs'kyi, the tone is clearly one of admonishment. One might wonder at the audacity of two émigrés writing to a ruling party with demands that this party change its policy. However, if one takes them at their word, namely that they genuinely believed that if the Soviet regime did not begin to cooperate with Ukrainian parties like the UPSR or the UKP then it would collapse due to lack of support in the villages, then one can see why the Foreign Delegation felt that their policy of seeking legalisation for their party would work: the very conditions in Ukraine would force the Soviet regime to make compromises. The Foreign Delegation believed that the rural character of Ukraine would mean that the peasants had to be the main prop of a Ukrainian Soviet state. Consequently, the party representing the countryside, the UPSR, would come to play the main role in the organisation of the state, eclipsing even the KP(b)U. This may have been the reason for the somewhat high-handed attitude evident in the letter. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the letter went unanswered and it was only in 1921 that the Politburo began to deal with the question of the legalisation of the UPSR and the return of its émigré members.

The line taken by Hrushevs'kyi and Zhukovs'kyi was also made more difficult by opposition from other members of the UPSR abroad. One of the leading opponents of the Foreign Delegation's position was Shapoval. This may be seen in his article "The Socialist Revolution in Russia and Ukraine", which was published in *Boritiesia-Poborete!*. Shapoval held many of the beliefs to be found in the rest of the journal: he stressed that the Bolsheviks were the leaders of the world revolution; he saw the service which they had rendered for Ukraine in fighting capitalism in the country; he criticised them for following the doctrine of Marxism, which underestimated both the national question and the role of the village in the revolution; he felt that the peasants of Ukraine were being pushed away from participation in the revolution because of the mistakes in Bolshevik policy and that this was harming the world socialist revolution.⁵⁵ However, he went further in his condemnation of the Bolsheviks and was much more sceptical about their ability to reform. He wrote that neither an independent Ukraine nor a federation between Russia and Ukraine existed: these were merely fictions used by Moscow to ease the incorporation of Ukraine into a one and indivisible Russia.⁵⁶ It was Shapoval's conviction that "the Bolsheviks are first Russians and then revolutionaries"⁵⁷ which distinguished him from the other contributors to the journal: the Russian mentality of the Bolsheviks meant that they would not allow Ukraine to follow her own path to socialism once counterrevolution had been defeated. Shapoval even wrote that Hrushevs'kyi encouraged the Bolsheviks to take this stance when he expressed his support for the Soviet system.⁵⁸ Though Shapoval felt that Lenin himself had recognised the dangers

⁵⁴ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 20, spr. 194, ark. 34–36.

⁵⁵ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 3, pp. 1–44.

⁵⁶ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 3, p. 30.

⁵⁷ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 3, p. 17.

⁵⁸ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 3, p. 16.

for the revolution of Russian chauvinism in Ukraine, he doubted that Lenin and his followers could overcome the Russian psychological inheritance.⁵⁹

The split in the UPSR abroad was fuelled by personal animosity between Shapoval and Hrushevs'kyi which went back to the revolution. As one can see from Shapoval's diary, there were regular arguments within the two émigré groupings of the UPSR about the revolution. Shapoval, who had supported the Directory, stressed its centrality to the Ukrainian revolution, whereas the Hrushevs'kyi camp argued that it had undone the work of the Central Rada. Shapoval also accused Hrushevs'kyi of having invited the Germans into Ukraine while he was head of the Central Rada. These disagreements heated up with the return of Vynnychenko to the emigration in September 1920. At the end of 1920 Vynnychenko gave a report to the UPSR in Prague about his visit to Ukraine. The dismal picture of the situation there confirmed Shapoval's critical stance towards the Bolsheviks. However, it also brought about further polarisation in the group. Zhukovs'kyi opposed the version given by Vynnychenko and read out another report on the situation in Ukraine by the pro-Soviet Social Democrat Serhii Vikul, which gave a far more positive portrait of conditions in the Ukrainian SSR. Shapoval's resolution on the matter was accepted against Zhukovs'kyi's opposition. A further issue of disagreement was whether the various socialist Ukrainian factions abroad should consolidate as one party. On this matter Shapoval was in favour of forming a common front with Vynnychenko, whereas Hrushevs'kyi and Zhukovs'kyi were opposed to this. Shapoval believed that Hrushevs'kyi's opposition to a united front was motivated by nothing more than personal hate for Vynnychenko.⁶⁰

The fourth conference of the UPSR in emigration, which took place in Prague between 18th and 23rd January 1921, brought these tensions to a head. According to Shapoval, in the run up to the conference the members of the Prague group were becoming increasingly impatient with Hrushevs'kyi and Zhukovs'kyi.⁶¹ The conference was characterised by controversies and protest: a meeting of Shapoval's supporters during the break caused objection, as did Shapoval's charge that Chechel's report on the economic program was different to the text which he had been shown previously. The Prague group opposed a favourable report by Khrystiuk on the Soviet Ukraine. In his diary Shapoval wrote that it was "not to the point [...] the [Ukrainian Soviet] government is not a government, [rather they are] Russifiers, nominated from Moscow, retarding the revolution of social and national liberation, ruining economic life and destroying the proletariat". On the 21st two more SRs, Hryhoriiv and Rzhepets'kyi, arrived from Paris. Hryhoriiv informed the conference that the TsK of the party was against the line being taken by the Foreign Delegation. This had a dramatic effect on the conference, and even Khrystiuk had to modify the text of his speech.⁶²

The resolution which appeared in *Boritiesia-Poborete!* very much bears the mark of Shapoval's group. Though the conference renounced any efforts to overthrow the present government in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks were roundly condemned for following a "one and indivisible, Great Russian, Muscovite policy". The conference called on the Soviet government and the Russian proletariat in Ukraine to abandon this policy for the good of the world socialist revolution. Instead they should support the independence of a Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, which would, the conference believed, enter a union with Soviet Russia.

⁵⁹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 3, pp. 42–43.

⁶⁰ MYKYTA SHAPOVAL *Shchodennyk*. Vid 22 liutoho 1919r. do 31 hrudnia 1924r. I. Chastyna. New York 1958, pp. 44–46.

⁶¹ SHAPOVAL *Shchodennyk* p. 49.

⁶² *Ibidem* pp. 51–52.

The system of commissariats should be abandoned and peasant and worker soviets organised in the regions as the only organs of power. Lastly, the conference demanded that all Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian soviet parties, including the UPSR, be allowed to conduct their work among peasants and workers legally to strengthen Soviet power in Ukraine.⁶³

Following this divisive conference, the Prague SRs formed their own organisation, the Foreign Committee of the UPSR. It included Shapoval himself and another member of the Prague group, Hrytsai. The new group also received the support of members of the UPSR in exile in Poland, and two of these, Hryhoriiv and Mytsiuk, joined the new body.⁶⁴

As a result of the polarisation inside the UPSR abroad, the eighth issue of *Boritiesia-Poborete!*, from April-June 1921, bore witness to a marked change in the position of the Foreign Delegation. The issue contained, for example, the second instalment of Shrah's article on federalism and Ukraine's relationship to Soviet Russia. The article had been written in January 1921 and stayed true to the principles which the Foreign Delegation had held at that time. He wrote that federation with Soviet Russia was desirable, but that at the moment the Bolsheviks were following too centralist a policy towards Ukraine. He warned that the mistakes of the RKP threatened the achievements of the revolution, called for the correction of these errors and argued that a federation could only be attained on the basis of equality and voluntary consent.⁶⁵ The article was followed by a note which stated that since the article had been written, the situation in Ukraine had changed. The independence of Ukraine had been affirmed in international treaties, for example with Poland; in this way, Ukraine had made an appearance on the world stage of international relations. "The independence, if one can put it like that, of Ukraine has formally taken one enormous step forward" the note concluded. The appendix also quoted from a report in *Novyi Mir* which suggested that in a revised Russian-Ukrainian federation the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would be given control over its own economic affairs. The author was therefore "certain that under the pressure of life the constitution of mutual relations between both republics is approaching all the closer and closer genuine socialist realities, towards the type of socialist state union which we have tried to outline in our sketch".⁶⁶

