

5

Russia, the Balkans, and Ukraine in the 1870s

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In the 1870s Alexander II had to respond to Slavonic awakenings in both the Balkans and Ukraine. In the Balkan case he began by discouraging local freedom-fighters but subsequently intervened on their side; in the Ukrainian case he began by permitting expressions of particularism but subsequently stamped them out. The immediate purpose of the present essay is to explain why the tsar responded in these different ways; the more deep-seated objective is to shed light on the differences between the political opinions of educated Russians and ethnically conscious Ukrainians in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Balkan crisis of the mid-1870s arose when a Slavonic revolt against Ottoman rule in Hercegovina in June 1875 spread to the adjacent Ottoman province of Bosnia and inclined the nearby autonomous principalities of Montenegro and Serbia to contemplate a war with the Ottomans on behalf of their cousins. A revolt among Bulgarians at the end of April 1876 and the subsequent 'Bulgarian horrors' increased Serbian and Montenegrin enthusiasm for the fray. By the time the two principalities declared war on the Porte on 20 June 1876, many of the tsar's subjects believed he should help them.

Their reasons were various. Some felt a sense of kinship with fellow Orthodox Christians. Some saw an opportunity to reverse Russia's defeat in her last conflict with the Ottomans (the Crimean War). Some stressed the need for the Russian Emperor to look to his laurels at a time when the King of Prussia had become Emperor of Germany and the Queen of England was becoming Empress of India. Mikhail Cherniaev, a retired Russian general who made his way to Belgrade in

April 1876 to take charge of the Serbs' armed forces, was partly motivated by personal ambition.¹ Nikolai Ignat'ev, the tsar's ambassador at Istanbul, feared Vienna, arguing that

If Austria–Hungary managed at some point to get the Serbs and Bulgarians into her hands in a political, economic, and military sense, to strengthen the Poles (who depend on her natural allies, the Hungarians), and to bring them closer to the Czechs, Vienna would head a Slavo-Catholic federation that would be hostile to us; in that event the significance of Russia would be at an end in Europe, and serious dangers would arise on our western frontier.²

At first the tsar was cautious. In a statement of October 1875 he emphasized the readiness of all the principal European states to assist the Ottomans in improving the circumstances of their Slavonic subjects, and expressed confidence in Ottoman preparedness to respond to Europe's concern.³ He seems to have paid as much attention to his judicious foreign minister, Alexander Gorchakov, as he did to the excitable Ignat'ev, and to have preferred negotiation rather than confrontation with Austria.⁴ He tried to get Cherniaev to come home from Serbia, and succeeded in preventing General Rostislav Fadeev from joining him.⁵ His censors took exception to the newspaper Cherniaev had edited in St Petersburg on the grounds that, in their opinion, it was trying to persuade the government to make war in the Balkans and 'have done with the Eastern Question once and for all'.⁶ In May 1876 the British Foreign Secretary confided to his diary that 'The Czar dislikes war on principle.'⁷

By the end of October 1876, however, when Alexander addressed the Moscow gentry on the subject of the Balkans, he was speaking of his 'firm intention to act independently' if he could not get his way by international agreement.⁸ By April 1877 he had provoked the Ottoman Empire into declaring war on him. When his troops crossed the Danube on their way south in June, he announced that 'Time and circumstances have not altered that sympathy which Russia has nurtured towards her co-religionists in the East.'⁹ On the twenty-third anniversary of his accession to the throne in early 1878 he allowed Ignat'ev to impose the Treaty of San Stefano on the Ottoman Empire and brought into being a large autonomous Bulgaria. He lost face when the Great Powers required modification of the treaty at the subsequent Congress of Berlin, but so far as the Slavs of the Balkans were concerned he could take comfort from the fact that, at the end of the crisis,

Hercegovina and Bosnia had escaped the embrace of the Turks (if only for that of the Austrians); Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania had gained full independence from Istanbul; and a small autonomous Bulgaria had emerged whose orientation in foreign affairs might have been expected to be pro-Russian. Alexander could not be said to have pursued the interests of Balkan Slavs single-mindedly, but nor could he be said to have ignored them.

If, on the other hand, one tried to assess Alexander's attitude towards non-Russian Slavs in the mid-1870s on the basis of the way in which he dealt with ethnically conscious Ukrainians, one would be obliged to conclude that, in a crisis, he was likely to insist on maintaining their subordination.

The two main Ukrainian activists of the 1870s, Pavlo Chubyns'kyi and Mykhailo Drahomanov, had both been in trouble with the imperial authorities in the 1860s. Chubyns'kyi was exiled to the province of Archangel for unsettling Ukrainian peasants in 1862;¹⁰ Drahomanov earned no plaudits for recommending the use of Ukrainian as the medium of instruction in Ukrainian primary schools in 1866.¹¹ At the end of the decade, however, and for a few years thereafter, the regime appeared almost to encourage Ukrainian attempts to delineate a specifically Ukrainian identity. Chubyns'kyi was given charge of an ethnographic survey of the south-western provinces of the empire which generated what is still an essential source for the study of Ukrainian customs.¹² Drahomanov earned his master's degree at the University of Kiev in 1870 and was promptly funded for foreign study to prepare himself for eventual appointment as a Kiev professor. In 1873 the authorities allowed Chubyns'kyi, Drahomanov, and other Ukrainophiles to set up a South-West Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society. For the first seven months of 1875 Drahomanov ran the *Kiev Telegraph* (*Kievskii telegraf*), a major Kiev newspaper. Briefly, the South-West Section and the newspaper enabled ethnically conscious Ukrainians to achieve a more substantial public profile than they had ever had previously in the Russian Empire.

The newspaper illustrates the use they made of their opportunities.¹³ Their programmatic statement on taking charge of it cited a number of instances in the past in which the south-western region of the Russian Empire had provided the north with object lessons and went on to claim that the vitality of the region's local press might be on the point of supplying another.¹⁴ An account of the work of the South-West Section argued that it was right to dwell on the culture of Ukrainian inhabitants of Ukraine rather than the cultures of Poles and Jews; that

its activities were attracting attention both in the imperial capital and abroad; and that its ethnographic finds required the establishment of a permanent Ukrainian museum.¹⁵ A pair of articles defended the South-West Section's wording of the language question in the Kiev city census of March 1874, which by preventing East Slav respondents from calling their language 'general Russian' (*obshcherusskii*) had obliged them to plump for Russian, Ukrainian, or Belarusian.¹⁶ A review of Ukrainian scholarly activity detailed a wealth of books and other studies in the fields of Ukrainian ethnography and history and pointed out that many Ukraine-related papers had been read at the Empire's Third Archaeological Congress (which had taken place in Kiev in 1874).¹⁷ News that Austria intended to open a university in Chernivtsi prompted an article on the ethnic composition of the Bukovyna, where Ukrainians were the largest single group.¹⁸ On 1 June 1875 the newspaper devoted the whole of its front page to a discussion of Ukraine's greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko.

