# RUSSIA'S WESTERN BORDERLANDS, 1710-1870

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with the collaboration of

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# PREFACE

In a recent study of Russification in the Baltic provinces and Finland, four coauthors and I noted that the previous development of separate laws, customs, economies, institutions, and social structures among the Baltic Germans, Estonians, Finns, Latvians, and Swedes of this region ruled out the possibility of easy victories for Russification. Our principal concerns in this study were, however, the formulation and implementation of government policy and the responses of Finns, Estonians, Latvians, and Baltic Germans to Russification. We did not include in our study a systematic discussion of the responses to Russification of the Belorussians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians of the former lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that Russia acquired between 1772 and 1815; nor did we examine in any detail the earlier history of the western borderlands of the Russian Empire. It is especially this earlier history, I believe, that helps us to understand why certain national and social groups succeeded to the extent they did in resisting Russificatory pressures during the years 1855-1914.

In this book I focus on two aspects of the history of the Baltic provinces, Belorussia, Congress Poland, Finland, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine during the century and a half that preceded Russification: (1) the efforts of the Russian government to integrate these borderlands into the administrative-legal structure of the empire; and (2) the efforts of German, Polish, and Swedish elites to defend their traditional rights and privileges, to preserve the separate identity of their native provinces, and to isolate local society from the rest of the empire. The Russian government did not pursue its policy of administrative centralization consistently and resolutely. It had too high a regard for the local laws and institutions of these borderlands, and in them it continued to rely on coopted German, Polish, and Swedish elites to maintain social order. At the same time, the efforts of traditional borderland elites to resist centralizing pressures and to harness the forces of change locally for their own particular purposes unwittingly unleashed social and economic forces that favored the emergence of new native elites. By the 1860s a number of these new elites had become an important factor in the social, economic, and cultural life of the western borderlands.

Both old and new elites operated within the traditional framework of institutions and political entities that no longer exist: namely, the *lantdag, Landtage,* Sejm, and *sejmiki* of the privileged estates of the Grand Duchy of Finland, the *Ritterschaften* of Estland, Kurland, and Livland, and the *szlachta* of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Congress Poland, and the western *gubernii.* If we are to understand the persistence of particularism in this area, we must try to forget the political and national geography of the twentieth century and use an atlas published in Mitau (Jelgava), Wilno (Vil'na, Vilnius), Lwów (Lemberg, L'viv, L'vov), Witebsk (Vitebsk), or Åbo (Turku) in, let us say, 1795. I have, therefore, decided not to use place names transliterated from the Russian but those that would have been familiar to educated Germans, Poles, and Swedes living in these borderlands early in the nineteenth century. For the Belorussian, Estonian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, and Ukrainian forms of these place names, see the glossary at the end of this study. Dates are given according to the official Julian calendar of the Russian Empire (eleven days earlier than the Gregorian calendar in the eighteenth century and twelve in the nineteenth).

I begin in 1710, when Russia acquired Estland and Livland, and end in 1870, by which time Russia had definitely decided, in principle at least, on a policy of centralization and Russification in these borderlands. This policy was not applied immediately to Finland, but the Finns then failed to obtain the ironclad and constitutional guarantee of their autonomy they desired.

I will not discuss in detail two regions that might seem geographically and historically within the western borderlands of the empire: namely, Bessarabia and the Left-Bank Ukraine. Russia acquired Bessarabia in 1812, then recognizing the laws, customs, and autonomy of this borderland; however, Russian officials soon lost faith in the ability of the local Rumanian Boyars to manage their own affairs and abolished Bessarabian autonomy in 1828. In the Left-Bank Ukraine, Cossack rights and privileges steadily eroded following the defection of Mazepa to Charles XII in 1708, and by the early nineteenth century this area had been pretty much integrated into the social, economic, and political structure of the Russian empire. It should be pointed out, however, that the history of Russia's relations with privileged borderlands began in the Left-Bank Ukraine with the Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654, more than a half century before Peter the Great annexed Estland and Livland in 1710.

Chicago, February 1984

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James H. Billington, the director of the Wilson Center, Zdenek V. David, the Center's librarian, and Abbott Gleason, then secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, opened for me the rich research and intellectual resources of the nation's capital. In June 1980 I made an oral presentation at the Wilson Center of my work-in-progress, at which time I greatly benefited from the viewpoints expressed by commentators Vlad Georgescu, then a fellow at the Center, and Orest Pelech, the Bibliographer for Russia and Eastern Europe, Princeton University.

The article I published in the *Journal of Baltic Studies* in 1981 ("Estland, Livland, and the Ukraine: Reflections on Eighteenth-Century Autonomy," 12: 311-17) has been incorporated into Chapter 1 with the permission of JBS editor Toivo U. Raun. On several occasions he has been helpful in answering questions concerning the demographic history of Estonia. W. Bruce Lincoln of Northern Illinois University made available to me his xerox copy of N. A. Miliutin's *Issledovaniia v Tsarstve Pol'skom po vysochaishemu poveleniiu*, an important source for studying Russian policy in Congress Poland during the 1860s. The constructive comments of John A. Armstrong have contributed much to the formulation of my concluding remarks. My

colleague John Kulczycki read the Polish chapters of this study and offered useful comments and criticism. Sandra Wearne of the UIC Computer Center has been of indispensable assistance to me and my collaborator in enabling us to use the university computer facilities for the production of this monograph.

My thanks also go to the competent and efficient staff of Princeton University Press, namely, to Gail Ullman for coordinating the publication of two manuscripts on the history of Russia's western borderlands; to Gretchen Oberfranc; and to Alice Calaprice for seeing this manuscript through the editorial process and the final stages of publication.

## ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| BM | *Baltische Monatsschrift*, Riga, 1859-1913, vols. 1-76. The volumes for 1914-1915 and 1927-1931 are referred to by year of publication, not volume number. The BM was continued under the title *Baltische Monatshefte* between 1932 and 1939. |
| CHTENIIA | *Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei pri Moskovskom universitete*, 1846-1918, vols. 1-264. |
| DBL | *Deutschbaltisches biographisches Lexikon 1710-1960.* |
| PSZ | *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, 3 series (St. Petersburg: 2-oe Otdelenie Sobstvennoi ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830-1916). |
| SIRIO | *Sbornik imperatorskogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, St. Petersburg, 1867-1916, 148 vols. |

## LIST OF MAPS

BETWEEN 1710 and 1815, the Russian Empire annexed western borderlands that, in 1815, accounted for about one-fifth of the land area and nearly 30 percent of the population of European Russia exclusive of the Caucasus. From the very beginning, Russian rulers and their officials wanted to bring this area closer to the rest of the empire, and under Catherine II and, again, under Nicholas I, a concerted effort was made to introduce Russian laws, institutions, and language. Yet, during the first century and a half of Russian rule, these borderlands retained their distinctive economic and social structures and networks of internal communication. Divided socially into estates resembling those of the old regime of central and western Europe (not the *sosloviia* of Muscovy and Imperial Russia), they were dominated by German, Polish, and Swedish elites. Until the 1860s, the Estonian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and even Polish nationality of the peasantry dominated by these elites was not a primary consideration. These borderlands had their own laws, customs, economies, institutions, and forms of social organization and were Catholic, Uniate, and Lutheran in religion. Culturally and socially, they remained a world apart from the rest of the empire.

The German, Polish, and Swedish estates of Russia's western borderlands held on to their special rights and privileges well into the nineteenth century. These rights and privileges were part of a political and social legacy inherited from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was the classical land of the *liberum veto* and of the "Golden Freedom" of the nobility, or *szlachta*. Roman Catholicism and the Polish language and civilization united the *szlachta* in outlook, beliefs, and way of life throughout the vast lands of the Commonwealth that stretched from the Baltic to the Dnieper. This did not, however, prevent the pursuit of narrowly conceived local or personal interests at the expense of the central authority of the Crown. An indirect consequence of so-called

*szlachta* democracy was a degree of internal political chaos and weakness that made it increasingly difficult for the Polish king to conduct an effective foreign policy and to resist pressures to grant, at one time or another, special religious and political rights and privileges to the burghers of Danzig and Riga, the Ukrainian Cossacks, and the nobles of Ducal Prussia, Kurland, and Livland.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Sweden, taking advantage of Polish internal weakness, conquered Estland and Livland. Initially, the Swedes allowed the German estates of these two provinces to retain the special rights and privileges they had enjoyed previously under Poland, the Teutonic Order, or the bishops of Riga, Ösel, and Dorpat. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, Sweden took measures to limit the extent of Baltic autonomy and to introduce Swedish norms, laws, and institutions. These measures only remained in effect briefly, for the historic duel between Charles XII of Sweden and Peter the Great soon provided the nobles and burghers of Livland and Estland an opportunity to shift their allegiance to Russia and to obtain from her formal confirmation of their special laws, institutions, German language, and Lutheran religion.

The wars Russia waged against Poland and Sweden between 1654 and 1815 contributed significantly to the consolidation of the special rights and privileges of elites in the western borderlands of the empire. As long as Poland and Sweden retained sufficient military power to contend for the control of these borderlands, Russia's position was not secure unless she could count on the cooperation of local native elites in newly annexed areas. To assure such cooperation, Russia allowed them to enjoy certain special rights and privileges as long as they remained loyal to the tsar and with the implied understanding that they would maintain locally a well-regulated society arranged into traditional social orders.

## CHAPTER 3

# EASTERN BELORUSSIA, LITHUANIA, AND THE RIGHT-BANK UKRAINE

As a result of the three partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795, Russia acquired 463,200 square kilometers of territory, populated (in 1795) by some 7.5 million Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Poles, and Jews.[1] This Russian share of partitioned Poland can be conveniently divided into three areas: Eastern Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine. Catherine II introduced the Provincial Reform of 1775 and the Charters to the Nobility and Towns into all three of these newly acquired areas, but only in Eastern Belorussia, which was annexed in 1772, did her officials have sufficient time to experiment successfully with projects of administrative and social uniformity prior to Paul I's restoration of special rights and privileges in 1796.

Since the time of Peter I, however, Russian officials had had ample opportunity to involve themselves in the affairs of not only Lithuania and the Right-Bank Ukraine but also in those of Poland-Lithuania in general. The reasons for the extent of this involvement cannot be understood without at least a brief discussion of two subjects: (1) the consequences of Poland's confrontation with the Ukrainian Cossacks and of the partition of the Ukraine between Poland and Russia in the second part of the seventeenth century; and (2) the social structure and the political and constitutional crisis of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This crisis and Polish efforts at social and constitutional reform (often with the consent or even support of Russia) continued throughout the period of the three partitions and into the first decades of the nineteenth century. After a discussion of these two subjects, we will turn to Russian policies in the annexed areas between 1772 and 1795.

The *szlachta* (nobility) was the political nation in Poland-Lithuania. Only members of the *szlachta* were full-fledged citizens in the Commonwealth. Only they could participate in dietine (*sejmik*) delibera-

[1] "Rozbiory Polski," *Mały słownik historii Polski* (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1967), p. 310; Kabuzan, *Narodonaselenie Rossii v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX v.*, pp. 161-63.

tions and elections, hold high office in the administration and church, own and inherit landed estates, be senators or deputies in the Sejm, elect the Polish king, and form armed confederations to defend the interests of the Commonwealth during an interregnum or another emergency, or to oppose illegal acts of the king. In the mid-eighteenth century, 99 percent of the *szlachta* was Roman Catholic in religion and Polish in nationality, whether by origin or assimilation. By then the *szlachta* saw the welfare of the Commonwealth in the teachings and institutions of the Roman Catholic Church and in the maintenance of the "Golden Freedom" of the nobility and of its "Sarmatian" way of life. All members of the *szlachta* were supposed to be equal and have the same political rights, but some 60 percent of the Polish nobility did not own land and, especially in the eastern palatinates, depended economically on powerful magnates who dominated politics and society in the Commonwealth.[2]

The Sarmatian way of life was, in the last analysis, a myth. It was based on the assumed descent of the *szlachta* from the inhabitants of ancient Sarmatia. Fashioned by an intellectual elite trained in the colleges and academies of the Jesuits and other orders of the Church in such centers as Cracow, Zamość, Wilno, Lwów, this myth gradually filtered down to the mass of the *szlachta*, which was scattered throughout the Commonwealth and accounted for about eight percent of the total population. Sarmatism undeniably helped to provide a basis for unity of belief and conviction in the Polish political nation, but it, as well as the pervasive influence of Jesuit education, tended to retard social and political development in Poland by fostering what has been called "Sarmatian and Catholic conformism."[3]

The *szlachta* of Eastern Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine proved to be difficult to accommodate to the Russian political and social order. Roughly 600,000 individuals (men, women, and children) living in these three areas considered themselves to be members of the nobility, whereas in 1795 there were only 150,000 nobles in all the Great Russian provinces of the empire.[4] In the first part of

[2] *History of Poland*, ed A Gieysztor, S Kieniewicz et al (Warsaw PWN, 1968), pp 262-66, 268-70, 297-301, Jorg K Hoensch, *Sozialverfassung und politische Reform Polen im vorrevolutionaren Zeitalter* (Cologne-Vienna Bohlau Verlag, 1973), pp 50-86, 116-20

[3] *History of Poland*, pp 297-301

[4] There are no reliable and exact statistics on the number of *szlachta* in this area at the end of the eighteenth century, but the elaborate calculations of Tadeusz Korzon concerning the size and distribution of the *szlachta* would seem to demonstrate that, as elsewhere in the Commonwealth, about eight percent of the population of these annexed territories consisted of would-be nobles Korzon, *Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski za*

the nineteenth century, especially during the reign of Nicholas I, Russian officials undertook to reduce the size of the *szlachta*, but they had to proceed cautiously in Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine because here Polish noblemen had a monopoly of the experience and skills required to deal with the peasantry and problems of administrative and social order in accordance with local traditions and customary law Even as late as the 1850s a majority of the Russian Empire's nobility still consisted of Poles

The political institutions of the *szlachta*'s Commonwealth functioned on both the provincial and national levels On the provincial level, the *sejmiki* controlled organs of local self-government, taxation, and the nomination or appointment of officials and judges They also formed an integral part of a complicated constitutional system that linked king, Sejm, or National Diet, and the local nobility The Sejm consisted of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate The king, although elected by the nobility, was more than a mere figurehead, for he was supreme commander of the armed forces, could make alliances, and appointed the higher officials who sat in the Senate The Chamber of Deputies, however, was a real center of political power in the Commonwealth, and in it matters of national policy were decided on the basis of instructions received by the deputies from their constituencies, i e , the assembled nobility in each local *sejmik* Since these constituencies generally opposed efforts of Polish kings to develop an effective central administration and to build a large standing army, Poland was militarily weak and her government decentralized and inadequate for the purposes of a major power in eighteenth-century Europe Yet, until the mid-seventeenth century the Polish constitutional system functioned fairly well, but in the political confusion that followed the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising of 1648 in the Ukraine and the Swedish invasion of 1655, abuse of the *liberum veto* and excessive and irresponsible exercise of the right to confederate led to political paralysis and repeated intervention by Russia and the other powers in the internal affairs of Poland [5]

*Stanisława Augusta (1764-1794) Badania historyczne ze stanowiska ekonomicznego i administracyjnego*, 6 vols (2nd ed , Cracow-Warsaw T Paprocki 1897 1898), 1 87-154 On the nobility in the Great Russian provinces between 1744 and 1857 see Kabuzan, *Narodonaselenie*, p 154, Kabuzan and S M Troitskii Izmeneniia v chislennosti, udel'noi vese i razmeshchenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782-1858 gg , *Istoriia SSSR* (1971, nos 4-5), pp 153-69

[5] Still to be consulted on the evolution and character of the Polish constitutional system is Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Historya ustroju Polski w zarysie*, 4 vols (Lwów Warsaw Bernard Poloniecki, 1905-1920) See also *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol II *Od połowy XV wieku do r 1795*, ed J Bardach (4th ed Warsaw PWN 1971), Władysław

The Andruszów (Andrusovo) Truce of 1667 and the "Treaty of Eternal Peace" of 1686 were important turning points in Russo-Polish relations and marked the end of Poland's eastward expansion Poland then ceded Smolensk to Russia and agreed to partition the Ukraine, retaining for herself the Right-Bank Ukraine but leaving the Left-Bank hetmanate and an enclave around Kiev in the hands of the Russians.[6] The four Right-Bank palatinates remaining in Poland (Bracław, Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia) occupied an area of about 165,000 square kilometers and seem to have had a population in the neighborhood of three and a half million in 1795. More than three-fourths of the inhabitants of the Right-Bank palatinates were Ukrainians The remainder of the population consisted mainly of Jews and Poles.[7]

During the fourteenth, fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries, the palatinates of Bracław, Kiev, and Volhynia had been part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. During these centuries, their Orthodox Ukrainian inhabitants enjoyed such special rights as the official use locally of the Ruthenian language, their own laws (the Lithuanian Statute), and protection for their religious and other freedoms and privileges. The western Ukrainian lands acquired by Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (that is, the Ruthenian and Podolian palatinates and the Chełm land) were not granted similar rights. In 1569, at the time of Lithuania's union with Poland, the palatinates of Bracław, Kiev, and Volhynia were transferred to Poland. Initially, the inhab-

Czapliński, "Das Problem der Einstimmigkeit im polnischen Sejm im 17 Jahrhundert," *Zeitschrift fur Ostforschung* 28 (December 1979) 641-47

[6] Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warsaw PWN, 1959), Bickford O'Brien, "Russo-Polish Relations in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century," in *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists*, vol 3 *History*, ed Anna Cienciala (The Hague-Paris Mouton, 1973), p 63

[7] Kabuzan, *Narodonaselenie*, p 163, N G Krikun, "Naselenie Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy v 1789 g ," in *Problemy istoricheskoi demografii SSSR*, ed R N Pullat, pp 92-103 There are also no reliable figures concerning the national composition of the population of this area at the time Russia annexed it My estimates are based on Henryk Mościcki, *Dzieje porozbiorowe Litwy i Rusi 1772-1800* (Vilnius J Zawadzki, [1913]), pp 23-24, and on the maps and statistical tables provided by P N Batiushkov, ed , *Atlas narodonaselenia zapadnorusskogo kraia po ispovedovaniam sostavlen pri Ministerstve vnutrennikh del v Kantseliarii zavedyvaiushchego ustroistvom Pravoslavnykh tserkvei zapadnykh gubernii* (St Petersburg n p , 1864) Batiushkov tends to underestimate the number of Poles living in the western *gubernii*, but his tables and maps are based on the best data then available as compiled by Russian statisticians and ecclesiastical and government authorities I have assumed that the basic national structure of the population changed relatively little during the pre-industrial period 1795-1863 It should be noted, however, that during this period the Jewish population of the western *gubernii*, especially in Eastern Belorussia, increased more rapidly than that of the other nationalities

itants of these three palatinates were permitted to continue to use Ruthenian as an official language and to retain the religious, political, and legal rights they had enjoyed previously as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[8] In the seventeenth century, however, the Ukrainians of these palatinates gradually lost control of local society and politics as the Roman Catholic Church increased its influence and the political and economic power of the magnates and *szlachta* was consolidated throughout the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Important elements of Ukrainian society—especially among the burghers, clergy, and Cossacks—stubbornly resisted the growing economic and political power of the Polish magnates and *szlachta* as well as the allures of Polish secular and religious culture and civilization. Orthodox brotherhoods and schools had flourished in the Right-Bank Ukraine during the seventeenth century. In 1632 Kiev Metropolitan Peter Mohyla organized a collegium, which, as the Kievan Academy, was the first institution of higher education for the Orthodox Eastern Slavs and which trained numerous Ukrainian nobles and clergy for political and Church careers in the Commonwealth, the Ukraine, and Russia. Although the Ukrainian aristocracy and a good part of the middle gentry became Roman Catholic and Polish during the seventeenth century, simultaneously the Zaporozhian Cossacks emerged as a nucleus of indigenous Ukrainian political and military power. Although Cossack leaders tended to be primarily concerned with their own special rights and privileges, by the time of the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt in the mid-seventeenth century the periodic uprisings against the Commonwealth organized in defense of Cossack rights and privileges had become associated with the grievances of other elements of the Ukrainian population—the clergy, burghers, Orthodox petty nobles, and peasants. "Rus' consciousness and unity," as Frank Sysyn has pointed out, was heightened during Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolt and the "Ukrainian ethnic mass went through a phase of vertical integration." As short-lived as this phase was, it was not forgotten by Ukrainians. In the century that followed, Cossacks again and again joined

[8] Andrzej Kaminksi, "Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Its Citizens Was the Commonwealth a Stepmother for Cossacks and Ruthenians?" in *Poland and Ukraine Past and Present*, ed Peter J Potichnyj (Edmonton-Toronto The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), pp 36-37, Frank E Sysyn, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement," in ibid , pp 67-69, Jaroslav Pelenski, "The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands of Old Rus' into Crown Poland (1569) (Socio-Material Interest and Ideology—A Reexamination)," in *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists*, 3 41-52

forces with other elements of the population in opposing the existing social and political order of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[9]

The peasants in the Right-Bank Ukraine represented a particular problem for the Commonwealth. Elsewhere within its borders, especially in ethnically Polish areas, the expansion of the lands of the *szlachta* and of the latifundia of the magnates was gradual, and peasant labor and other obligations owed to the landowners increased over an extended period of several generations, peasant uprisings occurred but were sporadic and did not seriously threaten the control that the Polish nobility exercised over the countryside. In the southeastern part of the Right-Bank Ukraine (that is, the southeastern regions of the palatinates of Bracław, Kiev, Volhynia, and also Podolia), on the other hand, the position of the Polish landowning nobility had been weakened by the Cossack wars of the seventeenth century, and disruptive Tatar raids continued into the eighteenth century. For some time the peasants in this border area were in a relatively strong economic position. Since local Polish landowners were interested in attracting and keeping new settlers on their lands, at the beginning of the eighteenth century money rents were common in this part of the Ukraine and peasant obligations to landowners were generally less onerous than was usually the case elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Within several decades, however, the economic position of a substantial portion of the Right-Bank Ukrainian peasants perceptibly worsened as the magnates and *szlachta* extended the corvée system and increased peasant obligations. Unwilling to accept the dominance of Polish Catholic landowners over their lives, tens of thousands of Right-Bank Ukrainians followed Zaporozhian and local leaders in destructive *haidamak* uprisings aimed at ending Polish rule and driving the *szlachta* and the Catholic Church from the Right-Bank Ukraine.[10]

Russia's rulers of the first part of the eighteenth century were self-proclaimed protectors of the Orthodox faith, the spiritual center of which in the Ukrainian lands was Kiev, which had belonged to Russia since 1667. Beginning with Peter the Great, the emperors and empresses of Russia had been the allies of August II and August III,

[9] Sysyn, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations," pp 77-78, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, ed K K Dubina et al , 2 vols (Kiev "Naukova Dumka," 1969), 1 186-206, 252-60, 335-44, Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Haidamak Insurrections and the Old Regimes in Eastern Europe," in *The American and European Revolutions, 1776-1848 Sociopolitical and Ideological Aspects* (Iowa City University of Iowa Press, 1980), pp 228-47

[10] Pelenski, "The *Haidamak* Insurrection," p 234, V A Markina, *Krest'iane pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy konets XVII-60-e gody XVIII st* (Kiev Izdatel'stvo Kievskogo Universiteta, 1971), pp. 5-6, 21-25, 30-32, 59-78, 130-37, 157-74

Poland's Saxon kings, and their supporters among the Polish *szlachta* and magnates. Russia frequently reminded the Poles of the religious rights to which Orthodox believers in the Commonwealth were entitled according to the terms of the "Eternal Peace" of 1686, but she was disinclined to take a strong stand on the so-called dissident question for fear of alienating the Poles and jeopardizing Russia's predominant position in Poland-Lithuania. Paradoxically, the Orthodox Church and the economic and social well-being of Belorussian and Ukrainian peasants reached a nadir in Poland at the very same time that Russian power and influence in that country was at its peak. Had it not been for Russia's willingness to use armed force to maintain social order in the Right-Bank Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that the Uniate and Catholic Churches and the Polish *szlachta* and magnates could have successfully defended themselves against the threat represented by a number of major Ukrainian uprisings during the eighteenth century. The revolt of Semen Palii between 1702 and 1704 and the devastating *haidamak* uprisings of 1734-1737, 1750, and 1768 were only suppressed thanks to Russian armed intervention. Poland, with an army of less than 20,000 soldiers, was no longer in a position to maintain social order in the Right-Bank Ukraine. In last analysis, in this troubled area it was above all the Russian army that enabled the Polish *szlachta* to complete the work of Polonizing the upper strata of the population, pacifying the peasantry, and keeping it within the fold of the Uniate Church.[11]

On the whole, the lower classes of the Right-Bank Ukraine—who were mainly priests, peasants, and townsmen—retained the Eastern Orthodox rite but were organized into Uniate parishes and dioceses. In union with the Roman Catholic Church, they lost almost all contact with the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in the Left-Bank Ukraine and Russia. A few hundred thousand Ukrainian Orthodox believers and a small number of Orthodox churches and monasteries managed

[11] Pelenski, "The *Haidamak* Insurrection," pp 238-42, Julian Janczak, "Der Palej-Aufstand von 1702 bis 1704 in der Ukraine und die Haltung der Rzeczpospolita zum Nordischen Krieg," in *Um die polnische Krone Sachsen und Polen wahrend des Nordischen Krieges 1700-1721*, ed J Kalisch and J Gierowski (Berlin Rutten & Loening, 1962), pp 95-128, Z E Kohut, "Myths Old and New The *Haidamak* Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent Historiography," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977, no 3) 359-78 There is no acceptable and detailed, scholarly study on Polish-Russian relations during the eighteenth century A brief scholarly treatment is, however, provided in Hoensch's *Sozialverfassung und politische Reform* Still useful for the facts of diplomatic history from a Russian point of view are the relevant volumes of S M Solov'ev's *Istoriia Rossii*, vols 7-15 of the Soviet edition (Moscow Sotsekizdat, 1959-1966)

to escape subordination to Rome and remained under the spiritual authority of Orthodoxy and the Metropolitan in Kiev. These Orthodox believers, monasteries, and churches, however, no longer possessed an organized church hierarchy to defend their interests within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Only in the eastern part of Belorussia did the Uniates fail to take over the Orthodox Church hierarchy within the Commonwealth, but the Belorussian bishopric remained unoccupied for several decades at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries.[12]

Following the "Eternal Peace" of 1686, representatives of Orthodoxy in the Commonwealth and in Kiev and Pereiaslav complained repeatedly to the Russian government and Holy Synod about illegal Uniate seizures of Orthodox churches and monasteries and the persecution of Orthodox believers in the Right-Bank Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. In 1710 Peter I obliged August II of Poland-Lithuania to reaffirm the religious liberties promised Orthodox Christians in the "Eternal Peace"; and in 1720 the Polish king, again under pressure from his ally, Emperor Peter of Russia, confirmed Sil'vester Chetvertinskii as the Orthodox bishop of Belorussia. Sil'vester, who died in 1728, was followed by a succession of other Ukrainians (Arsenii Berlo [1728-1732], Iosif Volchanskii [1732-1742], Ieronim Volchanskii [1744-1754], and Georgii Konisskii [1755-1795]), all of whom had been educated at the Kievan Academy and who continued the efforts of Sil'vester to alert the Russian Holy Synod and government in St. Petersburg to the needs and problems of Orthodox Christians in the Commonwealth.[13] Until the time of Catherine II, however, the Russian government, although it again and again protested the violations of the rights of Orthodox believers in Poland, did not give the Ukrainian bishops of Belorussia and defenders of the cause of Orthodoxy in the Commonwealth the sort of support that they perhaps were entitled to expect from the rulers of the most powerful Slavic and Orthodox nation in Europe.