The change in the Foreign Delegation's position can also be seen in an article by Hrushevs'kyi comparing the forceful suppression of the Paris Commune of 1871 to the revolution in Ukraine. Though the journal *Boritiesia-Poborete!* had repeatedly criticised the Bolsheviks' refusal to allow other socialist parties to operate freely in Ukraine, Hrushevs'kyi now praised the very ruthlessness with which the Soviet regime persecuted these parties. The article did say that that the present slogan of Communist dictatorship, which resembled the bourgeois' own methods of repression, might do more harm to the cause of revolution than the terror against the Paris Commune had done, and admitted the possibility that the "present sectarian exclusion and intolerance towards socialist non-Communist parties weakens the success of Communism more than the disunity of the Paris Commune". However, he went on to remind his readers that "the bourgeois, who are not obliged to worry about the interests of socialism and collectivism, must incline its head before the present Communist revolution and its leaders as people [...] who have sufficiently demonstrated their ability to

⁶³ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 7, pp. 58–60.

⁶⁴ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 9, p. 5.

⁶⁵ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 8, pp. 8–35.

⁶⁶ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 8, p. 36.

take power through the display of the capability to use its [the bourgeois'] methods with even more unscrupulousness and force".⁶⁷

The anniversary of the Paris Commune was not the only occasion for Hrushevs'kyi's article. The Central Committee of Hrushevs'kyi's own party had been convicted by a Soviet court and was sitting in a Bolshevik prison feeling the full brunt of the Soviet regime's "unscrupulousness and force". A condemnation of this sentence appeared in the same issue of the journal. The KP(b)U's dictatorship and the damage it did to the revolution were denounced. However, this did not turn the Foreign Delegation against the government in Ukraine. Rather, they called for the correction of these mistakes and the transition to genuine and sincere cooperation between the different soviet parties in Ukraine. The resolution ended by addressing the party in Ukraine, in particular the imprisoned members of the Central Committee. The Foreign Delegation expressed its "deep sympathy and comradely greetings", but also called on the TsK "not to give in to the impressions [created by] the mistakes of the present Communist regime and to stand firmly on the position taken: the reinforcement with all [their] strength of the party, the Soviet system and the deepening of the socialist revolution in Ukraine".⁶⁸ On 3rd July Hrushevs'kyi articulated similar thoughts in a private letter to the TsK. He reported that the Foreign Delegation was sending Chechel' to negotiate with Shums'kyi and that the arrest of the TsK would be the first issue of discussion.⁶⁹ The point to note here is not that the Foreign Delegation denounced the imprisonment of its own party leadership, which is not in itself surprising, but rather that even under these circumstances it hoped to come to an agreement with the Bolsheviks.

As the UPSR abroad began to split, the KP(b)U started considering the Foreign Delegation's desire to return more seriously. In January 1921, Shums'kyi reported to the Politburo of the KP(b)U that the Ukrainian historian wanted to come to Ukraine. This was rejected.⁷⁰ According to the historian himself, in February, at the time of the Riga conference, he was asked by the Soviet delegation to return to Ukraine to undertake cultural work, but refused due to the uncertainty about the Central Committee of the UPSR.⁷¹ In the same month, the Politburo met to discuss Vynnychenko. At the end of the discussion, the matter of Hrushevs'kyi was raised, but then, according to the Politburo resolutions, postponed.⁷² In April the Politburo considered the return of the historian and other SRs, but they decided that this was inopportune.⁷³ By 4th June this position had changed somewhat. The Politburo refused to legalise the UPSR, but would allow individual members of the party to enter Ukraine for private or Soviet work if they left the party and condemned it.⁷⁴ Thereafter, contact between the two groups intensified. In July 1921, the Foreign Delegation established links to the newly arrived Soviet plenipotentiary in Prague, Mykhailo Levyts'kyi. In June Chechel' was sent to Moscow and Kharkiv to conduct negotiations with the Soviet government.⁷⁵

⁶⁷ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 8, p. 7.

⁶⁸ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 8, p. 64.

⁶⁹ TsDAHO f. 8, op. 1, spr. 85, ark. 31.

⁷⁰ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 6, spr. 13, ark. 12.

⁷¹ Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv (TsDIA) f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 63, ark. 32zv.

⁷² PYRIH M. S. Hrushevs'kyi: mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu p. 60.

⁷³ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 6, spr. 13, ark. 86.

⁷⁴ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 6, spr. 13, ark. 112zv.

⁷⁵ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 560, ark. 44.

Towards the end of August, the Soviet mission in Prague turned to Hrushevs'kyi with a request that he take part in a campaign to buy and publish school books and belles-lettres for Ukraine in order to meet the shortfall there. A number of meetings between Hrushevs'kyi and the Soviet plenipotentiary took place at the end of August and beginning of September, in the course of which the latter also suggested that the Ukrainian historian take a role in organising aid for those Ukrainians suffering from famine.⁷⁶ Through these discussions, Levyts'kyi achieved an impression of the aims of Hrushevs'kyi and other members of the Foreign Delegation. His report gives an interesting picture of the Soviet view of the group. He described their goal of the legalisation of the UPSR and return as a party as being impossible because it would give them the "opportunity to develop their demagoguery about their correct point of view on the revolution and also about the correct line taken by the Central Rada and so on." He also recognised that it was impossible to allow them all to join the KP(b)U because, with two or three exceptions, they were far from being Communists. He did believe, however, that some members of the group would be "prominent and valuable" Soviet workers. As an alternative to the two impossible options of allowing the SRs to return as a party or to join the KP(b)U, he suggested that they be temporally allowed to form a party of "revolutionary Communism". He referred to the precedent of 1919 by which the *Borot'bisty* formed the Ukrainian Communist Party (*borot'bist*), after which they joined with the KP(b)U. The new party should be subject to the condition that they would not speak publicly against Soviet power, that they would not support the UKP and that they work towards strengthening the Soviet state. This party would act as a "transitory stage" towards joining the party. He believed that even those who were not prepared to join, among whom he assumed would be Hrushevs'kyi, could be accommodated in the Ukrainian SSR as partyless workers. He also warned against the dangers of not allowing them to return, for this would "give a trump in the hands of Petliurite agitation" by undermining the Bolshevik rhetoric on Ukraine.⁷⁷

Despite this progress in coming to an agreement with the Bolsheviks, the arrival in Prague of M. Balash as a representative of the TsK of the UPSR created new problems for the Foreign Delegation. On 11th July Zhukovs'kyi met Balash in the Czech capital where he informed the emissary that the Foreign Delegation stood "on the position of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks". Balash replied that "the TsK and the party in Ukraine do not stand on such a position" and that Chechel's negotiations with Kharkiv were taking place without the permission of the TsK. When Zhukovs'kyi pointed out that in a letter from 20th March 1921 the TsK ordered all foreign groups of the UPSR to subordinate themselves to the Foreign Delegation, Balash answered that at the time the letter was written, the TsK did not know what the platform of the Foreign Delegation was.⁷⁸ Balash therefore represented a significant challenge to the authority of the Foreign Delegation, which rested on the claim that it alone held the mandate of the party's leadership. Consequently, *Boritiesia-Poborete!* denied that Balash was an emissary of the TsK.⁷⁹

In response to this opposition the Foreign Delegation attempted to reassert its right as the sole representative of the UPSR abroad in a number of meetings over the summer. At a sitting of the group of 20th July 1921, the Foreign Delegation accused Shapoval's Foreign Committee of being a separatist group which hoped to destroy the unity of the UPSR in

⁷⁶ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 94, ark. 11, 24.

