

STUDIES OF WORLD MIGRATIONS

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of Imperial Russia's Resettlement Administration," *Slavic Review* 69.1 (Spring 2010): 151–79.

4. Ann Laura Stoler, "On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty," *Public Culture* 18.1 (2006): 137–38.
5. Andreea Geselle, "Domenica Saba Takes to the Road: Origins and Development of a Modern Passport System in Lombardy-Veneto," in *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 217; Andreas Fahrmeier, "Governments and Forgers: Passports in Nineteenth-Century Europe," in *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 233; Leo Lucassen, "A Many-Headed Monster: The Evolution of the Passport System in the Netherlands and Germany in the Long Nineteenth Century," in *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 251.
6. Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 399–400, 505–6.
7. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3–4.
8. Mike Davis, however, has drawn attention to the increase in squatters living on the margins of society and to the deterioration of urban life in Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (London: Verso, 2006), 166–67.

Human Mobility, Imperial Governance, and Political Conflict in Pre-Revolutionary Kiev

FAITH HILLIS

The rulers of imperial Russia did not only seek to *limit* spontaneous movement and migration; they also *used* human mobility as a tool of governance. State policies lured settlers to Siberia and the Far East, sent exiled criminals and dissidents to frozen wastelands, and used transnational religious pilgrimages to showcase Russian power and to undermine the empire's rivals. The state's role in human-mobility processes was especially pronounced in the empire's western borderlands, where in 1863 the Polish nobility (*szlachta*), which had been the dominant political and economic force in the region since the early modern period, rose up against the imperial state. Having implemented a series of measures to declassify Poles—aimed at forcing them off of their rural lands and out of their urban properties—imperial officials enticed upwardly mobile migrants to the borderlands' major cultural centers, where they hoped the newcomers would replace Polish elites as the leaders of industry and culture. This essay examines these processes from the vantage point of Kiev, a major center of the de-Polonization campaign and the administrative seat of the empire's southwestern borderlands. It also explores the unintended consequences of this governance strategy, considering how the clashing interests of the newcomers eventually generated new conflicts in urban society and shaped local political culture.

In the aftermath of the 1863 revolt, imperial officials relied on the tens of thousands of migrants who arrived in Kiev to reduce Polish social and economic influence in the city. As bureaucrats declassified *szlachta* clans who had invested heavily in the local sugar industry, they enticed Jewish capitalists who had proven their entrepreneurial mettle in nearby shtetls to relocate to Kiev by

offering them exemptions to the empire's rules on Jewish settlement. A series of tax incentives also attracted Orthodox merchants—primarily ethnic Ukrainians (or as they were known at the time, Little Russians) from the provinces just to the east of Kiev. Once these migrants arrived in the city, officials expected them not only to promote economic growth but also to contribute to the unfolding anti-Polish ideological campaign, which sought to claim Kiev as a primordialially Orthodox locale.

By the 1870s, the rapid influx of upwardly mobile Jewish and Little Russian elites had achieved the state's major goal: the de-Polonization of Kiev. Successful Jewish and Little Russian migrants joined the city's most exclusive private clubs, served together in the municipal *duma*, and moved into the posh districts that formerly had been *szlachta* strongholds. As the two groups competed for limited economic and political resources, however, they increasingly found themselves in conflict. The imperial state's continued involvement with the two migrant communities further complicated intergroup dynamics: even as officials grew more reliant on Jews' participation in the local economy, they patronized efforts to promote Little Russian consciousness in the city, which often portrayed Jewish commercial elites as "exploiters" of the region's simple folk. By the early twentieth century, the conflict between the two parties had assumed a dynamic of its own that the imperial authorities struggled to control. Little Russian activists played a key role in the organization of grassroots political movements—and street violence—that protested against the power of local Jewish commercial elites. In Kiev, at least, ideological incitement from above and popular antipathies from below were not the only factors that produced a violent and mass-oriented anti-Semitic movement.¹ Human mobility—and the conflicts it produced—profoundly shaped the ideologies of Kiev's elites and influenced political outcomes.

Human Mobility and Imperial Governance: Peopling a De-Polonizing City

In the wake of the 1863 revolt, Kiev bureaucrats launched an ambitious campaign to destroy Polish influence in the city. The de-Polonization drive had two major (and not necessarily complementary) aims: to minimize the role played by the *szlachta* in the city's booming economy, and to undermine Polish political and cultural influence by claiming Kiev as a primordialially Orthodox locale. Harnessing mobility processes to help them achieve both goals, local bureaucrats lured Jewish and Little Russian migrants to the city through a mixture of official policies and improvised incentives. Jewish entrepreneurs who had achieved success in the Pale of Settlement, officials hoped, could invest in the city's growing industrial sector; devoutly Orthodox Little Russian merchants

and upwardly mobile professionals and intellectuals could assist in the task of making Kiev a "truly Russian" city.

The migration of successful Jewish entrepreneurs to Kiev began in earnest just before the Polish revolt. In 1859, the governor-general of the Southwestern Provinces convinced the minister of finance to reverse the statute that had banned Jewish settlement in the city since the 1830s, noting that permitting "useful" Jews to settle in the city would encourage economic development.² The steady stream of Jewish migrants to Kiev in the first years of the 1860s became a flood in the aftermath of the Polish revolt. Eager to ensure that the estates and factories left vacant by exiled or ruined Polish families did not fall into disrepair, city officials established one of the empire's most liberal Jewish settlement regimes, allowing Jewish merchants of both the first and second guilds permanently to reside in the city.³ In 1863, Kiev's governor-general even petitioned the imperial ministries to waive the blanket injunction against Jewish acquisition of immovable property outside of the Pale, asking St. Petersburg to allow him to reward the city's successful Jewish entrepreneurs with hereditary honored-citizen status and plots of land.⁴

