

Races to Modernity

Metropolitan Aspirations in Eastern Europe, 1890–1940

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3. Modernist Visions and Mass Politics in Late Imperial Kiev

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The rise of mass politics—no less than the appearance of trams, department stores, and factories—marked fin-de-siècle Europe's passage into modernity. From Paris to Prague, representatives of the lower middle and working classes rose up to challenge the bourgeois-liberal domination of the continent's cities. The practitioners of this "politics in a new key" famously described by historian Carl E. Schorske created an emotionally charged and mass-oriented political style that established new centers of gravity on the extreme left and extreme right of the ideological spectrum. In the process, they signaled the transition from the era of notable politics to the age of mass mobilization.¹

Specialists on late Imperial Russia have studied the political modernization of the empire from several vantage points. They have reconstructed the efforts of workers, professionals, and voluntary associations to wrest power from the imperial state.² They have traced the achievements as well as the vicissitudes of Russia's experiments in urban self-government and parliamentarianism.³ Yet

¹ Schorske, "Politics in a New Key"; also Lidtke, *The Alternative Culture*; Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 47–108; John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism*; Nord, *Paris Shopkeepers*; Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik*.

² See, for example, Johnson, *Peasant and Proletarian*; Engelstein, *Moscow, 1905*; Surh, *1905 in St. Petersburg*; Wynn, *Workers, Strikes and Pogroms*; Balzer, *Russia's Missing Middle Class*; Engelstein, *The Keys to Happiness*.

³ Thurston, *Liberal City*; Nardova, *Samoderzhavie*; Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment*; Sheket Korros, *A Reluctant Parliament*.

even the scholars who are most optimistic about the prospects of Russian civil society have tended to highlight the empire's divergence from general European political trends, showcasing the ways in which the intrusive and paternalistic state atomized society and frustrated the rise of mass politics.⁴ Indeed, common sense would seem to dictate that mass politics are fundamentally incompatible with autocratic governance.

This chapter focuses on a Russian city where mass politics flourished—Kiev, which was then located on the empire's southwestern periphery. As early as the late nineteenth century, that city had begun to develop a boisterous mass political system: well-defined camps of nationalists battled against convinced cosmopolitans; bands of revolutionaries struggled to defeat local defenders of the tsarist regime and Orthodox traditions. In the political unrest brought about by the 1905 revolution, a populist and anti-Semitic mass movement that railed against the evils of capitalism as well as socialism emerged as the major political force in the city. In the aftermath of the revolution, Kiev's large and well-organized right-wing political parties continued to expand their influence through street agitation as well as electoral victories.

The success of an extreme and mass-oriented right in Kiev gave the city an unusual place in imperial political and intellectual life. Kiev was the only large city in the empire dominated by the political right; in most other Russian cities, from Moscow and St. Petersburg to the nearby urban centers of Kharkov and Odessa, liberals and radical leftists who denounced the imperial state played the most prominent role in local politics. And in terms of tone and style, Kiev's mass politics bore a striking resemblance to political movements elsewhere on the continent. The Kiev right promoted a socially emancipatory yet antiliberal platform that closely resembled that endorsed by Karl Lueger's Christian Socials, who captured Vienna in 1897.⁵ And like the *Action Française*—generally considered Europe's first integral nationalist movement—Kiev activists championed a strong state capable of protecting peasants

⁴ A recent work that highlights the accomplishments as well as the limitations of late imperial civil society is Bradley, *Voluntary Associations*.

⁵ See Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis*.

from the existential threats supposedly posed by Jews, socialists, capitalists, and foreigners.⁶

How did mass politics manage to take root in an autocratic setting? And why did this expression of modernity occur in Kiev, nearly 1,000 miles from the centers of imperial power in Moscow and St. Petersburg? Rather than emphasizing the ways in which Russia's autocratic system thwarted the development of mass political processes, this chapter considers how official policies unwittingly enabled the rise of "politics in a new key" on the empire's southwestern frontier. Although Kiev was incorporated into Muscovy in the late seventeenth century, as late as the nineteenth century the tsarist state remained in an active struggle to stake its claims on the region. In 1830–31 and again in 1863, the Polish-Catholic nobility (or *szlachta*), which traditionally had dominated the region's high society and culture, organized insurrections that aimed to reconstitute an independent Polish state. Although the influence of the *szlachta* fell precipitously in the wake of these revolts, by then Kiev was witnessing a huge influx of Ukrainian peasants and Jews looking for work in the city's rapidly growing industrial and artisanal sectors. At the turn of the twentieth century, just over half of Kiev's 250,000 residents were native speakers of Russian; nearly a quarter spoke Ukrainian; about 13 percent were Yiddish- or Russian-speaking Jews; and about 6 percent were Polish speakers of the Catholic faith.⁷ It was precisely imperial bureaucrats' efforts to manage this contested, diverse, and rapidly growing city that gave rise to the ideas and practices that would later enable mass political mobilization.

⁶ See Weber, *Action Française*; Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*.

⁷ See *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g.* (St. Petersburg: Izdanie tsentral'nogo statisticheskogo komiteta Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, 1904), volume 16, 98–99. Because the 1897 census relied on native language and confession to define ethnicity, it is challenging to make a more precise statement about the ethnic composition of Kiev. The number of Ukrainian speakers does not necessarily correlate to the number of ethnic Ukrainians, since a large percentage of the urban Ukrainian population spoke Russian at home. The census also likely underreported the Jewish population of Kiev; it was an open secret that tens of thousands of Jews resided illegally in the city, and this population was not fully accounted for.

Tsarist officials shared a common desire to transform Kiev into an orderly and well-governed imperial metropolis. However, their visions of what constituted the ideal modern polity varied sharply. One camp, well represented within the Kiev governor-general's office, firmly insisted on the need to promote the national concerns of the southwest's Orthodox East Slavs over the interests of other ethnonational communities. This group, to which I refer as nationalizing modernists, went as far as to encourage local peasants and workers to develop a national consciousness that defined itself against their Polish and Jewish neighbors. A separate camp of officials, associated with the Ministry of Finance in particular, viewed the economic development and industrialization of the city as the best means of rationalizing local governance and asserting imperial power in Kiev. I refer to this group as capitalist modernists; it looked to entrepreneurs of proven talent—regardless of their ethnic extraction or religious beliefs—to help transform the city into an economic powerhouse.

