NADIA M. DIUK

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The generation factor, which at the biological level operates with the uniformity of a natural law, becomes the most elusive one at the social and cultural level, where its effects can be ascertained only with great difficulty and by indirect methods.

—Karl Mannheim, *The Problem of Generations*

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Introduction

Until democracy becomes the universally practiced political system around the world, along with the democratic political culture that supports it, the issue of how states change their leaders and rulers will continue to be a topic of interest to policymakers and scholars and an issue of concern to politicians and citizens. Leadership change in democracies is easy to follow, and access to information on those processes is mostly readily available. But in the nondemocracies, we are often directed toward analyzing the significance of who stands in which position of proximity to the leader on the public podium or reviewing which son is favored by an authoritarian ruler.

Occasionally, social unrest and frustration with the leaders turns into public protest and people turn out onto the streets to demonstrate their discontent. Sometimes the dictator falls; sometimes the regime turns on the people and brutally suppresses the uprising. In most of these situations, youth and youth movements have taken center stage around the world as the catalyst for change, the moving force that mobilizes the people, and as the leaders of popular protest movements. Observers have noted the similarities among the youth-led movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine and the recent uprisings in the Arab world. The images of masses of peaceful but defiant protesters occupying the streets for days, setting up tent cities, bringing the normal routine of government to a standstill, and demanding retribution for the regime's crimes

and an end to dictatorship have been repeated in many countries in the past few years. The use of new media has reinforced the focus on youth: the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia was launched and broadcast through Facebook and organized through Twitter. These new communication tools have broken through barriers of censorship, providing information and bringing people together who were previously isolated from both.

When hundreds of thousands of people pour into the streets to petition for freedom and protest peacefully against dictatorship, there is always an atmosphere of euphoria generated around the event. When youth groups play a major role the energy and enthusiasm of the young elevates the movement to a special level. The principles of freedom and moral commitment that develop in opposing an oppressive regime become intensely concentrated into an ethos that is often sweeping and highly emotional. When the crowds disperse, however, what happens once the government has fallen, the tents are dismantled, and the protesters return to normal life? How enduring are the high-minded values they lived with on the street, and where are the changes they struggled to bring about? Do the new media that helped to bring people into the streets play a role in transforming the governing structures of societies to make them more democratic, or do the governments use the same technology for their own ends? Do the youth that led the revolution then participate in reform of the system they rose up to oppose? Do the leaders they have chosen come to power?

We now have information from observing youth-led protest movements over the past decade to be able to assess their impact on leadership change. To better understand these and similar events that dominated the news headlines in the Arab world for weeks in early 2011, let's turn to the post-Soviet states where there is an accumulation of evidence and analysis on how such popular movements are created, how they come to challenge the leadership of the state, and what happens after. Ukraine is a good example. Protests against a falsified vote in the presidential election of 2004 launched the Orange Revolution and overturned the attempt to transfer power to a candidate handpicked by the old regime and supported by Russia. But in a stroke of historical irony, the next presidential election in 2010 conceded victory to the unloved loser of 2004 in what was generally recognized as a free and fair contest. Azerbaijan, located in the Caucasus and sharing a border with

revolutionary Georgia, provides an example of a country where many years of opposition to an authoritarian regime led to several attempts at youth-led revolutions that failed and were crushed, enabling the dictatorship to endure.

When Vladimir Putin rose to the post of president of Russia in 2000, the manner of his accession posed a mystery not only to most observers of Russia, but to policymakers and specialists around the world. It raised many questions: What were the political channels and mechanisms that had brought him to power, and would they be replicated when it came time to choose Putin's successor? Despite its proximity to Ukraine, there has been no youth-led mass protest movement to assist in the process of changing the leader and the government. So we need to look at the other more traditional ways in which leaders come to power there. We already know something about how Putin's successor was chosen in 2008; Dmitri Medvedev was his handpicked candidate and the election process was influenced to support that choice. Most experts understand that the opaque underworld of power and finance played a larger role in this process than the votes delivered at the ballot box.

This book will offer some fascinating findings on leadership change and particularly on the role of youth. The narrative will highlight how youth rise up in various societies to aspire to leadership positions and promote change in their country, whether through their own independent efforts or by being absorbed into the current system. We will see how youth respond to the political environment, their values and beliefs, and the way governments try to control, co-opt, and exploit youth for their own ends. By reviewing three cases of youth in specific political environments, we can assess the channels that are available to them to participate in politics. Each youth group and movement has a history, and in turn, the citizens of the future will have been influenced by their experiences as youth. By understanding these processes, we may be able to foresee some important trends.

We will focus on Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan as case studies. All are new independent states that emerged out of the USSR when it dissolved in 1991, which adds an additional interesting dimension to the examination of youth. Leadership change and political life as a whole in the Soviet Union were run according to a strictly regulated, ideological plan. The Soviet political system was the antithesis of a democracy, and renewal of political cadres in leadership positions was

determined by the ruling Communist Party elite, which, by the 1980s, was dominated by a group of leaders whose advanced age had become the hallmark of the system. The youth that grew up in the final years of the Soviet Union and some born since independence are the first free generation after decades of Communism. This study will reveal how far they have evolved away from the former Soviet political system and, inasmuch as the Soviet Union was a multiethnic state, we will see how the first free generation has taken on the consolidation of new national identities.

Russia will continue to be important as the richest country in the region and not least because of the location of hundreds of nuclear warheads on its territory. Ukraine's importance lies not only in its size and population, but also in its location. Sharing its border with several NATO states and the European Union, Ukraine's independence is also credited with being a major obstacle to the reconstitution of a major economic or military bloc to the east under Russia's leadership. Ukraine's turbulent political history in the past decade has introduced the term "color revolution" into the lexicon of political scientists and policymakers around the world. Azerbaijan was brought to prominence by the discovery of potentially vast oil reserves surpassing those already being exploited since the nineteenth century. The future wealth of the country and the question of who controls the pipelines will provide the framework for the competition for political power in this state for the foreseeable future. Located at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, bordering on Russia and Iran, and on the fault line between Christianity and Islam, control over Azerbaijan's territories has been an indicator of the power relationships in the region throughout history.

The future leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are already living and working somewhere; where is the most likely place to look for them? Since they may well be of a different generation, what are the most profound generational experiences they have lived through to shape their outlook and behavior? By looking at the next generation of youth, can we determine some special characteristics or values that the presidents-in-waiting would be expected to share? The study of youth may help to determine the nature of the future political systems in these countries. Will the next generation change the institutions of power? Or will they be changed by them, as has occurred many times in preceding generations?

Tracing these developments will provide anyone interested in politics and government with some insights into the dynamics of political change. These were the questions posed as the Arab Spring progressed. By examining the three case studies presented here we can come to some conclusions for these and similar events in the future.

Unique public opinion polling data, conducted and compiled especially for this study, will provide valuable insights into youth culture, attitudes toward and confidence in institutions, and political preferences; how youth view the geopolitical environment and their own political leaders; and whether they aspire to political power themselves. Polling was conducted and data compiled for the three countries for the first time in 2003 and once more with the same set of questions in 2010. These six sets of data provide an exclusive opportunity to carry out a comparison among the countries and to present unique snapshots of the younger generation in three countries at two specific points in time.

The first set of data was compiled in 2003 from polling conducted among sixteen- to thirty-four-year-olds. The oldest were born in 1968 and the youngest in 1987.[1] Opinion polls were conducted in each of the three chosen countries using the same questionnaire in order to be able to draw comparisons. The polling questions covered lifestyle and income, political attitudes and expectations, attitudes toward foreign countries and emigration, language use, national identity, and other issues. As part of this project, a number of conferences and roundtables were held in Moscow, Kyiv, and Baku in 2003 and in the summer of 2004. A number of articles were published from the materials and proceedings of the events and analysis of the comparative statistics.[2]

Opinion polling for this study was conducted once more among youth in the three countries in 2010. The same questionnaire was used as for the 2003 data set among eighteen- to thirty-four-year-olds; this time the oldest were born in 1976 and the youngest in 1992.[3] With this data, the study was able to provide not only a comparative perspective among the three countries, but also some conclusions about the progress of youth through the past decade by comparing the first polling with the data seven years later.

Even though the polling data proved to be invaluable as a way to compare and contrast the emerging youth of the three countries, the numerous conversations and interviews that were conducted were the best way to learn more about the attitudes and beliefs of the next gener-

ation. With events moving at such a fast pace over the past two decades, not much of the history of the post-Soviet region has yet been written. But this attempt to provide some explanations about the broad generational and social movements and their interaction with the politics of the time will hopefully be a modest contribution and also of interest to observers of contemporary events around the world where these issues repeat, as they do, every few years.

1

Youth: The Next Generation

Youth only become active once they have grown up.

—Yuri Levada

The First Free Generation

A new generation of citizens has emerged in the twenty years since the Soviet Union disintegrated and fifteen new republics were created on the political and geographic map of Europe and Eurasia. The same twenty years have also seen the consolidation of states, the evolution of political systems, and the most dynamic revolution in information technology that the world has ever seen. This study will present a portrait of the next generation against the backdrop of political turmoil, social upheavals, and economic transformation in three post-Soviet states—Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. It will explore the main influences on the emerging political consciousness of youth with the aim of looking to the future to see what kind of leaders will emerge and what kind of countries they will live in.

We have the opportunity to track the dynamics of the formation of three distinct state entities and political cultures after years under the Soviet system. The transition of youth from being an object of policy to being an active element in this new environment has enriched the

growth of civil society, whose emergence in the form of nongovernmental organizations, political parties, trade unions, and civic groups is also a part of this story. Dramatic changes are taking place on a social and cultural level while many of the political institutions and structures inherited from the Soviet past still linger on. Each of the three countries inherited Soviet institutions and even some that were created especially for youth; in each of the three countries youth responded in their own way as the governments acted to limit or encourage youth activism.

The explosion of new media and social networking through digital communication is another element integral to a survey of youth. As the main purveyors of new technology, the assumption must be that the next generation of youth in these countries has harnessed this new instrument to create a very different social world from the one their elders and the current leaders grew up in. In the past few years, the ability to initiate social mobilization through the use of new media has placed an unprecedented and important tool at the disposal of youth groups and movements. In any state, these tensions could become the substance of revolution.

How much are youth truly an agent of change? To be sure, Karl Mannheim's reference to generational change as "the dynamic of historical development" applies. But the education and shaping of views of the youth that are to become the next generation of citizens and leaders is a critical element in determining whether they become active citizens, oppressed subjects, or perpetuators of the old system. The political environment in which they grow up will shape their outlook into adulthood. The tension between youth organizations established and controlled by governments and the emergence of independent youth movements and organizations provides a measure of how open to change a particular government has been and how authentic its desire to accommodate a vibrant and lively discourse with young people who may be the bearers of a different set of values and expectations. The extent to which youth issues have come to the fore and youth themselves have coalesced and have participated in the political process will be reflected in the future vitality of each country.

For these and many other reasons, a study of the youth over the past twenty years—a whole generation—in these three newly independent states that emerged out of the Soviet Union is an extraordinarily illuminating and interesting enterprise. By studying the possible genesis

and progress of youth movements in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan and their impact on the political development of those countries and beyond, it is possible to construct a thought-provoking framework for assessing historical change.

Young people born in the revolutionary year of 1968 were just about to enter adulthood in 1986, the year that Mikhail Gorbachev shook the system and introduced *glasnost* and *perestroika*,[1] which eventually led to the unraveling of the regime. Young people who, at that time, were on the brink of embarking on a career, whose course most likely had already been determined, became the leading edge of the first free generation. After 1986 nothing was for certain, and in the few more years that remained for the Soviet Union, many changes occurred that left an indelible imprint on all the people who struggled within and against the system in those years.

During Soviet times young people were more or less guaranteed jobs and placements, even though they might be many thousands of miles away from their homes. They were guaranteed a minimal amount of medical treatment, low quality as it was, and they were assured that they would be given housing at some point in their lives if they could wait their turn on the list. And their children would have the right to a free education. All of this was in exchange for the understanding that they would not travel abroad unless they were among the privileged few who were trusted by the regime. Their access to literature or information that provided an alternative to state-sponsored sources was limited, but as long as they did not pose a challenge to the status quo, the state would not interfere with them. It was understood that only the few who had access to the upper echelons of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) received privileges, and that these were the people who ultimately would come to power, when it was their turn, after serving in the ranks.

Then, suddenly, soon after Gorbachev came to power, everything changed. Young people were no longer guaranteed a place of work and the entire pecking order within the CPSU opened up to change. Information became more available and the borders eased open. Then, five years later, the power of the Communist Party itself crumbled when it became just one among other competing parties. The Soviet Union disappeared, to be replaced by fifteen sovereign, independent states.

The eighteen-year-olds of 1986 have lived through a turbulent era. Educated under the Soviets, their formative years as adults were spent

in confusion, discovering that the ideals their parents lived by were no longer valid. Toward the other end of the age group in this study are the young people who were born in 1992. They were born into the turmoil and have experienced nothing else in their lifetimes. None of them have any personal recollection of the Soviet Union, and in public opinion polls it is sometimes startling to learn that they have no knowledge of who Lenin was and believe that Karl Marx was an award-winning chocolate maker. These young people were the first-time voters of 2010. It is troubling, nonetheless, to see that some youth in Russia have tapped into a general current of nostalgia and think of Josef Stalin as a wise leader who made some mistakes but whose rule was generally beneficial for the country.[2]

What are the distinguishing features of this generation? This is a generation already coming into power in several areas, although most top-level positions are still held by their older brothers and sisters, and many who are older still. Generational change in political elites is not a smooth process even in democracies, where power may pass from one individual to another within the same peer group for years before there is a leap to the next generation. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, the process of generational change within the institutions of power and government is an additional challenge to the already profound problems they are undergoing in their faltering moves toward a market economy and liberal democracy.

Struggles for Power

When Vladimir Putin came to power as president of the Russian Federation in January 2000, it was clear from the way he bungled his first crisis, the sinking of the Kursk submarine, that his leadership skills were still very weak. His autobiography, published as a book from a series of interviews, showed a man with no special qualities of leadership who had risen rapidly to the position of prime minister and then president, surprising all but the most avid Kremlin watchers.[3] Putin describes his youth and the pursuits he enjoyed with his friends, then moves on to the ideals he held as a young man: to serve in the secret intelligence services of the Soviet Union. His interests and career choices were determined by his overwhelming passion to enter the KGB, and after a couple of

missteps he succeeded in getting to the starting position in a career that eventually led him to the Kremlin's most prestigious and powerful seat.

The rise to power of a relatively unknown official raised several important questions. First, about the character of the man: What were his values, what did he believe in, what was in his past? Did his background and history cast any light on the kind of president he was likely to be? Since there was so little information about Putin as an individual in late 1999 to 2000, and he had not made many major speeches, the question resonated both in Russia and the rest of the world: Who is Putin? After the publication of his autobiography, with more information available, pundits were able to speculate as to what his actions in the future might be. But another set of major questions remained: How did a relatively unknown former KGB officer rise to such a position? Were the skills needed somehow innate or could any former KGB officer have risen to this position? The third major set of questions relevant for this study was about the institutional channels by which Putin had accomplished his rise to power. Was there now a standard path to political power? What were these channels and would Putin's successor rise in the same way?

We now have the answer to how Putin's successor was chosen. After some soul searching and testing out international opinions as to whether a third Putin term would be tolerated, the decision was made to proceed according to the constitution and to hold presidential elections for a new president. As predicted, Putin's successor, Dmitri Medvedev, turned out to be someone from Putin's inner circle. At the same time that the presidency was changing hands, it was also made clear that Putin, as the newly appointed prime minister, was still in charge. In the few months leading up to the March 2012 presidential elections, even though it was not clear which of the Putin-Medvedev tandem wanted the position more, it was certain that whoever it turned out to be could hold the presidency until 2024, two full terms of six years, according to constitutional amendments passed by the Duma in 2008. Assuming that there will be no further constitutional changes to alter term limits, Putin and his peer group will then be in their early seventies, and Medvedev will be almost sixty years old.

If a candidate from the next generation emerges as a challenger for the post at that time, then that person is already living somewhere in Russia. If the requirements to hold office have not changed, then he or

she could have been born in 1989, thus fulfilling the mandatory thirty-five years of age to hold office. How will the biography of this president read? Could this young person have gained an appetite for political power coming up through the ranks of the youth group *Nashi* (Ours)? Or perhaps the candidate will have been born in the 1970s. Will the new president have been involved in the informal organizations of the late 1980s, have been attracted to politics in the 1990s, and then moved up through the ranks of one of the major political parties that still existed at that time? Will a sense of idealism about a different future for his or her country have provided the drive to aspire for the presidency? Is it likely that the new president could be a businessman who will make the leap into politics from an already powerful position in business? Or will the president be a consensus candidate chosen from among still warring factions and clans within the political elite?

Ukraine provides another perspective on the struggles for leadership and political power. The Orange Revolution in 2004 was the culmination of several years of mounting dissatisfaction among the people in response to steadily increasing authoritarian practices by President Kuchma's administration. When Viktor Yushchenko came to power after a million people had protested peacefully in the streets of Kyiv and other major cities, his margin of victory was still just a few points ahead of his opponent. The presidential elections of 2010 delivered a great historical surprise when the candidate for whom the election had been falsified in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, won in a contest against the incumbent prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, that was generally considered free and fair by the international community. This victory and the preceding five years of infighting between the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko factions dispelled much of the idealism that had been generated by the Orange Revolution and strengthened the impression that the political elite was in politics for purely selfish motives and purposes of financial gain, regardless of allegiance to "orange" or "blue," the color of the opponents.

With the exception of the election of Abulfaz Elchibey as president in 1992, Azerbaijan provides few examples of anything approaching a free and fair election and peaceful, undisputed transfer of power in the past two decades. After he took power as president in 1993, Heydar Aliyev exercised increasingly authoritarian methods to remain in this position, despite the fact that he remained genuinely popular among a large

part of the population. As his health began to fail throughout 2003, he redoubled his efforts to hold on to power. Even when it looked as if he might step down after positioning his son, Ilham Aliyev, as prime minister—constitutionally mandated to take power in the event of the death of the president—it was uncertain up until a couple of weeks prior the October 2003 election whether Heydar would contest the election from his sick bed. But once it became known that Aliyev senior was out of the race, it was clear that the succession was intended to fall to his son, who, by all accounts, had been an effective director of Azerbaijan's State Oil Company, but was generally thought to have few political skills. Thus, Ilham Aliyev followed in the footsteps of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev in having been the "choice" of his predecessor, albeit as a true dynastic successor in this case, establishing a precedent that will undoubtedly be watched closely in the Central Asian states, as authoritarian presidents ponder how to keep power in the family. On March 18, 2009, a referendum was carried out that, among other constitutional changes, abolished term limits for the presidency, thus confirming Ilham's claim to power for years to come. Even though polling in 2003 showed that Azerbaijan's youth were far behind Russians and Ukrainians in their support for political liberties as well as in their general material standard of living, access to the Internet, and so on, in October 2005, when the elections to the parliament yielded results that looked as if they had been manipulated, hundreds of young people came out to demonstrate support for the political opposition, some women wearing orange headscarves.

Of all the transitions that needed to take place in the republics of the former Soviet Union—the consolidation of statehood, transformation of a command-driven economy to a free-market economy, and the introduction of political democracy, among others—the introduction of democracy promised to be the most difficult. Even so, after twenty years, one of the major questions usually asked about this part of the world is this: Why have the transitions to democracy anticipated in the early 1990s moved so slowly? The usual explanations generally refer to the legacy of Communism and the historical traditions of this region that worked against a swift transition; the weakness of the democrats; the West's lack of support; the fact that, in the end, the threefold job of consolidating separate nation-states, introducing market systems, and establishing liberal democracy all at once was too large an agenda; and

so on. The fact remains, however, that the fundamental institutions of the state in all three countries have not changed. The bureaucracy, primarily in the form of the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, and the Economy, known as the "power ministries," as well as the successors to the KGB, and, to a lesser degree, the armies in each of these countries have remained, for the most part, unreformed since independence.

Unlike some of the countries of Eastern Europe, where young people played a significant role in the demise of Communism and the transition to democracy—for example, in Hungary, where the youth group *Fidesz*, which denied membership to anyone over thirty-five years old, evolved into an influential political party—no such party emerged in any of the countries of the former Soviet Union. Even though the youth in Ukraine have twice in the past twenty years risen up as a potential catalyst for change, the political shakeups they created faded away each time with little real impact on politics. The countries in this region remain in a gray zone, not as close to the consolidation of liberal democracy and establishment of a free-market economy as Poland and Hungary, but by no means like the dictatorships that have taken root in Central Asia.

Portrait of a Generation

A key question in any assessment of the likelihood of a country's transition to a liberal democracy is likely to be how far a society has managed to establish a middle class. The elements of what constitutes "middle class" are by no means agreed upon for this region, however. Some studies, especially those conducted by sociologists living in the post-Soviet states, still take into account such qualities as level of education, professional aspirations, and self-identification as a member of the old Soviet category of "intelligentsia." A simple way to go about looking at this is to take the level of income as the easiest way to begin to explore class difference and the situation of youth. The following section provides some comparisons on income, work, leisure, and lifestyle from the 2003 and 2010 data sets.

Overall, young Russians were and continue to be the best off in financial terms among their colleagues in Ukraine and Azerbaijan. In 2003, 5.9 percent of young Russians were close to being included in the

category "middle class" (defined at the time by many experts as enjoying an income of around $300 per month) with the percentage for Moscow and St. Petersburg rising as high as 21.1 and 25 percent respectively.[4] Young Ukrainians who fell into the same category were 1.4 percent, and in Azerbaijan, the figure was a mere 0.4 percent. Seven years later, while the Russians are still in the lead in terms of income, with 15.6 percent claiming an income of more than $500 per month, the Azerbaijanis have shown the most dramatic overall rise in income, with 6 percent now claiming over $500 per month income when seven years ago all who answered the question were below $400 with 85.6 percent as the largest group in the under-$100 category (appendix, table G7).

By 2010, the monetary threshold for determining who is in the middle class had shifted upward, so that looking at what the money will buy could be another way to measure. Young Russians were still the most well-off, with 32.3 percent claiming to be able to afford "major items without difficulty except for very expensive items," whereas only 16.3 percent of young Ukrainians and 16.2 percent of young Azerbaijanis put themselves in this category. The most interesting changes in upward mobility have occurred in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, where in seven years the percentage of youth who included themselves in the highest income category ("we can afford quite expensive items—an apartment, a summer house, and much more") went from zero to 0.8 and 0.6 percent respectively, while the figure for Russia fell from 0.5 to 0.2 percent (appendix, table G11).

These figures suggest that even though young Russians are still ahead in terms of overall level of wealth, the rate of accumulation of wealth has slowed down. What may have seemed an attractive trade off earlier on, getting richer and enjoying material comforts in exchange for support for Putin and Medvedev as the providers of these benefits, may not stand the test of time if not sustained. Putin has been the creator and guarantor of the aspirations of the rising middle class, but his role as the leader on this may be challenged if the economic situation takes a downturn. The recent spurt in rising level of income for the Azerbaijanis and Ukrainians poses its own potential problems. Young Ukrainians do not support the government and the presidency as in Russia, and do not identify their well-being necessarily with the policies of the government. Rising expectations in the face of a failing economy could also cause discontent among the youth.

In Soviet times, parents were generally better off than their children and the family budget was planned around this certainty. To confirm some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the progression of generations and expectations was being disrupted by the newly arrived opportunities brought in by capitalism, the question was posed in 2003 whether young people earned more or less than their parents. At that time, young people in all three countries were generally earning less than their parents. Again, the most significant advances have been made by Ukrainian and Azerbaijani youth. In 2003, 42 percent of Ukrainian youth claimed an income less than their parents. Seven years later this figure had dropped to 21.1 percent, with 23.1 percent claiming to earn the same and another 23.3 percent, more. In Azerbaijan, polling for 2003 showed 37.2 percent claiming to earn less than their parents; by 2010 this figure had dropped to 8.8 percent with 13.2 claiming equal income and 26.8 with an income surpassing their parents. For Azerbaijan this reveals an interesting phenomenon: the rise of a minority of wealthy young people who have dramatically improved their social and economic status, leaving behind the majority of youth (appendix, table G10).

In Azerbaijan, even though some young people are clearly on the ascendant in terms of income, with 45 percent claiming they have no income, these figures reveal a huge gulf between those who have done extremely well in financial terms and the majority, who still fall below the average. Whereas this differential was not so noticeable ten years ago, the accumulation of vast amounts of wealth by the few is now a daily parade in the city of Baku. This rapid, overt accumulation and flaunting of wealth and prosperity has created a polarization of society that must eventually have an adverse effect on the less well off. The income differential between generations in Russia appears to have remained stable. In 2003, 24.7 percent of young Russians claimed a larger income than their parents, with 11 percent the same and 29.5 percent earning less. Seven years on, the picture had not changed much with 25.8 percent earning more, 14.9 percent the same, and 23.3 percent, less (appendix, table G10).

Just as in 2003, the largest number of unmarried young people in 2010 was to be found in Azerbaijan, with 51.6 percent unmarried slightly down from 52.8 percent seven years earlier. The lowest number of unmarried young people is to be found in Ukraine at 44 percent just up slightly from 42.2 percent seven years ago. In 2003, 72 percent of young Azerbaijanis lived with their parents; the figure in 2010 was not

significantly different at a still high 69.2 percent. Figures for Ukrainians and Russians show that young people have gained a certain amount of independence from their families over the past seven years in that many more of them now live separately: in Russia in 2010, 51 percent of youth claimed to live separately from their parents, up from 41.5 percent in 2003; in Ukraine the figure was 47.4 percent, up from 37.4 percent in 2003 (appendix, tables H2 and G9).

The situation of women is also shifting. In Azerbaijan and Russia, the number of young women describing themselves as "housewives/homemakers" increased over those seven years: in Azerbaijan, from 12.6 percent to 19.8 percent; although fewer in Russia, the number increased from 7.3 percent to 10.1 percent. For reasons unknown, there was a significant drop in the number of young women in Ukraine who declared themselves a "housewife," from 14.5 percent to 9.6 percent seven years later (appendix, table G1).

The most dramatic change in lifestyle for the younger generation was in the acquisition of certain items, which seemed like luxury items then, but now have become staples of life—mobile phones, personal computers, and to some degree, automobiles. In 2003, the Azerbaijanis were ahead in the ownership of mobile phones with 22.2 percent claiming to have one. At the time this did not seem a surprising number as the mobile phone industry had made rapid inroads into the country, bypassing a weak and undeveloped landline system. By 2010, 78 percent of young Azerbaijanis claimed to have a mobile phone, whereas their colleagues in Russia and Ukraine had pulled way ahead: 89.5 percent in Russia and an even higher 96.4 percent in Ukraine. Young Russians took the lead on access to and ownership of personal computers at 59.2 percent, with 38.4 percent of Ukrainians and Azerbaijanis lagging behind at 25.6 percent. Again, this is a dramatic increase over seven years earlier when just 10 percent of Ukrainians and Russians claimed to have a personal computer available for their use and only 4.6 percent of Azerbaijanis claimed the same (appendix, table G3). The rapid increase in Internet use is supported by polling from other sources. In a study conducted among university students in Russia and Ukraine, 87.9 percent of Russians claimed to use the Internet "all the time every day," and 80.4 percent of Ukrainian students claimed the same.[5]

Ownership and use of an automobile underwent an increase in Azerbaijan, from 6.6 percent in 2003 to 14.4 percent in 2010 and also in Rus-

sia, from 18.2 percent to 24.2 percent. Interestingly, in Ukraine, access to or ownership of an automobile decreased, from 19.5 percent to 13.9 percent (appendix, table G3).

The fear and expectation of becoming unemployed increased across the board after 2003, when many respondents found it hard to respond to this question or simply did not respond. Azerbaijan was the only country in 2010 where more young people anticipated being unemployed in the next two years than believed they would not be: 52.6 percent believed they could be unemployed, 40.3 percent believed they would not be. In Ukraine, the numbers were fairly evenly split, with just a fraction more believing they would remain employed. Young Russians were also more optimistic that they would be employed, with 44.1 percent believing this and fewer (38.6 percent) anticipating they would become unemployed in the next two years (appendix, table G2).

Statistics on youth who are unemployed or temporarily without a job show an interesting turnaround. In 2003, young Russians appeared to be the best off, with only 7.2 percent unemployed or not working; by 2010, this figure had risen to 12.6 percent. The other two countries show a drop in the number of unemployed. Azerbaijani youth show 20.2 percent unemployed in 2010 and even though this is still high, it is a decrease from 2003 when the figure was 27.2 percent. And the Ukrainians are currently doing best of all with an unemployment rate of 10.8 percent, down from 16 percent in 2003 (appendix, table G1).

The number of young people who described themselves as students is also going down in Russia. At 17.7 percent in 2010, it was more than Ukraine's 14.8 percent or Azerbaijan's 9.4 percent, but was a considerable drop from 25 percent of young Russians in 2003. The numbers of students in Ukraine and Azerbaijan stayed more or less the same over the seven-year period. The reduction in the number of students in Russia seems likely to be the outcome of a government policy, since most all institutions of higher education are state run, which suggests a degree of planning by the government that is limiting access to higher education or has determined that so many educated young people are not needed by the state in the future (appendix, table G1).

Young Ukrainians seem to be doing well in the field of business. The number of young entrepreneurs went up a couple of percentage points from 4.8 percent to 6 percent. The numbers for young Russians went down slightly from 3.9 percent to 2.7 percent, while the young Azerbai-

jani entrepreneurs have stayed at a steady 4.8 percent. The decrease in the number of young Russians as entrepreneurs bears out anecdotal and journalistic evidence that will be discussed in chapter 5 about the diminishing numbers of small and medium entrepreneurs in Russia and the recent problem of middle-class flight from the country. The decreasing number of entrepreneurs will be detrimental to the consolidation of the middle class in Russia (appendix, table G1).

Polling for all three countries over the seven-year time period yielded some interesting data on white-collar workers—both with and without a specialty. In Ukraine and Russia the numbers increased. In Azerbaijan, however, the numbers for white-collar workers without a specialty went down. Ukraine has the largest number of white-collar workers without any special training (their number increased from 5.4 percent to 12.8 percent), while the number of workers with a special education stayed the same. In Russia, the number of young white-collar workers with a special education increased over this period by 4.6 percent. This difference should have been anticipated in view of the polling data of 2003, which showed a larger number of students among the Russian youth. These students have now become the educated specialists of 2010. The rising number of white-collar workers, especially in relation to young people who have launched a career in the private sector will have repercussions on the nature of the middle class in all of these countries, especially since jobs for the white-collar workers are generally to be found in government offices (appendix, table G1).

News, Leisure, and Lifestyle

The biggest changes over the years 2003 to 2010 occurred in the area of leisure and lifestyle. Many of the traditional forms of spending time and relaxation gave way to computer-related pastimes. The only activity that remained as popular as it was seven years earlier was watching television. In Ukraine the figure increased slightly from 75.7 percent to 76.2 percent, and in Russia it decreased from 77.7 percent to 76.7 percent. In Azerbaijan the figure went down from 89 percent in 2003 to 82.8 percent. The number of young people who listen to the radio dropped dramatically in Ukraine from 41.2 percent to 19.2 percent and in Azerbaijan from 38.8 percent to 13.6 percent. In Russia, the drop was

not as dramatic but still significant, from 34.2 percent to 22.5 percent. Reading newspapers also saw a dramatic drop in Ukraine from 40.9 percent to 29.4 percent; in Azerbaijan, the figure dropped from 25.6 percent to 11.6 percent. The numbers of Russians reading newspapers also decreased over the same time period from 35.7 percent to 24.4 percent. Reading of magazines decreased in Ukraine by almost 10 percent. Reading books for recreation was also down significantly: among Ukrainians it dropped from 38.9 percent to 26.6 percent; among young Azerbaijanis from 33.4 percent to 17 percent, with the Russians registering a similar decrease from 39.2 percent to 27.1 percent (appendix, table C1).

When asked, in 2010, where they learn about the news about their own country and about the world, over 90 percent in all three countries referred to television. Interestingly, in all three countries the next most popular source of news and information was "friends, relatives and neighbors"; 31.9 percent referred to them in Russia, 41.1 percent in Ukraine, and 21.6 percent in Azerbaijan. The Internet came in third as a source of news for Russians and Azerbaijanis, while in Ukraine it was fifth. Coming in third and fourth for Ukrainians were newspapers (39.9 percent) and radio (31.9 percent), which suggests that newspapers and radio are considered a good source of news in Ukraine but not in the other two countries (appendix, table G6).

There has also been a decline in traditional forms of leisure and relaxation activities. Fewer young people listen to music: down from 33 percent among Ukrainians and 31.1 percent among Russians to 20.4 percent and 21.8 percent; the 55.8 percent of young Azerbaijanis who listened to music in 2003 dropped to 12.4 percent. Fewer go to clubs, bars, and discotheques: 31.2 percent down to 20.2 percent among Ukrainians, and 27.5 percent down to 24.2 percent among Russians. Fewer host guests at home: down from 46.2 percent to 38.6 percent among Ukrainians, and 51.0 percent to 47.5 percent among Russians. Fewer young people work outdoors in their garden plot: 35.5 percent down to 16.6 percent among Ukrainians, and 25.0 percent down to 10.7 percent among Russians. Not so many young people engage in *remont*, or do-it-yourself, activities: down from 26.4 percent to 17.6 percent among Ukrainians, and 24.1 percent to 17.6 percent among Russians. Attending concerts is down: 10.2 percent to 4 percent for Ukrainians, and 11.5 percent to 8.8 percent for Russians. Going to the cinema is up: 10.8 percent to 12 percent for Ukrainians and 11.7 percent leaping up

to 27.1 percent for Russians. Knitting and sewing is down: 16.4 percent to 9.8 percent in Ukraine, 16.2 percent to 10.1 percent in Russia, but has remained at 5 percent in Azerbaijan. More young Russians are engaging in sports, however, up from 17.2 percent to 21.2 percent, while fewer Ukrainians are getting physically active, down from 15.2 percent to 11.6 percent, and among Azerbaijanis the figures are down from 11.2 to 9.2 percent (appendix, table C1).

The form of activity that increased the most over the seven years was the use of the Internet. The figures are striking, with 60.5 percent of young Russians and 51.5 percent of young Ukrainians using the Internet in 2010 when in 2003 the figures were 18.4 percent and 19.1 percent respectively. The Internet has become one of the major forms of leisure time activity: 40.8 percent of young Russians, 27.4 percent of young Ukrainians, and 15.8 percent of young Azerbaijanis reported spending time on the Internet as a form of leisure activity in 2010; 15 percent of Ukrainians, 25 percent of Russians, and 8.6 percent of Azerbaijanis reported playing computer games as a leisure pastime (appendix, tables G4 and C1).

In 2003, detailed questions about the use of the Internet were not even included in the survey. By 2010, it would have been strange not to pose questions about the use of the Internet, so pervasive has it become. In all three countries, young people used the Internet primarily for e-mail. Listening to music through the Internet was the next highest rated activity. Both Russians and Ukrainians make heavy use of the Internet for their social interactions on social networks such as "*Odnoklasniki*" and "*V kontakte*" and also for downloading films; Azerbaijanis also reported socializing on chat sites and in forums, and they tended to also use the Internet to find information either for work or other purposes (appendix, table G5).

What makes youth content? Are young people generally content with their lives? In 2003, Russians were the most content with 65.6 percent very or generally content with their life, while Ukrainians were at 47.1 percent. Seven years later, the figures barely changed, with Russians still the most content and the Ukrainians lagging behind. Azerbaijanis, however, went through a significant change in their outlook on life. In 2003, only 37.2 percent were content with their lives, with 58.8 percent somewhat or completely content. Seven years later 53.2 percent claimed to be mostly or very content with their life with 44.8 percent not content.

These perceptions of satisfaction with life are subjective, but when levels of satisfaction are rising it could be an indicator of a general acceptance of the status quo (appendix, table G12).

But perhaps a more relevant question is whether young people feel they can change the circumstances of their life for the better. Young Russians definitely felt the most empowered of the three groups by 2010, with 71.9 percent responding positively. This tracks closely with responses to the previous question. Azerbaijanis, at the other end of the scale, felt the least empowered, with a resounding 51.2 percent responding negatively to this question. Where this sense of impotence among Azerbaijanis will lead remains to be seen (appendix, table G13).

Differences in lifestyle and income show that profiles of youth in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan have already diverged in the past twenty years. The following chapters will describe the political context that has helped to shape the next generation.

2

The History of Youth

Komsomol volunteers!
We are strong in our true friendship;
We will walk through fire, if we must,
To blaze the trails of youth.

—*Komsolmoltsy-dobrovoltsy*, words
by E. Dolmatovsky, music M. Fradkin

"Toward a Shining Future"

In order to understand the youth of today, it is worthwhile to review the historical circumstances from which they emerged. Although it is taken for granted that the youth of Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan have different profiles, their roots, nonetheless, lie in the one country they grew out of, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

One of the interesting paradoxes of the USSR (often referred to as the Soviet Union) was that it was built on the values of youth, but grew to be the ultimate suppressor of innovation and generational change. The first ten years of the Soviet Union were an extraordinary period of turmoil in a country that was striving to transform itself into a modern state from the ruins of a nineteenth-century empire. In the early 1920s, the revolution that had brought the Bolsheviks

to power was beginning to consolidate into a system of government, and the ideology that had sustained a generation of determined and idealistic revolutionaries in exile was evolving into a social and political program that would make sense of the radical break with the past and provide an instrument for mobilizing and inspiring millions of people. The youth and vigor of the idealistic revolutionary lent itself to the needs of the new Soviet ruling class. Even though most of the Bolshevik leaders were by that time not so young, they enthusiastically embraced the injection of the values of youth into the immediate postrevolutionary regime. Youthful enthusiasm, hope for a brighter future, and love of life and of work were placed at the center of the newly emerging Communist ideology.

The All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth, usually known as the Komsomol, was founded as an organization in August 1918, but it was clear from its inception that it was to play a supportive role to the Communist Party. In the early days of the state, the Komsomol was already a source that identified trusted personnel to fill positions for the new state administration. By the end of the 1920s, when many of the original Bolsheviks had departed from positions of power, the Komsomol became all the more important as its members rose rapidly through the ranks of both party and state. As the imperative to build socialism grew, the notion of youth and the Communist future became inseparable. To emphasize the relationship even more, there was also the demographic reality that by the time the first Five-Year Plan was launched in 1927, half of the Soviet working class was under the age of thirty and a quarter was under twenty-two.[1] Thus the youth of the Soviet Union provided not only the ideology but also the work force that would build the brighter future.

Over the decades, the Komsomol consolidated its monopoly over all aspects of youth—its values and workforce—and projected the vigor of youth as the mandatory attitude required by the Communist Party. The attributes of youth fused well with the new ideology that sought to mold a new type of "Soviet Man." The new Soviets would of course be vigorous, energetic, patriotic, and filled with hope for the future of their young new country. The pictures of the ideal citizens represented in the Socialist Realist art and monuments of the 1930s portray rural and urban youth glowing with the sweat of their labor in acts of building socialism—with not an old person among them.

Just as the Communist Party ideology put forward theories and proposed transformations for every aspect of life, it also applied itself to the theory of "youth." Unlike youth in bourgeois societies, Soviet youth were not a player in the conflict between generations. All questions between "fathers and sons" had been resolved and any potential tension was subsumed into the seamless socialist society where the state—not the family—took the primary role in socializing young people. Youth subcultures were eliminated, and the rituals and festivities associated with youth practiced in rural communities disappeared. The Komsomol served as the socializer of youth and support for the transition to the full status of Communist Party member. Youth, in general, were also saddled with the role of constructors of Communism. Komsomol brigades from towns and cities were often used as the shock troops and implementers of the collectivization of agriculture, which lay at the heart of the first Five-Year Plan. Komsomol members went in their thousands to work on the massive construction projects at that time: the Urals-Kuzbass industrial complex (66,000), the coal mine of Donbas (36,000), the Moscow underground (13,000), and other projects. During the Second World War, the Komsomol played the role of the mobilizing vanguard of the people once again as more than 10 million Komsomol members went into battle.[2]

The Soviet system had a plan for all aspects of life for the new Soviet man, including youth. Under the Soviets, the concept of "youth" was well worked out. Young people, if they were to do well in the system, joined the "Pioneers" as children, then moved up into the young Komsomol at the age of fourteen and were expected to apply for full Communist Party membership around the age of twenty-eight or so. Youth officially ended at the age of thirty-five. There was an entire system of government offices and official positions connected to youth, as well as a category of administrative offices under the rubric of "youth politics." This paternalistic approach ensured a certain amount of attention to youth, but at the same time prevented any responses to the independent manifestations of youth that went beyond already planned and anticipated developments.

As the hierarchical structures of Soviet society developed, it became clear that the Komsomol was not only the bridge between childhood and full membership in the Communist Party, but also the barrier that prevented youth from attaining high-level positions before their time. It

acted as a filter and restraint on young and talented people, forcing them to wait their turn to rise into positions of influence with a commensurate income. Without a procedure to ensure a refreshing of cadres within the CPSU, the Komsomol became all the more important, as the membership of the Communist Party gradually grew older. As the spirit of youth became ossified under this system, the organization that sought to channel this segment of the population also grew more rigid over the years. Many of the "young" Komsomol leaders were still in place in the 1970s and 1980s. The organization that was supposed to promote youth had no process to encourage generational change within its own ranks.