A reassessment of Russian official attitudes concerning the dissident

[12] Hoensch, *Sozialverfassung und politische Reform*, pp 187-89, Albert M Ammann, *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte* (Vienna Verlag Herder, 1950), pp 321-27, 422-23, P N Batiushkov, ed , *Belorussiia i Litva Istoricheskaia sud'ba severo-zapadnogo kraia* (St Petersburg "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1890), pp 276-78, 294-96, Janusz Wolński, *Polska i kościół prawosławny Zarys historyczny* (Lwów Ossolineum, 1936), pp 111-24

[13] N. N Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoricheskoe izvestie o vozniksheі v Pol'she Unii* (2nd ed , Vilnius A Syrkin, 1866), pp 124-326, Batiushkov, *Belorussiia i Litva*, pp 297-307, G Ia Kiprianovich, *Istoricheskii ocherk pravoslaviia, katolichestva i Unii v Belorussii i Litve* (2nd ed , Vilnius I Bliumovich, 1899), pp 127-32, 137-39, 188-90

question in Poland began toward the end of Elizabeth's reign. In 1755 Russia obtained approval of the appointment of Georgii Konisskii, the former rector of the Kievan Academy, as Orthodox bishop of Belorussia. The Russian Senate then approved financial support of an Orthodox seminary and church construction in Belorussia as well as an annual salary of 500 rubles for Konisskii,[14] whose bishopric, it should be noted, still lay outside Russia in Poland-Lithuania. In 1757 Gervasii Lintsevskii, another learned Ukrainian educated at the Kievan Academy, became bishop of Pereiaslav and coadjutor of the Kievan Metropolitan. As bishop, Gervasii, no doubt with the knowledge of his superiors and Russian secular authorities, paid particular attention to the religious needs of Orthodox believers living to the south of Pereiaslav and in Poland on the right bank of the Dnieper. In 1761 he entrusted Mel'khisidek Znachko-Iavorskii, a third Kiev Academy graduate and Ukrainian defender of the religious rights of Right-Bank Orthodox believers, with the administration of all Orthodox churches subordinated to the authority of the Pereiaslav bishop and located in the Right-Bank Ukraine. Mel'khisidek, the archimandrite of the Motrenin Monastery in the Czehryń (Chigirin, Chyhyryn) region, soon became the focal point of Orthodox resistance to further encroachments of the Uniate Church and even of reconversion to Orthodoxy in an unstable border area contiguous to lands lying to the south and dominated by the Zaporozhian Cossacks.[15]

Catherine II's decision to combine defense of the rights of dissidents with more active intervention in Polish internal politics was an important factor in setting in motion a chain of events that led to the last great *haidamak* uprising in 1768 and the First Partition of Poland in 1772. Catherine was well informed about the dissident question from the very beginning of her reign. In 1762 Georgii Konisskii attended her coronation in Moscow, where he exhorted her in eloquent Biblical language not to abandon unfortunate fellow Orthodox believers who found themselves in "Egypt" far from "blessed Palestine" (apparently the Orthodox Russia of Catherine II). The Belorussian bishop then stayed away from his episcopal seat in Mohylew for several years. He remained in Russia, where he systematically collected

[14] Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 12 492

[15] P N Batiushkov, ed , *Podolia Istoricheskoe opisanie* (St Petersburg "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1891), pp 183-90, Wladyslaw Serczyk, *Hajdamacy* (Cracow Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1972), pp 265-89, M O Koialovich, *Istoriia vossoedinenia zapadnorusskikh Uniatov starykh vremen* (St. Petersburg Vtoroe Otdelenie Sobstvennoi E.I.V Kantseliarii, 1873), pp 11-89, M Cecylia Łubieńska, *Sprawa dysydencka 1764-1766* (Cracow-Warsaw W L Anczyc, 1911), pp 73-82

materials that documented illegal seizures of Orthodox churches and monasteries as well as other alleged Polish violations of the rights of Orthodox Christians living in the Commonwealth. In 1765 Catherine sent him to Warsaw with a guard of three Russian dragoons so that he could present his case to the Polish king and government. Mel'khisedek made trips to St. Petersburg and Warsaw during these same years to gain support for the rights of the Orthodox Church in the Right-Bank Ukraine. In the Ukraine, Bishop Gervasii worked together with both Mel'khisedek and Georgii Konisskii in promoting the interests of Orthodoxy. In 1765 Gervasii visited monasteries and parishes on the right bank of the Dnieper. This visitation, the first one in the Right-Bank Ukraine by an Orthodox bishop in more than fifty years, greatly encouraged the hopes of local Orthodox Christians in Poland for Russian assistance in defending their interests.[16]

In 1764 Stanisław August Poniatowski, Catherine's former lover, was elected king of Poland. Catherine made Russian support of him and of a moderate program of internal reform in Poland contingent upon recognition of equal political and religious rights for the dissidents within the Commonwealth. In 1767 and 1768 Russian Ambassador N. V. Repnin, after having failed to prevail by persuasion during the preceding three years, used force and intimidation to oblige Poland to accept a "perpetual peace" that guaranteed the rights and privileges of the dissidents and reduced Poland to the status of a protectorate of Russia, who became the guarantor of the constitution and of the territorial integrity of the Polish state. An almost immediate reaction to the treaty was the organization of the anti-Russian Confederation of Bar, which, centered in the southeastern Ukrainian part of the Commonwealth, helped spark the last major *haidamak* uprising, the violent *koliszczyna* of 1768. Turkey, feeling threatened by the consolidation of Russian power in Poland seemingly achieved by the "Perpetual Treaty," declared war against Russia in November of that same year. The diplomatic complications in Europe produced by the ensuing Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 resulted in the First Partition of Poland in 1772.[17]

Following the First Partition, Russia gradually reestablished her

[16] Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoricheskoe izvestie*, pp 56, 312-26, Kolalovich, *Istoriia vossoedineniia*, pp 24-25, Łubieńska, *Sprawa*, pp. 48-60, 153-60, Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 13 129-30, 363-65, 449-50, 14 243-45, Solov'ev, *Geschichte des Falles von Polen*, tr J. Sporer (Gotha E F Thienemann, 1865), pp 33-35

[17] On the diplomatic and military events associated with the First Partition, see Herbert H Kaplan, *The First Partition of Poland* (New York and London. Columbia University Press, 1962)

position in Poland, which continued to be based on cooperation with Stanisław Poniatowski. Bishop Gervasii and Archimandrite Mel'khisedek, who were held responsible by certain high-ranking Russian officials for having contributed to bringing about the *koliszczyna*, were transferred to new posts in 1768.[18] For several years pressure on the Poles to grant religious equality to the dissidents was somewhat relaxed, and the integration of newly acquired Eastern Belorussia into the general administrative and social structure of the empire soon became a more immediate task for Russian officials.

Eastern Belorussia, occupying an area of about the size of Indiana (87,000 square kilometers),[19] extended from Livland in the northwest to the Russian Ukrainian province of Chernigov in the southeast. In 1772 this new Russian borderland had a population of 1.3 million, consisting of Belorussians, Latvians, Poles, Jews, and Russians. Its Latvian peasant population was concentrated in Polish Livonia to the northwest, or in *Inflanty*, which had a population of about 170,000. Outside *Inflanty* in the area acquired by Russia in 1772, approximately a million Belorussians accounted for almost 90 percent of the population. The remainder of the population of Eastern Belorussia and *Inflanty* was made up of Jews (ca. 50,000), Polish *szlachta* (ca. 80,000), and Great Russian Old Believers (ca. 40,000).[20]

In Eastern Belorussia, as in the southeastern part of the Right-Bank Ukraine, the position of the *szlachta* and of the Roman Catholic hierarchy was somewhat weaker than in the western Ukrainian and Belorussian lands. Although no military class comparable to the Cossacks emerged in Eastern Belorussia, the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and peasant uprisings, on occasion with the support of the Ukrainian Cossacks, slowed the consolidation of the economic power of Polish landowners. In Eastern Belorussia the latter were also

[18] Koialovich, *Istoriia vossoedinenia*, pp 89-104, Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 14 244-45, 247-48, 263-64.

[19] The figure usually given is 93,000 square kilometers, but see A M Karpachev and P G Kozlovskii, "Dinamika chislennosti naselenia Belorussii vo vtoroi polovine XVII-XVIII v ," in *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii vostochnoi Evropy 1968 g* (Leningrad "Nauka," 1972), p 84

[20] For my 1772 estimates I have taken 80 percent of what the Batiushkov *Atlas* reports for Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* in 1863 (the population increased from 1 3 to 1 7 million between 1772 and 1863) The estimate of 80,000 *szlachta* is from Korzon, *Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski*, 1 152, and Henryk Mościcki, *Dzieje porozbiorowe Litwy i Rusi 1772-1800*, p 24 In the article cited in the preceding footnote, Karpachev and Kozlovskii ("Dinamika," pp 89-94) provide a detailed commentary concerning some of the problems involved in estimating the population of Belorussia at the end of the eighteenth century

obliged to adjust themselves to a local economy that resembled the Russian north-central region more than it did the grain-producing lands of the Vistula basin. The trade routes of Eastern Belorussia, which exported hemp, potash, vegetable oil, and forest products, led to Riga and the Ukraine via the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Peasant holdings were considerably more important than the latifundia in producing for both the local and export markets, and, as in the southeastern part of the Right-Bank Ukraine, money rents, not the corvée, represented the most common form of peasant obligation to the landowners. Consequently, Eastern Belorussian peasants, although serfs and economically dependent on the landowning *szlachta*, would seem to have been in a better position to defend their own interests than was generally the case in other parts of the Commonwealth.[21] Perhaps this was one reason why about 30 percent of the Belorussian peasants (ca. 300,000) in this Polish-Lithuanian borderland succeeded in staying out of the Uniate Church, giving Russia an opportunity to pressure Poles into allowing a succession of Ukrainian bishops trained at Kiev to serve as the Orthodox bishops of Belorussia after 1720. The presence of these bishops in Mohylew as well as the occasional interest displayed by Russian rulers in defending the interests of the Orthodox Church in Poland must have reminded many Eastern Belorussians of certain common interests and of the historical and cultural background they shared with their Russian neighbors.

In the spring of 1772 Zakhar G. Chernyshev was appointed as the first Russian governor-general of Belorussia. He had been interested in Polish Livonia and Eastern Belorussia for some time, and as early as 1763 he had recommended the annexation of these areas. He then suggested that, once annexed, these two provinces could be more easily assimilated by Russia if they would be joined administratively to adjacent Great Russian *gubernii*. Accordingly, in 1772 Polish Livonia and the Połock region were united (in an enlarged Pskov *gubernia*) with the Great Russian districts of Pskov and Velikie Luki, but in 1776 Velikie Luki and Pskov were separated from the areas annexed from Poland, which then became the Belorussian *gubernii* of Połock and Mohylew. The Provincial Reform of 1775 was introduced into these two provinces in 1778, when Chernyshev received the new title of Viceroy of Belorussia.[22]

[21] *Istoria Belorusskoi SSR*, ed L S Abetsedarskii et al , 2 vols (Minsk Akademia Nauk Belorusskoi SSR, 1961), 1 120-34, 165-89, 200-5, V I Meleshko, *Ocherki agrarnoi istorii vostochnoi Belorussii (vtoraia polovina XVII-XVIII v )* (Minsk "Nauka i Tekhnika," 1975), pp 3-39, 62-64, 217-20

[22] U L Lehtonen, *Die polnischen Provinzen Russlands unter Katharina II in den*

Between 1772 and 1778 Chernyshev and his assistants worked to prepare Belorussia for the introduction of the reform of provincial administration then being worked out for the empire as a whole. One of their first measures, and a very significant one at that, was the introduction of the Russian poll tax in 1773. From the very beginning Russian officials took over the higher offices in the provincial administration, which was organized as much as possible in conformity with the new institutions, administrative procedures, and social norms then being tested in nearby Tver', Novgorod, and Pskov *gubernii*, whose viceroy, the Baltic German Jakob Sievers, was one of the principal sources of ideas for Catherine II in matters relating to provincial reform. With the introduction in 1778 of Catherine II's Provincial Reform of 1775 into Belorussia, Russian courts, administration, laws, and language in the offices of the state bureaucracy largely replaced the hitherto dominant Polish legal administrative order in Połock and Mohylew *gubernii*. Local civil law (the Lithuanian Statute) continued, however, to remain in effect, Poles still controlled local government and courts, and their religious and property rights were respected.[23]

Indeed, Catherine II's social policies tended to perpetuate the special position of the Polish *szlachta* in local Belorussian society. An essential underlying assumption of both the 1775 Provincial Reform and the Charter to the Nobility was that the guarantee of certain rights and privileges for the nobility would encourage them to take an active part in public affairs and share with government officials the burden of administering and maintaining order in the empire's *uezdy* and *gubernii*. In the Połock and Mohylew regions this of course meant that Polish nobles would be the *guberniia* marshals of the nobility and that they would staff the Boards of Public Welfare and lower courts and administrative offices. The government, to be sure, exercised a greater degree of control and supervision over the activities of Mohylew and Połock nobles than they had known in the past, and it would seem that the imposition of Russian legal and bureaucratic norms did result in some improvement in the administration of justice and local

*Jahren 1772-1782*, tr G Schmidt (Berlin Georg Reimer, 1907), pp 234-37, 249, SIRIO, 51. 11, Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation*, pp 371, 393-94

[23] Lehtonen, *Die polnischen Provinzen*, pp 235-42, 247-48, 335-93, 422-23, B E Nol'de, *Ocherki russkogo gosudarstvennogo prava* (St Petersburg "Pravda," 1911), pp 420-23, Jones, *Emancipation*, pp 177-78, 214-17, Karl Ludwig Blum, *Ein russischer Staatsmann Des Grafen Jakob Johann Sievers Denkwurdigkeiten zur Geschichte Russlands* (Leipzig-Heidelberg. C. F Winter'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1857-58), 1 153-54, 2 35-112, James A Duran, "The Reform of Financial Administration in Russia during the Reign of Catherine II," *Canadian Slavic Studies* 4 (1970). 495

affairs and in raising the educational and cultural level of local society [24] But organized local society was largely Polish and Catholic, and its consolidation and reinforcement was one unanticipated result of the reforms of Catherine II in Belorussia

At the same time, other aspects of Catherinean policy marked the beginning of the gradual Russification of the upper strata of the population in the areas acquired from Poland between 1772 and 1795 Her policy of granting settled state or confiscated lands in Belorussia to Russian favorites and high officials, for example, removed some 190,000 peasants from the control of Polish landowners [25] This policy was continued by her successors, especially in the periods immediately following the 1830-1831 and 1863-1864 Polish insurrections Her educational policy also remained and made state-supported education in the Russian language available to the nobles of these formerly Polish borderlands Between 1789 and 1794 two *gubernia* four-class and five *uezd* two-class public schools were opened in towns of the Belorussian viceroyalty The establishment of such schools throughout Russia had been projected in the Provincial Reform of 1775, and the Russian Statute of National Education of 1786 instructed governors to proceed with their construction [26] Schools established in Russia during the reign of Catherine II represented, however, only a first, small step in the direction of establishing a national system of education for the privileged classes of the population In Eastern Belorussia, Russian state schools found it difficult until the second quarter of the nineteenth century to compete with the well-established Polish schools of the Jesuits and other Roman Catholic orders

The peasantry in Eastern Belorussia seems to have benefited very little from Catherine II's administrative Russification and introduction of Russian landowners into this borderland area To be sure, its annexation by Russia opened new opportunities for enterprising peasants in marketing their products in the Left-Bank Ukraine, Great Russia, and the Baltic provinces The strengthening of police and governmental authority may have been of some use to the Belorussian peasants in defending themselves against illegal and arbitrary acts by Polish landowners, but the reinforcement of the social and legal authority of Polish officials and nobles also made it more difficult for

[24] Lehtonen *Die polnischen Provinzen*, pp 297 302, 389 404

[25] Ibid pp 505 12 Madariaga *Russia* pp 554 650 n 26

[26] Madariaga, *Russia* pp 495-99 *Istoria Belorussii*, I 266-67 M K Kirillov Shkola i pedagogicheskaia mysl v Belorussii, in *Ocherki istorii shkoly i pedagogicheskoi mysli narodov SSSR XVIII v pervaia polovina XIX v* ed M F Shabaeva (Moscow Pedagogika 1973), pp 420 21

local peasants to evade their obligations to both the state and landowners And Russian rule meant increased taxation and recruitment into the imperial army [27]

Little was done to defend the religious rights of the Belorussian peasantry during the first decade of Russian rule The annexation of Eastern Belorussia in 1772 brought Georgii Konisskii's Orthodox Belorussian episcopal seat in Mohylew within the borders of the Russian Empire Throughout the remainder of the 1770s Konisskii worked in vain to obtain official approval for the mass conversion of Uniates to Orthodoxy Catherine II probably hesitated to give such approval because she remembered that only a few years earlier a major *haidamak* uprising, the *koliszczyna* of 1768, had occurred In addition, many practical problems were associated with bringing almost a million Uniates and Roman Catholics into the Russian Empire as a result of the First Partition of Poland Until then the handful of Catholics living in Russia had been subject to the administrative authority of the Justice College for Livland, Estland, and Finland Affairs At the time of the annexation of Eastern Belorussia, one of Catherine's first acts was to proclaim freedom of religion for her new subjects By the end of 1772 she had approved a nine-point program for church administration in Belorussia that made the Catholics and Uniates in this province subject to the jurisdiction of the Baltic Justice College, and she had proposed the appointment of a single bishop for all the Catholics in Russia Although the sanction of the Roman pontiff for the establishment of a Catholic bishopric for Russia had to be obtained sooner or later, Catherine acted promptly to subject the Roman Catholic clergy in Eastern Belorussia to the exclusive administrative authority of the Russian government As early as November 1773 she named Stanisław Bohusz Siestrzencewicz as bishop of Mohylew For nearly fifty years Siestrzencewicz was to cooperate with the Russian authorities in administering the affairs of the Roman Catholics and Uniates living in the Russian Empire, beginning with the nonpromulgation of the pope's brief *Dominus ac Redemptor* of 1773 that suppressed the Jesuit Order Catherine chose to defy the pope with regard to the Jesuits because she and Belorussian Governor-General Chernyshev valued their skills and services as educators and wanted them to continue to maintain their network of schools in Belorussia In 1782, again without consulting the pope, she elevated Siestrzencewicz to the position of archbishop of Mohylew Two years later the pope, yielding to Russian

[27] Lehtonen, *Die polnischen Provinzen*, pp 297-307 *Istoriia Belorusskoi SSR* 1 257 87

pressure, finally confirmed Siestrzencewicz as the archbishop for the Catholics of the Russian Empire.[28]

Georgii Konisskii had to wait until 1780 for permission to act on the petitions of Eastern Belorussian Uniates to return to the Orthodox Church. Even after 1780 Konisskii was authorized to act only on petitions from vacant Uniate parishes (that is, parishes without priests). Parishes, however, could easily be declared vacant after their priest had been reunited individually with Orthodoxy, opening the possibility of legally accepting entire Uniate parishes into the Orthodox Church. During the 1780s Konisskii managed to reunite more than a hundred thousand Uniates with Orthodoxy. At the same time, he played a major role in arranging in 1783 the appointment of Viktor Sadkovskii (then the chaplain of the Russian embassy in Warsaw and once a pupil of Konisskii at the Kievan Academy and the prefect of the Mohylew Orthodox Seminary between 1758 and 1775) as archimandrite of the Orthodox monastery in Słuck. In 1785 he was made bishop of Pereiaslav and coadjutor of the Kievan Metropolitan. With these appointments Sadkovskii, in effect, became the bishop for Orthodox believers living in Poland, an office that had been envisaged in the treaty of 1768 between Russia and Poland. Although he resided in Słuck and became a Polish citizen, he remained under the religious authority of the Russian Holy Synod. Like Konisskii, he was a zealous defender of the interests of Orthodoxy in Poland-Lithuania.[29]

From the mid-1770s to the late 1780s Russia dominated what remained of Poland-Lithuania, a country of 520,000 square kilometers and 7.4 million inhabitants (in 1775). The Russian ambassador in Warsaw between 1772 and 1789 was Otto Magnus von Stackelberg, a Baltic German landowner from Estland who had studied at Leipzig

[28] Lehtonen, *Die polnischen Provinzen*, pp 541-605, Ammann, *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte*, pp 440-44, J J Zatko, "The Organization of the Catholic Church in Russia, 1772-1784," *Slavonic and East European Review* 43 (1965) 303-13 Both Lehtonen and Zatko give the number of Uniates and Catholics living in Eastern Belorussia and Latgale in 1772 as approximately 800,000 and 100,000, respectively The number of Catholics would seem to have been greater, for there were 80,000 Polish *szlachta* in Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* and 170,000 people in Latgale, most of whom were Catholic Latvians Furthermore, the mid-nineteenth-century population statistics contained in Batiushkov's *Atlas* indicate that 16 percent of the population of Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* consisted of Roman Catholics In other words, there were probably something in the neighborhood of 200,000 Roman Catholics living in this area at the end of the eighteenth century

[29] Kolalovich, *Istoriia vossoedineniia zapadnorusskikh Uniatov*, pp 121-34, 207-14, 226-27, 279-87, Batiushkov (ed ), *Belorussia i Litva*, pp 308-9, 322-25, Korzon, *Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski za Stanisława Augusta*, 1 203-15, 237-38

University, traveled widely in Europe, and previously served as Russian minister in Madrid In August 1772 Nikita Panin, Catherine II's principal foreign-affairs adviser, instructed Stackelberg to cooperate with his Prussian and Austrian colleagues in Warsaw in obtaining Sejm approval of the First Partition and to use fully the means at his disposal (mainly Russian money and troops) to manipulate the Polish political system in a manner that would ensure the continuation of the "perpetual peace" the Poles had made with Russia in 1768 But after 1775 the political status quo in Poland—including the elective monarchy, the republican form of government, and the *liberum veto* —was now guaranteed by not just Russia but by all three of the partitioning powers This did not, however, hinder Russia from continuing to occupy a dominant position in Warsaw, for Stackelberg succeeded in using King Stanisław August Poniatowski and a newly established executive organ, the Permanent Council, for the purposes of Russian policy in Poland Stanisław August himself referred to Stackelberg as a sort of Roman proconsul in Poland [30]

Stackelberg's proconsulate helped stabilize Poland politically, and government by the Permanent Council represented, as E Rostworowski has noted, "a step forward in comparison with the former anarchy and provided a school of administrative experience of great importance for the future "[31] The *liberum veto* then fell out of use, and the Poles practiced a degree of self-restraint unknown in the Polish Sejm for more than a century Without the *liberum veto* it became possible to introduce a number of reforms during the 1770s and 1780s, including the reorganization and improvement of postal service, the police, and the administration of finances Even more important was the creation in 1773 of the Commission of National Education, which laid the foundations for a national system of education in Poland based on sound pedagogical and administrative principles and financed with funds resulting from the abolition of the Jesuit Order in Poland-Lithuania But Stanisław August and such reformers as Andrzej Zamoyski (a progressive landowner), Józef Wybicki (later an émigré patriot and author of the words for the future Polish national anthem, the *Ma-*

[30] DBL, p 752, *History of Poland*, ed Gieysztor and Kieniewicz pp 327-36, Solov ev, *Geschichte des Falles von Polen*, pp 147-54 Jerzy Łojek La politique de la Russie envers la Pologne pendant le premier partage de la Pologne d apres un document secret de la cour russe de 1772," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 8 (1974) 116-35, Daniel Stone, *Polish Politics and National Reform 1775-1788* (Boulder East European Quarterly, 1976), pp 9-13

[31] 'Tentative Reforms under Russia's Tutelage (1763-1788) ' in *History of Poland*, p 336

*zurka Dąbrowskiego*), and Hugo Kołłątaj (the reformer of Cracow University and a notable publicist and political leader) suffered a major defeat in 1780 when the Sejm rejected the codification of Polish law they had prepared at the request of the Sejm of 1776. The so-called Zamoyski Code would have deprived the landless *szlachta* of political rights, regulated church-state relations, and protected certain legal rights of serfs and townsmen. Neither Stackelberg nor the clerical and magnate opposition in the Sejm was then willing to tolerate the changes in the Polish constitutional and social system contained in the Zamoyski Code. Its rejection indicated the limits of reform permitted under Stackelberg's proconsulate.[32]