From their inception in the mid-nineteenth century, these two competing visions of modernity in the southwestern borderlands coexisted uneasily. Capitalist modernists created a diverse mercantile elite in Kiev and cultivated a spirit of accommodation within the urban *beau monde*. Nationalizing modernists denounced this very ethos of tolerance as dangerous, arguing that capitalism allowed the non-Orthodox, whom they alleged had exploited the toiling masses for centuries, to consolidate their control over local resources. By the 1890s, the ongoing dispute between nationalizing and capitalist modernists in the imperial bureaucracy had filtered down to society itself, informing a populist and antiliberal grassroots political movement that built on both visions of modernity. Drawing on the rising national consciousness of the city's Russian and Ukrainian population and widespread anger at the excesses of capitalism, intellectuals and politicians attributed the miserable conditions in which most city residents lived to the prevalence of non-Orthodox believers (especially Jews) among the urban economic elite. It was these same local demagogues who constructed a powerful political movement that called on the city's Orthodox residents to rise up against their "foreign" oppressors in the 1905 period. Imperial bureaucrats' efforts to consolidate state control of a contested borderland and to transform Kiev into an orderly and modern metropolis had accidentally

equipped local activists and intellectuals with the tools that they needed to create a boisterous mass political system.

Nationalizing Modernism

In the aftermath of the 1830–31 Polish insurrection, imperial administrators launched a concerted campaign to enhance state power and to streamline governance in Kiev. Between 1838 and 1850, the newly created governor-general's office constructed bridges connecting the city's deep ravines and forty new streets, mostly broad avenues. Engineers devised a systematic address system, which not only aided travel and tourism, but also assisted police in "knowing" the city and its inhabitants.⁸ As it transformed what had once been a conglomeration of hillside settlements into a unitary city, the governor-general's development program explicitly emphasized imperial claims on Kiev. Local bureaucrats changed street names to honor Orthodox saints, state institutions, autocratic rulers, and military heroes, and they established a university and a regional school system to promote imperial high culture.⁹

If official efforts to consolidate state power in the southwestern borderlands promoted imperial patriotism, elements of nationalizing modernism were already visible in the new policies, which relied on national classifications to distinguish between loyal subjects and possible turncoats. The campaign to "claim" Kiev as a Russian city explicitly defined Polish-Catholic culture as a dangerous force, denigrating the city's Polish heritage as it undermined the power of its Polish residents. Immediately after the 1830–31 insurrection, local authorities abolished Polish schools and banks and revoked Magdeburg law, which had allowed city residents to govern themselves since the early modern period, when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had ruled right-bank Ukraine.¹⁰ Administrators in

⁸ Rybakov, *Nevidomi*, 185, 188.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 186, 189–90. See also, Shandra, *Kyivs'ke heneral-hubernatorstvo*, 25–35; Tarasenko, *Stanovlennia ta rozvytok*.

¹⁰ I. Kamanin, *Poslednie gody samoupravleniia Kieva po Magdeburgskomu pravu* (Kiev: Korchak-Novitskii, 1888).

the governor-general's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs organized genealogical censuses to "unmask" Poles. Once they identified these potential fifth columns, bureaucrats subjected them to a full range of punitive measures, including a special taxation regime and removal from the ranks of the nobility.¹¹

As they singled out Poles for punishment solely based on their ethno-confessional identity, local officials also encouraged the city's Orthodox residents—many of whom were ethnic Ukrainians, or as officials then called them, Little Russians—to aid the official de-Polonization campaign. In 1843, the Kiev governor-general's office convened the Commission for the Collection of Ancient Acts, which aimed to gather historical documents that would prove that the city was a primordially Orthodox locale that had been subjected to Polish-Catholic culture by force.¹² The Commission soon became a gathering place for ethnic Ukrainian intellectuals, such as M.A. Maksimovich, P.A. Kulish, N.I. Kostomarov, and T.G. Shevchenko, who used the group's resources to decry the *szlachta*'s historical power in the region and its continuing domination of the Little Russian masses in contemporary life.¹³ Commission publications charged that Polish-Catholic power had "severed the internal moral connection" that once connected the Little Russian "aristocracy and simple folk [*narod*]." In villages, Polish nobles subjected Ukrainian peasants to a cruel feudal order and entrusted the keys of Orthodox churches to the Jews who managed their estates; in towns and cities, the *szlachta* allowed Jewish tavern keepers and money

¹¹ See Beauvois, *Le noble, le serf et le révisor*.

¹² See *Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii iugo-zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, sostoiashchei pri Kievskom, Podol'skom i Volynskom General-Gubernatore* (Kiev: N.T. Korchak-Novitskii, 1911), 1.

¹³ Many accounts have focused on the emergence of the Ukrainian national movement and imperial efforts to manage it. See, for example, Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva*; Miller, *The Ukrainian Question*; Vulpius, *Nationalisierung der Religion*. My work, by contrast, emphasizes the imbrication of the Russian and Ukrainian national projects, and considers the extent to which men such as Kostomarov, Kulish, and Shevchenko contributed to the creation of East Slavic nationalism while laying the groundwork for the development of a later Ukrainian national movement. For further details, see Hillis, *Children of Rus'*, especially part I.

lenders to dominate the Orthodox population.¹⁴ Though the Commission tended to take a dark view of Ukrainian history—presenting it as a "bloody battle" between Orthodox and Catholic culture—it celebrated violent peasant uprisings against the *szlachta*.¹⁵ Despite the Commission's Little Russian particularism and its overt sympathy for *jacqueries*, the Kiev governor-general's office remained an unstinting supporter of the group, financing its activities and creating an archive at Kiev University to showcase its findings.¹⁶ Kiev's nationalizing modernists had realized that Little Russian consciousness could be a valuable tool in their campaign to strengthen imperial rule. For their part, Little Russian activists used the support they received from the local authorities to draw attention to the plight of the Ukrainian masses—and the threat that they saw in the continuing political and economic influence of non-Orthodox minorities in the region.

