

THE REAL FACE OF RUSSIA

ESSAYS AND ARTICLES

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PREFACE

This book appears at a time when the Bolshevik rulers of the Russian communist empire are triumphantly celebrating the 50th anniversary of their take-over of the reins of power. All their huge propaganda machine is working itself up to glorify and magnify the "achievements" of half a century of Bolshevik dictatorship. The sad and shameful history of the Soviet Union in the last five decades is all but forgotten, its bloodstained pages are being surreptitiously torn out or compromising stains erased, uncomfortable skeletons are being hastily buried in the cupboards, and the world is being presented with a glossy picture of a powerful, benevolent and developed state, brimming with energy of happy and united people, multiplied by the harmony between the nations making up the USSR.

Many people in the free world are hypnotised by such a biased picture of the USSR, and even sometimes believe its claims to represent the apotheosis of an internationalist society. Others again believe that the USSR is merely another name for Russia, and do not perceive any distinction between the dominating Russian nation and the subjugated non-Russian nations, who after all constitute no less than 50 p.c. of the population of that immense empire stretching over one sixth of the earth's surface. For them Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians etc. do not exist, or else they are merely regional varieties of the "Russians", whereas in fact they are distinct and separate national entities fighting for their national independence. There are too many worshippers of "holy mother Russia" in the West who make every effort to draw a curtain of silence over the enslavement by Russia of numerous non-Russian nations. They deliberately mislead public opinion about the true nature of Bolshevism and Russian imperialism which presents today a serious threat to national and individual freedom in the world.

Various distinguished authors whose essays and articles appear in this publication trace the origin of the phenomenon notorious under the name of Bolshevism and attempt to define its real nature and character. By and large they come to the conclusion that Bolshevism has deeper roots in the Russian past and Russian mentality than in the writings of Karl Marx. They probe the peculiar aptitude of the Russians to embrace messianic ideas purporting to "save the world" and at the same, incidentally, helping to extend Russian domination over ever new territories. They expose mercilessly Russian chauvinist mentality and hypocrisy of imperialist Russian ideologies.

The contributors to this book analyze, from many different aspects, Russian imperialist ambitions and methods in the past, present and conceivable future. An article deals with the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation for its national independence. Two articles by the same author, concluding the collection, deal with the problem of countering the threat of Russian world conquest in the strategic and ideological spheres.

Hundreds of books have already been written about the Communist Russian ideology and state. What makes the present book different from the others is its deep and, at the same time, concise penetration to the roots of the problem. The authors do not lose themselves in details and superficialities, but get down to the essence of the peril looming over the free world from the totalitarian Russian Bolshevik empire encamped over the vast Eurasian land mass and ready to fill any vacuum on the globe.

V. B.

THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA

by

Dr. DMYTRO DONZOW

with a Foreword

by Maj.-Gen. J.F.C. FULLER, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

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FOREWORD

(TRANSLATION FROM THE GERMAN EDITION)

This is a profound and fundamental work surpassing all publications on the world crisis I have read so far, in that it presents the core of the problem which has been disturbing the old world for centuries and still today continues to disturb the entire world. It is not the conflict between different faiths or civilizations, important though these may be, but the conflict between the cultures of Europe and Asia that is its subject.

In Russia today, Marxism which permeated the country with a fanatical religious fervour at the time of the Revolution, is merely a liturgical language, and industrialisation has enabled Russia to catch up with the West as regards its material civilization. Nonetheless these factors — to use a Marxist concept — represent only a super-structure of the productive forces of Muscovite Messianism, and whether Russia is regarded as a Third Rome or a Third International, she is constantly striving to extend her territory and to assume the cultural leadership of the world.

Historically, the centuries-old conflict between Asia and Europe began with the clash between Persia and the Greek city states; it revealed itself even more clearly in the fight of the East Roman empire against the Arabs, the Huns, the Alans, the Mongols and many other Asiatic peoples, as well as against the Slavs. This clash appears just as clearly, in the conflict between Christianity and Islam — a conflict which lasted for a thousand years. All these struggles were in essence conflicts between different cultures, as was the case also in the struggle between Sweden and Russia in the Great Northern War. Leibniz, at the time, understood it, for when Charles XII suffered a defeat at Poltava in 1709, Leibniz said: "The Tsar will be a terror to all Europe, for he will, so to speak, become a Northern Turk." With it began the present era of the cultural conflict between Europe and Asia — and this a mere 12 years after the Turkish danger was removed by Prince Eugene on the battlefield of Zenta.

What are the components of the Muscovite Messianism, the spiritual nomadism, which today threatens to extinguish Western culture and with it also the Western way of life? We find the answer to this question in this scholarly and fascinating book. Dr. Donzow has most thoroughly investigated and explained here the factors of which this Messianism consists. He writes: "One can affirm with certainty that the ideology of Muscovite Communism and that of Tsarism are merely two different forms of one and the same thing, namely of the same phenomenon of a more general character and this is nothing

else than the Muscovite Messianism which wages war against the West."

This is, in fact, a book which ought to be read by all those wishing to understand the present-day world crisis, for it explains and plumbs the problem with which at the present time the entire world is concerned.

J. F. C. Fuller

CHAPTER I

THE FORCES OF THE ANTICHRIST

Europe and, indeed, the whole world is dominated by the sign of terror. This terror, created in the year 1917, has not descended upon the world unexpectedly. Our age is one of those eras of which it is prophesied in the Gospels: "And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars... For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: and there shall be famines and earthquakes in divers places. But all these things are the beginning of sorrows. And many false prophets shall arise, and shall lead many astray. And because iniquity shall be multiplied, the love of the many shall wax cold... and there shall be terrors and great signs from heaven... and upon the earth distress of nations" (Matthew, Ch. 24; Luke, Ch. 21).

Even the time when such catastrophes happen is, it is true, not expressed according to man-made calendars, but nevertheless clearly predestined, as, too, is the place: "Wheresoever the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together." And that is always the case. Wherever there is a smell of carrion, wherever and whenever society begins to rot, the vultures flock together in order to tear their victims to pieces.

And is not that era depicted in the Gospels which began in the year 1917? Are not wars being conducted everywhere in the world between nations and are not civil wars being waged within the nations? Are there not amongst us false prophets from the East, holding swords in their hands? Are we not witnessing the paralysing of the thoughts, hearts and will of many of the mighty of the free world? Is it not evident that only a few have resisted temptation, whilst many, however, "as in those days which were before the flood were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, ...and they knew not until the flood came, and took them all away" (Matthew, Ch. 24).

May it be left to those born blind to search for the fundamental cause of this terror in the material and visible world, — namely in the conflict about state frontiers, countries, worldly wealth, and in the rival struggle between various imperialisms; the cause lies elsewhere. It is a struggle between the ancient Christian civilization of the West and the forces of the Devil, which are preparing their last onslaught on the former; not a struggle for territories or party programmes, but a struggle for the soul of man created in God's likeness. If it were not so, why should the false prophets — the Frenchman Rousseau, the Jew Marx, and the Russian Lenin, strive, above all, to effect the severance from Christ? Why should such an intensive attempt be made to destroy the idea of God in man's soul, to infect man's mind, his heart and his will with rottenness? Why do the "counsel of the ungodly" in the Kremlin as well as their emissaries in the free world pursue this as their main aim?

For the simple reason that they know that wherever this aim is achieved, the deceived peoples will become the willing and obedient tool of the power of darkness and their blind slaves: they know that their satanic power, the power of the false prophets, will then rule the world unchallenged; that this power will assume its rule as soon as the masses and the peoples believe its doctrine, — its doctrine that one should worship the material things in life, mammon, profit and pleasure. If one believes that the false prophets have the power to change stones into bread, one must likewise believe that happiness and well-being will be achieved by undisciplined human reason and by human instincts; one only needs to let the peoples detach themselves from the chief commandment "thou shalt not make any graven image" in place of God, they will then bow down to and worship the evil power and will promptly become a pack of wild beasts or a herd of domestic animals and will willingly allow themselves to be pushed into an iron cage or into a pen.

Ukraine was the first to take up the fight against this evil power. For this power had, in the first place, emanated from Moscow and then remained invisible for a long time; it subsequently, during the fire and smoke of the so-called "October Revolution", showed its grim countenance and its red banner, with the invisible inscription: "Falsehood instead of truth! Evil instead of good! Ugliness instead of beauty! Antichrist instead of Christ!" There are many weaklings on this side of the Iron Curtain who allow themselves to be deceived, bribed and intimidated by the envoys of the Red Star, inasmuch as they establish a regular cult of the "light from the East", worship its idols, propagate its devilish doctrine, exhort those persons who are prepared to share the world with the Devil to engage in co-existence and cooperation with the latter for the purpose of rebuilding the world, and are full of admiration, fear and servility towards the bestial power which is preparing to inflict the same fate on the West

as it has already inflicted on Ukraine and other nations, conquered by Muscovites.

Those who have grown confused as a result of the progressive doctrine of the false prophets, ask: "What is the purpose of this superstition?" In what way is the Devil connected with it? How can one recognize that the invisible power of evil is at the head of the procession of the "era of progress"? — It is not hard for those whose brains have not been confused by Moscow's satanic religion to recognize this. One only needs to consider the works of the Devil's apostles. Must we not then realize that, inasmuch as they promised everyone the annihilation of absolutism and autocracy, they have introduced an autocracy which is a thousand times more terrible? That, inasmuch as they promised the "common people" freedom, they have imposed a servitude a thousand times worse on them, as well as on all social classes and on the peoples that have come under their rule? That, inasmuch as they promised equality, they have created a caste of new rulers of the type described in the Bible? That, inasmuch as they promised brotherhood, they have created a state of affairs in which man behaves like a ravenous wolf towards his neighbours? That, inasmuch as they promised happiness, the socialist paradise, for everyone, they have created a hell? That, inasmuch as they promised prosperity, they have introduced starvation and misery? That, inasmuch as they promised peace, they have waged war constantly against everyone; that, inasmuch as they claimed that they would free human reasoning from the compulsory dogmas of religion, they have created a dogmatism and a conformism such as no theocracy has ever known, and have introduced an inquisition such as has never before been imposed on any era? That, inasmuch as they promised to abolish the divine Commandments — "Thou shalt not kill! Neither shalt thou steal! Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbour!" — they have introduced the commandments of the Devil — "lie, kill and steal." That, inasmuch as they promised truth and life, they have brought falsehood and death with them?... Falsehood! — It is by this weapon that we recognize their leader, whom the Gospel calls the "father of falsehood", and the power which has inspired the false prophets of Moscow; for "the servants of the Devil are fond of creating the impression that they are servants of truth"; they are fond of constructing a chaos of conceptions out of mendacious slogans, inasmuch as they mix right and left, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, in order to lead the human race astray.

Those sceptics who are not satisfied with this proof, should recall another sentence which says: "By their fruits ye shall know them", and should bear in mind that he who cooperates with the Devil, builds on sand and that his house will fall. Indeed, is it not evident that the new tower of Babylon which has been erected by the

Muscovite builders is tottering? Is it not evident that they have created a state of chaos, out of which they will not be able to find a way? Is it not obvious to us that the spiritual foundations of their structure — their ideas — are already disintegrating into dust? Is it not obvious that they are trying in vain to assert their position by sheer despotism?

To those sceptics who are still not satisfied with this proof we can but say, — consider the “Gospel” of the said false prophets! With cynicism and with an unparalleled audacity they declare in their “Gospel” that they have been sent by the Devil to change the world into chaos. Moscow reminds one of the man in the Bible who was possessed of an unclean spirit, who screamed and hurled himself against stones, who rent his chains asunder, and no one had strength to tame him. The Muscovites have been possessed of this spirit of evil and, indeed, from time immemorial they have boasted of this fact; at the same time, they persuade the world — as does their patron saint, the invisible patron saint of falsehood, that the latter possesses a beneficial power, the representative of which is Moscow. Indeed, all the panegyrists of tsarist, democratic and Bolshevik Russia endeavour to persuade the world in general of this fact.

Pushkin flirts with his Devil and affirms that though the latter is a “questionable and mendacious” spirit, he is nevertheless a “beautiful” one. This Russian pagan god is portrayed as a darker, more sinister, more perverse and more terrible Devil in the works of the epileptic *Dostoevsky*, the panegyrist of the mad, the degenerates, and those possessed of Satan. In a conversation with his guest, the Devil, Ivan Karamazov says to him: “You are falsehood, you are the personification of myself.” One Russian critic has affirmed that in his novel “*Dostoevsky* let the Devil (who dwelt in his breast) express his own most intimate thoughts.” And the same Devil knew what was expected of him. The thoughts expressed by the Devil who visited his “hero” are the thoughts of Ivan Karamazov and of *Dostoevsky* himself: “The idea of God must be destroyed amongst mankind, and this is the primary task to be carried out.” For once God is destroyed in the human soul, He will also be eliminated from all human actions and works, from all human institutions and society. And *Dostoevsky* recognized this fact, for he realized that those who, possessed of the Devil, would bring about the Russian revolution, would no longer be persons possessed of demons, but simply “demons” (“Byessy”) themselves, as, indeed, he called them in his novel; he knew only too well that the revolution would be started by those “slaves and lackeys”, who, “in the name of envy, obsequiousness and equality” will trample underfoot the “image of the divine ideal”, the image of God in man’s soul.

This demonic obsession on the part of the Muscovites is even more apparent shortly before the appearance of Bolshevism and even more

significant after the victory of the latter. The Russian writer, *Maximilian Voloshin*, observes that after the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, “man became a devil towards his fellow-men” — in Russia, in the land of demonic slavery. Another writer, *V. Ivanov*, laments that he has been “cast off” by his keeper, his demon, and complains: “My keeper, deserted by you, I have fallen”... In place of a guardian angel, there is a keeper of the Devil, in whose absence the Russian feels “deserted.” The same writer continues: “Was not Lucifer the first of all my masks? Was it not I, I in him who ceased to believe that the Father is a living force, inasmuch as I said: I am the only one”... In place of God, the human “ego” of *Ivanov* is called God; Lucifer, the “morning star”, taught him that “God is not and that only Man is supreme” (Man with a capital letter).

On this superficial foundation, on this sandy soil, he builds up his intention: “I shall found a mad tower” over the illusion of life — as all Russians do in accordance with the famous example of the tower of Babel. A similar prophet of the Devil was *S. Yesenin*, about whom, as about others, the same *Ivanov* says, “whirled about by the tempest of the revolution, dazzled by it, rid of the measure for good and evil, for truth and falsehood, and obsessed by the idea that they were flying upwards to the stars, they fell down in the dirt on their faces”, after they had exchanged “Demon” for God, that is to say, in other words had entered the service of the “evil spirit.”

And *Maxim Gorky*’s proletarian says of himself: “I shall manifest myself! How? Only the Devil alone knows how. Everything can go to the Devil!” One Russian literary critic affirms that “in Russia the Devil’s works are glossed over with God’s name more than anywhere else in the world; the Devil has stolen from us that which belongs to God.” For this reason, the Russians themselves have from time to time had their doubts and have not known who — in the campaign of the Muscovite Ivan to conquer the world — sits on their backs, “whether it is the Christ Child or the young dog, Antichrist.” The Russian writer, *D. Merezhkovsky*, affirms that all *A. Chekhov*’s and *Gorky*’s heroes “resemble the devils on *Goya*’s pictures.” Prior to the revolution, however, *Chekhov* himself wrote: “A storm has broken out all around us. Everything is flying about in all directions, and we, too, are flying about — whether upwards or downwards, whether to God or to the Devil, — it is impossible to say.” And the above-mentioned *V. Ivanov* in his memoirs describes the atmosphere of various social classes in Russia prior to the revolution: in the palace of the Tsar — *Rasputin*’s orgies, amongst the socialists — the proletarian *Gorky*, in the liberal, bourgeois literary salons — “the destructive poison of insensible ale-house eroticism”, a “mystical anarchism”, some “third commandment” or other, and blasphemy combined with “searching for God”, — all of them mixed together!

V. Ivanov portrays one of the members of the Satanist sect which existed at that time, one of those persons who worshipped "the morning star, the source of grace and power", — the star of Lucifer — and immediately made a pilgrimage to the monastery of Athos... And one of these Lucifer-adherents declaims: "You have turned from God? Good, well done! But it is not enough to turn from God. One has to prove one's worth in the eyes of 'the other one.' You are of the opinion that 'the other one' will immediately accept you and will immediately help you as soon as you have removed the cross that you have been wearing round your neck? One must cherish him alone in one's heart..."

The moment when the entire "progressive" Russia would fall at Lucifer's feet and would worship him openly and no longer secretly as under tsarism, — this was the moment which Dostoevsky foresaw when he regarded the symbolic figure in his vision, the figure of a "common slave, a lackey, who will climb up a ladder in order to mutilate the image of the *divine ideal* in the name of equality, envy and stomach." In these words there lies the entire essence of the Russian revolution, — a revolution of slaves, of barbarians, of lackeys against the divine element in the human soul.

Blok is a cynic: in his poem "The Twelve" he depicts twelve marching Bolshevik soldiers of the Red Army as twelve apostles of a new truth, at their head the Devil, wearing "a wreath of white roses", and the mask of Christ. In his poem "The Scythians" he prophesies an analogous advance of the Muscovite horde — this time in order to subjugate the world — an advance of the millions of the masses, drugged and intoxicated with mystic heathenism, who swear that they love Europe, — the same Europe that they regard "with both hatred and love" — and that it is precisely because of this love that they want to crush Europe: "Are we to blame if your skeleton breaks into pieces in our heavy, loving paws?" Here again everything is combined, — love, murder, the "loving tenderness" of an assassin and the mystical ecstasy of a rogue. Dying in hospital, Blok dreams of a rising sun which will shine on the universe, but this sun, in his eyes, is both a universal and a purely Russian one.

The first stage of this evolution was the negation of the existence of God (and the conversion to the Devil); the second stage consisted in worshipping the Devil and subsequently glorifying man. Ivan Karamazov says: "It is incomprehensible to me how one can say — 'there is no God', without saying at the same time 'I am God!'" "The main theme of Russian literature", so D. Merezhkovsky wrote, "consisted already before the revolution in writing about the relation of man to man, ignoring God, without God, and finally — against God." Gorky affirms: "Man is truth! This is everything, the Alpha and Omega. Everything in man, everything for man, man alone

exists!" And Chekhov imitates him: "Man is above everything in Nature; he is even higher than that which is unfathomed and which seems miraculous", — that is to say higher than God.