The newspaper and the activities and interests it chose to report provoked antipathy among non-Ukrainophile inhabitants of Ukraine. These tended either to be sympathetic to the idea of a strongly integrated Russian Empire or, in the case of Poles and Jews, to be ill-disposed towards Russians but positively hostile to ethnically conscious Ukrainians. In April 1875 Mikhail Iuzefovich, a well-connected Russophile, resigned from the South-West Section and despatched an anti-Ukrainophile diatribe to St Petersburg.¹⁹ The imperial authorities had to decide whose side they were on. In August 1875 the tsar established a commission to advise him. The following year the commission recommended: (1) a ban on the importation into the Russian Empire of Ukrainian-language books published abroad; (2) a ban on the publication within the Russian Empire of most sorts of writing in Ukrainian; (3) a ban on theatrical productions and public readings in Ukrainian and musical publications with Ukrainian words; (4) the closure of the *Kiev Telegraph*; (5) increased monitoring of teachers in Ukrainian primary schools and exclusion from the libraries of Ukrainian primary and secondary schools of books and brochures whose dissemination and publication were to be halted under the first two recommendations; (6) the acquisition of information about the attitude towards Ukrainophilism of schoolteachers in Ukraine, the despatch of those who were unsound in this regard to non-Ukrainian provinces, and their replacement with Russians; (7) orders to the Minister of Internal Affairs to contact the relevant authority in respect of the activity and orientation of the South-West Section and to present a special report

on two members of that Section, Chubyns'kyi and Drahomanov; and (8) an order to the head of the Russian Empire's secret police that he request a subsidy for *The Word (Slovo)*, a newspaper published in Habsburg-ruled Galicia. By approving the commission's final report with only one significant emendation on 18 May 1876, the tsar turned its recommendations into law. His approval, usually called the 'Ems ukaz' (because Alexander was taking the waters at Ems near Koblenz), constituted the greatest misfortune to befall ethnically conscious Ukrainians in the course of the nineteenth century.²⁰

Why then did the tsar assist the Slavs of the Balkans but repress ethnically conscious Ukrainian inhabitants of the Russian Empire? The following answers appear in what to me is an ascending order of likelihood.

Since the official file on the Ems ukaz barely referred to contemporary Balkan developments, it may be that the tsarist authorities simply saw no connection between their Ukrainian and Balkan problems. Although Nikolai Ignat'ev included Ukrainian autonomy among the 'serious dangers' that he thought could arise on the Russian Empire's western frontier if Austria established a 'Slavo-Catholic federation', he prefaced it with a 'perhaps' which indicated that the prospect worried him less than a reborn Poland and autonomy for Lithuania and the Baltic provinces.²¹

Yet educated inhabitants of Ukraine had been setting their country in the context of the wider Slavonic world since at least the beginning of the 1820s.²² The most important document produced by the 'Kirillo-Methodian Society', a Kiev-based discussion group prosecuted in 1847 for supposedly subversive inclinations, was a summary history of the world whose principal argument was that Slavs in general (and Ukrainians in particular) had retained their primeval virtues when other peoples had lost them.²³ The 21 Ukrainian signatories of a letter from Kiev to a newspaper in Moscow in November 1862 justified the promotion of Ukraine's cultural identity partly on the grounds that everyone – so the signatories said – sympathized with the contemporary efforts of Bulgarians, Croatians, Slovenes, and Lusatian Sorbs to resurrect or develop their literatures. Why, the signatories asked, must the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire (*Rusiny russkie*) 'alone be denied a right granted to all other nationalities?'²⁴ In 1875 and 1876 popular support for the cause of the Balkan Slavs may have been greater in Russian-ruled Ukraine than it was in Russia.²⁵

Could the imperial authorities really have been oblivious to the fact that, if the Balkans rose, Ukraine might follow? They had certainly

worried about the possibility of interaction between Ukrainians and other subordinate Slavs when they closed down the Kirillo-Methodian Society in 1847, for they dubbed that circle the 'Ukraino-Slavonic Society' and looked, in the course of their investigations, not merely at Ukrainians whom they suspected of involvement in it but also at Russians whose interest lay in the general phenomenon of Slavonic culture.²⁶ Their failure explicitly to connect Ukrainians and other subordinate Slavs in the mid-1870s may have arisen not from their ignorance of a link between the two but from the fact that, by then, the connection was so obvious that it did not have to be spelt out.

The authorities would have been dim indeed if they had been unaware that Drahomanov, one of the Ukrainian activists who most troubled them, devoted even more time than most educated Ukrainians to locating his fellow-countrymen on the spectrum of subordinate Slavonic cultures. Drahomanov was sensitive to the fact that his own family was of Balkan provenance.²⁷ His activities in Ukraine in the mid-1870s could be regarded as the local application of a programme he had designed for Slavs beyond the frontier of the Russian Empire in 1868. '[H]istorical circumstances', he wrote at that time, 'have given the western Slavonic world three tasks at present: (1) the extension of education to the masses of the peoples, both for knowledge and the retention of their ethnic identity; (2) interaction, initially cultural, for mutual aid and the acquisition of political rights, and (3) influence on the educated world, historical activism like that displayed by other great tribes'.²⁸ That Drahomanov felt Ukraine belonged to the world in which the pursuit of such goals was appropriate is confirmed, up to a point, by his statement of 1870 that Russians ought to take Ukrainian culture more seriously because 'Geographically, ethnographically, and historically Little Russia [the contemporary Russian-language term for Ukraine] is a bridge [*perekhodnyi chlen*] between Russia and south-west Slavdom'.²⁹ In 1875 Drahomanov was responsible for the appearance in the *Kiev Telegraph* of articles on 'The Political and Cultural Strengths of the Southern Slavs', conflict among Czech national parties, Serbian domestic politics, and 'Hopes and Disappointments in Western Slavdom'.³⁰ He may have been the first inhabitant of the Russian Empire actually to pass money to the rebels of Hercegovina and Bosnia.³¹ When he said in a private letter of 1876 that he made no distinction between politics inside and outside the Russian Empire,³² he surely had in mind the fact that what to him was the principal political issue of the day, subordinate Slavdom, straddled the Empire's frontier. Immediately after learning of the Ems *ukaz*, he

pointed out how remarkable it was that it had been issued 'at a time when so much is being said about Russia's Slavonic liberating mission'.³³ He maintained an interest in Bulgaria after 1878 and spent the last six years of his life as a professor there.³⁴ He was still writing about the relationship between the domestic and foreign policies of the tsarist regime in the 1890s.³⁵ Although almost all Ukrainian political thinkers of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries implied the need for the deconstruction of the Russian Empire,³⁶ not many of them thought as hard as Drahomanov about re-designing east Elbian Europe as a whole. Since Drahomanov's opinions were no secret and officials hounded him for them – he was dismissed from Kiev University at the end of the summer of 1875 and left the Russian Empire for Vienna several months before the promulgation of the Ems *ukaz*³⁷ – it seems unwise to suppose that the Russian authorities were unaware, when they suppressed Ukrainophilism, that they were also adopting a position on subordinate Slavs in general.

If it is unlikely, then, that the tsarist authorities simply saw no connection between their Ukrainian and Balkan problems, perhaps the different ways in which they treated them can be explained by a closer look at dates. A telegram at the end of the file on the Ems *ukaz* makes clear that it was being enacted at the very moment the tsar was trying to get Cherniaev back from Serbia.³⁸ The possibility therefore arises that at the time of the *ukaz* Russian policy was hostile to Slavonic causes both inside and outside the Russian Empire.