Within a decade of the Polish revolt, Jewish newcomers had achieved stunning economic success in Kiev. In the early 1860s, Israel Brodskii, who operated a network of shops and refineries across the Pale, moved to the city with several of his brothers. Having purchased a sugar plant and a brewery shortly after their arrival, the brothers quickly established reputations as the "sugar kings" of the Russian Empire; they ultimately acquired thirteen sugar-beet refineries managed by six joint-stock companies in Kiev Province alone.⁵ By the 1870s, the Gafperin, Zaitsev, Liebermann, and Saks families had also established a place among Kiev's most successful sugar barons.⁶ The Koggen brothers, Karaites who hailed from Crimea, founded a small tobacco shop after their arrival and soon acquired the city's two largest tobacco factories.⁷ The modest steamboat company founded by D. S. Margolin in the 1860s had become the largest Dniepr shipping company within a decade.⁸ Even Evzel Gintsburg, one of Russia's most famed financiers, established a presence in Kiev, opening a commercial bank—which also boasted branches in Paris and St. Petersburg—in the city.⁹ The marriage of Evzel's son Horace to the daughter of a Jewish sugar entrepreneur further enriched the Gintsburgs and strengthened their ties to Kiev, bringing six southwestern sugar refineries into the family's portfolio.¹⁰ By 1874, one hundred Jews had achieved first-guild merchant status in Kiev, compared to only fifteen Gentiles; Jewish immigrants owned one-sixth of the commercial and industrial property in Kiev region, including twenty-seven sugar factories, 564 viticulture establishments, and 148 beer factories.¹¹

The local authorities, who had opened the city to Jewish merchants in the first place, accommodated and rewarded Jewish entrepreneurial elites at many

furnitures. In the 1870s, Kiev's governor-general convinced the ministries that Jews who maintained a respectable "lifestyle and occupation" should be permitted to acquire property anywhere in the city.¹² Overjoyed at this news, one member of the Brodskii family built a handsome home in the city center, across from the duma building, although the authorities refused his request to build a synagogue on the premises.¹³ The Kogens, too, erected several estates in the city's most prestigious districts.¹⁴ By 1879, 101 Kiev Jews had purchased homes within city limits, sixty-four of which were located in the city's ritziest neighborhoods.¹⁵ Local authorities also permitted Jewish merchants of the first guild to obtain residence permits for their employees—from domestic servants and tutors to lawyers and accountants—a policy that stimulated further Jewish migration. In 1863, three thousand Jews were registered in Kiev; a decade later, that number had risen to thirteen thousand out of a total population of 116,000, meaning that legally registered Jews comprised a healthy 11 percent of the city's population, outstripping the number of Polish inhabitants.¹⁶

In short, the men who ruled the empire not only created policies that permitted a Jewish entrepreneurial elite to emerge in Kiev; they also celebrated the arrival of the community's most successful businessmen into high society. The Brodskiis and Gintsburgs served on high-ranking commissions on the "Jewish question" that offered them direct access to ministers and even the tsar; Mar-golin was appointed Kiev's local representative to the Department of Trade and Manufacturing.¹⁷ The Gintsburgs, who welcomed ministers and even tsars to their table on more than a few occasions, were granted baronial titles and an enormous Crimean estate in the 1870s.¹⁸ In the process, Kiev's leaders signaled strongly to non-Jewish high society that a spirit of accommodation and toleration should prevail within the urban *beau monde*. The chairmen of the Kiev Stock Exchange (whom imperial law required to be Christian) welcomed Jewish participation in subcommittees; four of the five members of the committee that oversaw the construction in the 1870s of a grand new building for the exchange, located adjacent to the governor-general's headquarters, were Jewish.¹⁹ The exchange's leaders, in turn, expressed their regard for the group's Jewish members by moving its weekly meetings to Fridays to avoid the Jewish Sabbath.²⁰ Meanwhile, Jewish entrepreneurs became visible fixtures in the city's charitable associations and the municipal duma.²¹

If city officials created incentives to encourage Jewish entrepreneurs to invest in Kiev, they also used tax breaks to lure Orthodox merchants and entrepreneurs to the city. Although these efforts attracted a handful of entrepreneurs from the Great Russian interior, most of the city's gentle entrepreneurial migrants were native sons of the southwest. Drawn by tales of the vast fortunes to be made in the sugar industry, a number of Left Bank Ukraine's most prominent gentry clans, including the Kharitonenkos, Khanenkos, and Tereshchenkos, established

a permanent presence in the city. These ethnic Ukrainian migrants might have abandoned the gentility of provincial life, but they remained determined to preserve their cultural heritage.²² The Kharitonenkos, Khanenkos, and Tereshchenkos proudly traced their ancestry to the Cossack generals of the sixteenth and seventeenth century and devoted substantial time and money to protecting the traditions and language of the region's simple folk. The de Polonizing state heartily endorsed these tasks; recovering the "pure" Orthodox culture of Little Russians, after all, would diminish the influence of Polish-Catholic culture in the borderlands.

Together, Little Russian mercantile elites and the governor-general's office created historical commissions and archeological associations that presented Kiev as a "primordially Russian" city, emphasizing its status as the capital of Kievan Rus' ("The Mother of Russian Cities") and as the site of the East Slavs' conversion to Christianity ("The Cradle of Russian Orthodoxy"). The historical commissions demonstrated a special interest in the centuries that Kiev spent under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Under that "foreign" system, they claimed, the region's Orthodox masses had been subjected to cruel political domination by the Polish-Catholic nobility and economic exploitation by the Jewish estate managers and bankers retained by the *szlachta*.²³ As they compiled histories, published archival documents, and funded archeological digs, the Little Russian historical activists created a new pantheon of regional heroes. In particular, they were drawn to the seventeenth-century Cossack general Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, who led his regular armies as well as bands of peasants against the *szlachta* and their Jewish agents, ultimately wresting the central Dniepr region from Polish power. Khmel'nitskii's attempt to halt the "merciless bloodletting of the peasants, the result of repression by the Poles and the *pans*," and to change the fact that "Yids and dogs are respected more than our Christian brothers," claimed commission members, had allowed Cossack leaders and simple folk alike to join together to protect local culture and Orthodoxy on the empire's frontier.²⁴

By the late 1860s, the historical commissions had become powerful cultural institutions and political forces in Kiev. The expansion of their activities—and the prestige that came with participation in them—created an insatiable demand for journalists, historians, and teachers in the city, stimulating another wave of migration. In contrast to the early affiliates of the historical commissions, who tended to be noble-born, the new migrants included a number of self-made professionals who were proud of having risen up from the poverty that they believed had been foisted on generations of their ancestors by Poles and Jews. O. I. Levitskii, the son of a parish priest, served as the secretary of the governor-general's local history commission while still in his twenties, beginning a career as an historian, politician, and Ukrainian activist that would last through the 1917 revolution.²⁵ P. G. Lebedintsev, a parish priest posted in a district city in