A more fundamental reform of government and society in Poland obviously could only be undertaken if the Poles had full control over their own internal affairs. This they achieved during the Four-Year Sejm, 1788-1792, thanks to Russian involvement in another war with Turkey and thanks to a short-lived alliance with Prussia, a nation that was not in a position to dominate Poland to the extent Russia had prior to 1788. For four years the Sejm controlled the politics of a *szlachta* nation of some 700,000 individuals (out of a total population of nine million in 1791). The reform movement in the Sejm was supported by extensive journalistic discussions of the major problems of Polish society, including the freeing of the peasants and the extension of political rights to property-owning burghers. The leaders of the reform movement in Poland, the so-called Patriotic Party, were, however, also political realists prepared to compromise with the majority of their social peers that still clung to the "Golden Freedom" of the Polish nobility. Their compromise with this majority was embodied in the Constitution of May 3, 1791, which excluded the landless *szlachta* from the *sejmiki* (and Sejm), abolished the *liberum veto* as well as confederations and confederated Sejms, and provided for a ministerial form of government and for Poland's first systematized and centralized machinery of government. It also declared that the peasants were under the protection of the law, improved the legal position of burghers in Polish society, and entitled towns to send twenty-four plenipotentiaries with limited voting rights to the Sejm. There is little question that the Patriotic Party intended to proceed with further reforms as soon as circumstances permitted. Its intellectual leaders

[32] Ibid., pp. 331-37, 356-58; Stone, *Polish Politics and National Reform*, pp. 11-19, 26-28, 33-36; Jean Fabre, *Stanislas-Auguste Poniatowski et l'Europe des lumières* (Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1952), pp. 437-46, 458, 463-64; Ambroise Jobert, *La Commission d'Education Nationale en Pologne (1773-1794)* (Paris: Droz, 1941); Tadeusz Mizia, *O Komisji Educacji Narodowej* (Warsaw: PWN, 1972).

realized that Poland's future strength and prosperity depended to a large extent on including the burghers in the Polish political nation and on guaranteeing satisfactorily the personal, economic, and legal rights of some 6.5 million peasants, who accounted for more than 70 percent of the Commonwealth's population in 1791.[33]

A combination of Russian unwillingness to tolerate an independent Poland, Prussian territorial ambitions, and opposition within the *szlachta* to the Constitution of May 3 (especially, the Targowica Confederation of 1792) soon put an end to the Polish constitutional experiment. In the latter part of 1791 the success of Catherine II's diplomats in frustrating British plans for forming a coalition of powers to contain Russian expansionist designs on Turkish lands obliged Prussia to reassess the anti-Russian policy she had pursued in Poland since 1788. Peace with Turkey at the end of 1791 and the formation of the Targowica Confederation opened the way for renewed Russian military intervention in Polish affairs in May 1792. The Russians encountered relatively little military and political resistance in conquering Poland in 1792 and, together with the Prussians, in carrying out the Second Partition in 1793. The Poles, on the other hand, fought heroically during the Kościuszko insurrection of April-October 1794. The bitter and prolonged nature of Polish resistance in 1794 to the invading troops of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the attention the Polish insurrectionists paid to the examples provided by the French and American revolutions; their relative success in mobilizing the Polish nation and economy for the purposes of the insurrection, and their promise of personal freedom and security of tenure to the Polish peasants all very much disturbed the partitioning powers. If the total partition of Poland had not been a foregone conclusion from the very beginning, now it no longer seemed prudent to allow even a Polish buffer state to continue to exist.[34]

[33] *History of Poland*, pp 344, 359-76, Stone, *Polish Politics and National Reform*, pp 76-83

[34] *History of Poland*, pp 377-92, Madariaga, *Russia*, pp 427-51, Solov'ev, *Geschichte des Falles von Polen*, pp 261-362, Jerzy Łojek, "Catherine II's Armed Intervention in Poland Origins of the Political Decisions at the Russian Court in 1791 and 1792," *Canadian Slavic Studies* 4 (1970) 570-93, Łojek, "The International Crisis of 1791 Poland Between the Triple Alliance and Russia," *East Central Europe* 2 (1975) 1-63, Łojek, *Misja Debolego w Petersburgu w latach 1787-1792* (Wrocław Ossolineum, 1962), idem, *Przed Konstytucje Trzeciego Maja* (Warsaw Pax, 1977), idem, *Upadek Konstytucji 3 Maja* (Wrocław Ossolineum, 1976), Robert H Lord, *The Second Partition of Poland A Study in Diplomatic History* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1915), Lord, "The Third Partition of Poland," *Slavonic and East European Review* 3 (1925) 481-98

In the Second and Third Partitions of Poland, Russia acquired an additional area of 376,200 square kilometers (about the size of Montana), populated by some six million Belorussians, Jews, Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians. The territory annexed in 1793 was organized into Bracław, Iziasław (that is, Eastern Volhynia), and Minsk *gubernii*, which were reorganized in 1795 at the time of the Third Partition into Podolia, Volhynia, Bracław, Minsk, Słonim, Wilno, and Kurland *gubernii*. From the outset the Russian authorities made it clear that the inhabitants of these provinces, although assured of their religious and property rights, were not to be granted autonomy or special rights and privileges similar to those enjoyed by Estland and Livland during the first part of the eighteenth century. Initially, however, the Polish and Kurland German court systems were to continue to function according to their own established procedures and according to the Lithuanian Statute and Kurland local law until Russian courts and laws could be introduced at some unspecified future date. Meanwhile, the Russian authorities proceeded to introduce the Provincial Reform of 1775 throughout the area that had been annexed from Poland.[35]

Catherine II's officials also worked to introduce changes in the organization of religious life in these provinces that had long-range effects on the majority of their Belorussian and Ukrainian inhabitants. During the 1780s Bishop Viktor Sadkovskii and Stackelberg, the Russian ambassador in Warsaw, were the principal defenders of the interests of the Orthodox Church in Poland-Lithuania. The Polish leaders of the Four-Year Sejm arrested Sadkovskii and kept him under guard in Warsaw or in prison between 1789 and 1792. Liberated by the Russians in June 1792, he was elevated to the position of archbishop of Minsk, Iziasław, and Bracław on April 13, 1793, shortly before the Polish Sejm, meeting in Grodno, confirmed the Second Partition of Poland. As early as December 1792 Catherine had emphasized, in her instructions to Jakob Sievers, the principal Russian negotiator at the Grodno Sejm, that something had to be done to

[35] PSZ, 1st ser , 23 410-12, 417-19, 572-85, 641-44, 664-85, 691-92, 727-28, 844-46, 922-24, nos 17,108, 17,112, 17,264, 17,300, 17,319, 17,323, 17,352, 17,354, 17,417, 17,418, 17,494, and 17,495, March 27 and April 23, 1793, October 30, 1794, January 27, April 15, May 1, July 5, and December 14, 1795, and August 8, 1796, ibid , 24 228-30, 232-33, nos 17,634 and 17,637, December 12, 1796, Nol'de, *Ocherki russkogo gosudarstvennogo prava*, pp 423-27, Mościcki, *Dzieje porozbiorowe Litwy i Rusi 1772-1800*, pp 405-6, Klochkov, *Ocherki pravitel'stvennoi deiatel'nosti vremeni Pavla I*, pp 410-11, Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation*, pp 391, 398, "Rozbiory Polski," in *Mały słownik historu Polski*, p 310, Karpachev and Kozlovskii, "Dinamika chislennosti naselenii Belorussii vo vtoroi polovine XVII-XVIII v ," in *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istoru vostochnoi Evropy 1968 g* , pp 83-84

spare from religious oppression "lands and towns that had once belonged to Russia, populated and founded by her kinsmen (*edinoplemenniki*) and professing with us one faith "[36] Archbishop Viktor Sadkovski, however, did not immediately obtain permission from the Holy Synod to act on petitions for the conversion of entire Uniate parishes Only after the Kościuszko insurrection had begun was he able, in a pastoral letter of May 1794, to appeal directly to the peasants and townsmen of Minsk, Iziaslaw, and Bracław *gubernii* to leave the Uniate Church and rejoin the church to which their ancestors had once belonged The presence of victorious Russian armies and the chaos that reigned in Poland at that time no doubt assisted the work of reuniting the Uniates with Orthodoxy Between 1794 and 1796 almost 1 7 million Uniates were separated from the Roman Catholic Church and brought directly under the authority of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy and Holy Synod [37]

In the mid-1790s Archbishop Viktor won Uniates for the cause of Orthodoxy much more easily in the Right-Bank Ukraine than in Eastern Belorussia or Lithuania Three-fourths of his new converts (1 3 million) came from the same southeastern corner of the Right-Bank where the *haidamak* revolts had taken place earlier in the eighteenth century In Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii*, 110,000 Uniates returned to Orthodoxy in addition to the conversions made by Georgii Konisskii in the 1780s There were relatively few conversions in Volhynia, while in Minsk *gubernia* only 80,000 new converts were found for Orthodoxy out of a population of 870,000 in 1795 In Słonim and Wilno *gubernii*, which Russia acquired in the Third Partition of Poland, there is no record whatsoever of conversions to Orthodoxy [38]

About half the population of the Lithuanian provinces acquired in the Second and Third Partitions was Roman Catholic in religion Almost all Poles and Lithuanians of these provinces (roughly 40 percent of the total population of 2 5 million in 1795) belonged to the Catholic Church, as did 25 percent of the Belorussians Somewhat more than a million Belorussians were the largest single ethnic group living in this area, they were generally either Catholics or Uniates and ac-

[36] Koialovich, *Istoriia vossoedinenia zapadnorusskikh Uniatov*, pp 281-331, 350-53

[37] Ibid , pp 353-73, Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoricheskoe izvestie o voznikshei v Pol'she Unii*, pp 349-51, P N Batiushkov (ed ), *Podoliia Istoricheskoe opisanie* (St Petersburg "Obshchestvennaia Pol za, 1891), pp 208-12, Korzon, *Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski za Stanisława Augusta*, 1 172 74, 205 11, 237 38 Mościcki *Dzieje porozbiorowe Litwy i Rusi*, pp 365-70

[38] Korzon, *Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski*, 1 237 38, Kabuzan, *Narodonaselenie Rossii*, p 162

counted for the majority of the 1.4 million Uniates remaining in the Russian Empire after the mass conversions to Orthodoxy of the mid-1790s.[39] The large Catholic population and the influence excercised by the Roman Catholic hierarchy over the Uniate Church in the Lithuanian provinces made their inhabitants more resistant to Russian political and cultural pressures than was the case for those of Eastern Belorussia and the Right-Bank Ukraine.

In the last analysis, Russia did not possess sufficient human and institutional resources to effect the rapid administrative, social, and legal integration of the areas annexed from Poland in 1793 and 1795. These areas were extraordinarily complex in their national, social, religious, and political structure and contained a population (in 1795) eight times larger than that of Estland and Livland and four times larger than that of Eastern Belorussia. Even in the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Eastern Belorussia, Russia found it convenient to work together with the Polish magnates, clergy, and landowning *szlachta* for the control of the local serfs. By the same token, privileged elements throughout Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Right-Bank Ukraine shared the aversion of the Russian authorities to the French Revolution and the new rights and freedoms Kościuszko promised Polish, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian peasants in 1794. After the suppression of the Kościuszko insurrection, thousands of Polish magnates, landed *szlachta*, and clergy hastened to the new *gubernia* centers to swear unconditional loyalty to Russia and to petition for permission to send delegations to St. Petersburg. Among other things, such delegations undertook to thank Catherine II for having saved them, as the Grodno *szlachta* phrased it, from the "yoke of the perfidious rebels." The Russian authorities not only accepted but encouraged such professions of loyalty to the empress following the Kościuszko insurrection and the Third Partition. At the same time, they reorganized the Roman Catholic bishoprics and placed all the Uniates remaining in the empire under an enlarged Połock Uniate archbishopric, both to exercise more effective bureaucratic supervision over their activities and to assure the continuation of these activities as an element of social order and stability in the newly annexed areas.[40]

[39] Edward Likowski, *Dzieje Kościoła unickiego na Litwie i Rusi*, 2 vols. (2nd ed.; Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff, 1906), 2: 13. Our estimates concerning the religious and national composition of the population of the Lithuanian provinces have been made on the basis of statistics presented by Kabuzan (*Narodonaselenie*, p. 162) and by the *Atlas* edited by Batiushkov.

[40] Mościcki, *Dzieje porozbiorowe Litwy i Rusi*, pp. 371-85; D. A. Tolstoi, *Romanism in Russia: An Historical Survey*, tr. Mrs. M'Kibbin, 2 vols. (1874; reprint ed., New

As regards the 1.7 million Uniates who had been reunited with Orthodoxy, it was one thing to bring them under the formal authority of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, another, to provide the teachers, schools, and educated and properly trained clergy to transform their parishes culturally and socially and to make them a useful and integral part of Orthodox Russia. In any event, the Russian government soon lost interest in further conversions to Orthodoxy. After Georgii Konisskii died in February 1795, the vigorous leadership for the conversion movement in Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* was lost. The disinclination of Catherine II's government to act resolutely to end the resistance of Polish landowners and Uniate priests in Minsk, Słonim, and Wilno *gubernii* to the conversion of additional parishes to Orthodoxy is indicated by its decision early in 1796 to transfer Archbishop Viktor Sadkovskii to Chernigov in the Left-Bank Ukraine.[41]

Paul I and Alexander I inherited from Catherine the problem of how to deal with the Polish borderlands of the empire. Catherine and her advisers had introduced these lands to the Provincial Reform of 1775, and they had intended to proceed rapidly with the elimination of the Lithuanian Statute and Polish courts. They did not, however, have at their disposal (and perhaps did not even understand the need for) the detailed, comparative studies of Polish and Russian law that would have helped them to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive conflicts between traditional Polish and newly introduced Russian administrative and legal practices. It was almost two generations later that Russian officials, after Russian laws had been codified and a sufficient number of legal specialists trained by university law faculties, the School of Jurisprudence (founded in 1835), and the Second Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancery (established in 1826), that Russia was finally in a position to impose her legal norms and courts on the formerly Polish provinces in a fairly orderly manner. Even as late as the 1830s influential and well-informed Russian legal specialists questioned the wisdom of abolishing the Lithuanian Statute. Paul I's advisers seemed to have been aware of some of the problems and difficulties involved in introducing Russian legal order into the provinces annexed from Poland when they decided, in December 1796, to include Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine

York AMS Press, 1971), 1 336-37, 345, 364-69 The *ukazy* of 1793-1796 are listed in note 35 above. They clearly indicate the concern of the Russian government at the time about social order as well as its interest in having the support of the local *szlachta*, clergy, and property owners

[41] Koalovich, *Istoriia vossoedinenua zapadnorusskikh Uniatov*, pp 368-76

among the provinces administered on "special foundations according to their rights and privileges."[42]

Paul I and Alexander I made a wager on the loyalty to Russia of the Polish magnates and landowning *szlachta*. This wager was reasonable. Even though many Poles fought for Napoleon, wealthier landowning Poles of the Commonwealth's former eastern borderlands had long had much in common with the Russians in their preservation of the society of the Old Regime in Poland and Russia. Poles and Russians also had certain common economic interests. The Prussian acquisition of the Upper Vistula in 1772 impeded the free export of Polish agricultural products via Baltic ports, obliging the Poles to develop new trade outlets via the Black Sea. This trade was facilitated by recent Russian conquests from Turkey, the making of the Dniester into a navigable waterway, and the building of canals connecting the Dnieper river basin with the basins of the western Dvina and Vistula. There was, then, apparently good reason for educated and landowning Poles to make available to Russia political, administrative, and other specialized skills and knowledge acquired in a changing Poland during the second part of the eighteenth century for the purposes of reforming and improving Russian society at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

In Part Two of this study the interaction of reform for the empire with borderland special rights and privileges will be discussed. Because the borderland Polish and German elites were often well informed about what was going on in England, France, and Germany and had experience with European-type institutions of self-government, they seemed well suited to assist Russia in accommodating herself to new forms of society, governmental organization, and economic production then evolving in central and western Europe. Their privileged provinces became a sort of laboratory in which to experiment with peasant, educational, and even political reform. As long as these provinces continued to be a laboratory for reform, their special rights and privileges were not seriously questioned; indeed, they were expanded and further developed with the annexation of Finland in 1809 and of Congress Poland in 1815.

[42] PSZ, 1st ser., 24: 229, no. 17,634, December 12, 1796, Klochkov, *Ocherki pravitel'stvennoi deiatel'nosti vremeni Pavla I*, pp. 410-11, 426-27.

THE WORK of centralization in the western borderlands undertaken by Catherine II was largely suspended during the period beginning with the accession of Paul I and ending with the outbreak of the 1830 November insurrection in Poland. Baltic and Polish nobles enjoyed the favor of both Paul I and his son Alexander I, but factors other than the particular predilections of individual tsars would seem to explain what then happened in the western borderlands. For, it is clear that neither Paul nor Alexander intended to permit these borderlands to develop separately from the rest of the empire. Alexander I, for example, confirmed the rights and privileges of the Livland and Estland *Ritterschaften* but introduced the qualifying clause, "insofar as they are in agreement with the general decrees and laws of our state."[1] If Alexander and his father, Paul, were willing to allow the nobles of the western borderlands to deviate from norms observed elsewhere in the empire, this was done chiefly with strictly local affairs.

Favorable circumstances, however, served the interests of the privileged estates in the western borderlands. During the intermittent wars with France or Sweden from 1798 to 1815, it seemed prudent for Russia to cultivate as much good will as possible in the lands of partitioned Poland, the Baltic provinces, and Finland. The annexation of Finland in 1809 and Congress of Poland in 1815 added more than 450,000 square kilometers of land and four million inhabitants to the empire, increasing the land area of Russia's western borderlands by roughly three-fourths and their population by more than 40 percent. Congress Poland was granted a considerable degree of autonomy and a Constitutional Charter. The Grand Duchy of Finland, like Congress Poland, was governed separately from the rest of the empire, and

[1] Haltzel, *Der Abbau der deutschen ständischen Selbstverwaltung in den Ostseeprovinzen Russlands*, p. 5.

Alexander I specifically instructed the Russian ministers and Senate in St. Petersburg not to interfere in Finnish internal affairs. The Baltic German *Ritterschaften* in Estland, Livland, and Kurland, in contrast to the *szlachta* of Congress Poland and the estates of Finland, remained under the jurisdiction of officials in St. Petersburg, however, the addition of relatively advanced non-Russian provinces to the western borderlands seemed a guarantee that the empire would remain a multinational state ruled by cosmopolitan, landowning elites. Within this familiar and traditional Russian Empire, the historic rights and privileges of German nobles and townsmen seemed reasonably secure.

Various experiments with political and social reform early in the nineteenth century also played a role in the further development of the separate identity of the western borderlands. These experiments began with the reign of Paul I, who worked energetically during his short reign of four and one-third years to overcome what he considered the shortcomings of Russian government. Aiming at greater efficiency and economy in local government, he reduced the number of *gubernii* from fifty to forty-one and eliminated a number of governors-general and other posts in the courts and administrative offices of the provinces. He cut the cost of running local government by about 25 percent, and wherever he could he replaced elective local officials with officials appointed by the central government.[2]

The ministerial form of government introduced by Alexander I between 1802 and 1811 gave rise to many difficulties in administering the provinces. Although he tried, Alexander never succeeded in reforming local government, which remained under the nominal supervision of the Senate and still operated according to collegial principles of administration inherited from the eighteenth century. The newly created central ministries gradually extended their authority to the provinces, resulting in jurisdictional disputes with the collegially organized organs of the *gubernii* and considerable confusion in local government and administration. This confusion, as well as the inef-

[2] Klochkov, *Ocherki pravitel'stvennoi deiatel'nosti vremeni Pavla I*, pp 144-50, 156-58, 224-26, 408-33, Blinov, *Gubernatory*, pp 154-55 For recent views on Paul as a reformer and enlightened, absolutist ruler, see *Paul I A Reassessment of His Life and Reign*, ed Hugh Ragsdale, UCIS Series in Russian and East European Studies, no 2 (Pittsburgh University Center for International Studies, 1979), and Claus Scharf, "Staatsauffassung und Regierungsprogramm eines aufgeklarten Selbstherrschers Die Instruktion des Grossfürsten Paul von 1788," in *Gedenkschrift Martin Gohring Studien zur europaischen Geschichte*, ed Ernst Schulin (Wiesbaden Franz Steiner Verlag, 1968), pp 91-106

fectiveness of central control over local government, gave Polish, German, and Finnish political leaders in the borderlands many opportunities to defend their autonomy and special rights and privileges during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.[3]

One high-ranking Russian official, D. P. Troshchinskii (a member of the Permanent Council, minister of appanages from 1802 to 1806, and minister of justice from 1814 to 1817), advised Alexander not to allow the western borderlands to develop political and social institutions different from those of the rest of the empire.[4] Alexander did not heed Troshchinskii's advice, for he believed that Russia had much to learn from Finland, Poland, and the Baltic provinces. The free peasants of Finland, the emancipation of the peasants in the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, the emancipation of the Estonian and Latvian peasants in the three Baltic provinces between 1816 and 1819, and the Polish Constitutional Charter of 1815 all seemed to offer examples that Russia, herself might follow.

Like his grandmother, Catherine, and father, Paul, Alexander had been educated in the school of eighteenth-century enlightenment and cameralism. Even during the period of Arakcheev and the Holy Alliance that followed 1815, Alexander never seemed to have tired of having his advisers prepare projects for the emancipation of the serfs and for the reorganization of government and provincial administration. Two well-known projects prepared during his reign are M. M. Speranskii's Plan of Government of 1809 and N. N. Novosil'tsev's Constitutional Charter of the Russian Empire of 1820. A third draft of Novosil'tsev's Charter was prepared as late as 1824. Simultaneously, Alexander experimented with plans for the reform of local government through the combining of a number of provinces under governors-general. Thus, in 1819 Pskov *guberniia* was united with Estland, Livland, and Kurland under Governor-General Marquis F. O. Paulucci; between 1823 and 1831 the Belorussian *gubernii* of Witebsk and Mohylew were combined with two Great Russian provinces, Smo-

[3] Blinov, *Gubernatory*, pp. 156-61; S. P. Pokrovskii, *Ministerskaia vlast' v Rossii: Istoriko-iuridicheskoe issledovanie* (Iaroslav: Tipografiia Gubernskogo Pravleniia, 1906), pp. 107-17; A. V. Predtechenskii, *Ocherki obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Rossii v pervoi chetverti XIX veka* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1957), pp. 138-42, 395-406; D. P. Troshchinskii, "Zapiski Dmitriia Prokof'evicha Troshchinskogo o ministrakh," SIRIO, 3 (1868): 42-43, 98-101; George Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia 1711-1905* (Urbana-London-Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 206-7, 331-32; David Christian, "The 'Senatorial Party' and the Theory of Collegial Government, 1801-1803," *Russian Review* 38 (1979): 298-322.

[4] Troshchinskii, "Zapiska," pp. 100-109, 150-58.

lensk and Kaluga, under Governor-General N. N. Khovanskii, and between 1819 and 1827 Riazan', Tula, Tambov, and Orel became the constituent parts of a single *general-gubernatorstvo* under the administration of A. D. Balashev, the former minister of police.[5]

Alexander I's more ambitious plans for the social and political reform of Russia produced few concrete results, but the policies that he and his father pursued in the western borderlands fared better. Prior to 1796, common political institutions, serfdom, and the poll tax provided a common political, social, and fiscal framework within which the Baltic provinces and the annexed Polish areas could have been brought closer to the rest of the empire. In 1825 these provinces not only enjoyed a special status based on ancient rights and privileges, but two new autonomous provinces, Finland and Congress Poland, had been added to the empire. These two new provinces differed even more markedly from the Russian provinces in legal, political, and social structure than did Belorussia, Lithuania, the Right-Bank Ukraine, and the Baltic provinces.

[5] Predtechenskii, *Ocherki*, pp 63-178, 235-67, 367-406, Allen McConnell, *Tsar Alexander I Paternalistic Reformer* (New York Thomas Y Crowell Co , 1970), pp 3-10, 24, 39-41, 145-55, George V Vernadsky, *La charte constitutionnelle de l'Empire russe de l'an 1820* (Paris Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1933), Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation*, p 389

## CHAPTER 4

# THE POLISH PROVINCES

AT THE BEGINNING of the nineteenth century Russians were still inclined to view the "territories annexed from Poland" (*oblasti ot Pol'shi prisoediennye*), as they were officially designated, as Polish provinces. In the second part of the eighteenth century the historian N. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii and such Orthodox religious figures as Konisskii, Sadkovskii, and Mel'khisidek had pointed to the trials and tribulations of Belorussian and Ukrainian Uniates and Orthodox believers in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; and Catherine II had rhetorically hailed the reunion of these allegedly oppressed Christians with their Russian kinsmen. Early in the nineteenth century the historian Karamzin and certain Russian officials serving in the western borderlands warned about the dangers Polish national ambitions posed for the Russian state. On the whole, however, upper-class Russians did not pay much attention to such warnings. The Polish provinces then had much the same importance for Russia that Estland and Livland had had for Peter I almost a century earlier. Members of the Polish *szlachta* did not possess the military skills of the Estland and Livland nobles, but they had been trained in the arts of political and social reform in the last years of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and under the constitutional regime of the Duchy of Warsaw. Such Poles as Adam Czartoryski, Sewerin Potocki, Stanisław Staszic, and Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki served Russia well under Alexander I. Poles were also important for Russia in the context of European diplomacy. Between 1804 and 1815, Russia was at war with one country or another—Persia, France, Turkey, or Sweden. These wars enabled Russia to annex or retain such strategically important areas as Georgia, part of Azerbaidzhan and Armenia, Bessarabia, Finland, and, finally, additional Polish territory, but Russian control over these areas was not secure as long as she could not count on the cooperation of the local native elites in the annexed areas. Polish elites were encouraged to cooperate by the presence in the Russian government of Prince Adam Czartoryski, deputy foreign minister between 1802 and 1806, a Russian senator, and the curator of the Wilno School Region.