From the 1920s to the 1960s, officially, there were no youth problems in the Soviet Union. The ability to sustain this facade was partly attributable to the absence of any sociologists who could identify and analyze such problems. Any issues to do with youth up until the 1960s were connected with education or work. Another problem with the lack of sociological or cultural analysis was that the national and ethnic differences in the population were not studied. The youth of the "thaw generation" of the 1960s differed in the various republic capitals of the Soviet Union. In Moscow, the generation of the 1960s produced the dissident movement; Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel were sentenced for their writings in 1965. The Russians tended to focus on human rights and universal values. The same generation of young dissidents in Ukraine channeled its energies and talents into reviving the national language and culture and utilized them in modern literature and music on a sophisticated level. The *shestydesyatnyky*, or "generation of the '60s," as they became known, eventually broke the taboos that Soviet policies had imposed on the non-Russian cultures. In Azerbaijan, dissent often manifested itself in the complex and nonconformist jazz music of artists such as Vagif Mustafa-zadeh and his followers as well as in the pursuit of literature.

In all of the national republics of the Soviet Union, dissent and stirrings of national consciousness permeated the youth's response to the wave of protests that were occasionally heard about taking place in Western Europe and the United States. It was not that the Soviet Union ignored the different national cultures—in fact, in some regions folk traditions, costumes, dancing, and singing were actively encouraged within a Soviet setting to provide a sense of nationality where previously there had been only a weak identification. Any manifestation of the ethnic culture in the

sphere of "high" culture was strictly controlled, however, as was the use of the different languages for more academic and scientific discourse. A sweeping crackdown against many of the 1960s generation was launched in the early 1970s in all of the republics of the Soviet Union, and all succumbed to the continuing stagnation that was to contribute eventually to the severe social and economic problems of the 1980s.

Youth in a Time of Transition

Youth, as members of the Komsomol and as passive beneficiaries of "youth policy," had been an integral part of Soviet ideology. Gorbachev's new policies of glasnost and perestroika, however, envisaged a new role for youth. The changes that took place in the psychological and material situation of youth from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s were momentous. Not only did most of the institutions that had been created to channel youth and to form "policy" collapse, but youth themselves underwent a dramatic change in status.

During Soviet times, young people occupied a specific place on the social ladder. They were by definition poor, since promotions and job opportunities occurred according to a strictly hierarchical principle or else according to standard patronage arrangements, which also tended to favor years of loyal service rather than merit. Salaries for young people and for the jobs they did were much lower than for older adults, and students were expected to live on bare subsistence with the expectation that their parents would provide for them with care packages.

Things began to change during the 1980s, when inflation rose 3 to 4 percent. This had a significant impact on the job market in the carefully planned Soviet system. In the early 1980s, the number of jobs available to young people in enterprises, institutions, and organizations dropped dramatically, just as the amount of young people with higher education coming into the job market was rising steadily every year. Cutbacks in the administrative apparatus also meant that the number of positions for specialists was decreasing for the foreseeable future.

At the end of the 1980s, the cooperative sector opened up opportunities as a viable alternative for employment, as part of the new policy of perestroika, and the flow of young people into this kind of work marked the first step in the enrichment of a certain segment of youth. Given the

high level of unemployment at that time, it seemed natural for young people to take advantage of this opportunity. And even though the Communist Party had originally encouraged the creation of cooperatives, it did not foresee the consequences.

Within a decade, the socioeconomic status of youth had changed. By the end of the 1990s, young people made up a large part of the middle class in Russia, with many wealthy young people emerging in other post-Soviet states. The question of whether psychological attitudes caught up remains uncertain. Older people were always more wealthy than younger people and parents expected to provide financial support and housing to their children well into their thirties. It remains to be seen what impact this turnaround will have on these societies in the future.

The practice of governments issuing sweeping pronouncements on "youth politics" persisted in most post-Soviet states well into the 1990s. A ministry of youth remained part of the government in most of these countries, sometimes sharing ministerial obligations with those responsible for sports, culture, and in some cases tourism, and sometimes not as a ministry but as a lower-level state committee. It took almost a decade for the authorities in these countries to make the transition from regarding the younger generation as an object of policy, research, and analysis to admitting youth are no longer a predictable factor. In Russia, studies conducted five or six years after the demise of the Soviet Union still employed a Soviet approach, charting statistics and tracing the evolution of "youth politics" without looking at the subjective factors. Institutes for the study of youth funded by the state still existed in the mid-1990s. The materials they produced were of mixed value and often, if the academic researchers had not done any original thinking in their field, they reverted back to Soviet methodology.[3] Some of the literature produced in the 1990s focused on values and occasionally books would appear with a clearly didactic purpose. Defining the absence of values in the younger generation as a problem, some authors used their research to remind the younger generation of their obligations as the first generation of the new Russia.[4]

Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Komsomol

When Mikhail Gorbachev was elevated to the Soviet Politburo, the inner circle of the ruling Communist Party, at the age of forty-nine in

1980, his relative youth, compared with his colleagues, was considered quite revolutionary. The top position, the post of general secretary, was held by Leonid Brezhnev at that time. When Brezhnev died in 1982 at the age of seventy-six, he was succeeded by Yuri Andropov, who died fifteen months later at the age of sixty-nine, then Konstantin Chernenko, who died thirteen months after that at the age of seventy-three. Banking on Gorbachev remaining in good health for a while because of his relative youth, the Communist Party chose him to succeed the run of older men, and he became the youngest general secretary since Stalin in March 1985. He soon introduced policies that would have a profound impact on youth in the USSR. As a result of the new policies of glasnost and perestroika, hundreds of informal groups, usually referred to as *nieformaly*, began to spring up all over the Soviet Union. Although not normally thought of as youth groups, they were in fact usually made up of young people. They coexisted with the Komsomol, often revealing the strictures and limitations of these official groups, which could not possibly have contained all of the interests and activities of youth—even if that had been the purpose of the organization.

In Moscow, the new informal organizations focused on ecological issues, on collecting information about historical memory, and some on youth. In the republics, the new informal associations took on a distinctly national inclination. In Ukraine, the *Tovarystvo Leva* in Lviv was established in 1987 to revive the fast-disappearing traditional Ukrainian folk crafts still to be found in some remote villages of western Ukraine. In Azerbaijan, the *Yurd* organization combined a concern for the restoration of national monuments with a strong interest in strengthening moral and cultural values among Azerbaijani youth.

At the same time, the membership of the Komsomol was declining. In 1985, the Komsomol reported a membership of 42 million young people between the ages of fourteen and twenty-seven. The following year 1.5 million members quit, and 2.5 million the year after. And for all of its support for convention and order, in the final days of the Soviet Union the Komsomol played a rather destructive role in speeding the dissolution of the country. As part of his drive to promote glasnost and perestroika and to breathe some entrepreneurial life into the flagging Communist party structures, Gorbachev authorized branches of the Komsomol to set up small businesses. Under this new dispensation, small scientific and technical crafts centers and bureaus for tourism

were officially sanctioned under the leadership of the Komsomol in 1987 and 1988. Young Komsomol members threw themselves into work within the Soviet Union's first legal business structures of this kind. They took advantage of their unique privileges, which were still extended only to the *nomenklatura*,[5] to diversify their activities and for the first time to make legitimate money through business.

Gradually, as these ventures began to show some real success, the young *nomenklatura* became involved in setting up banks, construction, and real estate companies and other business ventures. As the true weaknesses of the economic situation of the Soviet Union began to be made clear to the Communist Party elite in the twilight days of the Soviet Union, these banks were used as a conduit for channeling Communist Party funds into more secure holdings. This story has been told elsewhere, but it does explain why, as independence dawned in Russia and in some of the republics, there suddenly emerged almost out of nowhere groups of wealthy young bankers formerly connected with the Komsomol, but now firmly entrenched as the new elite.[6] At the time, most of the men (and they were usually men) involved in these activities were around thirty years old or younger—born around 1960.

Azerbaijan differs from Russia and Ukraine in the way the Communist Party and the Komsomol met its demise. Perhaps it was because most of the youth, whether they were party members or not, were swept up in the wave of protests about Nagorno-Karabagh from 1987 onward, that there was no time for the Komsomol to establish the kind of businesses and transfer of funds that took place elsewhere in the Soviet Union. When the wave of demonstrations engulfed the University of Baku, students from the faculties of law, history, journalism, and bibliography were at the forefront of organizing the youth movement. There was a deliberate strategy on the part of the youth protesters to take over all of the positions of the Komsomol and the trade union within the university for the purpose of dissolving these institutions.

Since that time, the cadres of former Komsomol activists seem to have just "faded away" in Azerbaijan, according to one commentator. Many left active public life when President Elchibey's administration took over. The assumption was that they had migrated to Russia to pursue their business interests: "Whether that was so or not, today there is no trace left of that formerly great 'nation,' they have practically disappeared—just like the once great Khazar Khanate."[7] In the summer

of 2003, however, just six months prior to the presidential elections, reports of former Komsomol activists being promoted by President Heydar Aliyev to replace the mayors of three cities show that the old structures did not disappear altogether and were still useful to the executive powers in Azerbaijan.[8]

Prominent Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya identified Gorbachev's new policy initiative as a key to understanding the dramatic change in the age of the elites between the mid-1980s and 1990s.[9] The average age of Brezhnev's elite was fifty-seven, while Gorbachev's team came in at an average age of fifty-two. The average age of Yeltsin's team was forty-eight. Kryshtanovskaya pointed out, however, that despite the drop in age, most of the people who achieved positions of power in Yeltsin's elite had been connected to party structures at one time in their careers.

Youth and the Oligarchs

The thirty-year-olds who took the opportunity to become rich when the Soviet Union broke up are still among the most wealthy and influential elites throughout the post-Soviet region. The phenomenon of the superwealthy oligarchs became one of the defining features of the new politics in the 1990s particularly in Russia and Ukraine. Although many of the post-Soviet oligarchs were born before 1968, they have played a significant role in the emergence of the next generation.

In Russia, several of the young oligarchs started to acquire their fortunes within the ranks of the Komsomol. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for example, was of the age that he was well positioned to take advantage of the dissolution of Soviet institutional structures. Born in 1963, Khodorkovsky started to accumulate his wealth in the twilight years of the Soviet Union when the boundaries between what was legal and what was illegal were ill defined, if defined at all. Rumored to have dealt in illegal goods, Khodorkovsky was one of the founder members of the Menatep bank in the late 1980s. When the loans-for-shares plan was put forward in 1995, Khodorkovsky was ready to take on Yukos, Russia's second-largest oil company. Among all of the companies being auctioned off at that time, Yukos held the most potential for growth. By 2001, with skillful management and outmaneuvering of his opponents, Khodorkovsky had become the wealthiest man in Russia.[10]

Khodorkovsky laid down a challenge for the older oligarchs: to create a more Western-oriented and open Russia. The philanthropic foundation established with his funds was named the Open Russia Fund, echoing a similar initiative by financier George Soros two decades earlier. This foundation funded many youth initiatives and groups in the 1990s and early 2000s. In speeches connected with his foundation, Khodorkovsky described a new Russia where the Westernizers and Slavophiles of the twenty-first century were the new business elites: he placed his company Yukos firmly on the Westernizers' side, among the young businessmen who supported a system where they made money, created jobs, and paid their taxes, leaving the local authorities to run the hospitals, orphanages, and social centers. He contrasted his colleagues among the new businessmen with the older generation who perpetuated the "patriarchal" system, criticizing them for maintaining "one-company towns" as in Soviet and tsarist times.[11] Khodorkovsky's alternative vision of Russia's future and the role of the next generation was cut short when he was arrested and imprisoned on charges of tax fraud in 2003. A subsequent trial that ended in December 2010 was fraught with inconsistencies and severely criticized by the international human rights community; it handed him an additional sentence to last until 2017.

After Khodorkovsky's arrest it became clear that independent oligarchs were not going to be tolerated under the Putin administration. Some, like Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, had already fled the country, and others received the message loud and clear. The arrest of Khodorkovsky also challenged the view that economic development alone would eventually lead to democracy in transitional states. Since then, the businessmen who remained in the country have pledged their loyalty to the regime and rarely support initiatives not sanctioned by the Kremlin. The appearance of wealthy oligarchs in this age group is significant for a number of reasons. This phenomenon is likely to be a limited occurrence, since there was a limited amount of the business sector in the mid-1990s that could have been acquired in this way. Most of the younger generation, those born after 1968, missed the opportunity to enrich themselves.

The oligarch phenomenon has not been studied as closely in Ukraine or Azerbaijan, partly because there were fewer Western journalists around to document the main events in the 1990s. The path to riches through the Komsomol was, nonetheless, a path that was taken by

many leading young businessmen in Ukraine. While Ukraine was still a part of the Soviet Union, many of the banks established at the end of the 1980s were drawing upon Komsomol funds, and the leadership of the organization was well placed to benefit. In the wealthier, industrial regions such as Dnipropetrovsk, there were considerable amounts of money to be transferred. Leading members of the Komsomol were in the right place at the right time, in a prime position to take advantage of the privilege of their positions. The proliferation of newly established banks at the end of the 1980s elevated some members of the Komsomol into advantageous positions in comparison with their peers.

There were some who considered the training and access to networks provided by the Komsomol an asset not only for themselves but also for the good of the country as a whole. As late as 1998, a former Komsomol leader who became deputy secretary of Ukraine's Council for National Security and Defense Council stated that "the Komsomol was a kind of school in which it was possible to gain some experience of practical and varied kinds of life. The Komsomol educated leaders from many political parties who now have a real influence on the social life of Ukraine."[12]

The question of oligarchs as a separate power center in Azerbaijan was barely raised during the presidency of Heydar Aliyev. While there were individuals who both acquired wealth and challenged the president, such as Rasul Guliev, they were usually run out of the country into exile. Anyone who has acquired wealth in Azerbaijan in the past decade has done so with the support of the ruling power. While he was alive, Heydar Aliyev was both the chief oligarch and the possessor of all powers in the republic. Only members of his direct family and political clan were allowed to share the wealth after 1993. His son has taken over the position of chief oligarch and has continued that tradition.

Youth on the Threshold

The first major departure from the Soviet stereotype of "youth" was in the field of business, when many young people showed an interest in making money. Another direction—toward positions of political power and leadership—proved more problematic. Sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya noted that despite the shakeup in terms of age in the ruling elite, the people rising in the political ranks and also the people getting rich toward

the end of the 1990s were precisely those who had been positioned well by the Communist Party in its final days as ruler of the USSR.[13]

At the same time, many of the former structures devoted to youth lasted into the 1990s without providing youth with any advantages for their leadership aspirations. The Ministry of Youth in both Russia and Ukraine reverted to a state committee in the 1990s, while in Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Youth and Sports was newly established in 1994 and later in the decade took over responsibilities for tourism, reverting back to youth and sports in 2006. In Ukraine, a network of youth centers around the country, meant to provide social welfare and assistance to young people, still employed around 3,000 in the late 1990s. The president of Ukraine was still making annual statements "About the Situation of Youth in Ukraine" up until 2000, and awards were given that year to around thirty individuals in recognition of their work with youth, in the manner of Soviet-style decorations. An entire system of national, regional, and local offices was headed up by the State Committee for Youth Politics, Sport, and Tourism as late as 1999.[14] Despite all of the apparent attention to youth and youth organizations, very little seems to have been accomplished in terms of encouraging the creation of youth organizations that were not officially sanctioned by one of the state offices.

The direct link into the power structures that the Komsomol used to provide was not replaced by any of the plethora of independent youth organizations that sprang up in the nongovernmental sector or by the official youth organizations still supported by state funding, although many young people who worked in the administrative offices of these official youth organizations hoped for advancement to more mainstream positions in the structures of executive power. While the Komsomol imposed a certain hierarchy and pecking order on those waiting to advance and the wait was often long and tedious, at least it did provide some certainty of promotion in exchange for loyalty and patience. The new era removed this predictability and replaced it with different paths to leadership and forms of patronage.

Leaders and *Lidery*

Questions about the emergence of leaders among the younger generation, or even the emergence of leaders as a concept in general, were not

at the forefront of sociological research during Soviet times. Some researchers, who were conscious of their role as pioneers in this field and seeking the need for definitions, traced the origins of the use of the word *lider*, derived from the English, to the 1949 edition of S. I. Ozhegov's *Dictionary of the Russian Language.*[15] These authors drew their conclusions on the nature of leadership, from their study of the national and regional elections between the years 1988 and 1997.

Programs to train and encourage the emergence of leaders were promoted by a combination of Western-sponsored programs and some indigenous initiatives that brought the concept into the mainstream in the 1990s. In Russia, the U.S. government sponsored a program for young leaders organized by IREX beginning in 1999. "Leadership" in this case meant the opportunity for young Russians to compete for a limited number of places on an exchange program to come to the United States. At least one Russian organization embodied the concept of leadership in its title: "The Association of Young Leaders." Established in 1992, this organization grew with financial support from both Western and Russian donors. The New Generation Initiative, conceived by the Ukrainian government and supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development as part of the bilateral relationship at the end of the 1990s, was an attempt to encourage leadership skills and a pro-Western orientation among Ukraine's youth. Azerbaijan had a similar program run by ACCELS.

Once elections were held in the new independent states, it was some time before political parties and candidates for office focused on the next generation as a potential source of electoral support. The discovery of a whole new pool of votes and support, at a time when elections were only just being recognized as important, drew one Russian specialist to observe:

> In the times of the USSR, "attracting people into the ranks" was straightforward: political education, from pre-school to pension, proceeded along a straight line according to the Communist Party. [Russia's] young democracy utilized the same methods of sloganeering. The politicians exhorted: "Where is your sense of obligation? In the conditions of democracy it is supposed to grow!" . . . In the end they realized that slogans did not work, and that the youth would not be conquered with appeals and exhortations from the television screen. They had to admit that the new generation was more independent than the preceding one, and, most

> importantly, that it has the ability to choose. Nobody was going to give away their vote just like that. It was going to be necessary to work with the youth.[16]

The same author also noted that economists, sociologists, and political scientists had long ago determined that the age of the most politically active group was over sixty. This was an important point. Many observers believed that the younger generation was apathetic and not interested in politics, and as a result, the young were much less likely to turn out to vote. The eminent Russian sociologist Yuri Levada pointed out that "Youth only become active once they have grown up."[17] Yet not many pointed to the fact that it was not an inherent trait of youth that prevented the young from coming to the polls and participating in political life, but that their elders had been educated and trained to be part of the system and to think and behave in a certain way, including going to vote and actively supporting the Communist Party. When this system disappeared with the fall of Communism and the demise of the Soviet Union, youth reverted back to a more natural state, to be found in most other countries of the world, where youth participate in politics on their own terms. Ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, some observers had begun to appreciate the potential of the eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds, who numbered around twenty-five million people in Russia, constituting around one-quarter of the entire electorate.[18]

Education and National Identity

The problem of educating citizens in the new independent states was recognized early on in all of the states of the former Soviet Union, although how to solve it was not clear in any of them for a while. The old system had catered very well to the needs of a Soviet state and for the education of a quiescent population that was not expected to take part in the political decision-making required to run the country. Education for an active participating citizenry after 1991 was a different matter.

The three countries took up the challenge in different ways. For non-Russian republics, the issue of education was tied closely to the fundamental question of national identity and how it should be shaped and taught to successive generations of young people. Debates on the

national curriculum in Ukraine and Azerbaijan continue to contend with many forces vying to have an input into the new national identity of their country and, more importantly, how it should be taught in the schools. One solution for replacing all of the outdated Soviet textbooks was to simply substitute all of the historical figures and events from anti-Soviet texts that had previously been banned as the work of bourgeois Western historians. The quality of many of these materials was uneven at best and often just as tendentious as those that they were seeking to replace.

Although much of Russian history had been incorporated into Soviet textbooks, the rewriting and rediscovery of a national past became a political instrument over successive administrations seeking to promote their own political aims. Similar efforts were also made by the governments of Ukraine and Azerbaijan at various times. To counteract the politicization of scholarship and education, new educational institutions were established to provide an area for independent scholarship. In Russia, Yuri Afanasyev, who had been at the forefront of moves for glasnost, led the initiative to establish the Moscow Humanitarian University. In Azerbaijan, institutions of higher education that were not run by the state were established, such as the Western University and Khazar University. In Ukraine, supporting independent scholarship was one of the aims of the Ukrainian Catholic University, established in Lviv in 2002 as the first Catholic University in the former Soviet Union. Vyacheslav Bryukhovets'kyi, a member of the 1960s generation in Ukraine, dreamed of restoring the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy of the sixteenth century as a private university in Kyiv. Bryukhovets'kyi clearly linked the notion of a glorious past with the future development of Ukraine: "When people ask me why I am such an optimist, I can be completely honest: because we at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, constantly feeling the mighty breath of our glorious past, we communicate with the future of Ukraine every day. And I see how great our state will become in fifteen years or so." Bryukhovets'kyi saw the function of the new university precisely as the preparation of a new generation of cadres for the new state: "There are strong individuals among the youth today. They still need to gain experience, but if we, my generation and the one slightly older, do not realize that young people need to be brought along, given a place and prepared to be Ukrainian activists, then shame on us."[19]

Twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, education in the independent states continues to be a potential political battlefield. Young Azerbaijanis complain that the quality of their state educational institutions is poor and that to gain an education they must study abroad. In Ukraine, one of the achievements of the Yushchenko administration was in signing on to the Bologna Process, which would gradually integrate Ukraine's educational system and promote European standards; this move was challenged by the Yanukovych administration, which threatened to reverse these principles. Under Putin's administration, the educational system in Russia absorbed several rewritings of history textbooks to track more closely with the new emerging ideology around "sovereign democracy."

3

Ukraine: Land of Paradoxes

Why are yesterday's romantics embarrassed about their naive aspirations for rapid total happiness? Why has the generation that took upon itself the responsibility for the outcome of introducing its own project for social progress not managed to create a system of ideas, morals, values and ideals?

—Oles' Doniy, *Pokolinnya oksamytovoyi revolyutsii*

We're not chattel, we're not fools.
We're the sons and daughters of Ukraine.
Now or never, no more waiting:
Together we are many, we cannot be defeated.

—Theme song of the Orange Revolution—Greenjolly

Youth as an Agent of Change?

Youth first became a factor in Ukraine's politics even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the past two decades, youth protest in Ukraine has made a significant impact on society and politics through two important youth movements. The first, the "Revolution on Granite" of 1990, was a student protest the like of which had never been seen

in the Soviet Union. In a study conducted on the twentieth anniversary of the protest, a group of Ukrainian experts noted that this was probably the first time in the history of the Soviet Union that youth, and students in particular, had become the main actors on the political stage.[1] Paradoxically, this event led to the exclusion of young people from the political elite and a strengthening of the authoritarian resolve of Ukraine's leaders for the next ten years.

The second time Ukrainian youth rose up and took part in a potentially "game-changing" event of huge significance was the Orange Revolution of 2004. The role of Ukrainian youth was key: without the imaginative and resourceful actions of a number of youth groups that had organized themselves in the few months prior to November 2004, the demonstrations may not have turned out as they did, drawing almost a million people into the streets to protest a falsified election. The participation of young people in the Orange Revolution served to consolidate the Orange Revolution's success. But again, the politics that emerged afterward fell short of fulfilling the ideals and aspirations of the participants and especially the youth.

The impact of the Orange Revolution and the previous year's Rose Revolution in Georgia on political developments in the other states of the former Soviet Union should not be underestimated. In Russia, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, President Putin's administration saw a looming danger from unregulated youth groups and civic organizations, especially those that were funded by international donors. In Azerbaijan, protests against the government tried to employ the "Orange" way of organizing and hoped for similar success. Photos and videos of the mass protest movements in Baku in late 2005 show women protesters in orange headscarves. But again, the Azerbaijani government cracked down on the protesters, possibly with even greater force having seen the success that such protests had achieved in neighboring Ukraine.

In Kyrgyzstan, the riots and protests of April 2005 were called a "color revolution" (even though it was not certain whether the Kyrgyz color was yellow or pink). The outcome of these events was the downfall of an entrenched political leader, Askar Akayev. When his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, took on dictatorial tendencies, he met the same fate when protesters took to the streets once more in April 2010.

Protests against the ruling elites in other post-Soviet states from 2005 to 2010 also took on elements of a "color revolution": in Ar-

menia in 2008, when Levon Ter Petrossian stood against the ruling Karabakh clan with the support of thousands of people in the street, and in the run up to the presidential election in Belarus in 2010, when there seemed to be credible evidence that Russian state interests were working against Aleksandr Lukashenka, disguising themselves as a potential "color revolution" movement. Neither of these events ended in overturning an election or posing a serious challenge to the authorities in those countries. Because Ukraine's Orange Revolution had been so well studied by analysts in the Kremlin, who then took measures to ensure that nothing similar happened in Russia, other dictators in the region followed suit. After 2006, the likelihood of a successful "color revolution" taking place was all but impossible.

Land of Paradoxes

Five years of President Yushchenko's pro-Western administration after the events of 2004 left a mixed legacy, with many of the goals and wishes that had been expressed in the rousing slogans on the street left unfulfilled. The biggest irony, however, was the 2010 presidential victory of Viktor Yanukovych, whose fraudulent win in 2004 resulted in protests that overturned the election. Even more ironic was that the 2010 election was generally considered to have been free and fair. The swing from one end of the political spectrum to the other is emblematic of Ukraine's recent history. Putting this all into perspective may help to explain the environment in which young people in Ukraine have grown up and some of the often diverse choices they have been presented with.

One of the most critical questions about Ukraine's post-Soviet identity has been whether Ukrainians are fundamentally different from Russians and whether the existence of Ukraine as an independent nation-state is justified. When Ukraine was an integral part of the Soviet Union, it was difficult to untangle the historical and traditional elements of culture and ethos that had been woven into the fabric of Soviet identity. Moreover, Ukraine has always been a land of extremes and paradoxes. In Soviet times, the tide of nationalism that arose occasionally in western Ukraine, supported by a political and vociferous diaspora in the "Free World," created the impression of a population bursting to leave the Soviet Union. But looking to the east, the Ukrai-

nians of Dnipropetrovsk and Donbas formed the anchor of the Soviet state. Throughout history the lands of Ukraine were considered the keystone in the Russian imperial edifice, as British historian Norman Davies commented on the Russian Empire, "There was Moscow and there was Ukraine; and all the rest was window dressing." Looking at the geostrategic importance of Ukraine, former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski hailed Ukraine's independence as the most significant event of the twentieth century. Without Ukraine, he stressed, Russia would not be able to reconstitute itself as an empire.

Ukrainians themselves have not always been very clear on the issue of whether they are one people (*narod*) together with the Russians or a different national group; the views of young Russians and Ukrainians continue to reflect this uncertainty. Polling in 2003 revealed that only 34.2 percent of young Russians and 38 percent of young Ukrainians thought that they were different; by 2010, the number had risen to 49 percent of young Russians and 48 percent of Ukrainians who saw themselves as different. Conversely, in 2003, 61.2 percent of Russians and 59.2 percent of Ukrainians thought they were one *narod*. By 2010, the figures had dropped to 47 percent of Russians and 48 percent of Ukrainians believing they were one. Interestingly, young Azerbaijanis looking at Russians and Ukrainians from a distance have been consistent, with 81.8 percent in 2003 seeing Russians and Ukrainians as different and 83.2 percent expressing that view in 2010 (appendix, table A8).

Ukraine, as the republic that nurtured dissidents who questioned the very basis of Soviet rule in the 1960s, also produced the most rigid Soviet bureaucrats in the 1970s. Prominent former Soviet citizens from across the spectrum have traced their roots to Ukraine: from author of the *Gulag Archipelago*, Alexander Solzhenitsyn; Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky; Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa, through to leader of an opposition party Grigory Yavlinsky, reformer and former mayor of St. Petersburg; the late Anatoly Sobchak; and others who have had family connections or spent time in Ukraine. Many Soviet leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev worked in Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk region, whose party structures created a system of patronage that continues to have aftereffects today. Scholars such as Yuri Levada, who was born and raised in Vinnytsia, left their home towns to study in the more prestigious institutes and universities of Moscow during Soviet times and then stayed in Russia.

Also paradoxical is the fact that when assessments were made of the viability of the fifteen republics to go it alone in 1991 by institutions such as the Deutsche Bank, according to all economic indicators, Ukraine generally came in first place as the most likely to succeed as an independent state. The reality two decades later shows Ukraine dramatically underachieving its potential. Expectations that Ukraine would maintain independent statehood without ethnic or nuclear conflicts with the Russians, on the other hand, were rather low. But on this point, Ukraine surprised most observers not only by maintaining peace and stability with regard to the Russian minority and its relations with Russia, but also by its staunch and systematic strengthening of independent statehood. By 1998, Ukraine had signed an agreement with NATO, and after a few years of ambiguous foreign policy toward the West, in 2003, Ukraine sent troops to join the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq. After five years of President Yushchenko's pro-Western views, his successor President Yanukovych once more swung the pendulum of Ukraine's foreign policy toward Russia in his first year in office.

Ukraine was one of the most advanced of the republics in terms of its youth movement in 1990, but throughout the following decade few young people made any inroads into the political system. The country held the distinction of having been the first, and for a long time, the only post-Soviet state to have accomplished a peaceful transfer of power from one president to another in 1994 when Leonid Kuchma succeeded Leonid Kravchuk in a national election. This achievement notwithstanding, the mechanisms of political change in Ukraine did not become more transparent or understandable. On the eve of the 2004 election year, Ukraine was again in a paradoxical situation. It was the only one of the former republics where a viable and vibrant political opposition consistently surpassed the popularity of the president in public opinion poll ratings, while at the same time, its political elite was planning a transfer of power to a chosen successor.

The Revolution on Granite

To understand the roots of the Orange Revolution, it is necessary to go back to look at the youth movement of 1990. At that time, the youth in Ukraine were following the lead of their Central and East European

colleagues and were participating in mass protests. Ukrainian youth had specific reasons to oppose the Soviet regime. The explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26, 1986, affected many Ukrainian youth directly. In addition to the hundreds of young men sent to douse the inferno, many of Kyiv's school students remember being forced to take part in the Soviet May Day parades on the streets of Kyiv, just five days after the accident when, unbeknownst to any but the highest party officials, deadly nuclear particles were raining down upon them. Due to the new policies of glasnost and perestroika that allowed some modest release of information at the time, many eventually learned the truth about what had happened and heard about the serious shortcomings in the safety mechanisms at the plant that had been ignored and how Moscow had called the shots in the crisis, while Kyiv was mostly left in the dark. When the full extent of the disaster began to emerge, many in Ukraine saw their lack of ability to control or assist in their own fate as an issue of sovereignty.

By the beginning of the 1990s, in step with the waves of mass protest demonstrations sweeping the Soviet Union, the youth in Ukraine were poised to play a revolutionary role. Just four days after Boris Yeltsin's dramatic exit from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet took the bold step of voting for the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine on July 16, 1990. Meanwhile, on the streets of Kyiv unrest was mounting, particularly among students.

The initiative for creating an independent group, Ukrainian Students' Association (*Ukrains'ka students'ka spilka*—USS), emerged from an organizing committee made up of Kyiv State University students in the autumn of 1989. Membership grew rapidly and by February 1990, the USS had organized a series of hunger strikes and protests throughout Ukraine.[2] Strikes and demonstrations took place in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, and Luhansk. Protests and other activities in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk were organized by the Student Brotherhood (*Students'ke Bratstvo*) of western Ukraine, who were considered the veterans of the students' movement at that time.

The students' demands were political as well as economic: to abolish the compulsory courses in Marxism-Leninism, give students an equal role in the governing bodies of the institutions of higher education, ban the operation of the KGB and the CPSU within institutions of higher

education, protect students from persecution for political activities, and some concrete economic demands.

These students' appeals were filled with entreaties to fellow students to join in, to support the student community that was being left behind and ignored because it was not speaking for itself. As a result of the February strikes, some of the organizers were arrested for periods of several days and the news about their activities began to spread. The Ukrainian students sympathized with and were dismayed by the fate of the Chinese students on Tiananmen Square the year before and consciously joined in the worldwide student show of solidarity to commemorate May 13, the day the Chinese students had launched their hunger strike.

As the weeks passed and protests swept through the country, students both joined in and planned their own activities. On September 30, 1990, one hundred thousand people gathered in Kyiv to protest against the government; this was the largest demonstration the city had seen. The students' hunger strike began on October 2, 1990. Inspired by Tiananmen Square, the students erected tents on the newly renamed Freedom Square (*Maidan Nezalezhnosti*), even though the huge statue of Lenin still loomed over the tent city. The students' demands were simple: the resignation of Prime Minister Masol, passage of a law to ensure that military conscripts did their military service only on the territory of Ukraine, no new Union Treaty that was planned by the Kremlin to strengthen the bonds with the republics of the USSR, the nationalization of the Communist Party's property, and the holding of preterm multiparty elections to the parliament in the spring. The student protests "on the granite," as they came to be called because of the venue on the square, gathered a core group of around 200 who took part in the hunger strike and an additional 2,000 or so young people who participated in the tent city encampment. The students had come into Kyiv from several cities throughout Ukraine. The square in front of the statue of Lenin became home to around fifty tents for the duration of the hunger strike.

The students' strike also inspired the opposition members of parliament, eight of whom, including former dissidents who had served time in the gulag—Stepan Khmara and Mykhailo Horyn with white bands tied around their heads—joined the strike on October 10. The hunger strikers were joined every day by ten to fifteen thousand protesters, sympathizers, and onlookers. On October 15 a general students' strike was held at all the institutions of higher education in Kyiv, and more

people came out onto the streets in support of the students. A procession to the Ukrainian parliament led to a mass demonstration outside that building. Students seized the University building the same day.

One of the student leaders, Oles' Doniy, was invited to put the students' demands before the parliament. TV coverage was secured and the broadcast went out live. By the end of the day the Kyiv students' demands were known all over the country. The students called on all the other students throughout the country to stage sit-in strikes in their institutions of higher education. The following day, to the surprise of many people and particularly the Ukrainian authorities, the traditionally pro-Communist workers from the "Arsenal" factory in Kyiv also came out in support of the students. Symbolically, this was a great defeat for the Communists; the Arsenal factory had been memorialized since 1917 as the factory that had secured the victory of the Bolsheviks.

The protests paid off; just over two weeks after the students had first taken to the tents, Prime Minister Masol was dismissed. Two weeks after this success the students put forward the additional demand that the traditional military parade that generally took place on November 7 should be discontinued. The euphoria of the students' success led to other concessions from the Communist Party and the government throughout that turbulent autumn. An uneasy coexistence struck up between the students and the ruling elites for the rest of that year. Even though the parliament had acceded to their demands, the students who led the protest came under pressure a couple of months later; Oles' Doniy was arrested in early January 1991 and held for two weeks.

There were many reasons for the eventual failure of the students' movement. Mounting repressions and the gradual reneging of the authorities from the agreements that had been reached in October undermined their success. Other reasons were the predictable internal differences that hindered progress. One part of the student body had from the start called for the creation of a political party to consolidate their strategy, arguing that the youth's intellectual and practical approaches to resolving the most important problems in Ukraine differed so radically from anything the older generation of activists and politicians had proposed that it was no longer possible to join in with them and work in the same parties and organizations. Another faction in the students' movement believed that in these circumstances the best way to go was to organize a powerful students' organization. Differences and tensions

between the Lviv-based students and the Kyiv-led members also played a role. The members of the Lviv-based *Studentske Bratstvo* were much better organized and had gained more experience over the few years of glasnost and perestroika than their counterparts in Kyiv. The Kyiv students had at first looked up to their Lviv compatriots as an inspiration and with some degree of awe, in response to their far superior tactical skills, gained from their knowledge of underground tactics first developed in Lviv by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s. The initial sense of deferral to them however turned into rivalry, with the determination that the Kyiv leaders were not going to give in and be dominated by the Lviv contingent. Nonetheless, for many of the young people who took part in the hunger strike and protest, it was the first time they had encountered their counterparts from different parts of the country, especially the Lviv students with Kyiv.

Looking back a decade later, Oles' Doniy, one of the student leaders, assessed the student protests as a missed opportunity: "At that time young political leaders had the possibility to realize their ideas, just as there was also the possibility for the state to incorporate them. Unfortunately, the state squandered the opportunity . . . in fact, ideas about the complex social and political reforms in Ukraine were to be found at that time exclusively within the young political elite, in the student organizations."[3] Throughout the 1990s Doniy found no appropriate outlet for his early political ambitions and refused to make the compromises of his ideals that were necessary to gain support and financial favors from existing political groups. In the early 2000s he was, for a while, the proprietor of a downtown Kyiv bar called "The Last Barricade," which was continually coming under close scrutiny by the tax authorities and which served as a meeting place for many of the former leaders of the student protests. He later returned to politics, but has stayed with his principles, remaining in opposition to the corrupt system.

Despite some successes the organizations that emerged out of the youth protest movement failed to consolidate. The student movement united around the idea of opposition to the regime, and many of its members were preparing for a long period of struggle with the authorities. When the Soviet Union suddenly disappeared, many of their objectives also vanished. No Ukrainian *Fidesz* party formed, although some of the student leaders went into politics. The parties they joined tended to be the mainstream national democratic parties such as the

Rukh. Other student leaders failed to find a niche and remained on the sidelines. In Lviv, some of the student leaders of 1990 went into business and in 2004 were in a position to fund the youth groups of the next generation as they emerged to participate in the Orange Revolution.

Reconsolidation of the Elite

Ukraine's distinct and broad youth movement did not propel young people into government as happened in Russia. Unlike Russia, Ukraine did not begin its existence as an independent state with a reformist government. Although Leonid Kravchuk was one of the triumvirate that signed away the Soviet Union in December 1991, as chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet he was noted for his hesitation in condemning the coup against Gorbachev and was certainly not on the front lines when that institution declared Ukraine's independence on August 24, 1991. In Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the first party secretary of Ukraine, notorious for his crackdown against dissidents, critical intelligentsia, and even the nationally minded party officials in 1972, had kept a tight grip on political life in his republic up until 1989. It was not surprising that Ukraine's local politicians were less advanced than officials who were close to Gorbachev in Moscow.

The absence of a reformist government or even a vision of progress in the ruling circles in Ukraine was one reason why youth organized separately at that time. The creation of the Rukh—originally known as the Movement in Support of Perestroika—was another outlet for protest, which students and youth joined enthusiastically. The Rukh's charter and statement of purpose was first published in February 1989 and the first congress was held in September 1989. Its leadership was a mix of representatives of three groups: some moderate members of the *nomenklatura*, critical intelligentsia, and some former dissidents, who had returned from the Gulag just a couple of years earlier when Mikhail Gorbachev gave the order for the release and general amnesty for all prisoners of conscience in 1987. The Ukrainian former dissidents formed a compact and visible group that quickly became involved in politics in a more systematic way than the returnees in Russia. The leading members from all three groups were of the generation that had come of age in the 1960s. When younger people joined up, as the Rukh

grew to become a grassroots movement pushing for independence, their generation was generally not represented among the intellectuals and former dissidents in the leadership, who must have felt, having been kept away from the institutions of power for so long themselves, that it was their turn to lead the country. Youth thus missed an opportunity to participate in the reform movement at the top levels.

After the student protests of 1990 and the declaration of Ukraine's independence on August 24, 1991, a window of opportunity opened when it looked as if Ukraine might follow the lead of its Central European neighbors and achieve a complete change of elites under the pressure of a popular grassroots movement. The first election was for the newly created post of president of Ukraine. At that time nobody under thirty-five years old could be a candidate, which excluded all of the students who had participated in the "revolution on granite." However, all agreed that the interests of all that was Western oriented, freedom loving, and focused on democracy would be represented in the candidacy of Vyacheslav Chornovil, former political prisoner and dissident, who had become one of the leaders of the Rukh. For the young people of Ukraine who joined the Rukh in the thousands, Chornovil represented the next generation.

Despite hopes that he would come to power in the same way as Václav Havel and Lech Wałęsa, Chornovil came in runner-up with 26 percent of the vote to Leonid Kravchuk's 54 percent in the December 1, 1991, presidential election. Even though the population of Ukraine voted overwhelmingly in support of independence at a referendum held on the same day—becoming the only post-Soviet republic to put the question of independence to a popular vote—it was recognized by many in retrospect that Ukraine had missed the opportunity for an authentic and deep-rooted change on that day.

The election of Leonid Kravchuk as president of Ukraine was a sign that the forces he represented, the interests of the state *nomenklatura*, would predominate. Even though many informal associations, political parties and groups were being formed at that time, the process of consolidation of the former *nomenklatura* was also proceeding apace. Kravchuk had been the secretary responsible for ideology in the Ukrainian Communist Party in the 1980s, so it was not surprising that the team he brought in as his administration lacked purposeful reformers.