The 1863 Polish revolt highlighted the continuing threat posed by the *szlachta* of the borderlands, but it also raised the potential that the burgeoning national consciousness of Kiev's Little Russian activists might evolve into full-fledged national separatism. Minister of the Interior P.A. Valuev expressed particular concern that Ukrainian cultural activities might undermine imperial unity in a time of political crisis, and imposed new restrictions on Ukrainian-language publications aimed at a popular audience.¹⁷ Despite these new policies, the Kiev governor-general's office remained steadfast in its support for the Commission, which continued to insist that

¹⁴ The quote is from *Arkhiv Iugo-zapadnoi Rossii* 1:1 (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1859), LXXXVI–LXXXVII. On the rural order, see P. Kulish, *Zapiski o iuzhnoi Rusi* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1989) [original 1856], 166; on cities, *Arkhiv Iugo-zapadnoi Rossii* 5:1 (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1869), 1–94.

¹⁵ Quote from F.G. Lebedintsev, *Arkhiv Iugo-zapadnoi Rossii* 1:2, 2; see also *Arkhiv Iugo-zapadnoi Rossii* 1:1, IX.

¹⁶ "Tsentral'nye arkhivy drevnikh aktovykh knig: Vilenskii i Kievskii," *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (1883): 37; O.I. Levitskii, *Piatidesiatletie Kievskoi Komissii dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, 1843–1893: Istorieskaia zapiska o eia deiatel'nosti* (Kiev: S.V. Kul'zhenko, 1893), 14.

¹⁷ For further details on the debate within the imperial bureaucracy about the proper relationship of the governor-general's office with Little Russian activists, see Hillis, "Ukrainophile Activism."

raising awareness of the historical and contemporary struggles of the Ukrainian masses against their "foreign" captors would only complement the official de-Polonization campaign.¹⁸ The group's official publications indulged in ever more radical populist and nationalist rhetoric, presenting peasant revolts, for example, as wars of national liberation in which the Ukrainian masses attempted to throw off Polish and Jewish "exploitation."¹⁹ Even as the imperial authorities subjected Poles to new taxes and political restrictions, in the wake of the revolt Commission members lobbied the state to enact harsher measures against the *szlachta*. The group's president even expressed his desire to strip Poles of all "civil and political rights ... so that priests and the *szlachta* will be deprived of ... all possibilities further to nourish their permanent illusions and to continue their underground treasonous work against us."²⁰

Indeed, emboldened by the continuing support for nationalizing modernism within the governor-general's office, Kiev's Little Russian activists managed to reach out to broader segments of the urban population over the 1860s and 1870s. In 1864, V.Ia. Shul'gin, a member of the Commission for the Collection of Ancient Acts, founded the city's first daily newspaper, *Kievlianin*. Published in Russian—so as to reach the broadest possible audience and to observe the letter of Valuev's new language policy—the paper aimed to raise awareness of the cultural traditions of the Little Russians and their continued suffering under "the triple yoke of Catholic clergy, Poles (landlords, rentiers, and estate managers), and Jews."²¹ In 1872, Shul'gin joined forces with other veterans of the Kiev Commission for the Collection of

¹⁸ *Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii iugo-zapadnoi Rossii*, 14–15.

¹⁹ *Arkhiv iugo-zapadnoi Rossii* 3,3 (Kiev: I. Zavadskii, 1876), 1, 3, 5.

²⁰ The quote is from Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva*, 364. On the intensification of the de-Polonization campaign after 1863, see Beauvois, *La bataille de la terre*; Rodkiewicz, *Russian Nationality Policy*; Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia*.

²¹ V.Ia. Shul'gin, "Iugo-zapadni krai pod upravleniem D.G. Bibikova," *Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia* 6 (1879): 89. The paper also praised the ethnographic research and political activism of Little Russian activists as powerful weapons of de-Polonization. See, for example, "Zapiski ob universitetskoi zhizni (1860–1864)," *Kievlianin*, 25 August 1864, 1; M.P. Drahomanov, "Malorossii i ee slovesnosti," in *Vybrane* (Kiev: Lybid', 1991), 42.

Ancient Acts to launch a local chapter of the Imperial Geographic Society, which conducted research on folk culture and regional demographics as part of an effort to promote "Ukrainian self-organization" and to "counteract" Polish culture.²² In the early 1880s, Commission members launched *Kievaskaia starina*, a monthly journal of ethnography and local history. Journal contributors, who hoped to highlight the "internal, spiritual" life of Little Russia that had been unsullied by non-Orthodox influence, published original Ukrainian-language historical documents, pioneered Ukrainian national historiography, and worked to compile a Ukrainian-language dictionary.²³

Even after 1863, then, when Valuev articulated growing concern about official promotion of ethno-national consciousness, nationalizing modernists in the governor-general's office consistently strove to use Little Russian patriotism in the battle against Polish-Catholic civilization. *Kievlianin* became the unofficial paper of record for the southwestern borderlands, and benefited from a government subsidy.²⁴ *Kievaskaia starina*, too, was underwritten by the imperial state, which even intervened to save it from bankruptcy on several occasions.²⁵ Kiev's governor-generals insisted that far from a threat to imperial unity, the Little Russian consciousness emanating from Kiev promised to protect the empire from Polish threats. (They failed, however, to shelter Kiev Geographic Society members from accusations that their local patriotism had degenerated into Ukrainian separatism, and a tsarist decree closed the division in 1876, exiled some of its organizers, and implemented further restrictions against the use of Ukrainian in public.)²⁶

²² Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva*, 233–34. For an example of the Kiev Geographic Society's work, see P.P. Chubinskii, *Trudy etnograficheskoi statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v Zapadno-Russkii krai* (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskoe Russkoe Geograficheskoe obshchestvo, 1872).

²³ The quote is from TsDIAUK [Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorichnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, m. Kyiv], KMF-19, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 3–4ob; see also TsDIAUK, f. 295, op. 1, d. 16, l. 2; Maryna Palienko, "Kievaskaia starina" (3 vols.) (Kiev: Tempora, 2005).

²⁴ Starozhil, *Kiev v vos'midesiatykh godakh* (Kiev: Petr Barskii, 1910), 64.

²⁵ TsDIAUK, KMF-19, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 27–28.