Kiev Province, used the notoriety he gained in the historical commissions to advance through the church hierarchy, eventually becoming the first editor of *Kievskia eparkhialnye vedomosti* (News of Kiev Diocese) and the rector of St. Sophia's Cathedral.²⁶ Of all the commissions' affiliates, V. Ia. Shulg'in, the son of an itinerant, mid-ranking bureaucrat leveraged most effectively the respect and acclaim he gained in the local history circles. Determined to cast off "the triple yoke of Catholic clergy, Poles (landlords, rentiers, and estate managers), and Jews" that he believed continued to hang on the backs of the local Orthodox population, he founded Kiev's first daily, *Kievlianin* (*The Kiever*), in 1864.²⁷ The paper, which remained the city's most popular news organ through 1917, allowed Shulg'in to serve as the official spokesman of the "Orthodox cause"—and the most vociferous opponent of Polish and Jewish interests—in the southwest.²⁸

As they used the activities of the historical commissions to rise through the ranks of educated society, Kiev's Little Russian activists aspired to bring the masses with them. Labedintsev, Levitskii, and others in their circle participated in Sunday schools and popular-education ventures that taught peasants and workers to read in Russian and Ukrainian.²⁹ The historical commissions reached out to parishes and communes as well, distributing tracts in simple language that described their activities and solicited small donations. Inspired by Shulg'in's example, other activists founded penny papers, such as *Tryd* (Labor) and *Drug naroda* (Friend of the People), to educate the barely literate about the scholarly and political agendas of the commissions.³⁰ All the while, Little Russian activists—themselves recent arrivals in Kiev—sought to claim the city as an Orthodox space. They rechristened streets whose names invoked Polish political figures and military victories and founded museums of Ukrainian culture. They even attempted to erect in the city's central square a statue that depicted a horseback Khmel'nitskii trampling a Polish prince, a Jesuit, and a Jew—a plan that Alexander II vetoed as insensitive and politically inflammatory.³¹

The Costs of Mobility: Social and Political Conflict

In the 1880s, Kiev's Little Russian circles seized on the stunning success of Jewish economic migrants, which they interpreted as proof that the city remained under siege by non-Orthodox interests. Organs like *Kievlianin*, which had warned of the dual threat posed to local civilization by Poles and Jews, began to focus more intently on the allegedly baleful influence of Jews in Kiev's contemporary social and political life. Lamenting the influx of Jews into Kiev high society and the city's best neighborhoods, the paper denounced them as a "kulak nation that is strong by virtue of its unity, solidarity, single faith and beliefs, and views and has mastered the art of exploiting all non-Jews for more than ten decades."³² Kiev penny papers echoed these formulations, presenting the continued disen-

franchisement of the region's Orthodox population as a direct result of Jewish entrepreneurial success. *Tryd* complained that waivers allowing Jews to acquire land permitted entrepreneurial elites to assume the exploitative seigniorial role of the vanquished *szlachta*.³³ *Drug naroda* exposed price-fixing schemes allegedly cooked up by Jewish sugar barons and complained that the inclusion of the city's multicultural elites in the city дума had allowed "Jews and people . . . with a bad conscience" to "control and misuse local self-governance."³⁴

Kiev's Jewish elites did not directly respond to these attacks by Little Russian intellectuals; rather, they sought out state patronage only more aggressively. In 1887, Lev Brodskii, Israel's son, hosted a meeting of the city's major sugar producers, which produced a formal agreement to set production levels and to export quantities exceeding this limit overseas; within five years, 90 percent of the empire's sugar refineries had joined the Kiev cartel.³⁵ Coupled with new protectionist tariffs and had harvests in the late 1880s, the cartel's creation resulted in a rapid increase in the price of sugar—and in the sugar barons' profits. The finance minister Count Sergei Witte (who had befriended the Brodskis while managing the Southwest Railroad from Kiev in the 1870s) intervened at numerous points to protect the Kiev sugar industrialists, whom he viewed as model agents of capitalist development, from domestic and foreign competitors.³⁶ In 1895, after continued lobbying from the Brodskis, Witte officially recognized the cartel, levying harsh duties on foreign sugar and setting empire-wide production limits. Sugar speculation and the price-fixing practices of Kiev's sugar kings now gained official sanction from the imperial government, in an arrangement that foreign commentators viewed as a startling example of predatory capitalism.³⁷

In the face of increasing criticism—at home and abroad—of their capitalist excesses, Kiev's Jewish mercantile elites sought to highlight their imperial patriotism and sense of *noblesse oblige*, generously funding a variety of charitable causes while showcasing their commitment to the city's continued cultural and infrastructural development.³⁸ Around the turn of the century, they began to develop the city's utilities networks, which they saw as promising investments and as a means of endowing their city with a modern, European face. The Brodskis established a private water company, which by 1900 provided connections to four thousand of Kiev's seven thousand properties. Margolin, for his part, founded a transport company, which launched the Russian Empire's first electric tram in 1894 and built a network that comprised thirteen lines by 1904.³⁹ The Brodskis and Tereshchenkos—apparently the lone Gentile investors in the city's utility system—controlled an equal number of shares in the sewer company.⁴⁰

The creation of the sugar cartel and the continued expansion of the plutocrats' charitable and economic activities enraged a new generation of Little Russian populist activists. D. I. Pikhno, the son of a *meshchakin* who ultimately became a professor of economics at Kiev University and succeeded Shulg'in as the editor

of *Kievlianiin*, continued to argue that the interests of local Jewish elites were incompatible with those of the masses.⁴¹ The “Jews and sugar barons” of the Stock Committee, producers’ cartels, and utilities companies, he charged, had set artificially high prices for the most basic commodities, blocking upward mobility for millions of peasants.⁴² In 1902, Pikhno caused a scene at a Stock Committee meeting devoted to the bread trade. When Lev Brodskii and other Jewish entrepreneurs complained that existing trade agreements provided inadequate protections for the southwest’s largest commodity producers, Pikhno countered that state policy should aim to distribute the region’s wealth rather than concentrate it in the hands of a few. Before he stormed out of the meeting, the professor denounced the lack of transparency in the committee’s activities, complaining that its closed meetings were designed to keep the public ignorant of its decisions.⁴³