For the next three years, the political landscape was shaped by the newly established presidency working with the *Verkhovna Rada*, the Ukrainian parliament, which had been elected in 1990, under a set of special concessions that gave a limited number of seats to non-Communists. The "group of 239" Communists, who voted as a block, made gaining a majority against them in the 450-seat parliament almost impossible. Introducing reforms through the parliament was difficult and there were no Ukrainian equivalents to Yegor Gaidar or Boris Nemtsov, Russian president Yeltsin's young reformers, to introduce economic reforms through the executive on a national or provincial level. There were no young people of the generation born after 1968 in this parliament.

The elections of 1994 provided the first opportunity for the Ukrainian population to exercise some real choices in the leadership they wished to elect. This was an extraordinary year for politics in Ukraine. The parliamentary and the presidential elections were held at the same time. The result was the first parliament elected without a quota set aside for Communists and the first peaceful transfer of power from one president to another in any post-Soviet state.

Very few young people ran for any of the 450 seats. Since all the seats were to be decided through a majoritarian system, this tended to work against young candidates. Nonetheless, youth did participate in the 1994 elections in a notable way. The members of the Students Union took to mobilizing their colleagues throughout the country in a major get-out-the-vote campaign. Part of this campaign was organized by one of the spin-off organizations, the Youth Alternative. This group united hundreds of young people around the country, organizing rock concerts for a get-out-the-vote effort and by distributing close to four million pieces of literature to young people.

Despite the lack of young candidates in the parliamentary elections, there was a sense at that time that a vote for Leonid Kuchma and against the incumbent in the presidential race would open up possibilities for a fresh start. Ironically, once the full extent and true nature of the Dnipropetrovsk "clan" network under Kuchma's nominal leadership became known a few years later, it made many long for the Kravchuk years.[4] By the end of the year of elections in 1994, the framework for political activity had been established for the next few years. The door of opportunity for young people had been closed and was not opened again until

the parliamentary elections of 1998, when the electoral system changed to give half of the seats to winners in a proportional system and young political activists could vie for a place on a party list. By that time, just as in Russia, the nature of politics had changed so that a young person with only idealism and energy at his disposal stood no chance to be successful without backing from a financial or political mentor, and those who went into the Rukh and other pro-democratic parties would have to wait their turn at leadership in line after the older generation, who valued their presence but regarded them as young and inexperienced.

The leader of the 1990 protests, Oles' Doniy, published his reflections on those years and their outcome. He lamented the fact that, despite all of the signs that indeed a "new generation" had been formed with its own literary figures, journalists, popular artists, political analysts, politicians, and businessmen, it had failed to gain political power. He differentiated this generation from the dissidents of the "sixties generation," whom he described as being interested only in "opposition." He also blamed the rest of the political community for lack of interest in supporting the program of the young protesters of the early 1990s, and suspected them of deliberately excluding young people from any positions of influence by raising the minimum age for a candidate to parliament to twenty-five. Yet neither the younger nor the older generation had developed a new ideology or vision of the future of an independent Ukraine that could have rallied the activists and general population at that time.[5]

State-Sponsored Youth

After independence, various organizations were established to preserve some state support and control over youth. In some cases these were successors of old Soviet institutions and in others they were new. It is worth tracing the history of one of these organizations as an illustration of some of the government-sponsored attempts to channel youth and their activities that arose not only in Ukraine but also in the other post-Soviet states. The development of independent youth groups was hampered by the continuing existence of such official youth organizations; they not only diverted the energy of potential youth activists in the regions, but also, in the true tradition of many post-Soviet structures, were an instrument for

maintaining state control over the activities of the youth and for strengthening powerful personnel around the president.

In Ukraine, the Ukrainian International Committee of Youth Organizations (*Ukrainskyi mizhnarodnyi komitet molodizhnykh orhanizatsii*) generally referred to by its acronym in Ukrainian, UNKMO, had been created in the early 1990s as an umbrella group for youth organizations. Questions were raised about this organization when large sums of funding from the state budget were allocated to it, even though it was nominally a nongovernmental organization (NGO). A law passed in December 1998 stated, "The youth movement in Ukraine is coordinated by UNKMO, which is an independent non-governmental organization with the status of all-Ukrainian association of youth and children's social organizations."[6] In the year prior to the parliamentary elections of 2002, the conflict between the State Committee for Youth, Sport, and Tourism and the UNKMO came to a head. It had come to light that 13 million hryvnias had been allocated from the state budget for the support of UNKMO, whereas the state committee itself was allocated only 2 million. One journalist discovered what these funds had been used for reporting, "Under the guise of carrying out state and social programs, in fact UNKMO is supporting its own subordinate structures and existence."[7] The implication here was that the organization was being manipulated and exploited by corrupt political forces. The journalist noted that these revelations had come to light in the course of an increasingly public conflict between the head of the state committee and the head of UNKMO, who was at the same time the deputy head of the state committee. According to some reports, the UNKMO organization was receiving 75 percent of the funds available for youth programs in the state budget while servicing only 3 percent of the youth in Ukraine. Apparently, upon reviewing the budget the newly appointed head of the state committee had simply crossed out the line item for the UNKMO funding, which brought the whole affair to a head.

The activity of UNKMO had been growing steadily since 1996, even though it had been in existence since at least four years earlier. Over a period of four years its share of the state budget had increased from 2.5 million hryvnias in 1997 to the above-mentioned 13 million in 2001. Some commentators attributed its moral decline and the diversion of its originally principled aims, to the mistake of allowing political formations into its structure.[8] But it must be noted that the infiltration of

opportunists into the UNKMO was part of the general trend toward the corruption and manipulation of all state structures that became the hallmark of the Kuchma era in Ukrainian social and political life.

The manipulation of UNKMO in the struggle for political supremacy became even more pronounced in the fall of 2000, when the organization rallied a protest meeting of over four thousand youth outside the building of the Cabinet of Ministers. The protest was ostensibly to demand the implementation of the president's program for youth passed a year earlier, but at the same time the protesters also demanded the resignation of one of the deputy prime ministers, the generally pro-democratic Yuri Yekhanurov. Some press reports clearly identified the event as a move against the government of Viktor Yushchenko (who was prime minister at that time) by his opponent, Viktor Medvedchuk, who was the chairman of the Committee for Youth, which was closely affiliated with UNKMO.[9]

One reason why the activities of UNKMO had come under close scrutiny as the election campaign began in October 2001 was that accusations were rife that it was planning to use government funds for the elections. Young people in Ukraine had become very sensitive to the widespread practice of forcing students to vote a certain way. Students in schools and student dormitories were particularly susceptible to being manipulated by government officials in the same way as inmates in other state-run institutions such as hospitals, psychiatric institutions, and army barracks.

At the time of the 1998 parliamentary elections both the established political parties and the government moved to take an interest in youth in a way that effectively precluded any independent groups from emerging. Two youth parliaments were established: The Ukrainian Youth Parliament (*Ukrains'kyi molodizhnyi parlament*—UMP) was registered with the Ministry of Justice on November 16, 1998, as a nongovernmental organization. This organization claimed that its main function was the preparation of draft legislation. The other organization was the Youth Parliament of Ukraine (*Molodizhnyi parlament Ukrainy*—MPU), created on the initiative of the Union of Social Democratic Youth, the National Democratic League of Youth, the youth organization of the Liberal Party of Ukraine, and the independent student trade union POSTUP. Created in January 1998, the MPU encouraged young people to go out to vote and supported particular candidates for the parliamen-

tary elections. After the elections, its stated goal was to lobby for youth interests in the parliament.

A "youth government" was also formed that year, holding its first meeting with the existing government of Prime Minister Pustovoitenko in March 1998. The meeting of twenty-nine "youth ministers" with their counterparts was hailed as a resounding success by the government. Other commentators saw it as merely the continuation of the *nomenklatura* tradition and a guarantee to the government that each "youth minister" would be under the control of the actual incumbent. The same commentators pointed out that by April 1998, the interest of the older generation in youth structures had run out. Since the youth organizations were not able to sustain themselves without support of their former mentors, many of them fizzled out. None of the authentic concerns of the youth at the grass roots stood any chance to be represented within these organizational structures and in these circumstances.

There were already some signs that the oligarchic-financial groups within the political community had also turned their attention to the youth sector. Some of the participants in the Youth Parliament (MPU) complained that the takeover of the UNKMO organization was nothing but a thinly veiled ruse to provide cover for money laundering, and that the millions of hryvnias of state funds dedicated for the use of youth organizations were being squandered by the UNKMO leaders. A hearing that had been dedicated to discussion of youth affairs in parliament had been manipulated so as not to allow any review of the real problems existing in the sphere of "youth politics."[10]

Public opinion polls conducted around 2000 showed a relatively high level of youth interest in civic organizations and political parties. In May 2000, a poll conducted by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research among eighteen- to twenty-eight-year-olds revealed 3 percent as members of a political party.[11] Out of those who were members of a party, 46 percent were allied with a party of national-democratic ideology, 13 percent with social democratic ideology, an equal 4 percent for national-radical and "greens," with none opting for communist or socialist.

In his "address to the parliament" in 2000 President Kuchma showed that he too was becoming aware of the growing independent third sector; he cited the existence of 1,376 national and international organizations and 12,700 local groups.[12] He criticized them for being beholden to special interests and not taking part in the social and political devel-

opment of the country and called on them, especially the think tanks and analytical centers, to engage in a constructive dialogue with the executive branch of government, suggesting also that the government should explore ways to provide funding for the third sector.

In the autumn of 2000, there were some signs that the Ukrainian authorities wished to follow the lead of Russia in organizing an effort to establish control over civil society (see chapter 5 on Russia). In an obvious attempt to launch the initiative, the head of the president's administration, Volodymyr Lytvyn, published an article on civil society in one of Ukraine's mass circulation publications. The effort collapsed dramatically when it was discovered that the article was an almost verbatim translation of the work of a noted American expert on civil society.[13] The debate that ensued about the nature of civil society resulted in some of the major civic organizations in Kyiv deciding to take the initiative into their own hands before it could be hijacked by the government. The following year two major civil society conferences were held in February and June, with participation from hundreds of groups and organizations from the regions of Ukraine, with no apparent involvement of the authorities and with the majority of the participants being youth from the next generation. Perhaps it was an aversion to the revelations of corruption in the state-supported youth sector, or perhaps the realization that state officials and politicians had nothing to give to the youth, that fueled the continuing development of youth groups and movements independently from the state or any political party.

Attempts to bring under control or at least to investigate the activities of the independent NGOs resurfaced once more in the run up to the presidential election campaign of 2004. A parliamentary commission, established on the initiative of deputies from the Communist faction in the parliament, compiled a report on the major NGOs receiving foreign funding—primarily from the United States. The NGOs under scrutiny were almost exclusively run by young people in their early to mid-thirties.

Gongadze: Prologue to the Orange Revolution

The use of new media and mounting youth protests, two elements that became the hallmark of the Orange Revolution, were already on the rise in the years before that enormous event. And as fate would have it, they

were intertwined. In December 2000, mass protests of young people were taking place once more in downtown Kyiv, and a tent city had appeared on what was now called Freedom Square (*Maidan Nezalezhnosti*). For several weeks tension had been mounting around the murder of Georgiy Gongadze, a leading investigative journalist and editor of the Internet publication *Ukrains'ka Pravda*.

Gongadze had been one of a number of Ukrainian journalists who had condemned the increasing control over media being exercised by the Kuchma administration. He even made a trip to the United States in December 1999 to both warn of the diminishing freedom of the press in Ukraine and to seek assistance. He determined that returning to samvydav-samizdat independent publishing using new technology was the best way to proceed. *Ukrains'ka Pravda* was established as an innovative Internet publication in April 2000 and quickly became the premiere publication of its kind, reporting uncensored news and focusing particularly on the corruption in the governing elites. Gongadze's articles on Kuchma and his entourage of businessmen revealed shady dealings, corruption, and indications of coercion being used to derail political processes to construct a vertical structure of power for the president. The Internet format made this a relatively inexpensive way to publish for the young editor and his team (Gongadze was thirty-one years old). Even though the Internet did not reach so many people at that time, its primary readership was the computer literate and disaffected community of political and civic activists who had been effectively excluded from government by the regime. The hard-hitting articles published by *Ukrains'ka Pravda* resonated with this community, especially the younger generation, who often printed out the texts where they had access in Kyiv or at their jobs and packed them up to send by mail to their Internet-deprived colleagues in the regions. As the political crisis in Ukraine hurtled toward the 2004 events, *Ukrains'ka Pravda*, and several other Internet sites set up subsequently, became an important source of independent information and ultimately a tool for mobilizing people into the movement that became the Orange Revolution.

The disappearance in September 2000 and subsequent discovery a couple of months later of a decapitated body believed to be Gongadze may have gone unremarked as yet another unsolved crime had it not been for the revelation on November 28 by Socialist Party leader Aleksander Moroz of secretly recorded tapes implicating the president and

his top officials. The history of Gongadze's disappearance and murder, and the potential involvement of President Kuchma caught on recordings made secretly in the presidential offices, were well publicized and became a cause célèbre. The next couple of years marked a true low point both within Ukraine and in Ukraine's relations with the West. The summary dismissal by President Kuchma of the popular pro-Western foreign minister Borys Tarasyuk earlier in the autumn, apparently on orders from Moscow, only added to the feeling that dark forces were at work within the ruling elite of Ukraine. The predominant mood among all groups in society was that the country was spiraling into a deep political crisis. The death of the popular parliamentarian Alexander Yemets in a car accident in January 2001 reopened questions about the accident in which the leading democratic politician Vyacheslav Chornovil had been killed two years earlier. The murders of a number of regional politicians intensified the grim atmosphere in the country.

The plan to put up tents in the center of Kyiv in mid-December 2000 came initially from the youth connected to the Socialist Party and was quickly joined by more radical groups from both the left and the right such as the UNA (Ukrainian National Assembly) as well as the young Communists. A number of politicians soon started to take an interest in the nascent movement. The "tent city" protests were held under the slogan "Ukraine without Kuchma," which became the name of the movement, since one of the main aims was to press for the resignation of the president. The other demands of the movement were the dismissal of the other top officials implicated in Gongadze's murder, the minister of the interior, the head of the security service, and the prosecutor general, and included expanding the powers of the parliament with the aim of establishing a parliamentary republic.

Young people gathered from all around the country to join the sit-in in the tents and the pickets of the main government office buildings. The first large demonstration took place on December 19, 2000, consisting of around five thousand people. By the time the protests wound down for the holidays, similar tent camps had appeared in other cities such as Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, and Lviv. The movement was poised to come back with greater numbers in the new year.

Another group of youth that coalesced on the crest of the political crisis at that time was the "For Truth" (*Za Pravdu*) group. Bringing together seven youth organizations including Young Rukh, the youth

wing of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Association of Ukrainian Youth (*Spilka Ukrains'koi Molodi*—SUM), the Ukrainian Student's Union (*Ukrains'ka Students'ka Spilka*—USS), and others, the new movement reunited some of the original student hunger strikers from 1990. This formation advertised its aims as being broader than to merely be rid of the president, anticipating gaining broader support.

When the tent city protests resumed in late January 2001, the tense situation between the protesters and the president sharpened with the dismissal of one of the deputy prime ministers, Yulia Tymoshenko, who had been a leading advocate for curbing the ability of oligarchs close to the president to continue enriching themselves. Mass demonstrations began again in early February with between 5,000 to 10,000 people gathering on two different days and the largest turnout of up to 50,000 on February 25, when the protest action took on the form of a "Tribunal against Kuchma." A few days later, the tent city was forcibly dismantled by the authority of a court order.[14]

Many of the activities of the "Ukraine without Kuchma" movement, such as sponsoring rock concerts, aimed to gain support from young people. And in fact, many young people from all regions of Ukraine traveled to Kyiv to participate. It was clear from the reaction of the authorities that they considered youth to be leading the movement. The government responded by sponsoring its own youth meetings. On February 5, 2001, an "assembly of political forces" supporting the slogan "For constitutional order and democracy" was convened in one of the large halls of Kyiv, the "Ukraina Palace," initially advertising itself as a gathering of the leading youth groups of Ukraine. In the end, of the twenty-three or so organizations invited, only fifteen signed a declaration that pledged support for ending the political crisis through dialogue with all the political forces in the state and by working through the constitution. Planned as a pro-Kuchma event, it turned out that even those who attended voiced concerns about the "war without rules" being waged among the various financial political groups within the ruling elite, which was now threatening to undermine the very foundations of Ukraine's independent statehood.[15]

President Kuchma himself also went on the offensive in a speech at Kyiv State University in front of an auditorium of students, where he claimed emphatically that there was no political crisis in Ukraine. It seems clear that the political forces around President Kuchma recog-

nized that the most recent wave of opposition protests was driven by young people. The president's office issued a number of decrees on "youth politics" which included an increase in student stipends, support for students' self-government, securing jobs, and regular meetings with leaders of youth organizations in an attempt to placate or co-opt the young people, or at the very least to show the government as sensitive to youth issues.

Even though young people made up the body of the protest movement, the paradox lay in the fact that the issues were not the youth issues that had driven the protest movement of 1990. The aims of the movement were unclear at best: they were a mixture of immediate responses to the political struggle in the parliament and demands to bring the president to trial or else to force him to resign. The aims of the various protest groups were never as clear cut and as unified as they had been in 1990. In addition to the "For Truth" and "Ukraine without Kuchma" movements, another emerged in February 2001, the Forum of National Salvation, which consisted of some representatives from the other groups and also included politicians such as Tymoshenko, Moroz Serhiy Holovaty, and the veteran dissident Stepan Khmara.[16]

The crisis situation came to a head at the March 9, 2001, commemoration of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko's birth. By tradition, the president lays flowers at the poet's statue every year. That year, speculation began several days prior to the event as to whether the discredited president would be so bold as to show up. As it turned out, he did, but not without considerable protests from young people gathered under the auspices of the "Ukraine without Kuchma" campaign and the "For Truth" committee. Around 250 young people were arrested in clashes that ensued. Rumors abounded, and some people's deputies as well as members of the security services claimed they had evidence that the skirmishes had been deliberately stirred up by provocateurs. The galvanizing effect of the arrests and detention of the protesters increased the atmosphere of extremism and lawlessness, encouraging mounting radicalism on both sides. The atmosphere of revolution was intense enough for at least one of the participants to pen a comparison of current events with the student protests of 1968 in France.[17] The final indication that protests would mount was the forced resignation of then prime minister Viktor Yushchenko in April 2001, as the result of a vote of no confidence in the parliament. A

defiant Yushchenko left the parliament building, quipping that he was leaving but only to return.

The failure of this wave of the youth movement to achieve its maximalist goals should not have come as a surprise: there were many complicating political elements in the mix and, more so than in 1990, the authorities were prepared to use brute force against the protesters.

Struggle for the Youth Vote

The idea of establishing a new youth political party as a direct way for youth to participate in the political life of the country had not been broached since the elections of 1994. It was not that young people had lost interest in politics; they were joining up with the "older" more established parties. At a congress of the Popular Movement of Ukraine–Rukh in October 1997, its leader, Vyacheslav Chornovil, pronounced himself pleased with the work of "Young Rukh" and the way it was gathering an increasing number of members.[18] The Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS) became one of the founders of the new party of power, the National Democratic Party (NDP). The United Social Democratic Party, which had itself been established only in 1998, also moved to create some youth branches. By early 1998, most of the parties running for election that year had established youth wings: *Trudova Ukraina*, *Moloda Hromada*, *Soyuz Sotsial-demokratychnoi Molodi*. Only the Green Party categorically refused to establish a youth wing, explaining that most of its members were, in any case, under thirty years old.

It was not until the March 2002 parliamentary elections, however, that direct appeals to youth and a discussion about the change of generations and political elites entered into the campaign as an issue, even though this was a sub-theme in the overall drama of the struggle between Viktor Yushchenko and his allies and the political forces supporting President Kuchma. The political campaigns for the parliamentary elections of March 2002 were held in a mounting atmosphere of tension, increased by the anticipation that the ruling elite around Kuchma was determined to retain as much power as possible using any means.

One of the most interesting political parties to enter the race was built around overt appeals to the younger generation. The oddly named Winter Crop Generation Party (*Partiya ozymoho pokolinnya*) appeared

as a bloc in late 2001, and transformed itself into a party in time to register for the electoral competition. The idea of forming a new political party for youth emerged sometime in the summer of 2001, when Valery Khoroshkovsky (b. 1969) teamed up with another relatively young member of the current parliament, Inna Bohoslovska, who appeared to be looking for new political alliances at that time. It brought together the Constitutional Democratic Party (*Konstytutsiyno-demokratychna partiya*), the Liberal Democratic Party, the Party of Private Property (*Partiya pryvatnoi vlasnosti*), the Ukrainian Democratic Peasant Party (*Ukrains'ka selians'ka demoratychna Partiya*), and some young wealthy businessmen.[19] The party was registered in time to qualify to run in the elections; toward the conclusion of the campaign period some opinion polls gave the party a chance of receiving over the 4 percent threshold needed to enter parliament. As it turned out, the party came in ninth with 2.02 percent of the vote on the proportional side of the ballot.

Many political analysts believed that this well-funded effort, closely allied with individuals around the president, was an exercise in pulling away the youth vote from the Our Ukraine (*Nasha Ukraina*) bloc of Viktor Yushchenko, around whom the pro-democratic youth had coalesced. The ideology expressed by the Winter Crop Generation in various manifestoes and television appearances, however, voiced for the first time a clear call for the change of elites:

> Our bloc is without a name, as is our generation, which is currently a generation without a name. When it emerges, our bloc will give a name to an entire generation of Ukrainians, so let's not shy away from naming the generation. We need to find a name that is comprehensible to all Ukrainians, not like the terms "right," "liberal." We need to find a term, rooted in history and culture that will be understood by all of our compatriots. We do not need to emulate the "old men" wherever they are from, Ukraine, the West or the East. We need to search for our own identity. We are a young country, and there is much that we can begin from the start here without looking back at the construction heaps of others. They are entrapped by these; we are not.[20]

During the election campaign, the Winter Crop Generation was given prime-time air time on a major private TV channel ICTV, where they challenged their opponents by calling the Communists "our grandfathers' generation," and referred to the Our Ukraine bloc as

the "generation of our fathers." The party's platform and principles proposed to encourage the growth of the private sector and to limit the role of government in the economy and in international affairs to strengthen Ukraine's independence, but without a definite orientation toward Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions. This ambivalence toward Euro-Atlantic integration, revealed the new party's affiliations with the existing powers.

The Winter Crop Generation was launched with the implicit acquiescence of the state power structures in Ukraine, if not with their direct support. In order to receive as much publicity as they did and to campaign so vigorously, the Winter Croppers must have been well connected. Despite issuing dramatic challenges to the older generation of politicians, the Winter Croppers showed no real interest in working with other representatives of the next generation. Its leaders had not been among those who had participated in the youth and student protests of 1990 or 2001 and the message was not an authentic expression of a younger generation struggling to get its voice heard.

After the defeat of the Winter Crop Generation Party in the March 2002 elections, Khoroshkovsky was quickly taken into the president's administration and soon after became the minister for economy and European integration, and Inna Bohoslovska was appointed the head of the State Committee on Regulatory Policy and Support for Entrepreneurship in the spring of 2003. Despite his relatively young age, Khoroshkovsky had become one of the richest men in Ukraine by that time and had followed the path of his elders in combining a career as a businessman with politics. His fortune was made in metal trading, banking, furniture retail, and other trading businesses and as head of the steel giant *Evraz* company. After a short hiatus in the private sector from 2004 to 2006, he moved back into government as first deputy secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, then head of the Customs' Service, later becoming first deputy chief of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and eventually the head of the SBU under the new Yanukovych administration in 2010. As the majority shareholder in the Inter TV Company, one of Ukraine's prime TV channels, which was part of his U.A. Intermedia Group, he came in for a lot of criticism on the grounds of conflict of interest during the Yanukovych administration when the officials of the SBU were involved in the general harassment of civic activists and the media. His career path shows how making a career in government often depends on

support from existing political groups and that youth do not necessarily always strive toward liberal and democratic values in a society but can be just as adept at following in the footsteps of corrupt older politicians and, in some cases, even outdoing them at their own game.

Civil Society Grows

Much has been made of the activities of youth groups such as Otpor in Serbia in the struggle to bring down the Milosevic regime in 2000, the youth group Kmara in Georgia in the Rose Revolution in 2003, and Pora and other youth groups in Ukraine's Orange Revolution. While it is true that youth organizations played a crucial role in Ukraine and were the added element that gave the Orange Revolution its particular dynamism and unique satirical edge, the activities of these groups alone could never have overturned governments. There were many other factors in play, which has also led to the enduring hypothesis that there was a "formula" for regime change that brought about the Orange Revolution. Many scholars and journalists have written about the way "color revolutions" contained many similar elements: protests against a falsified election that were augmented and strengthened by the activities of civic groups and nongovernmental organizations, independent media reporting on the events, a leading role for activist youth groups, and the soft authoritarian government that in the end would not shoot at protesters. The detractors of the "color revolutions" have added an erroneous theory that the leading nongovernmental organizations were funded by foreign donors with nefarious plans to subvert the sitting government. Nonetheless, the role played by civil society organizations that had worked for years was a critical factor and will go down in history as the hallmark of this type of people power.[21]

For the decade and a half prior to the 2004 events, the growth of civil society was proceeding steadily in Ukraine. When the term "civil society" is used for this period in the post-Soviet states, it usually refers to the broad range of nongovernmental groups that were organizing independently of the state. The same processes were happening, perhaps at a less rapid rate, in other post-Soviet states, but in Ukraine, the distinguishing feature of this newly emerging civil society was that most of the participants in the NGOs were young, noticeably younger than

in Russia, for example. Throughout the 1990s, civic groups of all kinds were being formed. Some were a direct outcome of the student movement of 1990 and others were a way for youth to be active in response to the political situation.

For example, after the monumental get-out-the-vote efforts of the Youth Alternative for the 1994 elections, this group turned itself into an organization that selected and placed student interns in the Ukrainian parliament. By the end of the decade, it had introduced hundreds of young people into the political world, albeit as part-time interns. The organization *Smoloskyp* (Torch) was another example of an organization that provided young people with an introduction to politics. By means of seminars held around the country and an annual ten-day conference, this organization also built an alumni network of hundreds of enthusiastic debate participants.[22]

By the time of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine's fledgling civil society had taken on some distinctive attributes—mostly associated with youth and youth activities. The civil society groups that made up this community spanned the spectrum of nonpartisan activities on the edge of political processes. Ukraine was a pioneer in bringing into being a type of nongovernmental organization, staffed primarily by young people, the "think tank-analytical center." This hybrid type of organization was both analytical and activist, with not much apparent tension between the two activities. Often created by a group of like-minded peers, usually individuals who felt drawn to politics but who had no desire to join a political party, these groups created channels of communication among the government, political parties, the media, and the population at large, which were otherwise missing in the type of transitional society that Ukraine was at that time. In the capital, Kyiv, such groups included the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Europe XXI Foundation, the Razumkov Center, and others. All of these organizations were started up and run by young people. Often the main focus of their activity in the capital was to be involved in policy debates around the government. In the provinces, such organizations generally became citizen's advice bureaus and information centers assisting people with problems ranging from human rights violations to nonpayment of wages.

There were monitoring groups of several types. Some, such as the Open Society Foundation, focused on the parliament, keeping account of how deputies were voting and whether they were representing their

constituencies and voters effectively. Others, like the Equal Access Committee, monitored the media to show how the media, especially TV and radio, were dominated by pro-government forces, providing biased information to the people.

Some of the civil society organizations like the Committee of Voters of Ukraine were directly involved in monitoring elections. This group was perhaps the largest independent nongovernmental organization in the country in the 1990s. Established with assistance from the U.S. National Democratic Institute with the original objective of training domestic election observers, this organization claimed up to 20,000 members throughout the country, which rose even higher closer to election time. Young people who had no wish to join a political party but who wanted to be involved in politics found this organization a perfect vehicle for their interests. The Democratic Initiatives Foundation will go down in history as having pioneered the practice of using the "exit poll" in Ukrainian elections. It had conducted exit polls since the 1998 parliamentary elections and by the time of the March 2002 parliamentary elections was fairly accurately providing the true figures for elections that were routinely being falsified by the government. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, the authorities were unable to announce broadly falsified election results because of the exit poll results publicized by this group immediately as the polls closed, and in 2004 its data were critical in providing the grounds for proving the falsifications during the presidential election which launched the Orange Revolution.

Ukrainian civic groups were also notable for their growing inclination to form coalitions. In the 1990s, groups often worked independently and cooperated on occasions, but increasingly during the Kuchma period, coalitions of activists were coming together—for example, the "Freedom of Choice" coalition in 2002, "New Choice" in 2004, and other iterations of a similar kind. Two "Civic Forums," gathering civic groups from all over the country, were held in 2002 and by the time of the 2004 election Ukraine was covered with networks of civic groups, many of which were becoming increasingly radical as the political situation deteriorated; most were made up of young people.

Young people were also at the forefront of the small amount of independent media that had managed to thrive in the face of repressions from the Kuchma administration. *Ukrains'ka Pravda* had become the flagship Internet publication. After the murder of its editor and

cofounder Georgiy Gongadze, his coeditor Olena Prytula maintained and built up the publication. Many other Internet sites were offshoots of civic groups or created civic groups in cyberspace such as *Maidan*, which also carried news about the independent civic sector.

Without the solid work that these and other civic groups had conducted for years, it is doubtful that the Orange Revolution would have taken place as it did. If there is any lesson to be learned about such dramatic events that ended in "regime change," it was that the stronger and more rooted in society the civic groups and networks were, the more likely it was that the dramatic governmental changes would actually be followed by real progress on democracy.

Youth in the Orange Revolution and After

Even though most of the civil society groups described above consisted of young people, there was another even younger stratum of civic activists pushing from below by the summer of 2004. Their older brothers and sisters had by that time been active for several years. The youth that coalesced into groups such as *Pora* (It's Time), *Chysta Ukraina* (Clean Ukraine), and *Znayu* (Know) in 2003 and 2004 were generally around eighteen to twenty years old, and the formative experience they shared as young activists had probably been the murder of Gongadze in 2000. From March until October 2004, Ukraine's youth groups brought thousands of young people into the streets all over the country to protest against the government. The two wings of the Pora movement took different approaches. "Black" Pora worked on an overtly anti-Kuchma platform organizing protests under the catchy banner of anti-Kuchmism, while the members of "yellow" Pora saw themselves more as organizers of youth and trainers of activists to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.

As the electoral campaign progressed, campaign workers around Viktor Yushchenko were already anticipating government falsifications of the results despite the polling that showed Yushchenko in the lead. Thousands of volunteers were recruited and trained to monitor the elections throughout the summer and fall. Nonetheless, a group around Yushchenko was also making contingency plans in the event that people came out onto the streets, buying up tents, mobile military kitchens, and

old buses to use as barricades if necessary.[23] When it became clear on the evening of Sunday November 21, 2004, after the second-round runoff between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, that the election results were in the process of being falsified and the authorities were not about to give up their power and concede victory to Yushchenko, the machinery of mass protest that had been carefully prepared over the previous months swung into action. By the evening, a group of Pora activists had pitched twenty-five tents at one end of the Maidan, one for each of the administrative regions of Ukraine. Even at that stage, the hearsay was that neither Yushchenko nor his campaign team knew how many people would turn out to protest. When Yushchenko issued his plea to the nation on Monday morning, to come to the Maidan on whatever transport was available—cars, trucks, bicycles, or donkeys—there were around five thousand people on the Maidan, mainly Pora activists, but no guarantee at that time how many more would come out to join them. By week's end, as the inhabitants of Kyiv came out and people from other cities arrived, by November 27, with the Orange Revolution in full swing, estimates ranged from hundreds of thousands up to one million and more, with the young people forming the core of the tent city—the Maidan.

The course of the Orange Revolution and its outcome, the overturning of the falsified vote by the Supreme Court in early December leading to a third-round victory for Viktor Yushchenko on December 31, is well known. Many pages of print and several film documentaries have been devoted to the subject. So it is sufficient to say that youth in Ukraine once more played a crucial role in a historic event.

Seeking an Identity

Despite the dramatic events that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power, the five years of his administration saw few immediate changes for young people. In the first several months of the new government, to be sure, as often happens when there is a complete change of government as the result of a popular uprising, leaders of the opposition movement stepped into government roles. Many young activists came into the administration. But gradually, as disillusion set in with some and others were pushed aside, the "Orange" activists left to return to the nongovernmental sector.

The youth who were the leaders of the protest did not, typically, enter the government even at the beginning of the Yushchenko administration. They were faced with the same dilemma as Otpor in Serbia and Kmara in Georgia: what to do after their goal had been achieved. Predictably, some of the Pora activists opted to form a political party, which ran in the March 2006 parliamentary elections. It gained only 1.47 percent of the vote, which was not enough to enter the parliament. The other part of Pora adjusted its name to *Opora* (Support) thus marking its transition from a radical youth group focused on political action to an organization aiming to build civil society and promote accountability and good governance. Having used the new social media to great effect to mobilize youth for the revolution, now they were faced with transforming the use of these new tools for another activity. Most of the other youth groups followed a similar strategy, either desisting from protest and dissolving through inaction or transforming themselves into networks of watchdog groups to monitor local and national government to encourage accountability.

There were two areas where the Yushchenko administration made a significant contribution whose impact still remains to be assessed; both are likely to have a lasting effect on the way Ukrainian youth perceives itself and its social environment. The first was in maintaining a free media and promoting freedom of speech. The fact that there was no censorship of the press for the five years of Yushchenko's presidency did not seem remarkable until the Yanukovych administration came to power and pressure against journalists began once more. The deterioration in press freedom under Yushchenko's successor can be attributed to the fact that the ownership of major media had not changed. Whereas the major media-owning oligarchs felt no particular pressure from Yushchenko, his successor Yanukovych and his officials made it clear that they expected the press to reflect the policies and support the interests of the government. The preceding five years of relatively free and pluralistic media had become the norm for youth; the twenty-three-year-olds who had finished their education and started in a job or career had gone through their formative years experiencing a free press, and the eighteen-year-olds just entering higher education or the work force would not have known any other kind of media environment in their conscious preadult lives. What the long-term effect on this group of youth will be remains to be seen.

The second major contribution of Yushchenko's presidency was in an area that was close and very personal for him: the restoration and strengthening of a strong Ukrainian identity. His championing of the Holodomor (the Great Famine of 1931–1932), as a subject for research and as a tragedy to be commemorated on a national scale, resonated around the globe. The veterans of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) who fought against Germans and Soviets during the Second World War for a free and independent Ukraine, who had been reviled and repressed in Soviet times and assiduously ignored in the Kravchuk and Kuchma administrations, gained recognition. Yushchenko's personal passion for collecting antiquities from the Trypillian period, while appearing somewhat eccentric to some, actually provided an education for many who had not been aware of the history. The "blank pages" in Ukraine's history that had been erased by the Soviets were reintroduced into school curricula and into the national discourse. It was not until school history textbooks started to be rewritten to reflect a more pro-Soviet and pro-Russian line under Yanukovych's administration that people grew to realize the significance of Yushchenko's achievement. And again, it may take some time to know how these policies will affect the society in the long run.

Other tendencies have also emerged that give Ukrainian youth a distinct identity. One extraordinary, distinguishing feature revealed by opinion polling of Ukrainian youth over seven years is the consistency with which they lack confidence in their political leaders. In 2003, expressions of lack of confidence in the president were striking: 42.6 percent opted for the response "completely lack trust" and with the addition of 29.9 percent who were in the category "moderately lacked trust"; this was a devastating indictment of youth attitudes toward the president. At that time there were ample reasons for this distrust and lack of confidence in President Kuchma. The same question posed for the 2010 data set once more showed a dramatic lack of confidence in the president who had been the leader of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko. While it is true that popular support for Yushchenko had fallen over the previous five years for many reasons, it also seems to suggest that there is something inherently antiestablishment in the attitudes of the young people of Ukraine. Figures for those who "completely" and "moderately" lacked trust in the president were 50.2 and 28.2 percent respectively, surpassing Kuchma's negatives. These figures are all the

more startling when compared with Yushchenko's high popularity ratings at the height of the Orange Revolution (appendix, table D1.15).

By February 2011, President Yanukovych's rating among all age groups had plummeted to 17.8 percent from 40.9 percent in April 2010.[24] Polling conducted among young people in April 2011, showed Yanukovych with higher negatives than positives: Youth who moderately and completely lacked trust in him polled at 59.8 percent. Young people were also less inclined to go out and vote than their elders: 48.4 percent of youth said they would vote if the parliamentary election were to be held the following week as opposed to 54.7 percent of the population as a whole, and a high 39.2 percent of youth said they would not go out to vote as opposed to 32.3 percent of the population as a whole.[25]

Statistics on how young Ukrainians feel about their country echo these findings. Five years after the Orange Revolution, the youth of Ukraine did not have much faith or pride in their country. When asked whether they were proud of their country, 67 percent responded negatively. This stands out as unusual and very different from the responses given by the youth of the other two countries in this study. It could be explained by the huge disappointment experienced as the promises of the Orange Revolution dissipated over the five years of Yushchenko's administration. A similar question posed about pride in being a citizen produced a comparable result among young Ukrainians: 52.7 percent expressed a negative attitude toward being a citizen of Ukraine. Another explanation goes deeper into the psyche of Ukrainian youth. It may well be that these figures are the result of the lack of a definite sense of national identity, despite the initiatives started with President Yushchenko. In other post-Soviet nations resolving questions of identity has been more straightforward. In Ukraine, there is still an active debate on whether Russian should share the status with Ukrainian as a state language and on Ukraine's profile and historical past. The need to create and support a national profile and vision for the future as a unified country has not been a major preoccupation under any of the governments in the past twenty years, and indeed, the existing divisions in Ukraine have been exploited by politicians wishing to shore up their base. The results of this polling suggest that this issue could emerge as a highly charged problem for the future (appendix, tables A11, A12).

Political events in Ukraine over the past two decades have swung between conformist orthodoxy and revolutionary protest and have

produced two major popular youth-led protest movements that were unique in the region. They have left their mark on Ukraine's nascent political culture. The conclusion could be drawn that Ukraine is developing a political culture that prizes conformity in government and radicalism in protest. While the protest movements have been vigorous and enhanced by the ideas and demands of youth, the dynamism and ideals of these movements have not translated into reforms in government or improvements in social policy. Ukrainian governments typically fall into a conformist mode soon after they are elected with reform proceeding slowly if at all. Over the past two decades Ukraine's ruling elites have failed to introduce the reforms that are needed, and if this trend continues, the response will most likely be continuing challenges by protests outside of the governing circles—possibly led once more by youth on the streets. It may well be that Ukrainians simply do not have a vision of the state as an entity that serves their interests, and just as in Soviet times, they do not feel empowered to play a role in its routine operations, whether reform oriented or otherwise.

For the ruling elite, the state is the structure that ensures access to state benefits and riches, but for them the power that accompanies it, and which should be used to contribute to the welfare and well-being of the people, is incidental and to be used, simply to stay in power. Until the Ukrainian government and state structures open up to include and represent the wishes and desires of the people and particularly the younger generation, who have expressed most coherently the desire for a different society, the paradoxes in Ukraine's development appear set to continue.

4

Azerbaijan: From Mugham to Facebook

> Change is marching towards Azerbaijan from inside and from outside, from the left and from the right, from heaven and hell. And it is important for our generation to shape a strong vision, which would clearly define what kind of change we need in the value structures of our society and state not to end up in hell, but to make our way to heaven.
>
> —Emin Milli, Manifesto for Change, 2008

> Listen to us, new Azeri generation,
> The Mill [Deyirman] is moving, it's always with you.
> We lead the new generation forward.
>
> —Deyirman (Azerbaijani rap group),
> from "For the New Generation" (*Yeni Nasil Uchun*)

Identity and the Next Generation

Azerbaijan differs from the other two countries in this study in many ways. In contrast to its Christian, Slavic neighbors, it is a Muslim country of ethnic Turks. Often referred to as at the crossroads between the continents, it lies on the periphery of Europe and at the edge of

Asia—the gateway to the Silk Road. It also lies atop vast oil fields, first exploited in the nineteenth century, which became part of the mineral wealth of the Soviet Union and are now at the center of a web of international business relationships, which dominate independent Azerbaijan's political landscape.

Questions of identity confronted the young Azerbaijanis during the period of turmoil leading up to 1991, when events in faraway Moscow determined that the country would gain its independence from the Soviet Union. The break with the old "Soviet" identity and the need to shape a new Azerbaijani identity was an immediate challenge. Any visitor to Baku can see just by walking around that the city itself has gone through distinct and different cultural identities: the medieval district at the center of the city includes mosques and caravansaries, now mostly converted into stylish restaurants; the boomtown period in the nineteenth century when oil was first discovered gave rise to the "art nouveau" district with wide boulevards and buildings that could have been taken out of a Parisian street; the shabby Soviet *stroiki* and old city *kommunalki* or communal apartments show the Soviet period; and now the bright, shiny new buildings of vaguely Eastern design epitomize the new oil wealth. In the same way, Azerbaijan's generations have differed dramatically. The generation educated and raised in the Soviet Union is generally Russian speaking or at least comfortable with the language, and mostly secular. Those who came of age as the USSR dissolved encountered their Azerbaijani identity for the first time and began to see themselves as part of a Turkic continuum across the continent. The generation that has grown up with no memory of the Soviet Union has also seen the switch from Cyrillic to Latin script and the rise of its country as an oil state. The most fortunate in this group have been given the opportunity to study in Western universities and have returned to Azerbaijan with broadened horizons. The gulf between them and their compatriots who have not fared so well has created a wide social divide with the disadvantaged youth remaining unemployed, without prospects or with the only alternative being to leave the country for Russia or Turkey.