The personal friendship of Alexander I and Czartoryski encouraged many Poles to dream of the resurrection of Poland under the auspices of Russia. During the first years of Alexander's reign, Czartoryski not only occupied many important official positions but was also a member of the "unofficial committee," a group of four "young friends" who provided Alexander I much of the inspiration for his initial social and administrative reforms. Alexander seemed particularly inclined to make a restored Poland the cornerstone of his European policy when he visited the Czartoryski family estate at Pulawy in Austrian Poland in 1805. Alexander refused, however, to pursue the anti-Prussian policy recommended by Czartoryski, and in 1806 the latter resigned as acting foreign minister shortly before Russia entered into a military alliance with Prussia. Polish enthusiasm for Russia then understandably cooled, and for a number of years the majority of Polish leaders identified the cause of Poland with the fortunes of Napoleon Bonaparte, who, in 1807 and 1809, rewarded the Poles for loyalty to France by carving the Duchy of Warsaw out of territories populated by Poles that had formerly belonged to Prussia and Austria. Nevertheless, some Poles, especially magnates with large estates in Russian Poland, had their doubts about Napoleon's ultimate victory in Europe.

Czartoryski, for example, still served as a Russian senator and as curator of the Wilno School Region, and he continued to correspond with Alexander about the restoration of Poland. M. K. Ogiński, another wealthy Polish magnate, proposed to Alexander in 1811 the creation of an autonomous Grand Duchy of Lithuania in personal union with Russia and with its own army, laws, and institutions.[1] None of the plans presented to Alexander on the eve of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 were accepted, but the mere fact that Poles were willing to make such proposals suggested the compatibility of Russian and Polish interests and the possibility of Russia's using the Poles to extend the empire's borders to the west. But some concessions had to be made to the socially and economically dominant Polish element

[1] The best discussion of the influence European diplomacy had on Alexander I's Polish policy is provided by William L Blackwell, "Alexander I and Poland The Foundations of His Polish Policy and Its Repercussions on Russia, 1801-1825" (Princeton University Ph D dissertation, 1959), pp 27-45, 62-117 See also A J Czartoryski, *Mémoires du Prince Adam Czartoryski et correspondance avec l'Empereur Alexandre Ier*, 2 vols (Paris Librairie Plon, 1887), 1 350-51, 371-73, 2 272-78, Michał Kleofas Ogiński, *Mémoires de Michel Ogiński sur la Pologne et les Polonais depuis 1788 jusqu'a la fin de 1815*, 4 vols (Paris Ponthieu, 1826-1827), 2 323-25, 375-89, 3 47-70, 94-97, 110-21, 219-43, Patricia K Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1821-1825* (Berkeley-Los Angeles University of California Press, 1969), pp 104-50

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in the western borderlands if it was to be convinced that its interests were really compatible with those of Russia.

Alexander I, however, had to be more cautious in granting concessions to privileged elites of partitioned Poland than Peter I had been in dealing with Estland and Livland almost a century earlier. In 1710 the several thousand German nobles and town patricians who dominated Estland and Livland, two small provinces of 60,000 square kilometers in an area with little more than two hundred thousand inhabitants, were scarcely in a position to threaten the vital interests of Russia, even if they had wanted to do so. The numerous Polish *szlachta* scattered throughout Russia's "Polish" provinces at the beginning of the nineteenth century were another matter. They represented not only the socially mobile and dominant elements in an area of almost 500,000 square kilometers and populated by some eight million Belorussians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Jews, but they were also closely linked with millions of other Poles in the contiguous, ethnically Polish

provinces of Austria and Prussia and, between 1807 and 1815, of the Duchy of Warsaw.[2]

The large Belorussian and Lithuanian provinces that Paul I had created disappeared in 1802. With certain modifications, the area annexed from Poland was again broken down into the smaller *gubernii* of the time of Catherine II: Podolia, Volhynia, Minsk, Grodno, Wilno, Kiev, Witebsk, and Mohylew, with a separate district of Białystock formed out of the Polish territory Napoleon took from Prussia in 1807. Paul I's restoration of special rights and privileges in 1796 applied particularly to Podolia, Volhynia, Minsk, Grodno, and Wilno *gubernii* and the Białystock *oblast'*. Kiev, Mohylew, and Witebsk, on the other hand, were generally treated (with the major exception of educational affairs) as "Russian" *gubernii*, despite the Polish *szlachta*'s leading position in local affairs. Furthermore, throughout the lands annexed from Poland, governors-general, civil and military governors, boards of public welfare, *guberniia* financial and treasury offices still represented the authority of St. Petersburg on the basis of Catherine II's Provincial Reform of 1775.[3]

Paul I's restoration of rights and privileges in the Polish borderlands applied especially to the activities of district dietines (*sejmiki*). In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the meetings of these dietines, which played an important role in local administration and the selection of judges and other officials, were often characterized by considerable chaos and disorder. The Second and Third Partitions of Poland had prevented much-needed reform of the political structure of Poland, especially as embodied in the Constitution of May 3, 1791, from being carried out. The disappearance of Polish state authority, its brief replacement by Catherine II's Russian provincial institutions, and then Paul I's partial restoration of Polish institutions further delayed the reform of local government in Russia's "Polish" provinces.

Russian officials disliked the frequent disorders within the dietines, the lifetime tenure of elected officials, and the Polish practice of permitting all members of the numerous *szlachta* to participate in the discussion of local affairs. In this respect, they did not greatly differ from many reform-minded Poles, who had tried to eliminate these same abuses and practices during the latter part of the eighteenth

[2] On some of the problems and uncertainties involved in estimating the size and composition of the population in the areas annexed by Russia from Poland, see footnotes 1, 4, and 7 to Chapter 3 of this study

[3] Bohdan Winiarski, *Les institutions politiques en Pologne au XIXe siècle* (Paris Picart, 1924), pp. 35-36, 135-37, Klochkov, *Ocherki pravitel'stvennoi deiatel'nosti vremen Pavla I*, pp 115-16, 426-27

century. In 1802 the dietines of the "Polish" provinces were instructed to elect their judges and marshals of the nobility for three years and in all cases to present two candidates for confirmation in accordance with the Provincial Reform of 1775. In 1804 the government limited participation in the dietines to nobles who owned estates, earned at least 150 rubles annually, or held an appropriate civil or military rank. These measures did not put an end to the disorders in the dietines, in 1809 the government announced that nobles responsible for such disorders would lose their right to participate in local self-government and that governors would be removed from office if they failed to act resolutely in dealing with serious cases of disorder in the dietines.[4]

The government also tried to regulate its relations with the Roman Catholic and Uniate churches. St. Petersburg officialdom, learning how difficult it was to provide converts to Orthodoxy with church books and priests, and witnessing the social unrest and disorders accompanying mass conversion to Orthodoxy, now discouraged the activities of proselytizing Orthodox clergy in Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Right-Bank Ukraine, leaving well over a million unconverted Uniates under the spiritual authority of Rome.[5] Until 1797 Catholic and Uniate affairs were administered by the Justice College for Livland, Estland, and Finland Affairs. In that year a separate department for Roman Catholic affairs was created within the Justice College, from which it was separated in 1798 and placed under the Catholic metropolitan of Mohylew, Stanisław Bohusz Siestrzencewicz. In 1801 this department became the Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical College. In 1805 a Uniate department was established within the College, headed by Herakly Lissowski, the Uniate archbishop of Połock.[6] The establishment of a separate agency for Uniate affairs meant, despite its continued subordination to the Roman Catholic hierarchy, a form of official recognition of the special position of the Uniates within the empire. It was perhaps more than coincidental that the man who

[4] Nol'de, *Ocherki*, pp 429-33, Wmiarski, *Les institutions politiques en Pologne*, pp 135-37, 139-43, Russia, Pravitel'stvuiushchii Senat, *Istoriia Pravitel'stvuiushchego senata za dvesti let 1711-1911 gg*, 5 vols (St Petersburg Senatskaia Tipografiia, 1911), 4 362-63, Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Historya ustroju Polski w zarysie*, 3. 195-96, A. Romanovich-Slavatinskii, *Dvorianstvo v Rossii ot nachala XVIII veka do otmeny krepostnogo prava* (St Petersburg Tipografiia Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1879), pp 483-87

[5] Koialovich, *Istoriia vossoedinenia zapadnorusskikh Uniatov*, pp 366-70, 380-84, 392-400, Wasyl Lenchyk, *The Eastern Catholic Church and Czar Nicholas I* (Rome-New York Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 1966), p 20

[6] Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation*, pp 182-84, Ammann, *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte*, pp 458, 468-74

subsequently did more than anyone else to reunite the remaining Uniates of the "Polish" provinces with Orthodoxy, Iosif Semasako, was an assessor in the Uniate Department of the Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical College in St. Petersburg.

The government's measures to regulate Roman Catholic, Uniate, and *szlachta* affairs, however, obviously fell far short of totally integrating the "Polish" provinces into the political and social structure of the empire. Russia continued to rely on Poles to run local government, the courts, and schools in this area Only military, police, and the highest civil officials were Russians, while lower administrative positions and even a number of the civil governors were Poles. Although the Third Department of the Russian Senate became the highest court of appeals for Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia, local courts remained Polish in language and form and, with the exception of certain areas of criminal law, tried cases in accordance with Polish law and precedents.[7] But it was above all with regard to education that the Russian authorities allowed the local Poles freedom of action

Alexander I's educational reform of 1802 was influenced by the advice of two Poles, Czartoryski and Count Seweryn Potocki, and was based to a considerable extent on the experience of the Polish Commission of National Education Administration of the system of national education established in 1802 was decentralized among six school regions with headquarters in Dorpat, Kazan, Kharkov, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Wilno. However, a modicum of central direction for this educational system was provided by a curator for each educational region who resided in St Petersburg Two of these curators were Poles: Czartoryski (Wilno) and Potocki (Kharkov) [8]

Nationalistic Russian historians of education writing around 1900

[7] *Istoriia Pravitel'stvuiushchego senata*, 3 282-87, Wimarski, *Les institutions politiques*, pp 137, 139-41, Szymon Askenazy, *Rosya-Polska 1815-1830* (Lwów H Altenberg, 1907), pp 118-19

[8] *Ocherki istorii shkoly i pedagogicheskoi mysli narodov SSSR*, pp 197-206, S V Rozhdestvenskii (ed ), *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshchenia 1802-1902* (St Petersburg Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1902), pp 80-89, 151-54, Daniel Beauvois, "Les écoles polonaises de l'Empire russe Aspects du centralisme administratif de l'Université de Vilna (1803-1831)," in VIIe Congrès International des Slavistes, *Communications de la délégation française* (Paris Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1973), pp 35-38, Beauvois, *Lumieres et société en Europe de l'Est L'Université de Vilna et les écoles polonaises de l'Empire russe (1804-1832)*, 2 vols (Lille Atelier Reproduction des Thèses Université de Lille III, 1977), 1 21-43, Stefan Truchim, *Współpraca polski-rosyjska nad organizacją szkolnictwa rosyjskiego u początkach XIX wieku* (Łódź Ossolineum, 1969), pp 38-39, 44-49, 51-52, 62-67, 81, 89-90, 123-24, 138-39

often criticized Alexander I for allowing Poles to play a major role in the organization of education in Russia.[9] These critics usually failed to note, however, that eighteenth-century Russia had failed to produce forms of public financing and local support for education and to develop educational institutions capable of preparing nobles and others psychologically and professionally for service in a modernized Russian army, society, and bureaucracy. Catherine II had made some efforts to organize a national system of education during the 1780s and 1790s, but these modest efforts did not contribute significantly to supplying the increased number of trained personnel and educated nobles needed to translate into reality the provisions of the Provincial Reform of 1775 and the Charter to the Nobility of 1785. The empire's western borderlands, on the other hand, had a developed network of educational institutions and their nobles displayed a degree of public support for education that put them at least a generation ahead of the rest of the empire. This was especially the case for the active element among the nobility of the Wilno School Region, who had been involved in work of the Polish Commission of National Education since the 1770s. In 1809 there were more students in gymnasia and *uezd* secondary schools of the Wilno School Region than in all the gymnasia and *uezd* schools of the empire's four Russian school regions.[10] The introduction of Russian schools and language into this borderland would only have discouraged the participation of local privileged society in the promotion of education as well as its cooperation with the government in maintaining social order and in endeavoring to raise the cultural level of local society. Even Catherine II did not undertake the systematic Russification of the schools of the western borderlands; after all, the eighteenth-century *Polizeistaat* was based on a partnership between the state and the nobility, which in this area was Polish.

The Wilno School Region was completely Polish in terms of its pupils, its textbooks, its language of instruction, its rector and council of professors who administered its affairs in Wilno, and its curator, Czartoryski, who represented its interests in St. Petersburg. Educational policy decisions were generally made in Wilno, for Czartoryski was too busy as assistant or acting foreign minister between 1802 and 1806 and as a member of the Russian Senate after 1805 to devote a

[9] See, for example, the introductory discussions and the editorial comments by O. Kryzhanovskii in the four volumes of documents he edited concerning education in the former Polish provinces at the beginning of the nineteenth century, *Sbornik materialov dlia istorii prosveshcheniia v Russii izvlechennykh iz arkhiva Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (St. Petersburg: "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1893-1902), 4 vols.

[10] Beauvois, *Lumières et société*, 2: 690-91.

substantial amount of his time to the affairs of the Wilno School Region. But he wholeheartedly supported the use of schools as a means of disseminating Polish civilization and of raising the cultural level of the dominant Polish minority in Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine. In so doing, Czartoryski and other Poles involved in the educational work of the Wilno School Region were not necessarily engaged in some kind of Polish national conspiracy against Russia. Indeed, their correspondence at the time indicates that they were primarily concerned about education and that they believed that the advancement of Polish civilization in this area was not incompatible with the interests of the Russian Empire.[11]

Some Russian officials, however, opposed the strengthening of Polish influence in this area from the very beginning. As early as 1801, the civil governor of Volhynia and the military governor of Podolia expressed their concern about the republican and anti-monarchial ideas to be found in the textbooks used in the Polish schools of their respective provinces. Podolian Military Governor Andreas von Rosenberg, a Baltic German, then proposed the local adoption of textbooks approved for the empire's Russian schools.[12] This proposal led to the first thorough study by an agency of the central government, namely, the Commission for the Establishment of Schools, of problems connected with Polish schools in the Right-Bank Ukraine The Commission confirmed the critical judgment of the Volhynian and Podolian governors concerning the textbooks used in Polish schools, especially finding fault with ancient-history books that associated autocracy with the suppression of freedom and the republican form of government in ancient Greece with eloquence, wisdom, and nobility of the soul. Although the members of the commission were aware of the Germanization of education in the Austrian and Prussian parts of partitioned Poland, they did not recommend the Russification of the schools of Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Right-Bank Ukraine. Their report emphasized, however, that the annexed Polish territory had to be brought into a "close union with Russia" by introducing translated Russian textbooks into Polish schools and teaching in them a certain number of courses in Russian.[13]

[11] One illustration of this point is the correspondence of Hugo Kołłątaj with Tadeusz Czacki *X Hugona Kołłątaja korrespondencya listowna z Tadeuszem Czackim* (Cracow W Drukarni Uniwersyteckiej, 1844-1845), 4 vols

[12] Letter of I A Kuris to P S Svistunov, March 12, 1801, and Journal of the Commission for the Establishment of Schools, May 31, 1801, *Sbornik materialov dlia istoru prosveshchenua v Rossii*, vol 1, nos 43 and 51, cols 192-93, 371-75, DBL, p 650

[13] Journal of the Commission for the Establishment of Schools, *Sbornik materialov*, vol 1, no 53, cols 378-79, 383-86, 391-96

The Commission's report was never acted upon. Czartoryski then enjoyed the respect and confidence of Alexander I and of P. V. Zavadovskii, the first minister of education (1802-1810) and a Polonophile who had attended Polish Jesuit schools in his youth.[14] Even more important, the creation of the Ministry of Education in 1802 and the subordination of all schools in Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine, including even the "Russian" *gubernii* of Witebsk, Mohylew, and Kiev, to Polish educational administrators at the University of Wilno soon gave an entirely different direction to the administration of education in this area. Russian governors-general, governors, and officials attached to boards of public welfare and other local organs of the *guberniia* administration were no longer responsible for the direct supervision of education in the Wilno School Region and, therefore, now found it more difficult to curtail the activities of more zealous Polish school officials. The most successful of such Polish officials was Tadeusz Czacki, the school inspector for Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. Czacki even managed to gain Minister of Education Zavadovskii's support in preventing a Russian university from being established at Kiev in 1804-1805; in 1809, he founded the famous lyceum at Krzemieniec (Kremenets), the "Volhynian Athens" which educated, on the soil of the Right-Bank Ukraine, an entire *szlachta* generation in the spirit of Polish national tradition and civilization.[15] Only when he tried to have a Polish, not a Russian, gymnasium established in Kiev did Czacki run into concerted opposition by local Russian officials, who were appalled at the thought of a Polish secondary school in a city of such great importance in the history of Orthodox Russia. When the new gymnasium opened its doors in 1812, it was a Russian institution. And in 1818, all schools in the city of Kiev were separated from Wilno and transferred to the Kharkov School Region, in which the language of instruction was Russian.[16]

This insistence on Russian-language instruction in Kiev did not, however, result from any overall reassessment of Russian policy toward the Poles. On the contrary, it was especially at the Congress of Vienna and in the years immediately preceding and following it that Alexander openly identified himself with Czartoryski's ideas on the

[14] Beauvois, *Lumières et société*, 1 26, 32-43

[15] Kryzhanovskii, "Vvedenie," *Sbornik materialov*, 3 xlviii-xlix, lxxiii-lxxiv, lxxix-lxxxi, cxiii, cxxi-cxxii, *X Hugona Kołłątaja korrespondencya listowna z T Czackim*, 2 355-58, 3 121-24, 4 246, Beauvois, "Les écoles polonaises de l'Empire russe," pp 41-42, 47, "Liceum Krzemienieckie," *Mały słownik historu polski*, p 168

[16] Kryzhanovskii, "Vvedenie," *Sbornik materialov*, 3 xlix-li, letter of P P Pankrat'ev to P V Zavadovskii, April 5, 1805, ibid , no 269, pp 38-88, Beauvois, "Les écoles polonaises de l'Empire russe," pp 47-48

regeneration of Poland as an autonomous, constitutional kingdom united with Russia by common interests and the same ruler, even going so far as to suggest to the Poles that at least part of Lithuania might be added to the Polish kingdom at some future date. He acted so generously in part for tactical reasons, since the identification of Russia as Poland's benefactor served as an argument for extending Russia's frontiers to the west and incorporating Polish territories acquired earlier by Prussia and Austria. This expansionist policy was opposed by many of his own advisers and the majority of the powers at the Congress of Vienna, but, although not entirely successful, it did bring into the empire another three million inhabitants and 127,000 square kilometers of Polish territory.[17]

A Polish kingdom within Russia also offered Alexander an opportunity to experiment with "constitutional" projects. His interest in such projects reached a high point during the period 1815-1820, and it is certainly more than coincidental that the author of the Constitutional Charter for the Russian Empire of 1820 was Alexander's commissioner in Warsaw, N. N. Novosil'tsev. For Alexander, the word "constitution" in no way implied the willingness on his part to surrender any of his autocratic powers, it connoted, instead, a means of enabling himself to act more effectively in promoting what he considered the welfare of his subjects on the basis of a rationalized administrative structure and a detailed description of the functions and activities of the principal branches of the government.[18] Alexander remained a Russian autocrat, and his not infrequent use of the word "constitution" signified no break with the *Polizeistaat* mentality of his predecessors.

The one "constitutional" document Alexander I actually approved, promulgated, and even tried to put into effect was the Polish Constitutional Charter of 1815. Given that the Poles of the Congress Kingdom had already received a constitution from Napoleon in 1807 and that Alexander wished to win their favor, they could hardly be denied a constitution in 1815. Under Napoleon, the serfs had been

[17] Askenazy, *Rosya-Polska 1815-1830*, pp 63-65, 78, Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I*, pp 221-24, *The Cambridge History of Poland*, ed W F Reddaway et al , 2 vols (1941-1950, reprint ed , New York Octagon Books, 1971), 2 257-75

[18] One of the first writers to make this point was E N Berendts, "Proekty reformy Senata v tsarstvovanıa Aleksandra I ı Nikolaia I," in *Istorıa Pravitel'stvuushchego senata za dvesti let 1711-1911 gg* , 3 12, 127-36 For more recent comments on the "constitutionalism" of Alexander I, see Marc Raeff, *Michael Speransky Statesman of Imperial Russia 1772-1839* (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1957), pp 29-46

emancipated; the principle of the equality of all citizens before the law was established through the introduction of the French Code Napoleon; and an elected Sejm (60 percent by the *szlachta*'s dietines and 40 percent by communal assemblies) and an appointed Senate were organized to assist the king, a Council of Ministers, and a State Council in running the affairs of the Duchy of Warsaw. This small Polish state had been a vassal of France, and its government could do very little without the approval of the French resident in Warsaw and the commander of the French occupation troops, and serf emancipation and equality before the law meant very little as long as the Duchy's peasant majority did not own the land they cultivated and remained economically dependent upon the landowning *szlachta*. But the Napoleonic legislation, which resumed the work of social and political reform interrupted by the partitions, won favor among many Poles. If nothing else, Poland had gained a constitution that regulated her government and the lives of her citizens according to principles of law and administration widely accepted by reformers on the Continent.[19]

The Polish Constitutional Charter of 1815 was drafted by a mixed group of prominent Polish and Russian officials, including Czartoryski and Novosil'tsev. It confirmed the principle of equality before the law and the personal liberty of the peasants, it guaranteed such basic rights as the freedom of religion and of the press, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and the sanctity of private property, but it also placed the executive and legislative powers in the hands of the Russian autocrat in his alternate role as the king of Poland. To be sure, legislative power was shared with the Sejm, which consisted of an appointed Senate and a Lower Chamber whose members were elected by the landowning *szlachta* and the more prosperous or successful members of the middle class and professions. The Russian king had the right to convoke, dissolve, and adjourn the Sejm and to confirm or reject its enactments.[20] All orders and decrees of the king or viceroy were,

[19] Kutrzeba, *Historya ustroju Polski w zarysie*, 3 37-74, Winiarski, *Les institutions politiques en Pologne*, pp 55-70, *History of Poland*, ed A Gieysztor, S Kieniewicz et al , pp 410-18, S A Blejwas, "The Origins and Practice of 'Organic Work' in Poland," *Polish Review* 15 (1970) 28-29, Barbara Szacka, *Stanisław Staszic* (Warsaw PWN, 1966), pp 167-71, Stefan Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp 44-57

[20] The French and Polish versions of the original Charter can be found in *Dziennik praw*, 71 vols (Warsaw W Drukarni Rządowej, 1815-1871), 1 (1815) 1-123 These texts, together with a Russian translation, were republished in *Konstitutsionnaia khartiia 1815 goda i nekotorye drugie akty byvshego Tsarstva Pol'skogo (1814-1881)*, Bibliioteka Okraln Rossii, no 5 (St Petersburg A S Suvorin, 1907)

however, supposed to be countersigned by an appropriate minister to verify that they were not contrary to the constitution and the laws of Poland.[21] Article 76 of the Charter provided for the post of a Polish minister state secretary who resided in St. Petersburg, where he served as a representative of Polish interests and as an intermediary between the emperor and the Russian authorities in Congress Poland.

For the Russian Empire, and even for much of continental Europe of that time, the Polish Constitutional Charter was a remarkable document. Initially, a large part of educated Polish society seems to have considered it to be an acceptable foundation upon which to build an autonomous Poland within the Russian Empire. Alexander I indicated his high opinion of the Polish Constitutional Charter in a famous speech before the Warsaw Sejm in 1818, when he expressed the hope that the "salutary influence" of the principles of the Polish "liberal institutions" could be extended, "with the help of God," to "all the countries entrusted to my care by Providence."[22] At the end of the speech, Alexander expressed his satisfaction with the Poles and the desire to carry out his plans for extending the programs designed to benefit them.[23] Poles then generally interpreted these words to mean that he intended to do what he had more than once hinted at since 1815: unify Lithuania with Congress Poland.