⁷⁷ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 560, ark. 60–61.

⁷⁸ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 62, ark. 58.

⁷⁹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 9, p. 19.

emigration. The Foreign Committee was also accused of not complying with the resolutions of the conference and the Foreign Delegation declared the opposing body dissolved. On 3rd August a further meeting took place at which the Foreign Delegation resolved to disband the Prague group of the UPSR. Shapoval especially came in for attack for his "intrigue", "careerism" and "lack of political principles".⁸⁰ In order to reaffirm their authority among the UPSR, Hrushevs'kyi's group published a letter from the TsK from the 5th of August in which the TsK confirmed the Foreign Delegation's position as its representative abroad, condemned separatism among its party members in the emigration and called on them not to take part in any groups working against the present government of Ukraine.⁸¹

At the end of August Chechel' returned from Ukraine. His description of his negotiations there strengthened the Foreign Delegation's feeling that the position which they had adopted was correct. As a result of the information which Chechel' brought back, the Foreign Delegation asserted, in a meeting of the 5th of September, that they recognised "the socialism of the present Soviet government of Ukraine and the absence within it of anti-nationalism towards Ukrainian tendencies" and saw as a result of this a confirmation of the position which they had adopted. The Foreign Delegation continued to criticise the regime for its refusal to legalise other socialist, soviet parties because it prevented a broadening of the social base of the revolution, which in turn was a "serious danger for the Soviet republics". However, the Foreign Delegation repeated that it had "not lost hope that under the influence of the requirements of life the RKP and KP(b)U will in time change its view".⁸²

Chechel's own description of his meetings with members of the Soviet government (Oleksandr Shums'kyi, Khristiiian Rakov's'kyi and Dmytro Manuil's'kyi) in Kharkiv does not seem to provide much basis for this optimism. Though Shums'kyi was in favour of allowing the return of the members of the UPSR, especially of Hrushevs'kyi, as individuals to cooperate in the reconstruction of Ukraine, he felt that the legalisation of the party was impossible. Shums'kyi argued that the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the rule of one party: to shift the social base of this dictatorship towards the peasants by allowing the UPSR into government would weaken it by diluting it with petty-bourgeois elements. The head of the Soviet Ukrainian government Rakov's'kyi would only allow the Foreign Delegation to return if they left the UPSR, but he also sought to convince Chechel' of the sincerity of the Soviet government in satisfying the national needs of the Ukrainian labouring people. Chechel' felt that he had convinced Manuil's'kyi of his group's earnestness and he parted with Manuil's'kyi with the impression that the Bolshevik would support legalisation; however, even in Chechel's account, the Soviet minister made no definite statement in favour of this.⁸³

Other information arriving from Ukraine gave evidence that the Foreign Delegation's hopes would not be fulfilled. By August, Zhukov's'kyi had replaced Chechel' as the Foreign Delegation's negotiator with the Ukrainian Soviet government. On the 24th of that month, he sent a letter to Hrushevs'kyi containing more dispiriting news. The secretary of the Foreign Delegation passed on an Agitprop report in which the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR was characterised as counterrevolutionary. He told Hrushevs'kyi that the effect of the document was that one's "desire to continue to conduct further negotiations with them [the Bolsheviks]

⁸⁰ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 9, pp. 17–23.

⁸¹ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 9, pp. 25–26.

⁸² Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 9, p. 27.

⁸³ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 9, p. 10–13.

disappears".⁸⁴ According to the document, the group around Hrushevs'kyi claimed to be a soviet party and stand on the general platform of the Third International, but interpreted this not as the dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather the dictatorship of the labouring masses. It aimed to return to Ukraine as a legal, soviet party, and to work as a loyal opposition. The author characterised this position as a version of the slogan "soviets without Communists" put forward by the Russian Kadet Miliukov. The author therefore accused Hrushevs'kyi of wanting to castrate Soviet power and adapting it to their petty-bourgeois interests.⁸⁵ Presumably, the letter had not reached Vienna in time for the discussion on the information brought back by Chechel'. However, by 10th September, Hrushevs'kyi, at least in private, was not showing the optimism of the recent resolution. He wrote to Vasyl' Kuziv, a Ukrainian activist in Canada, telling him that "we are not going to Ukraine because the Soviet government has not agreed to legalise the party of USSR", and that they had received instructions from their TsK to continue working abroad.⁸⁶

As can be seen from Levyts'kyi's letters to his superiors, the question of the legalisation of the UPSR was the major stumbling block in negotiations between the Foreign Delegation and the Soviet representatives abroad. However, he continued to hope that the group could be of use to the Soviet regime. On 10th September he wrote that Chechel''s return was beginning to polarise Hrushevs'kyi's group of SRs: though they all called for the legalisation of their party, in fact they held very different points of view, such that "the group is breaking up; part of them are for joining the KP(b)U and a part are for the legalisation of the party".⁸⁷ On the 21st Levyts'kyi reported that the Foreign Delegation had passed the above-mentioned resolution demanding the legalisation of the UPSR and that they intended to publish it. Levyts'kyi told his superiors that if the members of the delegation did publish their resolution, he would "enter into a decisive struggle against them". Despite these problems, the Soviet plenipotentiary still believed that some members of the party could be won over to co-operation. In a letter from December he mentioned that in addition to Shtefan, who was already active in the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Union, Shrah, Khrystiuk and Zhukovs'kyi were ready to take up work.⁸⁸

The plan of publishing school books for Ukraine was also facing problems. Though Hrushevs'kyi had not declined to be involved in the editorial board, he insisted on organising the enterprise in Vienna through an academic committee which would be a local branch of the Kyivan Scientific Society. Levyts'kyi, however, wanted to organise the venture through a publishing department subordinated to the Soviet delegation.⁸⁹ Although an agreement was signed on 14th September, it reflected the wishes of Hrushevs'kyi rather than those of the Soviet plenipotentiary.⁹⁰ Consequently, the concord did not last long. As early as the 23rd of that month, Levyts'kyi wrote to the historian telling him that the school book matter would be organised through the Soviet trade mission, thereby going back on the decision made less than two weeks before. Attempts to clear up the differences through negotia-

⁸⁴ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 64, ark. 10.

⁸⁵ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 20, spr. 761, ark. 186–187.

⁸⁶ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 144zv.

⁸⁷ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 560, ark. 68–68zv.

⁸⁸ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 560, ark. 76–78.

⁸⁹ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 560, ark. 78.