When the Russians elevated man to the place of God, they did so without recognizing the laws over man and without recognizing any form of discipline. And this was bound to lead to the worship of all that was carnal, of the animal or beast in man. For this reason, the Russian thinker and writer, *Rozanov*, recognized neither Christianity nor Christ, since the religion of Christ, a religion of strict spiritual discipline, was a "religion of death" for this type of Russian. Golgotha in his opinion was a "poisoning of the joy in life." Christianity was too ascetical for him, an armour which was too hard for the naked Russian. Gorky maintained in the same sense that "the stomach in man is the chief thing. All human action comes from the stomach." The natural animal element is L. Tolstoy's god, too. He adores all that is carnal, both feelings and bestiality. The hero of his story *Yeroshka*, says: "I am a grand fellow, I am a drunkard, a thief and a hunter!" For "an animal is wiser than a man, even though it be a pig... It is a pig and yet it is not worse than you, for it is just as much an animal of God as you are" — and this in Tolstoy's heathenish logic means that the swinish nature in man must not be reformed or punished, but, on the contrary, must be extolled. And even the Russian critics of the bare-footed count, who understand all this in his character, namely that the impulse of *Yeroshka's* life consists in "love of freedom, loafing, robbery and war", bow down before him as if before an apostle of the evangelistic truth. The robber, the murderer, the animal, the pig — with all their uninhibited impulses — such is Tolstoy's god. And this is not an accident. *Yeroshka* and Tolstoy know perfectly well what they mean. "There is no sin at all — so *Yeroshka* preaches — take an example from animals!" Religion in *Yeroshka's* opinion is something empty. "We shall die, grass will grow over us, and that is all!" Like an animal, he does not distinguish between good and evil; everything is permissible. "An animal joy in carnal life" — that is how a Russian writer characterizes L. Tolstoy's philosophy.

In the subsequent stage there ensues a devilish confusion in the conceptions and ideas of the Russians, — a confusion of all the "pros" and "cons", of all the affirmatives and negatives, of all that is "permitted" and "prohibited", of all the differences between truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, — a negation of every form of discipline, both in moral, political and social life. *Konstantin Leontyev*, who realized this only too profoundly, wrote in the 19th century: "The Russian national community (as regards its customs), in any case already egalitarian enough, will proceed along the deadly path of 'universal confusion' even more rapidly. And we — to begin with, people without a social class and then

without a Church — we shall engender the Antichrist", — that is to say, shall become godless. And what will be even worse, as the servants of the Antichrist they will appear in the guise of Christ, in order to turn everything into chaos, for where there is no supreme legislator, there is chaos. The confusion of hatred under the guise of love is to be found in Blok and likewise in Pushkin, who allegedly "praised freedom and asked for mercy for those who had erred", but in reality extolled the ruthless Tsar Peter I and condemned all those such as Ukrainian Hetman Mazepa who, like the free Caucasians, brandished the sword of freedom against tyranny and evil. Dostoevsky admits: "Europe arouses in me a deadly loathing, even hate"; and at the same time he is full of praise for the Russian advance towards the West since in this way "the blood shed will save Europe", — Europe which he allegedly "loved" greatly. Merezhkovsky rightly points out that if this is love, then it is the love of a wild beast for its prey. Dostoevsky had his reasons for admiring the robbers — both those on the throne, that is the Tsar, as well as those in prison, where for a considerable period he had an opportunity of striking up a friendship with them. He was greatly impressed by their "enormous will-power, their boundless passion, their eagerness to achieve the aim which they had set themselves", in Dostoevsky's opinion, robbers are "the strongest and the most talented people" in Russia.

Satan is their patron, from whom they derive their spiritual strength, namely according to their own words — the aesthete Pushkin and the "rusticated" Count L. Tolstoy, the apostle of the city rabble, Dostoevsky, and the cynic Blok, who confuse everything in one medley, — good and evil, falsehood and truth, beauty and ugliness, so that all ethical values are destroyed in the general chaos, and so that proof is given that robbery is freedom, murder is love, equality is mutiny against God, beauty is dirt and swinishness. Dostoevsky himself was somewhat confused as to the problem of what a peculiar spiritual ability on the part of the Russians it would be, not to understand "what is sin and what is not", the ability "to cultivate the highest ideal, side by side with the greatest vileness in their soul and to do both quite sincerely." He did not know whether to describe this as the "spiritual breadth of character" of the Russians, which would take them far, or as "simple baseness." It is the baseness with which the Devil has imbued him, and it is also the "spiritual breadth of character" which, by deception and cunning, endeavours to convince the world that this satanic vileness is a "new truth" for the world, which it should accept from the Russian Satanists.

Incidentally, the Russians are not even desirous of understanding their spiritual chaos. In the opinion of a true Russian, "the Russians are drunkards, swine, libertines, liars, but all the same good people" (Chekhov), — good, since they are Russians, the "chosen people",

who, whatever they may do, do everything "for the good of mankind." Thus, Blok, for instance, affirms: "Maybe we are Asiatics, maybe we do not distinguish between love and hate, maybe in our great love for mankind we crush the latter in our loving embrace, — but it is all the same!" "The barbaric lyre summons to the brotherly banquet of work and peace", as does the world barbarian "with leering and greedy eyes", as does the same barbarian nowadays in the United Nations. Even those who, as, for instance, Merezhkovsky, see in the Russian revolution the phenomenon of the coming hooliganism, scorn the West and adore their Russia, whatever it may be like. Like Blok and Dostoevsky, Merezhkovsky, also issues his warning to Europe: "All the external facts of our revolution are known to Europe, but the internal character of the same is incomprehensible to it. It sees the body which moves, but it does not see the motive soul of the Russian revolution... We fly and fall head downwards... You are sober, we are drunk; you are just, we are devoid of all feeling for law... To you policy is knowledge, to us a religion. We are mystics. And the revolution, too, is a religion..." This is the philosophy of a raging horde, which has long since made Satan its god and which only recognizes one *ultima ratio*, — the power of numbers. Pushkin hurled his provocative challenge at the West, at the "people's orators" of Europe: "Why are you threatening Russia with your anathema? Do you think that the Russians are weak? Do you think that we are but few in number? We have extended our empire from Perm to the Taurus, from Arctic Finland to tropical Colchis, from the shaken Kremlin to the walls of immobile China!" All this is "Russian" territory! In short, "we knock everyone down with our caps alone and they fall down dead!" (a Russian saying). And Lermontov writes in a similar strain: "Why did the Caucasian Kazbek Mountain tremble (as the writer believes) before the host of Russians who advanced to the Caucasus?" Because "the grim Kazbek began to count and was forced to leave his enemies uncounted", because he could not finish counting this host... And Blok voices a similar opinion, already during the Bolshevik era, in his provocative challenge to Europe: "You number millions? We consist of infinite numbers and infinite numbers!" Here again there is no reference to ethical or ideological superiority, but only to the numbers of the Russian horde. And Stalin adopted the same attitude: when, on one occasion, certain statesmen of the West wished to discuss the political interests of the Vatican with him, he asked sarcastically, "And how many divisions has the Pope?"

With whatever idea this power of destruction has tried or tries to disguise itself — whether with the idea of the "true faith", or the Muscovite "Third Rome", of the all-Slav brotherhood, or with that of the "liberation of the working classes" as, for instance, under Bolshevik rule, it has always remained the same power of despotism,

the power of triumphant evil under the guise of good, with the watchword: "take the animals as an example!" A power whose warriors, the "sons of the Devil", have always regarded the "dog of an Antichrist" as the symbol of their "guardian angel." The Devil's legions, — possessing not the quality of knighthood, but the quality of a horde.

It was the same half godless, half heathen natural element, which in Muscovite Russia lived for ever both under tsarism and also previously under the grand duchy of Moscow. None other than the great Russian literary critic, *Vissarion Belinsky*, wrote as follows on this subject: "The Russian people — the most religious people in the world? This is a lie! The basis of religiousness is piety, morality, fear of God. Regard the Russian people more profoundly and you will discover that in keeping with their character they are an extremely atheistic people. They have many superstitions, but you will find in them no trace of religiousness... In the Russian people religiousness is not even to be found in the priesthood... The majority of our priests were always characterized by fat bellies, scholastic pedantry and complete illiteracy." There was amongst the Russian people no "sense of human dignity, — this had got lost in dirt and filth in the course of many centuries..."

And it was precisely for this reason that the transition in Muscovite Russia from Tsarism to Bolshevism was effected so easily. The pompous phrases of the Bolshevik magicians rapidly disappeared and the new regime returned to the protection of that dark power which the previous regime had already obeyed. As the saying goes: "The cur returns to his scum", or as Maximilian Voloshin wrote: "Everything was mixed together, the signs and the banners, the forgotten past of the tsars and the present reality of the Bolsheviks..." The Horde, which on the ruins of the free world desires to raise her Satanic banner of shame, terror and slavery.

CHAPTER II

RUSSIAN MESSIANISM

Common opinion sees the cause of the disease with which the social organism of Europe is stricken in the conflict between various forms of imperialism, that are hostile to each other. This opinion is not shared by the author. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the author does not share this opinion completely.

There can be no doubt about the fact that the present state of chaos is a result of the conflict between "imperialisms"; and undoubtedly, the hysterical clamour of the lower classes for a "new social order" is one of the main causes of a deeper or, at least, an older conflict.

This other conflict remains latent in the social struggle which Europe is undergoing. This other conflict was at the bottom of the conflict of 1914 between the two groups of states which were hostile to each other. And the same factor is evident in the revolution of 1648 and 1708-9 in Ukraine and in the national revolutions of 1917 in East Europe. This conflict, which Leibniz and Renan, Napoleon I and Hugo, Engels and Lord Beaconsfield foresaw with considerable alarm, which suggested visions of revenge to Herzen and Leontyev, Bakunin and Gorky, is the great conflict between two forms of civilization, between two political, social, cultural and religious ideals, — *the conflict between Europe and Russia*.

The fact that this conflict is actually based on numerous problems which disturb our era, will best be realized if we consider the last phase of this conflict, that is to say the phenomenon which now bears the ineffaceable designation of Bolshevism, and if we analyse this phenomenon, which many members of our indiscriminating intellectual class regard as the most perfect form of a social revolution.

What is Bolshevism? — those who support it unconsciously ask (for those who support it consciously do not put this question), and answer: it is an international movement and its aim is to overthrow imperialism, capitalism, nationalism and all the other idols of the bourgeois pantheon. Bolshevism, so its opponents retort, is the rebellion of slaves, the negation of logical laws and of the laws of national economy. Bolshevism — a third category of persons affirm — is a conspiracy to suppress Christianity. Both the first, the second and the third category are right, inasmuch as Bolshevik Russia has actually started social movements of international significance. But all three categories ignore the fact that Bolshevism, as its designation signifies, is a *Muscovite* and, indeed, primarily a *Muscovite phenomenon*. It is true that the foremost aim of the paid and of the idealist agents of Bolshevism outside the Soviet Union was the destruction of the European bourgeois order of society. But was that all? Was this the only reason for the violence with which countless such agents in Vienna, Budapest, New-York, Rome, Paris, London, and other centres, large and small, of the West carried on their work of destroying the existing order in the countries concerned? Was the overthrow of a system of exploitation really their foremost aim, or should one perhaps look for other deeper and stronger motives in their violence, motives about which Dostoevsky wrote in his day? In his *A Writer's Diary* he wrote: "Why do practically nine-tenths of the Russians, when travelling abroad, always seek to establish contact with European leftist circles, who, as it were, *disdain their own culture*? Is this not an indication of the Russian soul, to whom European culture has always been something foreign? I personally hold this opinion. The Europeans, however, regard us, rather, as barbarians, who roam about Europe and are pleased to have found something which can be destroyed; who carry out destruction for the sake of destroying and merely in order to enjoy seeing everything fall to pieces, — just as the wild hordes did in the past, as for instance the Huns, who invaded ancient Rome and demolished this holy city without knowing what great cultural treasures they were destroying."¹

Is there at least a grain of truth in these words of this gifted Muscovite? And if so, then do his words only apply to such wanderers of the revolution as Bakunin, or even to Herzen, too, who cursed the Western world with the words: "Long live chaos, vive la mort!" Or do they also apply to Lenin's followers who predicted the decline of European democracy? Or, possibly, also to the head procurator of the Russian "most sacred synod", Pobedonostsev, who violently attacked this same democracy as the "biggest lie of our era"? Do they apply only to Bakunin's intellectual descendants, to the Russian Red Army, or also to the army of the Tsar, which was as eager to

¹) F. Dostoevsky, *A Writer's Diary*.

turn the Galician and other West Ukrainians into "orthodox Russians" as the Bolsheviks were to turn them into Russian Communists? Do they not apply to that army which is trying to force its "pax Moscovitica" on Europe just as violently as Lenin tried to drag the latter into his Communist league of nations, into his "societas Leniniana (or leonina)"? Can the questions raised by Dostoevsky be applied only to the Red cavalry armies which carried their social and political system — that of the tyranny of the "Soviets" — into the West, or also to Catherine II's military rabble, who likewise brought the social and political system of Russia namely tyranny and serfdom, to Ukraine, Poland etc.?

And if that is the case, then must we not regard these migrations in Europe on the part of armed and unarmed Muscovites of various generations, who take a pleasure in destroying something there — as *phenomena of one and the same category*, with a continuance which is more universal and more dangerous than Bolshevism or Tsarism? One can affirm with certainty that *the ideology of Muscovite Communism and that of Tsarism are merely two different forms of one and the same thing, namely of the same phenomenon of a more general character and this is nothing else than the Muscovite Messianism which wages war against the West*. Threateningly and rapaciously, Bolshevik Russia, just like the Russia of Peter I, Nicholas' I day, is constantly on the look-out for "a possibility to destroy something."

The answer to all the above questions has already been given, time and time again, by the Russian intellectuals, — by the same persons who once cultivated "national traits" and later played a part in the "Chekas" and "proletarian culture", — the advocates of the idea of Russian Messianism: the Russian "intelligentsia", who in their own opinion are the guardians and the personification of the ideals of "truth and right", the prophets of the great mission of the Russian people which will make the entire human race happy, but in our opinion are the "propaganda makers" of Muscovite, Petersburg, Petrograd and Leningrad imperialism and of Muscovite imperialism over again, the sentimental apologists of the Muscovite "urge towards the West", the severe prosecutors in the historical law suit of the nations, who, with bloodstained hands, knock on the door of the Occident, — in short, the "advocatus diaboli."

It is possible that the representatives of this Russian intellectual class differed from one another as regards mental powers and genius. But all of them, prophets and harlequins alike, had one characteristic in common, — a deep mystical belief in the great predestination, in the world mission of the Muscovite people. They could paint their people in rosy colours like the national fanatics did, or could compare it to a herd of cattle, as for instance Chekhov did in his "Peasants"

("Moujiks"); or they could kiss the hem of its stinking "caftan", as Count Leo Tolstoy did, or, in fear of its unfathomable and incomprehensible nature, could appeal to the bayonets of the Tsar, like P. Struve and other no less famous writers of the once (after the revolution of 1905) well-known compilation "Signposts" ("Vekhi") did, — it all came to the same thing! Whether angel or devil, Apollo or centaur, half man and half animal, this people was in the eyes of the entire Muscovite intelligentsia a people chosen by God, and if it was an animal, then it was a sacred animal before which all other peoples should bow down in awe and reverence. This people and no other was to preach a new gospel to the agonized West. It alone was to proclaim the redeeming "Let there be light" amidst the chaos of the world.

"I believed and I still believe that Russia, which must take the lead in a new formation of the Eastern states, is to give the world a new culture, too, and is to replace the decadent civilization of Romanic-Germanic Europe by this new Slavic-Eastern civilization", — thus wrote the "Pope" of the Slavophiles, Leontyev, in the days of Nicholas I.² And the Slavophil poet Tyutchev, prophesying the death of the West in the near future, exclaimed: "Above the gigantic ruins of the West, Russia which is even greater will rise up, like the Holy Ark... Who will venture to doubt her predestination?" — "The West has already said all it could say. Ex oriente lux! Russia alone is predestinated to assume the spiritual leadership of Europe!" — such is the passionate cry of that notoriously fanatical advocate of Moscow's Slavophilism, S. Bulgakov. And, moved by these words, Rozanov answers, like an echo, "It was high time this was said." Pushkin idealizes Russian serfdom by contrasting it with the "suppression" of the English peasantry,³ and writes verses imbued with a violent hatred of European civilization.⁴

For years, the Russian patriot and visionary, A. Herzen, dreamt of the longed-for decline of the West and of "new barbarians who would come there to destroy it." The Slavophil Yuriy Samarin rejoices over the role which Russia would play "in the entire world", and the arch-revolutionary Bakunin believes that the Russian people "will bring new foundations into history and will create a new civilisation, as well as a new faith and a new life." Gorky "spits" America and "the sweet France in the face" in the name of the Muscovite lumpen-proletarian ideals; and Lenin usurps the heritage of the prime apostles of the socialist Church to the effect that before his bulls collapse the socialist idols of the West fallen into sin — as

²) K. Leontyev, *The Orient, Russia and the Slav Element*.

³) A. Pushkin, *Conversation with an Englishman*.

⁴) A. Pypin, *Characteristic Features of Literary Opinions*.

once did royal thrones before the bulls of an Innocent or a Bonifacius. And even Chaadayev ends in his "Apology of a Madman" with the belief in Russia's great destiny. "It is our task", he wrote, "to bring the saving principle of order into the world that has fallen prey to anarchy. Russia must not reject this mission imposed on her by the Master of Heaven and Earth." The voices of all representatives of Russian political thought joined in a single pæan in honour of their people; in fact they were all prepared to underwrite the official conception of Russian history which was formulated by the notorious chief of the secret police of Tsar Nicholas I, Count von Benckendorff, in the following words: "Her (Russia's) past was admirable, her present is more than splendid, and her future", wrote the count who apparently must have had foreknowledge of the Bolsheviks, "will surpass everything conceivable by human imagination!"