Even at the very beginning of Russian rule in Poland, many Poles had doubts about the true intentions of Alexander. An early disappointment was Alexander's decision not to name Czartoryski as the first viceroy (that is, the official who presided over the government whenever the Polish king was absent from Congress Poland). Instead, he appointed General Józef Zajączek, an elderly veteran of the Napoleonic wars who was willing to carry out Russian orders. Alexander made his own brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, commander-in-chief of the Polish army and sent Novosil'tsev to Poland as a special and all-powerful Russian commissioner (a post not provided for in the Constitutional Charter) with the right to sit on the State Council and with access to all organs of the government. Konstantin soon claimed extra-constitutional power with regard to military affairs, and he almost immediately clashed with Minister of War M. Wielhorski, who refused to take and countersign orders given by Konstantin without following the prescribed constitutional procedures. Em-

[21] Articles 47 and 68 of the Charter, *Konstitutsionnaia khartiia 1815 goda*, pp 69, 72

[22] N K Shil'der, *Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi Ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie*, 4 vols (2nd ed , St Petersburg A S Suvorin, 1905), 4 86

[23] Ibid , p 88

peror Alexander's support of his brother and acceptance of Wielhorski's resignation in early 1816 greatly disturbed Czartoryski and many other Poles, who felt that the Constitutional Charter was no longer inviolable and was even in jeopardy. Czartoryski, who was a member of the Administrative Council and the kingdom's Senate, soon ceased his participation in the government of the Congress Kingdom and turned his attention almost exclusively to his duties as curator of the Wilno School Region.[24]

Despite these efforts to keep the Polish constitutional experiment under close Russian supervision, many Russians felt that Alexander gave too much latitude to the Poles. His advisers usually disapproved of his Polish policy, and his brother Konstantin counseled him to return to Catherine II's policy of the full integration of the areas annexed from Poland into the general system of provincial administration established in 1775. Alexander resisted these pressures. In 1818, for example, in the text of the speech he intended to deliver before the Warsaw Sejm, he insisted on retaining his words of praise for Polish liberal institutions and the hint of more favors for the Poles, even though Count I. A. Capo d'Istrias had warned him that Russians would be offended and that Poles living in the provinces adjacent to Congress Poland would misinterpret his words.[25] Capo d'Istrias was quite correct in predicting a negative Russian response to Alexander's Warsaw speech: radicals and liberals were infuriated by the suggestion that Poland was more advanced than Russia, and Russians of all shadings of opinion opposed the joining of any part of the western provinces with the Congress Kingdom. In 1819 the historian N. M. Karamzin reminded Alexander that the western provinces had belonged to Russia in the past and had again become a legal Russian possession at the time of Catherine II, and cautioned him that the restoration of Poland would mean the ruin of Russia, "for our sons will stain Polish soil with their blood and again take Praga by storm."[26]

[24] Angela T Pienkos, "Grand Duke Constantine A Study in Early Nineteenth-Century Russo-Polish Relations, 1815-1831" (University of Wisconsin, Madison, Ph D dissertation, 1971), pp 57-64, Tadeusz Łepkowski, *Warszawa w Powstaniu Listopadowym* (Warsaw Wiedza Powszechna, 1965), pp 22-26

[25] Shil'der, *Imperator Aleksandr I*, 4 84, Predtechenskii, *Ocherki*, p 375, Pienkos, "Grand Duke Constantine," pp 43-45

[26] N M Karamzin, "Mnenie russkogo grazhdanina," in *Neizdannye sochineniia i perepiska Nikolaia Mikhailovicha Karamzina* (St Petersburg N Tiblen, 1862), pp 5-7, N. P Meshcherskii, "Iz bumag N M Karamzina, khraniashchikhsia v gosudarstvennom arkhive," *Starina i novizna* 2 (1898) 5-8, 17-19, R Vydrin, "Natsional'nyi vopros v russkom obshchestvennom dvizhenii," *Golos minuvshego* 1 (January 1915) 105-12, Shil'der, *Imperator Aleksandr I*, 4 92-96, Blackwell, "Alexander I and Poland," pp 143-77

Essentially, Alexander's policy in Poland was a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, he ignored the advice of his Russian critics and kept open the option of a conciliatory policy in Poland; on the other, he, as a Russian autocrat, overlooked Polish sensitivities in approving repressive or precautionary measures in response to signs of political opposition in the Sejm, and to reports concerning secret societies and nationalistic revolutionary sentiment among the Polish youth. Censorship was introduced in 1819, and arrests were made in the early twenties. In 1823 nationalistic ferment among Wilno students led to an investigation conducted by Novosil'tsev, who soon replaced Czartoryski as the curator of the Wilno School Region.[27] Also in 1823 the Belorussian *gubernii* of Witebsk and Mohylew were combined with the Great Russian *gubernii* of Smolensk and Kaluga in a new *general-gubernatorstvo* under N. N. Khovanskii. And in 1824 the schools of Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* were separated from Wilno and transferred to the jurisdiction of the St. Petersburg School Region because of complaints made by Governor-General Khovanskii about the poor Russian instruction and the anti-Russian spirit prevalent in the Catholic-dominated Polish schools of the Belorussian provinces.[28]

When the Second Sejm of the Congress Kingdom met in 1820, Alexander warned the Poles that their constitutional regime could only be justified and preserved through their own moderation and prudence. The meeting of the Third Sejm was delayed until measures could be taken to assure the absence of political opposition to government policy. When this Sejm finally met in 1825, the restrained behavior of the Poles very much pleased Alexander. In the period between the Second and Third Sejms, he had on occasion considered the possibility of abolishing the Charter of 1815. He did so, however, in the general context of preparing a constitutional charter for the empire as a whole; immediate action along these lines was unlikely as long as the succession crisis and the question of compensation for his brother Konstantin remained unsettled. In 1823 Konstantin secretly gave his pledge to abdicate. Alexander declined to satisfy fully his brother's demands for compensation; but he publicly kept open to the very end of his reign (for example, in his last appearance before the Sejm in 1825) the possibility of the unification of Congress Poland with Lithuania under the authority of Konstantin. He apparently did so in the hope of weakening political opposition and winning friends among the Poles, who had become increasingly disenchanted with

[27] Rozhdestvenskii, *Obzor deiatel'nosti Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia*, pp. 152-54.

[28] I. P. Kornilov, "Vvedenie," *Sbornik materialov dlia istorii prosveshcheniia v Rossii*, 2: xci-xcii; Beauvois, "Les écoles polonaises de l'Empire russe," p. 29.

Russia as a result of the repressive police, censorship, and educational policies pursued by Konstantin and Novosil'tsev in both Congress Poland and Lithuania throughout the period 1820-1825.[29]

Polish-Russian relations continued to worsen during the first five years of Nicholas I's reign. Unlike his brother Alexander, Nicholas was no Polonophile: he instinctively distrusted Poles and was particularly adamant about putting an end to what he considered irresponsible talk about the reunion of Congress Poland with Lithuania. He described Lithuania as a "Russian province" that could not be returned to Poland because this would "infringe upon the territorial integrity of the empire."[30] Nicholas also did not like the Polish colors and composition of the Lithuanian Army Corps, which Konstantin had commanded since 1817 in addition to his military responsibilities in the Congress Kingdom. In order to discourage Poles from seeing in Konstantin's dual command a symbol of unity of Lithuania and Congress Poland, Nicholas assigned Polish officers to service in the interior of the empire and Russian soldiers and officers to the Lithuanian Corps. Nicholas also replaced with Russians a number of the Polish civil governors and other high officials in the western *gubernii* In 1828 he approved plans for reuniting the remaining Uniates in these *gubernii* with the Russian Orthodox Church. With regard to Congress Poland, Nicholas was particularly concerned about the activities of a small group of Polish revolutionaries who had close relations with the Russian Decembrists. The Poles, in their turn, strongly disapproved of Nicholas's decision to create by decree a mixed Polish-Russian Commission of Investigation, which the Poles considered to be unconstitutional. They won, however, a small victory when Nicholas agreed, in 1827, to have eight accused revolutionaries tried in Poland, not in Russia, by a special Sejm tribunal. In 1828 three defendants were found innocent, while the others were sentenced to three years or less of imprisonment, not for high treason but for having belonged to a secret society. The Poles were once again outraged when Nicholas ordered a second trial for the leader of the group, Seweryn Krzyżanowski, who happened to have been born in the Ukraine. In the second trial Krzyżanowski was sentenced to hard labor in Siberia, where he went mad and died in 1839.[31]

[29] Frank W Thackeray, *Antecedents of Revolution Alexander I and the Polish Kingdom, 1815-1825* (Boulder East European Monographs, 1980), pp 79-131, 178 n 44, Askenazy, *Rosya-Polska 1815-1830*, pp 90-107

[30] Letter of Nicholas I to Konstantin Pavlovich, November 5 and 24, 1827, "Imperator Nikolai I i Pol'sha v 1825-1831 gg ," ed N K Shil'der, *Russkaia starina* 101 (1900) 299, 302

[31] Askenazy, *Rosya-Polska 1815-1830*, pp 107-14, 122-24, Pienkos, "Grand Duke

In 1830 Poles in the Congress Kingdom and the western *gubernii* still retained either a good measure of autonomy or at least important rights and privileges. Hundreds of thousands of Poles made up the dominant social, economic, and political element in the western *gubernii*, and Polish was the language of the schools, courts, and local administration. On the whole, Russian society and officialdom still tended to consider this area Polish. In 1824 even a Polonophobe like Novosil'tsev opposed transferring the schools of Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* to the St. Petersburg School Region, arguing that the youth of the Belorussian provinces were much closer to that of Wilno than to the youth of Russia by virtue of its origins, social usages, and language.[32] Obviously, for Novosil'tsev the Wilno School Region, his bureaucratic empire, was more important than the nationality of Belorussian peasants. In addition, he clearly shared many of the social attitudes and preconceptions of his upper-class, landowning peers in Russia and elsewhere.

In the Congress Kingdom, both the peasants and the *szlachta* were Polish. If the Russians occasionally violated the Constitutional Charter, they nevertheless respected the kingdom's special status within the empire. Beginning around 1820, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich gradually changed his attitude toward the Poles and became the most influential advocate among high-placed Russians of a conciliatory policy in Congress Poland. In 1829 Nicholas I followed his advice by coming to Warsaw to be crowned king of Poland and swearing to uphold the Polish Constitutional Charter.[33] But this gesture did not greatly impress Polish leaders, they were no longer the divided magnates and Russia's dependent clients of the eighteenth century. Intensive efforts at internal political reform, the partitions, the flourishing of Polish scholarship at the Universities of Warsaw and Wilno, the work of civic and national education throughout the Russian part of the lands of partitioned Poland, the beginnings of a modern textile industry in Łódź, the expansion of mining and metallurgy in Congress Poland encouraged by the policies of Mining Department Head Stanisław Staszic and Finance Minister Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki, and the emergence of Warsaw as the unquestioned urban center of the

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Constantine Pavlovich," pp 149-54, R F Leslie, *Polish Politics and the Revolution of 1830* (1956, reprint ed , Westport, Conn Greenwood Press, 1969), p 114

[32] Beauvois, "Les écoles polonaises de l'Empire russe," p 49, E Orlovskii, *Sud'by pravoslavia v sviazi s istorieu Latinstva i Unii v Grodnenskoi gubernii v XIX stoletii (1794-1900)* (Grodno Gubernskaia Tipografiia, 1903), pp 51-52

[33] Askenazy, *Rosya-Polska*, pp. 113-14, Pienkos, "Grand-Duke Constantine," pp 105-6, 131-32, 149-61

western borderlands (the third city in the empire with a population of more than 130,000)—all combined to produce a degree of unity and cohesiveness among educated Poles that they had tended to lack previously The process Tadeusz Łepkowski has described as the "birth of a modern nation"[34] was well under way

For early nineteenth-century Poles, however, the Polish nation encompassed not only Congress Poland and adjacent, formerly Polish territories in Austria and Prussia (that is, more or less the post-1945 Poland Łepkowski has in mind) but also Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Right-Bank Ukraine In the decades preceding the insurrection of 1830-1831, the numerous *szlachta* of these eastern provinces of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth still formed an integral part of the Polish nation Warsaw, if for no more than its intellectual and artistic life and the opportunities for employment it offered, was their capital as much as that of the Poles of the Congress Kingdom The University of Wilno, the Polish world's leading center of scholarship and learning between 1802 and 1830, coordinated a Polish system of education in an area three times the size of Congress Poland, it brought the educated elite among the *szlachta* and selected Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians intended for service in the Uniate or Roman Catholic clergy into contact with European Enlightenment and Romanticism Adam Mickiewicz, perhaps Poland's greatest romantic and patriotic poet, studied at Wilno, Joachim Lelewel, the founder of modern Polish romantic and patriotic historiography and a future leader of the Polish emigration, taught there Noteworthy figures not of Polish origin who studied at Wilno included Motiejus Valančius, a future Lithuanian national hero and bishop of Samogitia, and the Ukrainian or Belorussian Uniates Iosif Semashko, Vasilii Luzhinskii, and Antonii Zubko, who helped Nicholas I during the 1830s to reunite the Uniates with Orthodoxy

As early as the 1820s a number of influential Russians had become aware of growing Polish dissatisfaction with Russian rule The crux of the matter was that the educated segment of Polish society had greatly changed its outlook on the world and its expectations for the future, Russian autocracy had not This parting of ways was particularly serious in a borderland of some 600,000 square kilometers in which the *szlachta* dominated local society politically, economically, and cultur-

[34] T Łepkowski *Polska-narodziny nowoczesnego narodu 1764-1870* (Warsaw PWN, 1970) For a detailed, recent discussion of the social and economic development of the Congress Kingdom between 1815 and 1830, see L A Obushenkova *Korolevstvo Polskoe v 1815-1830 gg Ekonomicheskoe i sotsial'noe razvitie* (Moscow Nauka, 1979)

ally. A basic reassessment of Russian policy in this borderland was almost unavoidable, even without the Polish insurrection in 1830-1831.

This reassessment of Russian borderland policy applied especially to Lithuania, Belorussia, the Right-Bank Ukraine, and Congress Poland, but only partially to the Baltic provinces, and not at all to the Grand Duchy of Finland acquired by Russia in 1809. The case of Finland is important. It illustrates that throughout the first part of the nineteenth century Russia still preferred to rely on coopted, non-Russian elites to run local government and society in the western borderlands as long as these elites remained loyal to the tsar and managed to maintain a well-ordered traditional society, and as long as they could keep under control peasant unrest in the countryside and intellectual and revolutionary ferment among the academic youth and townsmen.

Finland, then, was an exemplary borderland for Russia. Here a handful of conservative Swedish-speaking aristocrats and officials firmly and effectively guided a well-ordered Finnish society and administration on the basis of Swedish laws, institutions, and parochial self-government. New ideas were not likely to take root immediately in Finland and upset her social equilibrium. She was a sparsely populated country (about one million inhabitants in 1811 in an area of 371,481 square kilometers) on the periphery of Europe, with no major urban centers; her two largest cities in 1810 were Åbo with 10,224 inhabitants, and Helsingfors with 4,065. In this quiet backwater of the empire and of Europe, so different from the "Polish" provinces, Finnish autonomy was born and matured almost unnoticed by nearby St. Petersburg officialdom which at the very same time had begun to experiment with measures to Russify the western *gubernii* and Congress Poland.

EVEN BEFORE the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831, Nicholas I dropped Alexander I's experiments with constitutionalism and decentralization of government in Russia. Instead, he concentrated on the gradual improvement of government and society and on bringing matters of vital interest under the immediate and direct supervision of his own most trusted agents, who usually worked in either sections of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancery or certain key ministries. Quite aware of the shortcomings of local government in Russia, Nicholas I sought to achieve some degree of influence and control over local affairs by establishing a network of gendarmes throughout the empire, by creating an agency (the Fifth Section of His Majesty's Own Chancery, which later became the Ministry of State Domains) to protect and promote the interests of the state peasants, and by placing the *guberniia* administration directly under the control of the governors and the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, such other branches of the central government as the Ministries of Education, Justice, and Finance also increased the number of their agents and inspectors in the provinces. The number of educated and competent officials working in the provinces, although still insufficient to meet the basic needs of local society, was expanded considerably during the first part of the nineteenth century.[1]

Nicholas I's bureaucratic centralism provided the Russian provinces with neither adequate police, cultural, and social services nor an ef-

[1] S Frederick Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia 1830-1870* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1972), pp 33-34, 47-48, Daniel T Orlovsky, *The Limits of Reform The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Imperial Russia* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1981), pp 17-51, N V Vavardinov, *Istoriia Ministerstva vnutrennikh del*, 3 pts , 8 knigi (St Petersburg V Tipografii Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1858-1862), pt 3, bk 2, pp 275-85, bk 3, pp 227-28, Hans-Joachim Torke, "Das russische Beamtentum in der ersten Halfte des 19 Jahrhunderts," *Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte* 12 (1967) 133-73, Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government*, pp 164-68, 205-7, 212-29, 322-27

ficient and effective local administration. Throughout Nicholas's reign Russia continued to be undergoverned as well as socially and economically backward. In the 1850s and early 1860s defeat in the Crimean War and widespread awareness of the many deficiencies of Russian society and government influenced educated Russians and their officials to proceed with the emancipation of the Russian serfs and to consider a number of other reforms. These included the decentralization of government and the devolution of certain social and economic functions to the local authorities and society. The pendulum swung back in the direction of bureaucratic centralism following the second Polish insurrection and the revolutionary agitation and social unrest in Russia of the early 1860s. However, before the advocates of stricter and more rigorous controls over society fully routed their opponents in government, zemstvos and institutions of peasant self-administration had been created in order to encourage the local nobility and peasants to involve themselves in activities that promoted social, cultural, and economic progress in the provinces.[2] In the 1860s Russian zemstvos and peasant institutions were not extended to the western borderlands, but here, too, the general empire-wide discussion of decentralization and reform of local government then helped to relax centralizing pressures. This gave local German, Polish, and Swedish leaders, who opposed the introduction of the Russian reforms of the sixties into their respective areas, an opportunity to propose their own projects for judicial, municipal, educational, and peasant reforms. The consideration, approval, and implementation of reforms designed specifically for the western borderlands revitalized their local forms of legal-administrative order and of socioeconomic organization, in this way setting these borderlands apart from the rest of the empire.

The reform projects in Congress Poland, the Baltic provinces, and Finland of the 1860s were based on their own local experience and activities in the spheres of education, codification of laws, and municipal, peasant, and economic affairs. Nicholas I's centralizing officials tried to influence, as well as reform, the internal life of the western borderlands, but usually with minimal results. As had been the case for their predecessors, they did not have the financial resources and sufficient agents with expertise and knowledge of local languages and traditions to assure them success in this endeavor. Furthermore, such governors-general as A. S. Menshikov in Finland, I. F. Paskev-

[2] S. Frederick Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia*, pp. 1-5, 44-58, 182-83, 289-91, 325-47, Orlovsky, *The Limits of Reform*, pp. 58-84.

ich in Congress Poland, and Karl Magnus von der Pahlen and A. A. Suvorov in the Baltic provinces frequently questioned the wisdom of policies formulated in the ministries and chanceries of St. Petersburg. Bureaucratic centralism meant very little in borderlands where the tsar's more or less permanent and all-powerful personal representatives—namely, his governors-general—were inclined to rely on their own judgment of what was needed locally rather than on the judgment of high officials in the capital. The tsar usually acted as an arbitrator of disputes among his governors-general and ministers rather than as the decisive coordinator of a general plan of bureaucratic centralization for the entire empire. As a result, the leaders of borderland society usually found one way or another to defend traditional practices and institutions and to discourage agents of the central government from interfering in local affairs.

In the long run, especially after the return to bureaucratic centralism in the mid-1860s, the ministries and the other organs of the central government prevailed over both the governors-general and the privileged elites in the western borderlands. The centralizing policies that applied to Congress Poland, the western *gubernii*, and the Baltic provinces in the 1860s and to Finland somewhat later were formulated to a considerable extent by agents of the central government who had come during the reign of Nicholas I and were experts in such matters as the codification of local laws and peasant, municipal, educational, and religious affairs. Many of these agents were young men who had received a thorough education either in Russian universities or at such elite schools as the School of Jurisprudence in St. Petersburg and the Tsarskoe Selo Lyceum. They included such figures as P. N. Batiushkov, who had served as vice curator of the Wilno School Region in the early fifties and who later became the Ministry of the Interior's leading authority on religious and nationality questions in the western *gubernii*; Iu. F. Samarin, who had researched the historical background of urban problems and conflicts in Riga for the Ministry of the Interior during the 1840s, worked under both Governors-General E. A. Golovin and D. G. Bibikov, and achieved reknown under Alexander II as a peasant reformer, Russifier in Poland, and the most effective of all Russian polemicists against the special rights and privileges of the Baltic Germans; I. S. Aksakov, who had acquired firsthand knowledge of the Russian provinces, including the Ukraine, on various assignments for the Ministry of the Interior and the Imperial Geographic Society during the 1840s and 1850s and who, in the newspapers he published during the 1860s and 1880s, aggressively defended Russian national interests in the western bor-

derlands; Count D. A. Tolstoi, who had studied the history of Roman Catholicism in Russia for the Main Administration for Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Foreign Confessions of the Ministry of the Interior during the late 1840s, published a famous anti-Catholic book on the same subject in 1864, shortly after the Polish uprising of 1863, and inaugurated a policy of Russifying all Polish schools as minister of education between 1866 and 1880; and P. A. Valuev, who served in the Baltic provinces in the forties and early fifties and pursued, as minister of the interior in the sixties, a firm but moderate policy in regard to the Baltic Germans.

Nicholas I's efforts to expand the activities of his bureaucracy in the provinces did not alter fundamentally the structure of society in the western borderlands or their relationship to the rest of the empire. Yet these efforts were important for the future, for the men who attempted to carry out a policy of Russification in the western borderlands during the second part of the nineteenth century had been trained in the school of Nicholas I. It was there that they gained the art of dealing with the extraordinarily complicated legal, religious, political, economic, and social conditions of this important and large borderland area conquered for Russia by the soldiers of Peter I, Catherine II, and Alexander I.

## CHAPTER 7

# THE WESTERN *GUBERNII*

UNLIKE FINLAND and Congress Poland, the western *gubernii* did not enjoy an autonomous position in the empire prior to 1830. Despite Paul I's assurances of 1796 to the contrary, the all-Russian institutions created by Catherine II's Provincial Reform of 1775 were gradually reintroduced at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the Right-Bank Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. Teachers, judges, lawyers, officials, and churchmen in these provinces, therefore, operated under the general supervision and control of Russian governors and governors-general and of the central ministries and sections of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancery. Until 1830, however, the courts, schools, churches, and lower administrative offices in this area remained the special preserve of the Polish *szlachta*. Here central supervision and control were not very effective, especially in a school system staffed by Polish teachers and administered by Polish professors at the University of Wilno.

Before the Warsaw insurrection of November 1830, Russians had viewed Polish constitutionalism with suspicion and opposed Polish aspirations in the western *gubernii*, but a Polish question as such hardly existed for them. The difficulties experienced by Russia during the insurrection of 1830-1831 and foreign support for the Polish rebels completely changed the attitudes of Russia toward Poles. Now Russians began to see in the unresolved Polish question a threat to the very existence of the Russian state. This feeling was by no means confined to conservative publicists. Even the great Pushkin, who had once sympathized with the Decembrists, defended Russia's suppression of the Polish revolt in 1831 and argued that either Russia or Poland had to perish in the duel over the historical heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the struggle for supremacy in the Slavic world. Such views were common in the Russia of the 1830s, and the official historians M. P. Pogodin and N. G. Ustrialov popularized them in articles published in literary historical journals and in textbooks used in Russian secondary schools and universities.[1]

[1] Władysław Bortnowski, *Powstanie listopadowe w oczach Rosjan*, Uniwersytet Łódzki,

Nicholas I, of course, did not need Pushkin, Pogodin, and Ustrialov to tell him that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was an ancient Russian possession or that Russian state interests in the western borderlands had to be defended. Indeed, he had cautiously begun to defend these interests before the Poles revolted in 1830, and earlier that year he had warned the Poles in the last meeting of the Sejm in Congress Poland that they needed to use the rights that had been granted to them "with wise moderation."[2] Their disregard of this advice served as justification for Nicholas's abolition of many Polish rights and privileges and for a program integrating the Polish borderlands into the general legal and administrative structure of the empire.

In 1840 Nicholas I ordered that the terms "Belorussia" and "Lithuania" were no longer to be used officially in referring to the western *gubernii*. After the abolition of the Białystok district in 1842 and the creation of Kowno *guberniia* in 1843, there were nine such *gubernii*. Grodno, Kiev, Kowno, Minsk, Mohylew, Podolia, Volhynia, Wilno, and Witebsk. Podolia and Volhynia were subordinated to the military governor of Kiev, Minsk, Grodno, and Kowno to the military governor of Wilno. Witebsk and Mohylew were combined with Smolensk in a single *general-gubernatorstvo*, which was abolished in 1856. Smolensk, which Russia acquired prior to the First Partition of Poland, was not considered as one of the nine western *gubernii*.[3]

For the coordination of Russian policy in the western *gubernii*, a so-called Western Committee was organized and attached to the Committee of Ministers on September 16, 1831.[4] The projects examined by the Western Committee originated above all the chanceries of the men who were among Nicholas I's most trusted representatives in the Western *gubernii*. such governors and governors-general as Prince N. N. Khovanskii in the Witebsk, Mohylew, Minsk, and Smolensk *gubernatorstvo* (1823-1836), M. N. Murav'ev in Mohylew and Grodno *gubernii* (1828-1835); and General-Governor D. G. Bibikov in the southwestern *gubernii* of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia (1837-1852). Khovanskii, as we have already seen, was instrumental

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Prace Instytutu Historycznego, no 10 (Warsaw Wykonanno w Zakładzie Graficznim Politechniki Warszawskiej, 1964), pp 23, 128-211, Wacław Lednicki, *Pouchkine et la Pologne A propos de la trilogie antipolonaise de Pouchkine* (Paris Leroux, 1928), pp 23-28, 63-96, 101, 113, 129-31, 146-55, 191, J L Black, "M P Pogodin A Russian Nationalist Historian and the 'Problem' of Poland," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 1 (1973) 61-63, 67-68

[2] N Reinke, *Ocherk zakonodatel'stva Tsarstva Pol'skogo (1807-1881 g )* (St Petersburg Senatskaia Tipografiia, 1902), p 64

[3] Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation*, pp 390-99

[4] Russia, Komitet ministrov, *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta ministrov*, 2 54-58

in separating Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* from the Polish Wilno School Region as early as 1824. During the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831 he persuaded the central government to act promptly in bringing the legal system of Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* into conformity with that of the Great Russian provinces of the empire. Even before the suppression of the Polish insurrection had been completed, *ukazy* of January 1 and February 6, 1831, abolished the Lithuanian Statute and introduced Russian courts and laws in Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii*.[5] Elsewhere in the western *gubernii* the Lithuanian Statute remained in effect until 1840.