This argument may be countered, however, by pointing to the fact that the tsarist authorities continued to repress Ukrainians after their attitude to the Slavs of the Balkans had become more generous. The censors decided in February 1877, for example, that a brochure by Drahomanov entitled *On the Question of Little Russian Literature* had to be 'absolutely prohibited'.³⁹ The Governor of Kiev despatched an alarmist report to St Petersburg in April 1877 when he learned that a society of radical Ukrainophiles in Kiev was pretending to collect money for the Serbian cause but in fact sending it to Drahomanov in Geneva (whither he had moved from Vienna) to support the publication there and in L'viv of 'revolutionary books and journals'.⁴⁰ I have tried to show elsewhere that the authorities adhered rigorously to the policy enshrined in the Ems *ukaz* from the moment they conceived it until at least the revolution of 1905.⁴¹

This long-term anti-Ukrainophilism tends to undermine the further possibility that whereas the tsar's Balkan policy was carefully considered, his Ukrainian edict was a knee-jerk reaction to a sudden but

passing shock. Superficially, distinguishing between the Balkan and Ukrainian policies along these lines has something to recommend it. Alexander took 22 months to commit himself to intervention in the Balkans (June 1875–April 1877). Although he seems also to have taken his time to decide upon the repression of Ukrainians (13 months, if one reckons from Iuzefovich's diatribe of April 1875 to the *ukaz* of May 1876), the appearance is deceptive because his bureaucrats did not convene for the purpose of drafting the anti-Ukrainian legislation until five weeks before it was ready for his signature.⁴² Of government officials, only the censors contributed a significant memorandum to the file from which the *ukaz* emerged.⁴³ Provincial governors were not consulted.⁴⁴ Iuzefovich, who had followed up his original diatribe with a second paper, was very much the driving force.⁴⁵ Thus the anti-Ukrainian edict seems not to have been the product of mature reflection. The government could almost be said to have been 'bounced' (by Iuzefovich). But if lack of reflection on the part of officials sprang from the fact that all they wanted to do was eliminate a short-term difficulty, then considerations other than those operative in 1876 must have come into play to ensure the long-term operation of the edict; and it is hard to see what those considerations might have been.

It is far likelier, in fact, that the tsarist authorities did not feel the need to reflect widely on Ukrainian matters in 1876 because they knew where they stood on them and needed only to re-state their position. Indeed, an obvious way of explaining the difference between Russia's policies on the Balkans and Ukraine in the 1870s is to say that in both cases the tsarist authorities simply replicated the way in which they had acted when Balkan or Ukrainian developments had troubled them on earlier occasions. By the mid-1870s it was becoming conventional, in official Russian circles, to try to stay out of Balkan problems but eventually engage with them and to foster Ukrainian 'awakenings' but then condemn them. In respect of the Balkans one might compare Russia's hesitancy with regard to the Serbs and Bulgarians in the 1870s with her even greater hesitancy at the time of the Greek revolt of the 1820s.⁴⁶ In respect of Ukrainians one might compare the Russian authorities' non-obstruction of Ukrainophilia in the years 1869–75 with similar periods of non-obstruction in 1845–6 and 1859–62, both of which ended in proscription only a little less far-reaching than that of 1876.⁴⁷

But the possibility that there was nothing new about the way in which the tsar responded to his Balkan and Ukrainian problems of the 1870s does not explain why his responses differed. On the contrary: far

from resolving the paradox of support for one sort of non-Russian Slav and hostility to another, it deepens it.

Two explanations offer better prospects than any I have outlined so far. The first turns on Russian public opinion, which was strongly supportive of the Balkan Slavs but patronizing towards Ukrainians. The second abandons altogether the attempt to explain the imperial authorities' attitude to non-Russian Slavs in terms of Slavonic inter-relations, and claims instead that the tsar's different responses had in common the defence or promotion of the interests of the Russian state, whether or not those interests coincided with the interests of subordinate Slavs in either the Balkans or Ukraine. I shall devote the rest of my space to these approaches.

The contention that Russian public opinion was strongly supportive of the Balkan Slavs has been the theme of so many studies that it hardly needs developing.⁴⁸ I gave reasons at the beginning why many of the tsar's subjects believed he should help Serbia and Montenegro in their war with the Turks of June 1876. Perhaps the most notable of those who disagreed were the handful of revolutionaries who believed that socialism should come before nationalism or that involvement in the cause of the Balkan Slavs would distract radicals from work at home.⁴⁹ Even Russian peasants appear to have been excited by the cause.⁵⁰ Vronskii's departure for the Balkans at the end of *Anna Karenina* was a fiction taken from the life. For detailed confirmation of the fact that Russians tended to be enthusiastic proponents of intervention one has only to recall that just before the tsar declared at the end of October 1876 that he had a 'firm intention to act independently', pro-Slav sentiment among educated Russians had reached a peak. Serbia and Montenegro had performed badly in their war with the Turks. The tsar had helped them procure a truce, but many felt he ought to do more. Aleksei Suvorin, editor of the St Petersburg newspaper *New Time* (*Novoe vremia*), had become a war-monger.⁵¹ In a speech at the Moscow Slavonic Beneficent Committee on 24 October, Ivan Aksakov suggested that

the moment has finally come for the Russian people [*dlia russkoi zemli*] to hand over its business to the state – a business of state-level importance which until now, for so many months, with an incredible expenditure of effort, it has borne on its shoulders alone, without help or co-operation from its government. I mean by this not merely the care of sick, hungry, orphaned Bulgarians and Serbs of various kinds, not merely help in the form of money and cloth-

ing, but help in the form of blood, the intense work of liberation – in a word the active involvement of the Russian people in the Serbs' very war for Slavonic independence. The truce just signed by the Porte does not yet guarantee that peace will follow ...⁵²

It is easy to imagine, in the light of this speech, that when Alexander began shifting towards a policy of military action in the Balkans he did so at least in part because he could no longer resist pressure from public opinion.

It is equally easy to argue that Alexander felt able to take strong action against ethnically conscious Ukrainians because he knew that few educated people would leap to their defence. I have mentioned that, in nineteenth-century Russian, the term for 'Ukraine' was 'Little Russia'. This usage did not admit of the possibility that Russians and Ukrainians were fundamentally different from each other. Rather, it implied something akin to the 'indissoluble brotherhood' of Russians and Ukrainians of which so much was to be made in the Soviet period of East Slavonic history. Hardly any nineteenth-century Russian intellectuals thought of Ukrainian culture as more than a local variant of their own. Tchaikovsky had not fallen prey to Ukrainophilia when, in 1872, he based his Second Symphony, the 'Little Russian', on Ukrainian folksongs. On the contrary, he was at the height of his Russian nationalism.⁵³ When Ukrainians gave educated Russians the impression that Ukrainian and Russian culture were separable, Russians deplored the idea. Their disdain for the three concentrated manifestations of Ukrainophilism in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire may be readily illustrated. In 1847 Aleksei Khomiakov, who is usually said to have been enthusiastic about the development of Slavonic as opposed to Western culture, condemned what the regime called the 'Ukraino-Slavonic Society' on the grounds that 'The time for politics is past'; in 1863 the journalist Mikhail Katkov ridiculed the attempt of ethnically conscious Ukrainians to promote the primary education of their fellow-countrymen in Ukrainian rather than Russian; in 1876 Iuzefovich claimed simply that 'The tsarist principle is as sacred and precious to the Little Russian people as it is to the Great Russian people' and that 'Little Russians have never placed their birthplace [*rodina*] above their fatherland [*otechestvo*]'.⁵⁴ Even the most liberal St Petersburg newspaper of the 1870s expressed no more than condescending toleration of what it called 'Ukrainian enthusiasms'.⁵⁵ A conservative Moscow quarterly condemned them.⁵⁶ Between the 1860s and the 1890s the literary critic Alexander Pypin was perhaps the only

prominent Russian intellectual to express open sympathy for the aspirations of ethnically conscious Ukrainians.⁵⁷

It looks, therefore, as if the weight of public opinion is a strong answer to the question why Alexander II treated his Balkan and Ukrainian problems differently. In this interpretation, the tsar acted as he did because educated Russians were well disposed to the non-Russian Slavs of the Balkans but unwilling to accept that there might be non-Russian Slavs (other than Poles) in Ukraine.