²⁶ See NBU IR [Natsional'na biblioteka Ukrainy imeni V.I. Vernads'kogo, Instytut rukopysu], I.8004; Miller, *Ukrainian Question*, 179–210.

In an effort to make Kiev a more legible and governable city, nationalizing modernists undermined the imperial estate system, assigning privileges and responsibilities—and distinguishing between loyal and potentially subversive subjects—according to ethno-confessional criteria. As they enacted punitive measures against Polish-Catholic residents in an effort to strip the *szlachta* of its power, they also encouraged Little Russian consciousness as a healthy antidote to Polish patriotism. In many respects, the nationalizing modernist campaign was a remarkable success: it delegitimated Polish claims on the region and created a new Orthodox intelligentsia to replace the *szlachta* as the leaders of culture. However, official promotion of a brand of Little Russian consciousness that was built on radically populist ideas and expressed a desire to avenge the centuries-long suffering of the simple folk through violence would complicate the task of governing the borderlands and sow new divisions among Kiev's residents.

Capitalist Modernism

As nationalizing modernists in the Kiev governor-general's office worked to claim the southwestern borderlands by punishing the "disloyal" Poles and cultivating an alliance with Little Russian populists, a rival camp of capitalist modernists looked to successful entrepreneurs of various ethnicities to turn the city into an economic powerhouse. A small military garrison for the first decades of the early nineteenth century, by mid-century, Kiev was poised to become a major industrial power. Technological advances in sugar refining—the city's major industry—and a steep increase in sugar prices in the 1840s and 1850s drew a colorful cast of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to the city.²⁷ Anxious to maximize Kiev's potential economic growth, local bureaucrats offered tax breaks and other economic incentives to merchants and entrepreneurs who relocated to the city. These inducements convinced many landed Little Russian gentry families, such as the Tereshchenkos, to aban-

²⁷ Oleksandr Ohloblin, *Narysy z istorii ukrains'koi fabryky: Krypats'ka fabryka* (Kiev: Proletar, 1931), 147.

don the gentility of provincial life for the quick profits to be made in Kiev's sugar industry.²⁸ Kiev's mid-century economic boom also created new opportunities for entrepreneurs of very modest origins to join the urban *beau monde*: several men who had been born serfs invested the profits that they made peddling artisanal goods at regional trade fairs in sugar refineries, becoming multi-millionaires by the 1860s.²⁹

But Orthodox believers were not the only entrepreneurs to profit from the attempts of the capitalist modernists to develop Kiev's economy. In the late 1850s, following lobbying by the ministry of finance, the imperial ministries lifted the blanket ban on Jewish settlement in Kiev in an effort to encourage economic development.³⁰ Among the first of these "useful" Jews who settled in Kiev—mostly entrepreneurs who had founded successful businesses in nearby shtetls—were the Brodskii family, which acquired a vast network of breweries and sugar factories in the region, and D.S. Margolin, who founded the Dniepr Steamship Company. By the 1870s, tens of thousands of Jews lived in Kiev, where they played a vital role in its flourishing economy: by 1874, almost 90 percent of the city's first-guild merchants were Jewish; nearly 12 percent of the Jewish-owned industrial establishments in the entire empire were located in Kiev province.³¹ In recognition of the key role that Jewish entrepreneurs played in the city's economy, local authorities granted them waivers and exemptions that permitted them to buy homes in the city's most desirable neighborhoods and even to obtain grand rural estates.³²

The capitalist modernists' efforts to develop the city's economy paid off handsomely. Already by the late 1860s, venture capital

²⁸ See Kovalinskii, *Metsenaty Kiieva*; Kovalinskii, *Sem'ia Tereshchenko*.

²⁹ A.P. Ogloblin, *Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi fabryki: predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika* (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo Ukrainy, 1925), 148–67.

³⁰ Anan'ich, *Bankirskie doma*, 39.

³¹ DAK [Derzhavnyi arkhiv mista Kyieva], f. 163, op. 39, d. 211, l. 56; *Recueil de matériaux sur la situation économique des israélites de Russie d'après l'enquête de la Jewish Colonization Association* (Paris: Librairies Félix Alcan et Guillaumin Réunies, 1906), 2:201–5.

³² DAK, f. 163, op. 7, d. 743, l. 1. For more on Kiev and its Jewish community, see Meir, *Kiev, Jewish Metropolis*.

investments in Kiev outstripped those of Moscow and Petersburg by more than twofold, and the city hosted one of the empire's most lucrative and rapidly growing commercial sectors.³³ The local sugar barons, eager to maximize their credit opportunities and their profits, established dense networks of private banks, commodities exchanges, and mutual aid associations.³⁴ In Kiev—which was rapidly acquiring a reputation as the empire's capitalist Wild West—social status tended to be conveyed by one's wealth and entrepreneurial talent, rather than one's social or economic background. Jewish, Russian, and Ukrainian businessmen freely mixed in the city's private clubs and served together in its powerful Stock Committee.³⁵ Kiev's Jewish business elite joined their Gentile colleagues in the elected municipal duma as well; indeed, owing to their strong representation among the entrepreneurial elite, Jews enjoyed disproportionately strong representation in the body and in the upper curiae of voters.³⁶

By the 1880s, as the empire-wide push for industrialization grew more powerful and Kiev's role in the global sugar business became more prominent, the relationship between the city's multiethnic economic elite and the imperial state grew only closer.³⁷ Together, mercantile elites and officials representing the Ministry of Finance (all four finance ministers between 1880 and 1903 had links to Kiev and had benefited from its economic boom) pursued a capitalist modernity in which state investments and protectionist policies benefited rationally organized enterprises.³⁸ In 1885, after lobbying

³³ D.I. Pikhno, *Kommercheskie operatsii Gosudarstvennogo Banka* (Kiev: Universitetskaya tipografiia 1876), 88–89.

³⁴ K.G. Voblyi, *Narysy z istorii rosiis'ko-ukrains'koi tsukroburiakovoii promyslovosti* (Kiev: Vseukrains'ka akademiia nauk, 1931) 3:1, 119; Kasymenko et al., *Istoriia Kyeva*, 409.

³⁵ Starozhil, *Kiev v vos'midesiatykh godakh*, 92.