Some brought forward the "sound forms" of the Muscovite state structure which were to save Europe; others wanted to cure the world with the help of the Muscovite peasant community, the "Obshchina", with its system of land as common property, or saw Russia's mission in the liberation of the Slav peoples (the white internationalists), or in the "liberation" of the world proletariat (the red internationalists), or in the theoretical ideal of an ethical rebirth of mankind through Russia. Some dreamt of Moscow as a "Third Rome", others saw in Moscow the capital of the Third International. The ideologists of Muscovite Messianism differed from one another as far as the individual details of their ideas were concerned, but they were all firmly convinced that the Muscovite people, though perhaps grudgingly and not by any means voluntarily, would nevertheless, like a donkey spurred on by the shouts of its drivers, drag along all other peoples in its wake towards an unknown but great future, in which these theoreticians, obsessed by a political mania, saw the shining vision of either a new "civitas dei", or the Muscovite cross on St. Sophia's Cathedral, or a "socialist fatherland of all workers."

Exaggeration and one-sidedness? But Messianism is not exclusively a peculiarity of the Russian people, — the sceptic will retort. But it is not a case of either exaggeration or one-sidedness, for what I have designated as Muscovite Messianism (and, incidentally, Pan-Muscovitism would be a more fitting designation) cannot in any way be regarded as identical with analogous phenomena amongst other nations and most certainly not with Pan-Latinism or Pan-Germanism.

Sceptics will reply, that may be so, but surely Messianism does not constitute the essence of Bolshevism? They will point out that the form which Bolshevik propaganda assumes in the West is a temporary phenomenon, which is just as transitory as the state forms introduced by Napoleon, which were the outcome of the French Revolution; and this latter event, so they will affirm, resembled Bolshevism

inasmuch as it was surely, a social revolution. And what connection can the conflict between Russia and Europe have with it? — they will ask. — This way of reasoning will no doubt seem irrefutable to those who always ascribe the same significance to social movements which the leaders of such movements endow them with. But if we study this extremely complicated problem more thoroughly, we come to quite a different conclusion, — namely, that the “liberation of the world proletariat” and the “liberation of the Slav peoples” are empty phrases, at the back of which there is quite a different factor. *And this is Muscovite Messianism, which is already known to us.*

Apart from the bombastic phraseology of the Bolsheviks, which they use to impress their subjects, whose intellect has been blunted by starvation, and their foreign adherents, who have been won over by various methods, there is another obvious characteristic trait of Bolshevik ideology; and that is consideration of the entire foreign policy of Bolshevism not from the aspect of such opposing conceptions as “revolution and reaction” or “proletariat and bourgeoisie”, but from the point of view of the *antagonism between Russia, as the vanguard of Asia, and Europe as a whole*. When the Bolsheviks play off national religious movements in the Orient against Occident, they are appealing not to any class conflict, but to the national fight of the East against Europe. When they seek to obtain the help of some Moslem ruler and leader or other, this is not an alliance on their part with the “international revolution” against the “international reaction”, nor a policy of alliance with the working masses, but merely the policy of national interests, the fight for Russia’s supremacy over Europe, — a policy from which the Bolsheviks try in vain to absolve themselves. When Lenin attacked Great Britain and America, he censured their *Anglo-Saxon* (and not their capitalistic) freedoms, which he took good care to put in inverted commas.⁵ When Bukharin criticized the “compromising elements” of the European working classes, he was not so much attacking the “traitors” of the working class as the “German, Austrian, French and English Mensheviks.”⁶ When Trotsky tried to rekindle the “patriotic fire” of his red mercenaries in the war against Poland, it was not so much a war against the “Szlachta” (nobility) as a war against the *Poles*... It is precisely at the European “slowness of thought”, at the French “petty bourgeoisie” and at the English “cretinism” that the Soviet Russian Olympus hurls its thunderbolts. It is Europe that opposes Russia’s political expansion, that is the enemy of Bolshevism and its Asian allies! On one side, Russia, — on the other, Europe! Such is the formula of Soviet Russia’s foreign policy.

⁵ V. Lenin, *The State and the Revolution*.

⁶ N. Bukharin, *The Programme of the Communists*.

And it is interesting to note that this policy considers the other Russian Messianist ideology, the Slavophil trend, from the same point of view. If a Slav problem arises, it is not considered individually or abstractly, but as a preliminary stage in the general campaign against the West. Where the internal affairs of the European peoples, who are either under Russian dominion or not, are concerned, all these questions are considered from the point of view of consolidating Russia’s power and Empire with regard to Europe.

A further comparison reveals an even more striking analogy. The Bolsheviks declare war on the European “bourgeois” order by appealing to the proletariat. And the old bourgeois Slavophiles likewise declared war on this same bourgeoisie by appealing to the same proletariat. Were they likewise champions of socialism, or are the Bolsheviks Slavophiles? Neither is the case. But both trends served or serve the same national Muscovite ideal, which necessitates the decline of Europe. Leontyev based his political theory on the following argument: “In this sense of culture and of way of life, which I regard as so valuable, all the Slavs, the Southern and Western Slavs alike, are nothing but an unavoidable evil, since all these peoples in the stage of their intellectual classes offer the world nothing but the most ordinary European bourgeoisie.”⁷

“Nothing but the most ordinary bourgeoisie”! How does the tsarist Leontyev come to make such a statement? Is it a slip of the tongue on his part? No, not at all, — it is his firm conviction, for he also writes elsewhere: “It is high time to put a stop to the development of the petty bourgeois, liberal progress!”⁸ And two pages further on, he again refers to the “Slav brothers” and expresses his regret that “these, to judge by all their qualities and faults, resemble the European bourgeoisie of the most mediocre type far more closely than we do.” — On page 415, this anti-bourgeois tsarist writes: “If the word is to cast aside bourgeois civilization in the near future, the new ideal of humanity will of necessity spring from Russia, from a people amongst whom bourgeois qualities are less developed.” These words might, in fact, have been uttered by Lenin or by Bukharin, who based their idea of the world mission of the Russian proletariat on the argument that it was less permeated by bourgeois morals and the corresponding prejudices than its Western counterpart.

But the author argues quite logically! If this “bourgeois civilization”, which he hates so intensely, is dying, then there must be someone to dig its grave. In Lenin’s opinion this grave-digger is, of course, the revolutionary, specially Russian proletariat. *And Leontyev holds the same view!* France was the chief herald of the bourgeois

⁷ K. Leontyev, loc. cit., p. 108 of the Russian edition.

⁸ Ibid., p. 384.

culture of those days, and for precisely this reason it was to be destroyed, so the Russian Pan-Slavists maintained, by the proletariat, of course. "If it is necessary for the further independence of Eastern Russian thought from Romanic-Germanic thought and for the adoption of a new cultural course and of state forms, that the prestige of Romanic-Germanic civilization should be lowered further and further in the eyes of the people of the East, and if it is necessary that the superstition regarding this civilization should be transformed into a violent prejudice against it as rapidly as possible, then it is to be desired that the country which has taken the initiative in modern progress should compromise its genius as speedily and finally as possible."⁹ So much for France! And since Leontyev wrote his pamphlet at the time of the Commune of Paris, 1870, he appeals for help to its Phrygian cap, which had been set up on the towers of Notre Dame and which was to proclaim the final decline of the bourgeois world. In his opinion it would, of course, be even better if Paris, with its "bourgeois" churches and its parliamentary buildings, were to vanish from the face of the earth completely; and since this is hardly possible without communist methods, the latter are also recommended by tsarist Leontyev. "Is a victory and the rule of the Commune — so he asks — at all possible without vandalism, without material destruction, of buildings, cultural monuments, libraries, etc.? Surely not; and in view of the modern means of destruction, it is far easier to reduce the greater part of Paris to dust and ashes than it was in ancient times to destroy other great centres of culture, as for instance Babylon, Nineveh or ancient Rome. And this should be the wish of everyone who aims to introduce new forms of civilization",¹⁰ it is — of Russian "civilization."

These words are neither the reflections of a fanatic obsessed by some mania, nor are they a quotation from a leading article in the Bolshevik official state organ "Izvestiya", but, I repeat, the profound opinion of a tsarist, of a Russian patriot, who was fully aware of the irreconcilable hostility between his country and Europe and tried to find voluntary or involuntary allies for his cause everywhere, — just as the salesmen of Bolshevism, who have likewise preached terrorism and vandalism in the name of the "new forms of civilization", have been doing. This does not, of course, mean that Leontyev was a Communist or that Lenin and his comrades were Pan-Slavists. In every case their appeal to the proletariat is nothing but a farce, a means to achieve aims which have as little connection with the liberation of the proletariat, as Russian Pan-Slavism had with the liberation of the Slavs, — a means to kindle a world conflagration which would engulf the entire European civilization.

⁹) *Ibid.*, pp. 433-434.

¹⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 435.

K. Leontyev, incidentally, was not the only person to express opinions which appeared original, when viewed in the light of his era and his personality. The well-known and intellectually fairly important ideologist of Slavophilism, O. Miller, wrote at about the same time as Leontyev: "If we were to begin to support it (the nationality principle) amongst the Slavs, we should stir up the whole of former Europe against us and we should have to seek bases against it precisely in Europe itself, namely in a close cooperation everywhere with its new forces."¹¹ What is meant by "new forces"? Precisely the same forces on which the tsarist Leontyev and the Communist Lenin also set their hopes. To ensure the prosperity of Russia and the destruction of Europe, elements are to be stirred up in the West that are hostile to European civilization. Of what concern is it to the Muscovite supporters of bourgeois trends if these elements march along under the red banner of socialism and take their oath not on the Gospel of St. Mark, but on that of St. Marx? They are only concerned with doing their Russian work! And the supporter of the Russian peasant community and of autocracy, the German Müller, who became a Muscovite Miller, actually stresses that it would be advisable to disregard all the principles of legitimism and to join forces with the Mephistopheles of the revolution! Referring to the mission of Russia, he writes: "It seems to me that it would have a great influence on Europe's attitude towards us, if we were to abandon the policy which we pursued until the Eastern War (i.e. the Crimean War, 1853-1855), and if we were to give up all traditions of our legitimism-mania and our revolution-phobia." Russia (that it, tsarist Russia!) is to show her "firm determination" as well as her "ability to prove to the peoples of Europe by deeds that our task, beyond the borders of the Slav world, too, is liberation." And elsewhere, Miller writes as follows: "But if the peoples of Europe still continue to believe them (their ruling classes), and if these peoples are a blind tool in the latter's hands and declare war on those with whom they ought to make a pact of friendship, in order to combat the all-European reaction jointly, then what is to blame for this fact are, for the most part, the former sins of our own policy and the period in which this policy was suffering from the virus of legitimism and the aversion to freedom with which it had been inoculated."¹²

In other words, the essence of the opinions expressed at length by Miller in his book is that Russia, as regards her policy towards Europe, is to rely on the revolutionary elements there and, with their aid, is to pull down the entire structure of the so-called

¹¹) O. Miller, *The Slav Element and Europe* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1877, p. 63.

¹²) *Ibid.*, pp. 99 and 109.

bourgeois or, as the West sees it, European culture as such. Similar opinions are also expressed by other Slavophil "patriotic writers", as for instance, Yuriy Samarin, who advised Russia "to take over the policy of liberation which, sooner or later, whether we want to or not, we shall be obliged to fulfil in the whole world." And the anarchist Bakunin was obsessed by a similar idea: "complete negation of the West" and the great liberation mission of the Russian people, headed by its Tsar.¹³

As for Herzen, however, he hopelessly confuses the mission of tsarism with that of the proletariat and paints a crass picture of the Last Day of Europe, in which he assigns the role of the seraphic herald to the armed Russian horde, who "will come in due course to waken the European Palæologi and Porphyrogeneti, provided that they have not already been wakened by the trumpet-call of the Last Judgement which will be pronounced on them by the socialism of revenge — Communism."¹⁴

But we have said enough as regards Herzen and Bakunin, for, after all, they were to a certain extent socialists, too. How, on the other hand, is one to interpret the opinions expressed by Samarin and Miller or by Leontyev, whom no one is likely to suspect of a liberal, let alone a revolutionary attitude? How is one to interpret the entire practice of Russian policy in Europe from the days of Alexey, the father of Peter I, until the reign of Nicholas II, — a policy which actually broke with the principle of legitimism again and again, inasmuch as it disseminated revolutionary, demagogic propaganda amongst the Ukrainian and Polish peasants against their "masters" of the nobility, and also amongst the Finnish peasants (the "Torpas") against the leaders of the peasants' independence movement, amongst the Balkan "Rayas" against their Turkish "oppressors", and amongst the Slav peasants in Austria-Hungary against the "German and Hungarian bourgeoisie exploiting them"? How is one to interpret the idea of tsarism itself, the "kingdom of the poor", the dictatorship in favour of the indigent, — which so closely resembles the Soviet ideology — also a "dictatorship of the poor against the rich"? Were the initiators of this policy — all the Ordin-Nashchokins, Menshikovs, Panins, Gorchakovs, Izvolskys, Shebekos and Hartwigs and other tsarists — agents of the world revolution? If one considers a Bolshevik idea which is apparently not a plagiarism, — namely, the plan to mobilize the Moslem peoples against "Western imperialism", then in this case, too, not the leaders of the Third International, but their teachers are to be congratulated on having invented this idea; for the said Leontyev had already affirmed that "a danger for Russia has arisen in the West" and that allies must be sought against this

danger: "Should Islam want to become one of these allies, all the better"; for "there are very strong and marked traits in the Russian character which remind one far more of Tatars or other Asiatics — or of no one at all — rather than of Slavs." An alliance with the Moslems would be advantageous, for the simple reason that they have not yet been imbued with any "Europeanism."¹⁵ Does not Bolshevism for the same reason look for allies there for its "Tartar socialism", as Kautsky called it? One could quote other examples and other Slavophiles without end; the ideas expressed will always be found to tally with Lenin's ideas. One could also study passages from the works and speeches of the latter, — one is certain to come across plagiarism from the Pan-Slavist and tsarist gospel. A toying with the idea of the revolution and of the proletariat, a crusade against the bourgeoisie, amorous glances towards Asia, tirades and attacks against the principle of legitimism, — these ideas and methods are used equally by Lenin and the Pan-Slavists, and tsarists. And in both cases there is one and the same aim — the destruction of "rotten" Europe *ad maiorem Moscoviae gloriam* — the Europe that is hostile to all the forms of the Russian state which have existed so far.

Precisely herein and in nothing else lies the common feature of the different forms of Russian imperialism — the tsarist, the Liberal, and the Bolshevik form. Indeed, the Russian pre-revolutionary publicist Strakhov had already realized this fact when he said: "If we consider our nihilism as a whole and from the entire aspect of its expressions, we shall realize that its sceptical opinion as regards Europe (and not of the bourgeoisie! — D. D.) is its most important characteristic. In this respect, persons of the most genuine Russian trend very frequently agree completely with the ideas of the nihilists" (and vice versa, we should like to add, — D. D.).¹⁶ Leroy-Beaulieu, too, realized this fact and held the opinion that nihilism was a form of protest on the part of Russia against Europe.¹⁷ A protest which very soon developed into sadistic dreams and affirmed that Paris would be razed to the ground; which exhorted the workers of Europe "to massacre their leaders who have become middle-class", as for instance Zinovyev-Apfelbaum did at the Congress of the German "Independents" in Halle; a protest on the part of the barbarians who "roam about Europe... and are pleased to have found something which can be destroyed... without knowing what great cultural treasures they were destroying" (Dostolevsky, see above). Their demagogic watchwords are nothing more than merely

¹³ M. Bakunin, *Letters on Patriotism*.

¹⁴ A. Herzen, *Letters from Italy and France* (in Russian), p. 267.

¹⁵ K. Leontyev, *loc. cit.*, pp. 28 and 182.

¹⁶ Strakhov, *The Fight against the West in Our Literature*, p. 126 of the Russian edition.

¹⁷ Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Empire Russe*.

a means of warfare, a kind of naphtha which — as Herzen says — should be poured on the edifice of Occidental culture, of which every Russian is aware, so that either an "earthy absolute ruler", Nicholas Romanov, or a dictator over the world proletariat, Lenin, could establish himself at the scene of the fire. When Russia's interests demand, a Pan-Slavist and tsarist becomes a revolutionary and an enemy of the bourgeoisie, but a socialist Bolshevik becomes a supporter of red tsarism and an ally of Asiatic chauvinists.

If we consider the part played by Soviet Russia in Europe's social movements, we realize that its doctrine (like the doctrine of Russian imperialism) only makes a pretence of siding with one or other of the powers fighting each other in Europe; *in principle, however, this doctrine adopts a hostile attitude to all that is European and to Europe as a whole*. Thus, in former times, socialists and Pan-Slavists in Russia joined forces on the basis of the Muscovite "Obshchina", the peasant community with its system of land as common property. It is still a question of the conflict of two forms of culture, of two national ideals.

Without wishing to deny either the existence of big social and political conflicts in Europe or the part played by Russia in these conflicts, we are of the opinion that behind all these conflicts there is, above all, a more universal conflict, which has weighed heavily on all the conflicts in Europe that have ensued during the past two hundred years.

Russia has always been the champion and supporter of the Messianist ideal, — this is the primary conclusion which we are bound to reach after studying the above-mentioned material and facts. And the second conclusion which we reach is that Russia has always regarded every stage in her expansion, both before 1917 (Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism) and later, too (Bolshevism), in the perspective of her fight against Europe as a whole. Whatever methods have been adopted in order to camouflage this fight and under whatever banner it has been conducted, the essence of the matter at issue has never changed. And bearing this in mind, we must now examine another question, namely the reasons for Russia's fundamental antagonism to Occidental culture.

CHAPTER III

RUSSIAN BARBARITY

It was affirmed in the preceding chapter that the "new gospel" which the Russians bring to Europe, apart from its various formulations, is always the same, inasmuch as it conforms to one and the same conception of the national ideal.

Let us now examine it more closely!

What strikes one most when one compares these two worlds — the Romanic-Germanic world, to which the West Slavs and Ukrainians alike belong, and the Russian Muscovite world? A colourful multifariousness, a certain eminence and grandeur throughout its entire history, the mobility of the masses, a dramatic tension in conflicts, the free play of forces, the powerful role of great personalities, the predominance of justice and of logical thought, — all these characteristics are to be found in the West.