By the 1890s, populist delegates within the Kiev city *duma* had joined local intellectuals in denouncing the capitalist city fathers’ disregard for the welfare of the Little Russian simple folk. Although the body was dominated by mercantile elites through the 1870s and 1880s, continued attacks on the absenteeism of the city fathers and their narrow class interests eventually permitted petty merchants and Orthodox professionals of the third curia to seize control, continuing the social-mobility process for a new generation of populist politicians. Once elected, these delegates spoke out against irregularities in elections and abuses of power by the city’s political elite and expressed dismay at the *duma*’s lack of interest in the welfare of the city’s laboring population, devoting special attention to the plight of impoverished neighborhoods on the urban periphery.⁴⁴ The newly elected Orthodox delegates singled out for criticism the private utilities companies; rather than endow the city with a modern appearance, the delegates charged, the companies created new distinctions between center and periphery, rich and poor, plutocrats and the “simple folk.” The high cost of the water-filtration system developed by the Brodskii’s guaranteed the proprietors of the waterworks immense profits but deprived the city’s poorest citizens of a potable water supply; Margolin’s tram network charged excessively high fares and served only the central areas of the city, where the wealthy congregated; and the electric lights installed throughout the city in the 1890s illuminated the central districts but left the peripheral neighborhoods, with growing crime rates, to languish in darkness.⁴⁵ As the physician and *duma* delegate E. I. Afanasiev put it, the neglect of the local plutocrats had put working-class residents on the “path to extinction.”⁴⁶

Afanasiev and other populist activists in the *duma*, including O. I. Levitskii, F. N. Iasnogurskii, the accountant A. L. Tsyrovich, and the railroad engineer N. P. Dobrynin, styled themselves as men of the people, denouncing with ever-greater intensity Jews’ role in the local economy and their historical “opres-

sion” of the local Orthodox population.⁴⁷ They began to form issue-based coalitions—which, by the mid-1890s, observers were even calling “parties”: a novel concept in a body where voting preferences traditionally had been shaped more by personal allegiances and self-interest than by ideological convictions.⁴⁸ Of course, on the eve of the twentieth century, the vast majority of the city’s residents remained excluded from the formal political process. But drawing on the historical narrative of oppression crafted by the first generation of Little Russian migrants, Kiev’s new generation of populist politicians had begun to craft a coherent political program that combined class and regional consciousness with anticapitalist and anti-Semitic sentiment.

From Conflict to Violence

The imperial state had used a variety of incentives to lure Jewish and Little Russian elites to Kiev, where they vied for economic resources and political power. A small group of Jewish plutocrats had managed to integrate itself into the upper ranks of the city’s society. These businessmen established a spirit of accommodation in Kiev’s multicultural *beau monde* but also jealously guarded their class privilege, using the city’s resources to enhance their wealth and social status. Ethnic Ukrainian entrepreneurs and political activists, resentful of Jewish elites, attacked their “exploitative” practices, positing the deracination of “Jewish capitalists” as a prerequisite to ensuring the upward social mobility of the simple folk. By the turn of the twentieth century, the clash between the two groups would be superimposed against the backdrop of revolutionary politics, as large segments of the tsar’s subjects united in what has become known as the liberation movement to call for basic civil rights to be extended to all residents of the empire.

The growing interest in politics, reflected in all segments of society, finally allowed populist opponents of the capitalist order and the local Jewish elite to spread their message to the masses, and groups inspired by their beliefs rapidly proliferated across the southwest. For example, the Union of Russian Patriots, a club that united Orthodox believers from all walks of life behind a populist, regionalist, and anti-Semitic agenda, wrote to the governor-general in August 1905 to complain that Kiev’s Orthodox population “has been isolated . . . by the shadow of Yids [*zhidovskoi teni*], which renders us invisible.”⁴⁹ Denouncing officials’ long-running accommodation of Jewish commercial elites, the group expressed its concern that the tsar would be convinced by liberalizationist forces and “White and Company . . . to give the damned Jews [civil] rights.”⁵⁰ The creation of an equal-rights regime, the group insisted, would only permit local “Yids” to consolidate their political and economic power; if the authorities continued to appease the “enemies” of the Orthodox people at the expense of the laboring masses, the group ominously warned, it might be forced to take matters into its

own hands.⁵¹ The activities of such groups imbued the catchphrase of liberation with exclusionary (and even eliminationist) tones. Turning the arguments of many liberationist activists on their heads, Kiev's populist demagogues insisted that the "simple folk" could be liberated not through the civic guarantees offered by a Reichsstat (which they alleged was a Jewish ruse further to enslave the simple folk) but only through emancipation from the "Jewish yoke."

Concerned by the growing popularity of groups like the Union of Russian Patriots, Kiev's Jewish elites began to explore political alternatives to the imperial patronage networks on which they traditionally had relied. Their first forays into mass politics, however, were hesitant, recognizing that they stood to lose everything if the liberation movement evolved into a revolution, the plutocrats insisted that change must be gradual and orderly. D. S. Margolin, for example, took it upon himself to visit local synagogues, urging his co-confessionals struggling for political change to "stand in solidarity with the Christian population and not to incite the population by carrying out illegal disturbances that could raise doubts about [Jews'] faith in the government."⁵² Non-Jewish liberationists, too, hastened to contradict the arguments of their antiliberal foes, insisting that the class distinctions that continued to divide the city's residents could best be resolved by democratizing municipal and imperial politics, not by attacking Jews' role in local business and culture.⁵³

In response, Kiev's populist *duma* deputies only intensified their attacks on the leaders of the Jewish community. Little Russian activists pointed out that the same liberal deputies who trumpeted the banner of equality for all recently had voted to provide a series of tax breaks for the Brodskii family.⁵⁴ Again, the local demagogues turned liberationist slogans against the liberationists, portraying Jewish entrepreneurs—not police and tsarist bureaucrats—as the true "enemies of the people." When the city *duma* met in October 1905 to discuss whether to permit a new mill to be constructed in the city, the *duma* deputy F. N. Iasnogurskii feverishly denounced those who voted against the project; he claimed that they were agents of the Brodskis, who hoped to establish a monopoly in the milling business.⁵⁵ "There is nothing more upsetting than the fact that the *duma* will not permit the construction of a new mill for the benefit of the capitalist Brodskii. This will slow the development of industry. Why is flour expensive in Kiev? Because the mill is in the hands of the millionaire Brodskii," he cried. Ending his speech with his trademark sarcasm, he sneered, "It's fine that the population drinks water that is dangerous for their health. No, we can't do anything about it."⁵⁶