³⁶ DAK, f. 163, op. 39, d. 211, l. 51.

³⁷ By 1887, the sixty sugar refineries located in Kiev province produced more than one-third of the empire's sugar—a proportion that would double by the turn of the century. See L.F. Volokhov, *Sakharnaia promyshlennost' v Rossii v tsifrakh* (Kiev: R.K. Lubkovskii, 1913), 43.

³⁸ On the “Kiev clique” within the Ministry of Finance, see Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, 108. For the ministry's plea to place the economic development of the empire as a top priority of governance, see *Obzor deiatel'nosti Minister-*

from the Kiev Stock Committee, the Ministry of Finance agreed to dismantle the free trade policies that had prevailed since the Crimean War, implementing new tariffs that favored major industrial producers.³⁹ Two years later, the city's major sugar producers, led by Lev Brodskii, formed a cartel, which set production levels for sugar and exported quantities exceeding this limit overseas, thus increasing producers' profit margins. By 1893, 206 of the empire's 226 sugar refineries had joined the cartel; in 1895, after extensive lobbying, the cartel officially gained recognition from S.Iu. Witte's Ministry of Finance.⁴⁰ Sugar speculation and the price fixing practices of Kiev's multicultural elites now gained official sanction from the imperial government, marking the apex of capitalist modernism in Kiev.

By the turn of the century, Kiev's leading entrepreneurs had begun to form private utility companies, which they saw both as a wise investment and as a means of giving Kiev the face of a modern European city. The Brodskii established a private water company; Margolin founded a public transit system, which launched the Russian Empire's first electric tram in 1894.⁴¹ The Brodskii and Tereshchenkos—the latter apparently being the lone Gentile investors in the city's utility system—co-directed the municipal sewer company.⁴² But if Kiev's capitalist modernists cited the development of the utility companies as *prima facie* evidence of their commitment to transforming the city into a sanitary and orderly metropolis, the utilities interests, more than any other single factor, created new social and geographic distinctions. The high cost of the water filtration system developed by the Brodskii's engineers deprived the poor of a safe water supply—while guaranteeing the shareholders of the waterworks immense profits. Margolin's tram

stva finansov v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra III (1881–1894) (St. Petersburg: V. Kirshbaum, 1902), 2–3.

³⁹ Snow, *The Years 1881–1894*, 8.

⁴⁰ “Sveklosakharnaia normirovka,” in *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1900), 29: 27.

⁴¹ Tron'ko et al., *Istoriia gorodov*, 158; Khiterer, “Jewish Life in Kyiv,” 83.

⁴² P. Golubiatnikov, *Spravka o khode dela po rasshireniiu Kievskoi kanalizatsii v chetyrekhletie s 1902 po 1906 god: Prilozheniia* (Kiev: Tipografiia Okruzhnogo Shtaba, 1906), 255–62.

network served only the central areas of the city, where its wealthy congregated; in any case, the base fare of five kopecks would have been out of the reach of most proletarians.⁴³ And the electric lights installed throughout the city in the 1890s illuminated the central districts, but left the peripheral neighborhoods, with growing crime rates, to languish in darkness.⁴⁴

The capitalist modernists had transformed the face and the society of Kiev, endowing the city with a well-developed industrial sector, a modern infrastructure, and a close-knit, ethnically diverse elite. But the development of capitalism also sowed new divisions and conflicts. As the state directed a growing portion of its resources toward the rich, the poor found themselves ever more marginalized. Even foreign commentators viewed government support for the sugar cartel as a startling example of predatory capitalism, and the self-interest and graft endemic to the private utility companies provoked great anger from politicians and ordinary people.⁴⁵ The fact that capitalist modernism reached its apex at the height of the de-Polonization campaign fostered further conflict. The Little Russian intellectuals patronized by nationalizing modernists portrayed Ukrainian history and contemporary politics as a constant struggle between the Orthodox simple folk and their non-Orthodox "exploiters." The key role that the non-Orthodox—especially Jews—played in urban economic and political life would provide ammunition to those who would seek to imbue resentment at the class differences that had emerged in the city with ethno-national antipathies.⁴⁶

⁴³ Tron'ko, *Istoriia gorodov*, 158.

⁴⁴ S.M. Boguslavskii, *Sputnik po g. Kievu* (Kiev: L.V. Khmeliovskii, 1913), 10.

⁴⁵ See, for example, *Appletons' Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year: 1901* (New York, 1902), 595. By the turn of the century, Kharkov residents denounced the municipal utilities interests, which as in most other cities were controlled by French and Belgian firms, as a foreign "cabal" bleeding city residents of their last dime. See D.I. Bagalei and D.P. Miller, *Istoriia goroda Khar'kova za 250 let ego sushchestvovaniia (s 1655-go po 1905-i god)* (Khar'kov: M. Zil'berberg i synov'ia, 1912), 397. In Kiev, where prominent local plutocrats, not faceless foreign capitalists, controlled the utilities, anger would grow even more intense.

⁴⁶ On the nexus between Jews and capitalism in modern Europe, consult Penslar, *Shylock's Children*; Muller, *Capitalism and the Jews*.

Antiliber Populism

The tensions between nationalizing and capitalist modernism in Kiev bred a third distinctly modern movement—antiliber populism. As early as the 1880s, a new generation of intellectuals who had come of age during the de-Polonization campaign began to translate the ideas of the nationalizing modernists into urban politics, working to "liberate" the city's simple folk from their foreign "exploiters" through the creation of a grassroots, anticapitalist, anti-Semitic political movement. In 1879, D.I. Pikhno, the son of a petty trader who ultimately became a professor of economics at St. Vladimir's University, succeeded Shul'gin as the editor of *Kievlianin*. Himself an alumnus of a school for underprivileged Orthodox children run by Little Russian radicals, Pikhno used the paper to attack the monopolistic practices and multicultural composition of Kiev's capitalist elite.⁴⁷ Far from an accidental by-product of the capitalist system, the social inequalities that had arisen in the city, he argued, reflected Jewish entrepreneurs' age-old efforts to dominate Little Russians. These abuses, he insisted, demanded enhanced state involvement to protect the welfare of the Orthodox toiling masses.⁴⁸ Pikhno did not limit his attacks on "Jewish interests" to the pages of his newspaper; he also became a fixture of public meetings in which he denounced non-Orthodox elites in no uncertain terms.⁴⁹

Pikhno's views—and his efforts to introduce them to a broader public—were well received by activists working within the city's formal political institutions. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, politically active Orthodox merchants and professionals hailing from the city's struggling peripheral neighborhoods convened meetings and launched voter mobilization drives. As a result of these efforts, many of these activists won seats in the city дума, where they styled themselves as defenders of ordinary city residents. Newly

⁴⁷ NBU IR, I. 8076, I. 5.