⁹⁰ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 94, ark. 24.

tions between Zhukovs'kyi and Novakovs'kyi of the Soviet trade mission proved fruitless. The materials and mandate necessary for the project were not sent to Hrushevs'kyi.⁹¹

As a result of these setbacks Hrushevs'kyi had, by autumn 1921, given up hope of returning to Ukraine soon. Still, he remained convinced of the necessity of coming to a reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. He told Kuziv in a letter from 25th October that he wanted to build an independent socialist movement in Ukraine which the Bolsheviks would have to take into consideration and compromise with. The historian was "convinced that an understanding with the Bolsheviks is very necessary for us, but not their fall, which would inflict new ruin and reaction on Ukraine". He did not think that he and his group would be able to return immediately to Ukraine and that at the moment it was better to do literary work abroad.⁹²

These opinions were echoed in an open letter sent to the Galician journal *Vpered* four days later. The letter was intended as an answer to rumours of Hrushevs'kyi's return to Ukraine. He reported that he had refused the requests from the Soviet authorities to return to the Ukraine to take up academic work because he was not prepared to renounce political activity. He said that he would remain abroad and continue his activity as a member of the Foreign Delegation of the UPSR and organiser of the Ukrainian Sociological Institute. However, he also wrote that he remained convinced "that in the interests of the Ukrainian people, Ukrainian society regardless of differences of opinion must devote its strength to cultural building within the framework of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, filling this framework of proclaimed Ukrainian independence with a living content, and on the other hand, that the ruling Communist party, in order to save [its] social-revolutionary achievements, must bind itself as closely as possible to the Ukrainian socialist soviet parties, summon them to work and make [them] partners in state and social soviet construction". His negotiations with the ruling party in Ukraine had shown that it was not ready for this, which meant that all those who had abandoned struggle with the Bolsheviks must "once more arm themselves with patience and hand the matter over to the only negotiator – time".⁹³ Even this late, Hrushevs'kyi remained convinced that an acceptance by the Bolsheviks of other Ukrainian socialist parties was inevitable.

Hrushevs'kyi was only right in so far as the government in Soviet Ukraine really had abandoned cooperation with the Foreign Delegation. On 18th October the Politburo of the KP(b)U decided to end the activity of the organisation for famine relief in Ukraine headed by Hrushevs'kyi.⁹⁴ Levyts'kyi also reported the failure of the school book project with the explanation that "it was only a project, we did not finally come to an agreement and I personally declared to him that if he published his resolution, which was triggered by the arrival of Chechel' from Ukraine, then we would sever whatever relationship there might be". He admitted that with the exception of Shtefan he had failed to attract Hrushevs'kyi's SRs towards cooperation.⁹⁵ One should not be too surprised that a resolution which actually represented the commitment of the Foreign Delegation to compromise with the Bolsheviks brought about the collapse of these attempts: the Bolsheviks and Foreign Delegation had entirely different understandings of the prerequisites for cooperation. The Foreign Delegation felt that an understanding would have to be between two equal, socialist parties. For the Bol-

⁹¹ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 10, p. 29.

⁹² TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 5–5zv.

⁹³ Boritiesia-Poborete! No. 10, pp. 30–31. The quotation is from p. 31.

⁹⁴ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 6, spr. 30, ark. 81.

⁹⁵ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 560, ark. 81.

sheviks, the only basis for cooperation was the subordination of the individual members of the UPSR to Soviet authority.

In response to these disappointments, Hrushevs'kyi wrote an angry letter to Rakovs'kyi on 5th November, which was published in the 10th issue of *Boritiesia-Poborete!*. The historian began by describing the hopes for successful cooperation that he and his comrades had entertained following Chechel's visit to Ukraine. Believing this, he had entered into the agreement of 14th September.⁹⁶ However, the agreement had not been implemented because the Bolsheviks wanted the Foreign Delegation to abandon politics completely, to renounce their support for the imprisoned TsK and to merely serve as bureaucrats under the commissariats. Hrushevs'kyi stressed that one can not see this as an individual incident, but rather evidence of the Bolsheviks' refusal to make peace with the Ukrainian intelligentsia in preference for a policy of attacking them.⁹⁷ Hrushevs'kyi then repeated many of the criticisms which he and his party had levelled against the KP(b)U: its bureaucratism, isolation from the Ukrainian people and its lack of independence. He also reiterated the warning that the regime's failings drove supporters of the revolution from the socialist camp.⁹⁸ Hrushevs'kyi ended by stressing that he had "never wanted 'the Bolsheviks to fall' after having not survived their own system, and drag along with them the achievements of the revolution and the prospects of socialism into obscurity". He appealed to Rakovs'kyi "as a socialist to a socialist, in the name of the common interests of the world revolution" to renounce party exclusivity and to introduce into the construction of the Soviet state what the historian called living content and living forces, which he believed would enable it to defend itself from the impending cataclysm.⁹⁹

The letter told the Soviet Ukrainian leader that only concessions by his side could create the possible conditions for cooperation; the UPSR had done everything it could. Several months later Hrushevs'kyi explained this to the émigré poet Oles'. He wrote: "I do not have any intention of seeking a meeting with Rakovs'kyi following this open letter, to which I can not add anything, especially due to your conjecture that 'he deigns to be angry'. After such an original ending to the negotiations on cooperation, started by their side, what can I propose? Only they, or he, can revive them."¹⁰⁰ Though the historian may have had little hope that Rakovs'kyi would respond, it was not the letter in itself which ended the attempt to legalise the UPSR, but rather Kharkiv's failure to reply.

Indeed, elsewhere in the 10th issue of *Boritiesia-Poborete!* the picture of Soviet Ukraine was less negative. Khrystiuk's analysis of the introduction of NEP reminded the reader that the resolution on the subject coincided with the beliefs which the UPSR had long held.¹⁰¹ Though Khrystiuk criticised the exclusion of the other soviet parties, he added "we are convinced that the best elements of the Bolshevik-Communists themselves will recognise on cold reflection that such 'indiscrimination' is dangerous as a method of political struggle".¹⁰²

⁹⁶ R. IA. PYRIH (ed.) Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istorieiu ta politykoiu (1920–1930-ti roky). Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv. Kyiv 1997, pp. 19–21.

⁹⁷ Ibidem pp. 21–22.

⁹⁸ Ibidem pp. 23–25.

⁹⁹ Ibidem pp. 25–26. The quotation is on p. 26.

¹⁰⁰ LIUBOMYR VYNAR (ed.) Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho. Vol. 1. Kyiv 1997, pp. 236–237.

¹⁰¹ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 10, p. 17.

¹⁰² *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 10, pp. 24–25.

NEP and other changes in the Bolshevik policy were confirmation that the UPSR had adopted the correct stance towards the Bolsheviks.¹⁰³

In private the historian had not abandoned hope of returning to Ukraine. He told Kuziv in December 1921 that he hoped to go back the following June. In another letter from that month, he repeated this, though he felt that it would be difficult to carry out: "As I wrote to you, I would be glad to travel to Ukraine in June if there were no hindrances. The last rising [referring the winter raid by the Petliurist general Tiutiunnyk] very much damaged the situation there, but perhaps somehow [the situation] will level out before that time".¹⁰⁴ Thus, according to Hrushevs'kyi it was not merely the position taken by the Soviet government which prevented him from returning; the Ukrainian opposition to the Bolsheviks was also making this difficult. Nevertheless, Hrushevs'kyi's letter to Rakovs'kyi marks a watershed in Hrushevs'kyi's relationship with the Soviet Ukrainian government for it signalled the end of his hope to achieve the legalisation of the UPSR.