Russian administrators in both the capital and the western *gubernii* agreed that the Polish *szlachta* had to be curtailed and eliminated as much as possible from positions of influence over local government and society. The estates of *szlachta* involved in the uprising were of course confiscated, and tens of thousands of Poles forced to settle in other parts of the empire. The petty *szlachta* received special attention, for their instability and lack of property made them, in the words of an *ukaz* of October 19, 1831, "most susceptible to insurrection and to criminal activities against legal authority."[6] The *ukaz* of October 19 reclassified petty *szlachta* who owned little or no land or who could not document their noble ancestry satisfactorily as either *odnodvortsy* (a category of state peasant) if they lived in the countryside or as burghers if they were townsmen. These new *odnodvortsy* and burghers, unlike the majority of the *szlachta* who were certified as hereditary *dvoriane*, were subject to a special tax of one to three rubles and to recruitment into the Russian army (but for fifteen instead of the usual twenty-five years that applied to state peasants, serfs, and burghers elsewhere in the empire).[7] They were not, however, immediately deprived of all claim to the title of nobility, although in 1847 they were specifically forbidden to own land populated by serfs; only in 1857 were they completely absorbed into the ranks of the state peasants and townsmen.[8] In this manner the Russian government substantially reduced the size of the Polish nobility in the western *gubernii*, for

[5] Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation*, pp 195-96, 391, A E Nol'de, *Ocherki po istoru kodifikatsu mestnykh grazhdanskikh zakonov pri grafe Speranskim*, vol 1 *Popytka kodifikatsu litovsko-pol'skogo prava* (St Petersburg Senatskaia Tipografiia, 1906), p 237, PSZ, 2nd ser , 6 1,171, nos 4,233 and 4,369, January 1 and February 18, 1831

[6] PSZ, 2nd ser , 6 135, no 4,869, October 19, 1831, Korzon, *Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski*, 1 138-149, Winiarski, *Les institutions politiques en Pologne*, pp 151-53

[7] PSZ, 2nd ser , 6 134-38, no 4,869, October 19, 1831

[8] PSZ, 2nd ser., 22 84-85, no 20,845, January 23, 1847, ibid , 32 553-54, no 32,000, June 17, 1857, N N Ulashchik, *Predposylki krest'ianskoi reformy 1861 g v zapadnoi Belorussii* (Moscow "Nauka," 1965), p 96

about 40 percent of the former *szlachta* in this area were then classified as *odnodvortsy* or burghers.[9] Nonetheless, in 1858 the majority of the nobles in the Russian Empire (377,627 out of a total of 611,973) still lived in the nine western *gubernii*. Only a handful of Russian landowning nobles had been introduced into this area, the overwhelming majority of almost 400,000 nobles consisted of Poles, who continued to be the masters of millions of Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian serfs (for example, 95 percent of the landowners in Wilno *guberniia* were Poles, 94 percent in Minsk *guberniia*, and 82 percent in Kiev *guberniia*).[10] Twenty-five years of anti-*szlachta* policy in the western *gubernii* obviously had not broken the back of Polish social and economic power.

In 1831 governors and governors-general in the western *gubernii* received instructions to fill administrative positions on the provincial and district levels as much as possible with natives of other *gubernii*, whereas officials of local origin were to be used preferably for service elsewhere in the empire. In 1855 these same instructions were reaffirmed, and in the intervening period of twenty-four years the government continued its efforts to bring Russian officials into the area and to oblige officials of Polish origin to begin their civil service careers in the Russian interior of the empire. Nicholas I's notions of state service were also extended to the local elected offices of the nobility in the western *gubernii*, for after 1835 only nobles with ten years of civil or military service were allowed to be presented for election to such posts.[11] Although these measures did contribute to the Russification of the western *gubernii*, at the end of Nicholas's reign their officials were still predominantly Poles. In 1855 Lithuanian Metropolitan Iosif Semashko complained that 723 of 866 senior officials in Grodno and Wilno *gubernii* were Catholic, and he warned against the dangers of the "Latin-Polish party's" activities in Belorussia.[12]

Catholic Poles retained important positions in the administration of the western *gubernii* for obvious reasons. Even if trained and com-

[9] The estimate of 40 percent is based on figures compiled by Korzon for seven of the nine western *gubernii* (*Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski*, 1 110) For three of these seven *gubernii*, Korzon's figures are for the period of the forties, for the other four they apply to 1857 and 1858

[10] A P Korelin, *Dvorianstvo v poreformennoi Rossii 1861-1904 gg Sostav, chislennost', korporativnaia organizatsiia* (Moscow "Nauka," 1979), pp 40, 45, *Sprava po voprosu o vosstanovlenii sobranii i vyborov dvorianstva v deviati zapadnykh guberniiakh* (n p , n d ), 3 6-7

[11] *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta ministrov*, vol 2, pt 2, pp 279-80

[12] *Istoricheskii obzor*, p 277

petent Russian officials had been available for service in this borderland, they would have been obliged to work within an unfamiliar framework of Polish laws, customs, and institutions until these could be eventually replaced by a new Russian social and legal-administrative order. The abolition in 1831 of the Lithuanian Statute in Mohylew and Witebsk *gubernii* was a first step in this direction. Another step was made in 1835, when Magdeburg law in Kiev was replaced by Russian municipal law and institutions. Here the initiative came from Governor-General V. V. Levashov, who had found Kiev's special laws, town and court institutions, and colorful religious parades to be a constant source of unnecessary irritation and complications in the relations of Kiev's inhabitants with the Russian government.[13] Levashov's successor, D. G. Bibikov, shared his dislike of the special laws and legal institutions of the western *gubernii*.

When Bibikov became governor-general in 1837, the so-called Western Code, or the codification of laws for the western *gubernii*, was in its last stages of preparation. When the Second Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancery was established in 1826, materials on local law collected previously by *guberniia* codification committees were transferred to it. Serious work on the Western Code began in 1830, when Ignacy Danilowicz, a specialist in Lithuanian law who had once taught at the University of Wilno, was attached to the Second Section. Under Danilowicz's direction, laws in effect in the western *gubernii* were systematically studied, codified, and prepared for publication. Bibikov, however, opposed publication of the Western Code, arguing that only uniformity in law and court procedures could unite Russia's inhabitants and that retention of special laws would only keep alive a separatist spirit in the area and perpetuate a Polish legal system alien to the majority of its inhabitants. Several memoranda prepared by Bibikov were considered in the Western Committee and the Second Section during 1839 and 1840. Second Section Head D. N. Bludov rejected Bibikov's rather political approach to legal problems of the former Polish provinces, pointing out that much chaos and confusion would result unless due consideration was given to existing legal practices and customs in the area. He did not find any particular danger to the vital interests of the empire in the Western Code that Danilowicz had so painstakingly prepared. Nicholas I, however, sided

[13] A E Nol'de, *Ocherki po istorii kodifikatskii*, pp 274-83, V Iu Shul'gin, "Iugozapadnyi krai pod upravleniem D G Bibikova," *Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia*, vol 5 (1879), no 2, pp 116-17

with Bibikov, and on June 25, 1840, the Lithuanian Statute was abolished throughout the western *gubernii*.[14]

The introduction of Russian courts and laws into the nine western *gubernii* lessened the dependence of the government on officials of local origin. The public affairs of these *gubernii*, however, still could not be administered without the assistance of the local Poles. Therefore, a new generation of local officials of Polish origin had to be educated in Russian state schools, where they were not only to master the Russian language but also gain respect for Russian culture and national tradition and become loyal subjects of the Russian tsar.

But first the Polish educational system centered at Wilno had to be destroyed. As early as April 1831 the Ministry of Education instructed the curator of the Belorussian School Region to begin closing schools controlled by the Roman Catholic clergy and to take measures to insure that all instruction in state institutions be conducted in the Russian language, for the purpose of public education in this area was to bring "the local inhabitants closer to native (*prirodnye*) Russians."[15] On May 1, 1832, Wilno University was closed and the Wilno School Region was dissolved. Minsk, Wilno, and Grodno *gubernii* and the Białystok district became part of the Belorussian School Region, while Podolia and Volhynia were temporarily assigned to the Kharkov School Region. In December 1832 Podolia and Volhynia, together with Kiev and Chernigov *gubernii*, became part of the new Kiev School Region. The "Volhynian Athens," that is, the Lyceum at Krzemieniec and its library and financial resources, were assigned to the new Russian St. Vladimir University in Kiev, which opened its doors on July 15, 1833.[16] An important purpose of this new university was, in the words of Minister of Education S. S. Uvarov, "to unite the Polish youth with the Russians in Kiev."[17] Until the 1860s a majority of the students attending St. Vladimir University came from Polish-*szlachta* families of Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine.[18]

The educational measures taken in the western *gubernii* during the thirties and forties were part of a general policy of the central government to assert its direct control over education in these provinces. The University Statute of 1804 had granted Russian universities au-

[14] Nol'de, *Ocherki po istoru kodifikatsii*, pp 49-68, 86-119, 230-38, 244-50, Shul'gin, "Iugo-zapadnyi krai," pp 117-18

[15] Rozhdestvenskii, *Istoricheskii obzor*, p 212

[16] Ibid , p 298, Wimarksi, *Les institutions politiques en Pologne*, p 156

[17] Rozhdestvenskii, *Istoricheskii obzor*, p 298

[18] Jan Tabiś, *Polacy na Uniwersytecie Kijowskim 1834-1863* (Cracow Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1974), pp 34-47

tonomy and had entrusted their councils with the administration of the lower schools in each educational region. Between 1804 and 1835 the curators of the six school regions resided in St. Petersburg. It was, of course, this decentralization of education in Russia that had permitted the flourishing of Polish schools throughout the Right-Bank Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belorussia during the period 1804-1830. This system had obvious disadvantages from the standpoint of administrative efficiency, for, as it was then argued, university professors had neither the time nor the experience required to administer the educational programs of the schools subordinated to their respective universities.[19] Statutes of June 25 and 26, 1835, deprived the university councils of their supervisory powers over lower schools, moved the curators to the administrative centers of their respective school regions, limited university autonomy, and subordinated all gymnasia, district and parish schools, and other local educational institutions to the control and supervision of the curators, that is, the regional representatives of the Ministry of Education in St. Petersburg.[20]

About the same time Uvarov reorganized the administration of the empire's schools, Szymon Konarski, an emissary of Young Poland, crossed the Russian frontier. Up to the time of his arrest in May 1838, Konarski traveled throughout the Right-Bank Ukraine, Lithuania, Belorussia, and even as far as St. Petersburg, involving some 3,000 Polish *szlachta*, students, teachers, and clergy in the conspiratorial activities of his Society of the Polish People (*Stowarzyszenie Ludu Polskiego*). By 1840 Konarski had been executed, several hundred of his followers imprisoned, Kiev University briefly closed, many Polish students expelled, and the Wilno Medical-Surgical Academy abolished altogether. Because a large proportion of the Polish students at Kiev University had joined Konarski's society, some Russian officials recommended closing this university permanently. Nicholas I did not follow this advice, but the Konarski affair had made clear that it would not be easy for Uvarov to carry out his self-imposed task of reeducating the Polish youth of Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine.[21]

[19] Rozhdestvenskii, *Istoricheskii obzor*, p 238

[20] Ibid , pp 238-45, *Ocherki istorii shkoly i pedagogicheskoi mysli narodov SSSR*, pp 210-11

[21] On Konarski, see the biographical sketch by Stefan Kieniewicz in *Polski słownik biograficzny* (Wrocław Ossolineum, 1935-), 13 477-79, Orest Pelech, "Toward a Historical Sociology of the Ukrainian Ideologues in the Russian Empire of the 1830's and 1840's" (Princeton University Ph D dissertation, 1976), pp 113-14, Alina Barszczewska, *Szymon Konarski* (Warsaw "Wiedza Powszechna," 1976), pp 140-238

In both the Belorussian and Kiev School Regions instruction in Polish was gradually discontinued during the 1830s, and measures were taken to curtail the teaching of the Polish language in secondary schools.[22] These schools, however, enrolled too small a proportion of *szlachta* children to have had much prospect of transforming this Polish social class into loyal supporters of autocracy and Russian national culture. In the nine western *gubernii* around 600 students attended the University of Kiev in mid-century, while several hundred others from this area studied in Moscow and St. Petersburg; their seventeen gymnasia and thirty-three district schools enrolled fewer than 10,000 students. In other words, from 1832 to 1855 it is quite possible that tens of thousands of young Polish nobles (non-nobles accounted for less than 20 percent of the students in secondary and higher schools) learned Russian well; but they were only a handful of individuals among nearly a million Poles (in 1863) living in this region. Young Poles continued to be educated in Polish at home, and the Russian authorities even failed to eliminate the teaching of Polish in state schools. Women's education was a special problem, for the Ministry of Education's inability to provide adequate educational facilities for the daughters of the *szlachta* made it seem unwise to abolish private schools for women in which instruction was given in Polish. And in state schools for men a large proportion of the teachers were still Roman Catholic Poles. When Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich called this fact to Uvarov's attention in 1849, the minister defended the continued use of Poles in the schools of the western *gubernii* by noting that they often were more effective than Russians in teaching patriotism and loyalty to Russia. These Poles, Uvarov argued, had the advantage of understanding the family life and milieu from which their pupils came.[23]

Furthermore, the establishment of the Russian schools in the western *gubernii* sometimes produced results unanticipated by St. Petersburg officialdom. The teaching of folklore, ethnography, and romantic nationalism and history at the Universities of Kharkov and Kiev, for example, profoundly influenced a handful of Russian and Ukrainian students who helped to give birth to the Ukrainian national movement. Poles, on the other hand, often learned Russian well in state schools and in the universities of the empire but were more impressed by the revolutionary ideas of Russian student radicals than by

[22] Rozhdestvenskii, *Istoricheskii obzor*, pp. 303-4; Winiarski, *Les institutions politiques en Pologne*, pp. 155-56; Kutrzeba, *Historya ustroju Polski*, 3: 214-15.

[23] Rozhdestvenskii, *Istoricheskii obzor*, pp. 308-10; *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta ministrov*, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 254-56; V. Ia. Shul'gin, "Iugo-zapadnyi krai pod upravleniem D. G. Bibikova," *Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia*, vol. 5 (1879), no. 2, pp. 126-29.

official ideology of Uvarov's educational establishment. Fluent in Russian and moving freely within the borders of the empire, educated young Poles easily came into contact with the Russian revolutionary movement. They established a communications network that assured a steady flow of information and new ideas among Polish students and nationalist leaders located in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw, and Wilno. Contact with such Russian revolutionary intellectuals as N. G. Chernyshevskii, A. I. Herzen, and N. A. Serno-Solov'evich certainly contributed to radicalize the Polish opposition movement. Poles who had lived in the interior of Russia played a major role in the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864.[24]

The relative failure of Uvarov's educational policy in the western *gubernii* illustrates some of the dilemmas of Russian borderland policy during the 1830s and 1840s. In Russia social and political order was maintained on a foundation of the nobility's economic power, familiarity with local conditions, and cooperation with the government within the general framework provided by serfdom. In the western *gubernii* the greater part of the population consisted of Orthodox or Uniate Belorussian or Ukrainian serfs or state peasants, while the nobles were mainly Poles whose willingness to cooperate with the government was not always certain. It was, therefore, not surprising that the government would make some effort to win for itself the support of the Belorussian and Ukrainian peasantry as a sort of counterpoise to the predominant economic and social order of the *szlachta* in the western *gubernii*.

Russia's old-regime bureaucrats, however, always found administrative reforms easier to introduce than social ones. In their efforts to establish a closer relationship between the government and the Belorussian and Ukrainian majority of the population in the western *gubernii*, they, therefore, began not with peasant reform but with the reorganization of the central organs in St. Petersburg that administered the affairs of the Orthodox Church and of the empire's foreign confessions. In Volume I of the Digest of Laws compiled during the early 1830s, the Orthodox Church was defined as the "dominant faith" of the Russian Empire.[25] The chief procurator of the Holy Synod be-

[24] Tabiś, *Polacy na Uniwersytecie Kijowskim*, pp 63-140, A F Smirnov, *Vosstanie 1863 goda v Litve i Belorussii* (Moscow Akademiia Nauk, 1963), pp 141-57

[25] David W Edwards, "Orthodoxy During the Reign of Tsar Nicholas I A Study in Church-State Relations" (Kansas State University Ph D dissertation, 1967), pp 172-76, F V Blagovidov, *Ober-prokurory Sviateishego sinoda XVIII i v pervoi polovine XIX stoletiia* (Kazan Imperatorksii Universitet, 1899), pp 400-13, *Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 32 vols (St Petersburg Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1832), I i, nos 40-46

tween 1836 and 1855, N. A. Protasov, once described the official church as a "marvelous source" of "pure Christian morality for future generations" that united the "Russian Orthodox people in its unlimited devotion to a Throne consecrated by Faith."[26] Protasov, a civilian and former army general, deprived this church of the "Russian Orthodox people" of almost all spiritual independence, subordinating it to the bureaucratic supervision and control of his own personal chancery. Non-Orthodox religions in Russia—except for the various forms of Old Believerism, which Nicholas I persecuted as an impermissible deviation from Orthodoxy[27]—were tolerated but subjected to regulation and supervision by the Main Administration for the Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Foreign Confessions, which was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education to that of the Ministry of the Interior in 1832.[28]

In 1827 Iosif Semashko, an assessor in the Uniate Department of the Roman Catholic College in St. Petersburg, which was subordinated to the Main Administration for the Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Foreign Confessions, submitted to the Russian authorities the first of a number of memoranda outlining how the remaining Belorussian and Ukrainian Uniates could be reunited with Orthodoxy. Semashko had worked in the St. Petersburg Roman Catholic College since 1822. Born in a Ukrainian village and the son of a Uniate priest, he had received a Polish education at the University of Wilno, where he had been taught by teachers trained in eighteenth-century Enlightenment Austria to be critical of the papacy and aspects of Roman Catholicism. In St. Petersburg Semashko prepared a Russian version of the written proceedings of the Uniate Department for his colleagues, who spoke Polish among themselves. Semashko himself always spoke Russian with an accent, but the Russian Orthodox setting of the capital had a different effect on him than on his colleagues, for his study of Russian and European works on Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and the Uniate Church eventually persuaded him to work for the reunion of the Uniates with the Russian Orthodox Church.[29] His betrayal of the Uniate cause was an unexpected and welcome windfall for Nicholas I and

[26] Russia, Sviateishii sinod, *Izvlecheniia iz otcheta ober-prokurora Sviateishego sino da za 1845 god* (St Petersburg Sinodnaia Tipografiia, 1846), p 110

[27] Russia, Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, *Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del Istoricheskii ocherk* (St Petersburg Tipografiia Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1901), p 93

[28] *Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del*, p 87

[29] Iosif Semashko's background and role in reuniting the Uniates with Orthodoxy are described in detail in *Zapiski Iosifa Mitropolita Litovskogo*, 4 vols (St Petersburg Imperatorskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1883). See also Daniel Beauvois, "Les lumières au carrefour de l'Orthodoxie et du Catholicism Le cas des Uniates de l'Empire russe au début du XIXe siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 19 (1978) 423-41.

the officials of the Main Administration for the Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Foreign Confessions. Semashko, after five years' work in the Uniate Department of the Roman Catholic College, had the intimate knowledge and expertise about Uniate affairs needed by Russian officialdom to effect an orderly reunion of the Uniates with Orthodoxy.

Nicholas I approved Semashko's program for the reunion of the Uniates with Orthodoxy at the end of 1827. In the spring of 1828 Roman Catholic influence over the administration of Uniate affairs was reduced to a minimum by creating an independent Greek Uniate Ecclesiastical College in St. Petersburg and by eliminating two of four Uniate bishoprics. At the same time, the Uniate Church's Basilian Order and the education of Uniate priests were subordinated directly to the new Uniate Ecclesiastical College in St. Petersburg. After 1828 the Russian government gradually assigned churchmen sympathetic to Orthodoxy to the St. Petersburg College and appointed appropriate auxiliary bishops in the Lithuanian and Belorussian dioceses. The remaining two Uniate bishops loyal to Rome, it is important to note, were old men, the first of whom died in 1833. As a result, Semashko then became Uniate bishop of Lithuania.[30]

The involvement of a number of Polish monks and priests in the 1830-1831 uprising provided the Russian government with a convenient pretext to close and confiscate the funds and property of Roman Catholic and Uniate monasteries; to arrest, imprison, or deport monks and priests, to close many Roman Catholic or Uniate schools, and to reaffirm laws regulating mixed marriages and forbidding the conversion of Orthodox believers to other religions. The Basilian Order was particularly affected. In 1832 it was subjected to detailed regulations and even more rigorous control than before by the St. Petersburg Uniate College. By 1835 two-thirds of its monasteries had been closed. And as the Basilian Order, which had long been the source of moral strength for the Uniate Church, rapidly declined, Semashko and the officials of the Uniate College and of the Ministry of the Interior proceeded with the complete Russification of the schools and seminaries that prepared Uniate priests for their calling, they also purged Uniate institutions and religious services of all Roman Catholic elements that had been introduced since the end of the sixteenth century.[31]

[30] PSZ, 2nd ser , 3 457-59, no 1,977, April 22, 1828, Lenchyk, *The Eastern Catholic Church and Czar Nicholas I*, pp. 39-45, Semashko, *Zapiski*, 1 45, 53-54, V Moroshkin, "Vossoedinenie Unii," *Vestnik Evropy*, April, 1872, no 3, pp 588-90, Edwards, "Orthodoxy," p 264

[31] Lenchyk, *The Eastern Orthodox Church*, pp 45-64, Edwards, "Orthodoxy," p 266, Winiarski, *Les institutions politiques en Pologne*, pp 162-63, Ammann, *Abriss*, pp 504-15

Until 1837 D. N. Bludov, a very circumspect and prudent administrator, coordinated the government's policy toward the Uniates. Between 1828 and 1832 he was director of the Main Administration for the Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Foreign Confessions, and in 1832 he became minister of the interior. At first the government proceeded cautiously and did not reveal its intention of reuniting the Uniates with Orthodoxy. After 1835, however, all doubt was removed about the government's plans for the Uniates, in that year supervision of their schools was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Commission on Ecclesiastical Schools, which operated under the control of the Russian Holy Synod. In 1837 the Greco-Uniate Ecclesiastical College was placed directly under Protasov, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod. After the death of Jozafat Bulhak in 1838, Semashko circulated petitions among Uniate priests and monks calling for the reunion of their church with Russian Orthodoxy. All three Uniate bishops and more than thirteen hundred priests and monks signed these petitions. On March 17, 1839, the reunion with Orthodoxy of some two million Uniates living in the nine western *gubernii* was proclaimed.[32]

Uniate resistance to reunion with Orthodoxy was sporadic, ineffective, and difficult to coordinate. The neutralization and weakening of the Basilian Order in the 1830s and the placement of Russian loyalists in control of the Uniate College in St. Petersburg and of the Uniate hierarchy frustrated Uniate attempts to prevent the takeover of their church by the agents of Bludov, Semashko, and Protasov. Recalcitrant priests and monks were threatened with reassignment, arrest, confinement in monasteries, or even corporal punishment. Soldiers were used against peasant villages in which organized resistance to the reunion occurred. Extreme measures, however, were probably the exception rather than the rule. In all, the reorganization of the hierarchy and the careful and gradual reform of the Uniate liturgical books and divine services do not seem to have had a profound effect on the Belorussians and Ukrainians who were reunited with Orthodoxy in 1839.[33]

[32] Edwards, "Orthodoxy," pp 267-68, Lenchyk, *The Eastern Orthodox Church*, pp 40, 43-44, 78-112, *Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del Istoricheskii ocherk*, pp 89-91

[33] The methods and means actually used by the Russian authorities to reunite Belorussian and Ukrainian parishes with Orthodoxy have not been satisfactorily studied on the basis of a systematic examination of materials in Russian and/or Soviet archives But the fragmentary evidence collected by Roman Catholic and Uniate historians clearly indicates that a good measure of force and coercion was used in dealing with the minority of peasants and priests who persisted in resisting reunion with Orthodoxy On

It is questionable whether the reunion appreciably altered the relationship of these peasants to Russia. After all, there was no reason to doubt their loyalty to begin with. True, they were no longer jurisdictionally under the pope and the Polish Catholic hierarchy, but before 1839 the influence of Polish Catholicism on popular attitudes and behavior in the Belorussian and Ukrainian village seems to have been a superficial one. And could the Russian state really rely on the poorly educated and impoverished local priests, so recently cajoled or forced back into the Orthodox Church, to serve as persuasive and enthusiastic intermediaries between Great Russian *chinovniki* and Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants? At the same time, the government was not able to finance an ambitious program of church maintenance and construction and of elementary and religious education in the western *gubernii*. The Catholic landowning *szlachta* was understandably not interested in underwriting the cost of such a program, and St. Petersburg officialdom soon discovered how futile it was to try to oblige Polish landowners to build, repair, and maintain Orthodox churches and schools for their Belorussian and Ukrainian serfs.[34]

But could not the Russian government have gained the confidence of these peasants by promoting their well-being and defending their rights vis-à-vis the Polish Catholic *szlachta*? The most outspoken advocate of such a policy was Kiev Governor-General D. G. Bibikov, who again and again emphasized the importance of protecting "peasants of Greco-Russian faith" from the "cruel persecution" of Polish landowners.[35] Concrete measures to defend the interests of "peasants of Greco-Russian faith" were proposed as early as 1835, and again in 1839, by P. D. Kiselev, who became minister of state domains in 1837. In 1835 Kiselev suggested that the interests of the government in the western *gubernii* could be furthered by introducing regulations to govern peasant-landlord relations on estates confiscated from Polish *szlachta* involved in the uprising of 1830-1831. In 1839 he recommended extending a system of similar regulations to all state-owned land in the western *gubernii* and enforcing corrected inventories of the obligations and of the distribution of land among the local state

the scattered resistance that did occur, see Lenchyk, *Eastern Catholic Church*, pp 67-73, 92-105, 119-31, Ammann, *Abriss*, pp 511-13, Edward Likowski, *Dzieje kościoła unickiego na Litwie i Rusi*, 2 116-29 Cf Semashko, *Zapiski*, 1 115-19, 128-40, 2 87-88, 3 413, 420, 422, 423

[34] *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta ministrov*, vol 2, pt 1, pp 273-76

[35] V I. Semevskii, *Krest'ianskii vopros v Rossii v XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX veka*, 2 vols (St Petersburg: "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1888), 2. 483-89, Shul'gin, "Iugo-zapadnyi krai pod upravleniem D G Bibikova," pp 10-11, 92-98

peasants. On state lands in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, these inventories had been known as *lustracje* (the plural form in Polish; in the singular, *lustracja*, in Russian, *liustratsiia* and *liustratsii*). Prior to Nicholas I's approval of Kiselev's new project, state lands in the former Polish provinces had been administered by members of the Polish *szlachta*, who controlled the local officials and institutions of the state peasants and received labor services from the peasants on a given estate according to norms fixed by a *lustracja*. The *lustracje*, however, were generally inaccurate and interpreted by the local Polish leaseholders in a manner detrimental to the peasants, which gave rise to considerable social unrest. Kiselev hoped to improve the lot of the local state peasants by establishing new *lustracja* norms, by gradually converting peasant compulsory labor services to money payments (*obrok*) based on land surveys and careful investigations of local conditions, and by replacing *szlachta* leaseholders with officials who worked under the supervision of the Ministry of State Domains.[36]

Kiselev's *lustracja* reform did somewhat improve the situation of state peasants in the western *gubernii*. By defining peasant obligations more satisfactorily, surveying the extent of land allotted to the peasants, gradually replacing compulsory labor with money payments, and partly freeing the state peasants from the control of the local Polish nobility, his ministry undeniably made at least a modest contribution to the economic and social development of peasants living on state-owned land in Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine.[37] But the Ministry of State Domains hardly acted any more effectively in the western *gubernii* than it did elsewhere in the empire. Bureaucratic regulation of state-peasant affairs, compulsion, corruption, and inefficiency on the part of many officials, the modest scale of the reforms which never called into question the legitimacy of subordinating the welfare of serfs and state peasants to the economic interests of landowners and of the Ministry of State Domains—these affairs caused

[36] A P Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, *Graf P D Kiselev i ego vremia*, 4 vols (St Petersburg M M Stasiulevich, 1882), 4 147, N M Druzhinin, *Gosudarstvennye krest'iane i reforma P D Kiseleva*, 2 vols (Moscow-Leningrad Akademiia Nauk, 1946-1958), 1 588-603, Russia, Ministerstvo gosudarstvennykh imushchestv, *Istoricheskoe obozrenie piatidesiatiletnei deiatel'nosti Ministerstva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv 1837-1887*, 5 vols (St Petersburg Iablonskii i Perott, Ia I Liberman, V Bezobrazov, etc , 1888), pt 2, sec 2, pp 111-30, T A Koniukhova, *Gosudarstvennaia derevnia Litvy i reforma P D Kiseleva* (Moscow Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1975), p 144-209, V I Neupokoev, *Krest'ianskii vopros v Litve vo vtoroi treti XIX veka* (Moscow "Nauka," 1976), pp 84-141.