⁴⁸ *Kievlianin*, 18 February 1883, 2; "Kredit i sel'skoe khoziaistvo," *Kievlianin*, 24 February 1883, 1; "Sakharnoe proizvodstvo i normirovka," *Kievlianin*, 21 January 1894, 1.

⁴⁹ For example, *Otchet Kievskogo Birzhevogo Komiteta za 1902 god* (Kiev: Frontskevich, 1903), 48–51.

elected delegates such as the accountant A.L. Tsytovich, the railroad engineer N.P. Dobrynin, and the doctor E.I. Afanas'ev lobbied eloquently for the need to eliminate graft and to improve public services in the urban outskirts.⁵⁰ But their campaign for social renewal was infused with sharp denunciations of the capitalist modernists' lack of concern for the greater good. Dobrynin complained that private capitalists—many of whom, he pointed out, were Jewish—had ravaged the southwestern region, acquiring its most valuable resources for their personal use.⁵¹ Afanas'ev darkly warned that local plutocrats' disinterest in improving public health placed ordinary people on the “path to extinction.”⁵² In short, building on an earlier intellectual tradition that opposed the interests of the borderlands' Orthodox masses and its largely non-Orthodox elites, antiliberal populists insisted that the plight of Kiev's average people could not be improved until their “foreign exploiters” were stripped of their power.

As the turn of the twentieth century neared, antiliberal populism grew more influential in the city council; indeed, in 1894 observers described right-wing activists as comprising a vocal and organized party—a remarkable fact, given that political parties technically remained illegal in Russia for another ten years.⁵³ In preparation for the 1902 municipal elections, antiliberal populist activists organized massive neighborhood meetings on the city's periphery. These efforts led to the emergence of the New Duma party, which relentlessly attacked the capitalist modernist status quo and won strong representation in the city council on election day.⁵⁴ Once in power, the New Duma delegates continued to call for more responsive and transparent governance; again, they connected this task with the

⁵⁰ “Zasedanie dumy,” *Kievskoe slovo*, 11 August 1891, 3; see also Garol'd, *Nashi Glasnye: Otkrytki s momental'nyimi snimkami nashikh dumtsev* (Kiev: P.K. Lubkovskii, 1906), 47.

⁵¹ N.P. Dobrynin, *Russkie zheleznye dorogi i ikh slabye storony* (Kiev: I.N. Kushnerev, 1886), especially 13, 26–28, 33.

⁵² The quote is from “Gorodskie i mestnye izvestiia,” *Trud*, 16 March 1881, 1–2; see also DAK, f. 163, op. 8, d. 55, l. 524; DAK, f. 163, op. 8, d. 55, l. 795; “Zasedanie dumy,” *Kievskoe slovo*, 11 August 1891, 3.

⁵³ *Kievskoe slovo*, 10 February 1894, 3.

⁵⁴ “Predvybornaia agitatsiia,” *Kievskaiia gazeta*, 10 January 1902, 3.

battle against Jewish elites. P.V. Golubiatnikov, a military engineer and the leader of the party, attacked the previous city council for drawing up utilities contracts that offered huge financial concessions to the Brodskii family.⁵⁵ F.N. Iasnogurskii, another New Duma delegate, denounced the Stock Committee for lobbying the duma to build a railroad spur through the city center, which he alleged would destroy monuments to the city's Orthodox heritage.⁵⁶ As he put it, “The murmur of Jews is audible at every step, and we, the representatives of the city, by means of our strength and capability must silence this murmur and ... protect our confrères [*sobratii*] from catastrophes.”⁵⁷

Having long marketed their platform as a path toward popular “liberation” from the oppression of the non-Orthodox, Kiev's antiliberal populists benefited the most from the rise of the Liberation Movement in the first years of the twentieth century. As city residents gathered to discuss politics in neighborhood meetings and on shop floors, antiliberal populism and the campaign against Jewish elites drove local politics. One of the many grassroots groups that sprang up in the city complained in a 1905 letter to the governor-general, “the religious center of the southwest region ... has been isolated ... by the shadow of Yiddom [*zhidovskaia ten'*], which renders us invisible.”⁵⁸ Condemning “flippant” local inhabitants and corrupt officials for compromising the best interests of city residents, the group urged Orthodox believers to unite in the struggle against “foreign” influence.⁵⁹ Other pamphleteers warned that Jews planned to use the political crisis in Russia to expand their political power. “We are children of our country, and they are only guests,” read one tract that circulated in August 1905. “We built and constructed our native Rus' with our blood and the blood of our ancestors; we should protect her from everything that is contrary to the

⁵⁵ Golubiatnikov, who won a position on the city sanitation committee, argued that Kiev was in urgent need of a public, city-wide sewer system: see Golubiatnikov, *Spravka o khode dela*.

⁵⁶ DAK, f. 163, op. 8, d. 94, ll. 415–16.

⁵⁷ DAK, f. 163, op. 8, d. 94, l. 75.

⁵⁸ TsDIAUK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 71, l. 28ob.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, ll. 28ob–29; ll. 31–32.

Russian spirit, remain loyal to our native antiquity.”⁶⁰ In Kiev, expressions of ethno-national pride and the desire to engage ordinary residents in formal political processes could not be separated from a broader campaign against capitalist modernism—and in particular, Jewish entrepreneurial elites.