Uniformity, the suppression of personality, the colourlessness of historical events, the lack of differentiation in the primitive forces of the people, the exorbitantly important part played by the state, — these characteristics are typical of Russia.

The conflicts between monarchs and Popes, a conflict fought with dramatic tension, — this is typical of the West. The suppression on the part of the all-powerful Tsar of the powerless clergy, — this is typical of Russia. The grim and determined fight of the feudal lords against kings — in the West. The ruthless execution of his "menials" (kholopy), as he designated his boyars, by Ivan IV — in Russia. The tragic conflict of the old faith with the Reformation and the even more imposing reaction of the former — in the West. The one-sided struggle between the official Church and the "Raskol" Schism — in Russia. On the one hand, Lutheranism, Zwinglianism and Calvinism;

on the other, the "jumpers", the "flagellants" (Khlysty) and the stylites. Great personalities of the French aristocracy, who retained their dignity even on the scaffold, — this is typical of France and of the West. The fainthearted clique of a "conditional aristocracy" by the grace of the Tsar, who spent their time sitting about in the night-clubs and taverns of Constantinople and Prague and waiting for their country to be saved, — this is typical of Russia. The execution of Louis XVI, or that of Charles I, Cromwell's great enemy, — this is characteristic of Europe. The fact that one does not know by whom and how the last of the Romanovs was murdered, — this is characteristic of Russia. An entire constellation of aristocratic names known throughout the continent, whose bearers fought against the French Revolution either at the head of the Vendée or of the coalition armies, — this is typical of the West. Brussilov, Polivanov, Klembovsky, Gutor and a number of Tsarist generals who fought for the Third International, — this is typical of Russia.

If we read the history of Europe, we become acquainted with the history of its peoples. But all we perceive when we read the history of Russia are the *obscure masses* who blindly obey their leaders and move in one direction today and in another direction tomorrow. In Europe, history was made by classes, parties, nations and great individuals, in other words by society. In Russia, it was made by the state, by the government, which left both, classes and individuals, as well as society itself, lying in fetters. This latter trait (and we now come to the very essence of the antagonism between Europe and Russia) is characteristic of all primitive communities, including the Russian one.

In primitive communities there is no distinct separation of the "I" from the "We", of the individual from the mass, of individual existence from substance. The individual does not, as yet, live by his own thoughts, but merely by the collective intellect of the masses. Moral, legal, religious and political precepts are not regarded as precepts of one's own ego (that is of "conscience"), but as fundamentally unfathomable decrees from above. Hence, in a community of this kind the relations between individuals or their groups and the complex whole assume a peculiar character. Elsewhere these relations are regulated and fixed by the law, by "imperative and attributive" rules, that is to say, by rules in which the obligation of one party is fixed by the awareness of the other party of the right to which it — the latter — is entitled (as, for instance, the obligation to pay a debt). In primitive communities, on the other hand, the mutual relations between the "I" and the "We" are regulated and fixed by rules of a one-sided "ethical" and purely "imperative" nature; that is to say, by rules in which the obligation of one party is by no means regarded by the other party as a right to which it — the latter — is entitled. Exactly the opposite is the case in communities

with a more highly developed legal awareness. In primitive communities the whole weighs heavily on the individual like an omnipotent divinity, whom one may only ask for mercy, but from whom one may by no means demand one's right. Here, state laws are regarded as moral laws and also vice versa. "Here — so Hegel writes — both moral norm and legal norm constitute the law, which rules the individual as an external power. The norms are fulfilled, but in a purely external way, as a regulation enforced from above. The individual obeys these laws, not because he realizes their justice, but solely because he does not know what he is doing."¹⁸

Accordingly, in such communities the means by which one gains the common recognition of the will of the nation (in the state) or of *truth* in general (in the Church) is also quite different. In more developed communities this means consists in logic and precisely defined legal procedure. In Russia, however, as in all other primitive communities, the corresponding means consists in vague, intuitive guess-work: the principle of "humanity" in the peasants' local meetings ("mirskoy skhod") and — in politics — the idea of a state's diet with no will of its own ("zemskiy sobor"), in religion, the predominance of the commands or the arbitrariness of the ruler. The important part played by individuals and their free grouping, a feeling of personal dignity, of one's own rights and duties, active participation in social organization, — these are the chief traits of the Western society. Insecurity and passivity of the individual, lack of legal mentality, complete absence of autonomous morality which is replaced here with orders and beatings — these are the chief characteristics of the Russian society. And, hence, there is "self-government" in the widest sense of the word in the West, and chaos or despotism in Russia.

This primitiveness, this lack of shape order in the structure of the Russian national organism, is evident in every sphere of life in Muscovite Russia: both in the social sphere, in the sphere of family life, as well as in the political, religious and cultural sphere. If we consider all these spheres in turn, we arrive at the following conclusions:

A typical example of social organization in Russia is the "Obshchina", the peasant community with its system of land as common property, — an institution about which there have been endless disputes, but which has been supported most enthusiastically both by the Slavophiles and by the "Westernisers" headed by Herzen, by the adherents of Tsarism and also by the latter's implacable enemies, the socialist revolutionaries. In the "Obshchina" the individual does not count at all. As part of the complex whole, he

¹⁸⁾ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*.

has no rights whatsoever. He has nothing which he can call his own property; even the plot of land which he has tilled and cultivated with his own hands only belongs to him for a short period, for he is liable to be deprived of it any time. The "Obshchina" can ostracize any of its members at will, and not only on account of some crime, but even on account of some offence of a purely individual kind, as for instance addiction to alcohol; it can force any of its members to sow or plant the crops which it stipulates on their plot of land. And this was the case, too, prior to the 1917 revolution in Russia, and since then in the collective and state farms.

Personal effort and personal ideas are entirely unnecessary in this community and, in any case, are not respected as such. For instance, a plot of forest-land which has been made arable and has been cultivated with great personal effort and labour, may be assigned to an idler at the next re-distribution of land, — on the strength of the principle that all members of the complex whole are equal. No distinction whatever is made between "mine" and "yours", and these two conceptions may be reversed from one day to the next. The "Obshchina" does not recognize any rights on the part of the individual which are independent of the collective, that is rights to the fruits of one's own labour. Nor does it recognize any personal obligations. In this community, where the system of joint suretyship prevails ("krugovaya poruka"), it is not the individual, but the community as a complex whole that is responsible for the payment of taxes. Naturally, all this is not a violation of the peculiar rationality of Muscovite peasant life, but this rationality, if one applies Hegel's terminology, is merely determined by "reason" and not by "intelligence", that is to say not by any "conscious reason."¹⁹ The rationality of the "obshchina" is not a planned organisation of a free collective, but only an automatic order to which the individual subordinates himself, apathetically and with no will of his own, without understanding this order.

A similar order — so one of the leading authorities on Russian national life, the Russian, *Gleb Uspensky*, affirms — exists in the animal kingdom, too. "The carp in the River Volga, which live in village-communities, like the Russian peasants, also have their envoys and their deputies. The latter usually swim on in advance, in front of their community, and when they come to a barrier set up across the river by fishermen, they first of all test its firmness with their snout; next, they push against it sideways, and then they try to leap over it; and if none of these efforts prove successful, the deputies go back to their community and report on the situation. Thereupon, it is decided in a community meeting of the carp that the barrier is to be removed by joint force and joint action; and the whole

community actually makes a fierce rush at the barrier and pushes it aside by their collective mouth. Many of the carp perish, but the rest force their way through the opening that has been made, and in this way are saved."^{19a}

According to G. Uspensky, the Russian "Obshchina" constitutes a similar community, in which every member lives by the collective wisdom of the mass. Each member of this kind of organization is (rather like Platon Karatayev in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*) "merely a component part, nothing complete in itself"; he has no individual and personal convictions or philosophy of life. Like figures on a chess-board, each of the members of such a community moves in obedience to the hand of the player and in accordance with certain rules; but left to reason things out for itself, however, the figure either remains motionless or falls over. "Such a component part", writes Uspensky, "if forcibly removed from its usual surroundings, may do all sorts of damage; for, accustomed as it is to obeying the will of others unreservedly and blindly, it is prepared to do anything." "Go and fetter them!", "Go and unfetter them!", "Shoot them!", "Release them!", "Beat them!" "Beat them harder!", "Come and save them!" — commands of this kind are all carried out, since these "component parts" are incapable of criticizing or opposing them. Today, such component parts may "crush the revolt", tomorrow they may "take up arms in order to liberate their Slav brothers", whilst the day after tomorrow, they may "fight for the Third International." — "Personally", so Uspensky adds, "they have no idea of what is wise and what is foolish, and of what is good and what is evil." Uspensky describes the helplessness and confusion of such a person, namely of the peasant, in the town, where he is exposed to every form of influence, and adds: "He is a complete stranger here, a man of alien influences, of alien commands, and even of alien ideas and intentions. He has no convictions and no moral principles of his own. He is an empty vessel which can be filled with any kind of contents", — that is either with a tsarist or with a Communist soup. A person of this type submits to all that "God sends" him, to all the blows that fate may "deal" him. He is amoral, for he has no conception of right or of the duties and obligations of others. He is not responsible for his deeds, for he has become accustomed to this state as a result of the feudal system, under which the lord of the manor — and the "Obshchina" — was responsible for him.

And the same applies as regards the constitution of other social groups in Muscovite Russia. None of them had an independent existence, as was the case in the West, but merely existed for the state. None of them were founded on the strength of their own rights, but were called into being by the state. In the struggle amongst

¹⁹⁾ Hegel, *ibid.*

^{19a)} Gleb Uspensky, *The Power of the Soil*.

themselves and against the sovereign power, none of them developed a corporative spirit or a feeling of class-consciousness within themselves, but each group received its privileges from the supreme power without fight or effort. The clergy (even before 1917) became a "Department for Clerical Affairs" under its Minister. The "third class", which in Europe was secure in its rights, in Muscovite Russia became a mercantile body of various "guilds", dependent on the municipal head of the town concerned. The nobility became a "public service class", a class of privileged "tsarist slaves", devoid of the rank-consciousness which feudalism in the West had created. A nobility on the strength of ancestral rights was a thing almost unknown amongst the Muscovites. Their nobility was a reward for service to the tsar. It is true that the classes had their "marshals of nobility", their "city elders", etc., but these were not free delegates of free corporate bodies, but merely ordinary officials of the tsar, that is a kind of Tatar "Baskaks." As in the West, there were in Russia nobles, bourgeois and demos, but no "noblesse", no bourgeoisie, no democracy, and no corporate bodies or classes which were independent of the state or frequently opposed the latter. As if history wished to stress the menial and servile character of the Russian nobility still more, it did not deny the latter the institution which was characteristic of the "Obshchina", — the joint suretyship (collective responsibility): in the days of Ivan IV, the relatives of every "free" noble, who wanted to evade or leave service with the Grand Duke of Moscow, — or the members of any other family of the nobility, too, — were held responsible for him with their lives. And a lasting trace of this truly Russian conception of justice is to be found in Bolshevik practice, namely in the joint security of an entire family for their "counter-revolutionary" relatives. At all times dependent on their lord and ruler, at first, as fond of moving from place to place as was the Muscovite peasant before the days of Tsar Boris (1598-1605), and, later, in possession of a piece of land which was part of the landed property of the tsar, and only sure of their rights to this land as long as they performed the service demanded of them, the Russian nobles, for whom the state thought and acted — just as the "Obshchina" did for the "moujiks", like the latter had no chance to set up their own code of political or corporative morals. In this respect, the Russian noble, like the Muscovite citizen or peasant, remained a nihilist as far as morals and politics were concerned. He subordinated himself to the rules of a collective will, personified by the tsar, but took no active or conscious part in determining this will. As far as the intrinsic character of his status was concerned, he was no better off than the masses and in the eyes of the tsar he was just as negligible a factor as the lowest peasant.

"Apprenez, monsieur", said Tsar Paul in reply to a remark made by General Dumouriez, the French envoy, "qu'il n'y a pas de

considérable ici que la personne, à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle."²⁰ These were not the words of a madman, but a very aptly expressed formulation of the relations between "I" and "We", between the individual and the people as a whole in Russia. Paul expressed an idea, which formed the basis of that truly Muscovite institution known as "official appointment according to family right" (*mestnichestvo*), — an institution of a purely official character: the Russian boyars counted above all on the fact that their fathers and forefathers had been in the tsar's service, but not on the lineage of their families, nor on the value of a personality, which — without the tsar's grace — was not and never could be "considérable."

But that which endowed all three European classes with illustriousness, resistance powers, caste loyalty and a definite code of "savoir vivre", which had been cultivated for hundreds of years, and gave the individual the feeling of personal dignity, was completely missing in Russia.

And if one considers the Muscovite conception of the family, one encounters this same phenomenon — the repression of the individual and the domination of the family as a whole. The very fact that in all legacy cases customary law holds good for the Russian peasant, deprives the individual within the family of all protection on the part of the civil code, inasmuch as he is completely subordinated to the dictatorship of the family, that is to say to the dictatorship of the person who is regarded as the head of the family. "I confess", so the well-known Slavophil *Danilevsky* wrote, "that I do not understand those persons who talk about the 'sense of family' of our people. I have seen many peoples. In the Crimea, in Ukraine, in Austria and Germany, I have always found one and the same thing. I noticed that almost all foreign peoples, not only the Germans and the English, but also numerous other peoples, such as the Ukrainians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs, have a far greater 'sense of family' than we Russians have."²¹

This same general idea is to be found in Russia's political order. In no other country was the ideal of the state cultivated as zealously as in Russia. And here, where individuals and corporate bodies counted for nothing, the state became omnipotent. "Here in Russia", writes the famous Russian philosopher and theologian, *Vladimir Solovyov*, "in a pseudo-Christian community, our own Islam came into being, but it does not refer to God, but to the state." And one believed in this state as in an "absolute power, in the presence of which man was as nothing", as in an "absolute personification of our

²⁰ "Know, Sir, that there is no person of esteem here except the person to whom I am speaking and only as long as I am speaking to that person."

²¹ *Danilevsky, Russia and Europe*, p. 127 of the original Russian edition.

national strength." Just as an orthodox Mohammedan regards all theorizing on the essence and attributes of the godhead as empty talk or a pretentious misuse of words, so the Russian consider it a sin to doubt the right of their god, the State, to do what it likes with them."²² The notorious Russian tsarist publicist, *Katkov*, once said: "Like a raging storm, it (the will of the State) drives the myriad particles of dust wherever it likes."²³

The relations between that absolute and the individual are typical of all public relations in Russia, and they are not determined by any law. They can be compared to the relations between the wolf and the lamb in Saltykov-Shchedrin's satirical fable: "If I want, I shall eat you, and if I change my mind, I may pardon you." Those who can still recall the physical attitude of Russian society in the days of Alexander III or of his son, will understand both Solovyov and Katkov. This same attitude also prevails in Communist Russia.

In those days, for instance, social relief work to help the destitute was subjected to persecution, since it was regarded as interference on the part of the people in state affairs which were no concern of theirs. When, after the appointment of Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky as Minister of the Interior in 1904, the municipal council of Odessa and, subsequently, other municipal councils, expressed their gratitude to him for his liberal proclamation, the authorities likewise regarded this step with disapproval as an unlawful demonstration. When Tsar Nicholas I was informed that the people were angry because of the Russian defeat in the Crimea, he replied indignantly: "What concern is that of the people?" For the right to praise also includes the right to criticize, but this is absolutely inadmissible in cases where there are no legal relations existent between the state and its subjects. It is true that the supreme power had certain duties towards its subjects, but they were not of a legal nature; it only had to account "to God", that is to its own conscience, for the fulfilment of these duties. The subjects of the state had no right whatever to demand either the fulfilment of these duties from the supreme power, or the fulfilment of purely ethical duties. On the other hand, however, the subjects of the state were in duty bound to love the Tsar; but the Muscovite masses did not regard the command to sacrifice their lives for their country in the same light as, for instance, the duty to pay debts of honour, — that is to say, not as a duty towards one's own conscience, but, rather, as a commandment issued by an alien external power, hurled, as it were, from above like a thunderbolt by Moses, — a commandment which must be obeyed as long as Moses held the thunderbolt in his hand, but which it would have been better to evade. And herein, too, lies the cause of the revolution of the Russian

²² V. Solovyov: *The National Problem in Russia*.

²³ Quoted from V. Solovyov's book, *The National Problem in Russia*.

people against tsarism, when the latter became weak (in the case of the non-Russian peoples the cause was another), as well as of the lack of resistance of the same people against Bolshevist tyranny (almost all uprisings against the tyranny occurred in the *non-Russian* territories of the U.S.S.R.).

The very concept "subject" itself most clearly reflects the nature of the mutual relations between the State and the individual. In Europe there are two concepts, — "subject" and "citizen." The former is an object of the state machine, of the supreme power; the latter is an authorized participant in this power, and the state is just as much under an obligation to him as he is to the state. In Russia there is no such concept as "citizen of the state" (*grazhdanin*), and when this word was invented at the end of the 18th century, Paul I promptly forbade its use, in order to prevent any confusion from being introduced into the harmonious system of the Russian state ideology. This step was by no means a whim on his part, but simply reflected the fact that the individual in Russia had no rights whatever.

In connection with this subject, *Herzen* wrote as follows: "In the most troublous times in European history we find a certain regard for the individual, a certain recognition of his independence, and certain rights which were conceded to talent and genius. However ruthless the governments may have been in those days, — Spinoza was not deported to a penal colony, Lessing was not flogged, nor was he forced to become a soldier. This regard not only for material, but also for moral power, this involuntary recognition of individual personality, is one of the outstanding characteristics of European life. There is no such thing as this in our country. *Man was absorbed by the state and lost his identity in the community* . . . The unwritten and instinctive recognition of personal rights, of the right of the individual to free thought, — a recognition which ethically curbed power, could not be and was not transmitted to us. . . . The state power in our country is more self-confident and freer than in Turkey or Persia; it is not restrained by anything, and not by any past."²⁴

The negative attitude towards a legal regulation of the relations between the state and the individual also had a certain influence on the original conception of the organization of the collective will. Elsewhere, constitutional guarantees constitute the means by which the legal relations between the people and the state are determined. In Russia guarantees are rejected both in practice and in theory, for the sole reason that they constitute a legal concept and are operative and attributive norms; and, incidentally, also because every constitution is allegedly a "falsification of the will of the people", a "rebellion" against the whole. In the opinion of the Slavophil

²⁴ A. Herzen (Gertsen), *From the Other Shore*.