Compared with the youth of Russia and Ukraine, casual observation of Azerbaijan's young people reveals differences that separate the generations in terms of culture, worldview, expectations, income, and many other factors to a much greater degree than the generation gap

in Russia and Ukraine. The identity of independent Azerbaijan, which is still evolving, is even now radically different from the identity of Soviet Azerbaijan. Buried for many years, its Turkic identity is acquiring definition. A strongly secular nation even in pre-Soviet times, young Azerbaijanis are for the first time being influenced by Islamic radicalism and are able to make a choice whether to assert their religious identity. Disputes with the authorities by young women wearing headscarves for official photographs and to school have emerged recently. A surprising number of young Azerbaijanis have expressed support for Sharia law (48 percent in a poll among youth conducted in 2010), although it is not clear whether they understood what this means. Even though 95 percent professed their belief in God, only 11 percent performed religious rituals on a regular basis.[1]

Azerbaijan differs from Russia and Ukraine in the proportion of young people that make up the population. The median age in Azerbaijan is 28.8 years, while in Russia it is currently 38.7 and in Ukraine 39.9. In Azerbaijan, 23 percent of the population is under the age of fifteen, while in Russia that age group is 15 percent of the population and in Ukraine, 13 percent. Despite Azerbaijan's newfound wealth, Azerbaijani youth on the whole are poorer than their Slavic neighbors, despite some gains over the past decade. In 2003, 90.8 percent of young Azerbaijanis reported an income below $300 per month. By 2010, there were 68.4 percent in that category (appendix, table G7).

Azerbaijan has had a choice in its foreign policy orientation: to face east, joining other Turkic Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union; remain oriented toward Russia in the north, as its neighbor Armenia has chosen to do; forge closer links with Iran, where up to seventeen million ethnic Azeris live; or pursue a European direction in its foreign policy. Even though Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe in 2001, Azerbaijan's leaders have tried to maintain an independent stance. The choices before Azerbaijan's leaders in both domestic and foreign policy have been all the more difficult to make because of the pressures created by the country's potential oil wealth. Azerbaijan has been able to balance overtures from the Russians by courting the West through relationships with major Western oil companies.

The difficulty in making logical foreign policy choices for Azerbaijan's leaders has been compounded by the war with Armenia over the territory known outside of Azerbaijan by the name the Russian-

speaking Soviets gave it, Nagorno-Karabagh; in Azeri it is known as Dagliq Qarabag, while the Armenians refer to the same territory as Artsakh. As early as February 1988, mass demonstrations began in Armenia calling for turning over control of what was then the autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabagh, located within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, to Armenian control, using the argument that the majority of the population there was ethnic Armenian. These events in support of self-determination for the Armenians in Karabagh strengthened the movement for Armenian independence. The outbreak of violence at that time brought Azerbaijani refugees flooding into Baku and other major cities, not only from Karabagh, but also from Azeri villages in Armenia that had been attacked. Azerbaijani refugees fleeing from Armenia retaliated against the local Armenian population in Sumgait, resulting in tragic killings and thus bringing the issue into world news headlines for the first time. The response to the events in Karabagh probably did more to galvanize a new Azerbaijani identity than any other event in the early years of independence.

War in Karabagh

The role played by Azerbaijan's youth in the years between 1987 and 1993 has not yet been adequately assessed and is known primarily through anecdotal accounts. The generation of young people who entered university around 1987–1988 was caught up in a maelstrom of events that shaped their lives for many years to come. Most had been brought up without any consciousness of nationalism as a political force. Gunduz Tahirli, a former editor of the newspaper *Azadlyq* (Freedom), who was a student at that time, claims that he was sixteen years old by the time he found out that Azerbaijan had at one time been an independent republic and heard the story of an Azerbaijani who had hoisted the flag of independent Azerbaijan in 1956 and had been hauled off to the Gulag, not to be seen again for thirty years.[2] He claims that he had only a vague notion of where Karabagh was located or that there were compact settlements of Armenians living there. Nonetheless, he joined in the mass of students who began to protest against the declaration by members of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's inner circle, reported in a French newspaper, that the territory of Nagorno-

Karabagh should be joined to Armenia. The most active students at Azerbaijan's State University in Baku at that time came from the Faculty of Journalism, the Faculties of History and Law, with the Faculty of Bibliography also showing a surprisingly high level of activism. The protests soon escalated, taking up issues concerned with university administration and the curriculum. The youth organization *Yurd* and its young charismatic leader Ali Kerimli played a key role in mobilizing the student youth at that time.

Glasnost and perestroika had stirred undercurrents of discontent in Soviet Azerbaijan as in the other Soviet national republics but the issue that crystallized nationalist passions and channeled people's energy into the streets was the news that Azerbaijanis were being evicted and mistreated in Armenia and that Azerbaijani lands were being taken over by Armenian troops. Young people took the lead in the protests and were first in the ranks of volunteers who went to fight in Karabagh.

Young Azerbaijani volunteers flocked to fight an Armenian army, which had received much better training and access to equipment as the more favored ethnic group in the Soviet Army. Without the level of military skill or support of sophisticated weaponry made available to the Armenians, the Azerbaijani side soon suffered huge losses. By the time of the cease-fire in 1994, Armenia had secured control over most of Karabagh and some of the surrounding territories and had forged a corridor that linked the territory with Armenia. The brutality of this war could not but have a direct impact on the young soldiers, and the fallout effect on the psyche of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis became a building block of their emerging national identities.

Many young men volunteered to join the army. From 1991 to 1993, according to some estimates, around 100,000 volunteers went to fight, and some 60 percent of this number were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, 30 percent were between twenty-five and fifty, and 10 percent were fifty years old and older. Unofficial estimates put the number killed at 17,000 to 20,000, with 45,000 to 50,000 injured.[3] Marked by their experiences, many were unable to gain a respectable disability pension or, if still able-bodied, to find employment in Azerbaijan. The unofficial unions of former Karabagh combatants organized protest actions for many years after to lobby for increases in the disability pension. This generation of young people, according to Tahirli, experienced a vast gulf between themselves and their elders after these experiences.

The student youth took the lead in the protest movement, and as it grew, anyone who might have been on the sidelines in 1988–1989 took a definite stand after the events of January 1990, when violent attacks against the Armenian population in Baku threw the country into further turmoil. The Russian-manned tanks that were sent to "restore order" in what was later suspected to have been a KGB-planned operation killed more Azerbaijanis than the Armenians reportedly killed in the violence against them. Once the violence had subsided, it was clear that there was no longer any question about whether Azerbaijan should become independent, but only a question of when. Hundreds of previously devout Communist Party members burned their party cards and dispelled any further misgivings about supporting the protest movement. The effect on the younger generation at that time was profound and life changing. The popular young Azerbaijani rap group Deyirman, all of whom were around ten years old in 1990, incorporated lyrics about the tragedy into several of their songs a decade later: "Visit Martyr's Alley regularly, remember those lying there, explain to everybody."[4]

The second event that marked a turning point in the evolving national consciousness of Azerbaijan's population, which also had a profound impact on youth, was the massacre on February 26, 1992, at Khodjaly. On this one day in the war with Armenia, six hundred Azerbaijanis were left dead. This event marked a new phase in the hostilities, which, since August 1991, were no longer about the largely formalistic transfer of one Soviet territory to the jurisdiction of another Soviet entity, but had become a full-blown conflict between one independent state and its neighbor, even though neither state yet had an organized national army. The fragmented news reports coming from Khodjaly sent shock waves through the public, intensified by the government's apparent lack of concern or ability to do anything or even to respond to outpourings of popular outrage and grief over the tragedy. Former first secretary of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan Ayaz Mutalibov, who had become the first president of Azerbaijan after independence, was forced to resign in March. Black January and the Khodjaly massacre came to represent the formative moments of reference for many young Azerbaijanis, even youth who were children at the time.

A generational theme was introduced by Abulfez Elchibey, a leader of the oppositional Popular Front, in his first television appearance after Mutalibov's ouster, when he declared that anyone working in the

government over forty-five years old should be forcibly retired, with the explanation that it was impossible to work with these people in a situation that required new strategies and thinking.[5] Events moved quickly and by June 1992, Elchibey was poised to win the presidential election. Despite his earlier pronouncement on age limits, Abulfez Elchibey became president of Azerbaijan at the age of fifty-four and even though some of his officials were relatively young—in their late thirties and early forties—many government positions remained in the hands of the former specialists, all of whom were the usual fifty to sixty years old. There was one notable exception; Elchibey's state secretary was the youthful twenty-seven-year-old, Ali Kerimli, who had been one of the youth movement leaders. This was one of the few instances in any of the post-Soviet states when a youth leader took over a high-ranking position once the protests had successfully led to a change in government. At the beginning of Elchibey's tenure as president, there was a feeling that the old guard could not return and the first year brought in an unprecedented wave of freedom. But the weaknesses and inexperience of his team were revealed when faced with the overwhelming problems of state building, the unpredictable war with Armenia, and the creeping return of the old guard.

The collapse of Elchibey's government in the wake of an attempted military coup in June of 1993 paved the way for the return to power of Heydar Aliyev. Abulfez Elchibey retreated into internal exile to Nakhichevan, and Aliyev was elected president in October 1993. Although Aliyev may have won the election legitimately at that time, falsifications and manipulation of the press and political parties launched his term of office in the manner in which it would continue, gradually and systematically suppressing all channels of democratic development.

These events had an impact on Azerbaijan's youth. At this time there was a general sense that the old forces had returned and that the youth, energy, and heavy sacrifices that had gone into the struggle for Karabagh and for national independence had somehow been lost, creating the notion of a lost generation of youth. The euphoria that accompanied the creation of the new independent state had quickly dissipated in the sea of tragedy around the war in Karabagh. The effects endured, leaving an indelible mark on the society. Many young men who had taken part in the conflict were killed and, of those who returned, many lived with injuries that would continue to affect them and their families.[6]

The young people who were caught up in these events were marked with experiences and impressions that set them apart from the generation immediately below and many that were slightly older. The more politically motivated threw themselves into working for the new country and against the old order. The staff of the newspaper *Azadlyq*, which had been established in 1989, voted in a new twenty-four-year-old editor, who lamented looking back ten years later that his generation became old before its time because of their experiences. He drew some differences with the younger generation as he reminisced about his time as an editor: "They are different. . . . They have computer and language skills, it is true, but I don't see any among them who could take up a leadership role as we did in the early 1990s." In a way he claimed to be envious of the next generation for their leisure pursuits and lack of concern for politics.[7] Another young Azerbaijani voiced similar frustrations at that time, reflecting on events that had shaped his age group: "We are what I would call a 'super-transitional' sub-group of the transitional generation, born roughly between 1966 and 1971, and 'stuck' between the old and the new. Arguably our group is the most active in this search for a new identity."[8]

Fathers and Sons

The political career of Heydar Aliyev, who arrived back in Azerbaijan in the midst of the ferment in 1990 after eight years in Moscow, is an interesting phenomenon in itself. His political longevity and skill in manipulating the political situation to his advantage while maintaining a balance of power among his opponents became legendary. He was elevated by Leonid Brezhnev to the position of first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in 1969 and was brought into the inner circle of the Soviet Politburo by Yuri Andropov in 1982. While the trend for presidents in the new independent states was generally to be younger than the defunct Soviet Politburo, Aliyev stood out as one of the last of its seasoned representatives, which raised the question throughout the second part of the 1990s: Who exactly was a member of the next generation in Azerbaijan?

The seventy-year-old Aliyev played up generational themes in orchestrating his comeback. In the creation of the Yeni (New) Azerbaijan

party, he drew attention to the need for members with experience and maturity. Public speeches, which sought to differentiate the current Aliyev government from the "hopelessly inexperienced" Elchibey administration, focused on the folly of giving young people important responsibilities before they had shown any aptitude. For the first few years of Aliyev's administration this theme was perpetuated through statements by government officials. Speaking at the anniversary of the creation of the Yeni Azerbaijan party in 1995, the vice president of the youth wing of the party Aga-ali Akhmedov, himself in his mid-twenties, articulated the thesis: "Everyone was a witness to the useless personnel policy of the Popular Front when young people such as Ali Kerimli, who had barely proved himself, and many others like him were given important positions in the government. This kind of policy encouraged and continues to encourage young people to hope for easy successes. We have to fight against these tendencies and explain to young people that we must first devote longtime and solid service under the guidance of experienced officials."[9]

As he gradually consolidated his rule by recentralizing authority, exerting control over all aspects of government and imposing a regime of rigorous censorship on the media, Aliyev also focused attention on "youth politics." Taking into consideration that he had made such an issue out of his own long-term experience in contrast to the "youthful inexperience" of the Popular Front, he nonetheless claimed that youth, once they spent the required apprenticeship time in the ranks, were important to the party, the government, and the country. Moving quickly, Aliyev established the Ministry of Youth and Sports (Tourism was added later) in July 1994, three months after the cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Abulfaz Garayev, a former Komsomol activist, was appointed minister and occupied that position until 2006, when the ministry was reorganized to represent youth and sports. Aliyev's son, the current president, Ilham, took up the position of head of the Olympic Committee working with this ministry, thus lending the enterprise certain dynamism.

Under Aliyev, a modified system of official youth structures reminiscent of Soviet times was reestablished. In 1996, the president issued a decree that February 2 was henceforth to be celebrated as the "Day of Youth" in Azerbaijan. The announcement was made at the National Youth Forum, which had convened the representative and official

youth of the country for a congress with all the pomp and ceremony of a post-Soviet spectacle. The February 1998 meeting was billed as a gathering of the youth of the New Azerbaijan Party (YAP); Aliyev proclaimed that this organization counted thirty thousand young people as its members and that eight thousand of them were present in the building that day.[10] In a habitually lengthy speech, Aliyev praised the youth, encouraged them to value their service in the army, warned against the presence of terrorists in Azerbaijan, roundly criticized the opposition, and asserted that when his term of office ran out in October of 1998, he would ensure that elections would take place "in completely democratic conditions." As with many of his initiatives, Heydar's interest in youth appears to have contained a large element of self-interest in consolidating his own position and winning the next election using all means available to him.

In his decree of July 29, 1999, on "State youth politics," Aliyev went through the entire history of youth and how it had been at the forefront of social, economic, and cultural life for the past two centuries, and then he promised the creation of a number of initiatives to help solve youth problems in Azerbaijan, but in typical post-Soviet fashion, not much came of any of these. The general theme of Aliyev's pronouncements and campaigns for youth was to promote the idea that they would step up to take over positions of responsibility. However, the regime remained very conservative and not open to youth and merit. In the opinion of observers who watched this campaign to cultivate youth, Aliyev's aim was not to rouse young people in general to step up, but, in fact, to challenge the "old brigade" within his own clan by encouraging his own young people.[11]

In striking contrast to the leaders of many of the post-Soviet states, Heydar Aliyev's cadres policy remained remarkably static throughout his presidency. While the average tenure for a prime minister under presidents Kuchma, Yeltsin, and Putin was around two years, President Aliyev was content to keep Artur Rasizade in that position for years, and passed him on to his son, who has retained him in that position as of this writing in 2011.

By mid-2003, Azerbaijan's government had remained unchanged for almost a decade and while Heydar Aliyev was president, each election became less free and fair and successively more controlled. The executive was tightly controlled by Aliyev, as well as the judiciary. The legis-

lature, consisting of 125 seats, has also been viewed as an instrument of the president. One hundred of the deputies were elected through a majoritarian system and were primarily people connected to the president and the remaining twenty-five seats were allotted through a proportional vote, which led to a handful of opposition deputies in the Milli Mejlis able to express dissenting voices. This system endured and grew stronger throughout the decade of Heydar Aliyev's rule. The officials who kept it functioning were mostly people of the same age or slightly younger than the president. The 2010 parliamentary election, which was believed to have been rigged as usual, returned none of the traditional opposition parties to the legislature.

Aliyev's son, Ilham, as first deputy chairman of the Yeni Azerbaijan Party, was a rank-and-file member of parliament and not formally in the leadership until his appointment as prime minister in August 2003. However, he had been in a key position in regard to Azerbaijan's oil wealth as first vice president of SOCAR, the State Oil Company, from 1994. Born in 1961, Ilham was younger than most of his father's team at the time of the presidential election in October 2003, so there was much speculation whether the younger Aliyev might turn out to be more liberal and progressive than his father.

Throughout the summer of 2003, rumors and reports circulated about Heydar Aliyev's failing health, but when the announcement came that the father would not run for president, it became clear that the intention was for the son to inherit the ruling post. Any illusions that the younger Aliyev would break the mold and significantly liberalize the system were shattered during the election campaign and especially on the day of the election on October 15, 2003. Opposition candidates and their parties were given very little air time on the state-controlled TV to publicize their platforms in the run up to the election, and their campaigns were beset with the same restrictions and harassment as in previous electoral campaigns. The day of the election was marked by violent protests in the streets of Baku, when hundreds of opposition supporters came out to protest against the fraudulent elections and to support Isa Gambar, leader of the Musavat Party, whom they believed had won the ballot. The brutality of the riot police was caught on camera and many of the protesters were badly beaten and hundreds arrested, including leading members of the opposition.

The Pull of Patriarchalism

Ilham Aliyev became the youngest post-Soviet president at the age of forty-two. Because of his young age and ability to speak smooth and fluent English, there were hopes that he might become a reformer, despite the undemocratic way he had come to power. But anyone looking for a fresh start or new initiatives would have been sorely disappointed. One year after Heydar Aliyev's death, a stranger arriving in Azerbaijan might have thought that he was still alive. Portrait posters of him were to be seen everywhere in the streets of downtown Baku, and the newspapers were still full of eulogies and praise for his wisdom. This peculiar phenomenon was most likely either the result of the tactics of Aliyev senior's political team, which had in fact brought Ilham to power, or Ilham's own efforts to consolidate his power on the lingering reputation of the former president. But the perpetuation of the image of the wise leader and deference to the elder is a phenomenon that may also be explained through reference to some old Azerbaijani traditions. Exploration of these particular beliefs and practices may also go a long way to explaining the obstacles young people in Azerbaijan face when they try to rise to positions of leadership.

Azerbaijan is a society now torn between two worlds: the traditional patriarchal society of the past and the new society of the global age. In his book on archetypes of the Azeris, author Hassan Guliev highlights the family as the predominant factor of influence in the formation of Azerbaijani "mentality" and also as the primeval organizing principle of the society.[12] The book describes a society where freedom is conditioned by tradition and by the members of the extended family for whom the individual lives and to whose interests the individual is subordinated. Another feature of Azerbaijani organized life is the adherence to the principle of patriarchalism, which reveres the *aksakkal*, or leader, who embodies qualities of wisdom acquired through years of experience and immersion in the culture of the people and exercises unquestioned leadership of the people to whom he is devoted. This promotes a vertical structure of society that frowns on the premature elevation of ambitious young people.

Guliev is of the opinion that the numerous tribes of Azerbaijan and the overbearing sense of belonging to one of them are imprinted on the Azerbaijani psyche. This type of society breeds the concept of a leader

as *Vozhd*, which is the logical outcome of a society that is built on hierarchical principles, as a pyramid, whether in the family, political parties, or the state itself. He paints a picture of the archetypal leader, who must have the appropriate biography, or else he would be unacceptable. This kind of leader is selected according to a whole set of criteria that have nothing to do with an open and transparent system of selection. The authoritarian system supported by this type of leadership is naturally antipathetic to the introduction of democracy. Problems arise in this kind of a system when the leader dies, since there is no agreed system for replacing him.

Another lingering feature of social life that has an impact on the arrangement of politics is the system of clan ties and patriarchal structures that continue to determine many developments in Azerbaijani social and political life.[13] The principle of *kharalysan,* or, posed as a question, "Where are you from?" or rather "Who are your people?," is still important in Azerbaijan's political landscape. In addition to the post-Soviet factors that determine the emergence of the leader and the upward mobility of young people toward political influence, Azerbaijani youth has to contend with another layer of standards that are embedded in these traditional structures of society.

Polls conducted as far back as 2000 to gauge the possible outcome of the 2003 presidential election highlighted the discrepancy between the level of knowledge about well-known personalities likely to run for president and the extremely poor general knowledge about the activity and profile of the party they represented. This evidence of "leader-based" parties appears to support the notion that the attitudes of the Azerbaijani electorate incline toward such choices, but it should be pointed out that leader-based parties have also remained the norm in most other countries of the post-Soviet region.[14]

The principle of patriarchalism continues to work in Azerbaijani politics. With the exception of Ilham Aliyev's ascendancy to the position of president, there have been very few changes in the government over the past ten years, and especially few appointments of young people. Many of the ministers carried over their positions from the previous president and the head of the presidential administration has held that position since 1995. What this means for the future development of politics in Azerbaijan remains to be seen. With term limits for the presidency having been abolished as the result of a referendum in 2009, the political

structures at the top of Azerbaijan's government have ossified even more with not much prospect for change.

The principle of patriarchalism also operates within political parties, and not only the pro-government ones. The leading opposition party Musavat, which has opposed both Aliyevs since 1993, has had the same leader since 1992. The leadership of the Popular Front Party has not changed in almost as many years, although Elchibey nominally held the position of party chairman until his death in 2000. Since its creation in 1995, the leadership of the Liberal Party has also been vested in the same person.

The growing number of young people eligible to vote has been estimated by the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan to be around a quarter of the population: those between the ages of twenty and thirty-four. This segment of the population, however, has the fewest representatives from their peer group in government or politics. Perhaps it was partly in recognition of the growing alienation of the younger generation that the government placed an exceptional emphasis on highlighting a new pro-youth policy in April 2011.

Whatever is going on in politics, in the society at large, the traditions of patriarchalism may be breaking down. Significant numbers of young people in Azerbaijan now earn more than their parents. Forty percent claimed to be earning either the same or more in 2010. Only 8.8 percent claimed to be earning less (appendix, table G10). Manifestations of the gulf between the generations in Azerbaijan began to be evident some time ago. In response to the question "How much have the youth in Azerbaijan really changed? And what makes them different from the older generation?," one young writer responded, "One of the most notable differences is that the average energetic, English and computer literate youth earns much more than his or her parents."[15] Although this applies only to the capital city, Baku, it is striking that this phenomenon is widespread enough for it to be taken for granted by many people. The instances of young women supporting their families as they become more successful at managerial jobs with Western companies are increasing. For a son to be supporting his parents would have been unheard of a few years ago, much less a daughter. In the countryside, traditional structures are also being challenged, with hundreds of young men leaving their womenfolk to go to Russia to earn money.

Politics, Culture, and Civil Society

Azerbaijani youth are relatively open to and interested in civic and political participation. When posed the question in 2010, "Do you think that you personally could be successful in the political arena?," 7 percent thought definitely they could be successful in politics, with 12.4 percent believing that probably they could. The overwhelming majority believed that the way young people could enter politics in Azerbaijan was by being active in a political party, 45.4 percent. Working in local administration was considered the pathway to enter the political arena by 32.4 percent and the same amount believed that working in a civic organization would accomplish this aim. Just 16.2 percent believed that they could enter politics through their own efforts without anyone's support (appendix, tables C3, C4).

When asked what the most important qualities of a politician should be, young Azerbaijanis chose "patriotism," (74.4 percent) as the most important followed by experience (38.2 percent). Interestingly, young Russians and Ukrainians were not swayed by patriotism in their politicians. Seven years earlier "patriotism" was ranked second after the ability to speak well by Azerbaijani youth, which fell to fifth place in 2010. Intelligence came in third place. Young Azerbaijanis' political preferences in terms of ideology reveal some interesting trends. The overwhelming majority were for social-democracy (39.4 percent) or nationalist ideas (31.6 percent) with the older group of twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds tending toward social democracy and the younger group, eighteen to twenty-four years old, toward nationalism. Politics with Islamic content was named by 14.2 percent as the closest to their beliefs (appendix, tables E2, F1).

Despite the slim prospects of gaining access to the upper echelons of any political party whether pro-government or opposition, young people have nevertheless given them their support and have often formed the rank and file membership. A poll conducted in July 2010 found that 6 percent claimed to be a member of a political party, although the same poll showed 10 percent in 2008 and 7 percent in 2009.[16]

The reemergence of civil society in the post-Soviet period rests on a long history of traditional Azerbaijani civil society from the time of the explosion of civic and philanthropic activity that accompanied the oil boom in the late 1800s. The rapid growth of an Azerbaijani middle class

in those years led to the flourishing of civic and intellectual life as Baku developed into a modernizing metropolis. Homegrown millionaires such as Haji Zeynalabdin Tagiyev, Aga Musa Nagiyev, and Shamshi Asadullayev contributed to the growth of philanthropy, sponsoring scholarships and underwriting educational programs including the establishment of the first Russian-Muslim women's grammar school in Baku. The lively civic and political life at the turn of the century is reflected in newspapers and journals such as the satirical periodical *Molla Nasreddin* magazine. The political activity of that period culminated in the creation of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, which declared independence in the wake of the crumbling Russian empire on May 28, 1918. Although it survived just less than two years, succumbing finally to the advancing Red Army, it instituted many democratic reforms, including women's suffrage. The ADR, as it has come to be known, has clearly retained an inspirational value for young people in today's Azerbaijan; on the eightieth anniversary of its creation in 2008, young Azerbaijanis gathered in groups in Baku, Los Angeles, London, and New York, posing for pictures in front of well-known monuments wearing brightly colored T-shirts emblazoned with the letters ADR. The republic has become a symbol of a different, democratic republic for young people.

Even during Soviet times, some independent culture flourished in Baku. A handful of dissidents and poets (including the late Elchibey) contributed to a national revival in the 1960s although they were not as well known or connected to human rights groups in the West as their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts. One area where Azerbaijan excelled was in the countercultural pursuit of jazz. In the 1960s Baku was the center of a new wave of experimental music that fused traditional Azerbaijani mugham with the best of Western jazz, and its leading proponent was Vagif Mustafa-zadeh. Trained as a classical musician Mustafa-zadeh and his companions developed the unique genre as a form of free expression and subtle protest against the system. His daughter Aziza,[17] who followed in his footsteps to become a world-renowned jazz artist, blames his untimely death on the Soviet system. He died of a massive heart attack in Tashkent in 1979, after a concert that the Soviet authorities had scheduled on the most holy day of Ashura, when most good Muslims should avoid listening to music.

Expression of patriotism and protest through music has remained in the Azerbaijani tradition. The youth rap music group Deyirman

took Azerbaijan by storm in the early 2000s and caused some controversy with the overtly patriotic themes of its songs. Even though all of its members were barely ten years old when the events happened, the themes of Black January, the massacre at Khodjaly, and other key events that have shaped Azerbaijani attitudes resonated in their work. Such powerful sentiments expressed as part of a lively youth culture provide some explanations as to why Azerbaijani youth appear to feel a high level of patriotism. Their performances have not been without criticism. The didactic tone in which they delivered exhortations to support their compatriots, to remember the war and to be true to their heritage, stirred some debate that these themes were inappropriate for youth, pop, and culture. Some Azerbaijani artists came out with songs that were very personal and individual, as a direct counter to Deyirman's patriotic themes. Ten years later the rap group HOST Alliance carried on the tradition and picked up the mantle in producing youth protest songs; it has gathered a youth movement of its supporters on the Internet.

In the late 1980s, glasnost and perestroika affected Azerbaijan in much the same way as other national republics. Permission to speak more openly about problems of Soviet society inevitably led to questions and issues of nationality and identity, which laid the foundation for the revival of the national movement. Informal associations such as *Yurd* were established. The declared aim of this group of young Azerbaijani students was to preserve and restore the national monuments of Azerbaijan, since activity of any other kind was illegal. But the driving force behind this and several other informal groups formed at that time was the moral and cultural imperative to move toward recapturing the values and even restoring the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. The Azerbaijani Popular Front emerged as a movement out of this informal activity and remained the leading force behind the independence movement until independence was achieved in 1991.

Throughout the 1990s, civic life in Azerbaijan revived gradually. The dominant independent institutions that were formed, however, were a plethora of political parties, which came to be known as the "opposition" after the fall of the Elchibey government. Some of the political activists took a deliberate stance on linking the reemergence of their party to institutions that had existed before the Soviet Union. First established in 1911, the Musavat Party was reestablished in 1992.

Each major political party quickly established a youth wing: Musavat in 1994, the People's Front in 1995, and the Youth Organization of the pro-government Yeni Azerbaijan Party in 1995. But as with all political party youth wings, these tended to keep young people away from the leadership of the adult party.

Independent civic groups and NGOs were slow to develop. One reason for this may have been the prohibition against engaging with the government of Azerbaijan imposed by the U.S. government through "section 907," which effectively prevented any American assistance to the third sector until this clause was relaxed in 2002.[18] Substantial U.S. government funding then came into the country, some of which went to support youth leadership and exchange programs.

The Orange Effect

The youth-led Orange Revolution in Ukraine clearly had an impact on the youth of Azerbaijan. It was the inspiration for the formation of a number of youth groups in early 2005. One of the first to be established was *Dalga* (Wave), which included many students and focused its activities on problems encountered by college students such as the corruption in institutions of higher education and the protection of youth and students' rights. The *Maqam* (It Is Time) civil movement claimed around one thousand members and also modeled itself on politically oriented East European youth groups. *Chagri* (Calling) was another group whose creation was inspired by the Orange Revolution; it claimed around 300 members in 2005. *Yox!* (No!) was another "Orange" youth organization established in 2005 with the aim of making youth more active in the struggle for democratic changes especially in the year of the parliamentary elections. This organization was very active in reaching out to similar youth organizations in Ukraine, Serbia, and Georgia and focused a great deal of its efforts on preparing youth to participate in the actions around the parliamentary election in the fall of 2005. *Yeni Fekir* (New Thought) was established in April 2004, and started its activities with a campaign against corrupt university teachers. As this organization grew in prominence and became more involved in political issues, it attracted the attention of the authorities. In July 2005, its chairman, Ruslan Bashirli, was arrested on trumped-up charges of collaborating with the

intelligence services of Armenia and a few other countries to bring down the government of Azerbaijan in a plan that was purportedly hatched by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite the flimsy evidence of such powerful political backing, Bashirli and his colleagues were sentenced in March 2006 to prison terms from four to seven years.[19]

The parliamentary elections of November 2005 were a turning point for Azerbaijan's political opposition. The massive protests launched after the opposition claimed the vote had been falsified failed to accomplish a "color revolution" reversal of the outcome. The police in Baku were particularly brutal and the demonstrators were met with violent repressions on the part of the authorities. Several additional measures were taken from that time onward to restrict the activities and operations of the major opposition political parties. They were deprived of their downtown Baku offices, which they had used for over ten years, and any requests to conduct large meetings or gatherings were granted only if the location were far from the city center.

By 2009, with the campaign to prevent the lifting of term limits for the presidency having failed, many of the youth groups that had been formed in the wake of the wave of youth activism throughout Eastern Europe in 2004 had either ceased their activity or become passive. Those that continued their activity, such as *Dalga* and *Ol!* (Be! . . . free, active, democratic, and so on, established in February 2006), focused more on strengthening the role of youth in civil society, protecting students' rights, and developing liberal and democratic values. But even they continued to be targets for government repressions. In July 2009, two members of *Ol!*, Adnan Hajizada and Emin Milli, were arrested on trumped-up charges of hooliganism following the production of a satirical video criticizing the government.

Youth groups that had supported the government from the outset, such as *Ireli* (Forward) and several others continued their activities without interference from the authorities. Many of these officially sanctioned NGOs were members of the National Assembly of Youth Organizations of the Republic of Azerbaijan (NAYORA). This group was launched in November of 1995 with a membership of eleven youth organizations, which grew to over seventy by 2011. It worked closely with the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Tourism to help its member organizations in their efforts to work on youth issues and represented Azerbaijan at the European Youth Forum of the Council of Europe.[20]

Exchange programs that have brought foreign students to the United States and to other Western countries have been an important part of Western assistance packages in most of the post-Soviet states. In Azerbaijan, they have also brought forth vigorous debate on the value of educating young people abroad. Foreign study programs have a much higher visibility and prestige value in Azerbaijan than in Russia or Ukraine. There are now thousands of young people who have studied in the European Union and United States on programs funded by the EU and U.S. governments such as the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program. As one commentator pointed out, these young people have, on average, had $20,000 spent on them—an unimaginable amount of money for the average Azerbaijani. It is no wonder that they are considered and consider themselves to be the *crème de la crème*, the future leaders of Azerbaijan. Many of these young people acquire skills in language, economic studies, and other professional qualifications that equip them to work in the global economy. However, because few other jobs are open to them that would provide adequate remuneration, many find jobs in the offices of Western companies, embassies, and international organizations in Azerbaijan or they remain abroad pursuing further studies.

Youth groups have been formed by the alumni of international exchange programs such as the American Alumni Association. But when two of its members, "bloggers" Adnan Hajizada and Emin Milli, were arrested, the membership divided on whether to support them. As one alumnus commented several years earlier, "These are not the people 'to change the world.'"[21]

The students, who studied in Turkey, while not quite such an elite group, seem to have had more impact on society. Perhaps because the program was created by the Popular Front during its administration, it tended to attract the more activist elements among the youth. The several thousands who returned have been active in Azerbaijan's civic life, participating in youth civic groups and launching political journals. Even though they often find work in Turkish companies, their level of participation in social and political life is high. As one commentator put it, "There are, as yet, no liberals among them: this is not 'post-modern' youth. They are, in general, nationalistically inclined."[22]

The level of activity of youth in the third sector has decreased over the years. When asked about how they participated in civic or

political groups in 2003, 86.6 percent of the youth said they did not participate in NGO organizations: 4.6 percent reported that they participated in a political organization and 2 percent referred to activities within a youth organization. By 2010, a significant change had taken place and 93.8 claimed no participation in any nongovernmental organization while only 1.2 percent participated in a political organization and the same amount in youth organizations (appendix, table C2).

Perhaps as a way to counteract these trends, as in many semiauthoritarian countries, the government has also begun to sponsor its own third sector, and those who participate in it are given resources and salaries but are also expected to toe the government line and support its policies. Following the model of the Public Chamber in Russia, Azerbaijan's government established a grant-making body in 2007, the Council for State Support to NGOs under the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which began its operations the following year. It has partnered with the World Bank and USAID to fund carefully selected NGOs, among them many youth groups. Officials from the Ministry of Youth and Sports proposed that the best way to implement the government's youth policy was to work with nongovernmental organizations. Providing a source of funding from the government is an easy way to accomplish this aim.

Officials of the Ministry of Youth have recognized in the past that reaching out to the independent nongovernmental organizations "was not an easy task." One official characterized the context in 2004: "In this period society was deeply divided into two groups: opposition and leading political forces."[23] The Azerbaijani government has maintained a strong interest in youth and youth policy throughout the years of independence, a fact that was reinforced by a government spokesman on announcing President Aliyev's signing of a special decree on the development of the State Program on Azerbaijani Youth in 2011–2015.[24] The vigorous responses of the Azerbaijani government to manifestations of youth activism imply that the likelihood of any unsanctioned youth initiatives achieving success seem unlikely in the short term, and as long as government-sponsored youth programs can satisfy the emerging younger generation, youth will not pose a major challenge. However, the evidence of growing discontent suggests that this is not a solution for the long term.

Internet and Identity

After two decades of independence the next generation of youth in Azerbaijan seems no closer to being able to enter and influence government than their fathers were during Soviet times. The relatively young president has followed in the footsteps of his father in preserving an authoritarian system, which is open to young people as long as they support the existing system.

In two decades, Azerbaijani youth have nonetheless developed a distinct profile. In terms of identity, young Azerbaijanis are definitely moving toward exclusive use of the Azeri language. Polling conducted in 2010 showed decreasing use of Russian among young Azerbaijanis. There was also a difference between the age groups with 77.7 percent of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds claiming to speak only Azerbaijani with their friends as opposed to 74.2 percent of those twenty-five to thirty-five years old. These figures reflect a steady increase in the use of Azerbaijani in preference to Russian. In 2003, 69.4 percent of youth used the Azeri language among friends; seven years later this figure went up to 75.6 percent. It is worth noting, however, that knowledge of Russian as a foreign language (55.6 percent) remains higher than knowledge of Turkish (45.8 percent) (appendix, tables A5, A10).

A high level of patriotism and sense of pride in the country also distinguishes young Azerbaijanis. In 2010, Azerbaijani youth were far ahead of their colleagues in Russia and Ukraine in terms of their support for the statement "Every honest man should serve in the army," 56.6 percent in favor as opposed to around 39 percent in those two countries. One explanation for the high level of support for the army may be that Azerbaijan's independence was born in a period of military conflict. It is also often assumed that there is a high correlation between support for the army and the level of patriotism (appendix, table D4).

Another national characteristic that stands out from the polling conducted in three countries is the generally high level of tolerance and sympathy young Azerbaijanis show toward other nations, especially when compared with Russians and Ukrainians. An overwhelming number of young Azerbaijanis viewed Russians and Ukrainians with "sympathy and interest" or "calmly with no particular feelings" (86.8 percent toward Russians and 94.4 percent toward Ukrainians in 2010). These feeling are not reciprocated. Only 61.8 percent of young Russians

and 71.5 percent of Ukrainians expressed positive feelings toward Azerbaijanis in 2010. Among young Russians 34.3 percent claimed to have negative feeling of animosity, mistrust, and fear toward Azerbaijanis (while only 18 percent of young Ukrainians felt this way). These figures are all the more interesting considering the high level of patriotism to be found among Azerbaijani youth, which has not manifested itself in xenophobic feelings against other ethnic groups, as has happened in Russia (appendix, tables A6, A7, A9).

All the evidence shows that youth in Azerbaijan are generally interested in politics and are idealistically inclined to support civic rights and freedoms. (A more detailed presentation of attitudes and beliefs may be found in chapter 6.) Despite the relatively sudden access to wealth by a small portion of youth experienced in the past few years, the majority remain poor, even by post-Soviet standards. The newfound wealth comes from oil and not as a result of increasing success in small and medium business, however (see polling results in chapter 1), so the likelihood of Azerbaijan developing a middle class of young entrepreneurs who could push for more political freedom seems remote (appendix, table G1).

Looking to the future, it is clear that there is limited space for a freethinking, independent, liberal next generation and even less space for this generation to participate in competitive politics, where the political space has been dominated by the same pro-government and opposition parties and leaders for over a decade. Although there are some young people in government, their role appears to be supportive of the old guard with little ability to initiate or carry through new policies. The example of the relatively young minister Farhad Aliyev (b. 1963) being arrested and removed from his post in 2005 must also be a reminder to toe the official line. The young, Western-educated officials that serve in secondary positions in the Azerbaijani government must see the stark contrast just across the border in Georgia where the average age of the Cabinet of Ministers, many of whom are Western educated, was thirty-seven years old compared with fifty-six in Azerbaijan, in 2010. The old opposition parties are no longer attractive for many young activists who believe that "the era of political parties is over."[25]

The contours of change are already visible in the society, however. Azerbaijan already has the highest Internet penetration for the population as a whole out of the three countries in this study. Rated at

44 percent of the population in June 2010, this was ahead of Russia's 42.8 percent and Ukraine's 33.7 percent.[26] Moreover, the rate of increase is also more rapid. The appearance of an alternative culture for youth in cyberspace is a reality in Azerbaijan. Bloggers share their thoughts and outrage on websites and on Facebook and occasionally real activities are organized by Internet. As in most countries, the Internet has become the indispensable tool for youth in the twenty-first century. One of the bloggers imprisoned for the satirical video even put it this way: "I missed freedom. Not spiritual freedom, because I had this even in jail. I missed freedom of movement, freedom of using the Internet. I think Internet deprivation is a new form of torture for people of our generation."[27] Another commentator compared Azerbaijan's growing number of independent youth with the dissident movement of the 1970s and 1980s in Eastern Europe, where ideas and particularly values were shared through samizdat, under a façade of conformity created and maintained like a "frozen lake" by the authorities in power.[28]

Azerbaijan will be a test case to see how far a younger generation that has been steeled against protesting in the streets by a determined authoritarian regime can use the Internet to improve its situation. So far, the youth that lives on Facebook has used the Internet to stay connected, to spread information, to learn about the blank pages in Azerbaijan's history, and to be connected to information in the global domain. This has had the effect of strengthening shared democratic values. But what will happen when expectations exceed the reality on a grand scale?

Young Azerbaijanis offer an answer: "Observing events in Egypt, Tunisia, and the Middle East as a whole suggests that the hold on power of the Azerbaijani elite might also not be as firm as they like to believe. Beneath the glossy exterior that they have created lives a generation that has learned to expect more from its leaders than handouts at the expense of rights and stability at the expense of democracy. It is a generation that has not given up on the promise of Azerbaijan turning, one day in the future, into a genuine European democracy."[29]

5

Russia: Redefining the Nation

If we work with young people in the right way today, in ten years we will get a generation of free, civilized society.