An answer based on the strength of Russian public opinion is unlikely to be complete, however, because imperial officials were not well known for taking public opinion seriously. Admittedly, the tsar's doveish foreign minister, Gorchakov, does seem to have noticed that public opinion on the Balkan question was at fever pitch in late October 1876, for in a letter of that date to the Russian Ambassador in London he made a vague connection between 'national and Christian sentiment in Russia' and 'duties [in the Balkans] which His Majesty cannot disregard'.⁵⁸ As a whole, however, the letter expressed outrage at the thought that foreign powers could believe the Russian Empire's intentions were aggressive. As the regime moved closer to war, moreover, the tsar was careful to sideline the Slavonic Beneficent Committees which had played such a part in bringing the public to fever pitch in the first place.⁵⁹ Clamour for military action on his part, therefore, seems not to have been Alexander's primary reason for going to war in the Balkans. If, incidentally, his goal in making war was indeed to satisfy the Russian public, he came nowhere near achieving it.⁶⁰

Public opinion may not have been the primary reason for the tsar's Ukrainian policy either. It is more likely that it simply made easier the pursuit of a policy Alexander would have adopted anyway. The censors began their memorandum in the file on the Ems *ukaz* by saying that one of their most important duties was 'to safeguard the state from such threats to its unity and existing structure as may arise in the sphere of the printed word'. Their conclusion, twenty pages later, was that if Ukrainophile writers, 'this ever-growing handful of people, are permitted to continue their separatist activity, then gradually there may emerge among the masses to whom they address themselves such thoughts and impulses as it will no longer be possible to cope with by censors' measures'. Although, on the way to this conclusion, the censors did everything they could to belittle Ukrainophilism (claiming, for example, that Ukrainophiles exaggerated the extent to which the Ukrainian language differed from Russian by spelling it oddly, and arguing that anyway the two languages were mutually

comprehensible), the general tenor of their argument was that Ukraine was a country *in posse* whose emergence to statehood had to be prevented at all costs. This was to take the aspirations of Ukrainian intellectuals more seriously than they were taken by Khomiakov, Katkov, or Iuzefovich. Since many of the specific provisions of the Ems *ukaz* came from the censors' paper, the government's Ukrainian policy begins to look less reactive and more studied.⁶¹

Having boxed myself into a corner, therefore, so far as the importance of public opinion is concerned, I turn to the last of my possibilities: that the tsar's different responses to his Balkan and Ukrainian problems had in common the interests of the Russian state. This argument comes in two versions. First, the tsar believed reasons of state required him to prevent Austria–Hungary from pre-empting him in the Balkans or threatening him across the south-west frontier of his Empire. Second, and probably more important, Alexander was committed to a form of statism that involved insisting on his own authority. These variants of the statist imperative seem to me to provide the best way of explaining the conundrum I began with.

Nikolai Ignat'ev was not alone in feeling that the principal reason why Russia had to act in the Balkans was to prevent Austria from pre-empting her. Ivan Aksakov agreed with him. Although, in October 1876, Aksakov gave the impression at the Moscow Slavonic Beneficent Committee that the cause of 'Slavonic independence' was enough on its own to justify Russian action in the Balkans, in a private letter of July 1875 he had placed the emphasis elsewhere. After saying that he was 'very much occupied and troubled by the Slavonic movement in Turkey', he went on:

To my mind there is not the least doubt that this is all Austria's doing, that, under cover of friendship with Russia, Austria is trying to lay hands on the East (or what goes by the name of the East in Europe). Austria has grasped, or Bismarck has explained to her, that it is incomparably more profitable to be close friends with Russia than to be openly at odds with her. Since this Triple Alliance of emperors came into being, roles in the Balkans have changed. Austrian policy has become active and aggressive, whereas we have become the thankless exponents of a policy of restraint, obstruction, and the pursuit of intolerable compromises.⁶²

Thus the man who is usually held to be one of the greatest exponents of the positive case for Slavonic liberation seems to have been equally

strongly motivated by the negative consideration that Russia had to act in the Balkans to prevent Austria forestalling her. Despite appearances to the contrary, Alexander II probably shared this position. Although he negotiated with Austria enthusiastically, in Balkan matters Russian rulers were well used to Austrian perfidy. By signing the Treaty of Carlowitz with the Ottomans in 1699 (and gaining the greater part of Hungary), Vienna had put an end to Peter the Great's dreams of an international crusade against Islam. Joseph II and Leopold II had been half-hearted in their support for Catherine the Great in the Russo-Turkish war of 1787–91. Alexander himself had been obliged to pull out of the Crimean War when Austria intimated that she might join the coalition against him. It is hard to believe, in the light of these considerations, that the tsar was wholehearted in his pursuit of agreement with Austria in 1876 and early 1877. He had assisted Napoleon III, after all, at the time of the Franco-Piedmontese campaign against Austria in north Italy in 1859. He had looked on complacently when Prussia drove Austria out of Germany in the second half of the 1860s. He certainly ignored his Austrian deals of 1876–7 in the brief period when he was in a position to do so, for, despite the fact that he had agreed not to create a large Slavonic state in the Balkans, he brought one into being at San Stefano. Two years after the Congress of Berlin he approved for distribution to his key diplomats a memorandum written by his War Minister which recommended that the Russian Empire ought to work towards the creation of a profoundly anti-Austrian confederation of Balkan states. It can be argued, then, that Alexander's main reason for intervening in the Balkans in 1877 was to put Austria in her place. In this interpretation his enthusiasm for Balkan Slavs was never more than a pretext and Academician Derzhavin was right when he said that the tsarist regime's attitude towards them would have been just the same if they had been Eskimos, Indians, or Persians.⁶³

It is no less possible to treat Alexander's Ukrainian policy as a reaction to his mistrust of Austria, though in this case the reaction was not to Vienna's formal conduct of international relations but rather to what, in Russian eyes, were alarming developments in Galicia, the province on the north-eastern edge of the Dual Monarchy which contained roughly equal numbers of Ukrainians and Poles (and a substantial Jewish minority). Iuzefovich was thinking partly of Galicia when he claimed in his second submission to the tsar's Ukrainian commission that 'The political idea of Little Russian exceptionality is an invention of Austro-Polish intrigue.'⁶⁴ The censors said that one of the

reasons why the activities of Kievan Ukrainophiles had to be taken seriously was that 'they coincide with similar activity on the part of Ukrainophiles in Galicia, who are constantly talking about a fifteen-million-strong south Russian people as if it were something separate from the other branches of the Russian trunk with a special fate ahead of it'. 'This opinion', the censors went on, 'will sooner or later throw the Galician Ukrainophiles, and then ours, into the arms of the Poles, who are right to see in the Ukrainophiles' separatist aspirations a movement which will be of the utmost use to them in the pursuit of their own "Polish business".'⁶⁵ These judgements underpinned the provisions of the Ems *ukaz* which banned the importation into the Russian Empire of Ukrainian-language books published abroad and ordered a subsidy to *The Word*, a Galician newspaper whose orientation the Russian authorities believed to be Russophile.