Konstantin Aksakov, every definite formulation of the relations between the state and the individual was nonsense. He prefers the "way of free conviction" or of "inner truth."²⁵ Yuriy Samarin does not recognize the principle of the people's representation, since the latter leads to the "disintegration of society into a majority and a minority and to the collapse of the community principle." He points out that the system of representation is also impossible in Russia because "no division is possible here between the supreme representative of the monarchist principle and the people."²⁶ The Muscovite ideal (even before 1917) is a state power unfettered by legal conditions and "freely inspired by national life."

Another ideal in the opinion of Aksakov and the Slavophiles of the first half of the 19th century, as befitted their doctrine, was the Land Diet (zemskiy sobor) of the 16th and 17th centuries, an institution in which "the entire state power was to belong to the Tsar and the entire freedom of thought to the people"; that is to say, the same elevation of purely intuitive norms of moral principles to the role of a regulator of the life of the state, — which is a characteristic of all undeveloped communities. This same community or "Obshchina" ideology is also applied to state conditions by the socialist anarchist Bakunin, according to whom "the (Russian) people regard the Tsar as the symbolical personification of the unity, the greatness and the glory of Russia." The reverence of the people for this symbol is, in his opinion, of a purely religious nature. They are bound to each other not by legal relations as in the West, but by purely imperative ones.²⁷ The majority principle is rejected, since the precondition for this principle lies in the disintegration of the masses into independent individuals, for the majority can no longer be an undifferentiated mass if it subordinates itself to the individual, who enjoys freedom of thought and freedom of election, — that is, to the principle of rationalism and individualism. The electoral system, in particular, is a provocation of the masses; even in its most primitive form ("those in favour, go to the right door, — those against, go to the left") it is based on a separation of the individual parts from the mass, — an idea which is entirely unacceptable to the mentality of the Muscovites, who have been trained in the spirit of the herd instinct. "Uniformity" is to prevail in every sphere of life, and since this, as a rule, only leads to chaos and to the logical conclusion of the latter, namely absolutism, "Long live absolutism!" has become the watchword of the entire social ideology of the Muscovites. This watchword is so

²⁵ K. Aksakov, *Historical Works*, Vol. I.

²⁶ Yuriy Samarin, *Collected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 57, 277, 305 of the original Russian edition.

²⁷ M. Bakunin, *Letters on Patriotism*.

Russian that the Bolsheviks also adopted it, that is to say, those who, prior to 1917, had always shouted "Down with absolutism!" Of course, the opinion is also held that the "absolutism" (whether tsarist or Soviet) is an emanation of the will of the people; but this opinion is one of those mysteries of the Muscovite mentality which no non-Russian is able to understand.

This same rejection of the principles of individualism is also in evidence in the Russian Church. And those who wish to examine the reasons for the antagonism between Russia and Europe must not overlook the question of religion.

But can this antagonism really be traced in the sphere of religion, too? Certainly, and, indeed, to a greater extent than is apparent on a superficial consideration of the facts.

Bakunin attacks the "social, legal, political and religious prejudices of the West."²⁸ The well-known Slavophil Miller enumerates the three main features of the Polish intellectual class and defines them as "the Catholic-ecclesiastical element, the aristocratic-nobility element, and the democratic-revolutionary element."²⁹ These words provide much food for thought not only for those who occupy themselves with the connection between culture and religion, but also for those who study the problem of the unity of Western civilization, which in all its aspects, even in those which are hostile to each other, opposes the Muscovite East as a cultural complex whole.

Russia derived her Church from Ukrainian Kiev, but this Church soon became a national Russian one and completely dependent on the supreme political power. In this respect it is no exception amongst the other social institutions of Russia. As regards its internal order, it is likewise permeated with the same principles which are in evidence in the political and social structure of Russia. As far back as the earliest days of the history of the Muscovite Church, these principles consisted in the crudeness and vagueness of the ruling class and in an aversion to logical principles, with all the corresponding consequences. In politics the Russian genius abhors all clearly defined forms in which the will of the people should be expressed; for this reason, it refers to the confused, illogical voice of the people, which could be recognized intuitively (cf. the dictatorship of the rabble, of the have-nots). In the Church the Russian genius attacks every precise definition of the means by which religious truth is to be taught; for this reason, it opposes the division of the Church into teachers and pupils and here, too, refers to the same confused voice of the "conscience of the people." In both cases the Russian genius rejects the principle of rationalism, which opposes the "only source of truth", — the opinion of the people as a whole. Khomiakov affirms

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Miller, *The Slav Element and Europe*, p. 95 of the original Russian edition.

that "the infallibility belongs exclusively to the oecumenical Church" (by which he means the Muscovite Church), and that "the unchangeableness of the dogma, as well as the purity of the rites are entrusted to the protection of not only the hierarchy, but also the whole people of the Church."³⁰ Khomiakov makes no mention of the fact, however, that these dogmas will be just about as well protected as are the flower-beds entrusted to the protection of the public.

If the above really is the case, if the entire people are the protectors of the Church dogmas, then there is no such thing as the division of the Church into teachers and pupils. Everyone can be a teacher. After the same principle, according to which an ensign Krylenko or a sergeant Budyonny can become a commander-in-chief, everyone can become a spiritual leader of the "Church of Christ", on whom God's blessing "rests", — today — the holy synod, tomorrow — the notorious monk, Iliodor, and the day after tomorrow — Rasputin.

"In our Church", says Khomiakov, "there are no teachers and no pupils, since the teachings of our Church are not confined to any set limits determined from above." Every word that "is inspired by the feeling of true Christian love, of living faith or of living hope, is teaching. Every individual, however high his grade in the hierarchy, or, on the other hand, however hidden he may be in the most modest surroundings, — alternatively teaches and is taught. For God gives the gift of His wisdom to whomever He sees fit."³¹

According to Miller, who likewise opposes a division of the Church, the truth of the orthodox Church is preserved in equal manner by the "entire orthodox community" and "is confessed with mouths and hearts in unison", without any division of the orthodox community into teachers and pupils, without any unjustified claims of personal reasoning which might set itself up over the community.³² And, finally, Kireyevsky clinches the argument by affirming that "no special genius is necessary to determine the evolution of the characteristic orthodox thought. On the contrary, such genius, the precondition for which lies in originality, might even harm the complex whole of truth." With considerable unwillingness, Khomiakov admits that "Christianity expresses itself both in a logical form and in symbols", but that, nevertheless, it is not left to our choice to make the right to teach someone's exclusive privilege: "The entire Church teaches, the Church in its entirety." The Roman Catholics, so he affirms, made a mistake in "setting up the guarantee of human reasoning or some other guarantee in place of mutual

love."³³ This latter quotation is particularly interesting. It reminds one of Aksakov's reflections on the perniciousness of guarantees in politics. In both cases — in ascertaining the true will of the people, as well as in determining the true faith of the people — every kind of system was rejected from the start. At the same time, every kind of guarantee for the right interpretation of this will or this truth was also rejected. And, in addition, every kind of rôle or validity of reasoning, which might usurp rights reserved exclusively to the chaotic instinct of the collective, or, as usually happens in such cases, to the command of the state, was also rejected.

The consequences of this and no other kind of organization of the Muscovite orthodox Church, which was subordinated to the secular power, proved fatal for this Church. They are similar to the consequences which the organization of other social institutions in Russia (rural communities, social classes, state) had on the independent activity and development of the same. These consequences were: stagnation and formalism, complete incapacity for action, as well as complete inability to shape and mould the psyche and the convictions of the broad masses whose welfare was entrusted to the Church. "The Russian Church is completely indifferent to everything that is connected with the needs of modern life and modern knowledge... It always remained aloof from the intellectual movement, since it has always given priority to the ritual elements; and, partly, for the simple reason that the standard of the general education of the Russian clergy is a low one. The attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to develop its traditional dogmas still further with the aid of explanations and deductions, and the efforts of the Protestant Church to bring its teachings into line with the progress of knowledge and with the changed trend of the intellectual movement, are equally alien to the spirit of the Russian Church. For this reason it does not engage in any profound theological or philosophical research, nor does it attempt to combat the spirit of irreligion in its modern forms. To a Roman Catholic who attacks science, in so far as it refutes his traditional religious conceptions, and to a Protestant who endeavours to bring his religious views into line with scientific deductions, the Russian Church must indeed appear to be an ante-diluvian fossil."³⁴

Danilevsky affirms: "The Russian Church maintains that all the problems and dissensions of the Church are already solved in the Revelation, but the Revelation is a word that is meaningless if no means are given by which to preserve its genuineness and indisputability and its true sense and to apply these in the right way in every given case... The relation of the Church to the Revelation

³⁰) Khomiakov, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 58-61 of the original Russian edition.

³¹) *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

³²) Miller, *loc. cit.*, p. 179.

³³) Khomiakov, *loc. cit.*, pp. 65, 66, 72.

³⁴) Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, Vol. II, pp. 193, 194.

is the same as that of the court to the civil code. Without judicial power to interpret and apply it, the civil code, in spite of its perfection, is a useless book."³⁵ Actually, it is precisely the lack of a special organ to interpret the doctrine of the Church which condemns the Russian Orthodox Church to complete impotence. "The Russian absolute, so Rozanov says, "rested in the coffins of hundreds of persons who were already dead, "qui dixerunt" ("who have already had their say"), to whom no more can be said, since one can neither start an argument over their graves, nor weep at their graves in order to make them hear us and substitute a *yes* for a *no* and a *no* for a *yes* at the crucial moment, that is in a fatal era of history."³⁶ There is no generally acknowledged authority, and for this reason a reformation is impossible.

The mental immobility and political formlessness of the Russian people and the weakness of the classes and individuals that detached themselves from the latter resulted in a complete incapacity for independent action and in the absolutism of the rabble. And the same immobility of the Russian community of the faithful and the impossibility of a division of the Church resulted in the atrophy of religious life as a whole and in the subjugation of the Muscovite Orthodox Church by the political power. These two results are the consequences of the Muscovite conception of the social organizations, of the relations between the community and the individual.

The most serious consequence of this restrictive organization of the Church consisted in formalism, in blind adherence to the letter, in an alienation from life, and in dependence on the state. In the Russian Church the main emphasis was always on absolutism and subordination to the political factor, a state of affairs which dates back to the 14th century. Peter I enslaved the Muscovite Church by subordinating it to the Holy Synod, but it was the slavish organization and mentality of the Russian Church which, in the first place, enabled Peter to carry out his experiment. In politics the rejection of the "external truth" (of parliamentarianism) and the appeal to the "unanimity" and to the will of the entire people — and both these fundamental ideas were completely anarchic in character — led, in the first place, to some robber-chief, such as Pugachov, being at liberty to interpret the will of the people; but later this right was only conceded to the Tsar, who to the Slavophiles stood for the incarnation of the will of the people as a whole, just as Lenin to the Bolsheviks is the personification of the proletariat. And the same was bound to happen as regards the Church. The dogmas of the orthodox Church, which were entrusted not to the protection of the hierarchy alone,

but also to that "of the entire people", had in the first place to seek a protector in some Christomaniac or other, and then, later, in the Tsar, who, incidentally, was called the "protector of the dogmas of the Orthodox Church" in the Russian legal code.³⁷ In this respect, however, the Russian scholars adopt a peculiar attitude; Khomiakov, for instance, in his letter to Palmer, in which he discusses the dependence of the Muscovite Church on the secular power, writes as follows: "A society can remain in actual dependence, but in character, however, still free, and vice versa."³⁸ But this already belongs to the sphere of that Russian "mysticism", which those who have been brought up in the "false presuppositions" of the "rotting West" are not allowed to comprehend.

In the intervals of light which dawned on the Russians, they themselves realized the questionable nature of their position. Thus, Samarin, for instance, assailed by doubts, wrote in such a moment: "How is one to know whether the orthodox element really preserves in complete entirety the two extremes into which the Western Church has been divided in the West (Catholicism and Protestantism)? It is possible that this unity, this entirety, is merely an initial indefiniteness. It is possible that the Slav sense of community merely represents such an initial undeveloped state."³⁹ But such intervals of enlightenment occurred only rarely.

The dependence of the Church and its formalism were the fetters which bound Russian orthodoxy, deprived it of its freedom of action and formed the breach which separated it from the sphere of active life. In the West even the monks in the monasteries did not, as a rule, cease to be active in the world for the good of the world. "Monastic life in the West", so the above-mentioned Mackenzie Wallace writes, "has, at various times in its history, shown a powerful striving after spiritual regeneration. And this striving was evident in the founding of new religious communities, each of which pursued its own aim by engaging in activity in some special sphere... There is nothing like this to be found in Russia. The Russians have restricted the activity of the monks to religious rites and prayers... Neither in Russian monastic life as a whole, nor in any individual monastery is there any indication of a definite trend towards a reform."⁴⁰

This dependence on the secular power and this alienation from worldly affairs had still further consequences. Since the Russian Church was not prompted by any permanent and predominant aim or impulse to effect a reform, but adhered either to the "old coffins"

³⁵ Danilevsky, *loc. cit.*

³⁶ V. Rozanov, *Next to the Church*, Vol. II, p. 63 of the original Russian edition.

³⁷ *Statute Book of the Russian Empire*, I, Par. 42, 43.

³⁸ Khomiakov, *loc. cit.*, p. 399 of the original Russian edition.

³⁹ Yu. Samarin, *loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 399 of the original Russian edition.

⁴⁰ Mackenzie Wallace, *loc. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 391.

or to the orders of a secular head — at one time the head of this Church was actually a general, it could neither be an ethical and religious support to its community, nor could it endow the latter with any autonomous moral principles. He who has been brought up in the Russian orthodox faith, can go to confession or, in fact, to church, just as a Russian soldier goes into an attack, but in both cases it is the command from above which prompts him, or else his blind adherence to the letter. For he has no inner, autonomous moral principles.

"The Russians think", wrote Solovyov, "that in order to be a true Christian, it suffices to adhere to the dogmas and the sacred rites of orthodoxy, and that they are in no way required to give political and social life a Christian character. They refused on principle to recognize the contradiction between truth and life." And even the only trend to reform to appear in Russia — the so-called Nikonian movement — for the most part merely stirred up a verbal quarrel, which had little to do with the essence of the matter, between itself and the "Old Believers." In order to bring about an essential reform in the Church and in the social order, Russian orthodoxy should have had a moral authority; but, as Solovyov asks, how can "a hierarchy, which has fallen into the hands of the secular power, manifest the moral authority which it has itself renounced?" The complete impotence of the Russian Orthodox Church with regard to a reform of the social order can best be seen from its incapacity to carry on any mission activity — in the widest sense of the word. "The means of compulsion and of coercion which are enumerated in the Russian criminal code", so Solovyov adds, "are, in essence, the only weapons known to our state orthodoxy with which it is able to oppose the indigenous "Old Believers" as well as the representatives of other confessions, which should dispute the power of orthodoxy over souls."⁴¹

It is precisely the Western Church that has succeeded in doing what orthodoxy failed to achieve, — namely, to breed the type of modern European who is conscious of his rights and duties and to make him a "political being." The cruelty and savagery of primitive man, his lack of understanding for the rudimentary conceptions of law, — from these things mediæval man was redeemed by the Church, an achievement, of which the Russian Church has not even effected one-tenth, since, like Saint Cassian, it keeps aloof from the world and fears to sully its white robes with wordly dirt.⁴² This alienation from the world is evident in every feature of the Russian Church, as, for instance, in confession, which here is a purely formal

⁴¹) V. Solovyov, *Russia and the Oecumenical Church*. Introduction, pp. 124, 125 of the original Russian edition.

⁴²) Hegel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 509-550.

procedure, — so formal, in fact, that the people have been obliged to devise the so-called (semi-secular) "Starchestvo" as a corrective substitute for it. The same also applies to the omission of the sermon. In this connection it is interesting to note that the plan to re-introduce the public sermon in the Russian Church aroused fierce opposition on the part of the so-called orthodox against the Patriarch Nikon. The alienation from life of the Russian Orthodox Church is also evident in its ideal of holiness. On this point Rozanov writes as follows: "In the East the ideals of meekness, endurance and steadfastness were fostered, but in the case of suffering, however, that of resignation, — a passive, long-suffering Christianity."⁴³

If we consider this negation of the individual in the Russian Church still further, we find that it is also in evidence in Russian religious art, for which the so-called Hundred Chapter Council (Stoglavy Sobor) of 1550 already laid down set patterns to which the individual work of the painter must strictly conform. To form a clear picture of the characteristic features of Russian religious art which have developed under the entire spiritual influence of the Muscovite Church, we must compare them with those of West European religious art; and on this point Mackenzie Wallace writes as follows: "In the West, religious art from the time of the Renaissance onwards kept pace with the intellectual development. It gradually freed itself from the old forms, transformed dead, typified figures into living persons, and illuminated their dark gaze and expressionless countenance with the light of human reason and feeling... In Russia, on the other hand, religious art never underwent such a development. Both the lack of mobility of the Muscovite Church as a whole and that of the religious art in question are equally reflected in the style of the ancient icons."⁴⁴ If we compare not only Catholicism, but also Protestantism with the Russian Church, it becomes obvious that the latter is as unlike the Russian Church as is the former. Indeed, the ideas of Protestantism met with almost as much fanatical hatred in Russian literature as did Catholicism.

Quotations such as the above suffice for us to be able to say that in the dependence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the secular power, in its adherence to formalism, in its incapacity to shape and mould life, in its cult of the vague instinct of the people as a whole, and in its subjugation of the individual — in fact, everywhere, we find the same characteristic features which come to light in our analysis of other social institutions in Russia, — in the "Obshchina", in the state, in the social order as a whole, — the same features and the same social result: the mechanical nature of social ties and the complete lack of participation of the individual ego in the forming

⁴³) Rozanov, *loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 218.

⁴⁴) M. Wallace, *loc. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 194.

of the collective will, which is regarded by the individual merely as a regulation imposed by an alien and higher power that is far superior to the individual.