Kiev's Jewish entrepreneurial elite and populist anti-Semitic activists came into direct conflict in the aftermath of the announcement of the October manifesto. At 9:00 a.m. on 18 October 1905, students of the First Commercial School arrived for class clutching copies of the manifesto. D. S. Margolin and Lev

Brodskii, who served on the school's board of directors, happened to be on the premises that morning for a meeting. The students crowded around the directors, begging for a celebration to mark the historic occasion. Margolin finally assented and arranged a Dnieper cruise for the students. As the directors and teachers accompanied the students to the riverside pier, they struggled to keep the group together; the students, who passed celebrants waving red flags, could barely control their excitement. Once the boat pushed off from the pier, the students declared themselves "young republicans," tore the school's banner into pieces, and hoisted a red flag on the boat's mast as they sang, danced, and gave speeches. The teachers struggled to regain control of the students, but to no avail. Finally, Margolin promised the pupils that if they calmed down, he would treat them to a day at his *dacha*, directing the boat's captain to head downriver to his property.⁵⁷ Only toward night did the drunken participants of the celebration finally begin wandering back to town.⁵⁸

By the afternoon of 18 October, special editions of *Kievlianin* excoriated the actions of Margolin and Brodskii and repeated rumors that Jewish mercantile elites, no longer content to oppress only Little Russians, intended to seize control of Russia. By early evening, the crowds that had convened at the city *duma* to cheer the manifesto were transformed into mobs of angry pogromists. The violence and looting began in ethnically mixed, outlying neighborhoods, where Gentile workers and merchants attacked their Jewish neighbors.⁵⁹ But in a stunning deviation from earlier pogroms in the city, aristocratic enclaves in central Kiev became the other major center of violence. Proclaiming that the liberation of the Little Russian people could not be accomplished until the "Jewish yoke" had been destroyed, activists and common mobs headed to Kiev's best neighborhoods on 19 October, resolving to attack the "Jewish millionaires."⁶⁰ The mansions of many of the city's Jewish sugar barons were destroyed that day, along with the central Kiev apartment of D. S. Margolin's son, a liberationist lawyer.⁶¹

Perhaps the most dramatic events of the entire pogrom unfolded outside the adjacent mansions of the Gintsburgs and Brodskii families on Bank Street. On the afternoon of 19 October, Aleksander Gintsburg, Horacé's son, went to ask the civil governor for protection, while his brother, Vladimir Gintsburg, stayed at home with his son.⁶² A crowd of a dozen or so pogromists arrived at the house, dragging Vladimir outside and beating him senseless while others ransacked the property. The student Grigori Brodskii, Israel Brodskii's grandson, witnessed the scene from his window, venturing outside with a Mauser in one hand and a Browning in the other. The student fired one shot into the air and another into the crowd as they approached the Gintsburgs' property. He then entered the house, shooting the Gintsburgs' butler, who apparently had not joined the rioters, as well as two attackers, one of whom later died. By the time that Brod-

called the home, a policeman was waiting for him. The student confessed the crime and handed over his guns, as the crowd chanted, "Beat him! That's the murderer!" Another armed member of the Brodskii family was removed from the home by the police.⁶⁵ As police and army regiments stood by watching pogromists then looted the Brodskii's property.⁶⁴

The violence continued unabated for three days. Finally, on 21 October, the political director of the city police, after meeting with Lev Brodskii, informed the civil governor of his intention to halt the pogrom.⁶⁶ By the twenty-second, the police and gendarme divisions that had ignored the violence were fanning out across the city looking for the Brodskii's billiard cues, which had been stolen during the mayhem.⁶⁶ The pogrom had finally come to an end. Leaving 1,800 homes and businesses destroyed, twenty-seven dead, three hundred injured, and 10.5 million rubles of damage, it attained a dubious distinction as the costliest outbreak of street violence in the entire empire in 1905.⁶⁷ The most striking casualty of the pogrom, however, was the peace of mind of the city's Jewish elites. The local authorities, whom they traditionally had viewed as their greatest patrons, failed to protect them from rampaging mobs; even the police had turned on them, permitting the destruction of their property and sense of security.

In the aftermath of 1905, relations between the Jewish and Little Russian elites who had settled in Kiev in the wake of the Polish revolt continued to deteriorate.⁶⁸ Appealing to abstract principles of justice and equality—and almost exclusively to their fellow social elites—Kiev's isolated liberal voices, unlike their adversaries, never mastered the art of mobilizing constituencies or manipulating the media. By contrast, populist activists continued their grassroots organizing efforts, catering to the masses with a political program that combined nationalist rhetoric, class consciousness, and vicious anti-Semitism. By 1907, Kiev's mass-oriented, right-wing, anti-Semitic political coalition had won a majority in the municipal *duma* and had seized the city's seat in the state *duma*; over the next decade, right-wing activists continued to expand their influence by staging public spectacles—from demonstrations to street violence to the notorious Beilis trial—designed to highlight the continuing threat posed by the city's Jewish elites. The growing power of the Kiev right distressed bureaucrats in the southwestern borderlands and St. Petersburg, who darkly warned that the "exceptional intolerance . . . and fanaticism" of the local right complicated the state's efforts to maintain civic peace.⁶⁹ Political conflicts created by official intervention in mobility processes had taken on a momentum of their own, which the state could no longer control.

State intervention in human-mobility processes utterly transformed the demographics and political culture of Kiev in the decades following the 1863 revolt. Imperial bureaucrats encouraged Jewish and Little Russian migration to the

city as a means of de-Polonizing its economy and culture; they hoped to use the former group to maintain Kiev's robust economic growth, and the latter to claim it as a primordially Orthodox locale. Contrary to bureaucrats' expectation that the new migrants would transform Kiev into an economic powerhouse and a "truly Russian" city, the rapid influx of Jewish and Little Russian subjects created new social and political conflicts. In the wake of the 1905 revolution, these tensions produced a violent, mass-oriented, and anti-Semitic right that dominated local politics, seriously undermined autocratic rule in the city, and distinguished Kiev's political culture from other urban centers, which tended to be strongholds of liberal or socialist thought. Impossible to explain by reference to political or sociological phenomena alone, the rise of the Kiev right was conditioned by official attempts to govern through mobility—and their many unintended consequences.

Notes

1. On the role of officials and intellectuals in proliferating anti-Semitic ideas, see John Doyle Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855–1881* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Hans Rogger, *Jewish Politics and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986). For excellent analyses of the social and political underpinnings of anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century Europe, consult Philip G. Nord, *Paris Shopkeepers and the Politics of Resentment* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
2. V. B. Ananich, *Bankirskaie doma v Rossii, 1860–1914 gg.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1991), 39.
3. On Jews' acquisition of Polish-owned property, see Witold Walewski, "Sukrowicktwo na Ukrainie" in *Pamiętnik Kijowski*, vol. 2 (London: Nakhadem Kola Kijowian, 1959), 179–81; Daniel Beauvois, *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863–1914: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques* (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1993), 48. On Jewish settlement laws, consult Natan Menachem Meir, "The Jews of Kiev, 1859–1914: Community and Charity in an Imperial Russian City" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2004).
4. Benjamin Nahans describes similar efforts to attract Jewish merchants of the first guild to St. Petersburg. See Benjamin Nahans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
5. G. B. Shozberg, *Delo minuvshich dnei*, vol. 2 (Paris: PASCAL, 1933), 144–56. This document was held in Shozberg's private archive, and he notes that he does not have a record of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' response.
6. Fanny Alexandra Brodsky, *Smoke Signals: From Eminence to Exile* (London: Radcliffe Press, 1997), 3–5; Victoria Khiterer, "Jewish Life in Kyiv at the Turn of the Twentieth Century" *Ukraina moderna* 10 (2006): 78.
7. Meir, "Jews of Kiev," 42.
8. Vitalii Kovalinski, *Metsenaty Kieva* (Kiev: Kyi, 1998), 400.

8. Shlozberg, *Dela minivshikh dnei*, vol. 1, 284; Michael Ventskiy, "Arnold Davydovich Margolin, 1877–1956," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 7:1–2 (1959): 1671.
9. The Gintsburg banking house was founded on profits from government-guaranteed investments in private railroads and the realization of land-bank obligations. See Shlozberg, *Dela minivshikh dnei*, vol. 2, 214.
10. Henri Shlozberg (G. B. Shlozberg), *Baron Horace-O. de Guntzburg: Sa vie, son oeuvre* (Paris: Pascal, 1933), 18, 33; Walewski, "Sukromnicтво na Ukrainie," 180.
11. "Vedomost' o chisle vydannyykh, kupcheskikh promyslovykh i prikazhnikh bilyey" (1881). Derzhavnyi arkhiv mista Kyeva (hereafter DAK), f. 163, op. 39, d. 211, l. 56; G. Ia. Krasnyi-Admoni, *Materialy dlia istorii antievreiskikh pogromov v Rossii: Vos'midesiatye gody (15 aprilia 1881 g.–29 ianvaria 1882 g.)*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1923), xx. Although Odessa is often cited as Russia's major center of Jewish commerce, Jews were better represented among the mercantile elite in Kiev than in Odessa, where about half of the first guild merchants were Jews. See Shlozberg, *Dela minivshikh dnei*, vol. 2, 75; Nicholas V. Ujine, *Odessa Memories* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 77.
12. Meir, "Jews of Kiev," 32.
13. Kovalinski, *Metsenaty Kyeva*, 214.
14. *Ibid.*, 339–401.
15. Report of Governor-General A. R. Drenteln to Kiev City Administration, 25 June 1879, DAK, f. 163, op. 7, d. 743, l. 1. A number of Jewish families, including the Brodskits, also acquired vast tracts of rural land zoned for industrial use in eastern and southern Ukraine, which featured lavish manor homes and well-manicured park lands in addition to sugar refineries. See Brodskiy, *Smoke Signals*, 6–7.
16. Viktoriia Khiterer, *Dokumenty sobrannye evreiskoi istoriko-arkheograficheskoi komissiei* (Kiev: Institut Iudaki, 1999), 143. These figures do not include the tens of thousands of illegal migrants who, hoping to emulate the success of the Brodskits, poured into Kiev from surrounding shtetls. The social station of these migrants contrasted greatly with that of the plutocrats. By the last years of the nineteenth century, a mere 15 percent of Kiev's Jews were registered merchants; one Zionist colonization group estimated that nearly 20 percent of the city's Jewish population lived in poverty. See Meir, "Jews of Kiev," 26; "Kiev," in *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 9 (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Elfron, n.d.), 527.
17. See Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 168–86; "Memoire du Baron Alexandre de Guntzburg" (1939), in the author's possession. I am very grateful to Benjamin Nathans for providing me with a copy of this unpublished manuscript.
18. Ananich, *Bankirska doma*, 46, 40; Shlozberg, *Dela minivshikh dnei*, vol. 2, 219; Boris V. Ananich and Sergei G. Belaev, "St. Petersburg: Banking Center of the Russian Empire," in *Commerce in Russian Urban Culture, 1861–1914*, ed. William Craft Brunnfield, Boris V. Ananich, and Yuri A. Petrov (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 14. The Gintsburgs maintained a close personal relationship with Tsarina Alexandra. Alexandra had first met the family as a child, when they built a railroad for her father, the Prince of Hesse. Alexander's brother, who became the Prince of Bulgaria,

- commissioned the Gintsburgs to build a railroad and national bank in that country. "Memoire du Baron Alexandre de Guntzburg," 26, 35, 38.
19. See N. Kh. Bunge to N. G. Khriakov, 2 March 1870, DAK, f. 226, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1; Kiev Stock Committee to Bunge, 7 March 1870, DAK, f. 226, op. 1, d. 1, l. 12; *Dvadsatipiatilietie Kievskoi Birzhi, 1869–1894 g.* (Kiev: S. V. Kul'zhenko, 1895), xvii. The committee included Lazar Brodskii, Israel's son. In 1870, a group of Orthodox merchants asked that Jews be banned from the ranks of the stock exchange's leadership. The president of the exchange passed the question on to the minister of finance and the governor-general, who ruled that Jewish merchants of the first guild, who enjoyed the right to reside in the city, could not be barred from participating in the groups' activities at any level. *Dvadsatipiatilietie Kievskoi Birzhi*, second pagination, 1.
20. Alfred J. Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 106.
21. Starozhil, *Kiev v vos'midesiatykh godakh* (Kiev: Petr Barskii, 1910), 92. Representatives of the Brodskii, Kogen, and Gintsburg families served in the Kiev city дума. On Jewish involvement in дума elections, see, for example, "Vedomost' o chisle izbiratelei za 1875–79 g.," DAK, f. 163, op. 39, d. 211, l. 51.
22. See Kovalinski, *Metsenaty Kyeva*; Vrhalii Kovalinski, *Semlia Tereshchenko* (Kiev: Pressa Ukraini, 2003).
23. On the commissions' activities, see "Tsentralnye arkhivy drevnikh aktyvnykh knig: Vlienskii i Kievskii" (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo narodnogo prosveshcheniia, 1883), 37; *Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii iugo-zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Kommissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktoy, sostoiashchey pri Kievskom, Podolskom i Volynskom General-Gubernatore* (Kiev: N. T. Korchak-Novitskii, 1911); O. I. Levitskii, *Piatidesiatilietie Kievskoi Kommissii dlia razbora drevnikh aktoy, 1843–1893: Istoricheskaia zapiska o ee deiatel'nosti* (Kiev: S. V. Kul'zhenko, 1893).
24. M. A. Maksimovich, *Vospominanie o Bogdane Khrmel'niiskom* (Kiev: Russkaia beseda, 1857), 68.
25. Levitskii served as president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the 1920s. On his life and accomplishments, see "Levyts'kyi, Orest," in *Entsyklopediia Ukrainianstva*, vol. 4 (Lviv: Molode zhitтя, 1994), 1269; M. Hrushevsk'kyi, "Orest Levyts'kyi," *Ukraina* 1–2 (1924): 199–202.
26. F. I. Titov, "Petr Gavriilovich Lebedintsev," *Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* 38.1 (January 1897): 133–75; Nikolai Vasylenko, "Akademik Orest Ivanovych Levyts'kyi," *Zapysky Sotsial'no-ekonomichnoho Viddil'u Ukrain'skoi Akademii Nauk* 1 (1923): xlii.
27. Via. Shulgin, "Iugo-zapadnyi kraii pod upravleniem D. G. Bibkova," *Drevniana i novia rossia* 6 (1879): 89.
28. See "Vrhalii Iakovlevich Shulgin," *Kievlianin* (Kiev: I. I. Zavadskii, 1880), 1–6; Shulgin, Vrhalii Iakovlevich," in *Biograficheskii slovar' professora i prepodavatelya imperatorskogo universiteta Sv. Vladimira (1834–1884)*, ed. V. S. Ikonnikov (Kiev: Imperatorskii Universitet Sv. Vladimira, 1884), 770.
29. Ignat Zhiets'kyi, "Kyiv'ska Hromada za 60-tykh rokky," *Ukraina* 1 (1928): 94.
30. On these popular-outreach campaigns, see M. V. Juzefovych to A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov, 10 February 1870, in DAK, f. 301, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 13–140b.

31. Alexander permitted the figure of the he-man alone, which still stands in front of St. Sophia's Cathedral. The episode is recounted in full detail in Faith C. Hillis, "Between Empire and Nation: Urban Politics, Community, and Violence in Kiev, 1863–1907" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2009, 146–63).
32. "Evrei i trudashchiasia massa v nashem krae," *Kievlianin*, 20 March 1881, 1. Consult also John D. Klier, "Kievanin and the Jews: A Decade of Disillusionment, 1864–1873," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5.1 (March 1981): 83–101.
33. *Trud*, 11 March 1881, 2–3.
34. "Zametka naimanushchimsia na sakharnye zavody," *Drug naroda*, 1 March 1876, 67.
35. "Sveklasakharnaia normirovka," *Enciklopedicheskiĭ slovarʹ* vol. 29 (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1900), 27. By 1887, the sixty sugar refineries located in Kiev Province produced more than one third of the empire's sugar—a proportion that would double by the turn of the century. See L. F. Volokhov, *Sakharnaia promyshlennostʹ Rossii v tsifrakh* (Kiev: R. K. Lubkovskii, 1913), 43.
36. V. B. Ananich et al., eds., *Iz arkhiva S.Iu. Vitte: Vospominaniia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003), 180–83; *Dvadtsatipiatletie Kievskoi Birzhi*, 90.
37. See, for example, *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year: 1901* (New York: Appleton, 1902), 595.
38. D. S. Margolin regularly attended synagogue, hired private Hebrew tutors for his children, and spoke Russian and Yiddish at home. He insisted, however, that his Jewish faith was completely compatible with his Russian patriotism. He declared it his patriotic duty to buy only Russian-made steamships and instilled in his son a love for the Ukrainian countryside, with its "housestops of straw . . . cherry trees, and . . . golden yellow fields" (qtd. in Starozhil, 189).
39. P. Golubiatnikov, *Spravka o khode dela po rasshireniu Kievskoi kanalizatsii v chetyrekhletie s 1902 po 1906 god: Prilozheniia* (Kiev: Tipografiia Okruzhnogo Shtaba, 1906), 255–62; P. T. Tronko et al., eds., *Istoriia gorodov i sel Ukrainskoi SSR: Kiev* (Kiev: Institut istorii akademii nauk USSR, 1979), 157.
40. "Zasedanie dumy," *Kievlianin*, 14 July 1904, 3.
41. "D. I. Pikhno," in *Biograficheskiĭ slovarʹ professor i prepodavatelei imperatorskogo universiteta Sv. Vladimira (1834–1884)*, ed. V. S. Ikonnikov (Kiev: Imperatorskii Universiteta Sv. Vladimira, 1884), 553.
42. "Sakharnoe proizvodstvo i normirovka," *Kievlianin*, 21 January 1894, 1; *Kievlianin*, 18 February 1883, 2; "Kredit i sel'skoe khoziaistvo," *Kievlianin*, 24 February 1883, 1.
43. *Otchet Kievskogo Birzhevoĭgo Komiteta za 1902 god* (Kiev: Frontskoevich, 1903), 48–51 (quotation on 51).
44. "Osoboe mnenie," 1889, DAK, f. 163, op. 8, d. 55, l. 524; A. L. Tsyrovich to City Duma, 20 August 1889, DAK, f. 163, op. 8, d. 55, l. 795.
45. P. T. Tronko et al., eds., *Istoriia gorodov i sel Ukrainskoi SSR: Kiev* (Kiev: Institut istorii akademii nauk USSR, 1979), 158; S. M. Boguslavskii, *Sputnik po g. Kiievu* (Kiev: L. V. Khmelovskii, 1913), 10. Criticism of utilities networks, which denizens of many cities denounced as foreign "cabals" bleeding city residents of their last dime, was widespread across the empire. In most cities, however, these companies were managed by French,

- German, and Belgian firms; in Kiev, where prominent local plutocrats, not faceless foreign capitalists, controlled the utilities, anger toward the companies became even more intense. See, for example, D. I. Bagalei and D. P. Miller, *Istoriia goroda Khar'kova za 250 let ego sushchestvovaniia (s 1655 go po 1905-i god)* (Kharkov: M. Zil'berberg i synovia, 1912), 397; Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1986), 191; John P. McKay, *Pioneers for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization, 1885–1913* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 100.
46. "Gorodskie i mestnye izvestiia," *Trud*, 16 March 1881, 1–2.
47. "Zasedanie dumy," *Kievskoe slovo*, 11 August 1891, 3; Garold, *Nashi Glasnye: Otkryti s momental'nymi sminkami nasikh dumsev* (Kiev: P. K. Lubkovskii, 1906), 47.
48. *Kievskoe slovo*, 10 February 1894, 3.
49. V. Gorbunov and D. Tirov to Kiev Governor-General, 3 August 1905, Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorichnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, m. Kyiv (hereafter TSDIAK), f. 442, op. 855, d. 71, l. 280b.
50. *Ibid.*, l. 28.
51. *Ibid.*, ll. 31–32.
52. Kiev Civil Governor to Ministry of Internal Affairs, 12 August 1905, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), f. 102, OO, 1905, d. 1350, ch. 15, l. 380b.
53. N. F. Stradomskii, *Osnovanie reformny gorodskogo polozheniia* (Kiev: Petr Barskii, 1905), 3.
54. DAK, f. 163, op. 8, d. 11, l. 865.
55. "V dumne," *Kievskie otkliki*, 4 October 1905, 3.
56. "Duma," *Kievskie otkliki*, 5 October 1905, 3; "V dumne," *Kievskie otkliki*, 4 October 1905, 3.
57. "Eshe o progulke na parakhode," *Kievlianin*, 30 October 1905, 3; GARF, f. 102, OO, 1905, d. 1350, ch. 15, l. 163.
58. *Kievlianin*, 28 October 1905, 3.
59. TSDIAK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, l. 311; l. 147.
60. GARF, f. 102, OO, 1905, d. 1350, ch. 15, l. 163.
61. D. S. Margolin to Governor-General Sukhomlinov, 20 October 1905, TSDIAK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, l. 179. See also Vice Governor Rafalskii to Governor-General Sukhomlinov, 21 October 1905, TSDIAK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, l. 178.
62. "Kievskii okruzhnyi sud: Delo Grigor'ia Brodskogo," *Pravo* 48 (30 November 1907): 2660.
63. *Ibid.*, 2658.
64. *Ibid.*, 2659.
65. Telegraph, Director of the Political Division to Kiev Civil Governor, 21 October 1905, TSDIAK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, l. 151.
66. Governor-General's Chancery to Judicial Investigator of the Kiev First District, 22 October 1905, TSDIAK, f. 442, op. 855, d. 391, ch. 1, ll. 168–69.
67. "Obrynitel'nyi akt," *Kievskata mysli*, 7 December 1907, 4; Zionistschen Hilfsfond in London, "Die Dimensionen der Oktober-pogrome (1905)," *Die Judenpogrome in Russ-*

land, vol. 1 (Cologne: Jüdischer Verlag, 1910), 209. A local commission charged with collecting materials on the pogrom, led by Lev Brovskii, estimated that seven thousand families had been touched by the violence. TSDIAK, f. 1423, op. 1, d. 30, l. 14.

68. By 1905, some of the little Russian migrants who had relocated to Kiev following the 1863 revolt identified as Ukrainians, while others saw themselves as Russian. If self-proclaimed Ukrainian and Russian nationalists now competed for control of the city, both groups tended to define Jews and Poles as “enemies” of the Russian and Ukrainian people. A small group of local intellectuals, including the historian I. V. Luchitskii, the lawyer and sociologist B. A. Kistiakovskii, and A. D. Margolin (the son of the steamboat magnate), hoped to reconcile national ideas with liberal ideals of inclusion, but outspoken anti-Semites dominated urban politics and the city’s nationalist movements. On liberal intellectuals, see Susan Heumann Kistiakovsky: *The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Victoria Khiterer, “Arnold Davidovich Margolin: Ukrainian-Jewish Jurist, Statesman, and Diplomat,” *Revolutionary Russia* 18.2 (2005): 145–67. For a discussion of the relationship between various national groupings and right-wing ideologues, see Hillis, “Between Empire and Nation,” chap. 6.

69. Governor-General V. A. Sukhomlinov to Chairman of the Council of Ministers P. A. Stolypin, 14 July 1907, GARF, f. 102, OO, 1905, op. 316, d. 999, ch. 39, t. 2, l. 528. For a similar sentiment, see Chairman of the Council of Ministers Stolypin to the Holy Synod, 28 July 1907, GARF, f. 102, OO, 1905, op. 316, d. 999, ch. 39, t. 2, l. 561.

2

Frontier Urban and Imperial Dreams

The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the Creation of a Russian Global City, 1890–1917

CHIA YIN HSU

Mobility in the context of the Russian Empire’s expansion has often been thought of as the “colonization” of frontier land, which the renowned late nineteenth-century Russian historian V. O. Kliuchevskii held to be the “basic fact” of Russian history.¹ Colonization was in turn seen by many Russians as an “internal” colonization, involving largely the migration of peasants.² The magnitude of this agrarian movement has tended to obscure the emergence of a new conception of imperial expansion in the last decade of the nineteenth century, which focused on the urbanization of the frontier, on land external to the empire.³ The articulation of this new conception followed the building of the Siberian Railroad, begun in 1892. Within the framework of the Russian Empire, the Siberian Railroad served as a central instrument of internal agrarian colonization.⁴ But its builders imagined it as an agent that could unify Europe and Asia and therefore saw it as having global significance. As such, the railroad inspired an urban vision of frontier development. Massive in scope and cost, this urban vision shaped the building of the Siberian Railroad’s final stretch to the Pacific Ocean, known as the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER).

Railroads were key to the expansion of towns and cities at the core and at the frontier of the Russian Empire. In both cases, urban growth brought by the railroad mostly took the form of the expansion of existing cities rather than the creation of new ones; and the scope and direction of this growth tended to be