The views of Iuzefovich and the censors on the Polish-Ukrainian relationship and Galicia were not very well informed. Although the thought that ethnically conscious Ukrainians were tools of the Poles occurred to Russians in all three periods of concentrated Ukrainophilism in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire,⁶⁶ it was largely a figment of their imagination. In 1863 the Ukrainian scholar Mykola Kostomarov called it 'very funny, if it were not so offensive'.⁶⁷ Drahomanov argued loudly with Poles in the pages of the *Kiev Telegraph* in 1875 and later devoted an entire book to criticizing Russian revolutionaries for thinking that, when the Russian Empire eventually fell, Poland had to be re-created in its pre-partition borders.⁶⁸ The censors showed greater subtlety than Iuzefovich when, instead of arguing that Ukrainophiles' ideas were actually inspired by Poles, they confined themselves to the view that Ukrainians and Poles might eventually be driven to make common cause with each other. In view, however, of the turbulent history of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship, even this was unlikely.⁶⁹ To believe that the Galician Ukrainophiles of the 1870s were a significant threat on their own was to be naive or paranoid. The lengthy studies of the activities of Galician Ukrainians which Drahomanov published in a major St Petersburg journal in 1873 could hardly have given an impartial observer much cause to worry about them.⁷⁰ Although Galicia was later to become known as the 'Ukrainian Piedmont' and is now the heartland of Ukrainian nationalism and the principal subject of study for patriotically inclined investigators of the Ukrainian past,⁷¹ between 1848 and the 1880s the majority of its educated Ukrainians were either sympathetic to Russia or purely local in their political sympathies.⁷²

Perhaps the real reason why the Russian authorities felt threatened by developments in Galicia was that, since they were in the habit of making trouble for Austria there, they expected trouble in return even when there were few real signs of it.⁷³

But whether or not the Russian authorities faced a genuine threat from the Austrian province of Galicia, they thought that they did. Since they also worried about Austria's ambitions in the Balkans, pointing to their Austrian concerns may be the best way of explaining the duality of their policy towards subordinate Slavs. The one significant weakness of this approach is that it provides direct elucidation of only two of the eight points of the Ems *ukaz* (the ban on importing Ukrainian-language books from abroad and the subsidy to *The Word*). A final hypothesis may be worth canvassing in the hope of elucidating the entire *ukaz* without rendering Russia's Balkan policy inexplicable.

According to Roberto Vivarelli, paraphrasing Federico Chabod, German victory in the Franco-Prussian War played a major part in 'the emergence [in late nineteenth-century Europe] of a conception of the state that recognized no limit to its powers'.⁷⁴ Perhaps, in central and western Europe, it did. In the Russian Empire, however, the conception was a commonplace. The possibility that it was in abeyance there at the time of Alexander II's 'Great Reforms' does not stand up to scrutiny, for it is easy to demonstrate that the 'Tsar-Liberator' shared the authoritarianism of his predecessors and successors. One of the most significant features of the abolition of serfdom, after all, was the *ex cathedra* manner of its enactment. Convinced it was necessary, Alexander resisted all attempts on the part of conservative bureaucrats and the Russian gentry to deflect him from the idea.⁷⁵ After it had been promulgated, he was equally effective at the other end of the political spectrum in his resistance to the introduction of central representative institutions.⁷⁶ Alexander rarely listened even to the people who had his ear. He was not likely to welcome the empowerment of the unprivileged. Interpreting his Ukrainian and Balkan actions from the point of view of his authoritarian brand of statism may be helpful.

That Ukrainophiles were trying to empower the unprivileged may be readily demonstrated. Most nineteenth-century Ukrainians were peasants. Few of them had Drahomanov's opportunity, appetite, or capacity for accumulating degrees and professorships. Drahomanov's immediate goals for his fellow-countrymen were therefore the goals he urged on western Slavs in the four-part survey of 1868: mass education, interaction with other Slavonic minorities, and bringing the interests of the masses to the attention of people who had been educated

already. His more long-term goals may be teased out of *Germany's Eastern Policy and Russification*, a book-length study he completed in Heidelberg in November 1871.⁷⁷ The thesis of this work was that Russian policy-makers were ill-advised to imagine that the challenge implied by the first part of the title could be met by the tactic identified in the second. In Drahomanov's opinion, trying to russify the western lands of the Russian Empire was a futile way of anticipating the possibility that a strong Germany might start coveting them. Russian policy-makers ought rather to pursue what in Drahomanov's opinion amounted to the opposite of russification: democracy, federalism, and local self-government. Only then, Drahomanov felt, might the ethnically non-Russian western edge of the Russian Empire respond willingly to edicts from St Petersburg. The creation of one newly integrated state did not warrant the closer integration of another. Two wrongs did not make a right. Political authority ought to be devolved, not concentrated.

When the Ukrainophiles of the Russian Empire controlled the *Kiev Telegraph* in 1875, their notions of empowerment reached the public domain. The newspaper's orientation was consistently pro-peasant. In March 1875, for example, it ran a two-part discussion of the efficacy of the law-courts set up for peasants at the time of the emancipation of the serfs; in May it called for the establishment of 'emigration agents' in Ukraine to help peasants take over land vacated by Tatars, the mountain peoples of the Caucasus, and Mennonites; in July Drahomanov informed his circle's Polish critics that 'what you call *khlopy* [a pejorative Polish term for peasants] we consider the foundation of our country, and from this flow all our conclusions on social, national, domestic, and international affairs!'⁷⁸

By this time, moreover, Ukrainophiles had gone beyond talking. They were working hard to promote native-language primary education. Drahomanov was to express particular regret in 1877 that the Ems *ukaz* ended the dissemination of the tens of thousands of cheap booklets he and his colleagues had made available to Ukrainian peasants in 1874 and 1875.⁷⁹ The tsar established his commission of enquiry in August 1875 'in particular [because of] translations and the publication of textbooks and prayer-books in the Little Russian dialect'.⁸⁰ Iuzefovich deplored the fact that, by distributing their 'tendentious publications' at 'trifling prices', Ukrainophiles were reaching out beyond the ranks of the intelligentsia to the unsophisticated.⁸¹ The input of the secret police into the work of the tsar's commission seems to have been based more or less entirely on information the police

were collecting about a Ukrainophile activist who was giving away low-brow Ukrainian publications to peasants in the province of Volyn'.⁸² The censors' memorandum urged that the government must 'in no way ... permit the teaching of any subjects whatever in the Little Russian language in primary schools, to which Ukrainophiles aspire and which they hope to achieve'.⁸³ The Minister of Education accepted the insistence of other members of the tsar's commission on the need for 'the most careful and scrupulous selection of teachers' in the southern part of the empire and agreed with their view that teachers who had received their training in the Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odesa educational districts ought to be required to teach in provinces other than those in which they graduated.⁸⁴

These official reactions make plain that the Ukrainophile belief in empowering peasants was wholly at odds with the political philosophy of the tsarist regime. Empowerment threatened to generate the very pressure 'from below' of whose dangers Alexander II had warned when he first committed himself to the state-led emancipation of the serfs in 1856.⁸⁵ Chubyns'kyi, Drahomanov, and their associates were likely to be able to work in the interest of Ukraine's unprivileged only so long as the tsar remained oblivious to their efforts. When he became aware of them, he was bound to respond vigorously. The wide-ranging nature of the Ems *ukaz* becomes comprehensible.