Incidentally, it goes without saying that this negative characterization of Russian orthodoxy only applies to Russian Muscovite orthodoxy, but not to Ukrainian orthodoxy, such as was established in historical respect at the time of the mediæval Ukrainian State of Kiev and, later, in the days of the Ukrainian Cossack hetmanate (17th and 18th centuries). Immediately after the February revolution of 1917, Ukraine set about ridding itself of all the Russian influences which had been forcibly imposed on Ukrainian orthodoxy, — both in the use of the Old Church Slavonic text in divine service, in books of ritual and in customs, as well as in the organization of the Church and in the spirit of Ukrainian orthodoxy itself. The fact that Russian orthodoxy is absolutely alien to the Ukrainians was already realized by the great national writer of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko. Thus it was not only in political and structural features of Russian orthodoxy, but also in its peculiarities as regards art, architecture and ritual, that Shevchenko perceived the gulf which separated Russian and Ukrainian orthodoxy. He regarded the Russian churches as heathen temples and felt that he could not pray there. And this will be understandable to those who have realized that the mystical and philosophical foundation of the Christian faith lay in the cultural legacy of ancient Greece. And it was precisely for this reason that the Christian faith took foot so rapidly, easily and profusely in Ukrainian soil — the soil of the ancient Pontus, a soil which from ancient times had been fecundated by the seed of ancient Greek culture and religion. And for this reason, too, those peoples did not accept or rejected Christianity who — like the Russians and the Jews — kept aloof from the influences of the ancient culture of ancient Hellas and ancient Rome.

The confused and chaotic mentality of the Russian is reflected in his face. "The Russian has no face", said *Chaadayev*, and *Goncharov* describes the face of his hero Oblomov as follows: "He was a man of thirty-two or thirty-three, of medium stature, of pleasant appearance, with dark grey eyes, but his features lacked the expression of any definite ideas and any concentration." Such is Oblomov's countenance and also that of almost every Russian, who cannot distinguish between good and evil and who has not yet detached himself from the "collective mouth" which he idolizes... In the state, the peasant community, the fatherland, the Church, — indeed, everywhere in Russia, the substance towered over the ethically and physically subjugated individual — like the august Dalai Lama over his faithful — and allowed him neither freedom of action nor freedom of thought.

The fatal consequences of such an organization of society and of the mentality of the individual have been only too apparent during

the past decades. The inability to defend their rights was clearly obvious in the ignominious downfall of the ruling classes when they came into collision with Bolshevism and in the passivity of the peasantry. The inability to take an active part in determining the collective will was apparent in the ignominious collapse of the Russian fighting front in 1917, which only the Bolshevik scourge succeeded in setting up again. What strikes one most in all this is that collective reason, which permits neither precision nor separation, namely the Hegelian "mere reason", which forms the basis of the Russian social organism and its institutions and which is so very different from the "intelligence" on which the entire structure of Europe is based, — is *consciously* chosen by the Russians as the supreme regulator of their social life. The extent to which the people as a collective whole, the "will of the people" and the "unanimity" was glorified by Russian thinkers and politicians, from the Slavophiles to the so-called Westernisers, can be seen from the above. And a closer study of the theoretician of Bolshevism — Lenin — would lead us to the same conclusion. The same spirit is also in evidence in Russian philosophy, in so far as one can speak of such a philosophy in the European meaning of the word. The most noticeable feature of all Russian philosophers lies in the fact that they have not handed on any system to posterity. Neither V. Solovyov, nor S. Trubetskoy, nor Kireyevsky bequeathed a system to posterity; yet through all their works there runs — though somewhat unsystematically — the apotheosis of that same "inner truth" which, in their opinion, is personified in the "Obshchina", in tsarism, as well as in all the other wonderful institutions of the genial Russian people.

A religious glorification of that "great whole", namely of the sublime substance, the essence of which must be comprehended through feeling, is also to be found in Russian writings and literature, in which the whole philosophy of life and the world in general of the average Russian is likewise reflected. Submission to the mass — as the French would say, the "engenouillement moral" before the obscure, vague and subconscious elements which exist at the root of the psyche of the masses, is the most characteristic feature of Russian literature. The mass — as *Leroy-Beaulieu* points out — is to the Russians the "unaware divinity" ("une divinité inconsciente") who resembles the earliest gods of Egypt and whose divine qualities represent a great, though not yet revealed power.⁴⁵ All, or, at any rate the overwhelming majority of Russian writers stand guard before this new cult of the mass and behind them stands the entire Russian so-called "intelligentsia." And in this respect the object of this cult — the people, the mass, the crowd — is regarded as Uspensky's "collective mouth", in which the individual, with all his aims, opinions and expressions of will, must melt, must dwindle

⁴⁵ *Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire Russe, Bk. I, Chapt. 7.*

away to nothing. Man must not endeavour to seek his course in life with a clear head and open eyes; nor must he be so presumptuous as to try to influence the mass. His sole aim in life and his right to live consists in listening to the murmur of the universal soul, like an Indian ascetic, and, like a somnambulist with sleeping intellect and closed eyes, in obeying the mystical commands of this soul in his sleep: to have his head battered at the coronation of a tsar one day (as was the case during the coronation of Nicholas II on the field of Khodynka near Moscow), to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem the next day, and to massacre the "bourgeoisie adherents" the day after.

One of the high priests of this cult was Leo Tolstoy, who, as the theoretician of the anti-intellectual campaign in literature, by his personality links up two epochs in Russian history with each other, — that of tsarism, when the masses, at the instigation of the gendarmes, carried out pogroms against the intellectuals, and that of Bolshevism, when the same masses, at the instigation of the people's commissars, carried out similar pogroms against the same intellectuals. In "War and Peace", the behaviour and attitude of Kutuzov before and during the battle of Moscow delights Prince Andrey Bolkonsky: "The more he realized that this old man lacked all personal qualities — for in place of intellect which classifies events and draws conclusions, he had retained only the ability to observe the course of events, — the more confident he became that everything would proceed as it should. This man will not do anything peculiar, he will not devise anything... He realizes that there is something more powerful and more important than his personal will." Bennigsen, on the other hand, endeavoured to do everything in the best way possible; he thought everything over, and it was precisely for this reason that he was no use at all. "He was no use at all precisely because he thought everything over very thoroughly and carefully, as is befitting for every German."

This fundamental idea of his is asserted by Tolstoy in all his works, inasmuch as he regards every intellectual, every judge, lawyer or priest, at best merely as useless persons and, in most cases, as rogues who, for personal egoistic motives, deceive the people and are thus enemies of the people. In this respect, Tolstoy, though a Russian count, was only on the same level as a Russian peasant. And in this respect the ideas of the humblest moujik of Yasnaya Poliana did not in the least differ from those of his titled lord and master. If we look at the heroes of Tolstoy's novels more closely, we see that all those who sought to put their own intellect before the intellect of the mass, all those whose ideal was something other than a human animal like Platon Karatayev, — Vronsky, Andrey Bolkonsky, Napoleon — perish; whilst all those who like somnambulists climb on to roof-top "without wanting to devise anything" — Rostov, Levin, Maria, the daughter of a prince, Pierre Bezukhov — seem to have drawn a lucky number, for they fare so well in life.

Those who fare best of all, of course, are the ones who have laid aside all intellect, as for instance idiots such as Ivan the Fool. Tolstoy's Ivan the Fool is truly a Russian Apostle Peter, the true rock which "will not be overcome by the gates of Hell": "The Devil wanted to tempt him. He came for dinner, and in Ivan's house a servant-girl who was dumb from birth portioned out the dinner. Those who were idlers used to deceive her. Instead of working, they would be the first to come for their dinner and would eat up all the porridge. One day, the servant-girl decided to pick out the idlers by the look of their hands: those who had weals on their hands were allowed to sit down at the dinner-table; but to those who had no weals she only gave what was left over of the meal. The old Devil was just heading for the table when the maid grabbed hold of his hands; she looked at them and saw that they had no weals, but were clean and smooth with long claws. With jeers and cries of derision, the Devil was chased away from the table." — Is this not likewise the philosophy of Bolshevism? "Those who have weals on their hands may sit down at the table! But those who have not, only get the scraps that are left over."⁴⁶ This is the same as the classification of the citizens into certain categories, which is carried out so scrupulously in the realm of the "people's commissars." It is one and the same negation of the intellect and of the intellectual class, which prompted the moujik to resort to the "cudgel" against the intellectuals, and Count Tolstoy to his pen in order to fight this same intellectual class, which they both regarded as the Devil in disguise.

Heroes in the European sense of the word are unknown in both modern and older Russian literature, for in the country of the Ivans and Platons there could be no such persons. It is thus not surprising that whenever such heroes are nevertheless portrayed, we must look for them not in the monotonous Muscovite landscape, but in the Caucasus or the Crimea (Pushkin and Lermontov) and, in any case, amongst foreign peoples (Goncharov's Stolz, Turgeniev's Insarov); in cases where the hero is, however, a Russian — and there have been such cases, he is obliged to show his heroism either in that same "fateful Caucasus" (like Lermontov's Pechorin, for instance), or in the streets of Paris (like Turgeniev's Rudin). The colourless Russian landscape — "the sky, pine-forests and sand" — was incapable of producing anything else other than equally colourless and somnolent human beings. Even in a heroic situation, as leaders of the masses (as for instance Kutuzov or Lenin) they resemble not so much the great leaders of the West, figures which appear to be carved out of marble, but, rather, persons who are half-drunk and seem to act as though in a trance. Gorky's heroes, too, are not heroes in the sense in which the word is used in the West. The words they utter are

⁴⁶ L. Tolstoy, *The Tale of Ivan the Fool*.

devoid of all steely logic, of all consciousness of the great mission of those inspired by the spirit, of all desire to be a leader; all that one perceives in their words is the roar of a hungry beast, which has woken up and wants to feed, the wild bawling of the mob, which has become insolent and presumptuous and surges through the streets of the town. When Dostoevsky, however, portrays heroes who are dissentients, they never manage to retain their position on the heights which they have attained, but, as though seized by a fit of dizziness, fall down into that tough and indefinite mass where there is no such thing as "one's own intellect", where no one ponders on anything, — and atone for their punishable elation by voluntary suffering or voluntary death: Raskolnikov, Stavrogin, Dmitry Karamazov, for instance. What is more, Dostoevsky's favourite heroes are those who passively endure injustices and wrongs which they have not deserved, as for example Makar Dievushkin, Nelly and Prince Myshkin.

* * *

The entire literature of the writers who cultivated "popular and national traits" also followed in Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's footsteps, inasmuch as it apotheosized the mass as the bearer of the higher truth, to whom the individual must subordinate himself unconditionally. The most talented of the said group of writers, *Gleb Uspensky*, knows only too well that the Russian peasantry could only become independent if it raised itself above the common herd level of the "Obshchina." But, he does not want this to happen! Eternal poverty and ignorance, tutelage of the individual by the "Mir" (community assembly) and even serfdom are to be preferred rather than a freedom obtained by using personal initiative and violating community ties. Just as Tolstoy regards every doctor, lawyer and judge as "evil", so, too, in Uspensky's opinion the "kulak" (well-to-do Russian farmer), policeman and landowner are emissaries of Lucifer, who destroy the idyll of the "collective mouth." Another writer of the same group, *Zlatovratsky*, affirms that every attempt on the part of the "intelligentsia" to raise themselves above the level of the people is treachery to the people; they should adjust their ideals and their views to the masses, they should descend to the level of the people and should humbly impart their knowledge to the latter.

The new socialist ideologists of Russian society followed in the footsteps of their predecessors. And this was hardly surprising! For the Russians had adopted the entire Marxist doctrine not on account of its socialist character, but because of the negation of personality in Russian history, a negation accepted by the Muscovites as entirely comprehensible. This negation is systematically maintained by all the

theoreticians of Bolshevism; thus, for instance, *A. Bogdanov* attacks the "glorification" of leaders and affirms that leaders should merely be "representatives of the common will." In his Communist "Index librorum prohibitorum" we also find the Book of Genesis, the Iliad and the Odyssey, the Mahabharata, as well as the ancient Ukrainian "Song of Ihor's Campaign" (1187) for all these works deal with the "deeds of gods, heroes, kings and leaders", and there must be no such persons. He also negates the entire literature written so far and all works of art which portray the conflict of the individual with the outer world, his struggle for personal happiness, his deeds, triumphs and defeats.⁴⁷ The aim of the literature of Communism is to destroy every form of individualism in art and every personal feeling in creative work, and to substitute a collective and herd-like activity in place of individual creativeness. According to *Kerzhentsev*, the story, the characters, their actions, and even the form of a literary work are to be "produced" in common effort by the mass of the writers! There must be no individual inspiration!⁴⁸

He further affirms that the alleged leading personalities are merely ciphers, and that the creator of the events is the inert mass, to which the presumptuous personality must adapt itself.

Tolstoy's story "Three Deaths", in which the philosophy of life of inorganic Nature and of a plant is compared to that of man and recognized as superior, is merely the result of all that Russian writers had propagated for decades: Kutuzov greater than Napoleon, Platon Karatayev greater than Kutuzov, Ivan the Fool greater than Karatayev, a plant greater than Ivan the Fool, — and nihility, so the Muscovite "self-immolators" (a radical sect of the Russian "Old Believers") affirm, is greater than all entity... What an attractive philosophy for the Russian soul, squashed like a midge by the tsarist "obshchina" or by the Bolshevik knout!

And political writers keep pace with Russian literature. Among the entire company of the publicists mentioned above, whether Slavophil or anti-Slavophil, there is not a single one who does not consider the universal development of personality as the greatest evil which could happen to his country. In the opinion of one of them, the Russian ideal has its good points, in so far as it does not contain "an exaggerated conception of human personality such as Germanic feudalism introduced in history,"⁴⁹ nor has it adopted as its own such a "self-respect of the individual as was first assumed by the bourgeoisie, as a result of envy and imitation, and as was called into being by the democratic revolution and all the phrases about the unlimited rights of the individual, and subsequently penetrated all

47) *Neu-Europa*, of October 30 and November 20, 1919, and issue 1918, No. 1.

48) *Proletarskaya Kultura* (Proletarian Culture), 1919, November edition.

49) K. Leontyev, loc. cit., p. 113-114.

the lower classes of Western society, inasmuch as it made every common worker or cobbler into a being crippled by the nervous feeling of personal dignity."⁵⁰ The author is also indignant at the widespread esteem shown in the West for women, which he likewise regards as the same kind of exaggerated respect for the individual. Another writer objects to the "cult of the human personality", to the European "system of chivalry with its cult of personal honour", as well as to the freedom of research and of individual thought."⁵¹ A third writer, Shevyriov, is of the opinion that the "essence of the historical past of the Russian people and the task to be achieved in the future lies in the degradation of personality."⁵²

The same idea also permeates Russian painting. The vitality and forcefulness of Rembrandt is art, the sunny and brilliant colours of Zuloaga, the painter of old Spanish scenes, the spiritualized madonnas of Murillo who are endowed with a superhuman intelligence, the ecstatic apotheosis of Nature in the works of Böcklin, the glorification of the organized collective in the paintings of the Belgian artist, Meunier, and the hymns to personality when under heaviest strain, which are expressed by Meissonier, the painter of battle-scenes, — none of these qualities are to be found in Russian painting. Here passivity, suppression of the individual, vagueness and the gloomy atmosphere of old Muscovite women's apartments and hermitages prevail. The religious ecstasy of an Ivanov savours of coldness and mildew. As compared to the imposing picture by Meunier of the miners, who, conscious of their physical strength, vigorously set about their work, we find the Russian "Volga Boatmen", who, with bent backs, like oxen dully dragging their yoke, "tow along the tow-path" on the banks of the Volga. Instead of such a masterpiece as Meissonier's "1807", all Russian painting has to offer is a Tolstoyist-Bolshevist hypocritical lament as in Vereshchagin's "Apotheosis of the War" which only has as its theme "mass murder" and death. Levitan's landscape paintings reflect the same gloomy melancholy of an apathetic Nature which has its origin in the chaotic soul of the Russians. Querulousness, servility to an unknown higher power, the same insidious disease which is apparent in the political, social and religious life of Russia, — these are the qualities which characterize Russian painting, too, even when it oversteps the customary limits and strives to attain revolutionary pathos; and the works of the revolutionary masters of Russian painting, as for instance Yavlensky, Kandinsky and others, likewise savour of the commonplace.

So far, one has refused to recognize in the above-mentioned characteristic features of Russian life the main and uniform idea,

which predominates in the social constitution of Russia, in her political and religious life, as well as in her philosophy and literature. The primitive nature of the entire social ideal of the nation, the suppression of the individual, the undeveloped character of the autonomous moral principles and the sense of right that prevail, the unlimited cult of the mass, — this is the main and uniform idea which has made the Russian people a people enslaved, a horde incapable of resisting any will imposed from above, a mass who, because of its numbers, represents a dreadful danger to the Western world, a mass who sets chaos against activity, natural energy against human energy, the knout against organization, servility and instinct against the preeminence of reason and will, and Muscovite formlessness in every sphere of life, whether communal, social or private, against the complex whole of ordered forms.

It is the influence of this main and uniform idea and of the institutions from which it was derived that has determined the peculiar Russian ideal of freedom, equality and democracy, an ideal the like of which exists nowhere in the whole of Europe or America. Whereas the Western ideal of freedom implies the right to influence the state mechanism, which may not accomplish anything without considering the wish of the individuals, the Russian ideal of freedom consists in levelling down all those who rise above the mass, and this process of levelling down may even be achieved at the price of political enslavement. The Russians know democracy — as Danilevsky says — but "not in the sense of government by the people, but in that of equality, or, to be more correct, egalitarianism."⁵³ But this ideal of equality is not a European one. In the West it is the justified aim of man to become stronger, namely to reach the level of those above him by his activity; in Russia, however, it is the aim of the weaker to drag the strong down to their level, instead of endeavouring to reach the higher level of the strong.

The most drastic expression of this ideal is to be found in the economic life of the Russians. The main factors of economic life — as conceived by the Russian peasants and the Russian intellectuals — were the distribution and standardization of the product. Of the three main sectors of human activity — production, exchange and distribution, the latter was always accentuated. In his "obshchina", as, incidentally, in state and Church life, too, the Russian was in the habit of neglecting personal initiative; indeed, he had never been able to develop such initiative, forced as he was to submit to the will of the "obshchina."