Hrushevs'kyi's return to Ukraine

The main source for the further development of Hrushevs'kyi's position over the next two years is the historian's correspondence during this period. This included prominent figures of Ukrainian cultural life, such as Kyrylo Studyns'kyi, the head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in L'viv, and the radical poet Oles' (Oleksandr Kandyba). He also wrote to Ukrainian booksellers and members of the Ukrainian émigré community in Canada and the USA (for example Tymotei Pochynok, Emil Faryniak and the Protestant minister Vasyl' Kuziv) who distributed his books and therefore were his main source of income during this period. Hrushevs'kyi wrote extensively on a number of topics, including the coordination of famine relief for Ukraine and book sales. The passages in which he gave his opinions on the situation in Ukraine therefore were often only shorter parts of longer letters. Hrushevs'kyi was not trying to expound his stance towards the Soviet regime and all the nuances involved (as he had been doing in *Boritiesia-Poborete!*). Instead, he was either reacting to news he had just heard or opinions put forward by his correspondent, or simply expressing the fears and hopes which occupied him at the time of writing. Consequently, the opinions one finds in these letters varied greatly from day to day. It is impossible simply to quote one passage from one letter, as indeed some other historians have done, and take this as typical of Hrushevs'kyi's views for the period. Rather, one must draw from a number of letters to show the full complexity of his feelings towards Soviet Ukraine.

Hrushevs'kyi did not immediately abandon the hope of travelling with the Foreign Delegation as a group. However, rather than return as a party, he hoped to transfer the activity of the Ukrainian Sociological Institute to Ukraine. He had been fostering this idea at least since August 1921, when he wrote to Volodymyr Mazurenko in Kyiv asking the Social Democrat for help in realising the plan.¹⁰⁵ Following the open letter to Rakovs'kyi, he began to see it as a means of forming, as he told Kuziv in a letter from May 1922, a "national and cultural centre in the Great Ukraine."¹⁰⁶ Though the transfer of the Institute to Ukraine would not bring any material benefits, since it possessed no funds, it would provide a means of keeping

¹⁰³ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 10, pp. 25–26.

¹⁰⁴ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 35.

¹⁰⁵ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 269, ark. 1.

¹⁰⁶ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 83–83zv.

the group together.¹⁰⁷ This represented a reorientation by Hrushevs'kyi from political engagement to cultural and academic work as a means of helping the post-revolutionary reconstruction of Ukraine. Indeed, in another letter the historian told the Protestant minister that "I really do assign more importance to the moral and cultural education of our people than to the political question, in which our intelligentsia is absorbed."¹⁰⁸ Chechel' and Zhukovs'kyi were entrusted with the implementation of the new tactic. They travelled to Ukraine in May 1922 to take part in a conference there in June as representatives of the Institute.¹⁰⁹ In July and October, Hrushevs'kyi posted to Kuziv optimistic reports of the establishment of a branch of the Institute by Chechel' and Zhukovs'kyi in Kyiv.¹¹⁰ The idea does not seem to have progressed any further than this. Only after Hrushevs'kyi's return did he try to resuscitate the project. However, this was without success.¹¹¹

Thus, the Foreign Delegation decided that it would have to return individually, not as a group.¹¹² For most of 1922 Hrushevs'kyi continued to talk of doing this soon.¹¹³ He was under no illusions about the difficulties facing his country and his letters to Kuziv from 1922 are full of reports of famine and terror.¹¹⁴ However, he did not place all the blame for this situation on the Bolsheviks. In February 1922 he attacked the attempts by the Poles and Petliura to sustain the uprising in Ukraine because they "made the Communists even more suspect and harbour prejudices against all Ukrainians regardless of differences; it is possible that they will simply come to look on Ukraine as a colony."¹¹⁵ He repeated here the argument set out in *Boritiesia-Poborete!* that Petliura's opposition to the Bolsheviks was one of the causes of the errors committed by the Russian party in Ukraine because it tainted the defence of the interests of Ukraine with the charge of reaction.¹¹⁶ Moreover, despite the fact that he was well aware of the difficulties facing Ukraine, he still felt that the revolution had unleashed positive forces. He wrote to Oles' on 1st October complaining of the emigration's hostility towards Soviet Ukraine, for "beyond the boundaries of the creation of the present occupation there is something living, powerful, constructive, and at the same time, from what reaches it, it [the emigration] only sees endless strife and ruin."¹¹⁷ Hrushevs'kyi's commitment to the revolution had not waned and he hoped to return to Ukraine to be a part of it.

It was only towards the end of the year that he lost the hope that he would be able to do so soon. In September he wrote to Studyns'kyi several times saying that he would be unable to return in that year.¹¹⁸ On 17th October Hrushevs'kyi told Kuziv that "there is no hope [of going] to Ukraine. Comrades are being stifled, so that there is no writing. The Bolsheviks, it

¹⁰⁷ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 63, ark. 70–79zv.

¹⁰⁸ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 35.

¹⁰⁹ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 795, ark. 31; TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 88zv.

¹¹⁰ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 124, 148.

¹¹¹ MATIASH Ukrain's'kyi Sotsiolohichniy Instytut M. S. Hrushevs'koho pp. 51–52.

¹¹² PRYSTAIKO, SHAPOVAL Hrushevs'kyi i GPU-NKVD p. 31.

¹¹³ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 49, 78–79zv, 82zv, 96zv.

¹¹⁴ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 50zv, 57, 71, 149zv.

¹¹⁵ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 50zv.

¹¹⁶ *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 2, p. 17.

¹¹⁷ VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* p. 238.

¹¹⁸ HALYNA SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhailo Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho za 1922 rik*, in: *Ukrains'kyi Istoryk* (1997) No. 1–4, pp. 288–323, here pp. 296–297, 300.

is said, would use my arrival with the aim of provocation.”¹¹⁹ It was around this time that his criticism of Ukraine became the sharpest. He told Faryniak on 11th November 1922 that “from Ukraine the news is all the worse. It was expected that the so called ‘New Economic Policy’ would yield Ukrainians [better] conditions of life, but it turned out to be the opposite. The Bolsheviks ingratiate themselves with the world bourgeois, the Muscovite-Jews are making all kinds of concessions, Ukraine [*ukrainstvo*] on the contrary is being stifled worse than ever before: they send Ukrainian public figures who demonstrate any kind of organisational ability out of Ukraine, they are winding up the Ukrainian posts and institutes which still exist, they do not allow any Ukrainian book to be printed abroad, [while] at the same time Russian [books] are floating down the river – and afterwards they say that due to a lack of Ukrainian books in schools they have to teach with Russian textbooks.”¹²⁰ Hrushevs’kyi probably referred here to be the order in August 1922 to expel seventy professors and members of the intelligentsia from Ukraine on the charge that they were spreading the ideology of *Smenovekhovstvo*.¹²¹ This may have been one reason for Hrushevs’kyi’s despair. Above all it seems that the letters which Hrushevs’kyi received from his colleagues in Ukraine had convinced him that, at least for the moment, the difficult conditions in the country ruled out the historian’s return.

Unsurprisingly, extracts like that from the letter to Faryniak are often quoted as being characteristic for Hrushevs’kyi’s feelings about the Soviet Union during his period in emigration as evidence that he constantly opposed the Soviet system.¹²² This does not describe the complexity of Hrushevs’kyi’s perceptions of the situation in Ukraine. On the very same day that he wrote such a damning account to Faryniak, he defended the return of the other members of the Foreign Delegation in a letter to Oles’. By rejecting public roles which were of no national or political worth in favour of more modest positions in cooperatives he felt that they had found “a deserving form of return”, something he would wish to anyone. About himself he wrote: “I, unfortunately, am in a worse position with regards to this, [and] therefore I am sitting while I can.”¹²³ This passage seems to suggest that he still supported the principle of returning and had only given up the idea of moving to Kyiv in the near future.