[37] Druzhinin, *Gosudarstvennye krest'iane*, 2 418, 436-39

general dissatisfaction and often serious social unrest among Russian state peasants. One special problem was the lack of trustworthy and trained personnel available to work for the Ministry of State Domains in the provinces. Between 1838 and 1842 it opened forty-seven *gubernii* boards (*palaty*) and 280 district, 1,308 township, and 5,860 village administrations to carry out its policies in the countryside. The ministry was in a position to staff only its own central administration and some of its provincial boards with competent personnel. Otherwise, it had to rely on local nobles, clerks, intellectuals, and peasants to administer state-peasant affairs. In the western *gubernii* this meant relying to a considerable extent on the Polish petty *szlachta*, who had no interest in implementing the political aims of the Russian state in this area and who compiled and interpreted the *lustracje* in a manner detrimental to the peasantry.[38]

Even if Kiselev's ministry had aimed at rapid social change in the western *gubernii*, it lacked the resources to bring it about. For example, it considered education important but did very little about it. In 1845 there were only 3,644 children in the elementary schools of the ministry in the western *gubernii* in a state peasant population of almost a half million.[39] On the whole, the activities of officials employed by Kiselev's ministry had very little impact on the manner in which the local state peasants viewed the world, organized their lives, and cultivated the soil. As a result, they remained for the most part economically and socially dependent on the local Polish *szlachta*. They also often found themselves at the mercy of incompetent and dishonest minor officials and of new state regulations they did not understand. Kiselev's reform, therefore, may very well have done more to produce peasant complaints and organized resistance to the implementation of official policies than it did to gain support for the government of the Orthodox "Russian" peasants of this area.

It was even more difficult for the Russian government to improve the lot of the Belorussian and Ukrainian serfs who lived on the private estates of Polish landowners in Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine. As much as Russian officials wanted to weaken the Polish landowners in this region, they had no intention of introducing radical social reforms likely to cause unrest among the local serfs. They were, however, willing to consider moderate reforms based on the inventories (*inwentarze*) of obligations of serfs living on privately

[38] Ibid., 2 574-78, Konukhova, *Gosudarstvennaia derevnia*, pp. 68-85, 144-57, 210-31, Neupokoev, *Krest'ianskii vopros*, pp 208-50, *Istoricheskoe obozrenie piatidesiatiletnei deiatel'nosti Ministerstva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv*, 1 34-35, 46-48

[39] *Istoricheskoe obozrenie*, vol 2, sec 1, pp 49-58, sec 2, pp 89-90

owned lands that had been used in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since the sixteenth century. These *inwentarze* were similar to the *lustracje* for peasants on lands owned by the state prior to the partition of Poland.

In 1840 the question of peasant reform in the western *gubernii* to be based on the verification and enforcement of inventories of peasant obligations, was brought before the Western Committee. This committee, together with the Ministries of the Interior and State Domains, worked out the principles of an inventory reform during the following four-year period. In April 1844 provincial committees were formed. Each provincial committee consisted of the civil governor as chairman, four Russian officials, and five landowners representing the local *szlachta*. On April 15, 1844, Nicholas I approved the rules that regulated the compilation and confirmation of inventories on private estates throughout the western *gubernii*. The government, however, encountered resistance to the inventory reform on the part of both peasants and landowners. Governor-General Bibikov decided that the only way to deal with landowner resistance and to gain the confidence of the peasants was to guarantee their continued use of the lands assigned to them in the inventories and to oblige the landowners to prepare new inventories in conformity with norms prescribed by rules confirmed by Nicholas I on December 29, 1848. Although these rules were extended to Lithuania and Belorussia when Bibikov became minister of the interior in 1852, it was only in the Right-Bank Ukraine that they were applied systematically and, to some extent, enforced.[40]

The government's attempt to introduce and enforce new inventory regulations perhaps accomplished even less than did its other special measures in the former Polish provinces during the period 1831-1855. These other measures, it will be recalled, fell far short of transforming

[40] Russia, Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, Zemskii otdel, *Inventarnye polozheniia zapadnykh gubernii* (St Petersburg Kommissiia dlia sostavleniia polozhenii o krest'ianakh, 1859), pp 1-63, *prilozheniia* pp 53-59, 190-211, A K Koshik, "Inventarnaia reforma 1847-1848 gg i krest'ianskoe dvizhenie na provoberezhnoi Ukraine," in Kievskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, *Istoricheskii sbornik* (1949, no 2), pp 97-122, Kh P Strods, "Sostavlenie obiazatel'nykh inventarei v pomeshchich'ikh imeniiakh Latgalii v 40-50-kh godakh XIX veka i znachenie ikh kak istoricheskogo istochnika," *Istochnikovedcheskie problemy istorii narodov Pribaltiki* (Riga "Zinātne," 1970), pp 213-28, N N Ulashchik, "Vvedenie obiazatel'nikh inventarei v Belorussii i Litve," *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii vostochnoi Evropy 1958 g* (Tallinn Akademiia Nauk Estonskoi SSR, 1959), pp 256-77, Ulashchik, "Inventari pomeshchich'ikh imenii zapadnoi Belorussii i Litvy 40-kh godov XIX veka," *Problemy istochnikovedeniia* 10 (1962) 85-103, V I Semevskii, *Krest'ianskii vopros v Rossii v XVIII i pervoi polovine*, 2 vols (St Petersburg "Obshchestvennaia Pol'za," 1888), 2 483-513

the *szlachta*, serfs, and state peasants of the western *gubernii* into peaceful, loyal, and dependable subjects of the Russian tsar. As regards the Belorussian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian serfs living on private estates in the western *gubernii*, their economic position was not significantly improved by the inventory reform. The government was not in a position to carry out the reform without the assistance of local *szlachta* society, which, in last analysis, looked with disfavor upon any attempt to regulate its relations with the serf population. But the very attempt of the government to regulate these relations suggested to the peasants that there were limits to the landowners' power. Russian gendarme officials thought that there was a connection between the inventories and social unrest in the area. Whether or not they were correct, it is clear that the serfs in the western *gubernii* often reacted with overt antagonism to the efforts of marshals of the nobility, civil governors, and other representatives of the government and the nobility to verify and enforce the inventories. The Belorussian, Lithuanian, and Right-Bank Ukrainian countrysides were among the areas of the empire where social unrest reached a degree of maximum intensity during the 1840s, 1850s, and early 1860s. In 1848, for example, 201 cases of serious peasant unrest occurred in the western *gubernii*, or more than half of such cases for the whole Russian Empire during that year.[41]

State-peasant reform had similar results, especially among the Lithuanian state peasants in Kowno *guberniia*. In 1863-1864 a considerable number of them voluntarily joined the ranks of the Polish insurgents in a common struggle against Russia.[42] Both the state-peasant and the inventory reforms were too limited in scope, too paternalistic in application, and too bureaucratic in execution to produce significant and immediate results for the purposes of official Russian policy in the western *gubernii*. Yet, these reforms were important if for no other reason than that they offered young Russian officials working

[41] Koshik, "Inventarnaia reforma 1847-1848 gg i krest'ianskoe dvizhenie na pravoberezhnoi Ukraine," p 106-22, Ulashchik, "Vvedenie obiazatel'nykh inventarei v Belorussii i Litve," pp 262, 275-77, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1826-1849 gg Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow Sotsekgiz, 1961), pp 426-31, 554-58, 609-30, G M Deich, "Inventarnye pravila," *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia*, 5 (Moscow "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1964) 828, Druzhinin, *Gosudarstvennye krest'iane*, 1 511, 530, Smirnov, *Vosstanie 1863 goda v Litve i Belorussii*, pp 141-57

[42] Koniukhova, *Gosudarstvennaia derevnia*, pp 230-31, V I Neupokoev, "Kontrreforma v gosudarstvennoi derevne Litvy (1857-1862)," in *Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859-1861 gg* (Moscow "Nauka," 1970), p 56 However, as Neupokoev points out, Murav'ev's counterreforms of 1857-1862 played an important role in turning Lithuanian state peasants against Russia

for the Ministries of Interior and State Domains an opportunity to acquire knowledge and expertise concerning the peasants and the social and economic problems of the western borderlands of the empire.

In the first years of the reign of Alexander II, the emperor and his principal advisers, fearing peasant unrest and needing to concentrate on the central task of reform, pursued a generally conciliatory policy in the borderlands. Only in the Right-Bank Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania did the Russian government then continue to follow the more or less Russificatory policies of Nicholas I. To be sure, the government and Russian publicists of those days considered Belorussians and Ukrainians to be Russians. Although certain concessions were then made to the wishes of this area's dominant Polish minority, Russian remained the official language of its schools and local administration. Its courts and municipal and *gubernii* institutions continued to operate as part of the general legal-administrative system established by Catherine II's Provincial Reform of 1775. In the early 1860s Russian officials saw no reason not to proceed with plans to extend Russian agrarian, judicial, educational, and other reforms to the western *gubernii*.

Problems of social control and security, however, soon persuaded the Russian authorities that they could not realistically insist on complete uniformity and standardization in extending reform to the western borderlands. Thus, in 1863 the terms of the Emancipation Edict of 1861 in the nine western *gubernii* were altered. In January of that year the Polish revolutionary government in Lithuania had promised the peasants land; on March 1, 1863, in an obvious attempt to isolate the Polish insurrectionists, the Russian government confirmed the peasants of Wilno, Grodno, and Kowno *gubernii* and of Latgale in the possession of all the land they had cultivated before the emancipation. By November 1863 the revised inventory had been introduced throughout the western *gubernii*, making available to the peasants several million desiatins of additional land and fixing peasant obligations at a level that was considerably lower than elsewhere in the empire. These new arrangements did not, however, mark any radical break with the past, for the new reforms of 1863 were still based on the old Polish *lustracje* and *inwentarze*. The major change was that Russians imported from other parts of the empire now replaced the Polish *szlachta* as the local arbitrators who interpreted the inventories and decided the extent of the peasants' obligations and how much land they were to receive. But the large estates of the Polish landowners, the separate peasant household (as contrasted with the repartitional type of commune in the Great-Russian areas of the em-

pire), and landless or poor peasants remained characteristic features of the life of the countryside in the western *gubernii*.[43]

Russian distrust of local society also contributed to keeping these *gubernii* apart from the rest of the empire. The decision not to introduce zemstvos into this area until the twentieth century (and then only in six of nine *gubernii*) is perhaps the best illustration of this point. Zemstvos were not introduced simply because the Russian authorities feared that the Polish landowners would dominate them. Elsewhere in the empire zemstvos encouraged local elements to engage in socially useful activities, especially the building of rural elementary schools. The absence of zemstvos in the western *gubernii* and the insistence on Russian as the language of instruction in rural schools effectively discouraged both peasants and landowners from taking the initiative in developing education locally. As a result, the literacy rate of army recruits put these *gubernii* in the company of the most backward of the fifty provinces of European Russia.[44] The area was well served by railroads in the second part of the nineteenth century, and its Polish large landowners and a minority of peasant proprietors (the so-called kulaks) prospered. The majority of the local Belorussian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian peasants remained, on the other hand, landless or at least socially and economically backward, poor, and cut off from the main currents of Russian life. The rural elementary school represented one possible way to change this situation, but the Russian government did not have the financial and human resources to promote education to any significant extent in this area, while local society tended to view suspiciously Russian-language schools funded and controlled by outsiders.

The punitive and severe measures introduced by M. N. Murav'ev, the "hangman of Wilno," and his successors during and following the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864 weakened the position of the Polish element in this area. This is not surprising, for its Polish minority was too small (probably about ten percent of the total population) to serve in the long run as the basis for a successful struggle against both the Russian state and the emerging national movements among the Belorussians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians. In 1830-1831 as well as in

[43] R F Leslie, *Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland 1856-1863* (1963, reprint ed , Westport, Conn Greenwood Press, 1969), pp 226-27, Jerzy Ochmański, *Historia Litwy* (Wrocław Ossolineum, 1967), pp 180-82, P A Zaionchkovskii, *Provedenie v zhizn' krest'ianskoi reformy 1861 g* (Moscow Sotsekgiz, 1958), pp 365-422

[44] Ochmański, *Historia Litwy*, pp 183-85, *Istoriia Belorusskoi SSR*, 1 420-21, A G Rashin, *Naselenie Rossii za 100 let (1811-1913 gg ) Statisticheskie ocherki* (Moscow Gosstatizdat, 1956), pp 305-6

1863-1864 the ethnic composition of the population of the western *gubernii* complicated for the Poles the task of organizing an anti-tsarist insurrection.

In 1863-1864 the Poles were the most successful in obtaining support for their cause among some 1.4 million Lithuanians, who then constituted about 13 percent of the population of the western *gubernii*. In contrast to the Lithuanians, the more than four million Right-Bank Ukrainians (38 percent of the population) gave very little support to the Polish insurrection; indeed, a large number of Ukrainians used the rebellion as a pretext to take their own action against Polish landowners. On the other hand, Polish influence was somewhat stronger among some 2.6 million Belorussians (about one-fourth the population of these *gubernii*), especially in the western and partly Catholic areas of Belorussia. Konstanty Kalinowski, the author of *Muzhytskaia prauda* and today—despite his Polish-*szlachta* origin—a Belorussian national hero, did manage to attract a number of Belorussian supporters for the insurrection in western Belorussia; Ludwik Zwierzdowski, on the other hand, ran into the resistance of the local Orthodox population when, in the spring of 1863, he tried to organize a peasant uprising in Eastern Belorussia.[45] Of all the nationalities of the western *gubernii*, with the exception of the Latvians in Latgale (whose "national awakening" began toward the end of the nineteenth century), the Belorussians were the least successful in organizing their own national movement.

Although it shared some of the weaknesses of the Belorussian movement, the Ukrainian national movement greatly benefited from the decentralization and relaxation of political controls early in the reign of Alexander II. The Ukrainian cultural renaissance began in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Under Nicholas I Russian universities at Kharkov and Kiev introduced young Ukrainians to romantic nationalism and stimulated their interest in Ukrainian ethnography, folklore, and language. A setback for the Ukrainian national revival was the arrest, imprisonment and exile in 1847 of V. M. Bilozers'kyi, M. I. Kostomarov, P. A. Kulish, Taras Shevchenko, and others associated with the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius. Amnestied by Alexander II, they resumed Ukrainian literary, scholarly, and journalistic activities in St. Petersburg in the late 1850s. Their example and influence helped to give birth to Ukrainian cultural

[45] Smirnov, *Vosstanie 1863 goda*, pp. 85-100, 201-9, 219-28, 341-45; P. N. Batiushkov (ed.), *Atlas narodonaseleniia zapadno-russkogo kraia po ispovedaniiam* (St. Petersburg, 1863).

societies in Poltava, Chernigov, Kharkov, Kiev, and elsewhere. Ukrainian elementary schools for children and Sunday schools for adults were organized, Ukrainian belles-lettres and scholarship were fostered and textbooks for schools published, and Ukrainian culture in the form of theatrical performances, concerts, and lectures were promoted wherever possible The Russian authorities, however, soon curtailed Ukrainian cultural and educational activities, and between 1863 and 1905 the government systematically suppressed the Ukrainian language and culture in schools and public life.[46] This policy of suppression and the illiteracy and social and economic backwardness of the Ukrainian peasantry impeded Ukrainian national development. But a beginning had been made, especially during the 1850s and early 1860s. In the long run, the existence of the second-to-the-largest Slavic people could not be denied.

Of all the emerging peasant peoples of the western *gubernii*, the Lithuanians were the most successful in laying the foundations for a viable national movement. Lithuanian national leaders came chiefly from the families of well-to-do peasants in Samogitia and trans-Niemen Lithuania (Užnemunė). In western Samogitia near the Prussian and Kurland borders, middle and certain state peasants had profited from favorable market conditions or the reforms introduced by Kiselev. In Lithuania south of the Niemen, a number of peasants, who had been emancipated in 1807 together with the Polish serfs of the Duchy of Warsaw, had sizable holdings. Prosperous peasants in Samogitia, Užnemunė, and elsewhere in Lithuania sent at least one son to school to prepare for the priesthood.[47] Not all of these sons turned out to be priests, for many of them did not enter the Church but became moderate or radical members of the secular Lithuanian national movement. The initial stage of the Lithuanian national movement was, however, dominated by the Church.

The bishop of Samogitia between 1850 and 1875, Motiejus Valančius, was the son of a local peasant. A student at Wilno University before the insurrection of 1830-1831, he and other Lithuanians came

[46] Pelech, "Toward a Historical Sociology," pp 48-245, D Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, ed O W Gerus (Winnepeg Humeniuk Publications Foundation, 1975), pp 525-27, 535-44, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 2 vols (Kiev "Naukova Dumka," 1969), 1 402-8, 472-75, E S Shabhovskii, "N I Kostomarov v gody revoliutsionnoi situatsii (1859-1861 gg )," *Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859-1861 gg 1970* (Moscow Akademiia Nauk, 1970), pp 101-23

[47] Koniukhova, *Gosudarstvennaia derevnia*, pp 172-76, 202-8, S A Suziedelis, "The Lithuanian Peasantry of Trans-Niemen Lithuania, 1807-1864 A Study of Social, Economic and Cultural Change" (University of Kansas Ph D dissertation, 1977)

into contact in Wilno with Poles interested in the language, culture, and history of Lithuania. In the decades following the closing of Wilno University hundreds of historical, ethnographic, and popular religious works were published in Lithuanian. Bishop Valančius himself was a talented writer who wrote ethnographic tales and other didactic works widely read among the peasants. His influential treatise of 1858 on temperance appeared in some 40,000 copies. Between 1858 and 1864 the temperance society sponsored by Valančius attracted 83.3 percent of the Catholics in Kowno *guberniia*. Equally important, he continued efforts of his predecessors to promote education, increasing the number of church schools in Samogitia and improving their administration and the supervision of teachers. Being a social conservative who did not approve of revolution, Valančius strongly criticized peasant involvement in the insurrection of 1863-1864, and in 1864 he offered to cooperate with tsarist officials in seeing to it that a prominent place would be given to instruction in Russian in Catholic schools as long as Lithuanian would also be taught. Soon, however, in reaction to the closing of Lithuanian church schools and to the ban on the publication of Lithuanian books not printed in a new, especially adapted Cyrillic alphabet, he began to organize a system of undergound Lithuanian elementary schools and the smuggling into Russia of Lithuanian books and anti-Russian pamphlets printed in Latin letters. He became a formidable opponent of Russification. The struggle he and the Roman Catholic clergy led against the Cyrillic alphabet and the Russification of education politicized the peasants, making them more aware of their cultural and national identity as Lithuanians than they had ever been before.[48]

The Poles were the one major nationality in the western *gubernii* which declined in relative importance during the second part of the nineteenth century. The punitive and discriminatory measures of the Russian government after 1863 wiped out the limited gains they had made during the period 1855-1863. In Belorussia the Poles were not only displaced by Russian administrators, priests, and schoolteachers but also by Russian nobles as the owners of the greater proportion of manorial lands, especially in the two eastern *gubernii* of Mohylew and Witebsk. In the Right-Bank Ukraine, the Polish economic position

[48] Suziedelis, "The Lithuanian Peasantry," pp 451-74, 498-501, K J Čeginskas, "Die Russifizierung und ihre Folgen in Litauen unter zaristischer Herrschaft," *Commentationes Balticae* 6/7 (1959) 6, 121-34, *Iz istoru shkoly Belorussii i Litvy*, ed V Z Smirnov, Izvestiia Akademii Pedagogicheskikh Nauk RSFSR, no 131 (Moscow "Prosveshchenna," 1964), pp 194-215, Jerzy Ochmański, *Litewski ruch narodowo-kulturalny w XIX wieku* (Białystok PWN, 1965), pp 78-117

was somewhat stronger, but the enmity between Poles and the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia and emancipated peasantry augured ill for the future of the Poles in three southwestern *gubernii* of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia. Even in the two Lithuanian *gubernii* of Kowno and Wilno, where Poles retained control of about three-fourths of manorial land as late as 1904, the dominance of Polish civilization and culture locally was increasingly challenged by an independent Lithuanian church hierarchy, the Lithuanian nationalist movement, social unrest among landless peasants, and the growing economic power of the Lithuanian middle and well-to-do peasants. Yet, though their relative numbers declined, the Poles in the western *gubernii* remained a sufficiently vital social and economic force locally to continue to trouble tsarist officialdom even into the twentieth century.[49]

The Poles of the Congress Kingdom were even more of a problem for Russian officialdom. Here, as in the western part of Austrian Galicia and in Prussian Upper Silesia and Poznania, they constituted a clear majority of the local population. In these provinces would-be national leaders bent on transforming the old *szlachta* democracy into a modern Polish nation did not, as they did in Eastern Galicia, Belorussia, Lithuania, and the Right-Bank Ukraine, have to compete with new national movements produced by economic and social change. In dealing with ethnically Polish areas, the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians all found it difficult to meet the needs and satisfy the desires of their Polish subjects without risking what seemed to be the vital interests of the modern state.

By 1870 Austria had become Austria-Hungary, with special provisions for a Galicia dominated by Polish *szlachta* and aristocrats, while Prussia by then had almost completed the unification of a Germany that was to attempt the full integration of Poles into the national, social, and political structure of the German Empire. Meanwhile, Russia vacillated considerably in her Polish policy. Between 1831 and 1870 the milestones of Russian policy in Congress Poland were the Organic Statute of 1832, Paskevich's military dictatorship, the era of Great Reforms, Wielopolski's and Konstantin Nikolaevich's brief experiment with Polish autonomy and self-rule, and the beginnings of Russification under N. A. Miliutin, F.W.R. von Berg, and D. A. Tolstoi.

[49] *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta ministrov*, vol 3, pt 1, pp 159-227, vol 4, pp 213-23, Piotr S Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918* (Seattle University of Washington Press, 1974), pp 239-54, Leon Wasilewski, *Litwa i Białoruś* (Cracow "Książka," [1912]), pp 78-117, S M Sambuk, *Politika tsarizma v Belorussii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* (Minsk "Nauka i Tekhnika," 1980), pp 103-10

# CONCLUSION

RUSSIA'S RULERS during the period 1710-1870 seem to have been in essential agreement that the special rights and privileges of borderland elites could only be permitted as long as they were compatible with the interests and general welfare of the empire. Catherine II even tried to impose Russian norms on privileged local society in the western borderlands. Her son Paul and grandson Alexander restored borderland privileges but intended to limit this restoration to certain local administrative and social activities. Alexander I, as has been pointed out in the introduction to Part Two, added a qualifying clause to the routine confirmation of Livland and Estland rights and privileges, "insofar as they are in agreement with the general decrees and laws of our state." His brother, Nicholas I, pursued a policy of administrative and even cultural Russification in the western *gubernii*, Congress Poland, and the Baltic provinces. This policy was somewhat relaxed toward the end of the 1840s and during the first part of Alexander II's reign, but resumed more energetically than ever before following the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864.

It was not easy to bring the western borderlands closer to the rest of the empire. Among the complicated problems, special circumstances, and centrifugal forces that impeded administrative centralization and the homogenization of the peoples of the empire were the following:

1. The personal and arbitrary power of the tsar was not excercised consistently in support of the policies of centralizing officials in St. Petersburg but also in defense of the special privileges, rights, and interests of the borderlands.
2. Because Peter the Great and many of his successors held up the laws, institutions, and the social and political organization of the western borderlands as models for the rest of the empire to imitate, Russian centralizers often found it difficult to justify the imposition of the empire's norms on these borderlands.
3. Problems connected with the preservation of social order in a vast old-regime, multinational empire in which serfdom existed until 1861 tended to make Russia's rulers dependent locally on

the cooperation of the western borderlands' dominant German, Polish, and Swedish elites.

4. During wars with Sweden, Turkey, and France, foreign-policy considerations led to the granting of concessions and new rights to the privileged elites of the western borderlands, making it all the more difficult for St. Petersburg officials to achieve a greater degree of uniformity and centralization in administering the affairs of the empire.

5. Beginning in the 1820s and 1830s the growing incompatibility of Russian and Polish objectives in the western *gubernii* and Congress Poland led to conflicts that strained the empire's human and financial resources to the utmost.

6. Religion, partly because of the policies pursued by the Russian state, turned out to be a divisive rather than a unifying force in the western borderlands.

7. In the latter part of the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth century German, Polish, and Swedish elites began to use forces of social change and modernization to develop local particularism; it was only toward the very end of the period treated in this study that certain Russian intellectuals and officials understood that the same forces could be used to bring about the integration of the western borderlands into the general social, economic, and political structure of the empire.