—Mikhail Khodorkovsky

We have some type of democracy, but really it's a kingdom
I love my country very much . . . but I hate
The state, the state, the state!

—Lyumen (Russian rock group)

Russia Redux

Russia was one of the few republics without an independence movement and where independent statehood, if it can be called that in the case of Russia, was not supported by a wave of national or social uprisings other than the dramatic, but short-lived, swell of street demonstrations against the coup attempt of August 1991, when Boris Yeltsin made headline news by standing on a tank to lead the protest. The crisis of leadership that followed the failed plot to take over the government of the USSR found its roots primarily in the rivalry between two political leaders: Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet

Federated Republic (RSFSR), and Mikhail Gorbachev, the first and last president of the Soviet Union. At that time, the youth of Russia were perhaps the least active of the three countries in this study. Even though the informal groups of the late 1980s had included many young people, there was no distinct youth movement as there was in Ukraine, or nationally conscious younger generation as in Azerbaijan.

Two decades after the dissolution of the USSR, even though the youth of Russia are wealthier and distinct from the older generation, the Russian leadership has once again harnessed youth groups and movements as instruments in the administration and control of the state. The Russian political leadership is once more sponsoring youth groups such as *Nashi* (Ours) and others for political purposes and has favored the creation of youth wings of the established political parties. The fortunes of Russian youth and Russian politics appear to have come full circle.

At the same time, the dynamics of generational change in Russia have put a spotlight on young people and the question of Russia's new identity. While Vladimir Putin, his administration, and the system of government he has created have borrowed heavily from methods and symbols of the past, the future development of Russia remains unclear. Russia's youth have not yet been given an opportunity to participate in the formation of Russia's post-Soviet identity. Twenty years after independence, Russians are still not sure whether the Russian Federation, the successor state to the USSR, is a European or Eurasian state, primarily for ethnic Russians, or a home for the multitude of cultures and ethnic groups that continues to live within its borders.

Young people also share in this uncertainty. Polling results gained in 2010 showed that 57.8 percent of young people did not feel themselves to be European or a part of the historical and cultural community of Europeans, with just 32.6 percent claiming they felt they belonged to Europe. Positive responses in support of the slogan "Russia for Russians" gained the support of 50.6 percent of young people. There was a clear consensus among youth on pride in their country, with 62.8 percent "mostly" or "completely proud." The younger group of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds was even slightly more ready to give unequivocal support, 14.2 percent as opposed to 12.3 percent for the older group of twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds. When posed the question of whether they were proud to be a citizen of Russia, the younger group once more was more enthusiastic in responding "completely yes," 28.6

percent, with 20.4 percent of the older group being in this top enthusiasm group (appendix, tables A11, A12, A13, B7).

In searching for differences between the younger and older groups of youth in Russia, it is interesting to note that the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds still lead the way in believing that the state should look after all of its citizens and provide a decent living. Some twenty years after the demise of the Soviet state, 64.3 percent of the younger group, who could not possibly remember it for themselves, believed that the state should look after all of its citizens, with the older group not far behind, with 60.3 percent supporting that view. One area where the younger group of youth may be on the leading edge is in their views on security vs. civil liberties: the younger group was more in favor of suffering some material disadvantages for the sake of maintaining individual freedoms (45.6 percent), while the older group were more in favor of giving up some rights and individual liberties in exchange for personal well being (42.1 percent). This younger group was born between 1986 and 1992, and should be the first truly free generation, with very little memory of the Soviet state (appendix, tables F5, F8).

It is all the more significant, then, that a large proportion of the younger generation in Russia has nostalgic feelings for the Soviet past, when Russia was part of the USSR. Citing a figure of 59 percent who regretted the fall of the Soviet Union twenty years later, one author noted that a large proportion of this figure must be young people.[1] Another earlier youth poll showed that 63 percent of youth were generally of the opinion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.[2] Reviewing the major influences on youth in the past twenty years may shed some light on this phenomenon.

The Elusive Middle Class

Even though political changes in Russia over the past two decades have not brought the younger generation forward, there are other areas where they have become a significant presence. The youth of Russia, more so than their Azerbaijani or Ukrainian counterparts, have benefited from economic reforms that have created the beginnings of a Russian middle class. Moscow is the lodestone that attracted Western

businesses and investments, particularly in the 1990s, which brought an influx of capital and jobs. Young Russians who knew languages, had studied law, and could operate a computer were suddenly earning salaries that were significantly higher than anything their parents had ever dreamed of. Offices needed to be staffed with bilingual secretaries, young people familiar with office skills were brought in to run offices, and, particularly in the heady early days of the boom, the foreigners needed to be taken care of by a newly hired army of drivers, housekeepers, and cooks, not to mention the job opportunities in the entertainment industry. For the most part, the newly hired workers were young people, often under the age of thirty. Advertisements announcing job openings would specify "no one over thirty-five need apply," on the simple assumption that young people would not only be more familiar with computerized office equipment, but would also have no bad Soviet work habits to reform. The stereotype of the "tea-drinking" Soviet office worker was well enough ingrained into the culture for most new companies to avoid older workers at all costs.

Young people also decided to go into business for themselves, taking advantage of undefined laws and loose regulations that allowed many people with an entrepreneurial spirit to make a lot of money before the more organized elements of the criminal underworld moved in to offer a *krysha* (protection) or the tax inspectors caught up with them. This phenomenon was not limited to Moscow but took place all over Russia.

The result of this injection of revenue and ability to make money has been the creation, over the past twenty years, of a social stratum of young people who are, on the whole, wealthier than their parents and who share an outlook on life that is qualitatively different. The generation born after 1968 is a new breed that has different aspirations from the generation of its parents and has the economic wherewithal to fashion change after its own desires. If ever there was a situation for a clash of generations, it should be in Russia. More so than the generation of the 1960s in the West, this generation of Russian youth could have created a revolution in politics, values, and social life.

Young Russians who are around forty years old have gone through a subtle revolution whose impact has yet to be felt. This generation of young people has become the backbone of Russia's emerging middle class. They are not the "New Russians" who got rich quick as the Soviet Union collapsed. These are the thousands of young people who

benefited from the opening up of the country and the demands of the reforming economy as new jobs were created that required a whole new set of skills. Hard work and pride in their careers are values likely to be found among this group.

There is a growing body of literature on the fledgling Russian middle class, much of it journalistic in nature. Even before the economic crash of August 1998, young people were reporting greater satisfaction with their standard of living than older people. Responses to a study conducted in 1997 among a representative group of seventeen- to twenty-six-year-olds showed that they were more likely to have seen an improvement in their standard of living in the past year than their forty- to sixty-year-old elders, and that they were much more likely to consider themselves living well than their elders. The majority of people who considered their standard of living to be poor were to be found in the older generational group.[3] The same study gave some explanations as to why young people were steadily improving their economic situation. Among the younger generation, 41.5 percent knew how to use a computer; 36 percent did not, but 22.5 were learning. Among the older generation, only 22.5 percent knew how to use a computer; 63.5 percent did not, but only 14.2 percent were learning. The knowledge and use of foreign languages also showed a similar breakdown, with only 16.3 percent of the older group knowing a foreign language and 77 percent not, whereas 24.4 percent of the younger group knew a foreign language and only 52.2 did not. As for those who were learning, 23.4 percent of the younger group claimed to be learning as opposed to only 6.7 percent of the older group. As a rule, the young people who worked in private enterprise considered their situation to have improved the most, while among the older generation, the workers and rural population considered themselves to be worst off, closely followed by the "humanitarian intelligentsia."

Discussions on whether there is a middle class in Russia have been taking place since the early 1990s, and most have concluded that indeed there *is*. Even after the crash of 1998, one survey conducted just a few months later determined that while the crash had eliminated around 10 percent of the middle class, it was nonetheless still accurate to consider it a permanent feature of Russian society. In determining who belongs to the middle class, Russian sociologists use all kinds of criteria, but have generally not taken age into consideration. By the end of the 1990s, the commercial sector finally compiled some profiles of the new consumers

and their purchasing preferences. This showed that in addition to the market for the ostentatious wealth of the new rich, there was a steadily emerging market for consumer goods aimed at the moderately well off, who were usually young. The profile of the middle class up until then had often been described in nonfinancial terms according to the level of higher education achieved or who felt themselves to belong to the "intelligentsia." Often a person's values were used to identify class affiliation. But it was becoming increasingly clear that a new social group was emerging in Russian society that needed to be assessed according to different standards to gain an understanding of the new elements in Russian society. The traditional assumptions on class and values needed to be reassessed.

According to a poll conducted by VTsIOM (The Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research) in November 2000, 23 percent of the respondents of a poll conducted in Moscow considered themselves to belong to the middle class. And at that time, the main body of statistics suggested that anyone with an income between $350 and $3,000 per month should be considered middle class. By 2011, the same polling organization, now called the Levada Center, produced data that showed 35 percent of Russians considered themselves to belong to the middle class, where the generally accepted level of income to enjoy such status was considered to be around $1,000 per month.

Around 2000, a series of articles in a popular magazine came up with a simple profile of the major types in the new Russian middle class.[4] These authors concluded the average "middling" or middle-class Russian was "around 32.8 years old." After the recovery from the 1998 crisis, these were the popular stereotypes. The average middle-class person was young, as the article stated, in his early thirties. Around 50 percent of the middle class were considered to be slightly older. These fell into the category of *delovye liudi* (professionals), who might, even so, still be in their mid-thirties. Their defining characteristics were a combination of the following: living in a privatized apartment, working as a middle manager, reading professional magazines, usually married and spending leisure hours with the family, taking some vacations abroad, driving a new Volkswagen, and generally buying articles with a quality brand name. The "yuppies" were a subgroup of the professional people category. Considerably younger, usually in their twenties, this group was characterized by their career-mindedness and desire to be judged

in terms of professional success. They cared about money, health, education, and the environment. A typical job would be as a lawyer in a foreign company. They did not save money, expecting their income to grow, and drove an Audi. Another group were the "independent artists" (*Svobodnye khudozhniki*) making up around 23 percent overall, who had found an occupation, not necessarily with a steady but nonetheless a high income, working at a creative venture or generally in an intellectual or artistic pursuit. They generally drove a Renault and smoked Gitanes cigarettes. The "dependants" (usually wives, mistresses, and children) of the "professional people" constituted 18 percent; the so-called *zolotaya molodezh*, the golden youth, also fell into this category. The subgroup that was just starting out constituted 4 percent, consisting of lower-level managers and future "yuppies"—young people, generally students, who lived apart from their parents, but who did not yet have their own source of income. At the time this article was published, such market research was becoming common to identify the tastes and preferences of the moneyed classes.

Ten years later, after Putin's presidency and well into the "tandem" leadership with Dmitri Medvedev, descriptions of Russia's middle class are no longer so lighthearted. Studies conducted in 2011 revealed that 80 percent of the population still had a monthly income of less than $860 (25,000 RR), even though the country had the third highest number of millionaires in the world. The expected rapid growth of the middle class had not occurred. Experts conducting sociological studies had come to several conclusions on the profile of the elusive middle class. It differed from its Western counterpart in being predominantly white collar in the source of its income. The number of people willing to go into business decreased dramatically from 2007 onward, with people opting for the security of a job in the government bureaucracy or in large corporations. Middle-class Russians were described in 2010 as a group with limited savings because of the propensity to spend on luxury items, holidays, and restaurants, with not much regard for saving and planning for the future.[5] Several months before the Duma elections of 2011, the main story on the Russian middle class was the large number who had emigrated or who wanted to emigrate. One report that summed up all of the disadvantages that the middle class faced estimated that one and a quarter million middle-class Russians had fled the country in the previous three years.[6]

At the end of the 1990s, the new opportunities to accumulate wealth in Russia were well illustrated by the number of rich young people. The new, rich, Russians were predominantly young: Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Fridman, Mikhail Prokhorov, Oleg Deripaska, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky were all featured in top twenty of *Forbes* magazine's "Wealthiest Under 40's" list in September 2003. By 2011, only two of the top twenty billionaires in Russia were under the age of forty.[7]

Leadership and Generational Change

During Soviet times, when the Communist Party held a monopoly over the main channels of promotion in social and political life, there was built-in discrimination against youth. It was understood that prestigious political office or coveted sinecures in the regions were usually a matter of waiting your turn. There were, of course, exceptional individuals who managed to climb the ladder of influence at an early age. Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, was considered a youngster when he broke into the ranks of the Politburo at the age of forty-nine in 1980, but on the whole, a system that put a premium on loyalty and regarded merit with ambiguity, had succeeded by the 1980s in producing a failing gerontocracy. It was Gorbachev, who had himself been a product of rapid upward mobility at a relatively young age at that time, who created the circumstances for the subsequent collapse of the USSR, the rise of new nations, and release of the next generation.

The three men who signed away the existence of the USSR in the hunting lodge at Belovezhskaya Pushcha—Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus—were all around sixty years old at the time. Even though the breakdown in the system of patronage was apparent in the first days of the new Russian Federation, young people were not immediately a noticeable presence among Yeltsin's team. The influx of new people was, however, a reality. One prominent Russian sociologist described it thus: "The early 1990s was a period when the elite was open. The system cracked open, for a change, and let some outsiders in: people from academia, the intelligentsia, and dissidents. . . . I call it the Great Leap elite."[8]

Others thought of the early years of the new Russian Federation as a "romantic" period. Even though the major decisions in government

were not being made by young people, nevertheless, it was possible at this time to break through to positions of influence and to posts that had previously been out of reach for a large portion of the population. The simple fact of the opening up of the political process made it possible for many people, including some from the generation born in 1968 and later, to enter politics with only their idealism and faith in a better future and commitment to the values of freedom and a liberal economy. For a while, it became possible to rise through the ranks on the basis of energy, enthusiasm, and merit in a way that had not been possible in the Soviet system.

Vladimir Ryzhkov describes himself as a beneficiary of this opening. On his return from serving in the Soviet Army in 1987, he became a member of an informal group, which he described as an "anti-Soviet, underground group" in his home town of Barnaul. It was a student group that organized meetings and discussed perestroika, the war in Afghanistan, and a broad range of political issues. Immediately after the August 1991 coup attempt, Ryzhkov was appointed the vice governor of the Altai region, was elected to Russia's parliament, the State Duma, two years later at the age of twenty-seven, and by the age of thirty-three had risen to the position of deputy speaker of the Duma.[9] During this "romantic" period, explained Ryzhkov, the system was open and everything was subject to discussion and criticism. The only qualities a young person needed to participate in politics were idealism and a genuine desire to bring about change. Most of the young people who came into politics at this time had no financial backing and no patrons higher up in the system. They rose and were promoted according to their abilities. "These were true revolutionaries," claimed Ryzhkov, and idealism was their principal quality. They joined in the efforts of Yeltsin and his team in the campaign to reform Russia.

As Yeltsin took steps to consolidate his victory, young people gathered around him: for example, Oleg Rumyantsev, the secretary of the Constitutional Commission tasked with drawing up a new constitution for Russia at the age of twenty-nine even prior to the coup attempt; Sergei Stankievich, who became the deputy mayor of Moscow at thirty-six; Boris Nemtsov, who was appointed governor of Nizhni Novgorod at the age of thirty-two; Yegor Gaidar, appointed prime minister, aged thirty-five; Sergei Glaziev, invited into the government, aged thirty; Sergei Shakhrai; Gennadiy Burbulis, a close adviser; Foreign Minister

Andrei Kozyrev; and Galina Starovoitova were all of a younger generation than their president even though they were all graduates of Soviet institutions. This transitional generation has itself been the subject of study and speculation. Change was initiated from the top, however, and as Yeltsin gradually consolidated his power, some of the faces around him changed, but did not become any younger.

The first flush of open political life came to an end in 1993, marked by the definitive split between the Duma and the president. From that time on, any aspiring young politician needed to have the backing of a political party or a wealthy political patron or oligarch to succeed. As Yeltsin moved to hold on to and consolidate his power in 1993 and through the presidential elections of 1996, young people participated, but "youth" was not a decisive element. His domination over the Russian parliament in 1993 determined the type of government and the powers of the presidency for the foreseeable future, and his victory over the Communists at the 1996 presidential elections determined the nature of the future presidency and ensured that the Communists, from that point forward, were no longer a threat to the balance of power in the state.

The shakeup in the system and increased access for younger political activists and politicians lasted until around 1995. The old practices of relying on a system of time serving and favoritism revived, and the old elites reasserted themselves. In her insightful work on leadership in Russia, sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya pointed out the changes in political elites. The average age of the Yeltsin elite in 1995, she determined, was forty-eight years old. Previous elites had been older; the average age of the Gorbachev elite had been fifty-two, and Brezhnev's, fifty-seven.[10] Her work described an orderly succession of elites, all of whom had served time in the lower echelons of the *nomenklatura*, rising by its rules to the higher levels. By 2000, President Yeltsin had settled on the relatively young forty-seven-year-old Vladimir Putin as his successor. Putin himself was part of the group favored by Yeltsin along with many of the leaders of the political parties such as Yavlinsky and Chubais. The opportunities afforded this generational group (and they are by no means all the same age) now appear to have been a unique and onetime event.

The defining characteristics of this group—the Putin generation—were the combination of a complete education received under Soviet rule, very little opportunity to have experienced the outside world other than through textbooks and on short trips, and then the sudden over-

whelming burden of statecraft that fell upon their shoulders without allowing them any time or ability to gain some experience. This group reached adulthood through a system that gave them a sense in their formative years that there was a defined path in their future and a set of assumptions that everyone shared. This generation also preserved an understanding of how the various patronage networks and system as a whole operates. And some sought to reinstitute it as a modus operandi.[11]

The leadership role of this transitional generation remained steady for the first few years of Putin's presidency up until the handing over of president's mantle to the forty-three-year-old Dmitri Medvedev as his successor in 2008. Time will tell whether Medvedev was an anomaly. By the end of his term as president in 2012, Medvedev was still a few years younger than the average age of the Cabinet of Ministers, which was then around fifty-six years old.

Youth on the Move: The 1990s

Public opinion polls confirm that young people in Russia have not shown a high level of participation in youth organizations or nongovernmental organizations in general; nonetheless, Russia's fledgling civil society and third sector have provided an outlet for some young leaders. Youth organizations have always occupied a special place in Russian society, during the Soviet period and in more recent years. As has already been discussed, the Komsomol youth organization was one of the key structures of Soviet society, yet independent organizations run by young people were among the first to break the Soviet mold in the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, youth organizations retained their importance as part of the third sector and continued to attract the attention of the authorities whether they were independent or supported by the state.

Toward the end of its existence, the Soviet-era Komsomol held within it three distinct tendencies: the future entrepreneurs quickly split away and went into business; those more ideologically committed to the left-wing ideals of the Communists ended up close to Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov; and the third part of the organization, those who declared their intention to continue to work on youth issues and interests, became the Russian Union of Youth. This organization inherited most of the property and assets of the former Komsomol on Russian

Federation territory and continued over the years to support initiatives mainly in leisure and recreational activities. It became a major instrument for carrying out government youth programs in the 1990s.

State-supported youth groups in the 1990s tended to conduct activities much in the same manner as in Soviet times. They participated in state-supported festivals such as the annual youth festivals held in Moscow that drew hundreds of young people from around the country. The festival of 2001 was opened with great ceremony by the minister of education on the steps of one of the spacious pavilions of the VDNKh complex in Moscow, originally built to show the achievements of the republics of the Soviet Union. The exhibition space accommodated stands advertising the activities of the numerous youth organizations taking part in the two-day festival. The largest booths were run by official organizations such as the Union of Youth Organizations of the Russian Federation. Many of the organizations had come with official delegations from the ethnic republics of the Russian Federation, such as Kalmykia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and others, complete with national costumes and traditional food for the public. The colorful mix of these and other official youth organizations tended to obscure the handful of independent youth organizations that had also chosen to advertise their activities at an event which otherwise resounded with a distinct post-Soviet atmosphere.

Independent youth organizations, which set their own priorities, organized themselves, and conducted their work without support from the government, often had their roots in the informal groups of the late 1980s. Many of these organizations worked on human rights, press freedom, or two issues that have traditionally mobilized young people—the environment and support of a civilian alternative to military service. The Socio-Ecological Union, one of the first independent organizations established in 1988, tapped into the deep-rooted concerns about the environment that had been present for many years and provided a way for many young people to become involved and active.

The movement for a civilian alternative to service in the military gained support by working with the thousands of young men and families seeking a way out of forced conscription into the appalling conditions in the army and with the growing number of genuine conscientious objectors. One small success for this movement came in the spring of 2002, when legislation was passed guaranteeing a choice of alternative

service for young conscripts. This concession had been negotiated by the third sector coalition that emerged out of the planning effort for the Civic Forum of November 2001. Despite Russian government claims that military reform would eventually include a volunteer army and the constant assurances that conditions in the army would be improved, reform of the military has been slow. One of the most important and active nongovernmental organizations that has emerged in Russia over the past two decades, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, drew its support from the thousands of families that had been affected by the suffering of their sons due to abysmal conditions in the army.

Many other nongovernmental youth organizations have emerged in the past two decades, particularly in the area of human rights. For example, the Youth Human Rights Movement was originally established in response to the mainstream human rights movement, which many young people felt was dominated by older former dissidents. The younger generation of activists interested in human rights felt constrained by the structures run by the older generation and faulted them for their inability to share information or to work within a team to improve the effectiveness of their work and the organization. Another unspoken complaint from the younger generation of activists was that they were often simply ignored or underestimated in the prevailing culture of the human rights movement that still deferred to the individuals who had been the subject of direct repressions in the Brezhnev years. The Moscow Helsinki Group, which traces its venerable origins to the 1970s, addressed this problem by giving over leadership to a younger generation when it was reconstituted in Moscow in the mid-1990s.

There are hundreds of similar nongovernmental organizations throughout Russia. They have been, and continue to be, authentic schools for cultivating leaders and encouraging leadership skills, coalition building, strategic thinking, and working toward a consensus among the younger generation. These organizations have a stand-alone existence or else are connected to other similar organizations on the basis of horizontal ties. They are rarely part of a vertical or hierarchical structure that might dictate policy or activities.

In trying to discern how young people get interested in politics in Russia, it would seem reasonable to turn to the third sector civic groups where nascent political ambitions often start, except that in Russia the third sector has developed an aversion to politics. More so than in other

countries, the independent nongovernmental groups in Russia deliberately distance themselves and shun cooperation with political parties and political groups. The path to positions of leadership in political structures that might be expected—moving from the nongovernmental community through advocacy groups to active membership in a political party—generally does not take place along this track in Russia because of the deep antipathy toward the notion of a political party that remains within the society. In the 1990s a number of organizations tried to overcome this divide by working directly with young political leaders, giving them support and encouragement: the Association of Young Leaders and the Moscow School for Political Studies, for example.

At the same time, the independent existence of these groups often runs into lack of funding or else complete reliance on foreign donors. Funding from the government has been made available to some organizations on the understanding that they will be more compliant with the authorities. In the early days of Western funding, one veteran foundation officer often advised new program officers to take note of the condition of the organization's office: if it was located in the worst part of town, with posters all over the walls, broken furniture, and five people waiting to use one computer, the organization was most likely an authentic activist group; if the office was well appointed, empty of people, with wood paneling and crystal chandeliers, they were to leave as quickly as possible because they were in the wrong place.

Youth and Politics

Youth tended to be overlooked in the first Putin administration when it was still unclear what the nature of politics would be. The spotlight was on the new president and on how he would bring order to the disorganized polity Yeltsin had left him. By 1999, according to Vladimir Ryzhkov, businessmen and politicians supported by business had come to dominate politics.[12] By 2001, the political party that was to dominate the next decade was formed. United Russia (*Yedinaya Rossiya*) was initiated out of the president's administration to gain support for the president's program. It was created from a merger between the Fatherland (*Otechestvo*) party led by Yuri Luzhkov and the United Party of Russia (*Yedinstvo*) led by Sergei Shoigu. When young Russians were

asked which party most represented their views in November 2002, even though 25.2 percent chose "none of the above" and 22.7 percent found it difficult to respond, United Russia came out first with 19.7 percent and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, polled second with 9 percent. The third most popular party was the Union of Right Forces, selected by 5.4 percent of the youth.[13]

These figures track fairly closely with the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003–2004. Among first-time voters nineteen to twenty-two years old, 46 percent gave their support to United Russia and 20 percent to Zhirinovsky's LDPR. The overall high figure for the LDPR was due to the large numbers of young people who voted in its support. The parties generally characterized as being pro-democratic, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, fared equally poorly across the age groups, while the Rodina Party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation did better with older voters.[14] Polling on trust in the president in 2003 showed that 82.1 percent of young people trusted the president. With youth bestowing such a high level of confidence in him it is easy to understand Vladimir Putin's easy reelection as president of Russia in March 2004 (appendix, table D1.15).

In the first Putin administration, the main way for youth to participate in politics was within the youth wing of one of the major parties. Most of the major political parties had youth wings, while some parties like the Liberal Democratic Party drew their supporters and membership primarily from among the youth. After the law regulating the activities and membership of political parties was passed in 2002, it became even more difficult for youth political parties to be formed and to exist without the support of an "adult" party. At least one commentator on youth participation in politics was skeptical about the ability of young people to create new structures outside of the standard political parties.[15]

There were some attempts to organize separately. A group calling itself *Pervoe Svobodnoe Pokolenie* (PSP), First Free Generation, which styled itself as an independent and dynamic youth party was active in the early 2000s. Despite often being associated with the Union of Right Forces, the leaders of the PSP fiercely proclaimed their independence and stated that the next generation had already arrived, and that they were it. One of their leaders, Vladimir Shmelev, insisted that their activity should not be considered "youth politics." "There is simply

politics," he claimed.[16] Their statement of intent could have been the clarion call for all youth activists in Russia: "We call ourselves the 'First Free Generation' and we can claim to represent the entire generation. And although we are sometimes accused of a sense of 'pathos' in choosing this name, it expresses the essence of our ideology very well. A free generation—a community of people brought up with roughly the same values, opinions, people of one type—democratic. And of course, these are primarily successful people."

Young Yabloko, led at that time by Andrey Sharomov, also claimed some distance from its "parent" party. "We have no specific youth ideology," he claimed. "Young Yabloko," he explained, "is organized as a network throughout the country: we don't have a hierarchical structure." He proceeded to elaborate on the advantages of a horizontal structure in making decisions and organizing activities in different parts of the country, in contrast to the cumbersome hierarchical procedures of the main party. The issues young Yabloko worked on at that time reflected the concerns of young Russians in general: education as a priority closely followed by the army and conscription, ecology, and civil society. As some members of Yabloko pointed out, the Russian army should be viewed as Russia's largest youth organization.[17]

Even at that time one of the major differences between the organizations of young people and those of the older generation lay in the organizational structures. Young people put a premium on organizing horizontal links and networks between their branches, eschewing the traditional vertical system that was the basis for organizing in all official structures of the Russian state. Other differences with the older generation were not limited to the liberal opposition parties. The Communists had attracted a large youth following into the ranks of its youth group: the Russian Communist League of Youth (RKSM) claimed to have 34,000 members in seventy-one regions. A split with the Communist Party of Russia occurred, however, around the time of the presidential election of 2000. A large portion of the organization expressed its support for Vladimir Putin, accusing Gennadiy Zyuganov of wanting continually to be in the opposition.[18] This dispute led to the splintering of the group and the formation of the Union of Communist Youth (SKM).

At the end of the 1990s there were some political youth organizations that espoused radical ideologies. The National Bolsheviks led by Eduard

Limonov, for example, although not a youth organization, counted 90 percent of its members as young. Yaroslav Nilov, the leader of the LDPR, the youth wing of Zhirinovsky's party, also was aware of the value of including young people in politics to carry out activities such as the picketing of foreign embassies.

After a powerful showing in the Duma elections of 1999, the decision was made to create a youth wing of the United Party of Russia, *Molodezhnoe Yedinstvo*. The new movement held its congress in April 2000 and elected Duma deputy Aleksandra Burataeva as its leader. In her interviews with the press, Burataeva revealed her thinking about the new political formation: "We will not build either communism or capitalism; our obligation is to encourage young people to build a just society." To help in this endeavor, Burataeva proposed to utilize "everything that was useful from the experiences of the Komsomol."[19]

Orange Surprise

The surge of popular protest in Kyiv at the end of 2004 in the form of the Orange Revolution took the leaders in the Kremlin by surprise. President Vladimir Putin had made several visits to Ukraine in the course of that year, visiting Crimea and also presiding over a military parade with President Kuchma and then prime minister Yanukovych, lending weight to the message that Russia still considered Ukraine the "younger brother" in the relationship. Massive resources flowed from Russia to support the openly favored candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. Financial support was supplemented by the work of Russian political technologists who came to Kyiv to set up an office. President Putin sent a congratulatory message to Yanukovych even before the results, which turned out to be falsified, had been released.

The subsequent mushrooming of events into the Orange Revolution and unraveling of the Russia-Ukraine relationship left Russia's strategy in shreds and must have severely challenged the Kremlin leadership's assumptions on how the post-Soviet space would develop. All eyes were on the Maidan in Kyiv, observing carefully as the events in Ukraine progressed. The conclusions that emerged included not only the threat of derailment in the relationship with Ukraine, but the even more serious risk of contagion and spread of the "orange" affliction into Russia. The

Kremlin's analysis highlighted a number of elements that were believed to have been crucial in fomenting the revolution. High on the list were the activities of youth groups and the role of nongovernmental organizations in general. In addition, the Kremlin appears to have believed that international funding of the nongovernmental organizations also played a major role in engineering the revolution.

In early January 2005, as Viktor Yushchenko, the triumphant winner of the Ukrainian presidential election, was being inaugurated, the president in the Kremlin must have been reviewing policy options on how to deal with the new situation. Putin's administration had already identified a role for the government in managing civil society. By the end of the 1990s, and particularly as President Putin's term of office progressed, there was increasing evidence of moves to bring the previously free and independent nongovernmental sector under the government's influence. The first major attempt, launched in the tried and tested Soviet tradition of gigantism, was the Civic Forum of November 2001, which was planned as an all-inclusive gathering of thousands of Russian nongovernmental organizations. The initiative for holding a meeting of all of the third-sector groups in Russia originated with the president's advisers, who were also planning to use this gathering to launch an institution that would fund, and thus exercise influence over, many of the nongovernmental organizations that had emerged over the past decade. As it turned out, this attempt was deflected through the vigorous participation in the planning of the Forum by several of the older, more established independent nongovernmental organizations such as Memorial, the Moscow Helsinki Group, and others.

When the Forum took place in November 2001, it was the largest gathering of nongovernmental activists ever seen in Russia.[20] The venue chosen for the event, one of the large halls within the Kremlin where numerous rallies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had been held in the past, created an atmosphere of foreboding for some of the participants. But at least the proposal to play the former Soviet anthem (which is now the Russian national anthem) was abandoned for fear that half of the participants might walk out during the opening ceremony. The line up on the presidium was strange indeed: eleven years after the demise of the Soviet Union, veteran human rights activist and chair of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, shared the platform with President Vladimir Putin. Eye-witnesses claim that after

Alexeyeva's opening remarks, President Putin delivered his speech, but omitted the paragraph that had been there the evening before, about uniting all civil society organizations under one umbrella authority.[21] After the Forum, the momentum for a grandiose unification of civil society under the leadership of the government slowed down, until 2004. But by 2005 the formation of the Public Chamber as the representative institution for civil society had been accomplished, partly in response to the Beslan school hostage tragedy the previous year and also as a way of counteracting the looming prospect of "orange" contagion.

Inoculation against the Orange Revolution needed a more vigorous policy for youth and youth organizations. There was already one approach that was active. In the early years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, a youth organization was created that was very directly reminiscent of the old Soviet style Komsomol—*Idushchee Vmeste* (Moving Together). At its creation in mid-2001, this group was generally believed to be heavily subsidized by government circles and was regarded as an attempt to gather additional support for the Putin administration. The members of *Idushchee* were issued T-shirts emblazoned with a profile of Putin's face and organized to march in the streets. Some investigative reporters claimed to have discovered the amounts of money the organizers and participants were being paid, to support the suspicion of Kremlin control. With a "moral code" eerily reminiscent of Komsomol times, this group in their identical T-shirts caused a stir on the streets of Moscow for a while.

One of the notable actions launched by *Idushchee* was the attack against undesirable literature, particularly the works of Viktor Pelevin and Vladimir Sorokin. Born in 1964, Viktor Pelevin had become the voice of his generation. Adopted by the young and denounced by the more conservative elements of society, his work contained satirical illustrations of contradictions of life in Russia for the younger generation. In his novel *Pokolenie P* (Generation P), he traced the fortunes of a young man buffeted by fate through the years of perestroika and mafia capitalism. With his references to crime and drugs, Pelevin raised the wrath of Russia's conservatives. In January 2002, *Idushchee Vmeste* organized an action of protest against the works of Pelevin, Sorokin, and Karl Marx. It sponsored the mass collection of their works and their return to the authors' home towns (Marx's works were sent to a city named after Marx). The group proposed to exchange these works for the good,

clean, and wholesome literature of author Boris Vasiliyev. Before becoming *Idushchee*'s leader, Vasily Yakemenko was an obscure official in the president's administration. Appearing on TV in June of 2002, he prided himself on having personally come up with the idea of creating an organization to support Putin, and he defended his increasingly lavish lifestyle as the result of previous years of hard work and frugal living.

As the lessons of the Orange Revolution sank in with the leaders in the Kremlin, the understanding that a more dynamic ideology was needed emerged. Up until 2004, Kremlin politics had been described primarily in terms of "managed democracy." By early 2006, a new formulation appeared described as "sovereign democracy" and articulated by Vladislav Surkov, who was assumed to be its main author. Sovereign democracy asserted Russia's exceptionalism more forcefully and also paved the way for a much more defined and active role for youth.

Our Youth—*Nashi*

In March 2005, Vasily Yakemenko announced the creation of a new organization, *Nashi* (Ours), which absorbed its predecessor and promised to provide a much more vigorous approach to organizing youth. The efforts to shape and create *Nashi* into an anti-Orange force, to engage youth and build up a nongovernmental movement, and to propose a set of ideas for youth gave Russia a national idea that, arguably, will determine its evolution toward authoritarianism for some time to come. The emergence of *Nashi* addressed a number of problems that the Russian leadership needed to confront. It provided an outlet for the energy of youth and provided an ideology that appealed to an activist spirit but was at the same time controlled by the Kremlin. The ideology eventually grew to be so important as to eclipse most other Kremlin-approved programs. Vladislav Surkov, who had been the main author of the concept of sovereign democracy, was also deeply involved in the launch of *Nashi* and the formulation of its ideology.

Nashi's strategy and ideology were laid out in its manifesto.[22] This document presented a clear picture of Russia's place in the world, its historical achievements, and a blueprint for the way young Russians were to behave and what they should believe in order to bring Russia back into its rightful place in the world and provide personal fulfill-

ment and enlightenment to each individual. The Great Patriotic War is revered as a time when the Russian people defended the sovereignty of the nation, defeating Nazi Germany and its fascist allies. The manifesto urges young people to take up responsibility for their country, to support the president in his correct course, and to fight back against the "liberals and fascists, Westernizers and ultranationalists, international money and international terrorists," who strive to bring Russia down. The *Nashi* program stated explicitly the need to work against the scenario of the Orange Revolution "that had been worked out in Georgia and Ukraine." Implicit in the organization's rhetoric was the view of the 1990s as a low point in Russia's history and the need to restore the country's strength and dynamism. Key areas where *Nashi* youth should focus were outlined as restoration of the sovereignty and unity of Russia, support for the modernization of the country, and, finally, to build an active civil society.

Nashi quickly acquired a broad following. By 2007 the number of members was reportedly around 120,000. Part of the attraction was the program of activities. Youth were given an opportunity to travel to Moscow to take part in meetings and events. Thousands were invited to a summer camp at Lake Seliger, which became an annual event of major importance for the next few years. The Lake Seliger events grabbed the headlines because of the masses of young people who attended and some of the gimmicks that were employed as part of the program. A part of the camp was set up for young couples to procreate, taking on the problem of Russia's low birth-rate in a very direct way. The program included lessons, seminars, and other activities and also visits from prominent Kremlin-connected officials, including the president himself. The camps were also an opportunity to engage in colorful criticism of the political opposition, of figures such as Gary Kasparov and others. Lurid murals of them dressed as prostitutes were displayed around the camps and the young participants were encouraged to denigrate them.

Beneath the veneer of healthy living and outdoor activity there was a sinister side to the whole venture. Stories emerged of ideological indoctrination and of streams of money brought in to pay not only for the activities, but also for the young thugs who kept order and discipline.[23] Branches of the movement were created all over the country and it appears that there was plenty of funding to support it.

Such summer camps are not a new idea in Russia. In 1994, Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Open Russia fund started up a program for young high school students where the camp became part of the "New Civilization" program. This was an effort to instill democratic values in youth. By 2002 these camps were being held in many different resorts around Russia and numbered around fifty or so, allowing thousands of young people to take part in this program. The entire venture, along with many other initiatives funded by Khodorkovsky, ended after his arrest in 2003.

One of the most significant aspects of the *Nashi* phenomenon has been the creation and propagation of its ideology. With major input from the Kremlin's chief ideologist Vladislav Surkov, meshed with the homespun ideas of Vasily Yakemenko, the ideology moved into the Russian political mainstream. Because of the weak identification of most people with any other ideas, the energy and appeal of the *Nashi* philosophy gained an extra boost. By January 2011, *Nashi* had become the most recognized of all the political movements and organizations in Russia, with 31 percent saying that they recognized or knew about it, surpassing *Rossiya Molodaya*, which gained 12 percent, as well as the Zhirinovsky youth organization and the National Bolsheviks at 8 percent each. The liberal and opposition movements, *Solidarnost* and Other Russia, were even further down the scale at 4 percent.[24]

Nashi has been the preeminent youth organization of its type and has been emulated by others such as *Mestnye*, *Molodaya Gvardia*, and others who have taken up the same professed opposition to fascism and extremism. Their activities do not appear to have held back the creation of the growing number of extremist groups, however. According to one Moscow-based commentator, twenty years after the breakup of the Soviet Union there were more than two hundred extremist organizations in Russia, with a combined membership of about ten thousand, mainly between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five. By the end of 2010, this subculture of skinheads numbered sixty thousand to seventy thousand people throughout Russia, with perhaps twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand of them having a tendency toward violence.[25] From the circumstantial indications regarding financial support, as well as the moral support given by the Kremlin, all evidence suggests that Russia's leaders have created the environment

for such extremist tendencies to grow. Despite passing legislation such as the law against extremism, most human rights groups and civic activists have noted that this law has been used mainly against opponents of the regime and is actually helping to give rise to the very extremism it was meant to defeat.

The riots that broke out on Manezh Square in the heart of Moscow in December 2010 appear to support the view that extremism is rising and especially among youth. Sparked by the murder of a soccer fan, various groups of soccer fans, skinheads, young men shouting racist slogans, police, and identifiable provocateurs were drawn into the skirmishes, and many people were injured. This was also an instance when the Internet was used for nefarious purposes. Many of the neo-Nazi websites that have sprung up in Russia and websites for soccer fans fueled the violence.

The fact that such seemingly random violence could engulf one of Russia's most prominent public places came as a shock to many people, coupled with the disturbing revelation that the police appeared to be powerless to control or stop the riots from progressing. The riots also showed that while the authorities had well-honed ways of controlling the protests of liberals such as the "Strategy 31" gatherings and the March of Dissent events, there appeared to be no strategy for this type of crowd, leading to suspicions of collaboration between the authorities and the perpetrators of the violence.

Theses riots were just one manifestation of the growing influence of extreme nationalist views. Polls conducted by the Levada Center showed that 15 percent of youth shared extreme nationalist views, while the figure for older respondents was 4 percent. In the 2010 data set for this study, young Russians were particularly ready to support nationalist groups' attacks on people from the North Caucasus (17.5 percent for the age group twenty-five to thirty-four years old) and against sexual minorities (19.7 percent in the same age group—the highest of any category in the survey). The broad coverage the Manezh Square events received and the subsequent arrests of the leaders and culprits show that the Russian government is now aware of the problem. But having initially encouraged the spread of nationalist views and values, the leaders of the country may find that they have opened a Pandora's box where the repercussions will be difficult to control (appendix, table B8).

Depoliticized Nation

Two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the political landscape in Russia seems to have come full circle back to where, as under Soviet rule, there is no meaningful choice of political party to represent different interests and interest groups within society and no legitimate way to change the government. The policies undertaken by the Russian leadership under Putin and especially after 2004 have led to the depoliticization of Russian society. The absence of viable political parties to represent citizens' interests has become a reality on the Russian political landscape. Many young people do not remember a time when a party other than United Russia had a real chance to govern or gain political power. In 2010, Russian youth expressed a low level of trust in political parties, which come in low on the list of trusted institutions with 66.1 percent of youth expressing a negative view of them. Young Russians' views on politics also reflect an idealized view of how an individual would seek political power. When asked what was necessary for a young person to be successful in politics, the support of a political party or organization came fifth on the list after personal values, financial support, good relations with the organs of power, and a good education (appendix, tables C5, D1.2).