The crisis through which Hrushevs’kyi was going also affected his relationship with the party of which he was the foreign representative. 24th November 1922 he wrote to the TsK of the UPSR in Kyiv announcing that he was laying down his post as a member of the party’s Foreign Delegation. He condemned Shapoval and other members of the UPSR abroad for bringing the party into disrepute, but also the TsK for not sending information or providing a guiding role in order to counter these tendencies. He concluded that “to represent a party, which leads such an apocryphal existence, which does not have a voice, which wavers between cooperation with the Ukrainian SSR and revolt [...], to speak in their name, to enter into relations with other socialist parties is impossible.”¹²⁴ To the leadership of the

¹¹⁹ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 161zv. In December, Hrushevs’kyi gave Faryniak exactly the same reasons for being unable to return. See M. ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs’koho do E. Faryniaka*, in: *Ukrains’kyi Istoryk* (1976) No. 1–4, pp. 121–130, here p. 130.

¹²⁰ *Ibidem* p. 129.

¹²¹ See ГЕОРГИЙ КАСИАНОВ *Vlada ta inteligentsiia na Ukraini roky NEP*, in: *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 15 (1990) No. 2, pp. 19–32, here pp. 23–24.

¹²² VYNAR *Syluety Epokh* p.85.

¹²³ VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs’koho* p. 240.

¹²⁴ ЗНУКОВС’КІЙ *Politychna i Publitsystychna Diialnist’* pp. 108–109.

UPSR, at least, Hrushevs'kyi continued to maintain that the line he had followed had been correct.

His doubts about returning did not last long. In January and February 1923, he told both Kuziv and Faryniak that he hoped to be in Ukraine soon. This was despite the fact that his perception of conditions in Ukraine had not improved. He told Faryniak that the "independence" of Ukraine was "pure irony": the country, gripped by need and famine, was governed by a handful of Bolsheviks who terrorised the population with shootings and arrests. He informed Kuziv that the situation in Ukraine was very doubtful and that an "intellectual famine" reigned there.¹²⁵ It is therefore unclear why Hrushevs'kyi again started writing about returning to Ukraine. It may well be that he had never abandoned the idea of going back, but rather at the end of 1922 merely lost hope of doing so in the near future.

Though Hrushevs'kyi remained abroad, his comrades from the Foreign Delegation and *Boritiesia-Poborete!* continued to find their way back to Ukraine. By April 1923 all of the other members of Hrushevs'kyi's group of SRs had returned. Khrystiuk was one of the last to do so, leaving Vienna on 10th April.¹²⁶ Over the spring negotiations between Chechel' and Rakovs'kyi were renewed. According to the account which Hrushevs'kyi received from Chechel', in one meeting Rakovs'kyi asked why the historian had not already returned to Ukraine. Chechel' had answered that this was impossible after no reply to the open letter had been received, to which the Communist leader answered that he had not been able to respond because he did not want to enter into a polemic. Rakovs'kyi tried to convince Hrushevs'kyi's former secretary that the Soviet government would follow the new course on nationalities policy firmly.¹²⁷ Indeed, according to Hrushevs'kyi, Chechel' claimed that there was even a chance that Rakovs'kyi would publish a reply to the historian's open letter.¹²⁸ On May 23rd the matter of the historian's return came up again before the Politburo. It decided that Rakovs'kyi should resolve the matter.¹²⁹ Another product of these talks may have been the letter from the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in May asking Hrushevs'kyi whether he was willing to join the body.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, at this time Hrushevs'kyi was considering alternatives to travelling to Kyiv. Both Kuziv and Faryniak suggested that the historian come to the United States. Hrushevs'kyi does not seem to have really ever considered accepting the invitation: he told Kuziv that he would only go to America "if there was no other way to avoid starving to death."¹³¹ Hrushevs'kyi was also reluctant to return to Galicia, even though he still possessed a cottage near L'viv. He had made clear his conviction that the Poles were thoroughly opposed to Ukrainian national aspirations in *Boritiesia-Poborete!* and he doubted that they would allow him back.¹³² He did not trust the Ukrainians in the province either, especially as a result of the developments in Galician politics following the Ambassadors' Decision of

¹²⁵ M. ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do E. Faryniaka*, in: *Ukrains'kyi Istoryk* (1977) No. 1–2, pp. 118–131, here p. 119; TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 277, 278, 279zv, 281–281zv, 282.

¹²⁶ TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 798, ark. 6.

¹²⁷ M. ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka* in: *Ukrains'kyi Istoryk* (1969) No. 4, pp. 78–98, here p. 96; IDEM (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do E. Faryniaka* pp. 125–126.

¹²⁸ VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* p. 249.

¹²⁹ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 6, spr. 40, ark. 57.

¹³⁰ HALYNA SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyn'skoho (1894–1932rr.)*. L'viv, New York 1998, p. 103.

¹³¹ ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do E. Faryniaka* p. 126; TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 17–18.

¹³² SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyn'skoho* p. 125.

March 1923. Above all, he condemned the attempt led by Volodymyr Bachyns'kyi to achieve reconciliation with the Poles. As he wrote in July 1923, "in the region there is fatigue and apathy, a lack of leadership and shameless courtship of the Poles."¹³³ He spent more time thinking over the offer to teach in Prague and Podebrady which he received at the end of July 1923. The offer originated in the SR circles in Czechoslovakia which dominated the Ukrainian educational institutions there. As is clear from his letters to Oles', Hrushevs'kyi remained in negotiations with the Ukrainian institutions in Czechoslovakia during the summer and autumn of that year. However, he was sceptical about the opportunity. He did not believe the salary was sufficient. He also felt that he was not being offered the place to carry out academic work, but rather to prevent his return to Ukraine. Most importantly, it is doubtful whether the historian actually saw a move to Prague as a permanent alternative to Kyiv. He told Oles' that going to Prague "would not hinder my return to Ukraine [...]. But if now the opportunity to leave for Ukraine soon arises, to go through one more terrible upheaval – to go to Prague, to establish relationships there, and afterwards again to Ukraine, this is beyond my strength."¹³⁴ In several letters to Studyns'kyi, Hrushevs'kyi also made it clear that Prague was a second choice, which he would only take if there were difficulties in travelling to Ukraine.¹³⁵

Financial uncertainty was an important reason behind Hrushevs'kyi's wish to leave Austria, whether it be for Prague or Kyiv. On 21st August he wrote to Kuziv saying that due to a collapse in the book market in America he could no longer live from selling his books as he had hoped. He would either have to take up the offer to go to the Czech capital or return to Ukraine. At the time he found neither prospect particularly encouraging.¹³⁶ As is clear from his letters to Studyns'kyi, over autumn Hrushevs'kyi's financial fears grew.¹³⁷ Despite Hrushevs'kyi's determination that he would not be forced to return to Ukraine through poverty,¹³⁸ the fact that this was such a concern in the months before he accepted the Bolsheviks' offer to go to Kyiv indicates that it undoubtedly played an important part in his decision. Nevertheless, though financial problems may have determined the timing of his return, they had not forced upon him his original stance towards the Bolsheviks. Indeed, his desire to go back had remained almost unbroken since 1920.