In view of this economic system, it was, therefore, hardly surprising that the periodical new portioning out of the land and, in fact, new portioning out in general, became the economic ideal

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 115.

⁵¹ Miller, loc. cit., pp. 68, 76, 258.

⁵² A. Pypin, *Characteristic Features of Literary Opinions*, p. 136.

⁵³ Danilevsky, loc. cit., p. 120.

of the Russians, whilst personal effort, work and production, the basic principles of the entire Western culture, receded into the background. Envy on the part of those who have been unlucky, inability to work one's way up by one's own effort and energy, and a sadistic pleasure in seeing the more successful members of the community levelled down, — such are the characteristics of the Russian equality which Danilevsky emphasizes and which is peculiar both to the "fine gentleman" and to the "moujik" in Russia. It is a logical consequence that this "egalitarian ideal of a new portioning out" leads not only to the doom of the prosperous, but also to that of prosperity as such, to the Bolshevism.

This ideal as a mass phenomenon is as yet unknown in the West. In England, so *Boutmy*, for instance, affirms, "prosperity has been practically raised to the level of a virtue, whilst poverty is regarded as a vice and a disgrace, for the simple reason that prosperity represents the price of effort and intelligence, whereas poverty is an indication of laziness which is especially odious."⁵⁴ To the Russian, prosperity is an object of hatred. In one of his most immoral works from the ethical point of view, his "Tales and Fairytales", Tolstoy in the tale "How the Devil Pledged a Slice of Bread" explains the reason for the drunkenness and immorality prevalent in the rural areas by the fact that the Devil "gave a surfeit of grain to the moujik... This bestial nature is always stirring in him (the peasant) but it does not come to the fore as long as the grain is scarce... When there began to be a surplus of grain over, he (the peasant) began to ponder as to how he could amuse himself. So I taught him the pleasure of drinking brandy" — the Devil recounts. It is thus not human intemperance which must be condemned, but prosperity as such, since the latter is the cause of all sins and of the ethical ruin of man. Personal intelligence and effort, which, in the opinion of the English, lead to prosperity, are, according to Tolstoy, an invention of the Devil.

But the principle of equality also leads to other conclusions. As we have just seen, both the muddled mind of the Russian moujik and the clear mind of Count Tolstoy regard prosperity and intelligence, material as well as intellectual superiority over the masses, as deadly sins. To be logical, one must, in rejecting one of the two, reject the other, too. As we have seen in Tolstoy's stories, both are evil; both represent a challenge to the ideal of equality and both — in particular intelligence — can become harmful and dangerous to the mass. The Russians, with that peculiar straightforwardness which is one of their characteristics, also draw conclusions accordingly. As we have already seen, they reject the intellectual factor as a principle which

⁵⁴ E. Boutmy, *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais en XIX siècle*.

guides community life; they reject talent and genius, since a genius may become the leader of the mass and, God forbid, may endow the "collective mouth" with his own human countenance. They reject personal honesty (as, for instance, Leonid Andreyev does in his story "Darkness"), since the individual must not dare to be honest, if the mass is not honest, as he must not wear a white collar and have smooth hands, if the "people" wear sheepskin and have weals on their hands. They reject science and art, since the mass does not understand them; they reject elegance on the part of women, since elegance is a thing for which neither the "people", the "people's commissars" nor the latter's female colleagues with their close-cropped heads show the least appreciation. They reject everything that is above the level of the mass and guide the latter, since all this is contrary to their conception of freedom, namely the conception of a mass of equals and a small group over them. Their appeal is to ochlocracy, to "collective reason", which needs no dangerous means to manifest its will, the will of the "class-conscious" rabble, to massacre the bourgeoisie. In their bold nihilism, which deeply impresses such naïve romanticists as Romain Rolland or Barbusse, but evokes disgust amongst persons of Western culture, they reject everything, — the Church and the State, monarchy and parliamentarianism, the conception of family and law, all institutions which represent some higher idea above the level of the individual, and "personal honesty", which in the opinion of *Leontyev* is nothing but an empty phrase, a ridiculous invention.⁵⁵

Such is the philosophy of life of Bolshevism and, indeed, of the entire Russian revolution. Dostoevsky had foreseen its outbreak when, about fifty years earlier, he raised the question as to what the Russian adherents of egalitarianism (he called them Shigaliov people after his own ideological "hero" in his "The Possessed") would do on the day after the revolution. And he gave the following answer to this question: "All are slaves and all are equal in slavery. In the most extreme cases — defamation and murder, but for the most part — equality. Above all, the level of education, learning and talents will be lowered. A high level of learning and talent is only accessible to the highest talents — talents are not necessary. Persons with the highest talents cannot help being despots and they have always had a more demoralizing than a beneficial influence; they are to be persecuted or executed (to a certain extent Lenin's and his followers' programme — *D. D.*). Cicero's tongue is cut out, Copernicus' eyes are put out, Shakespeare is stoned, — Shigaliov = mankind!" — or equality, as Dostoevsky would say today, for "slaves must be equal, — there must be equality in a herd."

Is this the opinion of a maniac? At least, that was what Dostoevsky's critics thought, who were either not as farsighted as

⁵⁵ K. Leontyev, *loc. cit.*, p. 143.

he was, or else had not the personal courage to rip open the wounds of their own people with such sadistic sarcasm. But in view of the experience gained from the events of the past decades, Dostoevsky's words must not be regarded as the ridiculous ravings of a maniac. They are a grim vision, which in our day has become a grim reality.

Since the Russian revolutionary negated everything, he was incapable of recognizing any ethical absolute principle as dominating, apart from the most evident needs of life and the knout. As a German writer once aptly remarked, "with the exception of alcohol and sexual intercourse, the Russians have analysed everything else away." And to Tolstoy even the latter exception seemed senseless; for the Russians parry everything with the question "why?". "But in that case — so a character in Tolstoy's "Kreutzer Sonata" asks — the entire human race would surely cease to exist?"... "Well, and what if it did?" replies the wise man of Yasnaya Poliana, "it isn't necessary." — "Man must be honest..." "Why?" asks L. Andreyev in surprise in his "Darkness." "Borrowed money must be returned..." "Why?" asks the Russian in surprise, who, according to Yuriy Samarin "does not know the unfortunate difference between mine and thine."⁵⁶

Such "why's?" are to be found in thousands amongst the Russians since their mentality is devoid of any fundamental ethical principle which has been called into being by the work of generations; for these generations in Russia have, in actual practice, never existed. Only the state power or the "power of the soil" (the "obshchina") has existed in their place. The state power devised certain external rules, but as far as the individual was concerned they always remained alien regulations.

Whenever the Russians were left to do their own reasoning, they rejected everything and, above all, work, which constitutes one of the main conclusions drawn from their revolutionary, egalitarian ideal. "There is little tranquillity in our country", Dostoevsky writes in his "A Writer's Diary", — in particular, little tranquillity of mind, that is to say the most essential form of tranquillity, for without tranquillity of mind one cannot live a satisfactory life. There is no tranquillity in the people's heads — and this applies to all social classes — and no tranquillity in our views, our convictions, our nerves and our tastes and trends. There is no tranquillity in work, still less a conscious feeling that one can only redeem oneself by work. There is no sense of duty, — and indeed, how could there be one?" And elsewhere describing the laborious path, life, by which European Müller or Smith reaches material prosperity, whilst his "Fatherland" attains the position of a world power, he rejects this ideal in disgust: "But I — says one of his heroes — would rather

sleep in a Kirghiz tent all my life than worship the German idol. I have only been here (in Western Europe — D. D.) a short time, but all that I have had time to observe and to scrutinize more closely rouses indignation in my Tatar soul. Begad, I do not wish to have such virtues. To have to work like oxen and always have to save money like Jews. I would rather debauch in the Russian fashion."⁵⁷ This ideal, which is peculiar both to the Russian "fine gentleman" (Barin) and to Tolstoy's moujik, who was tempted by the Devil, as well as to the Bolsheviks, who have turned all Russia into a "Kirghiz tent", — this ideal, which Dostoevsky perceived everywhere, in all classes of his people, drove him to veritable outbursts of madness and prompted him on several occasions to give vent to feelings which, in his own opinion, were blasphemous. When, for instance, he talks about Turgeniev's Bazarov, the personification of Russian nihilism, he lets one of his heroes make the following remark: "Bazarov... is a vague mixture of (Gogol's) Nozdriov and Byron, *c'est le mot*."⁵⁸ It (that is Bazarov's revolutionary nihilism — D. D.) consists simply of Russian laziness, of our mental inability to create an idea, of our disgusting existence as parasites amongst the nations. *Ils sont tout simplement des paresseux!*⁵⁹ Yes, for the welfare of mankind, the Russians should be exterminated like harmful parasites!" And elsewhere, the following words are addressed to one of the "Shigalirov people": "Do you not realize that the sole reason why the guillotine occupies a place of honour with you and your like and is regarded with so much pleasure by you, is that it is easier to chop off heads and hardest to uphold an idea."⁶⁰

And this perhaps also explains the Russian hatred of the so-called European bourgeois culture. K. Leontyev, whom we have already cited several times, imagines the reply of a Western Slav, a Greek or a Bulgarian to the "anti-bourgeois" twaddle of a Russian agitator as follows: "A bourgeois? — A politician, a wealthy man, — what is evil about them? Such a man is experienced, his morals are sound, and he is conscious of his dignity as a human being."⁶¹

They are simply lazy! The Russian revolution and all its fine slogans were merely phrases in the mouth of its disciples, which gave life neither new ideals nor new aims. A brilliant characterization of the revolutionary "intelligentsia" was given by Herschensohn in the compiled work *Vekhi* (Signposts), which became famous after the revolution of 1905:

⁵⁷ F. Dostoevsky, *The Gambler*.

⁵⁸ "That is the right word."

⁵⁹ "They are simply lazy!"

⁶⁰ F. Dostoevsky, *The Possessed*.

⁶¹ K. Leontyev, loc. cit., pp. 277, 465.

⁵⁶ Y. Samarin, loc. cit., Vol. I, p. 40.

"What have the ideas of our intellectuals achieved during the past fifty years?" — he asks. "A handful of revolutionaries went from house to house and knocked on every door: Come out onto the streets, it is a disgrace to sit at home! — and all "the enlightened" flocked to the market square, — the sick, the blind, cripples without arms — no one stayed at home. For fifty years they have been loitering about the market square, shouting and quarrelling. At home, dirt, poverty and chaos prevail, but the master of the house is occupied otherwise; he is publicly active, he is saving the people, and this is a task which is both easier and more interesting than the ordinary task at home... On the whole, however, the everyday life of the intellectual class is dreadful, in truth an abomination and entirely barren, with no trace of discipline, no trace of consistency, not even to outward appearance. The days go by, — who knows how they are spent, today in one way, tomorrow in another, according to one's mood, and everything is turned topsyturvy. Idleness, self-indulgence, Homeric disorder in one's private life, immorality and chaos in one's married life, a naïve lack of conscientiousness in one's work, an unbridled tendency to despotism in public affairs, as well as a thorough contempt of the personality of others, on the one hand an attitude of arrogance, on the other, an attitude of servility to those in authority."⁶²

These were the unlucky ones, the "ones who fared badly", to use an expression of Nietzsche's, and the revolution was their revenge, the revenge of the unlucky, who strive to set themselves on a level with those who are above them, and who are prompted by the feelings of a servant, who, left alone in the dining-room, after looking round timorously, is determined to enjoy the wine that he has so far only been able to sip in secret. These persons introduced new moral principles in the world for their own benefit, inasmuch as they transformed all the possibilities that had lain dormant in the chaotic Russian soul into a certain perfection and synthesis. The famous picture in the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow ("An Evening Party") and the pictures of the Moscow CheKa groups at their parade sessions show us exactly what these world reformers look like. Students with flowing manes, girl-students with close-cropped heads, their clothes and their general appearance dirty and neglected, as though they make little use of soap and water. Peculiar ragged attire, hats that look as though they had come out of the property-cupboard of a small theatre, trousers kept in place by a piece of rope, their faces typically Russian, broad and flat, alternately a friendly or a bestial expression in their eyes, which gleam fanatically with enthusiasm or as a result of taking cocaine, or with wild impatience or sectarian obstinacy, in short, an atmosphere that smells of the smoke of cigarettes that have been thrown on the floor, of conspiracies, bombs and blood. This is the grim atmosphere in which the entire so-called

revolutionary Russian youth lived from the end of the last century onwards. Anyone who entered the service of the "people" or of the "proletariat" had free access to this society. By nature lazy ("des paresseux"), unlucky, devoid of all ability in private life, they would only have been able to assert themselves in the community as a whole, if they had succeeded in turning their own wretchedness into an ideal which everyone was bound to acknowledge; just as their female comrades could only have laid claim to elegance, if a revolutionary taboo had been put on genuine elegance and refinedness as something "bourgeois" and punishable.

And this they succeeded in doing. With the impudence and arrogance of a have-not who has attained fame, and full of joy at the prospect of humiliating those whose level they could not at the moment climb, they set about their big task of drawing up new commandments for the "rotten bourgeois world." We have already stressed the glorification of poverty in the above. This soon degenerated into the glorification of deformity both physical and moral. Firm convictions, personal courage and honesty and a strong sense of right and justice were incompatible with this attitude, — and still less, the religion of duty, which relentlessly persecuted every crime and every form of idleness. Here, other "virtues" prevailed, in particular the chief virtue, a doglike devotion to their idols, as well as the so-called "humane", considerate, and even admiring attitude toward all other cripples and underdogs who wanted to become the lords and masters of the world... One only needs to recall the episode in Tolstoy's "Resurrection", the episode in the church at Easter, where Katiusha approached the beggar, who instead of a nose had a red scarred ulcer in the middle of his face, and without the least expression of loathing, but, on the contrary, with eyes shining with happiness, kissed him three times. This was a symbolical "communion" with the people, with that which in Tolstoy's opinion represents the absolute. It was the same "crowning of the lousy head of the moujik" with which, according to Dostoevsky's opinion, Russian literature has always occupied itself. It was the same bowing to deformity which is so very popular with the revolutionary and non-revolutionary Russians. According to this philosophy of life, deformity ceases to be deformity, beauty becomes a crime and the criminals become "unfortunate persons" whom one "should not condemn, but, rather, reform" and, above all, pity. Pity — it is herein really that the true religion of the Russian lies, a religion that is more closely allied to the Bolshevik "CheKa" (Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-revolutionary Activity, Speculation and Espionage) than would appear at a first glance. For pity is the beginning of the so-called humane attitude; the humane attitude consists in kissing the moujik with the ulcer in his face instead of a

⁶²) *Sbornik Vekhi* (Compiled work *Signposts*).

nose and in releasing "unfortunate" gangsters and forgers from prison; and the third stage of this "humane attitude" is the enthronement of physical and ethical deformity, the enthronement of the "triumphant swine", the solemn conferring on him of the authority and power to condemn and sentence the healthy, whose tongue is cut out or who will be ordered to scrub latrines — according to Dostoevsky's original recipe, in order to condemn the great ideal of the Occident, the ideal of all that is strong, healthy and beautiful, the ideal of work, intellect and genius of individualism, which is personified in the Cathedral of Milan or in St. Sophia's in Kiev, in the works of the "clerical" Dante or of the lord Byron, whose genius is unbearable to the builders of a "new world" who have been brought up with Muscovite songs and factory slogans.

No doubt it was in one of his sleepless nights that Dostoevsky put the words of a prophetic vision into the mouth of Stepan Verkhovensky (in "The Possessed") — "About the common slave, the common lackey, who will be the first to climb up a ladder with a pair of scissors in his hand in order to cut the divine countenance of the great ideal to pieces, in the name of equality, envy and digestion..." in the name of a new ideal must be added, whose spiritual fathers (like Rousseau for the French Revolution) will be considered to be not only nameless Bolshevik sadists, but also Tolstoy, Gorky, Artsybashev and Skitalets, as well as a whole galaxy of writers who cultivated populist ideas, Alexander Blok and a number of other typical representatives of Russian national genius.

In spite of this fact, this genius of the Russian people is by no means devoid of the "friendliness" of an incalculable blockhead, by means of which it ingratiates itself with all the Slav and non-Slav souls brought up in slavery who fall into self-indulgence. The Russians are not conscious of their rights and duties and for this reason allow themselves to be prompted in their actions by their mood at the time in question. If a Russian gets out of bed on the wrong side, one day, it is quite likely that he may daub the waiter's face with mustard, but next day, he may perhaps give the same waiter a hundred roubles as a present. This is the Russian "incalculability" ("samodurstvo")! Brought up as he has been in an atmosphere of complete slavery, and dependent on every mood of his lord and master, a Russian actually feels most content under constantly changing moods. Without venturing to assert his rights, he at least takes pleasure in enjoying the fleeting favour of his master and in the favourable wind that has changed the latter's mood and, in keeping with the mentality of a slave, he proudly compares the "magnanimity" of his master with the "coldness" and "formalism" of a European, who needs no one's favour or consideration, but who sternly defends his right and who respects the rights of others, but

never forgets a wrong once done to him. Devoid of all convictions of his own, a Russian is capable of doing anything. "It is difficult for a human being (i.e. for a Russian — *D. D.*) — so Dostoevsky writes — to recognize what is a sin and what is not; herein lies a secret that surpasses human (that is, Russian — *D. D.*) reason." And if this is so difficult, then all roads lie open to the Russian and, in any case, he has no definite course. "I have often wondered at this ability on the part of human beings (and, above all, as it seems, of the Russians) — so Dostoevsky continues — to harbour in their soul the highest ideal side by side with the greatest vileness — and all this quite sincerely. Whether this is a special broadmindedness in the case of the Russians, which will get them far, or simply vileness, — that is the question."⁶³

It is precisely this lack of "broadmindedness" or "vileness" in the case of the European that makes the Russians dislike the latter so intensely, as can be seen from the example of a heroine in Goncharov's novel *Oblomov*, who "perceived in the German character no leniency, no sensitiveness, no tolerance, — none of those qualities which make life so pleasant and by means of which one is able to avoid some rule or other, overstep the common limits and not adapt oneself to the order."