The events of October 1905 further shifted political momentum in the favor of antiliberal populists. Early on the morning of 18 October, when word that the tsar had granted his subjects basic civil rights and an elective parliament reached Kiev, city residents poured out into the streets, excitedly conversing about the news. By mid-morning, tens of thousands had convened in front of the city council, where they cheered the “people’s liberation.” By afternoon, however, rumors began to circulate that local Jews were plotting to seize power, and that liberation could not be complete until “Jewish interests” were vanquished.⁶¹ As *Kievlianin* affiliates took to the streets, describing instances of alleged Jewish perfidy, Orthodox workers, artisans, and petty merchants convened neighborhood meetings that resolved “to teach the Yids a lesson.”⁶² By nightfall, these gatherings had degenerated into a pogrom, as protestors ransacked Jewish homes and businesses in both peripheral neighborhoods and the city center.⁶³ The mobilizing ideas and institutional networks that illiberal populists had used to promote social change had now become incubators of mass violence.

By the morning of 19 October, pogromists marched into the city’s most elite district, declaring their resolve to punish the “Jewish millionaires.”⁶⁴ The crowds destroyed numerous estates of Jewish sugar entrepreneurs as well as the apartment of D.S. Margolin’s son.⁶⁵ The most dramatic moments of the day unfolded outside one of the Brodskii’s manors. As pogromists ransacked

⁶⁰ DAKO [Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivsk’oi oblasti], f. 2, op. 41, d. 222b, ll. 35ob–36.

⁶¹ TsDIAUK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 3, l. 267; TsDIAUK, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1057, l. 16.

⁶² E.F. Turau, *K istorii Kievskogo pogroma* (Kiev: Progress, 1906), 27; “Uchastniki patrioticheskoi manifestatsii,” *Kievskie otkliki*, 25 October 1905, 4.

⁶³ TsDIAUK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, l. 142ob.

⁶⁴ GARF [Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii], f. 102, OO, 1905, d. 1350, ch. 15, l. 163.

⁶⁵ TsDIAUK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, ll. 178–79.

the property of another prominent Jewish entrepreneur who lived next door, beating its inhabitant senseless, the university student Grigorii Brodskii fired a pistol at the assailants, killing one and injuring two. Police soon arrived to arrest Brodskii—and later stood by idly as *pogromshchiki* looted his home.⁶⁶ Despite Lev Brodskii’s pleas to bureaucrats to halt the pogrom, the police did not subdue the violence for three days.⁶⁷ By the time the authorities regained control in the city, the pogrom had become the costliest outbreak of violence in the entire empire in 1905, having incurred 10.5 million rubles of damage and taken nearly 400 lives.⁶⁸ This explosion of mass violence decisively shifted political power away from the capitalist modernists; abandoned by the officials who had promoted and protected them, Kiev’s Jewish elites proved unable to defend themselves against the politically mobilized masses.

In the wake of the pogrom, antiliberal populists grew still more outspoken. City council representatives such as Golubiatnikov continued to lament the “exploitation” of the city’s workers by its homegrown capitalists; meanwhile, the body passed a resolution that heralded the violence as the beginning of a new era of popular engagement, in which Orthodox believers no longer would be forced to endure insults and oppression at the hands of Jews.⁶⁹ *Kievlianin* showcased similar sentiments, publishing letters from ordinary residents that portrayed the suffering that had befallen the Jewish elite as just deserts for their centuries of alleged exploitation.⁷⁰ Indeed, hundreds of unpublished letters, many of which describe

⁶⁶ “Kievskii okruzhnoi sud: Delo Grigoriia Brodskogo,” *Pravo*, 30 November 1907, 2659–60.

⁶⁷ TsDIAUK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, l. 151.

⁶⁸ Figures from “Obvinitel’nyi akt,” *Kievskaiia mysl’*, 7 December 1907, 4; “Die Dimensionen der Oktober-pogrome (1905),” in *Die Judenpogrome in Russland* (Cologne: Jüdischer Verlag, 1910), 1:209. A local commission charged with collecting materials on the pogrom, led by Lev Brodskii, estimated that 7,000 families had been touched by the violence (TsDIAUK, f. 1423, op. 1, d. 30, l. 14.).

⁶⁹ P. Golubiatnikov, *Sovety kievlianam, izbirateliam v gorodskuiu dumu* (Kiev: Petr Barskii, 1906), 4–7; “Pis’mo glasnym kievskoi gorodskoi dumy,” *Kievlianin*, 4 November 1905, 3.

⁷⁰ *Kievlianin*, 27 October 1905, 3; “Ochevidets Mikhail Khanenko,” *Kievlianin*, 27 October 1905, 3.

violent fantasies of purging Jewish influence from Kiev, remain in *Kievljanin's* archive.⁷¹

Seeking to secure a dominant role in local political discourse, antiliberal populist activists worked doggedly to expand their popular support base among the city's working classes. They created their own youth groups and labor unions to combat organizing efforts by left-wing groups, and even a fund to support antiliberal city residents who had been victimized for their political views.⁷² They invited workers to testify in city squares about incidents of alleged Jewish exploitation, and organized meetings to explain to city residents why they should not elect "Yids, Poles, and other non-believers" to public office.⁷³ And they launched new penny papers that both heralded anti-Jewish violence as a heroic act of national self-defense and invited ordinary opponents of capitalist modernism to submit songs, articles, and poems describing their political views and activities.⁷⁴

In the end, the cross-class, antiliberal coalition that emerged from Kiev transformed everyday life and political culture in the city. Organized boycotts of Jewish-owned (or allegedly pro-Jewish) enterprises challenged the economic power of the capitalist modernists.⁷⁵ Military-style parades of right-wing activists through the city undermined the spirit of accommodation that the entrepreneurial elite had fostered.⁷⁶ A combination of dirty tricks and voter

⁷¹ TsDIAUK, f. 296, op. 1, d. 1–2.

⁷² Consult "Partiia pravogo poriadka," *Kievskii golos*, 31 October 1906, 3; "K predvybornoi agitatsii," *Kievskii golos*, 2 November 1906, 2; "Iz partiinoi zhizni," *Novyi vek*, 14 February 1906, 3; "Iz zhizni politicheskikh partii," *Kievskii vestnik*, 21 January 1906, 3; "Sobranie chlenov 'kassy zhertv dolga,'" *Kievljanin*, 23 October 1906, 3; "Strakhovanie monarkhistov ot revoliutsionerov," *Zakon i pravda*, 11 October 1906, 3; TsDIAUK, f. 442, op. 636, d. 647, ch. I, l. 659.