There were also developments in Ukraine. Over the summer of 1923 the Bolsheviks began formulating the policy of "Ukrainianisation", which sought to increase the number of Ukrainian state and party cadres and promote the Ukrainian language and culture. However, Hrushevs'kyi's assessment of the new course was ambivalent. In August and September, he told Kuziv that the condition of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had not improved, but rather worsened. He criticised the new Soviet policy on the nationalities, saying that "'Ukrainianisation' might force Jews or Muscovite functionaries to acquire a smattering of the Ukrainian language, but it does not bring gains for Ukrainians!"¹³⁹ He feared that the basic struggle for everyday existence which the difficult economic circumstances in Ukraine forced upon the Ukrainian intelligentsia prevented them from taking part in intellectual and spiritual pur-

¹³³ ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do E. Faryniaka* p. 125.

¹³⁴ VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* p. 254, 257, 259, 261. Both quotations are on p. 261.

¹³⁵ SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho* pp. 114, 129.

¹³⁶ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 188, 285zv.

¹³⁷ SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho* pp. 119, 123–125, 127.

¹³⁸ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 175zv.

¹³⁹ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 254. See also TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 250zv.

suits.¹⁴⁰ Consequently, at times he was unsure whether he intended to return soon. On 6th August, he told Oles' that "news about 'hastened Ukrainianisation' does not really encourage an immediate departure" for Ukraine.¹⁴¹ As Hrushevs'kyi himself acknowledged, the collapse of the negotiations between the Foreign Delegation and the Soviet authorities had made him cautious about any claims made the Bolsheviks.¹⁴² However, at other times Hrushevs'kyi praised those very elements which he criticised in his letter to Kuziv. In July 1923 he told Pochynok that "Ukrainianisation is running all the same; they did not only declare it: officials really must take up Ukrainian grammar books and dictionaries, which a state publisher is issuing for them. It is necessary to wait in order to judge."¹⁴³ In other letters, too, Hrushevs'kyi indicated that he hoped the Bolsheviks would implement Ukrainianisation firmly and consistently.¹⁴⁴

The progress of Ukrainianisation also had personal ramifications for Hrushevs'kyi. Though he often mentioned his desire to continue his *History of Ukraine-Rus* as one of his motives for returning,¹⁴⁵ this represented not merely a private wish, but rather the hope of taking up work once more on behalf of the Ukrainian nation. Whatever reservations he had towards Ukrainianisation, he began to feel that in comparison to the opportunities for this in the emigration, the Ukraine was better. In October 1923, Hrushevs'kyi told Kuziv that he had the impression "that the process of ruin has not ended there [Ukraine], and it is useless to start constructive work". Still, he felt "although I do not have great hopes to conduct productive work there, for all that it may be necessary to go there soon, because, ultimately, I can no longer do anything here".¹⁴⁶ A prerequisite to such work was the feeling that it could be done without interference from the Bolsheviks. In a letter to Pochynok from December, after Hrushevs'kyi's return had been arranged, he said that though he was expected in Ukraine, "I will not hurry – the real opportunity to write freely about anything will not come more quickly. But it will come to this". In another passage, he wrote that though in the worst case the opportunity to work might not be great, it would still exist.¹⁴⁷ Hrushevs'kyi repeatedly claimed, both before the closure of *Boritiesia-Poborete!* and after, that only the Ukrainians could give Soviet Ukraine a genuinely Ukrainian content.¹⁴⁸ By taking up work in the Kyiv he hoped to contribute to this himself.

Despite his censure of the Soviet system, Hrushevs'kyi continued to draw the distinction, set out in *Boritiesia-Poborete!*, between criticism of the Bolsheviks and opposition to them. In a letter to Pochynok from July, Hrushevs'kyi expressly condemned the idea of armed conflict with the Bolsheviks: "It is necessary in criticising the Bolsheviks, in the struggle with them, not to cross boundaries beyond which an anti-socialist union begins".¹⁴⁹ The greatest danger was, as Hrushevs'kyi told Faryniak in August, that "in the place of the Bol-

¹⁴⁰ Other examples include TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 281, 286zv, 312–313zv.

¹⁴¹ VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* p. 254.

¹⁴² SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho* p. 99.

¹⁴³ ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka* p. 96.

¹⁴⁴ SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho* p. 114; ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do E. Faryniaka* pp. 129–130; TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 1394, ark. 36.

¹⁴⁵ PYRIH (ed.) *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi* p. 30.

¹⁴⁶ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 286zv.

¹⁴⁷ M. ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka z dodatkom dvokh lystivok do D. Ostrovs'koho*, in: *Ukrains'kyi Istoryk* (1970) No. 1–3, pp. 168–183, here pp. 176–177.

¹⁴⁸ IDEM (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do E. Faryniaka* pp. 129–133; VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* p. 262; *Boritiesia-Poborete!* No. 10, pp. 30–31.

¹⁴⁹ ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka* (1969) p. 96.

sheviks comes reactionary Russian monarchism – this is more merciless and hopeless for Ukraine.”¹⁵⁰ The claims that Hrushevs’kyi returned to the Ukraine in order to continue the fight against the Bolsheviks therefore contradict the written records of Hrushevs’kyi’s opinions. In fact he described Vynnychenko’s call to follow this course as “an extremely unfortunate arousal of interest and suspicion [on the part] of the Bolsheviks towards any returnees”.¹⁵¹ Hrushevs’kyi also continued to assert the argument put forward in *Boritiesia-Poborete!* that it was the duty of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to work with the Bolsheviks because this was the course chosen by the Ukrainian people. In a letter to Faryniak in August Hrushevs’kyi wrote that on the basis of the information he had from Ukraine it was clear that “neither the peasantry nor the intelligentsia want either a rising or an foreign invasion against the Bolsheviks. They desire much more that the Bolsheviks come to reason, search for genuine ties [...] with the Ukrainian village, with the Ukrainian people, with the Ukrainian intelligentsia”. Those “who spilled their blood for Ukrainian statehood and regard it seriously feel that, however it may be, the present Soviet Ukraine is all the same a Ukrainian State, if only in name”¹⁵²

Thus, there is much contradictory evidence on Hrushevs’kyi’s perception of Soviet Ukraine. He was highly critical of the conditions in the country. However, Hrushevs’kyi’s awareness of the failings of the Soviet system did not preclude the hope that the situation might improve and he certainly indicated that evolution was possible under the Bolsheviks. Indeed, as 1923 progressed Hrushevs’kyi increasingly began to argue that the Bolsheviks were a useful ally against the Ukraine’s traditional enemies, the Poles and the Russians. In a letter to Studyns’kyi from October he quoted approvingly a Socialist Federalist who claimed that the Bolsheviks had helped the Ukraine by attacking the Great Russian element there.¹⁵³ Shortly before hearing that the Bolsheviks had agreed to allow him to return, Hrushevs’kyi wrote: “I think that in the given situation, in which I do not foresee imminent change, we can only free Western Ukraine and defend ourselves from the Muscovite onslaught with the help of the Bolsheviks. Our own forces, on which we should orient ourselves above all, are insufficient for this because we are going through a period of weakness. For this reason I will try to return to the Ukraine despite everything”.¹⁵⁴

In Soviet Ukraine itself, the UPSR continued to disintegrate. In September, in response to a plenum of the UPSR’s Central Committee in July, Chechel’, Khrystiuk, Shrah and Zhukovs’kyi wrote a letter condemning the line taken by the TsK of the party. They described the UPSR as having become split between genuine socialists, represented by themselves, and petty-bourgeois, nationalist and opportunist groups, which included the Shapovalists and the TsK itself. They declared that their platform was one of decisive struggle with the bourgeois in order to achieve a worker-peasant dictatorship and they emphasised the importance of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to this struggle. They called upon the UPSR to protect the republic from the attacks of internal and external counterrevolution and to take an active part in the construction of the Soviet state. Though they admitted that Soviet Ukraine had made mistakes, they claimed that recently the KP(b)U had taken “a direction, which in its time the UPSR pointed to and strived towards.” They accused the TsK of

¹⁵⁰ IDEM (ed.) Lysty M. Hrushevs’koho do E. Faryniaka p. 127.