And it is precisely for this reason that it is so difficult for the average European to get used to living together with a Russian, even with the most civilized: the latter, for instance, will borrow a book and not return it; he will enter a strange room without knocking on the door; he will interrupt someone in the midst of important work by his empty twaddle; he will open letters that are not addressed to him and will not regard this as an offence; as soon as he makes someone's acquaintance, he will take unthinkable liberties, and he never ceases to be amazed at the "reserve" and "falseness" of the European, who for his part would gladly forgo the drunken kisses of the Russian, as well as all the other manifestations of the latter's "broadminded" nature, and, on the other hand, demands that he should explicitly fulfil the duties that he has taken on.

It is not surprising that such a community could only be held together by absolutism. The Russian mass being, or, as Nietzsche would say, "the herd animal", could never do without some form or other of absolutism. "Russia's main misfortune — so V. Solovyov writes — lies in the undeveloped nature of the personality and thus, also, of the community, since these two elements are proportionately related to each other: if the personal element is suppressed, man becomes not a community but a herd."⁶⁴ Such a herd developed out

⁶³) F. Dostoevsky, *A Raw Youth*.

⁶⁴) V. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, Vol. V, p. 206 of the original Russian edition.

of the Muscovite community by suppressing individuality and as a result of the decline of what I designated as an *autonomous moral principle*. The Russians have never known this moral principle of consciously subordinating oneself to the ethical absolute principle. "In Europe — so Dostoevsky continues — laws and duties were moulded and formed for thousands of years. Good and evil were determined and weighed. Standards and stages were set up by the historical sages of mankind and by studying the human soul incessantly. There was nothing of this kind in Russia; neither good nor evil were measured there by one's own conscience; both were dictated from above without the individual having any say at all in the matter." And *Herzen* says: "We (that is the Russians) could not let the unwritten disciplinary moral feeling, the instinctive recognition of the right of the individual, of the rights of opinion, hold in our country." And he continues: "The Europeans have definite moral principles, but we have only a moral instinct. Where their own conscience tells them to stop, we are stopped by a policeman."⁶⁵

The same opinion was expressed by *D. Merezhkovsky* when (in 1905) he affirmed that "there has never been a conscious, religious will to patriotism or to courage in our country; there has only been an elementary will." A similar opinion had already been previously voiced by *Bodenstedt*: "The Russian peasant submits to force just as a German does, but for a different reason. He fears force as if it were an elementary, unreasoning, blind power; and it seems permissible to him to try to evade its destructive effects, irrespective of whatever means he may resort to in order to do so. The German respects the state power, for he recognizes its right to exist; the Russian does not recognize it and thus tries to evade its effects by bribery or by desertion."⁶⁶ Once rid of the compulsion of the state, he is capable of doing anything: "Once a Russian has got off the official beaten track, which in his opinion constitutes the law, be it ever so slightly — so Dostoevsky writes — he immediately does not know what to do. As long as he keeps to the beaten track, everything is clear, — income and status, public position, coach, visits, employment and his wife." But when there is no command from above, he asks "What am I now? A leaf driven along by the wind." *M. Katkov*, who glorified the tsarist state power, wrote: "Like a storm, which nothing can hold back, it will whirl up myriads of particles of dust (i.e. Russian "citizens of the state" — *D. D.*) and will drive them along without troubling to ask what each of them thinks or wants."

⁶⁵ A. Herzen (Gertsen), *From the Other Shore*.

⁶⁶ Bodenstedt, *Russian Fragments*, Vol. I, p. XIII.

And what will happen if the power which drives along these particles of dust or leaves, as Dostoevsky calls them, becomes paralysed? What, indeed? This was the case in the spring of 1917, when Russian troops deserted the front lines, when in spite of all the efforts of that loudmouthed revolutionary Kerensky, all state authority collapsed, when the myriads of "particles of dust" were whirled up in that wild dance which was designated as the "great Russian revolution." Every new class in Europe which took the place of an older one showed a great talent for reconstruction and organization; neither the English after the execution of Charles I, nor the French after the execution of Louis XVI, were in the position of the babes in the wood after the good fairy that had shown them the way had suddenly vanished. As far as the Russians were concerned, however, the situation was a different one. The Russian proletariat started a big revolution, but very soon found itself in the position of one of Gorky's heroes, who says: "I feel I am being driven into a corner and I must therefore make life wider, must change it completely and rebuild it. But how? I cannot think any further... I do not understand, and that is my ruin!" In such a case one had, of course, to turn to those who "understood" the situation, to a new red Tsar, who, like Peter I, "asserted himself by terror rather than by greatness and loathed the 'mise en scène' necessary for a monarchy",⁶⁷ but nevertheless was an autocrat. Those who had no self-discipline, had to set an autocrat on the throne; the inner discipline that was lacking had to be replaced by an external one. And the administrative apparatus which in Russia, whatever the regime, is the only one possible, had to be newly regulated. It is precisely in this connection that *Herzen* writes as follows about the indestructibility of the absolutist tradition of autocracy in Russia: "Russia is administered by means of adjutants and mounted couriers. The Senate, the Imperial Council and the Ministries are simply offices where the matters concerned are not investigated, but merely settled formally. The entire administration is a telegraphic signal by means of which one person announces his will from the imperial palace. It is easier to shake the summit of such an automatic, officious organization than to alter it fundamentally. In a monarchy, if the ruler is killed, the monarchy remains; in our country the despotic machine of a bureaucratic order remains. As long as the telegraph apparatus functions, — it is all the same who is in charge of it, obedience will prevail."⁶⁸

Obedience was shown to Lenin, but Lenin promptly adopted those government principles peculiar to the Russians which had allegedly been overthrown by the revolution. In doing so, he was merely

⁶⁷ A. Herzen (Gertsen), *The Old World and Russia*.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

applying those principles in practice which he had been proclaiming a long time. When in 1903 in London, the Russian social democratic party split up into two factions, Lenin, in defending his new party statute, against those who held other views said: "Legal convictions, which could discipline our intelligentsia from within, are alien to them. We need a discipline from without."⁶⁹

Once Lenin had taken over the state power, he began to apply in practice precisely those principles that had also been tsarist principles and which were justified by the amorphous organization of Russian community life and by its complete lack of culture. Perhaps for the very reason that tsarism during its latter years had shown itself incapable of consistently applying the principle of absolutism in practice, inasmuch as it created the Duma (the Russian parliament from 1906 to 1917), a certain freedom of the press and similar institutions and thus caused Russia's national organism, which was incapable of self-administration, to totter, — and perhaps it was for this very reason that Bolshevism appeared at the crucial moment as the "deus ex machina", as the saviour of the Russian "innate fundamental elements." Perhaps it was only an experiment to save the dying Empire, which had been infected by the "poison of West European liberalism." This possibility is also discussed by the "prophets." *Leontyev* mentions the possibility of a transfer of the principles of European culture and European liberalism to Russia, but consoles himself and his readers with the thought that this would not be of any lasting success, since this liberalism "can so easily be crushed between two forces which are by no means liberal, — between the wild nihilistic onslaught and the firm defence of our great historical principles."⁷⁰

This was not achieved by the "defence of the great historical principles" and it had to be replaced by the "wild nihilistic onslaught" which we have witnessed ourselves and at the head of which Alexander Blok saw Christ "in the crown of white roses" — the Antichrist. The purpose of this onslaught was to destroy the germ of European culture in Russia, a germ which was deadly both for tsarism and for the Russian revolution.

And this brings us to the answer to our question as to why Russia is in principle hostile towards Europe and why it is bound to fight Europe. The amorphous Russian mass can only be led by absolutism, the independent European community only by its own action. For this reason, Russia must, on the one hand, defend itself against characteristic European features and must ward off European germs,

⁶⁹) Official Records of the 2nd Regular Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party, Geneva, 1903, p. 33 of the original Russian edition.

⁷⁰) K. *Leontyev*, *Collected Works*, Vol. V, p. 386 of the original Russian edition.

since these features, if inoculated into Russia, can only lead to the chaos and downfall of the state mechanism and the imperium. On the other hand, however, Russia must endeavour to destroy this Europe and to exterminate Europe's ideas throughout the entire European sphere of influence, since these ideas constitute the only protection against every form of absolutism, including Russian absolutism, too. For this absolutism strives to attain domination over the continent in order to destroy the spiritual affinity which in the West unites individuals as groups, classes, societies and nations, and endeavours to turn the individual into an amorphous, unresisting mass. Russia has always combatted these European principles, however much it may have tried to disguise this fight. Russia has fought not against the bourgeoisie, but against the principle of personal dignity and of right, which both Lenin and *Leontyev* erroneously confuse with the principle of "bourgeoisie." In former times, Moscow fought the aristocracy "which suppressed the people" in Poland and in Ukraine because this social class represented a united body of persons who were hostile to absolutism and who, with sword and pen, led the political life of their nation. Since the Bolshevik revolution, Russia has fought the peasant class in Ukraine, which has become politically conscious and constitutes the greatest obstacle to Muscovite despotism in Ukraine. Soviet Russia fights the "yellow syndicates" and the leaders of European Workers Unions, since the working classes must be turned into an inert and leaderless mass if one wishes to gain control of the West European workers' movement. Soviet Russia fights every idea which surpasses the "ideals" of a barbarous egalitarianism and egoism, which, sooner or later, always lead to absolutism. Soviet Russia fights voluntary cooperation and organized collectivism, based on the principles of a highly developed individualism. It fights on behalf of the ideas which are common to tsarism and Bolshevism. The fight against the Ukrainian Church in the 19th century, and against the Ukrainian peasantry in the 20th century, — this was only the first stage of the Russian campaign against the West; further stages were the fight against the Polish "noblemen" in the years 1832 and 1861, against the Polish Catholic Church under Nicholas II (favouring of the so-called Marianites), and against the European workers' movement. The aim remains one and the same, — the demoralization of the community in question and its disintegration into myriads of "particles of dust", as *Katkov* calls them, which constitutes a necessary precondition for Russia's domination in Europe.

Whether it is a question of Russia's foreign or home policy, the same can be ascertained everywhere. Inasmuch as Russia now furthers such social classes as the lowest proletariat in the West, it aimed and still aims in the first place to win over to its side those elements abroad who only pay homage to the ideals of egalitarianism

and for the realization of these ideals are even prepared to accept an alien absolutism, that is to say their own political death, since they easily become the victims of Russian demagoguery.

One can, no doubt, leave out of account the problem of a "future Russia" or of a "third Russia", as well as the question as to whether Russia will ever succeed in adopting European principles. *Chaadayev* was right when he said: "Nous avons je ne sais quoi dans le sang, qui repousse tout véritable progrès."⁷¹

One thing, however, is certain, and that is that Russia in the course of its entire history has so far shown itself incapable of adopting the ideas of the Occident or of following the example of the West. Indeed, it does not want to do so. Threateningly, it already stands in the midst of the nations of the West and makes no attempt to conceal its intention to swallow up each of these nations in turn, to subjugate them and break them. Will the West give the new Mongols the answer that they deserve?

CHAPTER IV

THE APOCALYPTIC DRAGON AND THE WEST

During the 1870-1871 war, *E. Renan* wrote the following grim prophetic words: "Russia will only become a great danger if Europe allows it to form shock-troops out of the conglomeration of the barbarian peoples of Central Asia, — out of the peoples who are at present powerless, but who, once they are disciplined, will, if one is not on one's guard, be capable of flocking together and forming troops under a Muscovite Genghis Khan, as under the Apocalyptic Dragon... Consider what a burden would cause the balance of the world to totter if Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, Servia, the entire Slav population of East Europe, a heroic and belligerent race, who only need the right commanders, were to join the big Muscovite conglomeration... What would you say then?"⁷²

This grim warning on the part of a prophet, who has long since been forgotten, rises up like a threatening admonition before the unsuspecting West of our day.

So far, the present elite of the Occident has failed to find an answer to this fateful question. And what is more, events happened of which neither Renan nor his contemporaries ever dreamt. At Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran, the politicians of the Occident themselves paved the way which led the Muscovite Genghis Khan into the ancient cities of the West, — Kyiv, Lviv, Prague, Budapest, Berlin and Vienna. Even during the tragic times of Ukraine (1917-1921), of Poland (1920 and 1939) and of Hungary (1956), the West, as if under a spell, remained silent and looked on indifferently whilst these peoples fought their heroic fight against the Apocalyptic Dragon

⁷¹ "We have something in our blood which repulses every genuine progress"
— *Chaadayev, Lettres sur la philosophie de l'histoire.*

⁷² *E. Renan et L'Allemagne, par E. Buré.*

of Moscow, whose representatives, together with the Western politicians, seek to restore the golden age of prosperity and world peace in the organization of the United Nations.

What is the reason for the continual retreat of the West before the Muscovite Genghis Khan? What is the reason for the continual urge of Moscow to the west, to the east and to the north and south, in order to get all peoples under its domination?

The reason for the Russian arrogance and the growing Russian influence in the West is immaterial and diabolical in character. Is it the power of an idea? Yes, indeed, it is! This idea, which mobilized the Russian hordes against the West has constantly changed. It has alternately been the "sole beneficial" power of the Russian shamanic "orthodoxy", the "regulating power" of tsarism as compared to the turbulent West, Pan-Slavism — the "liberation of the Slavs", Communism — the "liberation" of the nations subjugated by "Western imperialism"; the banner of the Muscovite Mohammed unchanged its colours and its emblems, but one thing remained unchanged, namely the idea of the "chosen" Russian people, a people of "supermen", a "higher race", which was to realize all the above-mentioned ideas and, under the leadership of Moscow, was to make all the "lower races" happy and bring them under Russian rule. The impelling power of the Russian urge was thus the idea, but with certain reservations! For an idea which constantly changes, which is really a disguise and which is based on lies, gradually becomes something more than an idea. It becomes the sheer will to subjugate everything around one. The idea itself only retains the role of a disguise in order to deceive the naïve world as to its carefully concealed aim. It is interesting to note that another prophet of the West already realized this fact a hundred years ago and warned the West accordingly. He was an expert authority on Russia, — Viscount Melchior de Vogüé. He wrote at follows about F. Dostoevsky's famous novel *The Possessed*:

"The greatest merit of this book lies in the fact that it gives us a clear idea of where the strength of the nihilists (the name applied to the Bolsheviks' predecessors), lies. Their strength lies not in doctrine or organization, but in the character of certain men. The author (Dostoevsky) vividly portrays the tense will of these men, whose souls are hard as steel. People feel drawn to them, mainly because of their character, even though their entire energy is devoted to evil. For their character promises the masses a leadership and guarantees a stable order, and this is the primary need of the human collective." Considering the future, de Vogüé adds: "If these nihilists go over to the propaganda of action, they will seem very similar to our own revolutionaries. But if we regard them more closely we shall discover the same difference amongst them as between a wild

beast and a domestic animal. Our worst revolutionaries are merely vicious dogs, but the nihilists are wolves, in fact, raging wolves, which is far more dangerous."⁷³

The unlimited faith in their race "chosen by higher powers", in their "sacred mission" as predestined to be the people to lead the "degenerate West", combined with the savage strength of a raging wolf or a servant of the Devil, — these are the imponderables which give the Muscovite horde their impetus and at the same time, paralyse the resistance of all Western timorous plebeian souls against this two-legged *Boa constrictor*. In order to combat this fanatical power of evil, which is determined to destroy the Christian civilisation of the West, it must be opposed by more powerful idea and spiritual force, in the service of that higher power which, at the beginning of our Christian era, sent its envoys to sinful mankind on the earth. But, unfortunately, there are only a few persons in the West who would be able or willing to bear the banner of this power. The eyes of the leading men of the West are dazzled by materialist idols. They are blind to the danger which threatens and they turn from those superhuman forces which could give our soul and our hands the necessary strength. The power of discernment of the leading elite of the West is dimmed by these materialist idols; this elite is thus demobilized spiritually and morally, and, in spite of the financial and armament strength of the West, physically, too, its will to fight is paralysed, — that same will and also that faith before which the hordes of Genghis Khan and of Attila once retreated.

It is this same incapacity on the part of the present leading circles of the West to assert themselves as the champions of a great, uncompromising anti-Russian idea, that makes them indifferent, if not hostile, to the only saving watchword of today, to that of the nations of Central and East Europe who are fighting for their independence, — namely *the destruction of the monstrous colonialist power, the disintegration of the barbarous Russian empire, the empire of slavery, of godlessness, of genocide and of ignominy.*

During the French Revolution, the famous English thinker and statesman, Edmund Burke, sadly wrote the strange visionary words: "the age of chivalry is gone, that of sophists, economists and calculators has succeeded",⁷⁴ and the words were meant more seriously than appears at a first glance. The leading caste of the West today are the "sophists", that is to say men who have no faith in a noble idea, for which one either stands or falls. The leading caste of the West today are the "economists", that is, persons who overrate the power of materialist things, of the economic factor, of money and of material

⁷³) *Roman Russe.*

⁷⁴) Selection from the Speeches and writings of Edmund Burke (The Carlton Classics).

wealth, and fail to realize that it is the soul that is not broken and the appreciation of spiritual and moral values which make a nation strong. The elite of the West today are the "calculators", that is, persons who regard every conflict of international and historical importance in which one side is victorious and the other doomed to ruin, solely as a misunderstanding between two businessmen, a misunderstanding which could have been settled by some kind of fifty-fifty arrangement. These sophists, economists and calculators will never possess the necessary nobleness of soul, wisdom of intellect, far-sightedness and will-power to kill the Apocalyptic Dragon of Moscow. This could only be achieved by a new elite, an elite which possesses the characteristics lacking in the present elite, — the elite of a Charlemagne, a Richard Coeur-de-Lion, or a Joan of Arc. The West needs a new chivalry in order to defend the sacred values and traditions of Christian civilization successfully. The old elite, which Burke scorned, must make room for the new elite and must abdicate. And the same applies to the mafia of Muscovite henchmen who poison the once free air of the Christian West. One must bear in mind the profound words of Demosthenes to his half-hearted fellow-countrymen during the fight against the Macedonians: "You must hate with all your hearts those in your midst who speak for Philip. You must understand that it will never be possible to overcome the enemy outside the walls of the town as long as you fail to overcome those in the town itself who stretch out their hands to him."
