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Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter. P.J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, Gleb N. Žekulin, eds. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992. 346 pp. \$24.95, cloth.

The book under discussion is interesting and important in two respects: firstly, as a collection of scholarly research devoted to an extremely timely but very poorly studied problem; secondly, as a very effective stimulus to a critical understanding of the stereotypes which have accompanied the study of Russian-Ukrainian relations during the years when many historians of Europe and North America, particularly historians of Ukrainian origin, considered it their civic, national or simply human duty to serve the political and cultural independence of Ukraine, or, at minimum, the preservation of its cultural and national identity. The past several years have radically altered the situation. Thus one of the important questions that has been raised by the current situation in Ukrainian-Russian relations is whether historians will be able to make a positive contribution to the organization of a new, equal, unbiased and non-hostile dialogue between the two societies and their intellectuals. The difficulties that stand in the way of mutual understanding (to say nothing of agreement!) are quite numerous. It will be extremely difficult to overcome them, as one can surmise from certain articles in this volume. But, regardless of the difficulty and length of such a dialogue, it would be a most unforgivable error to reject it. Therefore, this article should be considered not only as a review, but also as an attempt to understand the possible starting positions on certain questions concerning the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations, and, also, to test approaches which might possibly, in my opinion, be either productive or unproductive.

It is important to bear in mind that the book in question consists of materials from a conference held in the early 1980s. Of course, today it reads differently than it would have ten years ago. But, on the other hand, the very obsolescence of some articles reveals the importance of the present situation. The attainment of Ukrainian state independence and the rise of completely new conditions for a Ukrainian-Russian dialogue enable us to see just what may be possible or even necessary to reject in aspiring toward an objective and impartial understanding of the history of conflicts and ties between the two countries.

The book opens with Omeljan Pritsak's interpretation of the problems and difficulties inherent in the Ukrainian-Russian dialogue. They stem, he says in the introduction, not so much from politics or national prejudices, as from the actual historical circumstances of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship: a mutual lack of understanding when the Pereiaslav agreement was concluded (to which Hans-Joachim Torke devotes an article); the triumph "of a mystical and bureaucratic patriotism" during the time of Nicholas I; and, the difficulty in discussing the Ukrainian question under conditions of the prerevolutionary empire (particularly "after the prohibition of Ukrainianism in 1863 and 1876") and even more so in the Soviet period. Thus, in Pritsak's opinion, it was too complicated for Russian prerevolutionary and, later, Soviet intellectuals to treat seriously the Ukrainian question and "to overcome a basic blind spot in their vision of reality: they still insist on the integrity of their empire" (p. xi). It is this habit of seeing the empire and nation as one that Pritsak uses to explain the familiar position of P.G. Struve regarding Ukraine; the inability of A.A. Shakhmatov—whose unimpeachable scholarly and moral authority played an enormous role in the acknowledgment of Ukrainian as a language instead of a dialect—to recognize not only the independence, but even the political autonomy of Ukraine; Lenin's refusal to allow the creation of a national Ukrainian Communist Party; and even M.A. Suslov's struggle against the awakening of nationalism in Ukraine.

The volume's first article is by Jaroslaw Pelenski. It is devoted to a long-standing classical problem in historical research, i.e., the legacy of Kievan Rus' in the political and cultural development of the Vladimir-Suzdal and Galician-Volhynian principalities. The overall conclusion is that, even though both states are genetically connected with the Kievan tradition, there are more grounds to consider Galicia-Volhynia the successor of the Kievan state. In support of his conclusion, the author cites such factors as "territorial continuity, dynastic policies and religious or cultural evidence"; in contrast Vladimir-Suzdal Rus' is connected to Kiev on "religious evidence exclusively, or ... a combination of that and some aspects of dynastic politics" (p. 15). However, the very vagueness of the final conclusion and the blurred criteria—why, for example, are the "common social and institutional traditions" (p. 15), and cultural continuity reserved exclusively for the Galician-Volhynian principality, when no one has yet successfully argued the absence of such continuity between Kievan Rus' and Vladimir-Suzdal?—indicate that in general the problem, as it is presented by Pelenski, is unlikely to be solved. It is not only that historians, in principle, are unable to measure the degree of continuity between Kievan Rus' and its successors (and thereby solve the controversial question concerning who has preferential rights to this legacy), but also that the connection of North-Eastern

Rus' with Kiev is as obvious as the connection between Kiev and Galician Rus'. Thus, in my view, it is possible to compare certain aspects of the socio-economic, political, and cultural development of the two East Slavic regions, but it is impossible to establish the degree of their familiarization with the Kievan tradition. Indeed, one can agree that the Vladimir-Suzdal principality and Galician-Volhynian Rus' were incorporated into two diverse circles of civilization (p. 13), but this hardly means that the former became part of the Tatar-Mongolian world while the latter, surrounded by countries of Latin-Catholic culture, managed, as the author believes, to preserve the Kievan tradition more successfully.

But if we are discussing the subjective side of historical processes, then—judging by the chronicles of Galician-Volhynian origin—the connection between the future West Ukrainian and Kievan lands was felt and articulated much more weakly than the connection between North-Eastern Rus' and Kiev. Pelenski acknowledges that the compilers of the Galician-Volhynian chronicles, in contrast to their Vladimir-Suzdal contemporaries, were not at all insistent upon a continuity between Kiev and Galicia. Nor did they attach great significance to religious ties or a religious-ideological continuity between the Kievan and following epochs, unlike the authors of the chronicles of Vladimir-Suzdal origin, for whom the commonality of religious tradition with Kiev had an enormous significance (pp. 9–10). This obviously contradicts the idea put forth in the article; and the author's references to the greater pragmatism of the representatives of the Galician-Volhynian élite when it came to solving religious ecclesiastical problems (pp. 10–11) is a very weak argument. After all, by standards of the period, the absence of a religious rationale for any political-ideological program cannot be regarded other than a display of its immaturity and superficiality.

One may agree with all that Pelenski writes about the continuity between Kievan Rus' and the Galician-Volhynian principality; about the close ties of Galician Rus' with the Western world; about the peculiarities of the political and social development of the region; even about the formation of a distinct nation which the author defines as “proto-Ukrainians.” But does this mean that North-Eastern Rus' did not continue the Kievan tradition, completely broke off her relations with the West and was integrated into the sphere of Asiatic civilization, and that “proto-Russians” ceased to be a part of the East Slavic community of peoples?

Here we face a very widespread feature of the traditional approach to the problem of Ukrainian and Russian history, aggravated by national preconceptions. The paradigm of this approach, it seems, consists in historians “dividing” the legacy of Kievan Rus' between Russians and Ukrainians (or

Ukrainians and Belarusians together), and simply being unable to agree that it may indeed be shared. The “Russian position” boils down to this: Moscow became the successor to Kiev, while the society of Galician-Volhynian Rus' was subjected to total Polonization; the “Ukrainian position” boils down to the assertion that Galician Rus' specifically, and later Ukraine in general, had, so to speak, a monopoly on the Kievan legacy, while the Muscovite state rejected, or broke away from it, and almost completely merged with the barbarian world of the nomadic East. The strength of such stereotyping in historical thought is striking and very difficult to overcome, even for the professional historian (to say nothing of publicists, journalists and writers—the real “opinion-makers”). The very paucity of sources allows the processes reflected in them to be interpreted in very different ways. Nevertheless, historians, rather than saying that there is much that we do not (and will never) know about the history of the Ukrainian and Russian lands in the tenth to fourteenth centuries, prefer to pass off the hypothetical and possible (and sometimes even quite impossible!) for something historically proven, adjusting—wittingly or unwittingly—their formulations to one or the other general pattern. In effect, this leads to the ideologization of historical research, the overcoming of which, in my opinion, is possible only with a clear separation of the proven from the hypothetical, and the hypothetical from what is inaccessible to historical knowledge.

Edward L. Keenan's article will undoubtedly arouse great interest among readers, inasmuch as the author touches on seemingly unshakeable historical notions: he raises doubt concerning the Muscovite élite's (specifically Moscow politicians') special interest in other East Slavic peoples during the sixteenth century, and that it perceived its society and culture as part of a wider Orthodox Slav community. Keenan acknowledges that his statements are more a provocative hypothesis than the concrete result of specialized research. Thus, it is difficult to reproach him for the groundlessness of his various positions. But to what extent are his hypotheses legitimate? He proceeds, for example, from the assertion that the secular élite of the Muscovite state was not literate enough to have familiarized itself with the content of the chronicles or to arm itself with this knowledge (pp. 24–25). However, both his assertion about the semi-literacy of Moscow politicians, and his exclusion of non-written avenues of transmitting knowledge about the past, contain much that is, to say the least, disputable. After all, one is reminded of the fully literate representatives of the Muscovite court (such as Fyodor Karpov or Ivan Viskvatyi), as well as the historical legends that circulated in sixteenth-century society. Nor is it possible to accept as a starting point (regarding the indifference of Moscow society toward the Eastern Slavs), the notion that Moscow historiography exhibited little interest in the Kievan legacy and the post-Kievan fate of the Ukrainian-Belarusian lands,

inasmuch as Muscovite chroniclers bear testimony to precisely the opposite.¹ Keenan asserts that statements in the chronicles and diplomatic documents pertaining to Ukrainian-Belarusian territories being the “patrimony” of the Muscovite princes, should not be regarded as an expression of the idea of an historic unity among East Slavic peoples; that references in the sources of the Muscovite period to so-called Orthodox solidarity do not reflect the actual character of confessional consciousness, because supposedly the Moscow court was by nature indifferent to the religious problems of its time and was religiously tolerant; that it was only emigrants from Ukrainian-Belarusian lands who forced the upper strata of Russian society to recall the legacy of Maxim the Greek and to treat seriously the theory of “Moscow the Third Rome”; and, that on the whole “Muscovites were not so fully committed to the notion of East Slavic unity and historical identity as we might expect them to have been” (p. 35).

Unfortunately, there is virtually not a single assertion here that would not evoke the most serious objection. One can hardly doubt that behind the change of Ivan III’s system of titling (the introduction into the title of the expression “Sovereign or Tsar of All-Rus”) was a vivid awareness of what was “All-Rus” and how its separate parts were historically connected. Also indicative of the fact that the Muscovite court was hardly indifferent to the religious clash of the fifteenth through sixteenth centuries or to the relations between Orthodoxy and other faiths in the Lithuanian state, is the entire correspondence of Elena Ivanovna with the Muscovite court regarding attempts to convert her to Catholicism or the Union; the sharp polemics on religious questions during the years of the “judaizer” heresies; and, later, the polemics of Maxim the Greek and other publicists, which elicited enormous interest within court circles (such a reaction is recorded, for example, in the famous epistle of Fyodor Karpov to Maxim the Greek)²; the inclusion in a mid-sixteenth century chronicle of rich information regarding the formidable danger of Protestantism for Orthodoxy in the Great Lithuanian principality; the dissemination, by order of the Muscovite court, of Ivan Grozny’s reply to Jan Rokita under the guise of “The Epistle of Parfenii the Holy Fool (Urodivyi).”³ Interest in the ideas and person of Maxim

¹ See one of the last works on this subject: I.I. Schwarz, “Das Problem der Kontinuität von der Kiever Rus zum Moskauer Staat in den Moskauer Chroniken des 14. bis zum Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts” in *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, Bd. 99.1–2 (1991): 69–81.

² *Pamiatniki literatury Drevnei Rusi, konets XV–pervaia polovina XVI veka* (Moscow, 1984) 496–99.

³ D.S. Likhachev, “Knigi i molitva angelu Groznomu Parfeniia Urodivogo (Ivana Groznogo)” in *Rukopisnoe nasledie Drevnei Rusi. Po materialam Pushkinskogo doma* (Leningrad, 1972) 10–27.

the Greek was not insignificant in the mid-sixteenth century, if young Ivan IV appealed to him for advice; if the elder Artemii tried to transfer Maxim to the Troitse-Sergeiev monastery and, like Kurbskii, spoke of him with great respect; and, if references to the works of Maxim the Greek are often found in Zinovii Otenskii. The objections to Keenan could be continued; nonetheless, they do not undermine the soundness of the author's main point, namely that the Muscovite state's understanding of the East Slavic world prior to 1654 must be studied separately, and, that any statement concerning a full-fledged common consciousness among East Slavic peoples ought not be taken as something self-evident.

The article by Hans-Joachim Torke is devoted to the well-studied problem of political relations between Ukraine and Russia in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, it represents a new step forward in conceptualizing Russian-Ukrainian relations, primarily because it is free from all preconceptions. By scrupulous analysis of the main aspects of Russian policy toward Ukraine in the seventeenth century, the author arrives at the persuasive conclusion that right up to Peter I, the Muscovite leaders treated the prospect of getting deeply involved in Ukrainian affairs with great caution. According to the author, there are no grounds to speak about an imperialist line in Russia's *démarche*, nor about Russia's interest in control over Ukraine, inasmuch as this led toward an inevitable conflict with Poland and the Ottoman Empire, and particularly because Russian foreign policy at the time had more of a Western and Baltic orientation. Russian-Ukrainian, or more accurately, Russian-Cossack relations of this period were characterized by mutual mistrust, and only the general political situation pushed Ukraine and Russia toward one another. On the whole, Torke's analysis exemplifies a balanced and objective approach, which is what Ukrainian and Russian researchers now require most, as they touch on historical problems common to both countries.

Marc Raeff tries to explain in his article why Ukraine—which at the historical moment of its subordination to the Muscovite state clearly surpassed Muscovite civilization—was considered in the nineteenth century—when modern national self-awareness was just stirring in Europe—a country of primitive and oppressed peasant culture. One of his most important and persuasive conclusions is that the projection of nineteenth-century national aspirations onto the preceding epoch of Ukrainian history, leads to a misunderstanding of what the real mechanisms of interaction were between the *élite* layers of Ukrainian society and the Russian state apparatus. The reality is that the better educated representatives of the Ukrainian nobility (*szlachta*) and Cossack officer stratum (*starshyna*), who were drawn by Peter into the building of the new state apparatus, became the creators of the future empire, and as bearers of Ukrainian

culture did not separate their interests from the interests of Russia. On the contrary, the significant participation of native Ukrainians in the development of Russian (*rossiiskoi*) culture, the modernization of the administrative apparatus, and economic activity, and, on the other hand, the residency of the Russian nobility in Ukraine and their initiation into local traditions, led to the social and cultural integration of the élites Russia-wide. The author reasonably regards the demands for autonomy and the preservation of ancient rights and privileges, as the manifestation of particularism or regionalism, but definitely not nationalism. According to this proposed view (which appears very convincing), the reception of the essential ideas, values and orientations of the Enlightenment (in Russia, as in Ukraine) brought about the readiness of the Ukrainian élites to integrate into the imperial, social, political and cultural system, and brought about the loss of their specific characteristics (pp. 75, 81). Nationalism of a later period, which arose under the strong influence of romanticism and idealist philosophy, was a response to the aspirations of the state under Nicholas to subordinate, in Ukraine and in Russia, civil society to total bureaucratic control. On the whole, Raeff's article—as all the works of this prominent and immensely erudite scholar of Russian history—is valuable and provides not only a description, but also a model of the historical process. With enviable impartiality, the author demonstrates that the examination of the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the prism of the processes of social and cultural integration, is more productive than conceptualizing it in terms of a conflict between the two nations and cultures.

The article by Edgar Hösch deals with the policies of Emperor Paul I toward Ukraine. Emphasizing that Paul I is often characterized as a madman, the author expresses doubt about the fairness of such an assessment. Specifically, Paul I's Ukrainian policy demonstrates that the leitmotif of his actions was pragmatism, alongside the desire to improve the administrative apparatus of Russia, and not a blind denial of all that was achieved by Catherine II. Although he had not relinquished the idea of a bureaucratic centralization of the country, the Emperor did contribute to the restoration and preservation of special legal norms for Ukraine, forbade the sale of peasants in Little Russia and re-established the status of the Uniate Church. However, Paul's rule was so short-lived (1796–1801) that he, contrary to Hösch's opinion (p. 96), can hardly be considered an “instructive example of the hopelessness of tsarist nationality policy.”

In the article “Ukrainian and Russian Women: Cooperation and Conflict,” Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak attempts to reveal the distinctive features of the feminist movement in Ukraine at the end of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, as well as demonstrate the differences in the social, political and cultural role of women in Ukrainian and Russian society. These differences,

according to the author, are not only more fundamental than is normally thought, but are deeply rooted in the historical past of both nations. In Kievan Rus', public and property rights of women and their participation in cultural and political life were very extensive. This tradition (if we are to believe the author) was forgotten in North-Eastern Rus' but was preserved almost perfectly in Ukraine: "The Tatar invasion did not change Ukrainian social mores: the seclusion of upper-class women and their subordination to men, which had occurred in the north, in Russia, did not take place on Ukrainian territory. In contrast to the subordinate and passive Russian women, Ukrainian women appear to have been as free and resolute as any frontier women" (p. 103). One can hardly prove such a thesis by citing, as Bohachevsky-Chomiak does, the literary works and journalistic statements of later periods (Lesia Ukrainka, Olena Pchilka, Marko Vovchok, Hanna Chykalenko Keller). Neither Polish nor Russian scholarly historical research on the question is taken into consideration.⁴ Although it is acknowledged in the article that it is impossible to separate those Ukrainian and Russian women who participated in the revolutionary movement at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century (p. 106), such distinction, according to the author, is perceptible in the nature of women's cultural activity and their work among peasants. Whereas Russian women concentrated on the spreading of revolutionary ideas and on educational work in the village, their Ukrainian contemporaries and ideological sympathizers were much more devoted to the collecting of folklore and relics of folk art. Unlike Russian women, who were worried primarily about sex discrimination against peasant women, Ukrainian women devoted their activities to the task of stimulating national self-awareness; Ukrainian women activists were subjected to more severe punishment and persecution than were Russian women; not a single Ukrainian woman played a significant role in the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine, nor did a single Ukrainian woman become an outstanding leader of the Bolsheviks; the work of the *zhinviddily* (women's chapters organized by the Communist Party) in the 1920s reflected the direction of the Muscovite centre and not of Ukrainian social organizations (pp. 106–114). It is impossible to say that all these statements are proven in the article. The examples which are given to substantiate these assertions remain precisely that—examples; they do not convince, say, that Russian women were collecting folklore to any lesser extent than Ukrainian women (recall, for example, the activity of N. Shemetova in this field); or that Russian women were hurt more by the discrimination against women in the family than Ukrainian women, or that they suffered less from

⁴ See the rich literature cited in N.L. Pushkarev's *Zhenshchiny Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1989).

police persecution and legal repressions; or, that Russian women played a different role than Ukrainian women in the post-1917 Communist revolutionary movement. Bohachevsky-Chomiak's clearly demonstrated fact that activists of the Ukrainian womens' movement (Olena Pchilka) stressed the importance of the national question for Ukraine, does not prove that there were differences in the feminist movement as such in the two countries.

Everything that has been said allows us to put the question more broadly: is it possible, in principle, to divide the social movements of the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century in Russia into strictly Ukrainian and Russian movements, or at least to catch certain essential differences in the nature of these movements and societal moods? Does a national or regional criterion enable one to show the distinctiveness of one or another form of social life in Ukraine in contrast to Russia? Of course, this does not apply to Galicia or those Ukrainian organizations in Russia that completely devoted their activity to the idea of Ukraine's national isolation from Russia. Not being an expert on this issue, it is difficult to answer the questions. However, even a superficial acquaintance with the societal and cultural development of Russia in the given epoch makes clear the great danger of attributing the political-national antagonisms of the twentieth century to the past, and thereby distorting the real picture. One forms the impression that Bohachevsky-Chomiak has been unsuccessful in avoiding this danger.

The article by John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," is particularly important from a methodological point of view. It demonstrates that the actual development of ethnic and national consciousness more often than not takes a different course than does the development of myths about past history created by intellectuals. It is precisely myths—not language or historical knowledge—that shape concepts of national identity. This general rule is also true in the case of Ukraine. The myth about the Cossacks as the border guards of Orthodoxy and Slavdom—rather than any myth about a particular language or memory of Kievan Rus'—became the foundation of an embryonic form of Ukrainian national consciousness (p. 132). Similar myths arose in many societies that existed on the border between different zones of civilization. The unstable and unoriginal character of such a myth, along with the feebleness of other components of national consciousness that separate and distinguish Ukrainians from other Eastern Slavs, have created, as the author demonstrates, many difficulties in the search for symbols of Ukrainian national self-identity. These difficulties are compounded, of course, by the centralizing and Russifying policies pursued by tsarist Russia and later the government of the USSR. Nevertheless, from Armstrong's article one may conclude that it is not so much these political causes, as the character of the

historical past itself and the cultural evolution of Ukrainian society that created, then and now, obstacles to the growth of a national consciousness that would clearly contrast and separate Ukrainians from Russians and Belarusians.

John S. Reshetar's article traces the different perceptions in Ukrainian and Russian society of what the author calls the "Ukrainian Revolution." The very concept of a "Ukrainian Revolution," introduced in the title of the article, appeals to the unproven: is it possible to speak about a Ukrainian revolutionary movement as something located outside of an all-Russian revolution? Is it possible to say that the author has demonstrated the plausibility of such an approach? Probably not, although Reshetar does attempt to contrast the Ukrainian revolutionary experience of 1917–1920 to the Russian in every way. Whatever side we take, whatever aspects of the "Ukrainian Revolution" we choose, we will see in everything not only a continuation, but even a facet of what occurred throughout all of Russia—in Moscow as well as in the regions. What is more, judging by Reshetar's exposition, the differences in position and outlook between the leaders of Western Ukraine and those living on Russian territory ran deeper than between Eastern Ukrainian and Moscow politicians. Of course, it would be absurd to deny that the national question was viewed differently by the leaders of the social movements in Ukraine and in Russia. But is it an accident that the Central Rada so long delayed the declaration of Ukrainian state independence, and that the call for a federal arrangement of post-revolutionary Russia was the most widespread political slogan with respect to the national question? Does this mean that Ukrainian leaders and society strove to obtain full independence but did not anticipate receiving it (such a conclusion seems inevitable from Reshetar's article), or, does it mean that they could not imagine the future of Ukraine separate from Russia? It seems to me that the latter is much nearer the truth than the former, although obviously, only specific research will produce a convincing answer to this question.

As to the author's proposed analysis of the perception of Ukrainian events in Russian society, many of his starting points seem a priori and tendentious. He accepts as indisputable that the concepts "Little Russia," South, and South-Western Rus' were imposed upon Ukrainian society by the imperial system; that a serious attitude toward Ukrainian culture was unknown to Russian society; that Mazepa and *Mazepinstvo* were generally perceived to be synonymous with national hostility of Ukrainians toward Russia, rather than high treason; that the attitude toward T. Shevchenko was permeated with a pathological fear (in this respect the author cites only the well-known negative statements of V.G. Belinskii about Shevchenko, ignoring the completely opposite comments, including those of Belinskii himself); that Russians acted in accordance with the views of imperial nationalism, disallowing Ukrainians to convene their own

Constituent Assembly; that the “imperial syndrome” fostered perceptions of Ukraine as if it were Central Asia or Siberia; that the cultural provincialism of Little Russian society was a result of Russian rule in Ukraine; that “arrogance, obtuseness, insensitivity, self-aggrandizement and the like” (p. 154) were typical characteristics of the Russian minority living in Ukraine, etc. In conformity with these stereotypes, Bolshevism in Ukraine is considered not an independent occurrence but the continuation of Russian Communism, and the very policy of the Bolsheviks is regarded as a continuation of old Russian imperial policies, having originated, in essence, in traditional notions of “a single and indivisible Russia” as well as in messianic pretensions. To dispute these theses is very difficult, inasmuch as they are neither the result of preceding analyses nor of specialized research by the author himself; they rely on absolutely a priori, generalized assertions (for example, it is assumed that rebellions in the rear of Denikin’s army were provoked by the general’s policy of Russification, and not by a desire to uphold what were essentially Socialist Revolutionary agrarian reforms initiated by the Bolsheviks) or isolated testimonial memoirs which are quite unrepresentative (particularly of revolutionary epochs). Thus, references to the memoirs of Vynnychenko are obviously insufficient for one to assert that “the first Soviet invasion of Ukraine in January 1918 was openly hostile to everything Ukrainian: the language was regarded as ‘counter-revolutionary,’ bookstores and print shops were closed, and portraits of Shevchenko were trampled underfoot” (p. 156).

Reshetar’s article represents an attempt to look at certain aspects of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine and Russia as the clash of national interests between two countries and peoples. It seems to me, from a scholarly point of view, that such an approach is condemned to failure from the outset. It is inadequate in terms of the object of analysis itself, inasmuch as national problems were not the logical centre of the all-Russian revolutionary movement, even including its Ukrainian theatre. The October Revolution and Bolshevism were historical phenomena different from the nineteenth-century national movements. Thus, standards of the Victorian era are inapplicable. Despite Reshetar’s final conclusion (pp. 158–59), it is difficult to believe that the fate of Ukraine in the period 1917–1920 could have been any different than Russia’s, and that the cause of this failed alternative lay in the inability of Russian revolutionaries to reject their authoritarian and expansionist Russian past. The years of revolution and civil war speak exactly of the opposite. It is another matter entirely that the utopia of Russian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks was precisely that—a utopia, the downfall of which struck a painful blow at both Ukraine and Russia.

The manner in which Yaroslav Bilinsky puts the problem in his article, "Political Relations between Russians and Ukrainians in the USSR: the 1970s and Beyond," might evoke the same bewilderment as Reshetar's article. Is it possible to regard the policy of the Moscow leadership as "Russian" or that of "Russians"? Is it possible to discern in the views of Soviet dissidents (Grigorenko and many others cannot be called Russian dissidents) on the issue of Ukraine's national needs, a discrepancy between Russians and Ukrainians regarding political relations? This article was written before important state archives of the former USSR were opened, therefore, the author (as scores of other political scientists) was forced to look for nuances in Brezhnev's statements concerning the national question in the Soviet Union; to posit important hidden meaning in the fact that Brezhnev's speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the USSR was delivered not on 30 December (the day of the proclamation of the USSR), but on 21 December (the birthday of J.V. Stalin); and to see in all this a symptom of the resurrection of pro-Russian and pro-Stalinist emphasis regarding the nationality policy of the Moscow leadership. Can the fact that the First Secretaries of the republican Communist Parties were denied the privilege to discuss the "new historical community of Soviet people" be regarded as a refusal to support this "assimilationist idea" (pp. 166–67), when it is known that the right to ideological innovation was strictly reserved for the centre? The author speaks of the "intensive Russification policy of 1978–79" (p. 167), referring to the closed resolution of the CC CPSU concerning the improvement of the teaching of Russian language in the republics (which can hardly be regarded as strictly secret if its summary was published in a journal for teachers—compare pp. 167–68 and p. 191, footnote 15), and, attempting to ascertain just what was being concealed by these actions, assumes that the speech was about a secret plan of assimilation, if not of all the peoples of the European part of the USSR, then at any rate, of Ukrainians and Belarusians, and about the creation of a sort of "East Slavic Empire" (p. 168).

In my view, the crux of the matter is not just whether Bilinsky is right or wrong—he, as all those who have written about the contemporary internal development of the USSR until recently, could not rely on a relatively authoritative information base. At stake are much broader and more profound issues. Can ties between Moscow and the Soviet republics really be regarded as inter-national (*mezhnatsional'nye*) relations, and Moscow's actions identified with Russian or pro-Russian policy? Do the categories of analysis generally accepted in political science research (and similar to those in Bilinsky's article)—which, strictly speaking, are adopted from the experience of the nineteenth century—fit an analysis of national relations in the USSR? Was the Soviet Union not itself something quite unique, a phenomenon *sui generis*, whose

experience, correspondingly, can hardly be forced into the scheme of traditional, so to speak, normal development, the model of which might provisionally be considered the history of the Western world? If we are to speak frankly and unambiguously, can we consider the Soviet Union to have really been an empire, moreover, a Russian empire?

In my opinion—to be sure that of a non-specialist and of a Russian, who has nevertheless known ordinary Soviet reality in its primitive and modest daily manifestations from the inside—there are two circumstances which allow us to question the application of the categories “empire,” “colonialism,” “national assimilation,” and so forth, to the USSR. In the first place, knowing specifically the intrinsic experience of life in the USSR and the real relations that were formed among peoples of different nations on the one hand, and the all-powerful state on the other, there are serious reasons, in my view, to doubt the thesis that “Soviet Imperialism” was “Russian Imperialism.” Even by maintaining a minimal objectivity, it is impossible to see in Russians the ruling nation of the USSR. Such an imperial nation did not exist in the Soviet Union, and the policy of the centre, bereft of national attributes, was in essence no less imperial in relation to Russians than in relation to other peoples. In the second place, by articulating the word “empire,” we inevitably place the USSR into the category of other empires, primarily the colonial empires of the nineteenth century. Even if we find grounds to define the USSR as a Soviet empire (Russian-Soviet or simply Soviet—in this instance it is irrelevant), its distinguishing features from the Austro-Hungarian or English empires will be so great that the use of the very concepts “empire” or “colonialism” may appear false, leading us toward confusion rather than serving as a useful tool for the comprehension and interpretation of the real phenomenon that was the USSR. Would it not be more correct to speak of the USSR as a kind of supra-national community? Perhaps, indeed, the Kremlin ideologists were correct in speaking about the international character of the USSR and the “Soviet people”?

The main part of Bilinsky's article is devoted to the attitude of Russian dissident groups toward the Ukrainian question. The analytical criteria are the recognition or non-recognition, by individual dissidents as well as by their groups, of the possibility of Ukrainian state independence. The author is forced to establish that even Ukrainian General P. Hryhorenko (Grigorenko), in the early period of the dissident movement (1971–76), simply did not express an opinion on the Ukrainian question, and later only “gradually evolved into a moderate Ukrainian nationalist” (p. 169). The author characterizes R.A. Medvedev's position as generally “hostile” toward the idea of Ukrainian national independence, which included even justifying the “natural” process of Russification of Ukrainians outside of Ukraine. And in the case of Academician

A.D. Sakharov, the author is surprised that he at first completely ignored the Ukrainian question, and later gave an extremely negative appraisal of both Russian and non-Russian nationalist movements. (Bilinsky is inclined to see in this more of an emotional than a reasoned reaction [p. 172]). The author views as inconsistent the position of those dissidents who foresaw state independence for the Baltic republics, but did not envision such prospects for Ukraine, though they repeatedly and actively spoke in defense of Ukrainian human rights advocates, including ardent Ukrainian nationalists (pp. 173–175). In all this Bilinsky sees misconception, immaturity, reliance on traditionally erroneous notions about Ukraine rather than an expression of a particular principled position.

Among Bilinsky's carefully collected documents concerning the dissident movement, only two expressed a readiness to recognize the possibility of Ukrainian state independence. These were: 1) an anonymous "Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union" signed by "Democrats of Russia, Ukraine and the Baltics," which demanded the right of nations to "political self-determination by means of national referendums"; and 2) the forecast by A. Amalrik and V. Gorsky (the pseudonym of an unknown dissident) concerning the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the separation of Ukraine from Russia (pp. 175–177). As to the first document, it is known that behind it stood a group of five people (three Estonians, a Russian and a Ukrainian) living in Estonia. As for Amalrik and Gorsky (whom Bilinsky calls "leading Russian intellectuals"), it remains rather unclear (particularly in the case of Gorsky) to what extent their voices were representative of the dissident movement, not to mention of those intellectual circles that considered themselves opponents of the existing order.

As Bilinsky indicates, there were individuals—sometimes qualified as bearers of a neo-slavophile ideology—who denied the notion of Ukrainian independence, and expressed the traditional and widespread point of view that Eastern Slavs were organically bound by their historical fate. There is also specific reference to A.I. Solzhenitsyn, whose inability to recognize the right of Ukraine and Belarus to independent national-political life is difficult for the author to comprehend, particularly since Ukrainians number among Solzhenitsyn's immediate ancestors, and because of his personal and profound affection for Ukrainians and their cultural aspirations. As in the case of Sakharov, Bilinsky does not offer any explanations for the views of Solzhenitsyn, mentioning only in passing his "tendency toward all-embracing, almost mystical constructs" (p. 181), which sounds extremely vague, and expressing the hope that Solzhenitsyn will in due course reconsider his views. All the same, it is difficult not to give in to the temptation to provide at least

some sort of interpretation of so reserved—if not hostile—a position of Soviet dissidents on the Ukrainian question. Helpful to some extent are two of Solzhenitsyn's letters to the participants of conferences in Strasbourg (1975) and Hamilton (1981), both of which were devoted to Russian-Ukrainian relations. Judging by these letters, published as supplements to the book under review, there can be no doubt that for Solzhenitsyn the fate of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples are so intimately interwoven that he simply finds it impossible to imagine their separation, mutual isolation and opposition. Such a view seldom finds understanding amongst those Ukrainians who have never lived in the USSR or who emigrated as children. For any Russian, including the author of these lines, as well as for the majority of Ukrainians (so it seems to me—a Russian who has many Ukrainian friends and acquaintances), the distance between the two peoples, increasing at present, seems to be a certain historical misunderstanding, which may, moreover, have the most unpleasant consequences for Ukrainians and Russians. Perhaps, this is a stereotype and a prejudice shared even by such a distinguished person as Solzhenitsyn. However, it may be much closer to the truth to say that such perceptions of Ukrainian-Russian relations is a significant factor in the mentality of both peoples, and they carry considerable historical weight and influence in the present-day development of Ukraine and Russia.

A number of articles treat the problems of culture, religion, economy and demography in the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations. James Cracraft addresses what has become, of late, one of the central research questions concerning the history of Ukrainian culture: the role of the Baroque in Russia and Ukraine between 1600 and 1750. His caution against exaggerating the role of specifically Ukrainian influences in the development of Baroque elements in Russian art and literature sounds very timely. However, his doubts about applying the category “Baroque” to this stage in the development of Ukrainian literature proves to be unfounded, as the recent research of Ukrainian literary scholars has demonstrated.

The article by George G. Grabowicz, devoted to nineteenth-century Russian-Ukrainian literary relations, is pragmatic in character and will attract the attention of historians of Ukrainian and Russian literature for a long time to come. He proceeds from the point that the relationship of the two literatures can hardly be described as “an encounter” or even an “historical encounter.” It is more correct to say—and here one must agree with the author—that in this case we are dealing with “an historical and indissoluble embrace or, as others might see it, a Sartrean *No Exit*” (p. 214). Grabowicz demonstrates that by virtue of this organic connection between the two literatures, no formal criteria (such as language, birthplace and residency, or the themes of literary works) can be used

as a reliable criterion for separating Ukrainian literature from Russian literature. This is clearly evident in the example cited by the author: Korolenko, having lived all his life in Ukraine and writing about Ukraine, cannot be acknowledged as a Ukrainian writer, while Gogol, despite all the facts of his biography and his place as a classic in the history of Russian literature, remains a great Ukrainian writer. By approaching literature and culture as a system Grabowicz presents a convincing approach to the problem of demarcating Ukrainian and Russian literature. The author's view concerning the consequences of the Ems Ukaz (1876) for the development of Ukrainian literature is extremely interesting: paradoxical as it may sound, that decree helped "to shift Ukrainian literature out of the provincial mode" (p. 226).

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw's article is a close investigation of the main stages and turning-points in Ukrainian-Russian church relations in the period 1917–1921. The author stresses the national motives behind the activity of the founders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, and demonstrates how irreconcilable and intolerant was the reaction on the part of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. However, also deserving of attention, in my opinion, is the strictly religious radicalism of the Ukrainian Autocephalists. They repeated in Ukraine the experience of Russian reformers (*obnovlentsy*) for whom the arrival of the revolution opened a new epoch in the life of the church, a period when the church was obliged to find, according to the reformers, its place within socialist society, and support through the radicalism of its religious and social message, the changes taking place in the country.

The articles by Grabowicz and Bociurkiw, in my opinion, once again demonstrate how much an interpretation of Ukrainian history gains in depth and adequacy when it is not artificially separated from the history of Russian society.

The book's two closing articles by Ralph S. Clem and Peter Woroby, both based on rich statistical materials, demonstrate the influence of economic and demographic processes on the relationship between Ukrainians and Russians on Ukrainian as well as on Russian territory. These articles confirm and convincingly illustrate the well-known fact that the socialist period led more and more toward a homogeneous fusion of the two peoples. Nevertheless, there is the question: Must we see in these processes a reflection of purposeful policies of Russifying Ukrainians in Ukraine and assimilating them on Russian territory? Although this question is ordinarily answered in the affirmative, it can hardly be convincing until new documents from the archives of the CC CPSU and other executive organs of the USSR are published. But even now, by viewing all these processes from within the society in which they were taking place, it is possible to say that the matter never came down to the oppression or discrimination of one nation by the other. Such concepts as well as, for example, the concept of

“imperial nation” applied to the Russians in the USSR, quite inadequately convey, in my opinion, the real essence of the on-going socio-cultural processes.

In closing, I wish to say that the book actually benefitted from having appeared eleven years after the presentation of the papers. Only now, following the colossal changes in the republics of the former USSR, are conditions developing for a truly free and productive dialogue between historians of Ukraine and Russia. Only time will tell what the results of this dialogue will be. There is no doubt, however, that it can and must be continued.

Translated from the Russian by
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