¹⁵¹ IDEM (ed.) Lysty M. Hrushevs’koho do T. Pochynka (1969) p. 98.

¹⁵² IDEM (ed.) Lysty M. Hrushevs’koho do E. Faryniaka p. 127.

¹⁵³ SVARNYK (ed.) Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs’koho do Kyryla Studyns’koho p. 125.

¹⁵⁴ Ibidem p. 133. The same argument appears in a letter to Faryniak. See ANTONOVYCH (ed.) Lysty M. Hrushevs’koho do E. Faryniaka pp. 129–130.

holding a position of Menshevism, that is claiming that the time was not right for revolution in Eastern Europe. Those signing the letter therefore declared that they no longer owed any allegiance towards the TsK.¹⁵⁵

The renunciation of the UPSR by Hrushevs'kyi's former colleagues may have helped clear the way for a positive decision by the Bolshevik leadership. On 2nd November 1923 the KP(b)U's Politburo finally agreed to allow him back into the country. Twelve days later it sent a letter to Levyts'kyi informing him of the decision and asking him to pass on the news to the historian. Though Hrushevs'kyi had already consented to submit his candidature for the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in August, it was this Politburo resolution which at last settled the issue of where he would go. On the 23rd Hrushevs'kyi told Kuziv that the matter of his return had in principle been decided, although the questions of "how" and "when" remained yet to be resolved. Three weeks later the historian wrote again, this time claiming that he expected to leave after 20th January.¹⁵⁶ By this stage, the negotiations with Prague and Podebrady had finally broken down. One reason was the failure of the Ukrainians in Prague to finance his move to the Czech capital. Hrushevs'kyi had also been told that the sociology course which he should be teaching was to be postponed for a year, which confirmed his fears that the offer was of a political and not an academic nature.¹⁵⁷

Even after hearing of the Politburo's decision, Hrushevs'kyi displayed a certain degree of ambivalence in his stance towards the Bolsheviks. In his letters to Pochynok and Faryniak, who criticised his decision to return because they feared it would help legitimise the Soviet regime, he robustly defended his choice.¹⁵⁸ However, in a letter to Oles', he wrote that he could not advise anyone to travel there until he had seen conditions in Ukraine for himself. It was not a question of whether one should trust the Bolsheviks, as it was doubtful that so foreign an element would take care of the Ukraine. Rather, it was a question of where one could be useful.¹⁵⁹ Oles', too, was at that time considering going back. It is perhaps natural that Hrushevs'kyi was more willing to share his doubts with someone who was considering taking the same step as himself. Nor should it be any surprise that Hrushevs'kyi was uncertain about his fate. He had headed a government which had been at war with the Bolsheviks and did not know how he would be treated when he went back. For this reason he requested, and received, a letter granting immunity from persecution from the Ukrainian government.¹⁶⁰ However, one should not confuse such doubts with opposition to the regime in Ukraine.

Hrushevs'kyi left Vienna later than he had hoped on 2nd March and he arrived in the Ukrainian capital on the 8th. From Kyiv, he wrote several more letters which give an insight into his reasons for his decision. He had not ceased to criticise the limitations of Ukrainianisation. On 20th March, he told Kuziv that the theatre, books and concerts were all inaccessi-

¹⁵⁵ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 62, ark. 54–57zv. The quotation is on ark. 56.

¹⁵⁶ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 6, spr. 40, ark. 135zv; TsDAVO f. 4, op. 1, spr. 615, ark. 69; TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 267zv, 268zv; SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho* p. 119

¹⁵⁷ VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* p. 262. See also SVARNYK (ed.) *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho* p. 135, where Hrushevs'kyi expressed the fear that the Shapoval group would use his arrival in Prague for their political ends.

¹⁵⁸ ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka* (1970) pp. 176–177; IDEM (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do E. Faryniaka* pp. 129–130.

¹⁵⁹ VYNAR (ed.) *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* p. 262.

¹⁶⁰ PLOKHY *Unmaking Imperial Russia* p. 228.

ble to the Ukrainian intelligentsia.¹⁶¹ However, he continued to believe that even in these reduced conditions, he was more useful to the Ukrainian people in Ukraine. In September 1924 he defended his return to conduct cultural work against the Pochynok's claim that such labour was "miserable": "our misfortune was that political opportunities closed before firm cultural national foundations were created. You rightly complain of the lack of national consciousness among the emigrants from Ukraine. But what can give them that consciousness if not cultural work!"¹⁶² He saw Soviet Ukraine not as the completion of state-building, but rather a point in the process of achieving Ukrainian statehood. Indeed, he went so far as to present it as an heir to the UNR, which had been the first stage in this national construction. "Here, despite all the defects", he wrote, "I feel that I am in the Ukrainian Republic which we began to build in 1917, and I expect that with time the defects will even out and it will unite those Ukrainian lands which at present remain beyond its borders".¹⁶³

Conclusion

In *Boritiesia-Poborete!* Hrushevskyyi defended cooperation with the Bolsheviks in the name of the world revolution. In doing so he displayed many elements of the populist tradition: an enthusiasm for the "people," the need for a national and a social revolution, the realisation of Ukrainian national aspirations within a federation and the creation of a decentralised form of government. Despite the failure to legalise the UPSR, Hrushevskyyi's desire to return to the Ukraine did not diminish. However, he began to defend his stance in national terms. Above all he hoped to return in order to contribute to the development of Ukrainian culture by continuing his *History of Ukraine-Rus*. This reflected not only the disappointment following the open letter to Rakovskyyi, but also a change in circumstances. While Hrushevskyyi was editing *Boritiesia-Poborete!*, the spread of revolution to Western Europe seemed to be a real possibility. By 1924 this was not the case, but the introduction of Ukrainianisation made it possible to reconcile national goals with acceptance of the Soviet regime. Hrushevskyyi also continued to use some of the arguments employed in *Boritiesia-Poborete!*: that it was dangerous to criticise the Bolsheviks as this could bring about a restoration of the Russian monarchy and that the Ukrainian intelligentsia should follow the direction shown by the Ukrainian people themselves.

Summary

The return of Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi to Ukraine in 1924 is one of the most controversial episodes in the historian's life. Most accounts up till now have sought to dismiss the possibility that Hrushevskyyi might have done so out of support for the Bolsheviks. This paper argues that between 1919 and 1921 Hrushevskyyi advocated reconciliation with the Bolsheviks in order to promote the development of the world socialist revolution. Despite the failure of these efforts, he continued to hope that he could return. Though he was highly critical of the Bolsheviks' treatment of Ukraine, he believed that in Soviet Ukraine he could contribute to the cultural development of his country.

¹⁶¹ TsDIA f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 266, ark. 312zv.

¹⁶² ANTONOVYCH (ed.) *Lysty M. Hrushevskyyi do T. Pochynka* (1970) p. 181.

¹⁶³ *Ibidem* p. 182.