Can one discern the tsar's authoritarian brand of statism in his Balkan policy? Apparently not, for, in the sense that unprivileged Bulgarians stood to benefit from Russian intervention, one of the tsar's objectives in the Balkans appears to have been empowerment. The following case, however, can be made for the view that Russia's Balkan policy was indeed aimed, first and foremost, at the promotion of 'statist' rather than 'populist' interests: Alexander tried to get General Cherniaev back from Serbia and refused to associate himself with the Serbian-Turkish war of 1876 because he did not want to take sides in a war that he could not hope to direct; he was nevertheless prepared to contemplate a war in which he would be able to call the shots; he may positively have wanted the Serbs to lose their war with the Turks in order to make room for a war of his own making; and what he hoped to get out of that war was not Slavonic liberation but pliant Slav kingdoms and the two things he actually did get, restoration of the Russian toe-hold on the Danube and the inclusion in the Russian Empire of Kars in Anatolia. Disorder in the Balkans, in other words, was to be manipulated in order to provide the tsar with yet another opportunity of investing events with the mark of his authority; the empowerment

of Bulgarians was a side-effect. Far from rendering Russia's Balkan policy inexplicable, an interpretation that relates it to the tsar's statism can be said to make it clearer.

This was certainly what Drahomanov thought. In 1875 and early 1876 he had been prepared to believe that good might come of Russian intervention in the Balkans.⁸⁶ In essays of October and November 1876, however, when Aksakov was calling upon the tsar to offer Serbs and Bulgarians 'help in the form of blood' and the tsar was announcing his 'firm intention to act independently', the exiled Ukrainophile excoriated St Petersburg for giving foreign adventure a higher priority than reform at home.⁸⁷ The suppression of Ukrainophilism had opened his eyes to the priorities of the Russian state. Far from contemplating the empowerment of subordinate Slavs, St Petersburg was determined to control them. In a letter of February 1878 Drahomanov insisted that he had always been 'the most fervent protagonist of war with Turkey to the point of the complete destruction of that state and the complete emancipation of all the peoples shackled by it'. But 'at the same time', he said, 'I was also a protagonist of the internal reform of Russia, holding, amongst other things, that this reform was an essential precondition of starting the war at the right time, conducting it successfully, ending it radically, and having the right attitude towards the peoples emancipated from Turkey'.⁸⁸ Perhaps, in the 1860s and early 1870s, Drahomanov had been hopeful that the empowerment of the unprivileged could be assisted by the state. No longer. By the end of the 1870s he had turned against statism in all its forms, even what he held to be the 'leftist' statism of the Russian revolutionaries who assassinated Alexander II.⁸⁹ He had divined that, from the point of view of the tsar, statism was a primary good whose pursuit could dictate different behaviour in apparently comparable circumstances. He did not like what he saw. Whether his dislike was reasonable is a topic too big to take on here.

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Notes

1. David MacKenzie, *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev* (Athens, Georgia, 1974), p. 124.
2. N. P. Ignat'ev, 'Zapiski', *Istoricheskii vestnik*, vol. 135, no. 1 (1914), p. 55.
3. S. S. Tatishchev, *Imperator Aleksandr II, ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie*, 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1903, repr. Moscow, 1996), vol. II, pp. 275–7.
4. For the fact that the tsar listened to Gorchakov rather than Ignat'ev on the 'Andrassy Plan' of 1875 see David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875–1878* (Ithaca, 1967), p. 70; for the Austro-Russian Reichstadt agreement of 26 June 1876 see B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870–1880* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 172–6, 583–601; for the Austro-Russian Military Convention and Additional Convention of January and March 1877 see *The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774–1923*, ed. M. S. Anderson (London, 1970), pp. 94–6; for recent accounts of the Balkan crisis of 1875–8 as a whole see John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (New York–Oxford, 1997), pp. 138–42, 266–70, 324–5, and *Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii: Vtoraia polovina XIX veka*, ed. V. M. Khevolina et al. (Moscow, 1997), pp. 174–219.
5. *Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot turetskogo iga: Dokumenty*, 3 vols, ed. S. A. Nikitin et al. (Moscow, 1961–7), vol. 1, pp. 231, 237; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 183–4, 70.
6. *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv* (RGIA), f. 776, op. 2, d. 16, 1.209, minutes of the Council of the Main Censorship Administration, 5 July 1876.
7. *A Selection from the Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826–93) between September 1869 and March 1878*, ed. John Vincent (London, 1994), p. 301.
8. Tatishchev, *Imperator Aleksandr II*, vol. 2, p. 313.
9. L. M. Chichagov, *Dnevnik prebyvaniia Tsaria-Osvoboditelia v Dunaiskoj armii v 1877 godu* (St Petersburg, 1887, repr. 1995), p. 97. Despite the fact that much of the Ottoman Empire lay to the south-west of Russia, in official Russian parlance the whole of it belonged to 'the East' (which says something about the cultural orientation of Russia's rulers).
10. RGIA, f. 1282 (Chancery of the Minister of Internal Affairs), op. 1, d. 352, ll. 54–5 (from an untitled and unsigned official minute on Chubyn's'kyi of 15 April 1876).
11. Uchitel' (M. P. Drahomanov), 'Pedagogicheskoe znachenie malorusskogo iazyka', *Sankt-Petersburgskie vedomosti*, 8 April 1866; M. P. Drahomanov, 'Avtobiograficheskaia zametka', in his *Literaturno-publitsychni pratsi u dvokh tomakh*, 2 vols (Kiev, 1970), vol. 1, p. 48.
12. *Trudy etnograficheskoi-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v zapadno-russkii krai*, 7 vols in 9 books, edited by P. P. Chubinskii (Chubyn's'kyi) (St Petersburg, 1872–8).
13. A full account of their activities is to be found in Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876r.* (Kiev, 1930; repr. Munich, 1970).
14. *Kievskii telegraf (KT)*, 1 January 1875.
15. *Ibid.*, 27 January 1875 (repr. in Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 343–6).
16. *Ibid.*, 29 and 31 January 1875 (repr. in Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 339–43).
17. *Ibid.*, 7 February 1875.
18. *Ibid.*, 23 March 1875.