⁷³ "Mestnaia khronika," *Otgoloski zhizni*, 19 May 1906, 2; "Chorna sotnia abo-zh 'istynno-russkie' liudi," *Hromads'ka dumka*, 17 May 1906, 1.

⁷⁴ "Sedletskii pogrom," *Zakon i pravda*, 23 September 1906, 2–3; see also *Zakon i pravda*, 25 January 1907, 1; "Svoboda, ravenstvo," *Zakon i pravda*, 29 September 1906, 1.

⁷⁵ "Boikot studentov-politekhnikov," *Kievskii golos*, 20 September 1906, 2; *Kievljanin*, 21 September 1906, 3.

⁷⁶ "Chorna sotnia abo-zh 'istynno-russkie' liudi," *Hromads'ka dumka*, 17 May 1906, 1.

mobilization campaigns also led the antiliberal populists to victory in the municipal дума elections of 1906.⁷⁷ The biggest victory of all for Kiev's antiliberal populists came in February 1907, when city residents elected Platon, the Bishop of Chigirin, the Rector of the Kiev Theological Academy, and a vocal opponent of capitalist modernism, to the imperial parliament.⁷⁸ The first Orthodox bishop elected to the body, Platon was one of only three right-wing delegates elected by Russian cities.⁷⁹ On the night of the election, antiliberal populists marched around the city, lauding Platon's ability to protect the Orthodox residents of "ancient Kiev" from its non-Christian enemies.⁸⁰ Once in the power, the bishop did not disappoint his constituents; even as he lobbied to extend state benefits for unemployed workers, he opposed liberals' attempts to condemn the assassination of Jewish дума delegates by right-wing paramilitary units.⁸¹

Through the end of the old regime, Kiev remained a reliable supplier of right-wing delegates to the imperial parliament and the spiritual home of an East Slavic nationalist movement that called on a strong state to expand the economic and political opportunities available to the borderlands' Orthodox residents, and to limit the abuses of the capitalist elite and the civil rights of Poles and Jews. If some veterans of the antiliberal populist movement of the 1890s and early 1900s had by then begun to identify as "Russian" nationalists, Kiev's antiliberal forces continued to draw on Ukrainian culture as a means of defining themselves against their "foreign exploiters."⁸² As antiliberal populist ideas now intersected with

⁷⁷ For detailed coverage of these elections, see Hillis, *Children of Rus'*, 181–210.

⁷⁸ "Vybir posla vid Kyeve," *Rada*, 7 February 1907, 3; "Akt," DAKO, f. 2, op. 42, d. 300e, l. 98. For biographical information on Platon, see DAKO, f. 2, op. 42, d. 300e, ll. 71–73.

⁷⁹ Aleksei Smirnov, *Kak proshli vybory vo 2-iu gosudarstvennuiu dumu* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1907), 251.

⁸⁰ "Provody chlena Gosudarstvennoi Dumy ot Kieva, preosviashchennogo Platona, episkopa Chigirinskogo," *Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* 7 (1907): 156–68.

⁸¹ *Gosudarstvennaia дума: Stenograficheskie otchety* 1907 g. (St. Petersburg: Gorodskaiia Tipografiia, 1907), 1: 1275, 1374–75; 2: 604–5.

⁸² On self-proclaimed "Russian nationalists," see *Sbornik Kluba russkikh natsionalistov* (Kiev: Kushnerev, 1909); for examples of antiliberal populists' efforts to draw on Ukrainian culture, see Ia. Demchenko, *Pravda ob ukrainofil'stve* (Kiev: I.N. Kushnerev, 1906); and the daily paper *Kiev*, launched in January 1910.

coalescing national movements, the future of inter-ethnic accommodation in Kiev grew ever more uncertain. Already hounded by constant threats of pogroms, Kiev Jews were further marginalized by the notorious Beilis Affair (1911–13), which saw local activists convince the Ministry of Justice to accuse an innocent Jew of ritual murder.⁸³ By the eve of World War I, Kiev's antiliberal populists had severely undermined the imperial social order and expressed their willingness to usurp vital governance tasks from St. Petersburg.⁸⁴

In the last years of the old regime, Kiev was one of the empire's most violent and unstable corners. Yet far from evidence of the city's civic or political underdevelopment, the explosive mass politics that emerged from Kiev testified to its modernity and to its involvement in pan-European political trends. Despite the continued existence of the autocracy, the city had generated a "politics in a new key" that relied on mass mobilization through the press, public spectacles, and electoral agitation. Indeed, as this chapter has argued, official efforts to modernize and better manage the borderlands had unwittingly equipped activists with opportunities as well as tools to forge a new style of politics that would ultimately threaten civic order in the city and challenge the authority of the autocratic state.

From a political vantage point, Kiev was far from a provincial backwater; despite its distance from the centers of power in Moscow and St. Petersburg and its liminal position on the continent, it was a modern metropolis being transformed by the increasingly radical political cultures sweeping the rest of the continent. The case of Kiev serves as a useful reminder that the Russian Empire's race to modernity entailed more than democratization, industrializa-

⁸³ Consult *Delo Beilisa: Stenograficheskii otchet*. 3 vols. (Kiev: Pechatnia S.P. Iakovleva, 1913). On local activists' insistence that a blood ritual had taken place in Kiev, see TsDIAUK, f. 317, op. 1, d. 5482 (tom 1), ll. 15a–15g.

⁸⁴ Hans Rogger's classic work on the right in the Russian Empire ultimately dismissed its political prospects, arguing that "there was still little that could fuse the disparate and scattered elements of the Right into an effective force." This chapter, by contrast, contends that Kiev's antiliberal populists built a powerful and transformative social movement that became much more than the "noisy, powerful irritant" that Rogger describes. See Rogger, *Jewish Policies*, 206, 211.

tion, urbanization, and the rise of civil society. It reveals the dark underbelly of modernity, showing how these processes could stir up new resentments, generate new conflicts, and militate against the dreams of liberal reformers. The rise of mass politics in Kiev foretold the demise of the era of notables and spoke to the desire of tsarist subjects to seize control of their political destinies, but it also revealed the self-destructive and violent potential of political mobilization.