The *Nashi* organization also has a plan for how a young person with political aspirations might go about getting involved in politics in Russia. The *Nashi* website gives an outline. Showing the biographies of Medvedev, Putin, Barack Obama, and Nicolas Sarkozy, as they rose to the position of president in their respective countries, the web page also details the *Nashi* plan for young people in any area of work outlining the steps they would take to become president along with the claim "democracy gives everyone a chance, regardless of social background."[26] With the reassurance that "every age breeds its own heroes," the advertisement gives the improbable advice that "the path up the Presidential stairway is open to all." By channeling young people potentially interested in a political career into its own organization, *Nashi* appears to be playing the same role as the Komsomol in the Soviet Union.

In their responses to what "democracy" meant to them, young Russians referred first to "free and fair elections." High on the list of what they believed democracy to be was the notion of "social protection and social guarantee" and also "prosperity and a stable economy" and

"security for my family." Interestingly, there is extremely low positive support for the notion that democracy means that the "parliament represents my political views" and also a low positive rating for democracy as "separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial." This suggests that young Russians have less trust or understanding of the institutions that are crucial to the democratic process. All of this paints a disheartening picture for the future participation of young Russians in the formal political institutions that support a democratic system, if and when they start to operate in that way in Russia (appendix, table F7).

The institutions that populate the Russian political landscape as a substitute for political parties and as the channel for expressing the popular will have, for the most part, been created by the government but appear to be genuinely supported by the people. The system of public chambers, councils, and commissions created as forums for discussion, and also as quasi-decision-making bodies, has been accepted by the Russian people and appears to fulfill its function. The notion that political parties would play a major role in reforming the society seemed to have been all but abandoned by 2011, when Russia's leading independent newspaper noted in a perceptive editorial that there were two major parties in Russia: "the Internet Party and the TV Party."[27] This phrase took off and was used by many analysts to describe the Russian reality. Against the backdrop of the electoral race toward the 2012 presidential elections, the TV Party generally referred to supporters of Putin as the larger group, and the smaller, more intellectual group of supporters of Medvedev were the Internet Party.

Russian sociologists have looked at the figures, which indicate trust in institutions and satisfaction with the pace of reforms, in order to make some predictions about the likelihood for deep-rooted democratic transformation of the society. They have taken into account the growing sense of frustration toward the reformers and democrats who introduced the reforms; this sense of frustration has often transmuted into skepticism for democratic values as such. Polls have also been conducted on how adapted people are to the new circumstances, as well as what attitudes they have toward wealth and career. Ten years ago the results of this analysis showed that the group most likely and ready to enter into a "social contract" with the government, which lies at the foundation of a democratic society, were those who had some experience in negotiating with other institutions, primarily business-

men.[28] Since that time much has changed and the businessmen of ten years ago have been drawn into supporting the government to a degree that it is difficult to distinguish between big business and government. A merger (or *sliyanie*, to use a favorite Soviet term) has occurred.[29] With the growing middle class emerging as predominantly a young white-collar force, it is hard to see how this group could take the lead in promoting reforms. Could the wealthy and aspiring members of Russia's young middle class coalesce and create professional organizations, clubs, or even political parties to undertake collective action to protect and promote their interests? Could the small and medium businessmen of Russia develop once more into a national bourgeoisie?

Ten years ago, the late eminent sociologist Yuri Levada identified another set of criteria for attempting a prognosis of which groups might take up the cause of liberal reforms: "If democracy needed to be protected in 1999," he commented, "there would have been few young people among its defenders. Rather, it would have been the 45- to 55-year-olds, who constitute a part of the 25 percent of the democratically minded respondents, who would come to the rescue of democracy."[30] He went on to describe the effect on society: "[Young people] are free from old fears and old interests alike. The young people don't have to destroy or negate anything, because they have no past. The country buried its past in 1991 and we do not have the continuity of generations that is normal in industrialized countries. . . . We moved from an abyss to a precipice in the past decade. And this greatly influenced the development of inner values and behavior of the rising generation. Young people today are free not only from old fears, but also frequently of any respect for law. Polls show that many of them think tax evasion and graft, let alone cheating in municipal transport, a normal thing. Other negative characteristics of a considerable part of the rising generation are a cynical attitude to the world and its moral values, and cruelty, which I see as a hypertrophied reflection of the cruelty of our society."[31]

In the years since this observation was made polls have continued to show that young people continue to lack an understanding of the principles and processes that constitute a democratic society. In these same ten years the major development for youth has been the widespread use of the Internet and social networking. Most of the political opposition and all independent groups and news outlets have a presence on the Internet. The most popular sites for youth are Live Journal,

V Kontakte, and *Odnoklasniki*, as well as Facebook. The Internet and social networks provide an outlet for nonconformist ideas and discussion, which is growing rapidly.[32] However, in Russia, more so than in any other country, the government determined early on that it was already too late to control the Internet using technological means. It has developed another method to counteract the uncensored, uncontrolled information and contacts this medium provides: it has encouraged the flooding of the Russian Internet space with myriad sites that present pro-government views and many that aim deliberately to confuse and influence the Internet community. This is the present-day version of the old tried and tested Soviet tactic of "disinformation."

Looking at all the trends for youth in Russia the likelihood of young people breaking free from the current political system to promote reform and democracy seems remote. In the context of increasing government control over public institutions and the active policy toward absorbing active youth into pro-government movements, Russian youth has tended to opt for conformity to principles and standards put forward by the ruling powers. Despite the government's declared objective of encouraging youth leadership and focusing more attention on youth politics and problems, young people appear to be being filtered out of the channels leading toward political power, with the exception of those carefully chosen and nurtured in the approved organizations. The current path to power in Russia favors individuals and organizations that support the government; a selection process based on patronage and loyalty to the regime as opposed to merit is once more being reconstituted. The consequences of this policy, if continued for the long term, may lead once more to the systematic gerontocratization of the ruling elite.

The mass demonstrations that brought thousands of Russians into the streets on December 24, 2011, in protest against the manipulation of the Duma elections were the first sign that Russia's new middle class, which had hitherto remained passive and silent, might be ready to break out of the constraints created by the Putin administration. Whether these manipulations of discontent will prove a major challenge to the system remains to be seen.

6

Three Countries in Comparative Perspective

> The continuous emergence of new human beings certainly results in some loss of accumulated cultural possessions; but on the other hand, it alone makes a fresh selection possible when it becomes necessary; it facilitates reevaluation of our inventory and teaches us both to forget that which is no longer useful and to covet that which has yet to be won.
>
> —Karl Mannheim, *The Problem of Generations*

National Identity and Language

Moving out of the shadow of the Soviet Union two decades after its dissolution, how far have the youth of the emerging independent states determined a national identity? What is old and what is new in the culture, attitudes, and expectations of this generation? What can we discern in this study of three countries to help answer these questions? While not comprehensive, the two data sets of polling conducted in 2003 and 2010 in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan indicate some major trends and some areas where there has been no progress.

The growing self-identification of young people consists of two elements. Cultural self-identification includes language use, sense of nationality, and awareness of the nation's place in the world. Politi-

cal self-identification includes attitudes toward the state, government, values, and beliefs. As we look to the future, can we determine how this generation of young people will behave and react? What conclusions can we draw by looking at the polling results?

For young Ukrainians and Russians, the sense of belonging to a nationality has not changed over the past ten years. In 2003, 86.9 percent of the young Russians polled considered themselves Russian and 78.2 percent of the young Ukrainians considered themselves Ukrainian. Polling figures in 2010 show almost identical figures. Azerbaijanis, however, have moved closer to being a mononational population whether through reidentification or emigration: in 2003, 89 percent of the Azerbaijani youth claimed Azerbaijani nationality, whereas in 2010, the number increased to 95.4 percent. When asked whether they considered themselves "Europeans" in 2010, the differences are clear; 57.8 percent of young Russians and a comparable 60.5 percent of young Ukrainians do not consider themselves to be Europeans, while a resounding 81 percent of the Azerbaijanis determined that they were not Europeans, with only 1 percent not sure how to respond (while 9.5 percent of the Russians and 8.6 percent of the Ukrainians were not sure how to respond) (appendix, tables A1, A13).

Language is another strong factor in self-identification in this part of the world. Azerbaijanis have moved conclusively toward speaking Azerbaijani, moving away from using Russian as their parents did. In 2010, 85.6 percent of Azerbaijanis were speaking their own language within their family and 75.6 percent with their friends; both figures were up from seven years earlier when 74.2 percent spoke it within the family circle and 69.4 percent with friends. Just over 2 percent claimed to be speaking Russian with their family and also with friends by 2010—a considerable drop from seven years earlier when 12.2 percent were using Russian within the family and 7.4 percent with friends (appendix, tables A3, A4, A5).

For Ukrainian youth, language use has been connected to political connotations over the years, with some politicians seizing on the issue to bolster support for themselves. To gain support from Ukrainians living in the eastern part of the country, where the Russian language is used more often, politicians occasionally raise the issue of making Russian a second state language equal to Ukrainian. Even though these moves have never been successful, young Ukrainians appear to be using the Ukrainian language less over the past few years. The use of Ukrainian

dropped in all categories: in the home, from 41.4 percent in 2003 to 29.9 percent in 2010, at work from 35.8 percent to 22.9 percent, and among friends from 34.3 percent to 22.2 percent. The use of Russian, however, did not increase at the expense of Ukrainian; in fact, it decreased. Polling conducted in 2005[1] showed 29.2 percent of young Ukrainians using the Ukrainian language at work and 30.3 percent among friends. These polls also showed that young people spoke more Russian than the general population of Ukraine in all age groups. The category that increased was the bilingual category—using both Russian and Ukrainian—up from 20 percent to 34.7 percent in the home and at work, large and surprising increases from 18.9 percent in 2003 to 24.4 percent in 2005 and to 40.3 percent in 2010. Among friends, the figures rose from 23.3 percent to 24.5 percent in 2005 up to 39.7 percent in 2010. This trend suggests that young Ukrainians may be developing an identity based on bilingualism. It also shows that Russian speakers are not learning Ukrainian, taking advantage of the habit among bilingual speakers to simply fall into speaking whichever language starts off the conversation. How this trend toward bilingualism affects young Ukrainians' attitudes and whether it is significant in relation to political participation remains a question (appendix, tables A3, A4, A5).

Pride in one's country was another question asked in 2010. Of the three groups, 49.2 percent of the Azerbaijanis were "very proud" of their country, and 51.6 percent were "proud to be a citizen." At the other end of the scale, only 10.4 percent of young Ukrainians were "very proud" of their country and 13.9 percent "proud to be a citizen." In the negative categories, 39.2 percent claimed to be "not very proud" of being a citizen of Ukraine and 13.5 percent were "completely not proud." Such negative attitudes to one's homeland and civic community among young Ukrainians stand out as unusual (see the discussion in chapter 3). Among young Russians, similar questions produced a generally positive view with more positive sentiments toward both country and citizenship (appendix, tables A11, A12).

Relations with Other Countries and Foreign Travel

Responses to questions on emigration bear out these attitudes toward their country. These have also changed over the past decade. When

people are content and feel they have good prospects in their own country, numbers of those wishing to emigrate might be expected to be low. These questions were designed to gauge the psychological state of the young people, their assessment of their future life in their own country, and their assumptions about being able to improve their prospects by living or working outside of their own country. The expectations of this generation were also revealed by those who wished to travel for different reasons and for different periods of time.

The number of young Ukrainians who wanted to emigrate for good went up from 10.6 percent to 13.8 percent while Azerbaijanis who wanted to emigrate for good went down from 15.8 percent to 13.4 percent. The number of Azerbaijanis who did not want to leave went up 48.2 percent to 56.6 percent while Russians and Ukrainians in that category stayed almost the same. Interestingly, when this same question was asked just after the Orange Revolution in a poll conducted in 2005, the number of Ukrainian youth who wanted to leave for good dropped to 7.4 percent (appendix, table B1).

A comparison of figures for those who would like to leave their countries for a short while in 2010 showed that Russians wanted to stay away an average of 2.8 years and Ukrainians 3.4 years, while Azerbaijanis would like to stay away for 4.5 years on average. Among the Azerbaijanis, 23.7 percent wanted to stay away for five years, a larger percentage than in any other time category or country group except for the Russians, with 46.5 percent choosing an optimal one year away from Russia (appendix, table B2).

Reasons why young people want to leave their country stayed the same. In 2003, Azerbaijanis and Ukrainians chose "to work" most frequently as their reason for wanting to leave, followed by "to see different countries." The dynamics in 2010 remained the same: Young Russians most often chose the option of "to see different countries" as their main reason for wanting to leave as they did in 2003. Azerbaijanis and Ukrainians once more chose "to work" first and "to see different countries" in second place (appendix, table B3).

The countries they chose to travel to changed over the seven years, however. In 2003, the top two choices for young Ukrainians were Germany first and the United States second. For young Russians, the United States also came second, after "another country." By 2010, young Russians were choosing Great Britain first, then the United States

and Germany as equal second, while young Ukrainians switched their primary preference to Russia followed by Great Britain, which came in some few points behind. Preferences among Azerbaijanis also changed from Russia first and Germany second in 2003 to Russia first and Turkey second seven years later (appendix, table B4).

Youth and the International Dimension

The attitudes of young people toward other countries have also evolved over the past seven years. Young Azerbaijanis increased their positive assessment of Turkey as a country with which they would have the best possibilities for development. In 2003, 29.4 percent thought that Turkey would make a good partner; by 2010, the level of support had gone up to 48.2 percent. Perceptions of Russia as a good partner also changed among the Azerbaijani youth, decreasing from 28 percent in 2003 to 16 percent in 2010 (appendix, table E11).

However, in assessing their personal attitude toward other countries, young Azerbaijanis liked Ukraine the best, with a 94.8 percent positive rating, with the European Union in second place with 87 percent positive support. Positive attitudes toward Russia came in at 64 percent with 10.2 percent feeling "very negative." Azerbaijanis' assessment of the United States was only slightly more positive, with 66.6 percent declaring so; only 7.4 percent within that group described their attitude toward the United States as "very negative" (appendix, table E12).

Young Russians altered their attitudes, particularly in regard to the United States. In 2003, 20.4 percent considered the United States a good partner, this number dropped to 10.5 percent in 2010. The two regions that appear to have benefited from this turning away from the United States are China (4.1 percent to 11.3 percent) and the other countries of the CIS (4.9 percent to 11.8 percent). In terms of their overall attitudes, young Russians like the EU countries the best, 12 percent with an overall 84.7 percent putting themselves on the positive side. The country regarded as the worst partner, not surprisingly, is Georgia, with 25.6 percent of the young Russians putting it in the "very negative" category and 64.5 percent overall on the negative side. The negative ratings for the United States and Georgia can be seen as a direct result of Russia's more assertive foreign policy toward the United States and aggression

toward Georgia that did not subside after the 2008 war (appendix, tables E11, E12).

Young Ukrainians' enthusiasm for relations with the United States also decreased, from 10.4 percent in 2003 to 5 percent in 2010. Interest in relations with Russia increased, 36.6 percent to 49.3 percent. Young Ukrainians seem to like Russia the best, with 42.2 percent "very much" and 87.4 percent overall positive. The most negative attitudes were toward Azerbaijan and Georgia (appendix, tables E11, E12).

Perceptions of the importance of Europe as a partner stayed steady in all three countries: 21.6 percent to 22 percent in Azerbaijan, 38.7 percent to 34.5 percent in Ukraine, and 49.9 percent dropping a little to 42.6 percent among young Russians (appendix, table E11).

Toward a Political Identity

Defining a national identity also includes a political dimension. Although many people do not attribute an overtly political identity to themselves, their attitudes and confidence in social and political institutions help to shape their political expectations and views. Already in 2003 the differences between young Russians, Ukrainians, and Azerbaijanis were evident in certain areas. Ukrainians stood out at that time because of their antiestablishment attitudes and lack of confidence in most political and social institutions and particularly in their dramatic lack of confidence in the president, Leonid Kuchma, at that time. Polling showed that 72.5 percent of young Ukrainians moderately or completely lacked confidence in their president, while the same question posed to Russians and Azerbaijanis yielded a result of 12.6 percent and 17.4 percent respectively. In Azerbaijan, the president (President Heydar Aliyev) was positively rated by 72.8 percent of young people (appendix, table D1.15).

At that time, these polling results could have been explained by the particular political circumstance in which these three countries found themselves, and possible assessment of the level of political sophistication of young people at that time. President Kuchma was sinking in the polls partly because of the scandals around the murder of the journalist Gongadze and the generally deteriorating conditions for human rights and freedoms in the country at that time. Putin's high rating

could be interpreted as still tapping into the general sense of relief early on in his presidency that he had restored some semblance of stability and order after the tumultuous years of the Yeltsin presidency. In Azerbaijan, the high rating for the president could be explained partly as a genuine sentiment among the people, a sense of confidence that Aliyev had worked hard to evoke, and partly as the fear of saying something different.

After the Orange Revolution set a precedent in the region that an unpopular president could be "brought down" by street protesters, it might have been anticipated that support and confidence in the next president among young people would have increased. Surprisingly, polling for 2010 shows that even with different incumbents in each president's seat in the three countries, attitudes stayed the same. Again, Ukrainian youth distinguished themselves by their lack of confidence in their president, even though the incumbent this time was Viktor Yushchenko, who just five years earlier had led the mass protest movement in the Orange Revolution. Ukrainian youth divided out with 78.4 percent having little or no confidence in the president and an astonishingly low 7 percent with some or full confidence![2]

There are many reasons why confidence in Viktor Yushchenko dropped so dramatically over the five years of his presidency, but the main one was generally believed to be the failure to accomplish the reforms that had been promised, which led to the disillusion that brought down his personal ratings. It seems, however, that there is more than the response to an individual president in question here when we review the responses to the same question for the next president, Viktor Yanukovych. Elected in February 2010, a June 2010 opinion poll conducted 100 days into his administration showed eighteen- to thirty-four-year-olds with 51.6 percent expressing some or total confidence in the president and 31.3 percent with some or complete lack of confidence. By April 2011, the same question brought out a response of 25.6 percent of young Ukrainians with some or complete confidence in the president and 60 percent on the negative side with some or complete lack of confidence, with the "complete lack of confidence" category as the largest at 42.6 percent. These youth responses tracked fairly closely with the overall population and attitudes of older people to the same question.[3] These low ratings for the Ukrainian president suggest that there is more at issue here than responses to individual politicians and that the

Ukrainian responses may now be elements within the nascent political culture (see discussion in chapter 3).

The same question posed about the president during Dmitri Medvedev's term in office in Russia brought out a 79.4 percent vote of confidence among youth, and for Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan, a record-breaking 94.4 percent of youth who somewhat or fully trusted him, with 70.6 percent in the "fully trust" category. These figures also suggest that rather than being an assessment of an individual politician, these attitudes are more related to perceptions of the state and the desire for security, inasmuch as the presidents in both countries have identified themselves with the particular kind of state that each country has become.

Attitudes toward institutions of various kinds were measured to assess levels of confidence among the youth of the three countries. Respondents were asked to give their responses in one of five categories: "fully trust," "somewhat trust," "somewhat do not trust," "completely do not trust," and the standard "difficult to respond." In 2010, all three national groups had a high level of trust or confidence in their family and friends. Religious institutions, churches and mosques, came in for an overall positive rating, although the Azerbaijanis showed a lower level of trust in religious institutions, an aggregate +14 percent, whereas young Russians placed the most trust in their religious institutions, at +51 percent, with Ukrainians at +35 percent (appendix, tables D1.19, D1.20, D1.18).[4]

Surprisingly, another area where the youth of all three countries had an overall positive rating for trust in an institution was the mass media. Even the otherwise cynical Ukrainians had an overall positive trust rating for the mass media of +7 percent, while the Russians give the mass media more support with +31 percent and the Azerbaijanis a solid +68 percent. Given the usual skepticism of the intellectual classes about the quality and sincerity of the mass media, this comes as a surprising figure. But this tallies with the results of the 2003 data set, where a similar result was also a surprise, particularly at a time in Ukraine when it was well known that the mass media was being controlled by the president's administration through a system of *temnyky*, directives to the press issued by the president's administration with instructions on how news stories were to be covered (appendix, table D1.1).

Political parties fared poorly overall in their ratings of trust from the three groups. Ukrainians were the most skeptical, giving political parties a –63.7 percent rating in 2010, up from a dramatically low –72.4 percent seven years earlier. Russians also rated political parties at a low –41.3 percent in 2010, which was also up from the –63.2 percent seven years earlier. Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, went in the other direction; after rating their level of trust in political parties at –13.6 in 2003, they went down further to –24.4 percent seven years later (appendix, table D1.2).

Ukrainians' attitudes toward their parliament also reveal a deep disaffection with the institution, an aggregate of –72.4 percent lacking trust in it in 2010, while Russians and Azerbaijanis, although not enthusiastic supporters, at least managed to keep on the positive side of the ledger with around +1 percent rating each. Seven years earlier, Ukrainians were not too different in their overall negative rating of their parliament. At that time, the aggregate rating was –55.6 percent among the Ukrainians. The Azerbaijanis and Russians were also polling with the majority giving negative assessments of –33.4 percent and –33.1 percent respectively. It remains a question as to why over seven years the level of trust of young Russians and Azerbaijanis in the State Duma and the Milli Mejlis increased and the Ukrainians' trust in the Verkhovna Rada diminished so dramatically. One possible explanation might be that the decreasing influence of the parliament in the Russian and Azerbaijani political systems has promoted a perception of the peaceful operations of these two institutions, while pitched battles of political opponents were still taking place in the Ukrainian parliament in 2010 (appendix, table D1.16).

In comparing the levels of confidence in various governmental institutions, the striking divergence of Ukrainian youth stands out again in the polling of 2010. The deep differences in the level of trust in the president have already been mentioned. Ukrainians also had the lowest level of trust in their government (Yulia Tymoshenko's government at the time of polling) at –71 percent; Russians had more confidence with a balance of +34 percent and Azerbaijanis +53 percent. The Azerbaijanis also expressed a high level of confidence in their president's administration with an aggregate +54 percent, with Russians lagging behind somewhat at +37 percent, while Ukrainians gave a firm vote of no confidence in the secretariat of then president Yushchenko with

–68 percent. When the question was posed about "government institutions in general," Ukrainians emerged again as the least trusting with an overall aggregate of –17 percent, with the Russians much more trusting at +22 percent and the Azerbaijanis with +38 percent (appendix, tables D1.17, D1.14, D1.3).

Institutions concerned with the administration of justice were another area where Ukrainian youth maintained an overall negative view. Ukrainians' trust in the procuracy (public prosecutor's office) received a –44 percent rating and the courts –46 percent. Russians came out with a cautious +10 percent rating for the procuracy and +8 percent for the courts, while the Azerbaijanis showed an ambiguous +14 percent for the procuracy and –9 percent for the courts (appendix, tables D1.6, D1.4).

Young Ukrainians' generally negative attitudes toward the institutions of the state were repeated in their attitudes toward other social institutions. In their ratings of social and nonpolitical institutions they differed again from Russians and Azerbaijanis, who were generally positive about these. For example, Ukrainians were very negative about banks and financial institutions at –45 percent, while Russians were generally positive at +9 percent and Azerbaijanis at +34 percent. Similarly, concerning medical institutions, Ukrainians gave them a –2 percent rating, while Russians and Azerbaijanis gave them +37 percent and +32 percent confidence ratings respectively. On the subject of educational institutions, Russians turned out to be unusually positive, with +65 percent as an aggregate positive rating, while Azerbaijanis gave a rating of +25 percent. Ukrainians, on the other hand, were generally negative about their educational institutions, with a solid –16 percent negative rating (appendix, tables D1.7, D1.9, D1.11).

Statistics on the level of trust in the military in each of these countries also reveal interesting differences and open up discussion on perceptions of the military in each country and potential future support of young people. Attitudes toward the army and military service are sometimes used to gauge the level of patriotism among youth, and whether they are ready to fight for their country. Statistics show a great discrepancy among the three national groups.

The differences were particularly striking in the case of Azerbaijani youth, which went from an aggregate +58 percent level of trust in the military in 2003 to a very strong positive rating at +73 percent in 2010. In 2003, figures for Azerbaijan showed a relatively high 65 percent of

young people opting for the response "every honest man should serve," with the younger age group registering 61.7 percent in favor of this option; among young women, 70 percent. In 2010, the figures fell a couple of points but only to 56.6 percent, while only 3.8 percent of young Azerbaijanis considered military service to be "pointless and dangerous; people should avoid it at any cost" (appendix, tables D1.12, D4).

Russians became more supportive of their military over the years, up from +10 percent in 2003 to +15 percent in 2010. In 2003, 38.7 percent of young Russians believed that "an honest man should serve in the army" with almost no difference between men and women, 38.9 percent and 38.5 percent. Seven years later this figure was almost the same—39 percent. In 2003, the remainder was almost equally split on whether military service is an "obligation" or "pointless and dangerous," 28.2 percent and 27.2 percent; these figures were not much different seven years later at 30.3 percent and 24.0 percent for the same categories (appendix, tables D1.12, D4).

In 2003, in the North Caucasus, the support for the first option "every honest man should serve" was 45.3 percent, considerably higher than the average. The highest for this option, 49.1 percent, was to be found in the north-northwestern region. Respondents in small towns and villages were also more "patriotic," with villages registering 53.1 percent in favor of "every honest man should serve."[5]

Ukrainians showed the lowest level of confidence in their army and military, going from an aggregate positive percentage +6.8 percent in 2003 to a negative –2 percent in 2010. In 2003, 50.9 percent of young Ukrainians believed that "every honest man should serve in the army": 56 percent among men and 45.8 percent of the women held this view. The younger age group of fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds was less inclined to hold this view (48.8 percent) than the older group of twenty-five to thirty-four-year-olds (52.7 percent). By 2010, figures had dropped to 39.7 percent believing that every man should serve. In 2003, the other two opinions offered—"military service is an obligation that should be repaid to the state even if it does not suit your interests" and "military service is senseless and dangerous, and should be avoided at all costs"—were chosen almost equally, 20.4 percent for the first and 22.3 percent for the second. By 2010, figures for these two categories were 23 percent and 27.8 percent respectively (appendix, tables D1.12, D4).

The more positive attitude toward the military and toward military service in Azerbaijan may be due to several factors. Many young people still have a memory of serving themselves or seeing their older brothers fight in the war in Karabagh. The Azerbaijani military also enjoys more prestige, especially the officer corps, which has received support from Turkey, where the military tradition is a pillar of the secular Muslim society. In Russia and Ukraine, where conscription is still the law, the military has degenerated to such a degree that young people try to avoid the draft. Many youth NGOs put the issue of revoking conscription or allowing for alternative nonmilitary service as their highest priority. As mentioned earlier, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers arose and gained its momentum from the thousands of family members who felt themselves helpless faced with the terrible conditions their sons encountered in military service or else who needed help to assist those sent to serve in Chechnya in what was generally considered a senseless war.

Measuring the level of confidence in nongovernmental organizations over the years gives slight cause for optimism. In 2003, all three groups rated their confidence in nongovernmental organizations or civic groups in aggregate negative figures: Russians with the lowest level of confidence at –38.8 percent, Ukrainians at –29.4 percent, and Azerbaijanis only just on the negative side of the ledger at –2.6 percent. In 2010, the overall figures looked better, with Azerbaijanis at +5 percent, Russians now also on the positive side of the ledger at +3 percent, with Ukrainians, although still in the negative at –11 percent, higher than before. This raises the question of what could have caused the dramatic rise in confidence among young Russians, particularly when nongovernmental organizations, and especially those funded by international donors, have come under direct criticism by the Russian president (appendix, table D1.8).

In all three countries, the level of trust in family and friends is much higher than in any governmental or social institution. And perhaps it should be expected that when a society has not developed public trust in these institutions, falling back to a more traditional system of reliance on family ties would be the norm. But these family ties are just one step away from clan ties and the opaque networks of favors and patronage, which have dominated the formation of political elites in this region, so not a positive factor in the long term.

Equality versus Freedom

The formation of a political identity includes a complex set of attitudes and perceived relationships with the state. One set of questions posed to the young people of the three countries sought to probe how far attitudes toward the state had changed. Emerging out of the Soviet Union, it might have been expected that the first free generation would not have the same expectations and responses as their parents did with regard to the Soviet state. Breaking down the multitude of considerations in this spectrum of relationships, one simplified, shorthand way to gauge attitudes is to counterpose the concepts of freedom and equality and to set the questions within that framework. The assumption behind this question is that lingering attitudes that might support the old Soviet system would be revealed among those choosing "equality" and those who chose "freedom" could be assumed to be more Western oriented and inclined to liberal democracy.

The question was formulated in the following way and youth in all three countries were asked to make a choice:

> Freedom and equality are both important, But if it is necessary to choose between them:
>
> I choose freedom as the more important, because a person should live as they choose without limitation, or
>
> I choose equality as the more important because social differences between people should not be too great and nobody should be able to take advantage of undeserved privileges.

In 2003, Russians came out differently from Ukrainians and Azerbaijanis: 52.6 percent of Russian youth opted for "freedom" and 42.4 percent for "equality." In Ukraine, more than half of the young people expressed a preference for "equality," 51.5 percent overall, with 44.3 percent preferring "freedom." In Azerbaijan, 53.8 percent opted for "equality" while 43.4 percent chose "freedom" (appendix, table F4). Men and women in each country gave a different measure of support to the two choices. Young Russian men showed 56.1 percent support for "freedom," as did 49 percent of young women. In Ukraine, 49 percent of young men supported "freedom," as did 40 percent of young women.[6]

Looking at the breakdown between age subgroups in Russia, those over twenty-five years old came out evenly between "freedom" and

"equality," at 47 percent, while the younger groups diverged dramatically with 57.4 percent for "freedom" and 37.9 percent for "equality." This seemed to bear out the conventional wisdom that Russian youth were less "Soviet" in their outlook. In Ukraine, among the seventeen- to twenty-four-year-olds were almost equal numbers opting for "freedom" and "equality," 48 percent and 47 percent, while in the older group of twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds, the clear majority, 54 percent, favored "equality" over "freedom," at 42 percent. Variations in Azerbaijan depended on age and level of education: the eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old group broke down evenly at 48.1 percent between "freedom" and "equality," with the older groups choosing "equality" more often. Those with higher education were also more likely to choose "freedom"—62.2 percent.

The regional distributions on this question were also interesting in 2003, especially in the case of Ukraine, where conventional wisdom suggested that western Ukraine was more progressive and less Sovietized than eastern Ukraine. The regional breakdowns show clearly that the youth in western Ukraine regarded freedom more highly: 56 percent for freedom and 38 percent for equality. Ukrainian youth of the south had the most regard for equality in the region of Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Kherson. The preference for equality predominated in every other region in Ukraine. Also, the larger the population settlement in Ukraine, the more likely the young person was to value freedom.

An expert on Ukraine's youth offered the following comment: "The preference for freedom can perfectly well coexist with paternalistic tendencies." Referring to the statistics on the relationship between the state and its citizens, she came to the conclusion, "It is interesting, among those who defend individual freedom as a priority above the principle of equality, the idea that the state should take care of everyone also predominates, including in the freedom-loving Western Ukraine. This means that liberal ideas do not have the prospect of being popular in Ukraine, even among the younger generation."[7]

The regional breakdowns in Russia showed some interesting differences, given that Russian youth were already more likely to choose freedom. Youth in Moscow were not the leaders. Ahead of Muscovite youth, who polled 55.2 percent on this question, were the youth of western Siberia with 64.8 percent, the Volgo-Vyatskyi region with 61.1 percent, the north-northwestern region at 60.6 percent, followed by the city

of St. Petersburg, which surpassed Moscow by a hair's breadth with 56.1 percent. In Russia, the size of the settlement where young people lived made very little difference to the way they regard equality and freedom.[8]

The figures for the same question in 2010 revealed some sobering realities. The Azerbaijanis increased their support for "equality" from 53.8 percent to 57 percent and decreased their interest in freedom, from 43.4 percent to 41.4 percent. The changes in the other two national groups were more dramatic. Young Russians who were the leaders in supporting "freedom" in 2003 drew back and dropped their support to 39.5 percent in 2010, with 51.1 percent voting for "equality." In Ukraine, the drop in support for the "freedom" question was even more dramatic, with only 28.4 percent for this option in 2010 when it gained 44.3 percent seven years earlier. Another figure worthy of note was the number of young Ukrainians in 2010 who found it difficult to respond to this question: it had risen to 18.1 percent, when the same category registered only 4.3 percent in 2003. One explanation for the relatively large number of confused young Ukrainians might be the growing understanding of the complexity of these choices and reluctance to opt one way or the other (appendix, table F4).

Recognizing that stark choices between freedom and equality may prove difficult to answer, the same issue was approached with a slightly different focus in 2010 when the following question was posed:

> Of course, both freedom and material well-being are important; in order to secure my own material well-being, I would be ready to give up some of my rights and civic freedoms to the state.

The opposite was also formulated into a statement:

> Of course, both freedom and prosperity are important; for the sake of my personal freedom and as a guarantee to be able to keep all my civil rights, I would be ready to tolerate some material difficulties.

Young people were asked to choose which more closely resembled their point of view. In this set of responses Azerbaijanis were the most advanced in their support of liberal values with 62.4 percent choosing the second option. Going into the different age subgroups, young Azerbaijanis eighteen to twenty-four years old selected this option at the rate of 66 percent, ahead of their twenty-five- to

thirty-four-year-old colleagues in Azerbaijan, who registered 59.7 percent for this question. Least ready to give up material security for civic freedoms were the young Ukrainians, 33.6 percent of whom opted for the second choice while more of them, 39 percent, chose the option of giving up civic freedoms for material well-being. It is worth noting that the Ukrainians among the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds were the biggest supporters of giving up civic freedoms in favor of material well-being, 42.8 percent in this group as opposed to their elders in the twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-old group, 36.2 percent of which chose that option. The Russians fell in between. The larger group, 42.2 percent, opted for keeping civil rights and 39.3 percent voted to hold on to material well-being. The eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds among the Russians also revealed themselves to be more supportive of civil rights, with 45.6 percent of this group choosing that option, and fewer, 38 percent, of the older group in solidarity with them (appendix, table F8).[9]

The conclusion these comparisons suggest is that young Ukrainians have become averse to the notion that civil rights are worth sacrificing for. But it still remains a question as to why the youngest group, some of whom would have barely been teenagers at the time of the Orange Revolution, would also have this view. The high level of support for civic freedoms among youth in Azerbaijan is also an interesting phenomenon, particularly since the government's policy in the past few years appears to have been to forge an understanding with society that good levels of material comfort may be achieved, but at the expense of giving up civic and political rights.

Values and Beliefs

In an attempt to understand the values and beliefs of this first free generation, questions were posed to identify the values and to probe the beliefs that lie at the heart of this generation's view of the world. Young people in all three countries were asked to choose which values they considered most important out of the following: freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of conscience (religious freedom), protection from arbitrary arrest, the right to work, right to a home, and the right to an education.

In 2003, the top four choices made by Russian and Ukrainian youth were the same: the right to a job was the top choice, followed by the right to a home, the right to education, and in fourth place, freedom of speech. The Azerbaijanis were the outliers at that time in their consideration of freedom of speech as a second choice. By 2010, there had been leveling out, with all three groups putting the right to work in first place, the right to a place to live in second. The Azerbaijanis' still strong support for freedom of speech came in third while Ukrainians and Russians put the right to education in third place. All three groups placed freedom of conscience as last of seven choices. The statistics also reveal the Azerbaijanis as more rights oriented by the differences in overall levels of support. On the right to work, the Azerbaijanis showed 81.2 percent support while, even though they still put this right in first place, the Ukrainians polled at 61.5 percent (while the Russians were at 70 percent) (appendix, table F3).

A set of questions specifically about democracy was posed in 2010. All three groups believed that democracy was the best type of arrangement for the state. And here the Azerbaijanis supported this premise at 81.4 percent while Russians and Ukrainians gave it 39.3 percent and 40.7 percent support, respectively. Azerbaijanis also stood out in their low support for the statement, "In certain circumstances an authoritarian regime could be better than a democracy." Only 6.4 percent of the Azerbaijanis supported this alternative, while 25 percent of the Russians and 25.2 percent of the Ukrainians gave it their vote. However, when asked what democracy means for them, the top concept for Ukrainians and Azerbaijanis was "prosperity and the stable growth of the economy." In first place for Russians was "the conduct of free and fair elections" (appendix, tables F6, F7).

In an attempt to gauge whether there is fertile ground for the growth of liberal free market ideas, a question about the relationship between the state and the citizen was posed. Surprisingly, the young Russians seem to have experienced some backsliding on this question. Whereas in 2003, 9.7 percent considered that the state should keep out of the economic affairs of its citizens, by 2010 the number had decreased to 6.3 percent. The tendency in Azerbaijan and Ukraine seems to be going in the opposite direction, with fewer young people believing that the state should "take care of all its citizens and ensure a decent standard of living." In 2003, 68.2 percent of the young Azerbai-

janis supported that sentiment; by 2010 the number was down to 58.6 percent. The drop in Ukraine went from 62.6 percent to 48.8 percent; while in Russia, there was only a two-point drop from 64.3 percent to 62.2 percent (appendix, table F5).

This set of questions showed once more that the Azerbaijanis, who arguably have been under the most pressure with diminishing civil rights in the past decade, come out relatively more rights oriented and pro-liberal, while the Ukrainians, who enjoyed a period of free press and assurance that governments can be changed through popular uprising, have tended to register their views as hard-headed and focused on material concerns above civil rights. Young Russians, who seemed to be leading the way on liberal views in 2003, have stalled and on some questions have gone backward.

What Kind of Politics?

This study also attempted to examine young peoples' attitudes toward and interest in politics. By posing the same question it was possible to measure changes in the level of interest in politics over seven years. There does appear to have been a slight drop-off of interest. The figures for those not at all interested in politics grew among the Russians and Azerbaijanis, from 19.2 percent to 26.1 percent and from 30.8 percent to 35.6 percent respectively. Ukrainians' interest in politics seemed to increase with fewer not at all interested in politics, dropping from 25.8 percent to 23 percent. At the other end of the scale, the numbers of those very interested and extremely interested in politics decreased, however: from 14.2 percent to 6 percent in Azerbaijan, from 9.1 percent to 7 percent in Russia, and from 11.8 percent to 7.8 percent in Ukraine (appendix, table E1).

Self-identification with a particular political ideology has also undergone some interesting developments. In Azerbaijan, young people increased their support for nationalist and social-democratic political ideas. In 2003, 8 percent of the youth supported nationalist political ideas, rising to 31.6 percent by 2010; those supporting social-democracy increased from 5.2 percent to 39.4 percent in the same time period. Social democracy now, in fact, enjoys the highest level of support from young Azerbaijanis. The number who found it difficult to respond seven years earlier fell from 43.8 percent to 7.6 percent, making the

Azerbaijanis the most decisive about their political allegiances among the three national groups (appendix, table E2).

In Ukraine, the confusion and difficulty of picking out a compatible political philosophy in 2003 remained in 2010, for 33.9 percent and 31 percent respectively. The two most popular trends in Ukraine in 2010 were the national democratic, chosen by 15.6 percent, and social-democratic, by 15.8 percent. Support for the ecological inclination dropped from 22.5 percent in 2003 to 9.4 percent. Overall, Ukrainian youth appear to be more diverse in their political allegiances, as were the Russians in 2010, whose highest support went for ecological trends, 13.5 percent, while by far the most, 39.5 percent, found it difficult to respond to this question (appendix, table E2).

Young people's views on the qualities needed to become a politician also underwent some changes. While young Russians and Ukrainians put "professionalism" as the most important quality for a political leader in 2010, Ukrainians put "experience" in second place and "organizational abilities" in third; Russians rated "honesty" as the second and "experience" third. The Azerbaijanis were the odd ones out, choosing "patriotism" as their top quality for a political leader, just as they did in 2003, with "experience" in second place and "refinement" in third (appendix, table F1).

In the polling of 2010, questions were posed on the type of person young people wanted to become president. The overwhelming majority in all three countries opted for a "political leader" to become president, but in Ukraine second place went to "businessman," while second place in Russia went to "a military man, or from the security services." In Azerbaijan the second highest rating was allocated to the response "it makes no difference" (appendix, table E9).

The general picture of youth that emerges in the three countries shows that each has taken on definite characteristics to distinguish their national identity: the Azerbaijanis have moved the greatest distance from the previous Soviet identity, while the Ukrainians still have the most difficulty in identifying what being Ukrainian means to them in terms of language use and pride in their country. In terms of each national group's expectations of the state, none of the three had moved very far from the Soviet expectation that the government was responsible for everything and that the state would provide for the people. Another common factor was the lack of understanding or trust in many of the major building blocks of a democratic political system and society.

7

Looking to the Future

> Nothing is more false than the usual assumption uncritically shared by most students of generations that the younger generation is "progressive" and the older generation *eo ipso* conservative. . . . Whether youth will be conservative, reactionary, or progressive, depends (if not entirely, at least primarily) on whether or not the existing social structure and the position they occupy in it provide opportunities for the promotion of their own social and intellectual ends.
>
> —Karl Mannheim, *The Problem of Generations*

Conflict, Collaboration, or Co-optation?