The personal and arbitrary power of the tsar was not consistently exercised in support of the policies of centralizing officials in St. Petersburg, for the tsar often listened to the advice of those who criticized these policies. If only such courtiers from the borderlands as Adam Czartoryski, Alexander von Benckendorff, and Gustav and Alexander Armfelt had opposed the policies of St. Petersburg centralizers, the latter may have had their way more often than they actually did. Far more formidable and influential critics of their policies were the governors-general and viceroys in Helsingfors, Riga, and Warsaw. Such governors-general and viceroys, who were the personal agents of the Russian autocrat in the borderlands, possessed rank and status equivalent to the ministers' in St. Petersburg. They were inclined to defend jealously the full extent of their local authority and to view suspiciously even the most legitimate efforts of St. Petersburg ministers to make their influence felt in the borderlands. In Riga such Baltic governors-general as Filippo Paulucci, Karl Magnus von der Pahlen, Prince A. A. Suvorov, and Wilhelm Baron Lieven blocked the implementation in the Baltic provinces of a number of

projects favored by St. Petersburg centralizers; and they assisted local German elites to obtain approval for programs of educational, peasant, and legal reform that often conflicted with reforms under consideration for the empire as a whole. In Helsingfors the Finns could not have achieved the degree of autonomy they did by 1870 without the support of Governors-General A. S. Menshikov, F.W.R. von Berg, and N. V. Adlerberg. In Warsaw Viceroys M. D. Gorchakov and Konstantin Nikolaevich were largely responsible for overcoming Alexander II's misgivings about going ahead with a conciliatory policy in Congress Poland at the end of the 1850s and at the beginning of the 1860s; and the "exclusive power" exercised by I. F. Paskevich, certainly no friend of the Poles, served for an entire generation to keep Congress Poland apart, as a separate Polish world, from the rest of Russia. Even in the western *gubernii*, where the Russians followed a Russificatory policy after 1831, the arbitrary power of governors-general hardly encouraged the orderly extension of the bureaucratic authority of the central ministers to this region.

The fact that Peter the Great and many of his successors admired the laws, schools, and political and social institutions of the western borderlands also slowed the progress of bureaucratic centralization. Since Peter's time the rulers of Russia had been trying to reshape society and government in Russia in the image of the old-regime, Swedish and central-European *Polizeistaat* of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. German, Polish, and Swedish elites of the western borderlands were well prepared for the role of intermediaries between Russia and Europe, for they had been comparatively well educated and had gained administrative experience and expertise in institutions of self-government that closely resembled those of Sweden and central and western Europe. Indeed, in the Baltic provinces, Congress Poland, and Finland, European forms of political and social organization already existed within the Russian Empire. Peter the Great, Alexander I, and even Catherine II, therefore, looked to these borderlands for ideas and inspiration in undertaking to reform Russia's internal administration. Was it, then, wise to proceed so rapidly in imposing Russian political and social norms on these borderlands? Did not Russia's laws first have to be codified, her courts and institutions of self-government reformed, her educational system expanded and improved, and—above all—her serfs emancipated?

Russian political leaders were equally deterred from pursuing a consequential centralizing policy in the western borderlands by the importance of German, Polish, and Swedish elites in maintaining political and social order. These elites had centuries of experience in

controlling local peasants within a traditional framework of custom, laws, and social and political institutions. They also had a sufficient knowledge of local languages to communicate with their peasants. For a long time Russia remained dependent on German, Polish, and Swedish elites to run the local administration and economy, because until the second part of the nineteenth century there were few Russians with the expertise and knowledge of requisite languages to serve competently and effectively in the western borderlands.

At the same time, in the Baltic and "Polish" provinces the traditional elites depended on Russian military power to restore order in times of social tension and crises. In the Baltic provinces a number of widespread peasant disturbances were quelled during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by bringing in Russian troops. In the "Polish" borderlands, the Russian army protected Polish landowners from the fury of Ukrainian serfs and *haidamak* insurgents even before Russia acquired the Right-Bank Ukraine in the Third Partition of Poland. In the nineteenth century the Russian government and Polish landowners, despite the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831, continued to be aware of the common interests they shared in preserving social order in the countryside. Thus, the Russian authorities proceeded with extreme caution in experimenting with legislation to improve conditions among the peasantry of the western *gubernii* and Congress Poland. What reforms the Russian government did introduce before 1863 were generally carried out locally by Polish landowners and minor officials and administrators. Only after the Great Reforms had begun in Russia and after the insurrection of 1863-1864 had been crushed did Russians feel confident enough to use their own imported agents to impose Russian norms on local society in Congress Poland and the western *gubernii*.

In Finland, too, high priority was given to maintaining social order. However, during the first part of the nineteenth century, peasant unrest presented a serious problem only in Old Finland. Here peasants living on land that had been given to Russians and others by Russia during the eighteenth century had to wait until the 1860s to obtain the same rights and legal protection enjoyed by peasants elsewhere in Finland. However insignificant social unrest was in Finland before the 1850s, the Finnish and Russian official servants of Alexander I and Nicholas I were determined to do what they could to protect peasants and a handful of townsmen from Swedish nationalism and liberalism and from various other new teachings originating in western Europe. This point is perhaps best illustrated by the petty harassment of Adolf Ivar Arwidsson in the 1820s and of Johan Vilhelm

Snellman in the 1840s. Finnish officials were particularly interested in preserving the appearance of social tranquility and stability in Finland. By adroitly associating this tranquility and stability with the Russian rulers' respect for Finnish laws and institutions, Finnish leaders helped frustrate on more than one occasion the plans of certain centralizing St. Petersburg officials for Finland.

Foreign policy was another consideration in following a conciliatory policy in the western borderlands, which became part of Russia between 1710 and 1815 after wars with Sweden, Turkey, Poland, and France. The cooperation of German, Polish, and Swedish elites was essential for the conduct of Russian foreign policy in Europe throughout the period examined in this study. These elites, once their traditional rights had been recognized, helped Russia maintain her control over newly conquered areas and defend her interests as a great power. The Baltic Germans cooperated after 1710 with Russia in defeating Sweden in the Great Northern War. They were involved, as diplomats, administrators, and soldiers, in the extension of Russia's sphere of influence and control into Poland and northern Germany. Within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth many Polish magnates and *szlachta* believed that their interests coincided with those of Russia, and they worked together with the Russians both before and after the three partitions of Poland. During the Napoleonic Wars, despite the faith many Poles had in Napoleon, the support for Russia among Polish magnates and landowning *szlachta* was sufficiently strong to justify a constitutional regime under the auspices of Russia in Congress Poland. Meanwhile, in 1809, Alexander I had assured the cooperation of the Swedo-Finnish Estates in consolidating Russian rule in newly conquered Finland by confirming their traditional rights and privileges and by granting them a degree of provincial autonomy they had never enjoyed as part of Sweden.

In the nineteenth century, ministers of foreign affairs in St. Petersburg were reassured by Finnish and Baltic German loyalty to Russia. They knew that revanchist and Russophobe sentiment still existed in Sweden, but whatever danger that sentiment posed for Russia was rendered insignificant by the Finns' decision to try to work out their future within the framework of the Russian Empire. Baltic Germans not only backed Russian policy in Poland but participated actively in the pacification of that country in 1830-1831 and 1863-1864. Russians particularly appreciated Baltic German and Finnish loyalty and Prussian diplomatic support during the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864, when Britain and France showed some inclination to interfere in the affairs of Congress Poland. It is to be noted that Alexander II person-

ally opened the Finnish Diet in Helsingfors in September 1863, shortly after he had decided to replace Konstantin Nikolaevich with General F.W.R. von Berg as viceroy in Warsaw and to entrust the administration of Polish reform to the Polonophobe, N. A. Miliutin. At the same time, Wilhelm Baron von Lieven remained in Riga as Baltic governor-general until the end of 1864, when Emperor Alexander replaced him with P. A. Shuvalov. The latter brought to Riga a new program of Russian reform, but he firmly opposed hasty measures likely to affect adversely the interest of the privileged elements of local Baltic society. One reason these elements were then treated so considerately was the generally pro-Prussian and pro-German orientation of Russian foreign policy, which continued even after the unification of Germany and—despite vociferous criticism of this orientation in the Russian press—into the first years of the reign of Alexander III.

The Polish question complicated the conduct of Russian state policy both externally and internally. Externally, it offered opportunities to other powers to try to interfere in Polish-Russian relations and tended to make Russia dependent on Prussia in Europe. Internally, the incompatibility of Russian and Polish interests, which became apparent even before the insurrection of 1830-1831, persuaded the Russians to embark on a policy of Russification and repression, especially in the western *gubernii*, but they still lacked the human and financial resources to carry out this policy successfully. The Russified schools of the western *gubernii* and Paskevich's regimentation of education in Congress Poland simply failed to transform perhaps a million former *szlachta* in a borderland of approximately 600,000 square kilometers into loyal subjects of the Russian tsar. At the same time, various experiments with social, religious, and peasant reform, especially in the western *gubernii*, would seem to have exacerbated social and religious tensions among Belorussians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians without substantially lessening the dependence of the Russian government on the landowning Polish nobility as its principal partner in maintaining social and political order in Russian lands that were once part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In Congress Poland following the January Insurrection of 1863, F.W.R. von Berg, like Paskevich before him, relied mainly on soldiers, gendarmes, and policemen to carry out the purposes of Russian Polish policies. N. A. Miliutin, whom Alexander II had charged with reform of Poland's countryside and political and social structure, disliked Berg and sharply criticized the police methods Paskevich had employed in Poland between 1831 and 1855. Yet, Miliutin's own plans for the "organic transformation" of Polish society without the coop-

eration of the Polish nobility, clergy, and intelligentsia would seem to have been little more than fantasy In the long run, the Polish peasant could not be relied upon as the ally of the tsar, because there was no way for the socially backward rural population of Poland to interact positively with officials imported from Russia who neither spoke Polish nor felt comfortable with Poles Unable to obtain effective support from the peasantry and having rejected the option of support from conservative elements in the clergy, *szlachta*, and professional intelligentsia, Miliutin could not avoid dependency on the military and police apparatus of Viceroy Berg to carry out his projects By the time of his incapacitating stroke in 1866, Miliutin had little to offer aside from administrative centralization, police regulation, and other bureaucratic solutions to the problems Russia faced in Congress Poland That the intelligent and able Miliutin had been forced into this impasse is perhaps not all that surprising, for he was a Russian bureaucrat who had served a long apprenticeship in the Ministry of the Interior under Nicholas I and L A Perovskii during the 1840s and early 1850s

The importance official Russia attached to the defense of the interests of the Orthodox Church in the conduct of policy in the western borderlands (except for Finland) is noteworthy At a time of growing secularism and religious toleration elsewhere in Europe, Russian policy makers gradually reverted to the religious policy advocated in the eighteenth century by such anti-Polish and anti-Catholic Ukrainian churchmen as Georgii Konisskii, Mel'khidsidek, and Viktor Sadkovskii Catherine II's identification with this policy was sporadic and, it would seem, politically motivated By the time of Nicholas I, however, Russian historians and officials associated with the Holy Synod and the Main Administration for the Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Foreign Confessions had formulated a fairly coherent ideological justification and fashioned the bureaucratic and legal tools for the Orthodox Church's work of reunion and conversion in the western *gubernii*, Congress Poland, and the Baltic provinces As late as 1875 the reunion with Orthodoxy of the Uniates of the Chełm district in Congress Poland was proclaimed A system of penalties and official harassment kept these Ukrainian-speaking peasants in the Orthodox Church until the promulgation of religious tolerance in 1905, when from 100,000 to 200,000 of them converted to Roman Catholicism The Chełm area was detached from Congress Poland and made a separate Russian *gubernia* in 1912, today, although there is still a small Ukrainian-speaking minority, it is a region of Poland [1]

[1] O nalozhenii i vzyskanii denezhnykh shtrafov s dukhovnykh lits Wojewodzkie

Russian religious policy was similarly counterproductive in the Baltic provinces. In the 1840s the support given by certain high-ranking government and Church officials to peasants in Livland who sought social and economic justice through acceptance of Orthodoxy did strengthen the position of the Orthodox Church, but the overwhelming majority of Estonians and Latvians remained Lutherans, and the conversion movement was accompanied by prolonged and widespread unrest among Livland peasants, undermining the very foundations of social and political stability in that province. Beginning in 1848 and continuing until the 1860s, Governors-General Suvorov and Lieven curtailed the activities of Orthodox priests and officials in Livland. At the same time, the Russian authorities were ill-prepared to take care of the religious needs of so many new converts, a large part of whom soon pressed to revert to the Lutheranism of their ancestors, which was prohibited by Russian law. The ensuing cases of individual psychological suffering and proceedings against Lutheran pastors could only alienate many Estonians and Latvians, fan the flames of Russophobia among Baltic Germans, and give Russia a reputation for religious obscurantism and persecution in Europe and North America.

In the western *gubernii* Russian religious policy would seem to have done much to reinforce resentments and antipathies that the Catholic population of the western part of this area had long felt for Russians and the Eastern Orthodox Church. The support given by many Lithuanian and Catholic Belorussian peasants to the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864 is one illustration of this point. Russian religious policy was, to be sure, more successful among Belorussian and Ukrainian Orthodox Christians, who generally took no part in the activities of Polish insurrectionists or even assisted the Russian authorities in suppressing them. The resulting Russification of private landownership and the strengthening of the position of the Orthodox Church was not, however, an unmitigated blessing, for until the 1860s the Catholic Church and the Polish nobility played at least a modest role in promoting educational and economic progress in areas populated by Belorussian and Ukrainian peasants.

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Archiwum Państwove w Lublinie, Kancelaria Gubernatora Lubelskiego, 1867, no 72, "O vysylke Greko-uniatskikh sviashchenennikov, ustranennykh ot prikhodskikh dolzhnostei v drugie mesta," ibid , 1874, nos 20, 93, and 272, 1875, no 100, Józef Tomczyk (ed ), *Wojewódzkie archiwum państwowe w Lublinie Przewodnik po zespole akt Kancelarii gubernatora lubelskiego z lat 1866-1917* (Warsaw Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, 1966), pp xxii-xxiv, 9, 33-36, 94-95, 100-102, Edward Chmielewski, *The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma* (Knoxville University of Tennessee Press, 1970), pp 111-37

After 1830, and especially after 1863-1864, such initiative was discouraged by the Russian authorities, who were more interested in social control than in promoting social and economic progress in this area Thus, following the January Insurrection of 1863, their fear of Polish influence delayed the introduction of zemstvos into the western *gubernii* until 1910 (and then in only six of nine *gubernii*) In all *gubernii* of this area with a preponderance of Russian landowners and an Orthodox population of more than 70 percent (Kiev, Minsk, Mohylew, Podolia, and Volhynia), the proportion of literates in the general population in 1897 was less than 18 1 percent, placing these *gubernii* in the company of Bessarabia and of socially underdeveloped areas in the Left-Bank Ukraine and eastern European Russia [2] Illiterate Belorussian and Ukrainian peasants usually did not know Russian, the communication tool necessary to establish contact with the Russian nation to which they supposedly belonged

The importance of the borderland elites' ability to use economic and social change to achieve their respective local purposes needs to be emphasized Before the 1870s Russian authorities were much less successful in harnessing the forces of economic and social change to unify the empire The predecessors of Alexander II seldom fully appreciated the possibilities that education and economic and social modernization offered as a means of strengthening the ties that linked the borderlands with the rest of the empire The borderland elites, on the other hand, had been predisposed to accept the necessity of at least a minimal social and economic reform by their participation and involvement in the affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Duchy of Warsaw, eighteenth-century Sweden, or the Baltic corporations of the nobility and by the university studies many of them had pursued at Åbo, Kraków, and Wilno or in Germany In the first third of the nineteenth century the more advanced parts of the western borderlands were a generation or two ahead of the empire's Russian provinces in providing educational facilities for the nobility and townsmen, and by 1870 elementary education had progressed in Finland and the Baltic provinces to the point that virtual universal literacy among Estonians, Finns, and Latvians could be achieved within a single generation By 1820 peasants were legally free in the Baltic provinces, Congress Poland, and Finland, while the emancipation of the Russian serfs did not occur until 1861 Literacy,

[2] Rashin, *Naselenie Rossii za 100 let*, pp 308-9, Ochmanski, *Historia Litwy*, p 184, *Iz istorii shkoly Belorussii i Litvy*, ed V Z Smirnov, pp 68-71 Batiushkov, *Atlas narodonaselenia zapadnorusskogo kraia po ispovedovaniam*

free peasants, and various locally initiated legal, social, and economic reforms reinforced patterns of property ownership, social organization, and agricultural production that differed markedly from those of the Russian provinces of the empire. It was above all this separate socioeconomic development that made it so difficult for would-be Russifiers of the second part of the nineteenth century to carry out their programs in the Baltic provinces, Congress Poland, and Finland.

In the western *gubernii*, despite separate peasant households and the lack of repartitional tenure, patterns of educational, social, and economic development conformed more closely to those of the empire's Russian provinces. Russian officials always made a distinction between this area and the other western borderlands, whose inhabitants were expected to learn Russian and become loyal subjects of the tsar but not, necessarily, to abandon Roman Catholicism or Protestantism or their Estonian, Finnish, German, Latvian, or Swedish nationality. In the western *gubernii*, on the other hand, Belorussians and Ukrainians were considered to be Russians who had been forcibly detached by the Polish *szlachta* and Catholic and Uniate clergy from the Russian nation to which they rightfully belonged.

Only western *gubernii* where at least 30 percent of the population was Catholic (Grodno, Kowno, Wilno, and Witebsk) could boast of a literacy rate higher than the average for European Russia (22.9 percent). Kowno *guberniia*, where 75 percent of the landowners were Poles and 83 percent of the population Catholic, had a literacy rate of 42 percent, which, apart from the Baltic provinces and Finland, was exceeded in European Russia only by that of St. Petersburg *guberniia* (55 percent). Yet in 1897 no more than 6.8 percent of Kowno school-age children attended the hated official schools, compared to the average of 42 percent for all fifty-two provinces of European Russia.[3] In other words, it would seem that the relatively high rate of literacy in Kowno *guberniia* was a result of successful resistance to Russification and of the efforts of Lithuanian intellectual leaders and of the Roman Catholic clergy to educate and form the values of the younger generation in accordance with the traditions and needs of local society.

These various frustrations and dilemmas of Russian policy in the western borderlands were unmistakably reflected in the polemics and debates over Russian nationality policy during the 1860s. Following the emancipation of the Russian serfs and the Polish insurrection of 1863-1864, Russian conservative-nationalist, liberal, and Slavophile

[3] Rashin, *Naselenie Rossii za 100 let*, pp 308-9, Ochmański, *Historia Litwy*, p 184, Smirnov, *Iz istorii*, pp 68-71, Batiushkov, *Atlas*

journalists and intellectuals wanted the government to pursue a consequential policy that would defend the interests of the Russian national state and integrate the western borderlands organically into the general political, economic, and social structure of the empire. They emphatically rejected Polish aspirations to rule over Orthodox Russians (namely, Belorussians and Ukrainians) in the western *gubernii* as well as the arguments of German and Finnish publicists that held Russia to be morally and contractually bound to recognition of rights and privileges gained since 1710. M. N. Katkov and Iurii Samarin warned that such rights and privileges could become exceedingly dangerous for Russia if combined with Finnish "separatism" and the Germanization of the Estonians and Latvians (a danger, incidentally, that they clearly exaggerated) in the Baltic provinces. In addition, Katkov and Samarin noted with alarm the growing German nationalism in the Baltic provinces at a time of Prussian military victories and national consolidation within the German Confederation.

Among the critics of official Russian policy in the western borderlands, Iurii Samarin above all understood some of the weaknesses of Russian social and economic policy in this region. He wanted the government to remedy the defects of borderland social and economic policy by vigorously promoting the social and economic interests of the Belorussian, Estonian, Latvian, and Ukrainian peasants living in the western *gubernii*, Congress Poland, and the Baltic provinces. Such a policy, he believed, would win the mass of the local population for Russia and weaken the position of traditional elites still unwilling to unify with the rest of Russia.[4] The rural population of the western borderlands, however, was seen by Samarin from above and through the eyes of a Russian landowner, though an enlightened one, to be sure. Thus, he overestimated the attraction of Orthodoxy for Latvians and Estonians and would seem to have detected in them little potential for developing their own national cultures. He viewed the peasants of Belorussia and the Ukraine with similar condescension. When he was in Congress Poland in 1863 in the company of N. A. Miliutin, he no doubt displayed considerable expertise concerning economic and social conditions among Polish peasants, but his hatred of what he called "Polonism" blinded him to the latent significance of Roman Catholicism and the Polish nationality for these peasants. But he knew very little about Lithuanians and Finns. He did not welcome the con-

[4] E C Thaden, "Samarin's *Okrainy Rossii* and Official Policy in the Baltic Provinces," *Russian Review* 33 (1974) 405-13, Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia*, pp 133-37.

solidation of Finnish autonomy during the 1860s and did not devote himself seriously to that question.

St. Petersburg officials of the 1860s shared many of the concerns of Russian nationalistic journalists and intellectuals about the empire's western borderlands. Thus, such influential officials as D. A. Tolstoi and the brothers D. A. and N. A. Miliutin could usually be counted on to support measures aiming at extending the Russian Great Reforms to the borderlands, pacifying Poland, favoring "Russian," Orthodox or even Polish peasants at the expense of non-Russian landowners, and, generally speaking, defending what they considered Russian national interests. Such other equally influential officials as P. A. Shuvalov and P. A. Valuev favored a more cautious and moderate policy in uniting the peoples of this area with the rest of Russia, for they did not want to risk total alienation of the traditional borderland elites in an empire in which public order continued to be so dependent on the social and economic predominance of the landowning nobility in the countryside. In the 1860s the proponents of moderation and consideration for the social and material interests of traditional elites still prevailed in the formulation of Russian policy for the western borderlands; later, a more ambitious policy of cultural Russification, at least for a short time, was to follow. Finland, in many ways, remained a special case, but, as was pointed out at the end of Chapter 10, the Russian tsar reserved for himself the right to alter the form of Finnish autonomy if this were required by what he considered the vital interests of Russia.

In last analysis, the traditional societies and separate institutions and special rights and privileges of Russia's western borderlands represented an obvious anachronism in nineteenth-century Europe. Ironically, at the very time Russians began to aspire to build a modern nation-state, new national elites emerged in these borderlands. More and more of these new elites came to demand separate national and cultural rights for themselves, while the older German, Swedish, and even Polish elites still played a prominent role in the local economy, society, and cultural establishment. It proved difficult for tsarist Russia to undo the work of the centuries that had shaped the institutions, customs, cultures, and social values and structures of the empire's western borderlands. The interests of these borderlands often did not converge with those of the rest of the empire; in 1870 there was, in certain important respects, more diversity than there had been 160 years before.

# GLOSSARY OF PLACE AND TERRITORIAL NAMES

Listed are the English, German, Polish, or Swedish place and territorial names most frequently used in the text. For additional information concerning foreign terms, administrative and territorial units, institutions, and offices, see my glossary in *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914.*

Åbo (Sw.); Turku (Fin.)
Åland Islands (Sw.); Ahvenanmaa (Fin.)
Białystok (Pol.); Belostok (Rus.); Belastok (Belor.)
Borgå (Sw.); Porvoo (Fin.)
Bracław (Pol.); Bratslav (Rus. and Ukr.)
Brahestad (Sw.); Raahe (Fin.)
Chełm (Pol.); Kholm (Rus. and Ukr.)
Czehryń (Pol.); Chigirin (Rus.); Chyhyryn (Ukr.)
Dorpat (Ger.); Tartu (Est.)
Estland (Ger.); Eestimaa (Est.)
Helsingfors (Sw.); Helsinki (Fin.)
Iziasław (Pol.); Iziaslav (Rus. and Ukr.)
Kowno (Pol.); Kovno (Rus.); Kaunas (Lith.)
Krzemieniec (Pol.); Kremenets (Rus.); Kremianets (Ukr.)
Kuda (Ger.); Kuuda (Est.)
Kurland (Ger.); Kurzeme (Lat.)
Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine (Eng.): Beginning in the second part of the seventeenth century, the Dnieper River separated the Polish Right-Bank Ukraine from the Russian Left-Bank Ukraine. The city of Kiev on the right bank and the Zaporozhian region within the bend of the Dnieper were, however, included in the Russian part of the partitioned Ukraine. In the nineteenth century Kiev was reunited with the Right-Bank Ukraine, where Polish influence remained strong until after the insurrection of 1863-1864.
Livland (Ger.); Vidzeme (Lat.); Liivimaa (Est.)
Lwów (Pol.); L'vov (Rus.); L'viv (Ukr.); Lemberg (Ger.)
Mitau (Ger.); Jelgava (Lat.)
Mohylew (Pol.); Mogilev (Rus.); Magileu (Belor.); Mohyliv (Ukr.)

Nyland (Sw.); Uusimaa (Fin.)
Nystad (Sw.); Uusikaupunki (Fin.)
Ösel (Ger.); Saaremaa (Est.)
Pernau (Ger.); Pärnu (Est.)
Podolia (Eng.); Podole (Pol.); Podillia (Ukr.); Podoliia (Rus.)
Połock (Pol.); Polotsk (Rus.); Polatsk (Belor.)
Reval (Ger.); Tallinn (Est.); Revel' (Rus.)
Słuck (Pol.); Slutsk (Belor. and Rus.)
Sveaborg (Sw.); Suomenlinna (Fin.)
Tammerfors (Sw.); Tampere (Fin.)
Tavastehus (Sw.); Hämeenlinna (Fin.)
Uleåborg (Sw.); Oulu (Fin.)
Viborg (Sw.); Viipuri (Fin.); Vyborg (Rus.)
Volhynia (Eng.); Wołyń (Pol.); Volyn' (Rus. and Ukr.)
Walk (Ger.); Valga (Est.); Valka (Lat.)
Wenden (Ger.); Cēsis (Lat.)
Wilno (Pol.); Vil'na (Rus.); Vilnius (Lith.)

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