19. *Ibid.*, 4 April 1875 (resignation); RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 47–52 (diatribe: repr. in Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 368–72).
20. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, l. 1, A. L. Potapov to A. E. Timashev, 28 August 1875 (establishment of the commission); *ibid.*, ll. 104–5, and Anon. (V. P. Naumenko), 'Do istorii ukaza 1876 roku pro zaboronu ukrains'koho pys'menstva', *Ukraina*, vol. 2, no. 5 (1907), pp. 149–50 (recommendations). The tsar turned recommendation (7) into an order for the immediate closure of the South-West Section.
21. Ignat'ev, 'Zapiski', p. 55.
22. David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1985), pp. 227–30.
23. *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, 3 vols, ed. P. S. Sokhan' *et al.* (Kiev, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 152–69.
24. Vladimir Antonovich *et al.*, 'Otzyv iz Kieva', *Russkii vestnik: Sovremennaia letopis'*, no. 46 (1862), pp. 3–6.
25. See, on the one hand, H. D. Desnitsa, 'Serbs'ko-turets'ka viina (1876r.) i ukrains'ka hromads'kist'', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (1962), pp. 79–82, and M. Ia. Gol'berg, 'Balkanskie sobyitiia 70-kh godov XIX v. i nekotorye voprosy razvitiia ukrainsko-serbskikh obshchestvenno-politicheskikh i kul'turnykh svyazei', in *Razvitie kapitalizma i natsional'nye dvizheniia v slavianskikh stranakh*, ed. V. I. Freidzon (Moscow, 1970), pp. 211–35; and, on the other, Z. M. Khanutin, 'Otnoshenie obshchestvennykh krugov Rossii k balkanskim sobyitiiam v period serbo-turetskoi voiny 1876 goda', *Uchenye zapiski belorusskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, vol. 16 (1953), pp. 299–328, and T. G. Snytko, 'Iz istorii narodnogo dvizheniia v Rossii v podderzhku bor'by iuzhnykh slavian za svoiu nezavisimost' v 1875–1876gg.', in *Obshchestvenno-politicheskie i kul'turnye svyazi narodov SSSR i Iugoslavii: Sbornik statei*, ed. S. A. Nikitin and L. B. Valeva (Moscow, 1957), pp. 78–106.
26. *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 1, p. 20 (name of the society): vol. 3, pp. 211–57, 291–324 (investigations of Russians).
27. 'Z lystuvannia M. P. Drahomanova z O. S. Suvorinyim', ed. D. I. Abramovych, *Ukraina*, no. 4 (1927), p. 139.
28. Slavianin (M. P. Drahomanov), 'Slavianskoe obozrenie', *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, 7 June 1868.
29. P. T-ev (M. P. Drahomanov), 'Malorossiiia v eë slovesnosti', in A. R. Mazurkevich, I. G. Pryzhov: *Iz istorii russko-ukrainskikh literaturnykh svyazei* (Kiev, 1958), p. 369.
30. *KT*, 7 February, 28 March and 25 April, 7 and 9 May, and 11 June 1875.
31. Drahomanov, 'Avtobiograficheskaia zametka', p. 62.
32. 'Z lystuvannia', p. 123.
33. M. P. Drahomanov, 'Po voprosu o malorusskoi literature', in his *Literaturno-publitsychni pratsi*, vol. 1, p. 350.
34. See Petko Atanasov, 'Rol' M. P. Drahomanova u zmitsnenni ukrains'–kobolhars'kykh zviazkiv', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 9 (1965), pp. 26–39.
35. M. Dragomanov (Drahomanov), 'Russian Policy, Home and Foreign', *Free Russia*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1891), pp. 13–16; no. 2, pp. 12–13; no. 3, pp. 12–13; vol. 3, no. 6 (1892), pp. 10–12.

36. For an overview see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Fourth Universal and its Ideological Antecedents', in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1987), pp. 389–416.
37. Drahomanov, 'Avtobiograficheskaia zametka', pp. 61–3; Ihnat Zhytets'kyi, 'Ostannii vyizd M. P. Drahomanova za kordon', *Ukraina*, no. 2–3 (1926), pp. 29–37.
38. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, l. 132, S. S. Perfil'ev to L. S. Makov, Ems, 26 May 1876 ('Our news: ... an official summons has been issued to Cherniaev concerning his return to the Fatherland').
39. RGIA, f. 777 (St Petersburg Censorship Committee), op. 3, g. 1876, d. 10, ll. 53, 67.
40. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 3, d. 130, l. 383.
41. David Saunders, 'Russia's Ukrainian Policy (1847–1905): a Demographic Approach', *European History Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 2 (1995), especially pp. 181–2, 201.
42. To judge by a pencil reference to a meeting of which no record was kept, the first session of the tsar's Ukrainian commission took place on 12 April 1876 (RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, l. 59).
43. Anon., 'O vrede literaturnoi deiatel'nosti Ukrainofilov i merakh k ego otrashcheniiu', RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 23–32.
44. As M. I. Chertkov, the Governor-General of Kiev, Podillia, and Volyn', pointed out when trying to get the *ukaz* lifted in 1881 (anon., 'Naiblyzhchi vidhuky ukaz 1876 r. pro zaboronu ukrains'koho pys'menstva', *Ukraina*, vol. 2, no. 6 (1907), p. 251).
45. The file on the *ukaz* opens with a clerical copy of his second paper, 'O tak nazyyaemom ukrainofil'skom dvizhenii' (March 1876): RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 3–22 (published in Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 372–81).
46. On Russia and the Greek revolt see, for example, LeDonne, *Russian Empire*, pp. 120–1.
47. On 1845–6 see Orest Pelech, 'Towards a Historical Sociology of the Ukrainian Ideologues in the Russian Empire of the 1830s and 1840s', unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton (1976), whose thesis is that until 1847 the Russian authorities positively encouraged 'patriotism, both national and local' (p. 141). On 1859–62 see David Saunders, 'Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: the Valuev Edict of 1863', *International History Review*, vol. 17, no. 1 (1995), especially pp. 23–4, 32–4.
48. See, for example, Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 56–80; MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, and the references in n. 25, above.
49. These were mainly adherents of Peter Lavrov: Snyt'ko, 'Iz istorii narodnogo dvizheniia', p. 86.
50. A. V. Buganov, *Russkaia istoriia v pamiati krest'ian XIX veka i natsional'noe samosoznanie* (Moscow, 1992), pp. 172–97 (I am indebted to David Moon for this reference).
51. See, for example, 'Russkoe obshchestvo i natsional'naia zadacha', anonymous leader in *Novoe vremia*, 17 October 1876, pp. 2–3.
52. I. S. Aksakov, *Slavianskii vopros, 1860–1886* (Moscow, 1886), p. 217.
53. David Brown, 'Tchaikovsky, Pyotr Il'yich', in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 20 vols, ed. Stanley Sadie (London, 1980), vol. 18, p. 611.

54. A. S. Khomiakov, 'Pis'ma', *Russkii arkhiv*, no. 11 (1879), p. 328; *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 22 June, 4 September 1863; Iuzefovich, 'O tak nazyvaemom', ll. 5 and 7 (slightly misprinted in Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 374).
55. 'Ukrainskie uvlecheniia', *Golos*, 28 September 1874.
56. Z., 'Sovremennoe ukrainofil'stvo', *Russkii vestnik*, vol. 115, no. 2 (1875), pp. 838–68.
57. See Alexis E. Pogorelskin, 'A. N. Pypin's Defence of Ukraine: Sources and Motivation', in *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present*, ed. Bohdan Krawchenko (New York, 1993), pp. 35–54.
58. R. W. Seton-Watson, 'Russo-British Relations During the Eastern Crisis', *Slavonic Review*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1925–6), p. 195 (trans. in Anderson, *Great Powers*, p. 93).
59. S. A. Nikitin, *Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858–1876 godakh* (Moscow, 1960), p. 342.
60. V. I. Ado, 'Berlinskii kongress 1878 g. i pomeschich'e-burzhuznoe obshchestvennoe mnenie Rossii', *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 69 (1961), pp. 101–41.
61. Anon., 'O vrede', quotations from ll. 23 and 32, recommendations at ll. 29–31.
62. 'Perepiska I. S. Aksakova s kn. V. A. Cherkasskim (1875–1878)', ed. I. V. Koz'menko, in *Slavianskii sbornik: Slavianskii vopros i russkoe obshchestvo v 1867–1878 godakh*, ed. N. M. Druzhinin (Moscow, 1948), p. 142. The first *Dreikaiserbund* or 'League of the Three Emperors' (of Germany, Austria, and Russia) came into being in 1872–3 (LeDonne, *Russian Empire*, p. 265).
63. N. S. Derzhavin, 'Russkii absoliutizm i iuzhnoe slavianstvo', *Izvestiia leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, no. 1 (1928), p. 47. On Carlowitz, Joseph II, the Crimean War, north Italy, German unification, and the deals of 1876–7 see LeDonne, *Russian Empire*, pp. 90, 243–4, 126, 262, 138, 269. On the War Minister's proposal of 1880 for the creation of a Balkan confederation see S. D. Skazkin, *Konets avstro-russko-germanskogo soiuza*, 2nd edn (Moscow, 1974), pp. 164–8, and N. S. Kiniapina, 'Balkanskaia konfederatsiia v planakh voennogo ministra Rossii D. A. Miliutina', *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 3 (1996), pp. 150–4.
64. Iuzefovich, 'O tak nazyvaemom', l. 8 (slightly misprinted in Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 375).
65. Anon., 'O vrede', ll. 26–7.
66. For 1847 see A. F. Orlov, 'Dopovid' Mykoli I pro diial'nist' kyrylo-mefodiivs'koho tovarystva', in *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 1, p. 66 (derivation of the central text of the Kirillo-Methodian Society from a work by Mickiewicz); for 1863 see David Saunders, 'Mikhail Katkov and Mykola Kostomarov: a Note on Pëtr A. Valuev's Anti-Ukrainian Edict of 1863', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 17, no. 3/4 (1996 for 1993), especially p. 371.
67. M. Kostomarov, *Naukovo-publitsychni i polemichni pysannia* (Kiev, 1928), p. 160.
68. For examples of the press debate see *KT*, 2 May 1875 (leader entitled 'Pol'skomu bol'shinstvu galitskogo seima') and 18 June 1875 (leader entitled 'Pol'skii vopros v iugozapadnom krae'). The book was M. P. Dragomanov (Drahomanov), *Istoricheskaia Pol'sha i velikoruskaia demokratiia* (Geneva, 1882).

69. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: the Burden of History', in his *Rethinking*, pp. 49–76.
70. M. P. Dragomanov (Drahomanov), 'Russkie v Galitsii' and 'Literaturnoe dvizhenie v Galitsii', both repr. in his *Politicheskie sochineniia*, ed. I. M. Grevs and B. A. Kistiakovskii, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1908), pp. 268–342, 343–417.
71. For the nickname see M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), 'Ukrainskii P'emont', in his *Ukrainskii vopros* (Moscow, 1917), pp. 61–6; for the extent of the scholarly literature see Paul R. Magocsi, *Galicia: An Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (Toronto, 1983).
72. For the former view see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule', in his *Rethinking*, pp. 329–33; for the latter, Paul R. Magocsi, 'Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: a New Conceptual Framework for Analyzing National Ideologies in Late 19th-Century Eastern Galicia', in *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists*, vol. 2, ed. Paul Debreczeny (Columbus, Ohio, 1983), pp. 305–24.
73. For the irritation Russia caused Austria by annexing the Ternopil district of east Galicia in 1809 see LeDonne, *Russian Empire*, p. 251; for the Galician machinations of the chaplain at the Russian Embassy in Vienna in the reign of Alexander II see *Zarubezhnye slaviane i Rossiia: Dokumenty arkhiva M. F. Raevskogo*, ed. S. A. Nikitin et al. (Moscow, 1975), esp. pp. 26, 36, 158–60, 162–3, 240, 375.
74. Roberto Vivarelli, '1870 in European History and Historiography', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 53, no. 2 (1981), p. 186.
75. See especially N. G. O. Pereira, 'Alexander II and the Decision to Emancipate the Russian Serfs, 1855–61', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1980), pp. 99–115.
76. V. G. Chernukha, *Vnutrenniaia politika tsarizma s serediny 50-kh do nachala 80-kh gg. XIX v.* (Leningrad, 1978), especially pp. 133–5.
77. M. P. Dragomanov (Drahomanov), 'Vostochnaia politika Germanii i obruse-nie', repr. in his *Politicheskie sochineniia*, pp. 1–216 (first published in a St Petersburg journal in 1872).
78. *KT*, 2 and 3 March, 7 May, 30 July 1875.
79. M. Drahomanov, *Narodni shkoly na Ukraini sered zhyt'ta i pys'mennstva v Rossii* (Geneva 1877), pp. 54–5.
80. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, l. 1.
81. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 379.
82. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 59–62, 71–8, 82–4, 95–6.
83. Anon., 'O vrede', l. 31.
84. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 102–3; Anon., 'Do istorii ukaza', pp. 147–8.
85. 'It is better to start abolishing serfdom from above than to await the time when it starts spontaneously abolishing itself from below': quoted in Ia. A. Solov'ev, 'Zapiski o krest'ianskom dele', *Russkaia starina*, vol. 30 (1881), p. 228.
86. In 'Nadezhdy i razocharovaniia v zapadnom slavianstve', *KT*, 11 June 1875, he had implied that intervention would be worthwhile by regretting that it was unlikely in view of the currently friendly state of Russo-Austrian relations. The last paragraph of his *Pro ukrains'kykh kozakiv, tatar ta turkiv*, a brochure published in Kiev in the first half of 1876 (repr. in M. P. Drahomanov, *Vybrane* [Kiev, 1991], pp. 175–204) implied that, after freeing

the northern shore of the Black Sea from Muslims, Russia was well advised to think of moving on to the liberation of 'Serbs, Bulgarians, Moldavians, and Greeks'.

87. M. P. Dragomanov (Drahomanov), 'Chistoe delo trebuet chistykh ruk', *Molva*, 10 October 1876, and *Turki vnutrennie i vneshnie* (Geneva, 1876), both repr. in his *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii*, 2 vols, ed. P. B. Struve and B. A. Kistiakovskii (Paris, 1905–6), vol. 2, pp. 20–45, 46–73.
88. 'Z lystuvannia', p. 143.
89. M. P. Dragomanov (Drahomanov), "'Narodnaia Volia" o tseentralizatsii revoliutsionnoi bor'by v Rossii', in his *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii*, vol. 2, pp. 391–412.