Conventional wisdom suggests that youth and the younger generation are more inclined to be liberal and progressive than the older generation and that somehow the very essence of youth endows the young with a more democratic attitude toward life. Since this presumption has generally held true in the Western world since World War II, it has tended to color our views of the younger generation emerging from the former Soviet Union. As we can see from the three case studies in this book, however, while youth is always energetic and often prone to radicalism, youth's democratic and liberal credentials should not be assumed or taken for granted.

The particular political landscape in their society provides some indicators on how young people get involved in politics and rise to positions of power. The older political elites of the post-Soviet states, whether they currently hold political power or are in opposition, often do not make room for younger challengers for their positions. They may offer channels and opportunities to younger politicians, but it is usually with the understanding that they take up the beliefs and philosophy of the older members in exchange for support and patronage. As we have seen, particularly in Russia and Ukraine, young would-be politicians often face this choice, lacking the necessary funding, support, and personal connections to enter politics. Only a few exceptional historical periods have provided an opening when energy and enthusiasm was enough to secure a political career. Sometimes, the co-opting of youth involves not so much a compromise of their ideals, but a conversion when they decide that they can also operate in the corrupt system of their elders and that it is now their turn to take advantage of the system for political gain or self-enrichment. When the political system they join is corrupt and unreformed, it generally takes a very strong-minded reformer to make a change from within.

An undemocratic regime will always want to perpetuate itself, and its members will want to hang on to the privileges and assets they have accumulated. If the old elite is agile enough, it will attempt to co-opt members of the rising younger generation, absorbing them into the old structures and culture. Youth's energy and enthusiasm are value neutral and can be a blank slate for any ideology; they can either be co-opted to support the old regime or mobilized to lead a protest movement to challenge the old order.

Even when a youth-led protest movement achieves a change in government unexpected consequences can result. The high-minded moral themes that become popular slogans as the euphoria and culture of the "revolution" progress, are difficult to put into practice once the "dictator" has been "brought down," the new government is in place, and the practical realities of governing the country emerge. Youth often find themselves once more on the outside. This is a pattern that will repeat unless there is a purposeful plan to introduce reforms and to integrate the young people who led the revolution into the new government's decision-making process. The young often lose out and disillusion sets in.

Ukraine's youth have been at the cutting edge of potential political change at least twice in the past two decades. Each time the youth movement emerged in response to a political system that was rigid and dismissive of their ideals and demands. Since the system would not accommodate these new political players or new political ideas, they had no alternative but to organize and be active outside of the existing political structures. The youth-led Orange Revolution was extraordinary in the breadth of its appeal to millions of Ukrainians and also in the way it turned civil disobedience and peaceful street protests into viable instruments of political opposition. The slogans "Together we are many; we will not be defeated" and "Bandit-politicians to prison" resonated globally as popular themes for all oppressed societies under authoritarian regimes. The failure of the Orange government that was brought into power to conduct fundamental reforms and the veering back to authoritarian practices of its successor do not bode well for maintaining social stability for long.

Against the backdrop of these social and political upheavals, young Ukrainians have acquired a definite profile that distinguishes them from their post-Soviet peers. They give their support and trust to their presidents extremely grudgingly, with the same lack of trust extended to most government and political institutions. However, this has not translated into more liberal views in terms of expecting less government support for their social needs, nor has it manifested itself in being a leader in terms of belief in freedom and the willingness to sacrifice material comforts for civic freedoms (where Azerbaijanis are ahead). In fact, it would have been very difficult to predict the role young Ukrainians played in the Orange Revolution by looking at the polling figures of 2003, when it seemed as if young Russians were leading in their support for freedom.

Azerbaijan's youth have experienced more severe circumstances. Having seen how political power could spin out of the hands of the former Soviet elite as the result of protests and street demonstrations that led to the administration of the pro-democratic President Elchibey, the subsequent president, a wily and experienced Soviet operative, not only took back power into his own hands but ensured that it would be passed on to his son, thus creating the first dynastic succession in any of the post-Soviet states. His son seems intent on keeping power for the long term, having abolished term limits for the presidency. Although many higher officials in Azerbaijan are old, there has been a steady intake of young administra-

tors into the government, but on the condition that they follow the prevailing government line. Another obstacle to participation in political life for youth in Azerbaijan is that the traditional longtime opposition parties have preserved their own leadership structures that have also militated against the inclusion of youth with different ideas.

In social terms, Azerbaijan's youth is distinct from the other two national groups in having the greatest differential between a small but very wealthy group of young people and a large group that has a very low level of income. Azerbaijan's youth appear more tolerant but also more patriotic than youth in the other two countries, particularly in their attitudes toward the military. Youth in Azerbaijan also appear more idealistic in that they support civil rights and democratic freedoms more readily than the other two. Azerbaijani youth have also used the Internet and particularly social media to create an alternative community in cyberspace that is highly sophisticated and focused on values and education for its young supporters.

Russia's youth have been kept out of the ruling circles since the first few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Despite the rise of Dmitri Medvedev, the relatively young successor to Putin, this has not been a trend in the rest of Russia's government. Medvedev himself is a good example of a younger politician who climbed up through the ranks by supporting the policies of his elders. Never having held elective office before he became president, it was only once he reached the top position that he expanded on his liberal views. Russia's ruling elite has been particularly creative in harnessing and controlling youthful exuberance in Russia, particularly after the perceived threat of Orange contagion from Ukraine after 2004. The structure and operations of the youth group *Nashi* are looking increasingly like the old Soviet Komsomol.

Russia's youth have shown themselves to be more xenophobic and generally more intolerant than the two other national groups. But at the same time, Russia's youth have managed to carve out a place for themselves in Russian society with less desire or apparent need to leave the country for work, and when they do it is primarily for recreational or educational purposes. This has gone hand in hand with pride in the country and confidence in the president and in Russia's governmental institutions. Russia's youth are generally better off in material terms than their peers in other post-Soviet countries, forming the backbone of the new Russian middle class. At the same time, expectations that

these middle-class Russians will lead the way in reforming the country seem remote, since they are primarily white-collar workers who rely on the government for their livelihood and therefore are unlikely to press for their rights. Under the Putin administration, a conscious effort was made to both create and cultivate the middle class that would be needed to support the president, offering a stable political situation and economic benefits to seal the pact for their support. This arrangement will most likely continue to work as long as economic benefits are easily attainable. However, there is some evidence in the polling that young Russians' material advantages have slowed compared to their peers in other countries, so how long this pact will be sustained if economic goods are not delivered remains to be seen. The mass demonstrations at the end of December 2011 were another signal that the Putin administration could no longer count on unqualified support from this group.

Next Generation Rising

Youth movements and youth groups have been an important factor in the past twenty years in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, and by examining their impact we can draw some conclusions about the general nature of youth in politics. Even though independent youth movements can have a dramatic impact on the political course of a country, as they did in Ukraine, in the end the youth-oriented groups tend to lose out to the pragmatic political forces that come in after the people have left the streets. Youth groups and youth themselves are by their very nature fleeting and ephemeral. Unless liberal political forces immediately move to consolidate the reforms and positive changes that youth have promoted with their activism, the mundane business of putting government into place can wash away the high-minded ideals that were the motivating slogans for the masses of youth. Nondemocratic governments will try to hang on to power and will devise all kinds of means to subvert youth groups.

Youth will always be on the cutting edge of discovering and using new technologies. The dramatic increase over the past ten years can be seen even in this study. New media and social networking sites have opened up immense avenues for previously exclusive information and have increased the ability to contact and coordinate people. This is truly a new element in the consideration of youth whose impact we have yet

to see. New technologies have yet to play a significant role in securing representation and political access and in consolidating the institutions of democratic government. We should be mindful, though, that the new media are not inherently positive and democratic. While the Internet and new media have been used extremely effectively by protest movements to mobilize demonstrators and by civil society groups to help citizens monitor their government and promote accountability, they have also been used to organize mob violence and criminal rampages. The Arab Spring protests against authoritarian government and the destructive riots in Britain in August 2011 were both organized through social media networks. Understanding its inability to control Internet access as the Chinese government has done with great success, the Russian government has allowed a proliferation of websites with questionable information and pro-government or highly nationalistic content to flood the fiber optic airwaves so as to confuse casual Internet surfers. Nonetheless, where the message is positive and the motivation optimistic, the new media can be a powerful transmitter of affirmative, democratic values.

None of the three countries in our study—Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine—is yet a fully fledged democracy as of this writing in 2011. Authoritarian and nondemocratic regimes have within them strong imperatives for perpetuating their rule. But the sector of society that holds the key to reversing this trend is the younger generation. If youth become depoliticized and fall in with the prevailing disillusionment regarding political parties and government and remain outside of the decision-making circles, these systems could endure for many more years, their rulers growing old, as they did in the Soviet Union. If youth determine to initiate pro-democratic change, then there is hope for a more inclusive and participatory system. At the risk of restating a platitude, the constant factor in all societies is a rising generation of youth, and if there is one overarching recommendation that comes out of this study, it is that in order for youth to be a positive force the values and ideals they grow up with need to be shaped and conveyed with deliberation. Political systems that promote younger people on the basis of merit and ability and allow participation by the young on their own terms will in the end support social and political renewal in a positive way. Youth will continue to be a crucial element, whether through innovation, conflict, or cooperation with the previous generation, as the march of history moves on.

Appendix: 2003 and 2010 Youth Surveys Conducted in Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine

A blank space in a table indicates that the category exists in the survey but no particular figure was filled in for the country. The term "n/a" in a space means the question/answer was not included in the survey. A zero in a space indicates the value given for that question (as opposed to the space simply being blank).

Section A: Language

A1.
What nationality do you consider yourself?

	Azerbaijan	
	2003	*2010*
Azerbaijani	89.0	95.4
Russian	6.6	1.8
Lezgin	2.8	0.8
Other	1.6	2.0
	Russia	
	2003	*2010*
Russian	86.9	86.6
Belarusian	0.1	0.1
Armenian	1.2	1.0
Bashkir	0.9	1.1
Chuvash	2.2	2.2
Tatar	3.8	4.1
Ukrainian	1.2	1.2
Nationality of the North Caucasus	1.1	1.2
Other/No answer	2.6	2.7
	Ukraine	
	2003	*2010*
Ukrainian	78.2	78.0
Russian	18.1	19.2
Belarusian	0.2	0.6
Jewish	0.4	0.6
Other/Difficulty in answering	3.1	1.6

A2.
What is your native language?

	Azerbaijan	
	2003	*2010*
Azerbaijani	86.8	96.4
Russian	11.6	2.0
Other	1.6	1.6
	Ukraine	
	2003	*2010*
Ukrainian	61.9	60.0
Russian	36.2	38.8
Other/Difficulty in answering	1.9	1.2

A3.
What language do you use with your family?

	Azerbaijan	
	2003	*2010*
Only Azerbaijani	74.2	85.6
Only Russian	12.2	2.6
Russian and Azerbaijani (depending on the circumstances)	12.4	10.2
Another language/Difficulty in answering	1.2	1.6
	Ukraine	
	2003	*2010*
Only Ukrainian	41.4	29.9
Only Russian	37.8	34.7
Russian and Ukrainian (depending on the circumstances)	20.0	34.7
Another language	0.8	0.8

A4.
What language do you use at work?

	Azerbaijan	
	2003	*2010*
Do not work	44.2	47.8
Only Azerbaijani	34.2	37.2
Only Russian	3.0	0.8
Russian and Azerbaijani (depending on the circumstances)	17.0	13.8
Another language	n/a	0.4
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer	1.6	n/a
	Ukraine	
	2003	*2010*
Only Ukrainian	35.8	22.9
Only Russian	36.4	36.8
Russian and Ukrainian (depending on the circumstances)	18.9	40.3
Another language	0.0	n/a
Did not answer/Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer	2.6	n/a

A5.
What language do you use with friends?

	Azerbaijan	
	2003	*2010*
Only Azerbaijani	69.4	75.6
Only Russian	7.4	2.2
Russian and Azerbaijani (depending on the circumstances)	23.2	22.0
Another language	n/a	0.2
	Ukraine	
	2003	*2010*
Only Ukrainian	34.3	22.2
Only Russian	42.0	37.7
Russian and Ukrainian (depending on the circumstances)	23.3	39.7
Another language/Difficulty in answering	0.4	0.4

A6.
How do you personally relate to Russians (citizens of Russia)?

	2003		*2010*	
	Azerbaijan	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Ukraine*
With sympathy, curiosity	44.2	40.9	31.8	36.0
Quietly, without particular feelings	42.2	56.3	55.0	60.2
With irritation, hostility	8.0	1.4	9.6	0.8
With distrust, fear	4.4	0.6	2.6	
Difficulty in answering	1.2	1.0	1.0	3.0

A7.
How do you personally relate to Ukrainians?

	2003		*2010*	
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*
With sympathy, curiosity	32.2	16.8	29.8	13.0
Quietly, without particular feelings	57.2	73.0	64.6	76.0
With irritation, hostility	2.0	5.7	2.2	6.9
With distrust, fear	1.6	2.1	0.2	1.7
Difficulty in answering	7.0	2.5	3.2	2.5

A8.
Do you consider Russians and Ukrainians to be one people or different peoples?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
One people	11.6	61.2	59.2	14.2	47.1	48.3
Different people	81.8	34.2	38.0	83.2	49.2	47.9
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	6.6	4.6	2.9	2.6	3.6	3.8

A9.
How do you personally relate to Azerbaijanis?

	2003		*2010*	
	Russia	*Ukraine*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
With sympathy, curiosity	2.6	5.0	4.2	5.6
Quietly, without particular feelings	47.6	66.9	57.6	65.9
With irritation, hostility	28.1	11.0	22.7	8.6
With distrust, fear	17.3	10.2	11.6	9.4
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer	4.4	7.0	3.8	10.4

A10.
What foreign languages do you speak?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Arabic	0.6			1.6	n/a	n/a
English	14.0	44.7	33.0	23.6	42.7	41.3
Farsi	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.2	n/a	n/a
French	1.4	2.9	3.7	1.0	3.2	3.2
Georgian	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.4	n/a	n/a
German	0.8	15.1	8.1	2.4	10.8	8.0
Polish			2.3	n/a	2.2	3.6
Russian	43.6		8.9	55.6	n/a	56.0
Swedish	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.2	n/a	n/a
Tatar	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.8	n/a
Turkish	31.2			45.8	n/a	n/a
Another language	1.0	6.3	3.7	n/a	1.6	2.7
Do not speak any foreign languages	35.8	31.0	48.4	17.8	42.3	20.3
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	0.4		0.8	n/a	n/a	n/a

A11.
Are you proud of your country?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Completely yes	n/a	n/a	n/a	49.2	14.1	10.4
Mostly yes	n/a	n/a	n/a	34.2	48.7	16.6
Mostly not	n/a	n/a	n/a	10.8	25.0	41.8
Completely not	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.4	6.9	25.2
Difficulty in answering	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.4	5.3	6.0

A12.
Are you proud to be a citizen of your country?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Completely yes	n/a	n/a	n/a	51.6	23.9	13.9
Mostly yes	n/a	n/a	n/a	32.0	50.6	26.9
Mostly not	n/a	n/a	n/a	12.4	17.9	39.2
Completely not	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.0	3.8	13.5
Difficulty in answering	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.0	3.8	6.6

A13.
Do you consider yourself a European?
Do you feel that you belong to the culture and history of Europe?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Yes	n/a	n/a	n/a	18.0	32.6	30.9
No	n/a	n/a	n/a	81.0	57.8	60.5
Difficulty in answering	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.0	9.5	8.6

Section B: Emigration

B1.
Do you wish to emigrate from your country?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Yes, forever	15.8	4.4	10.6	13.4	6.9	13.8
Yes, for the time being	35.4	39.2	37.6	28.6	36.5	29.9
No	48.2	53.4	50.9	56.6	53.8	51.5
Difficulty in answering	0.6	2.9	1.0	1.4	2.9	4.8

B2.
For how many years would you like to leave your country?
Give the closest, single number answer.

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Average	n/a	n/a	n/a	4.5	2.8	3.4

B3.
For what reasons do you wish to leave your country?

	*2003**			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
To study	4.8	8.3	1.9	10.5	15.8	5.5
To work	22.0	19.9	22.4	49.7	42.6	65.1
To see other countries	18.6	25.8	13.9	32.9	76.8	30.1
To solve a family problem	1.6	1.8	1.0	7.0	5.8	6.8
Other/Difficulty in answering/ Did not answer	65.0	62.8	63.3		2.1	1.4

*The use of different methodologies precludes comparison between the 2003 and 2010 results.

B4.
Which country would you like to go to?
(you may choose several)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Australia	0.0	1.2	6.2	n/a	2.1	2.4
Austria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.0	0.5
Canada	6.1	1.4	5.2	0.4	2.1	4.4
Czech Republic	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.6	1.0	3.4
Egypt	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.2	4.2	1.0
England/Great Britain		3.7	0.8	2.0	15.7	12.2
France	4.9	5.9	2.1	1.6	11.0	4.4
Germany	11.9	9.1	14.1	6.0	14.7	11.7
Greece	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		2.4
Iran	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.0	n/a	n/a
Israel	0.0	0.9	2.1	0.2	0.5	2.0
Italy		1.6	2.5	0.8	4.2	10.2
Japan		1.3	0.4	n/a	2.6	0.5
Norway	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.0	n/a	n/a
Poland	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		2.0
Portugal	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		2.0
Russia	16.9		5.8	11.4		19.0
Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.1	1.5
Spain		0.6	1.2	0.8	3.7	4.4
Sweden	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.2	n/a	n/a
Switzerland	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.4	1.6	1.5
Turkey	8.4	0.4		6.4	2.6	1.0
Ukraine	2.6			0.6	0.5	
United States	8.2	9.7	12.3	4.4	14.7	11.2
Different countries of the Near East and Asia	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.5	1.0
Latin American countries, except Cuba (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.0	
Different European countries	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.7	3.4
Another country	5.5	10.2	6.3	3.0	3.0	2.5
Difficulty in answering/Did not answer/Refused to answer	48.8	58.8	54.8	n/a		
Not yet decided	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.3	5.9

B5.
Do you support the slogan "Azerbaijan for Azerbaijanis"?

	Azerbaijan 2010
Completely yes	27.0
Mostly yes	13.2
Mostly not	26.4
Completely not	32.8
Difficulty in answering	0.6

B6.
Do you support the slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians"?

	Ukraine 2010
Completely yes	16.6
Mostly yes	27.2
Mostly not	25.2
Completely not	26.0
Difficulty in answering	5.0

B7.
Do you support the slogan "Russia for Russians"?

	Russia 2010
Completely yes	12.4
Mostly yes	38.2
Mostly not	28.8
Completely not	15.5
Difficulty in answering	5.2

B8.
Do you approve of nationalist organizations undertaking actions against the following groups of people?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Asians	3.4	10.3	5.6
Africans	3.0	4.6	7.0
People from the North Caucasus	6.2	17.6	9.6
The homeless	8.0	9.2	7.4
People with a suspicious appearance	16.2	5.0	2.4
People with nontraditional religious beliefs	13.4	6.9	5.8
People with nontraditional sexual orientations	27.0	17.7	10.4
Resolutely do not approve of actions against these groups	49.4	50.0	48.2
Difficulty in answering	7.0	14.1	12.2

Section C: Leisure and Interests

C1.
How do you usually spend your free time?
(you may choose several)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Amateur photography or making videos	1.0	3.2	5.0	0.8	4.8	3.4
Be involved in political activities, go to meetings or demonstrations	3.4	1.0	1.9	0.4	1.0	1.0
Go camping, tourism	1.4	7.1	6.4	4.0	6.3	6.4
Go over to friends' houses or receive guests	52.0	51.0	46.2	37.6	47.5	38.6
Go to bars, clubs, and discotheques	4.2	27.5	31.2	1.6	24.2	20.2
Go to the movies	3.0	11.7	10.8	1.4	27.1	12.0
Go to the theater or concerts	6.8	11.5	10.2	4.0	8.8	4.0
Listen to CDs, tape recordings	55.8	31.1	33.0	12.4	21.8	20.4
Listen to the radio	38.8	34.2	41.2	13.6	22.5	19.2
Meet friends, away from home	52.2	57.0	53.8	38.0	59.4	51.4
Play computer games	10.2	11.7	9.3	8.6	25.0	15.0
Read books (artistic literature)	33.4	39.2	38.9	17.0	27.1	26.6
Read magazines	16.6	27.3	34.9	14.2	28.4	25.2
Read newspapers	25.6	35.7	40.9	11.6	24.4	29.4
Repairs, house construction, making something	12.4	24.1	26.4	12.8	17.6	17.6
Sewing and needlework	11.6	16.2	16.4	5.0	10.1	9.8
Spend time on the Internet	8.0	6.0	4.6	15.8	40.8	27.4
Sports (aerobics, at the gym, running, etc.)	11.2	17.2	15.2	9.2	21.2	11.6
Watch sports events	4.2	10.5	9.4	5.6	11.3	5.0
Watch television	89.0	77.7	75.7	82.8	76.7	76.2
Work in the garden	32.6	25.0	35.5	12.4	10.7	16.6
Working to raise my qualifications (independently, or by taking courses, get additional education, etc.)	4.4	12.4	14.6	4.4	13.4	9.2
Other	1.0	3.5	3.5	0.8	3.4	3.4
I do not have free time	2.0	0.0	2.7	3.6	2.7	1.6

C2.
Do you take part in the activity of any nongovernmental organization and, if so, of what type? (you may choose several)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Charitable	1.4	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.2
Cultural-educational	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.6	1.5	1.4
Ecological	0.6	0.4	1.4		1.0	0.6
Humanitarian	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4
In defense of human rights	0.0	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8
Political	4.6	1.2	2.1	1.2	1.0	2.0
Religious	1.2	0.5	2.1	0.6	0.6	0.4
Youth	2.0	2.9	2.5	1.2	2.3	2.6
Another organization	3.0	1.9	2.0	2.8	0.8	0.8
I do not take part	86.6	90.0	89.8	93.8	87.2	87.2
Difficulty in answering	0.6	1.2	0.0		3.4	4.4

C3.
Do you think that you might become involved in politics or run for an elected office?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
I am already involved in politics	2.2	0.8	1.5		0.4	0.8
Definitely yes	5.8	2.9	4.8	7.0	3.8	4.6
Probably yes	11.8	8.9	11.4	12.4	13.9	9.8
Probably not	17.0	33.2	28.3	32.4	35.3	29.6
Definitely not	56.6	48.6	49.1	42.8	44.5	48.6
Difficulty in answering	6.6	5.7	4.8	5.4	2.1	6.6

C4.
What ways do you think there are for young people to enter the political arena? (You may choose several.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Act on one's own, without any support	10.6	5.2	10.4	16.2	5.9	4.8
Support a businessman and serve his interests	26.8	36.3	23.7	16.0	18.1	19.4
Take part in the activity of a civic organization*	n/a	n/a	n/a	32.4	20.2	18.2
Take part in the activity of a political party and/or civic organization	56.6	50.9	43.0	45.4	51.9	52.4
Take part in trade-union activity	6.6	5.3	9.1	3.2	11.5	8.8
Work in local government	16.4	23.1	17.7	32.4	32.6	37.0
Work in the bureaucracies of regional or state bodies	24.4	32.5	22.5	24.2	28.8	31.2
Work in the power departments (SBU, MVS, prosecutor's office, etc.)	8.4	21.5	11.6	11.8	13.9	14.8
Other	0.0	0.5	1.9		0.4	3.0
Difficulty in answering/Did not answer/Refused to answer	18.8	11.3	13.7	5.6	12.4	14.0

*In 2003 this option was included in "take part in the activity of a political party and/or civic organization."

C5.
What, in your opinion, is most necessary for a young politician to have in order to achieve success in the political arena? Give no more than three answers. (You may choose up to three.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Concrete political program, idea of the country's future	18.4	29.5	17.7	22.4	18.3	18.2
Good education, high level of professionalism	49.4	58.5	57.0	38.4	39.5	33.2
Good relations with the organs of power	21.0	25.1	23.7	33.0	45.2	38.2
Money, financial support	36.6	35.5	44.3	47.8	49.8	56.6
Moral qualities (honesty, integrity)	36.8	40.5	39.9	18.2	27.7	22.8
Personal qualities (activeness, initiative, efficiency)	52.8	55.8	45.5	31.8	56.3	48.0
Support of political parties, organizations	22.4	21.5	17.7	26.0	28.1	23.2
Other	0.2	0.4	0.2	n/a	n/a	n/a
Difficulty in answering	10.0	4.0	5.4	1.4	2.9	5.2

Section D: Trust and Corruption

D1.
Which of these structures do you fully trust, mostly trust, mostly do not trust, and completely do not trust?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
D1.1 Systems of mass information (television, radio, newspapers)						
Fully trust	19.6	7.0	10.4	32.6	7.3	7.4
Mostly trust	52.4	59.8	57.0	51.6	57.3	42.1
Mostly do not trust	18.6	25.9	19.7	10.6	27.1	32.5
Completely do not trust	7.0	5.1	11.2	4.8	6.5	9.8
Difficulty in answering/ Did not answer	2.4	2.2	1.7	0.4	1.9	8.2
D1.2 Political parties						
Fully trust	6.2	1.5	1.2	3.8	1.9	1.2
Mostly trust	31.0	13.3	11.0	32.0	22.9	11.4
Mostly do not trust	29.6	51.0	48.8	39.8	44.7	45.0
Completely do not trust	21.2	27.0	35.8	20.4	21.4	31.3
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	12.0	7.2	3.3	4.0	9.2	11.0
D1.3 State structures						
Fully trust	11.4	7.0	4.1	15.6	7.1	4.6
Mostly trust	40.4	50.1	31.0	52.4	50.2	29.9
Mostly do not trust	28.2	27.0	37.4	21.8	27.5	31.5
Completely do not trust	12.6	7.3	21.2	8.6	8.2	20.0
Difficulty in answering/ Did not answer	7.4	8.5	6.4	1.6	7.1	14.0
D1.4 Courts						
Fully trust	9.4	6.2	7.5	6.8	8.0	3.8
Mostly trust	30.8	40.9	30.1	36.2	42.0	18.0
Mostly do not trust	25.8	33.6	33.5	31.8	29.8	35.4
Completely do not trust	26.8	13.7	22.9	20.6	11.8	30.4
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	7.2	5.7	6.0	4.6	8.4	12.4
D1.5 Police						
Fully trust	8.8	4.3	4.6	18.4	4.2	3.2
Mostly trust	21.0	24.5	24.1	35.6	29.0	15.0
Mostly do not trust	29.8	39.1	38.3	24.2	38.4	37.4

	2003			2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Completely do not trust	34.8	28.5	29.7	21.0	22.3	32.2
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	5.6	3.6	3.3	0.8	6.1	12.2
D1.6 Prosecutor's office						
Fully trust	10.8	5.6	6.7	15.0	6.7	4.2
Mostly trust	31.2	38.0	32.2	39.6	42.7	17.0
Mostly do not trust	24.6	30.4	32.4	26.2	28.4	35.6
Completely do not trust	25.0	16.7	23.1	14.6	10.9	29.2
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	8.4	9.4	5.6	4.6	11.3	14.0
D1.7 Banks						
Fully trust	7.0	10.2	9.4	17.8	7.3	3.0
Mostly trust	30.6	39.2	34.1	48.8	43.3	17.8
Mostly do not trust	29.2	28.6	28.1	21.8	32.6	39.6
Completely do not trust	26.2	12.7	20.4	10.4	10.3	26.4
Difficulty in answering/ Did not answer	7.0	9.3	7.9	1.2	6.5	13.2
D1.8 Nongovernmental organizations						
Fully trust	6.4	1.7	2.5	11.2	4.0	2.8
Mostly trust	34.2	19.6	25.6	37.6	38.9	29.4
Mostly do not trust	25.8	40.0	32.6	30.0	31.9	28.6
Completely do not trust	17.4	20.1	24.9	14.2	8.4	14.4
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	16.2	18.5	14.5	7.0	16.8	24.8
D1.9 Medical establishments						
Fully trust	17.2	17.0	11.8	20.8	10.3	6.4
Mostly trust	41.4	57.5	49.1	45.4	56.7	36.4
Mostly do not trust	26.4	17.7	26.4	23.2	23.5	29.4
Completely do not trust	12.2	5.7	10.6	10.6	6.5	15.0
Difficulty in answering	2.8	2.1	2.1		3.1	12.8
D1.10 Insurance organizations						
Fully trust	4.2	6.2	4.6	9.0	3.8	2.6
Mostly trust	18.0	30.0	20.6	29.4	38.0	17.4
Mostly do not trust	31.0	36.5	36.6	37.6	31.9	34.3
Completely do not trust	29.8	17.3	27.4	15.8	14.7	29.3
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	17.0	10.0	10.8	8.2	11.6	16.4

	2003			2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
D1.11 Educational Institutions						
Fully trust	24.8	29.0	19.5	24.2	19.1	11.7
Mostly trust	44.8	59.0	56.8	38.2	61.1	46.1
Mostly do not trust	20.4	7.3	14.6	24.0	13.0	21.1
Completely do not trust	8.2	1.9	5.4	13.6	2.5	8.9
Difficulty in answering/ Did not answer	1.8	2.9	3.7		4.4	12.3
D1.12 Army						
Fully trust	41.2	11.7	12.3	51.0	14.3	8.6
Mostly trust	36.4	40.2	35.5	35.4	38.7	32.6
Mostly do not trust	11.2	26.1	23.5	7.0	27.1	22.8
Completely do not trust	8.8	15.5	17.5	5.6	10.5	16.6
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	2.4	6.4	11.2	1.0	9.4	12.3
D1.13 Trade unions						
Fully trust	3.6	4.5	4.6	4.8	3.6	2.8
Mostly trust	26.2	25.4	26.6	25.0	28.6	20.8
Mostly do not trust	18.4	31.6	30.1	39.2	30.0	25.2
Completely do not trust	18.4	19.7	22.0	21.2	12.2	22.4
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	33.4	18.9	16.8	9.8	25.6	28.8
D1.14 Administration of the president						
Fully trust	17.2	9.3	2.9	29.8	15.5	1.2*
Mostly trust	32.2	48.6	17.5	46.6	47.1	6.6*
Mostly do not trust	27.4	20.4	34.1	15.6	19.5	30.7*
Completely do not trust	13.8	8.8	35.7	7.2	5.9	44.8*
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	9.4	12.9	9.8	0.8	12.0	16.7*
D1.15 President						
Fully trust	35.4	28.2	4.2	70.6	26.9	1.68**
Mostly trust	37.4	53.9	17.2	23.8	52.5	5.4**
Mostly do not trust	9.6	8.3	29.9	2.0	11.8	28.2**
Completely do not trust	7.8	4.3	42.6	3.4	4.6	50.2**
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	9.8	5.3	6.2	0.2	4.2	14.6**

	2003			2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
D1.16 Parliament (Majlis, State Duma, Verkhovna Rada)						
Fully trust	6.8	4.2	1.5	14.4	9.2	1.6
Mostly trust	24.2	25.5	17.3	36.2	35.9	5.0
Mostly do not trust	31.0	40.5	38.0	31.4	31.3	31.0
Completely do not trust	33.4	22.3	36.4	18.0	13.0	48.0
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	4.6	7.5	6.7		10.7	14.4
D1.17 Government/Administration						
Fully trust	n/a	n/a	n/a	30.0	17.7	1.8†
Mostly trust	n/a	n/a	n/a	46.2	45.0	5†
Mostly do not trust	n/a	n/a	n/a	16.4	20.6	31†
Completely do not trust	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.4	8.0	46.8†
Difficulty in answering	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.0	8.6	15.4†
D1.18 Religious Institutions						
Fully trust	19.0	23.8	27.9	10.6	25.8	20.8
Mostly trust	39.0	41.7	38.0	46.0	43.5	38.2
Mostly do not trust	23.2	12.6	12.1	31.0	11.3	14.0
Completely do not trust	14.2	9.8	10.6	12.2	6.5	10.0
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	4.6	12.1	11.4	0.2	13.0	17.0
D1.19 Relatives						
Fully trust	59.6	62.9	65.1	46.0	60.3	63.6
Mostly trust	28.0	31.4	29.3	44.6	34.2	26.2
Mostly do not trust	8.8	3.5	3.3	7.2	2.9	3.0
Completely do not trust	2.8	1.3	1.0	2.0	0.8	1.0
Difficulty in answering	0.8	1.0	1.4	0.2	1.9	6.2
D1.20 Friends						
Fully trust	45.4	44.5	47.8	43.6	44.7	42.8
Mostly trust	41.8	46.6	42.0	49.0	46.4	42.6
Mostly do not trust	8.8	5.9	6.6	6.2	6.1	4.4
Completely do not trust	2.8	1.5	1.9	1.0	0.8	1.4
Difficulty in answering/ Did not answer	1.2	1.4	1.7	0.2	2.1	8.8

*Secretariat of President Yushchenko
**President Yushchenko
†Government of Yulia Tymoshenko

D2.
How often do you think there are cases when to resolve a situation it is necessary to give a bribe or do some sort of favor for a bureaucrat?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Very often	23.0	26.9	33.0	16.8	12.2	20.8
Rather often	33.4	45.4	41.8	33.8	47.9	40.3
Rather rarely	21.8	14.1	12.9	25.8	20.4	22.0
That practically never happens	15.2	5.4	7.9	23.0	12.4	10.2
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer	6.6	8.2	4.4	0.6	7.1	6.6

D3.
Have you personally encountered corruption, bribe-taking or illegal activities by officials during the last two years? (Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
No	26.2	48.9	38.7	28.2	47.5	29.9
Only once	11.2	6.2	4.4	10.4	7.3	10.0
Rarely	25.4	24.7	29.5	22.6	30.9	34.1
Rather often (several times a year)	22.0	11.9	17.7	19.2	9.4	18.3
Very often (several times a month)	7.6	2.4	5.2	10.2	1.1	3.2
All the time (daily)	0.8	1.6	1.7	8.0	0.8	0.4
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer	6.8	4.4	2.7	1.4	3.1	4.0

D4.
How do you personally feel about service in the army?
Which of these points of view is closest to yours? (Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Every honest man should serve in the army	65.0	38.7	51.0	56.6	39.1	39.7
Service in the army is a debt one must pay to the state, even if it does not serve your own interests	27.4	28.2	20.5	39.6	30.3	23.0
Service in the army is a pointless and dangerous activity, and should be avoided at any cost	6.4	27.2	22.2	3.8	24.0	27.8
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	1.2	5.9	6.4		6.5	9.5

Section E: Politics

E1.
What level of interest do you have in politics? (Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
A very high level	3.6	1.4	3.9	0.4	1.5	1.4
A high level	10.6	7.7	7.9	5.6	5.5	6.4
A medium level	27.2	34.9	38.7	35.4	30.2	39.9
A low level	27.2	35.8	23.3	22.8	35.7	27.3
Totally uninterested	30.8	19.2	25.8	35.6	26.1	23.0
Difficulty in answering	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.2	1.0	2.0

E2.
Examine, please, this list of political descriptions.
Which of them best describes your options? (Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Communist	9.8	n/a	5.8	2.8	5.3	4.3
Environmental	9.8	n/a	22.5	1.8	13.5	9.4
Liberal	1.8	n/a	2.3	0.6	6.3	8.0
National-Democrat	14.8	n/a	11.0		9.7	15.6
Nationalist	8.0	n/a	3.7	31.6	9.2	3.7
Religious	4.4	n/a		14.2	1.5	2.9
Social-Democrat	5.2	n/a	19.5	39.4	8.8	15.8
Socialist	2.4	n/a	1.4	2.0	3.6	6.8
Other	n/a	n/a	n/a		0.2	2.5
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	43.8	n/a	33.9	7.6	39.5	31.0

E3.
Did you take part in the fall 2009 municipal elections?

	Azerbaijan 2010
Yes	37.8
No	56.4
Don't remember	1.8
Not 18 years old at the time	4

E4.
Did you take part in the previous State Duma elections, which were held in December 2008?

	Russia 2010
Yes	51.1
No	39.3
Don't remember	5.2
Not 18 years old at the time	4

E5.
Did you take part in the last Verkhovna Rada elections, which took place in spring 2007?

	Ukraine 2010
Yes	56.8
No	30.6
Don't remember	7.6
Not 18 years old at the time	5.0

E6.
Do you plan to take part in the elections for the parliament of Azerbaijan in 2010?

	Azerbaijan 2010
Yes	62.4
No	17.4
Undecided	20.2

E7.
Do you plan to take part in the upcoming elections for the president of Russia in 2012?

	Russia 2010
Yes	68.9
No	10.3
Undecided	20.6
Will not yet be 18 years old	0.2

E8.
Do you plan to take part in the elections for president of Ukraine in 2010?

	Ukraine 2010
Yes	71.4
No	15.8
Undecided	12.8

E9.
Who would you like to see elected as president of your country in the next election? (You may choose several.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Athlete	3.0	6.8	3.5	0.6	6.9	1.6
Businessman	4.8	11.1	14.0	2.2	5.9	14.0
Cultural leader	2.4	2.9	1.9	0.6	4.8	0.8
Journalist	0.8	2.5	2.1	0.2	1.5	1.0
Political leader	74.8	48.2	40.2	80.2	51.9	42.9
Religious leader	3.0	1.5	5.0	1.0	1.3	1.6
Scholar	15.6	13.2	13.0	1.2	7.8	5.8
Someone from the army, security services, power structures	9.6	18.2	10.7	1.0	11.3	5.4
From another professional sphere	2.4	5.0	5.0		4.6	4.9
His/her profession doesn't matter	n/a	n/a	n/a	12.6		
Leader from among those who took part in the democratic movement at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s	14.8	2.8	3.5	0.4	3.4	3.1
From the capital	24.6	15.4	6.8	14.0	23.1	9.1
From the regions	14.6	24.1	7.8	5.0	30.0	9.5
Around 40 years old	19.6	47.8	45.0	20.4	43.9	17.1
Around 50 years old	42.6	29.1	23.5	38.0	25.8	18.8
Around 60 years old	12.8	1.2	1.9	2.2	1.5	3.5
Male	73.0	67.1	49.9	63.8	63.9	29.9
Female	7.6	0.7	16.5	4.6	6.3	9.7
Other	2.4	7.8	0.0		1.3	1.0
Difficulty in answering	6.8	0.0	6.8		10.3	22.3

E10.
On this card are presented general points of view regarding which economic system is necessary for your country.
Please read and indicate which point of view you consider most correct.
(Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
It is necessary to revive state management of the economy without any private enterprise	8.4	5.5	7.1	4.8	9.7	8.6
It is necessary to revive state management of the economy, reserving some possibility of private enterprise	20.8	23.0	14.5	16.0	23.9	20.0
It is necessary to create a balance between state management of the economy and private enterprise	32.4	39.3	42.2	45.4	39.1	40.9
It is necessary to give way to private enterprise, reserving a role for state management of the economy	19.6	19.3	18.7	22.6	13.9	14.1
It is necessary to give private enterprise freedom, without any government intervention	8.8	5.0	11.6	6.6	3.8	3.9
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	10.0	7.9	6.0	4.6	9.5	12.6

E11.
Close ties with which country do you think would give your country the best opportunities for development? (Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
With China	0.2	4.1	0.0	1.6	11.3	1.0
With Iran	0.6			0.8	0.2	0.2
With Japan	0.2	11.2	1.9	0.2	11.1	0.6
With other CIS countries	1.8	4.9	6.4	0.2	11.8	4.4
With Russia	28.0		36.6	16.0		49.3
With the countries of Europe	21.6	49.9	38.7	22.0	42.6	34.5
With the countries of the Islamic world	1.6	0.8	0.2	3.8	0.8	0.2
With the United States	15.6	20.4	10.4	6.8	10.5	5.0
With Turkey	29.4			48.2	0.8	
With Ukraine		1.2		16.0	3.4	
With other countries	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2
Difficulty in answering	1.0	7.5	5.4		7.3	4.6

E12.
How do you feel in general toward the following countries?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
E12.1 United States of America			
Very positive	14.0	6.7	15.6
Mainly positive	52.6	59.4	61.1
Mainly negative	24.2	20.4	14.0
Very negative	7.4	6.7	6.7
Difficulty in answering	1.8	6.9	6.9
E12.2 Countries of the European Union			
Very positive	33.0	12.0	20.2
Mainly positive	54.0	72.7	64.5
Mainly negative	9.2	6.5	4.6
Very negative	2.6	1.0	2.0
Difficulty in answering	1.2	7.8	8.6
E12.3 Azerbaijan			
Very positive	n/a	3.6	3.4
Mainly positive	n/a	49.6	45.0

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Mainly negative	n/a	25.9	17.1
Very negative	n/a	8.4	6.2
Difficulty in answering	n/a	11.5	28.3
E12.4 Russia			
Very positive	28.0	n/a	42.2
Mainly positive	46.0	n/a	45.2
Mainly negative	15.4	n/a	6.0
Very negative	10.2	n/a	2.8
Difficulty in answering	0.4	n/a	3.8
E12.5 Ukraine			
Very positive	38.4	5.3	n/a
Mainly positive	56.4	57.1	n/a
Mainly negative	3.6	25.2	n/a
Very negative	0.4	5.0	n/a
Difficulty in answering	1.2	7.4	n/a
E12.6 Georgia			
Very positive	24.0	1.7	4.6
Mainly positive	60.6	23.5	43.5
Mainly negative	10.4	38.9	19.1
Very negative	2.6	25.6	7.4
Difficulty in answering	2.4	10.3	25.4
E12.7 Baltic countries			
Very positive	24.4	3.2	9.6
Mainly positive	58.6	42.7	58.0
Mainly negative	6.0	29.8	9.8
Very negative	0.4	12.6	1.6
Difficulty in answering	10.6	11.6	21.1

Section F: Politics, Values

F1.
Which qualities are most important for a politician?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Connections	23.2	16.9	21.2	15	11.1	11.2
Energy, youth	17.2	31.4	25.8	12.8	20.6	6.2
Entrepreneurialism	18	18.9	15.6	17	15.6	13.5
Experience	45.6	43.3	47.8	38.2	50.6	51.6
Flexibility	7.4	10.3	8.3	12	9.4	9.4
Hardness	18.2	26.7	20.6	10.6	34.2	21.9
Honesty	50.8	45.2	48.6	26.4	51.7	44
Intellect	29.8	45	43	33.6	45.8	38.4
Organizational abilities	32.4	38.7	44.9	29.6	39.9	41.8
Patriotism	56.4	29.4	20.6	74.4	41.2	28.5
Professionalism	32.8	48.3	43	25.6	54.2	63.7
Refinement	22.2	13.4	14.6	31.2	15.5	9.8
Resolution	11.8	34	31.2	13.6	31.7	23.3
Well-spoken, correct language	59	27.6	19.1	30.4	20.6	16.7
Difficulty in answering	5.8	2.7	3.5		0.4	6.4

F2.
Which qualities are the most important to you, when you are assessing a politician?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Belonging to the political force that you support	8.2	9.2	8.7
Government position	32.2	18.5	17.7
Honesty, incorruptibility	46.4	66.6	60.6
Intellectual qualities, culture	27.8	24.6	20.3
Readiness to protect the interests of people like you	36.2	55.3	53.9
Resoluteness, manliness	13.6	24.6	18.7
Responsibility, faithfulness to one's word and promises	41.4	56.9	20.3
Success in previous activities	11	17.9	17.9
Other		0.2	0.6
Difficulty in answering	0.4	2.1	6.6

F3.
In what order would you put the following values in terms of their personal importance to you? Please number them from very important to less important (from 1 to 7).

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
F3.1 Freedom of speech						
1-very important	26.2	15.8	21.8	62.6	37.2	35.6
2	17.6	6.9	10.4	24.8	24.2	16.5
3	10.4	8	8.7	6.8	13.9	19.4
4	13.4	22.6	18.1	2.4	11.6	15.2
5	11.6	19.9	14.8	1.4	5.5	6.3
6	11	18.4	14.6	0.8	5	3
7-less important	9.8	8	9.8	1.2	2.5	4.5
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	0	0.3	1.7	n/a	n/a	n/a
F3.2 Freedom of movement						
1-very important	2.6	4.5	8.9	47.4	39.5	31.8
2	8.2	6.2	6	24.2	26.9	20.4
3	13.2	6.1	7.1	12.8	13.7	17.2
4	15	19.1	12.3	7.2	6.1	10.9
5	17	32.5	22.7	2	5.9	9.1
6	21.6	23.6	23.7	1.8	3.6	6.7
7-less important	19.6	7.8	17.2	4.6	4.2	3.8
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	2.8	0.2	2.1	n/a	n/a	n/a
F3.3 Freedom of conscience (religious freedom)						
1-very important	5.6	1.5	10.4	38.6	33.2	21.1
2	11.6	1	7.1	23	19.5	14.2
3	11.8	3.7	6.2	22	15.8	16.5
4	11.8	4.4	9.8	9.6	8.2	12.6
5	19.4	11	14.1	1.4	6.1	7.3
6	17.6	22.4	19.5	1.4	7.1	5.5
7-less important	20.4	55.4	30.1	4	10.1	22.8
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	1.8	0.6	2.9	n/a	n/a	n/a

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
F3.4 Protection from arbitrary arrest						
1-very important	5.4	8.3	10.2	61.4	56.7	44.3
2	7.8	5.4	5	27.6	18.9	16.8
3	14.6	7.3	10.4	7.2	7.6	7.3
4	20.4	20	18.9	2	5.2	10.1
5	16.6	15.3	15	0.4	3.2	6.3
6	18	22.2	14.5	0.4	3.2	9.7
7-less important	17	21.1	24.1	1	5.2	5.5
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	0.2	0.4	1.9	n/a	n/a	n/a
F3.5 Right to work						
1-very important	34.2	30.2	39.3	81.2	70	61.5
2	22.2	28.9	23.1	15.4	17.2	21.5
3	16.6	21.1	15.4	2.8	4.2	7.1
4	10.6	9.1	7.9		2.7	3.4
5	7	6.7	5.4	0.2	2.3	2.4
6	4.6	2.3	3.3	0.2	0.8	2
7-less important	4.8	1.6	4.4	0.2	2.9	2
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	0	0.1	1.2	n/a	n/a	n/a
F3.6 Right to housing						
1-very important	19	24.5	20	63.4	69.7	60.3
2	18.6	34	26	25.8	17.7	18.6
3	14.4	21.2	19.1	9	3.2	10.1
4	12.4	10.1	12.3	1	2.9	3
5	12.6	5.6	8.9	0.4	1.9	3
6	12.4	3.3	6.7	0.2	1.5	3
7-less important	10	1.2	5.4	0.2	3.1	1.8
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	0.6	0.1	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a
F3.7 Right to education						
1-very important	7	15.3	20.8	58.2	61.6	49.4
2	14	17.5	15.8	28.8	17.7	17.9
3	19	32.6	24.9	9.4	7.8	9.3
4	16.6	14.6	12.7	2.4	2.9	8.3

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
5	15.2	8.3	7.1	0.6	1.5	6.7
6	12.8	7.1	7.7	0.2	3.2	5.1
7-less important	15.2	4.2	9.4	0.4	5.2	3.3
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	0.2	0.4	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a

F4.
Which of these two opinions is closest to your own?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Both freedom and equality are important. But, if choosing between them, I think that personal freedom is more important, so that every person can live as he chooses without outside constraints.	43.4	52.6	44.3	41.4	39.5	28.4
Both freedom and equality are important. But, if choosing between them, I think that equality is more important, as social disagreement between people must not be too great and no one should have undeserved privileges.	53.8	42.4	51.5	57	51.1	53.5
Difficulty in answering/Did not answer	2.8	5	4.3	1.6	9.4	18.1

F5.
What do you think the relationship between the state and its citizens should be? (Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
The state should interfere with the lives and economic freedom of its citizens as little as possible.	11.2	9.7	8.3	8.2	6.3	10.8
The state should set "the rules of the game" that are the same for all and make sure that these rules are not broken.	20.6	23.2	27.9	33.2	28.4	33.3
The state should look after all of its citizens and ensure them a decent, even standard of living.	68.2	64.3	62.6	58.6	62.2	48.8
Difficulty in answering/Did not answer	0	2.8	1.2		3.1	7.1

F6.
Which of these opinions is closest to your own?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Democracy is most desirable governmental system for my country.	81.4	39.3	40.7
In some circumstances, an authoritarian regime might be better than a democratic system.	6.4	25	25.2
For a person like me, it doesn't matter whether there is a democratic regime in the country or not.	10	20.6	17.1
Difficulty in answering	2.2	15.1	16.9

F7.
What does democracy mean to you first and foremost?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
The conducting of free and fair elections	36.6	37.2	30.7
Independence of the judicial system, rule of law	21.2	22.5	22.3
The execution by those elected of their electoral obligations	16.2	25.2	21
Constant social control over the elected authorities	12.8	19.1	8.7
Prosperity, stable growth of the economy	49.4	34	31.8
Safety for my family	26	31.5	23.5
Separation of power into legislative, executive and judicial branches	2.2	11.6	5.2
Social conflict	0.4	2.3	2.3
A parliament that defends my political views	5.4	7.8	6.8
Social stratification into the wealthy and poor	1.2	5.2	2.1
Freedom of speech and mass media, freedom of movement and education, etc.	37	31.7	23.1
Ability of citizens to take part in the government and civic life	19	26	13
Social defense, social guarantees	28.6	36.3	21.9
Anarchy and chaos	0.8	2.9	4.5
Difficulty in answering	0.6	7.8	15.7

F8.
Which of the following opinions is closest to your personal views?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Of course both freedom and prosperity are important; however, in exchange for personal prosperity I would be ready to give up some of my rights and civil freedoms to the state.	29.4	39.3	39
Of course both freedom and prosperity are important; however, for the sake of personal freedom and as a guarantee to keep all my civil rights I would be ready to tolerate some material difficulties.	62.4	42.2	33.6
Difficulty in answering	8.2	18.5	27.4

Section G: Employment, Financial Situation

G1.
What is your profession?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Independent entrepreneur	4.8	3.9	4.8	4.8	2.7	6
Manager	1.4	3.5	2.3	2.8	4.4	2.4
Specialist without management duties (with special education)	14.6	13	16	15.6	17.6	16.4
Employee without professional education	10.6	8.5	5.4	7.4	10.5	12.8
Military, Ministry of the Interior, prosecutor's office	1.6	5.7	2.3	1.4	2.7	2.4
Worker (including foremen and brigadiers), including in the village economy	14.4	24.9	23.1	16.4	21.8	21.4
Farmer	3		0	2.2	0	0.4
Homemaker	12.6	7.3	14.5	19.8	10.1	9.6
Scholar, student	9.4	25	14.3	9.4	17.7	14.8
Unemployed, temporarily out of work, not working	27.2	7.2	16	20.2	12.6	10.8
Other	n/a	n/a	n/a			2.8
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	0.4	1	1.4	n/a	n/a	n/a

G2.
Do you think that you might become unemployed in the next two years?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Definitely yes	8	4.9	6.2	27.7	8.9	16.3
Probably yes	16.6	19.5	31.4	24.9	29.7	27.5
Probably not	10.4	17	6.7	25.7	33.2	35
Definitely not	10.8	8	7.3	14.6	10.9	9.1
Difficulty in answering	4.6	11.1	2.3	7.1	17.3	12.2
Did not answer	49.6	39.5	46.1	n/a	n/a	n/a

G3.
Do you personally own or make use of...?
(Choose all that apply.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Automobile	6.6	18.2	19.5	14.4	24.2	13.9
Mobile telephone	22.2	12.9	14.8	78.4	89.5	96.4
Personal computer	4.6	10	10	25.6	59.2	38.4
None of the above	72.6	69.1	67.8	21	6.5	3
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer/Did not answer	0.4	0	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a

G4.
Either at home, at work, or anywhere else,
do you make use of either e-mail or the Internet?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Yes	13.4	18.4	19.1	27.8	60.5	51.5
No	86	81.6	80	72.2	39.5	48.5
Difficulty in answering/Did not answer	0.6	0	1	n/a	n/a	n/a

G5.
For what reasons do you usually use the Internet?

	2010		
	*Azerbaijan**	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Carry out a business project on the Internet	0.6	2.8	4.7
Carry out banking operations, pay bills (telephone, etc.)		7.3	3.5
Distribute information about oneself with the goal of finding work, income	2.8	10.7	11.3
Download software	2	25.2	16.3
Download, read interesting non-literary texts	1.8	15.1	7
Download, read literary texts	1.4	18.3	15.6
Familiarize oneself with the sites of acquaintances	7.4	16.4	7.8
Find information and conduct searches necessary for studies	7.2	43.5	37.7

Find information and conduct searches necessary for work	8.6	41	40.5
Find information in encyclopedias, dictionaries, and reference media for one's personal interests	6.2	28.7	24.1
Listen to or download music	10.4	60.3	47.9
Look at, download photographs, artistic materials	1.8	30	15.6
Maintain a personal site, blog, live journal	2.6	8.2	4.3
Make orders on the Internet (goods, tickets, hotels)	0.6	15.5	7.8
Participate in Internet actions (charitable, political, rights defense)	0.8	3.5	0.4
Play online games	3	25.9	17.9
Read newspapers, journals, news portals, Internet publications and newspapers and magazines	7.8	33.4	26.5
Receive and send email messages	16.2	61.8	54.9
Seek information for personal, family, domestic matters	5.4	42	32.7
Socialize on chat sites, in forums, and on blogs	7.6	41	27.6
Socialize on social networking sites (*Odnoklasniki*, *V kontakte*)	5.2	56.5	43.2
Watch, download films, shows	1.8	53.6	41.2
Other		2.2	0.8
Difficulty answering			2.3

*Respondents were permitted to choose only one option in Azerbaijan in 2010.

G6.
Where do you most often find news about the country and the world?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Friends, relatives, neighbors	21.6	31.9	41.1
Internet publications (newspapers, journals, information portals)	10.8	29	21.4
Journals	2.8	9.4	17.6
Newspapers	5.2	21.9	39.9
Radio	4.2	22.5	31.9
Television	92	91.8	92.8
Different Internet sources	1.4	10.5	13.8
I am not interested in news	1.2	1	0.4
Other		1	1.2
Difficulty answering		0.4	0.2

G7.
What is your personal monthly income?
(percentage of those with an income)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Less than 100 dollars	85.6	52.8	68.5	14.0	1.0	0.2
100–199 dollars	4.8	22.6	6.9	22.4	58.4	59.6
200–299 dollars	0.4	5.9	1.4	32.0	8.0	25.3
300–399 dollars	0.0	0.6	0.2	14.4	10.2	11.2
400–499 dollars	0.0	0.9	0.2	9.6	6.6	2.2
500 dollars or more	0.0	0.6	0.1	6.0	15.6	1.3
Refused to answer	9.2	16.6	22.7	2.6	0.2	0.2

G8.
What is the average monthly income of your family?
(Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Less than 100 dollars	69.0	22.1	48.9	8.0	0.0	2.0
100–199 dollars	16.8	43.1	25.4	14.4	46.8	56.0
200–299 dollars	5.4	15.5	3.3	19.6	3.4	9.7
300–399 dollars	0.0	3.9	1.0	11.2	5.0	11.2
400–499 dollars	0.0	3.2	0.2	16.6	4.9	12.8
500–599 dollars	0.0	1.3	0.2	3.8	3.5	2.3
600 dollars or more	0.0	1.2	0.3	9.6	36.4	6.0
Difficulty in answering/ Refused to answer	8.8	9.7	20.7	16.8		

G9.
Do you live together with your parents or separately from them?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Together with parents (parents of significant other, grandparents)	72	58.5	61.7	69.2	48.3	52.6
Separately from them	28	41.5	37.4	30.8	51	47.4
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer	0	0	1.0	n/a	n/a	n/a

G10.
Do you earn more than your parents (the parent who earns more)?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
More	17.8	24.7	30.8	26.8	25.8	23.3
About the same	10.8	11	10	13.2	14.9	23.1
Less	37.2	29.5	42	8.8	23.3	21.1
I don't have an income	n/a	n/a	n/a	45.2	26.7	20.7
I don't have parents	4	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.5	1
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	30.2	32.5	14.6	3.8	6.9	10.8

G11.
Please look at the card and indicate in which of these groups you think you belong. (Only one answer.)

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
We scarcely make ends meet. We lack money even for food.	18.2	6.2	14.5	10.4	4.6	4.4
We have money for food, but purchasing clothing causes great financial difficulties.	47.2	27.1	42.8	32.6	16.4	27.7
We have money for food and clothing, but purchasing major items (refrigerator, television) is a problem for us.	29.4	51.8	33.3	38.4	43.3	44.8
We can purchase major items without difficulty. However, for us it is difficult to purchase expensive items.	4.4	14.1	6.9	16.2	32.3	16.3
We can afford quite expensive things—apartment, cottage, and plenty of other things.	0	0.5	0	0.8	0.2	0.6
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	0.8	0.2	2.6	1.6	3.2	6.2

G12.
Speaking on the whole, to what extent would you say that you are content with your life?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Completely content	5.4	17.4	9.3	4.8	16.2	8.9
Mostly content	31.8	48.2	37.8	48.4	50.4	38.6
Mostly not content	36.8	27.4	32.8	31.8	26.7	36.4
Completely not content	22	5.4	17.9	13	5.2	12.5
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	4	1.5	2.4	2	1.5	3.6

G13.
Do you think that you can, with your own powers, change the circumstances of your life for the better?

	2010		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Yes	16.2	26.9	21.3
More yes, than no	28.6	45	38
More no, than yes	32	17.6	26.7
No	19.2	4.8	8
Difficulty in answering	4	5.7	6

Section H: Social Demographic Questions

H1.
Gender of the respondent

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Male	48	50.7	50.5	49.8	49.2	49.2
Female	52	49.3	49.5	50.2	50.8	50.8

H2.
Age of the respondent

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
16–24 years	50.3	41.2	47.4	n/a	n/a	n/a
18–24 years	n/a	n/a	n/a	43	46.2	43.2
25–29 years	25.7	27.8	27.4	n/a	n/a	n/a
25–34 years	n/a	n/a	n/a	57	53.8	56.8
30–34 years	23.9	31	25.2	n/a	n/a	n/a

H3.
Familial status

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Not married (and never was previously married)	52.8	49.4	42.2	51.6	47.7	44
Married	43.2	39	49.1	45.2	41.2	45.2
Living together, unrecorded marriage	0.4	6.1	1.5	0.2	8.4	6.6
Divorced	3.2	4.3	6.2	2.8	2.5	4.2
Widow/widower	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	
Other	0	0.9	0.2	n/a	n/a	n/a
Difficulty in answering/Refused to answer/Did not answer	0	0	0.4	n/a	n/a	n/a

H4.
How many people (together with children) live in your home?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
On average	4.7	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.2	3.7

H5.
How many children do you think would be the optimal number in a family?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
On average	2.4	2	2.1	2.6	2.1	2
Difficulty in answering/ Did not answer	6.8	6.6	8.1	0.4	n/a	n/a

H6.
What is your level of education?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Elementary (less than class 7) or lower	0.6	0.6	0		0.6	0.2
Incomplete secondary (less than class 10)	4.4	17.9	7.5	4.8	11.3	11.8
Secondary (college or university)	54.6	36.3	36.6	43.8	31.7	29.3
Specialized secondary (technical, etc.)	22.4	31.1	30.8	14.8	31.5	35.9
Incomplete higher (no fewer than 3 higher courses)	5.4	4.6	8.9	6.8	5.3	7
Higher (one higher degree)	12.4	8.7	15.4	28.6	18.1	15.3
Two higher degrees	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.3	
Graduate or doctoral degree	0	0.4	0	0.4	0.2	0.4
Difficulty in answering	0	0	0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Did not answer	0	0	0.2	n/a	n/a	n/a

H7.
To what religious confession do you belong?

	2003	*2010*
	Azerbaijan	
Agnostic/do not confess to any religion	2.6	0.2
Catholic	0.2	0.2
Judaism	n/a	0.4
Muslim (Islam)	89.2	97.6
Orthodox	6.8	1.6
Protestant	0.6	n/a
Other	0.2	n/a
Difficulty in answering	0.4	n/a
	Russia	
Agnostic/do not confess to any religion	25.5	16.4
Catholic	0	n/a
Judaism	0	0.2
Muslim (Islam)	4.6	5.5
Orthodox	64.5	74.8
Protestant	0.1	0.6
Other	1.1	1
Difficulty in answering	4.2	1.5
	Ukraine	
Agnostic/do not confess to any religion	18.9	15.8
Greek Catholic (Uniate)	5.8	11.1
Judaism	0.4	0.2
Muslim (Islam)	1	0.2
Orthodox under the leadership of the Kyiv patriarch	47.2	36.6
Orthodox under the leadership of the Moscow patriarch	12.3	21.8
Protestant	1.9	1
Roman Catholic	0	0.6
Other	3.3	2.6
Difficulty in answering	8.5	10.1
Refused to answer	0.4	n/a
Did not answer	0.4	n/a

H8.
How often do you go to church (mosque, synagogue, or other religious establishment)?

	2003			*2010*		
	Azerbaijan	*Russia*	*Ukraine*	*Azerbaijan*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Daily	0.4	0.2	n/a	1.0		0.4
Weekly	1.6	1.4	n/a	3.4	3.0	11.1
Monthly	6.4	8.3	n/a	18.2	10.5	16.0
Yearly	31.2	27.7	n/a	37.6	42.5	47.5
Less than once a year	20.0	23.0	n/a	15.8	27.2	11.5
Do not go at all	39.8	37.8	n/a	23.6	14.2	11.1
Difficulty in answering	0.6	1.7	n/a	0.4	2.7	2.4

Notes

Introduction

1. Polling in Russia was conducted in January 2003 by the All-Russian Center for the Research into Public Opinion VTsIOM (known as the Levada Center from 2004), with a sample size of 1,264 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and ten regions of Russia. In Ukraine, polling was conducted in November 2002 by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology under the direction of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation with a sample size of 519 in Kyiv, Crimea, and twenty-four regions of Ukraine; in Azerbaijan, the GORBI group (Georgian Research Business International) conducted the polling in April 2003 with a sample size of 500 in Baku and nine regions of Azerbaijan. Polling in Russia and Ukraine was conducted among sixteen- to thirty-four-year-olds and Azerbaijan among eighteen- to thirty-four-year-olds, and was representative according to age, sex, level of education, region, and size of settlement. These polling results will be referred to as the 2003 data set throughout this study.

2. Nadia Diuk, "Pervoe Svobodnoe pokolenie: Molodezh, politika i identichnost' v Rosii, Ukraine i Azerbaidzhane" [The First Free Generation: Youth, Politics, and Identity in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan], *Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniya*, Jan–Feb 2004. Also, Nadia Diuk, "Russian Democracy in Eclipse: The Next Generation," *Journal of Democracy*, July 2004; Nadia Diuk, "Portrait of the Next Generation," *Azerbaijan International*, Winter 2003.

3. Polling in Russia was conducted by the Levada Center from 15–27 January 2010 with a sample size of 500 aged eighteen to thirty-four years old. Polling in Ukraine, under the direction of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation

and the Ukrainian Sociology Service took place in 14–26 December 2009 with a sample size of 500 aged eighteen to thirty-four years old; and in Azerbaijan, by the FAR CENTRE in March 2003, with a sample size of 500. The samples in all three countries were representative by age (divided into two groups eighteen to twenty-four years old and twenty-five to thirty-four years old), sex, level of education, region, and size of town or village. The statistical margin of error is less than 4.6 percent. These polling results will be referred to as the 2010 data set throughout this study. A consolidated chart of both sets of data is included as an appendix.

1. Youth: The Next Generation

1. *Glasnost*, meaning openness in terms of access to information, and *perestroika*, meaning "restructuring," or "reform," were the descriptions Mikhail Gorbachev gave to policies he introduced in the Soviet Union one year after his accession to the top leadership position of first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985.

2. Sarah Mendelson and Ted Gerber, "The Putin Generation: The Political Views of Russian Youth," presentation at Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 25, 2007.

3. Natalya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Public Affairs, 2000).

4. 2003 data set.

5. The Kyiv-based Gorshenin Institute conducted polling among students in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Poland from October 2010 to March 2011. The results were published in Gorshenin Institute, "Students—an Image of the Future," International Research 2011, http://gorshenin.eu/annuals/5_Students-an_Image_of_the_Futur.html (retrieved May 13, 2011).

2. The History of Youth

1. Hilary Pilkington, *Russia's Youth and Its Culture: A Nation's Constructors and Constructed* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 59.

2. Pilkington, *Russia's Youth and Its Culture*, 65.

3. For example, P. I. Babochkin, *Molodezh 97: Nadezhdy i razocharovaniya*, Sbornik Statei (Moscow: Institute of Youth and the Center for Sociological Research of Moscow State University, 1997). This collection of articles is a mixed bag with some highly original articles and others that miss the point. This study

was part of the federal program "Molodezh Rossii," which sought to research Russian youth's social situation, political preferences, and the success of the government's policies on youth.

4. A. A. Kozlov, *Molodye patrioty i grazhdane novoi Rossii (sotsiologicheskii ocherk)* (St. Petersburg: Om-Ekspress, 1999).

5. *Nomenklatura* refers to a system of allocating jobs in the Soviet Union and other Soviet-style states according to set approval procedures by the Communist Party. Being a member of the *nomenklatura* also brought with it access to goods and privileges which were not available to ordinary citizens.

6. See Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) for an examination of the process of disintegration of the Komsomol.

7. Hikmet Hadjy-Zadeh, "Some Thoughts on Youth in Azerbaijan," unpublished report, July 2003.

8. *Turan News*, April 18, 2003, www.turaninfo.com.

9. Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "Transformatsiya staroi nomenklatury v novorossiiskuyu elitu," *Obshchestvennyi nauki i sovremennost'* 1 (1995): 51–65.

10. For an account of how these deals were carried out, see Paul Klebnikov, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia* (New York: Harcourt, 2000).

11. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, speech delivered at the Grant-Makers East Conference, Moscow, October 2002.

12. Aleksander Razumkov, STB, "Vikna" 29 October 1998, quoted in V. Pikhovshek, S. Kononchuk, and O. Yarosh, *Rozvytok demokratii v Ukraini: 1998 rik* (Kyiv: UCIPR, 1999), 77.

13. See O. Kryshtanovskaya, "Young Oligarchs," translated in *NGO News* 21, published by Freedom House. The original of this article appeared in *Vremya MN*, January 2002.

14. V. A. Holoven'ko, "Problemy rozvytku ukrains'koho molodizhnoho rukhu na suchasnomu etapi," *Ukrains'kyi Sotsium*, January 2002.

15. N. P. Pishchulin and M. Yu. Fedorova, *Sotsiologiya liderstva* (Moscow: MGAV, 1997), 22, in the series Nauchnye trudy Moskovskogo gorodskogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta.

16. Elena Temicheva, "Molodye kadry—'zoloto partii'?" *Agency for Social Information Bulletin "Obshchestvennaya aktivnost' molodezhi"* 7, no. 37 (October 1999): 4.

17. Yuri Levada, remarks delivered at a conference, "The Present and Future of Three Key Post-Soviet States (Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine): Perspectives on Youth," Kyiv, June 18, 2003.

18. Liubov Gribanova, "Molodezhnyi elektorat v poiskakh samoopredeleniya," *Agency for Social Information Bulletin "Obshchestvennaya aktivnost' molodezhi"* 7, no. 37 (October 1999): 9.

19. Vyacheslav Bryukhovets'kyi, "Krytychna hran' buttya Ukrainy" (brochure), 2002.

3. Ukraine: Land of Paradoxes

1. Democratic Initiatives Foundation, "20-Richchya students'koi revolyutsii na hraniti, chy hotova s'ohodn'ishnya molod' do aktsii protest," http://dif.org.ua/ua/press/berkgoljk (retrieved May 20, 2011).

2. Ihor Ostrovs'kyi and Serhii Chernenko, *Velykyi Zlam: Khronika "Revoliutsii na hraniti 2-17 zhovtnia 1990 roku"* (Kyiv: Ahentstvo "Ukraina," 2000).

3. Oles' Doniy, *Pokolinnya oksamytovoyi revolyutsii (yak nam dozhyty do 2009 roku?)* (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 1999).

4. See N. Lysyuk, ed., *Dnipropetrovs'ka Sim'ya* (Kyiv: Fond Demokrtatii, 1996).

5. Doniy, *Pokolinnya oksamytovoyi revolyutsii.*

6. Quoted in S. Kononchuk and O. Yarosh, *Rozvytok demokratii v Ukraini: 1998 rik* (Kyiv: UCIPR, 1999), 75.

7. *Kievskie Vedomosti*, November 14, 2001.

8. See, for example, V. A. Holoven'ko, "Problemy rozvytku ukrains'koho molodizhnoho rukhu na suchasnomu etapi," *Ukrains'kyi Sotsium*, January 2002.

9. "'Svynstvo' u 'lyal'kovomu' teatri," *Ukraina Moloda*, November 10, 2000. See also "'Lyal'kovyi' shabash. Molod' stala 'harmatnym m'yasom' u borot'bi oliharkhiv z uryadom," *Sil's'ki Visti*, November 16, 2000.

10. "Chy ye v Ukraini efektyvna derzhavna molodizhna polityka?" *Ukraina i svit*, July 1–7, 2000.

11. V. Holovenko, "Stavlennia molodi do hromads'koho zhyttia," in *Molod' Ukrainy u dzerkali sotsiolohii*, ed. O. Balakirieva and O. Yaremchenko (Kyiv: Ukrains'kyi instytut sotial'nykh doslidzhen', 2001), 126.

12. Kuchma's address to parliament in 2000, www.president.gov.ua/officdocuments/officmessages/85605396.html.

13. The original article was by Thomas Carothers, "Civil Society," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1999–2000.

14. Myroslava Gongadze and Serhii Kudelia, *Rozirvaniy Nerv Khronolohiia hromads'koho protestu* (Kyiv: Fundatsia "Vidkryte Suspil'stvo," 2004).

15. A. Zubkov, "Pravda—ne na barykadakh. . . ," *Molod' Ukrainy*, February 6, 2001.

16. This wave of protest is well portrayed in the 2003 documentary film *Face of Protest.*

17. Dmytro Lykhoviy, "Nemaye v revolyutsii kintsya, 1968–2001: My vidmovlyayemosya hraty za fal'shyvymy pravylamy," *Ukraina moloda*, April 27, 2001.

18. S. Kononchuk, ed., *Rozvytok demokratii v Ukraini: 1997 rik* (Kyiv: Ahentstvo Ukraina, 1998), 93.

19. Kost' Bondarenko, "Zastupnykom hlavy Administratsii Prezydenta Ukrainy stav kolyshnyi vodiy Kyivs'koho zooparku," http://ukr.for-ua.com, June 29, 2002.

20. Valerii Khoroshkovsky, "Open Letter," published November 28, 2001, quoted in Bondarenko, "Zastupnykom hlavy."

21. Nadia Diuk, "In Ukraine, Homegrown Freedom," *Washington Post*, December 4, 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34008-2004Dec3.html (retrieved May 30, 2011).

22. Both organizations received most of their initial funding for these programs from the National Endowment for Democracy.

23. Author's interview with Taras Stetskiv, leader of the Maidan organization effort, March 11, 2005.

24. "First Year of the New Authorities: Intentions, Actions, and Results," *National Security and Defence* 3 (2011). Razumkov Center, 2011.

25. Polling conducted by Democratic Initiatives Foundation.

4. Azerbaijan: From Mugham to Facebook

1. "Public Opinion Poll on Moral and Social Stance of Azerbaijani Youth (June 3–July 3, 2010)," Center for Social Researches ADAM, under the auspices of FAR CENTRE, Baku, Azerbaijan.

2. Author's interview with Gunduz Tahirli, July 2001.

3. Thomas de Waal notes that the figure twenty-five thousand dead is used by the U.S. Department of State in *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 285.

4. Jean Patterson, "Dayirman: Rap Music for a New Generation," *Azerbaijan International*, Spring 2001.

5. Reported in Thomas Goltz's *Azerbaijan Diary* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 141.

6. For the story of one young soldier who became blind through his injuries, see Faig Karimov, "Turning Tragedy into Triumph—the Story of Faig Karimov," *Azerbaijan International*, Winter 2003, 48.

7. Author's interview with Gunduz Tahirli, July 2001.

8. Elin Suleymanov, "Youth in Search of the Future: Identity Changes in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan," *Azerbaijan International* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 10–11.

9. Hikmet Hadjiy-Zadeh, "Some Thoughts on Youth in Azerbaijan," unpublished report, July 2003.

10. "Rech Geydara Alieva na vstreche s Molodezhnoy Organizatsiey Partii Novyi Azerbeidzhan," February 2, 1998.

11. Hadjiy-Zadeh, "Some Thoughts on Youth in Azerbaijan."

12. G. G. Guliev, *Arkhetipichnye Azeri: liki mentaliteta* (Baku: Yeni Nesil, 2002).

13. Zurab Todua goes into this in his *Azerbaidzhanskyi pas'yans* (Moscow: ZAO "KON-Liga Press," 2001). He divides the Azerbaijani political elite into Nakhichevantsy, Bakintsy, Karabaghtsy, Talyshi, and Gyandzhintsy.

14. "Lider nachala XXI veka," *Informatsionno-analiticheskyi byulleten'* No 7 po itogam issledovaniy dekabr' 1999, fevral' i mart 2000, Prognoz nezavisimyi tsentr sosiologicheskikh issledovaniy.

15. Faris Ismayilzade, "Guest Editorial: Perspective from Youth, Moving Forward," *Azerbaijan International*, Winter 1999.

16. *Public Opinion on Moral and Social Stance of Azerbaijani Youth* (June 3–July 3, 2010), Centre for Social Research ADAM.

17. Aziza Mustafa-zadeh, born in 1969, has lived in Germany for the past two decades.

18. Section 907 was appended to the Freedom Support Act funding bill in 1992 as a ruling of the U.S. Congress that emerged as part of its assessment of the conflict around Karabagh and was meant as a sign of reprimand to Azerbaijan for its blockade of Armenia. It specified that no funds from the U.S. government could be used to support or benefit the government of Azerbaijan.

19. "Monitoring of Youth Organizations of Azerbaijan (2006)," *III ERA*, N7 August 2007, The Far Centre, Baku.

20. "Monitoring of Youth Organizations in Azerbaijan (July 2009)," The Far Centre, Baku.

21. Hadjiy-Zade, "Some Thoughts on Youth in Azerbaijan."

22. Hadjiy-Zade, "Some Thoughts on Youth in Azerbaijan."

23. Official website of the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Tourism, Statement by Vugar Yagubov, "Ministry of Youth, Sports and Tourism as a Conductor of State Youth Policy," www.infoyouth.az (retrieved in June 2004).

24. "Presidential Administration: Azerbaijan Is Only Post-Soviet State Paying Particular Attention to Youth," April 23, 2011, *Today.Az*, www.today.az/print/news/politics/84957.html (retrieved May 1, 2011).

25. *Generation Facebook in Baku*, ESI, www.esiweb.org.

26. Internet World Stats, Usage, and Population Statistics, www.internetworldstats.com/list2.htm (retrieved May 21, 2011).

27. "Freed Azerbaijani Blogger Says Year without Internet Was 'Torture,'" *RFERL*, November 19, 2010, www.rferl.org/content/Freed_Azerbaijani_Blogger_Says_Year_Without_Internet_Was_Torture/2224983.html (retrieved May 21, 2011).

28. *Generation Facebook in Baku*, European Stability Initiative, Berlin-Brussels, March 15, 2011, www.esiweb.org.

29. *Generation Facebook in Baku.*

5. Russia: Redefining the Nation

1. Yulia Yakusheva, "20 let bez SSSR: Glazami drugogo pokoleniya," March 30, 2011, www.ia-centr.ru/expert/10137 (retrieved May 22, 2011).

2. Sarah Mendelson, CSIS, and Ted Gerber, "The Putin Generation: The Political Views of Russian Youth," University of Wisconsin-Madison, July 25, 2007.

3. M. K. Gorshkov, ed., *Srednii klass v sovremennom rossiiskom obshchestve* (Moscow: Rossiiskii nezavisimyi instytut sotsial'nykh i natsional'nykh problem, 1999), 87.

4. Olesia Blazhenova and Tatyana Gurova, "Klass," *Ekspert*, September 18, 2000.

5. Svetlana Kononova, "The Golden Mean: While Authorities Say That the Middle Class Will Account for the Majority of the Russian Population by 2020, Critics Say It's Impossible," February 21, 2011, http://russiaprofile.org (retrieved March 12, 2011).

6. Natalya Alyakrinskaya and Dmitriy Dokuchaev, "Ot'ezd s otyagchayushchimi obstoyatel'stvami, Srednii klass bezhit iz Rossii," *New Times* 17 (May 23, 2011), http://newtimes.ru/articles/print/39135 (retrieved May 30, 2011).

7. Forbes Staff, "The World's Billionaires," *Forbes*, March 9, 2011, www.forbes.com/wealth/billionaires#p_2_s_arank_-1__195 (retrieved April 21, 2011).

8. Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "The Khaki Colored Government," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 19, 2003, cited from WPS Monitoring Agency.

9. Author's interview with Vladimir Ryzhkov, October 21, 2002.

10. Kryshtanovskaya, Olga, "Transformatsiya staroi nomenklatury v novuyurossiiskuyuelitu," *Obshchestvennyi nauki i sovremennost'* 1 (1995): 51–65.

11. See the series of interviews conducted by Ludmila Teren' in *Moskovskie Novosti* 2002 and 2003, under the rubric "Pokolenie Putina" (Putin's Generation). Interviewees have included Grigory Yavlinsky, Sergei Stepashin, Irina Khakamada, Antoly Chubais, Yegor Gaidar, Nikolai Fedorov, Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Prusak, and Sergei Glazev. She begins with the assumption that any of these politicians could have been a candidate for president in 2000.

12. Author's interview with Vladimir Ryzhkov, October 2002.

13. From the 2003 data set; this question was specific to Russia with the political parties named in the questionnaire.

14. See figures from the Levada Center at www.levada.ru/press/2004011201.html.

15. Anna Zakatonova, "Politicheskie igry mladshego pokoleniya," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 195, October 18, 2001.

16. Author's interview with Vladimir Shmelev, October 30, 2000.

17. Author's interview with Andrey Sharomov, June 26, 2001.

18. "Rossiyskie komsomol'tsy sporyat iz-za Putina," *Lenta.ru*, March 20, 2000, www.lenta.ru/vybory/2000/03/20/komsomol.

19. Anna Zakatnova, "Litso 'medvezh'ei' molodezhi," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 28, 2000, www.ng.ru/printed/7229.

20. Alexander Nikitin and Jane Buchanan, "The Kremlin's Civic Forum: Cooperation or Co-optation for Civil Society in Russia?" *Demokratizatsiya*, www.demokratizatsiya.org/archives/pdfs/upload/DEM%2010-2%20Nikitin-Buchanan.PDF (retrieved May 23, 2011).

21. Author's interview with Arseniy Roginskii of Memorial, July 2002.

22. "Manifest molodozhnogo dvizheniia 'Nashi,'" www.nashi.su/pravda/83974709.

23. Anna Kachurovskaya, "Paren' is 'nashego' ozera: Ispoved' 'nashista,'" *Vlast'* 29 (July 30, 2007).

24. *Levada.ru*, www.levada.ru/press/2011021002.html (retrieved April 23, 2011).

25. Georgy Bovt, "Will Russia's Youth Follow the Egyptian Example," *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, February 10, 2011, http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/02/10/will_russias_youth_follow_the_egyptian_example_12447.html (retrieved April 23, 2011).

26. Nashi, www.nashi.su/president_stairs.

27. "Internet protiv zomboyashchika," *Gazeta.ru*, December 21, 2010, www.gazeta.ru/comments/2010/12/21_e_3473009.shtml.

28. D. Dragunskii, ed., *Obshchestvennyi dogovor: Sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie* (Moscow: Vserossiiskii Tsentr Izucheniya Obshchestvennogo Mneniya [VTsIOM], 2001).

29. *Sliyanie* (merger) was the term used in Soviet times in discussions of Soviet nationalities' policy, which aimed at one time to bring about the merger of all of the nations within the Soviet Union to create one Soviet nation.

30. Yuri Levada, "Sociological Portrait of Russia's Rising Generation," interview *Trud* 192 (2001).

31. Levada, "Sociological Portrait of Russia's Rising Generation."

32. According to one source, *Runet v Tsifrakh* by Dmitriy Chistov, there are now 43 million users on the Internet in Russia and 62 percent of those are between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four; see http://conf2010.weballiance.ru/download/chistov_krasnoyarsk.pdf.

6. Three Countries in Comparative Perspective

1. Additional polling for this project conducted in Ukraine among young people eighteen to thirty-five years old by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation.

2. Polling was conducted in Ukraine at the end of 2009 before the presidential election of February 2010.

3. Polling conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation.

4. Positive and negative ratings were combined to reach the "aggregate" figure.

5. 2003 data set.

6. 2003 data set.

7. Iryna Bekeshkina, "Molod u polititsi (Youth in Politics)," paper delivered at Ukraine in the XXI Century—Attitudes of the Younger Generation, conference organized by Democratic Initiatives Foundation, January 30, 2003.

8. 2003 data set.

9. 2010 data set.

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About the Author

Nadia Diuk is a long-time resident of Washington, DC, where she now serves as vice president for programs in Europe, Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). She has been with the NED for over twenty years, starting her career there as program officer for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. She worked on providing assistance to dissidents and underground activists leading up to the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 and reached out to the national democratic movements of the Soviet Union in its final days as it disintegrated in order to provide support for democratic activities and to strengthen the values of freedom and democracy. She has travelled extensively in the former Soviet Union and has cultivated a broad network of contacts among the civic activists in this region over the years. Dr. Diuk is the coauthor of two books, *The Hidden Nations* and *New Nations Rising*, which focus on the emerging nations of the former Soviet Union.

Born and raised in the United Kingdom, Dr. Diuk gained a BA (hons.) in modern history at the University of Sussex and gained a masters' degree in Russian and Eastern European studies and a doctorate in history at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford.