


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THE SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION OF WESTERN UKRAINE, 1948-1949

David R. Marples

Western Ukraine comprises those areas of Ukraine annexed by the Soviet Union after September 1939. They are (1) Galicia, made up of the Soviet oblasts of Lviv, Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk), Drohobych (now part of Lviv oblast) and Ternopil; (2) Volynia, made up of Rivne and Volyn oblasts; (3) Bukovyna (Chernivtsi oblast); and (4) Transcarpathia (Zakarpatska oblast). In the interwar period, the Galician and Volynian territories were governed by Poland, Chernivtsi was part of Romania and Transcarpathia was ruled by Czechoslovakia. Whereas the former areas were all annexed by the USSR after the invasion of Eastern Poland in 1939, Transcarpathia became part of the Soviet Union only in June 1945.¹

The annexation of Western Ukraine and the consequent collectivization of agriculture is of interest to the student of the USSR for two main reasons. First, it brought about the merger of a highly westernized region with the sovietized Eastern Ukraine, which led to the re-emergence of Ukrainian nationalism on a wide scale. Second, the annexation united, along with Western Belorussia, a zone of collectivized farming with a zone of private farming. It would have been illogical for collectivization to have been delayed indefinitely, since such a delay might have caused difficulties on the East Ukrainian kolkhozy. But, what is of particular interest is how much the experience in collectivizing the eastern oblasts was utilized in the western campaign; and to what extent this campaign was conducted either by East Ukrainians or by personnel predominant in the East Ukrainian collectivization process.

This essay will show that as far as collectivization was concerned, Soviet authorities introduced few new ideas into the newly

1 On Western Ukraine in the interwar period, see V. Kubijovyč, *Western Ukraine within Poland, 1920-1939* (Chicago, 1963); S. Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities* (New York, 1961); and B. M. Babyi, *Vozziednannia zakhidnoi Ukrainy z Ukrainskoiu RSR* (Kiev, 1954). The best works covering the area for the postwar years up to 1953 are Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1964); J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd. ed. (Littleton, Col., 1980); and R. S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957* (New York, 1962).

annexed territories. Basically, the experience of the 1930s served as the precedent for the following decade. At the same time, as will be demonstrated below, the postwar process was accelerated by the imposition of collectivization on Eastern Europe.

The Collectivization Campaign

To date, the so-called "mass movement" of peasant households to collective farms in the western oblasts of Ukraine in 1948-49 has received little attention in the West, although there have been studies of the postwar collectivization campaign in the Baltic republics and in Right-Bank Moldavia.² The essay looks at some of the problems in collectivizing Western Ukraine, makes a comparison with the process in the other western borderlands, and analyzes the nature of the anti-kolkhoz movement.

For the 18 months before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, about 12.8 percent of peasant households and 14.9 percent of the arable land had been collectivized.³ Thus some progress had been made. However, the political situation — with the German army across the old Polish border — made conditions for a mass campaign less than ideal. During the war, the West-Ukrainian peasants left their kolkhozy en masse, and most were disbanded. As is well known, the Germans attempted to maintain the kolkhoz system, using the name "communal farm." But as far as Ukraine was concerned, they were obliged to rely on those farms in the eastern oblast that had been stabilized before the invasion. After the war, it is clear that piecemeal collectivization was taking place in Western Ukraine from 1944 to 1947, although no mass movement occurred during those years.⁴

2 J. Biggart, "The Collectivisation of Agriculture in Soviet Lithuania," *East European Quarterly*, 9 (1975): 53-75; E. Jacobs, "The Collectivization of Agriculture in Right-Bank Moldavia," Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics, 1979; J. Labsvirs, "A Case Study in the Sovietization of Baltic States: Collectivization of Latvian Agriculture, 1944-1956." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1959; R. Taagepera, "Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase," *Soviet Studies*, 1 (1980): 379-97. To date nothing has appeared in the West about the process in Western Belorussia.

3 See D. R. Marples, "The Soviet Annexation of West Ukraine and the Collectivization of Agriculture, 1939-1941," M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1980, p. 130.

4 At the end of 1947, only about 7.5% of West-Ukrainian households were reported as collectivized. See *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1968), p. 256. [Referred to hereafter as *Sots. pereb.*]

In 1948, however, the Soviet authorities suddenly stepped up the collectivization campaign. Why? It is possible that the party had been waiting for the economy to be restored. Perhaps more important, the Soviet leaders were adhering to the Leninist agrarian policy. Before collectivization could be implemented, the policy held, the peasant had to be won over gradually to the kolkhoz system. The first step was to attract peasant support through land reforms; that is, authorities wanted to create what they saw as the essential preconditions to the collectivization campaign. In this they were following their interwar policies.

But in early 1948, the effects of the 1946 famine were still being felt,⁵ and these prevented economic recovery. The rural economy of the Ukrainian SSR had suffered a debilitating blow from the famine, which stopped the transfer of resources from the collectivized Eastern Ukraine to the western oblasts. This transfer had been a feature of the first two postwar years, and was often cited by Soviet propaganda as evidence of the benevolence of the Soviet state toward its newly annexed territories. In addition, it is possible that the collectivization process was speeded up in 1948 because of the party's increased strength in the western oblasts (see Table 1). However, as Table 1 suggests, although the party's position — at least in terms of numbers — had improved by 1948, it was still far short of the situation desired by the authorities (the majority of party workers were located in the towns rather than the countryside). Moreover, it

Table 1. Growth of the Party in Western Ukraine, 1941-49

Year	Total member
1941	36,969
1944	7,174
1945	33,165
1948	73,183
1949	97,480

Sources: Y. Bilinsky, "The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine." In R. Szporluk, ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR* (New York, 1975), pp. 184-185; *Pravdu ne zdolaty* (Lviv, 1974), p. 121; V. Iurchuk, *Borotba KP Ukrainy za vidbudovu i rozvytok narodnoho hospodarstva (1945-1952 rr.)* (Kiev, 1965), p. 128.

⁵ On the effects of the 1946 famine in Ukraine, see I. K. Sas, "Vysvitlennia sotsialistynoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 4 (1960): 105. [Referred to hereafter as *Uk. ist. zh.*]

was clear from decrees⁶ issued in 1944-45 that the party was not going to rely on local cadres alone to carry out its political program (i.e., cadres were to be moved in from the east as much as possible, rather than selected from the West-Ukrainian oblast). There must have been other reasons why mass collectivization was imposed in 1948.

One plausible reason has been suggested by Wädekin and Jacobs.⁷ They link mass collectivization in the western borderlands to its simultaneous imposition in Eastern Europe and suggest that the timing was precipitated by and coincided with Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform. Stalin, they claim, decided to enforce collectivization at home as a means of preventing further recalcitrance on the agrarian issue within the Communist-bloc countries. The inference here is that Soviet collectivization was pushed forward ahead of time to provide an example for Eastern Europe. The East European countries then followed the Soviet example, but it took them considerably longer to complete collectivization than the western areas of the USSR. This difference in time scale is, perhaps, only to be expected, since the Soviet authorities had already had some experience in collectivization in the western areas in the prewar period and were aware of the problems involved. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, conditions were not the same as in the USSR (land reform proceeded somewhat differently; there was a great shortage of machinery; political cadres were in shorter supply; and most important, local political conditions were different), and the Soviet experience was not always applicable.

In short, mass collectivization began in 1948 as a mass campaign in the western areas of the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Events in Western Ukraine were merely a part of this campaign.

The Pattern of Mass Collectivization by Individual Oblast

The rates of collectivization in individual oblasts of Western Ukraine are illustrated in Table 2, below. Before examining the general characteristics of the process, it is pertinent to comment on the regional variations in the rate as revealed by Table 2. Only in two

6 Three decrees, published on 27 September, 19 October and 24 November 1944 all focused on the weaknesses and "mistakes" made in the West-Ukrainian party organizations. By February 1945, about 20,000 party members had reportedly been sent into Western Ukraine (mainly from Eastern Ukraine). See P. I. Denysenko, "Vidbudova ekonomiky i kultury v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR (1944-1945 rr.)," *Uk. ist. zh.*, 5 (1964): 94.

7 K.-E. Wädekin, *Agrarian Policies in Communist Europe* (The Hague, 1982), pp. 27-28; Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 422-25.

Table 2. Collectivization of Peasant Households in Western Ukraine, 1948-49 (percentages)

Oblast	Jan. 1948	Jan. 1949	Dec. 1949
Lviv	7.6	40.0	50.0
Drohobych	2.0	79.0	88.0
Volyn	9.9	80.0	96.8
Rivne	5.1	25.1	67.3
Stanislav	2.4	17.0	37.6
Ternopil	7.1	29.8	70.0
Chernivtsi	22.2	77.3	97.5
Transcarpathia	0.5	48.2	74.0

Sources: *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1968), p. 259; Report of the CC CPU at the XVI Congress of the CPU, 25 January 1949. In *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR (1939-1950)* (Kiev, 1976), p. 72; *Radianska Ukraina*, 12 February 1948, 27 November 1948; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 13 January 1949; *Istoriia selianstva URSR*, vol. 2 (1967), p. 397; M. K. Ivasiuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytsva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 105.

oblasts — Chernivtsi and Volyn — was collectivization declared to have been completed by the end of 1949. According to *Radianska Ukraina*, collectivization was occurring “too slowly” in Stanislav, Drohobych, Ternopil and Lviv oblasts, and the newspaper laid the blame for this squarely on the shoulders of the raion authorities.⁸

There may have been genuine reasons why collectivization was proceeding slowly, particularly in Lviv and Stanislav oblasts. But given that collectivization was being imposed in Eastern Europe at this time, it made sense for the authorities to concentrate first on collectivizing the border regions. The more easterly oblasts, such as Stanislav and Rivne, were adjoined to the collectivized oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR and would subsequently become noncollectivized “islands” amidst the collectivized oblasts to the east and west. In the most westerly oblast, Transcarpathia, collectivization proceeded rapidly in the postwar years, especially in the winter of 1948-49. Again, this suggests that the outlying regions were collectivized first.

In the case of Transcarpathia, there may have been other reasons why the oblast was collectivized so rapidly. First, the oblast was separated from the rest of Western Ukraine by the natural barrier of the Carpathian Mountains. Both geographically and histori-

⁸ *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 September 1948.

cally, the region was quite different.⁹ This aided the Soviet authorities in two ways. First, they could mobilize forces for a concentrated effort on a small, remote area, having sealed off the border. The majority of the residents from the mountain regions had been transferred to the lowlands and became dependent upon the state for working on collective farms. Second, the region had not experienced Soviet rule prior to the war and thus had had no direct experience of collectivization. Moreover, it had not been an area of Ukrainian nationalist penetration. These factors may have accounted for a passive attitude toward Soviet rule¹⁰ and the relatively quick pace of collectivization.

In contrast, other oblasts lagged behind, as Table 2 reveals. Lviv, the prime locus of party forces, was one such oblast. How does one account for this? Three reasons spring to mind. First, the years of the fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-50) saw a major campaign to industrialize the city of Lviv, initiated by two decrees the previous year.¹¹ This required that the bulk of party forces remain in the city. Agriculture, by comparison, was a secondary matter. A second reason was the activity of nationalist forces — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or UPA — in the Lviv oblast (a factor that also helps to explain the slow rate of collectivization in Stanislav oblast). In fact, UPA commander Roman Shukhevych was reportedly killed near the city of Lviv during a skirmish with Soviet troops late in 1950.¹² Thus there was underground activity at least until that year, that is, throughout the period of “mass collectivization.” Third, the oblast party cadres may have been dispersed fairly widely. Lviv, after all, was the capital of Western Ukraine, operating on a “national” rather than an oblast level. As suggested above, it seems that party workers were sent to the outlying oblasts first, thus leaving collectivization in Lviv until a later date.

In Rivne oblast, also “lagging behind,” Soviet reports suggest that the delay was due “almost entirely to deficiencies in organizational and political work among the peasants, especially in Rivne, Mizotsk, Tuchynsk, Mezhyrychy and Hoshchany raions.” Speakers at the second oblast party conference, held in January 1949, roundly denounced all those responsible for agriculture: the oblast agricultural section, instructors, executive committee, and others.¹³ The

9 The best work on Transcarpathia and its historical development in English is P. R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).

10 See Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, pp. 294-95.

11 *Leninizm torzhestvuie* (Lviv, 1957), p. 193.

12 See Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 300.

13 *Pravda Ukrainy*, 15 January 1949.

key problem, however, was the weakness of the raion party and government organizations, a feature common to the western oblasts in these early postwar years. The attacks on the oblast organizations were veiled hints that the raion organizations required urgent attention. According to a Soviet source, the reason why only about 59 percent of peasant households were united in kolkhozy in November 1949 was the "unhealthy tendency" of "certain raion leaders" to strengthen first those kolkhozy that already existed rather than to organize new ones.¹⁴ Evidently, the authorities secured numerous appeals from households to join kolkhozy, but little was done to take advantage of them. Again, one suspects that the real reason for the delay was the authorities' failure to provide the peasants with any real incentives to join the kolkhozy, such as seed, livestock or money.

The Soviet authorities claim that, whereas in 1946-47 the majority of peasants joining the kolkhozy had been land-hungry *bidniaks* (poor) and farm laborers, in 1948 it was the *seredniak* (middle) stratum that was starting to join.¹⁵ In Ustyluha raion, Volyn oblast, for example, more than half the households joining the kolkhozy were reportedly *seredniaks*.¹⁶ *Radianska Ukraina* (24 March 1948) explained that the *kulaks* had by then been isolated as a result of the consolidation of those kolkhozy already in existence, so that the *seredniak* stratum was being "encouraged" to join. This explanation is implausible: the kolkhozy at this time were poorly equipped, and farming was being conducted at a low technical level, even according to Soviet accounts.¹⁷ There were thus few reasons why the *seredniak* would voluntarily have joined the kolkhoz. The evidence suggests that it was in fact widespread coercion that was involved. Mass collectivization, by definition, required that *seredniaks* join the kolkhozy, and all means, including coercion, were employed to ensure that they did so.

There are many examples to show that in 1948 and 1949, collectivization was becoming an increasingly coercive process. In Volyn

14 I. P. Bohodyst, "Sotsialistychna perebudova zakhidnoukrainskoho sela," *Uk. ist. zh.*, 2 (1957): 75.

15 *Radianska Ukraina*, 24 March 1948.

16 V. P. Stoliarenko, *Sotsialistychne peretvorennia silskoho hospodarstva na Volyni (1944-1958)* (Kiev, 1958), p. 56.

17 In Volyn oblast, for example, which may be taken as representative of Western Ukraine, a Soviet source admits that in 691 out of 1,074 kolkhozy established by 1949, "the organization of work was on a low technical level," and the accountants in particular lacked the necessary preparation. See *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblasteri Ukrainy RSR (1939-1950)* (Kiev, 1976), p. 416 [Referred to hereafter as *Z ist.*]; and Stoliarenko (1958), p. 68.

in 1948 a kolkhoz had been established in the village of Domashiv (Tsumany raion) by the raion party secretary, who reportedly had entered the village and forced all the peasants to go to the building of the village Soviet, whereupon he demanded that they present appeals to join the kolkhoz.¹⁸ This example is probably typical, particularly in oblasts like Volyn in which the rate of collectivization increased suddenly in 1948 (see Table 2). In other areas, also, there are numerous instances to suggest that coercion was involved in the collectivization process. In Briukhovytsk raion (Lviv oblast), the authorities had reportedly disregarded the principle of voluntariness. Two kolkhozy had been set up, but the oblast party committee "had to intervene and dissolve these kolkhozy, since they had, in the process, violated the voluntary principle."¹⁹ In Sokaly raion (Lviv oblast), 48 communists had been sent into the villages, where they organized a local *aktyv* (activist group) and were the first to sign their names to the list of those who wished to join the kolkhozy.²⁰

Such "violations" were common not only in Western Ukraine, but in the western borderlands generally. The Sokaly and Briukhovytsk examples suggest that the party members were having difficulty in creating any support for the kolkhozy among the West-Ukrainian villagers. Possibly, the raion members established paper kolkhozy without consulting the local peasants at all. More likely, however, is that the peasants themselves were resisting efforts to establish kolkhozy. As a result, the raion members came under attack on the grounds that they had violated the voluntary aspect of kolkhoz membership.

The authorities also dealt severely with those in the village who were opposed to collectivization and with recalcitrants on the kolkhozy. In the Lviv region, for example, on 19 October 1949, six collective farmers were sentenced to six months hard labor for their refusal to participate in kolkhoz work.²¹ In Volyn, as a result of deportations that accompanied the mass-collectivization campaign, it is said that all the well-to-do families had completely disappeared from the villages. Extremely high taxes were being imposed on those

18 Stoliarenko (1958), pp. 57-58.

19 Information of Lviv oblast executive committee to the UkSSR Council of Ministers, 30 December 1948, "Pro provedennia oblasnoi narady holiv kolhospiv, peredovykiv-kolhospnykiv i selian-odnoosobnykiv," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 377.

20 Bohodyst, op. cit., p. 76.

21 *Arkhiv misii UPA pry UHVR (1945-1950)* (Munich), folio 6, no. 1, pp. 8-10. Consulted with the kind permission of Professor P. J. Potichnyj, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.

who refused to join the kolkhozy, and all the young people — those born between 1929 and 1933 — had been drafted into the Red Army and taken out of the region.²²

Two consequences of enforced mass collectivization were weak kolkhozy and alleged dissolutions of kolkhozy (see below). Table 2 reveals that the most dramatic increase in collectivization occurred in Drohobych oblast, where the percentage of households collectivized rose from 2 at the start of 1948 to 79 at the end of the year. As late as 1949-50, according to a Soviet report, 138 of the 811 kolkhozy in the oblast were “badly organized,”²³ and, given the tendency of Soviet accounts to smooth over problems, one can assume that the real figure was somewhat higher than this.

Dissolution of kolkhozy was said to be a common occurrence during the campaign. In Rivne, for example, the plenum of the oblast party committee of April 1948 revealed 18 cases in which kolkhozy had not been “organizationally strengthened” and subsequently “ceased to exist.” The reason cited for this was that some party organizations had grown used to small individual farms that required less attention than kolkhozy.²⁴ The more likely reason is that these were “paper” kolkhozy, that is, they had never gone beyond the planning stage. There is additional evidence of paper kolkhozy in the oblast later in the year when mass collectivization got under way. *Radianska Ukraina* declared, in a report about Rivne oblast (9 September 1948), that although 67 kolkhozy had been created since April, they had not been consolidated so that it was “difficult to call them real collective farms.” Either these kolkhozy had been dissolved or, as seems more likely, they existed only in the minds of the raion authorities, who were under pressure to collectivize peasant households rapidly. Perhaps some dissolutions occurred as a result of the coercion of households into the kolkhoz at the behest of urban plenipotentiaries, who would then proceed to the next village. As a result, the peasants left the kolkhozy as soon as they had an opportunity.

In the midst of the campaign to collectivize Western Ukraine, the authorities organized a mass excursion of West-Ukrainian peasants to the kolkhozy of the eastern oblasts of Ukraine. Altogether, about 2,000 peasants are said to have visited collective farms in Kiev, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamianets-Podilsk, Kharkiv, Stalino, Voroshylovhrad and Odessa oblasts.²⁵ The excursion lasted

22 *Ukrainian Bulletin* (New York), 15 September 1948.

23 *Radianska Drohobychchyna* (Drohobych, 1957), p. 129.

24 *Radianska Ukraina*, 9 September 1948.

25 *Ibid.*, 24 November 1948.

about ten days. The participants, according to Soviet newspaper reports, visited various raions, and in each raion, several collective farms in order to become acquainted with the nature of collective farming, farmers who had attained high harvests and other "progressive" collective farmers.²⁶ In Kiev, the delegation from Volyn and Rivne oblasts met with Khrushchev and other Ukrainian leaders, and a ceremony was held during which several members of the delegation were accepted into the party.²⁷

How significant was this excursion? According to Soviet accounts, it played a major part in convincing Western Ukrainians of the "advantages" to be derived from collectivization. They cite the fact that three months after the excursion, another 285,000 peasant households had joined the kolkhozy, and 1,600 new kolkhozy had been established.²⁸ One may assume from these figures that the excursionants were predominantly individual peasants, or members of initiative groups. But, evidently, this was not necessarily the case. In Ternopil oblast, for example, of the 118 excursionants, 27 were kolkhoz chairmen and 6 were chairmen of village Soviets.²⁹ Thus about one-quarter of the participants seem to have been people who were already convinced of the "advantages" of collective farming. In fact, the excursions were largely a Soviet propaganda exercise. The ceremonial acceptance of members of the Volyn and Rivne delegations into the party is proof of this. Newspapers such as *Vilna Ukraina* and *Radianska Ukraina* devoted entire issues to the excursions so that the dramatic increase in collective farms in 1949 could be directly attributed to the influence of the excursion. But, as has been shown earlier, Western Ukrainians were already familiar with the problems facing East-Ukrainian kolkhozy because many Eastern Ukrainians had entered the western oblasts after 1946 in search of food.

The excursions, then, were an attempt to portray mass collectivization as a voluntary process; as something that the peasants wanted and had been convinced of as a result of visits to sample kolkhozy in Eastern Ukraine. Following the excursion, it is claimed that "delegates from East Ukrainian collective farms" attended meetings of

²⁶ Information of the newspaper *Vilna Ukraina*, 26 November 1948, "Pro ekskursii kolhospnykiv skhidnykh oblastei URSR dlia zapozychennia peredovoho dosvidu i oznaiomlennia z zhyttiam kolhospnykiv," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 361.

²⁷ *Radianska Ukraina*, 24 November 1948.

²⁸ See, for example, *Istoriia selianstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1967), vol. 2, p. 391; and M. K. Ivasiuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 102.

²⁹ Ivasiuta, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

agricultural experts in Western Ukraine,³⁰ and that "hundreds of people" were returning to Western Ukraine from the eastern oblasts and were standing as "popular agitators for the kolkhoz road."³¹ However, as a Western source indicates, the dramatic increase in collectivization at this time owed much to the infusion of about 6,000 "specialists," who were sent into Western Ukraine from the eastern oblasts to "supervise" collectivization.³² In other words, the excursions marked the beginning of a move to force the peasants into the kolkhozy; they signalled a major push toward collectivization.

In addition to the excursions, the effective isolation of areas such as Transcarpathia, and the coercion of the *seredniaks*, there were other reasons for the rapid increase in households collectivized in 1948-49. One was the collectivization of migrant households. In Transcarpathia, these were families who had been moved from the mountain regions to the lowlands. In the other western oblasts, they were frequently families who had been removed from the Polish side of the border in 1944-46. In Pustomytiv raion (Lviv oblast), for example, it was possible to chart the distribution of kolkhozy because they were all located around the village of Navariia, which had been fully collectivized in July 1948,³³ a rare phenomenon in the oblast at this time (as Table 2 reveals). But evidently the village had been either empty or emptied shortly after the war and was filled with migrants, who had been repatriated from Poland. Consequently, almost everyone in the village was new and entirely dependent upon the charity of the Soviet authorities. As a result, it was relatively easy for the latter to establish a kolkhoz and to ensure that the entire village joined it, since the migrants were permitted to bring only a few goods with them during their repatriation.³⁴ The authorities were clearly less successful with the long-term West-Ukrainian residents.

Another period when collectivization appears to have made headway was at the time of election to the local Soviets in December 1948. It is likely that the villages were flooded with agitators at this time, and evidently, those people who were "elected" as deputies were frequently the initiators of kolkhozy. Another incentive was that prospective kolkhozniks were offered "labor day advances;

30 M. O. Butsko, *KPRS: orhanizator vsenarodnoi dopomohy trudiashchym zakhidnykh oblastei URSR v vidbudovi i dalshomu rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva (1944-1950 rr.)* (Kiev, 1959), p. 93.

31 *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 November 1948.

32 *Ukrainian Bulletin*, 15 December 1948.

33 *Radianska Ukraina*, 27 July 1948.

34 *Ibid.*, 14 July 1948.

that is, individual peasant households could be more easily persuaded to join the kolkhozy if they were promised an immediate reward in terms of payment with grain.³⁵

Finally, the increase in the number of kolkhozy (as opposed to the increase in the number of peasant households joining) was partly a result of a campaign to restore those kolkhozy that had existed in the prewar period. First Secretary Khrushchev had announced (in 1945) that all prewar West-Ukrainian kolkhozy were to be restored by the end of 1947.³⁶ This campaign failed. But there is evidence that steps toward this goal were again undertaken in 1948-49. In Lviv oblast, in 1947, only 41 kolkhozy out of 171 opening were said to have existed in 1940-41; in 1948, 119 out of 198 kolkhozy had existed before the war. In the first three weeks of 1949, another ten prewar collective farms were restored.³⁷ The restoration of these prewar kolkhozy in the western oblasts also played a part in the mass-collectivization campaign.

Thus, in the years 1948-49, collectivization had virtually been completed in Volyn, Chernivtsi and Drohobych. Table 3, below, illustrates the process in Chernivtsi oblast and reveals that the most dramatic increase occurred between April and November 1948, when the number of households within the kolkhozy more than doubled. In other oblasts, the biggest increase occurred in the autumn and winter of 1948-49. In Transcarpathia, Ternopil and Rivne, collectivization

Table 3. Collectivization of Agriculture in Chernivtsi Oblast, 1948-49

Date	No. of kolkhozy	Total no. of households	Av. no. per kolkhoz	Land Area (hectares)	Av. per kolkhoz	Percent Collectivization	
						Households	Arable land
Jan. 1948	306	37,563	122.7	99,600	325.5	22.2	25.1
April 1948	364	52,432	144.0	122,066	335.3	31.0	32.0
Nov. 1948	452	111,232	246.1	269,407	596.0	71.7	81.0
Oct. 1949	491	145,533	292.4	458,913	934.6	90.7	95.6

Sources: *Radianska Ukraina*, 12 February 1948; Information of Chernivtsi oblast committee CPU to the CC CPU, 20 November 1948, cited in *Radianska Bukovyna 1946-1970: Dokumenty i materialy* (Uzhhorod, 1980), p. 45; report of the oblast government of land usage and crop rotation to the oblast agricultural administration, 1 October 1949, cited in *ibid.*, p. 59.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 22 December 1948.

³⁶ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 30 January 1946.

³⁷ Report of the agricultural section of Lviv oblast committee CPU, 2 December 1949, "Pro khid kolektyvizatsii v oblasti," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 396.

zation had achieved a decisive breakthrough. Thus, only in Lviv and Stanislav were the majority of peasant households still farming on an individual basis, largely as a result of the activity of the nationalist underground and the concomitant weakness of the raion and village authorities in these oblasts.

Resistance and Purges

The mass collectivization campaign was accompanied by three events: alleged nationalist terrorism, the regime's assault on kulaks and thorough, frequent purges of Soviet and party personnel in the rural areas. According to a Soviet scholar, the low percentages of collectivized households in Ternopil, Lviv, Rivne and Stanislav were a result of "weak organization and inadequate political work," unsatisfactory struggling against kulaks and "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," and violations of the Model Charter.³⁸ The XVI Congress of the CPU, which took place in January 1949, also emphasized the necessity of "heightened class vigilance" and increased agitation against the kulaks, in order to expose their hostile work against kolkhoz construction.³⁹

What form did this kulak resistance take and why did it occur? First, one should differentiate between the so-called kulaks and the Ukrainian nationalists. In the case of the former, resistance was provoked by specific measures of the Soviet authorities, whereas the nationalists were continuing a long and drawn-out campaign of general opposition. Thus the perspectives and aims of the kulaks and nationalists did not necessarily coincide, and there is no evidence that the two groups worked in concert. Moreover, as in the interwar period of collectivization, the term kulak was widely applied to all strata of peasants, not only to the richer ones.⁴⁰

According to an UPA report, in the latter part of 1949, the authorities were desperately trying to raise the number of livestock on kolkhozy and therefore turned to individual peasant households to increase their supply. High taxes were placed on animals in the possession of individual farmers. Although some of the livestock was reportedly purchased by the authorities for a cash or gain payment,

38 V. P. Stoliarenko, "Borotba komunistychnoi partyi za sotsialistychne peretvorennia ta dalshyi rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei URSS." In *Z istorii zakhidnoukrainskykh zemel* (1960), p. 63.

39 Resolution of the XVI Congress of the CPU on the report of the CC CPU, 28 January 1949, "Pro zavdannia v orhanizatsiino-hospodarskomu zmitsnenni kolhospiv zakhidnykh oblastei URSS," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 73.

40 On the kulak question, see D. R. Marples, "The Kulak in Postwar USSR: the West Ukrainian Example," *Soviet Studies*, xxxvi (4) (October 1984): 560-70.

calves were taken without payment. As a result, the peasants in Drohobych, Medynitsky, Dubliansky raions,⁴¹ and undoubtedly throughout Western Ukraine, began to slaughter their livestock, thus acquiring the kulak tag whether or not they were rich. In addition, a penalty of five years' imprisonment was imposed by the authorities. In spite of this treatment, the peasants are said to have "paid no attention."⁴² This slaughter of livestock was not a new phenomenon, having been a typical feature of interwar collectivization.⁴³

Events in Transcarpathia also show the division between the kulak and nationalist opposition in Western Ukraine. It is known that in Transcarpathia nationalist forces were negligible. However, there are reports of "kulak resistance" in Soviet accounts. For example, a note of 8 December 1948 by the oblast secretary declares that the kulaks had remained strong and had "influence over that part of the *bidniak-seredniak* population that took a negative view of the increasing tempo of socialist construction in the villages."⁴⁴ The report suggests that there was anti-kolkhoz sentiment in the oblast among *all* sectors of the peasantry. Notably, the Soviet authorities had reacted to this situation in 1948 (the precise date is not given) by trying to separate the *bidniaks-seredniaks* from the kulaks by freeing the former from taxation and stepping up taxes on the kulaks.⁴⁵ In other words, the distinctions between the peasant strata were being artificially created by the authorities once again, so that collectivization would occur simultaneously with a regime-inspired "class war."

In addition to the alleged resistance from kulaks, the year 1948 saw a continuation of the terrorism that had dogged the West-Ukrainian villages in the early postwar years.⁴⁶ Although UPA forces had been substantially reduced by this time, their actions became increasingly desperate as collectivization took on a mass perspective. In Lviv, for example, Khrushchev declared that the slow rate of collectivization was a result of weak party forces in villages in which

41 *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 6, no. 5, p. 1.

42 *Ibid.*

43 See, for example, R. W. Davies, *The Soviet Collective Farm [The Industrialization of Soviet Russia 2]* (London, 1980), pp. 101-02.

44 Information of Transcarpathia oblast committee CPU to the CC CPSU, 8 December 1948, "Pro khid kolektyvizatsii v oblasti v 1948 r.," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 370.

45 *Narysy istorii Zakarpatskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Uzhhorod, 1980), pp. 162-63.

46 On the insurgents, see Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1964), pp. 111-40.

"new settlers were offering determined resistance."⁴⁷ We have already seen, however, that it was the new settlers who were most committed to the kolkhozy, since they lacked the resources to carry out individual farming and were dependent upon the state for their welfare. Khrushchev was evidently attempting to conceal the extent of nationalist opposition at this stage of the collectivization campaign. One Soviet writer admits that in some cases, the peasant households would present appeals to join a kolkhoz, but then the kolkhoz had to be dissolved almost immediately because "kulaks and nationalists" reportedly terrorized those who had added their names to the register.⁴⁸ Again, the source is unclear. But the nature of the attack suggests that it was the nationalists, not the kulaks, who were doing the damage. The UPA stepped up the attacks in an attempt to stave off the onset of collectivization, thereby hoping to maintain its supply of food from the villages.

One result of these attacks was the apparent unwillingness of people to take on positions of rural authority because of the fear of assassination. For example, in Lviv oblast, on 26 November 1949, the secretary of the Soviet in the village of Briazi was assassinated. His position was left vacant, and in many other villages, the Soviets remained leaderless, or the top positions were taken over by lesser officials. The raion centers began to look like military occupation zones. UPA sources claim that the centers were being run by Russians, while in a typical raion center there were over 250 members of the Komsomol who were almost all East Ukrainians. Also, an MGB unit made up of 220 soldiers was stationed on a permanent basis in the raion center.⁴⁹

The period of mass collectivization also featured thorough purges of Soviet and party personnel in the West-Ukrainian oblasts. At the oblast level, the purges were revealed at the second oblast party conferences held in the spring of 1948 and the third conferences held in January 1949. For example, at the Chernivtsi conference in March 1948, speakers declared that questions of Soviet and kolkhoz construction were not being raised to their crucial primary role by the oblast party committee. Two secretaries, Zeleniuk and Vovk, had reportedly been removed from their posts.⁵⁰ In Stanislav oblast, in January 1949, the conference declined to re-elect first secretary Slon, ostensibly because of his failure to improve the situation of the party in the villages of the oblast.⁵¹ The purge, however, did not

47 *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 September 1948.

48 Bohodyst, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

49 *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 6, no. 1, pp. 8-10.

50 *Radianska Ukraina*, 6 March 1948.

51 *Pravda Ukrainy*, 15 January 1949.

end there, and it is reported that when Melnikov took over the position of Ukrainian First Secretary (Khrushchev went to work in Moscow at the end of 1949), one of his first acts was to make a tour of towns and villages of Western Ukraine, carrying out extensive purges of party organizations along the way.⁵²

The purges were also directed below the oblast level. A report from UPA focuses on the changes in one raion, which might be taken as typical of a so-called backward raion in Western Ukraine during this period. According to the report, virtually the entire membership of the raion party committee had been changed in the latter part of 1949. Many people were arrested for alleged "anti-state activities," bribery and other charges that suggest a thorough purge of personnel.⁵³

Why did these purges occur? In answering this question, one should differentiate between the removal of oblast personnel and the purges at the raion level. In the former case, it is possible that the secretaries were being made scapegoats for their failure to overcome the opposition to collectivization in the West-Ukrainian villages and for what the authorities perceived as inadequate organizational and political work. Not all the secretaries were removed, and those that were dismissed, such as Slon in Stanislav, were evidently reinstated after several months.⁵⁴ Thus the purges at the oblast level were a short-term goal intended to put pressure on the oblast secretaries to improve work toward the completion of collectivization. A Western scholar has noted that the party's problems were magnified at this time because, in place of open opposition, there were the peasants' clear indifference and apathy toward kolkhoz work.⁵⁵ We have seen, however, that the open opposition was still continuing. The authorities were thus very concerned about this situation, and the instability at the oblast level in the republic as a whole is evident from the fact that 14 of the 25 Ukrainian oblast leaders were moved between December 1949 and June 1951.⁵⁶

At the raion level, however, the purges seem to have been more widespread. Possibly the removal of many members of raion party committees was a sign that the authorities wanted to clamp down on "careerists" and others who had joined the party only recently

52 V. Holubnychy, "Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine." In *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (ed. I. S. Koropec'kyj) (Edmonton, 1982), p. 120.

53 *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 6, no. 1, pp. 1-4.

54 Slon had evidently been reinstated by 29 November 1950; witness the report given under his name at the Stanislav committee plenum on this date, cited in *Z ist.*, pp. 450-51.

55 See Sullivant, *Soviet Politics in the Ukraine*, p. 273.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 275.

and lacked the discipline necessary at such a crucial period. The vague term "anti-state activities" also suggests that this purge may have been part of the general purge against the Jews in the USSR that was occurring at this time.⁵⁷ Again, the term may have indicated mainly the extent of the opposition to Soviet rule in West-Ukrainian villages, and that the raion party organizations were not up to the task of attracting the villagers to the kolkhoz movement. These organizations were not entrusted by the authorities with enforcing mass collectivization, and MTS political sections were brought in for this purpose.⁵⁸ We may assume that their performances were deemed unsatisfactory in late 1948 and early 1949.

The measures adopted by the authorities suggest that the campaign took on many of the features of the collectivization campaign of the thirties: the rapid enforcement of collectivization, accompanied by deportations and coercive methods; heavy punishments imposed on those who refused to work once the kolkhozy had been established; and extensive purges and changes within the village, raion and oblast leaderships. This was also a characteristic of the campaign in the western borderlands, generally.

Collectivization in the Other Soviet-Western Borderlands, 1948-49.

As noted above, the collectivization campaign in Western Ukraine formed part of a general pattern that encompassed the other western borderlands and the Soviet-bloc countries of Eastern Europe at this time. Table 4, below, looks at the comparative rates of progress in certain Soviet-western borderlands. In Western Ukraine, the takeoff point for mass collectivization took place after September 1948. Thus, whereas in mid-September there were still reportedly only about 20 percent of peasant households collectivized,⁵⁹ this figure had risen to 41.2 percent by the end of the year.⁶⁰ In contrast, the figure in Right-Bank Moldavia remained under 20 percent, and the process had barely begun in Estonia. But the West-Ukrainian figure is complicated by several factors. The question arises, why the authorities would have delayed the onset of mass collectivization until well after the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute in the Cominform had come to a head (March-June 1948) and some two months after the Polish

⁵⁷ See, for example, M. McCauley, *The Soviet Union Since 1917* (London, 1981), pp. 135-36.

⁵⁸ On the formation of the MTS in Western Ukraine (the decree has never been published), see Ivasiuta, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁵⁹ Note of the deputy chief of the West-Ukrainian section of the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture, P. Cheresniuk, 17 September 1948, "Pro velyki peretvorennia v zakhidno-ukrainskomu seli," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 347.

⁶⁰ *Sots. pereb.*, vol 2, p. 259.

Table 4. A Comparison of Collectivization in the Soviet-Western Borderlands, 1948-49

(in percentages of peasant households)

Area	On 1. I. 48	On 1. I. 49	On 1. VII. 49	On 1. I. 50
Western Ukraine	5.4	41.2	59.8	66.4
Right-Bank Moldavia	10.0	19.0	32.0	80.0
Estonia	0.03	5.8	68.5	79.1
Lithuania	0.08	3.1	33.9	55.8
Western Belorussia	2.0	6.8	41.8	39.3

Sources: *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, vol. 2, p. 259; *Stanovlenie i razvitie kolkhoznogo stroia v Moldavskoi SSR* (Kishinev, 1971), pp. 148, 180-81; R. Taagpera, "Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Taxation Phase." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 10 (1979): 265; J. Biggart, "The Collectivization of Agriculture in Soviet Lithuania." *East European Quarterly*, no. 9 (1975): 75; M. A. Vyltsan *et al.*, *Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva v SSSR: puti, formy, dostizheniia* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 332, 334; *Tridtsat let po sotsialisticheskomu puti*, vol. 1 (Vilnius, 1979), pp. 74, 76; *Sovetskaia derevnia v pervye poslevoennye gody* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 394-95.

authorities announced that the countryside was to be collectivized in July 1948.⁶¹ It would have been more logical to commence mass collectivization at once in order to show the other Soviet borderlands, Yugoslavia and the rest of Eastern Europe that the "correct" agrarian policy was to give priority to the rapid elimination of small-scale peasant farming through collectivization. There are, in fact, indications that a major push was attempted as early as February 1948.⁶² It seems likely that the authorities were prevented from pushing mass collectivization as early as they had desired because of the fierce opposition from nationalist forces. This statement is borne out by the great variations in the extent of collectivization among individual oblasts. In those oblasts where UPA forces were known to be strong (principally Stanislav, Lviv and Ternopil), collectivization had failed to take root.

⁶¹ A. Korbonksi, *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960* (New York, 1965), p. 135. For a reference to the Cominform, see Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 422-25.

⁶² A report of an UPA scouting mission in Horodok raion (Lviv oblast) points out that in February 1948, the raion authorities demanded that "not less than 50% of peasant households had to be collectivized by the spring of 1948," and the rest by the end of the year. It is probable that this was the Soviet policy for the entire Western Ukraine. See *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 7, no. 8, p. 6.

Collectivization in Western Ukraine, then, was probably instituted in the spring of 1948, well before the Polish decision was announced, but it did not take on mass movement until September of that year. Between September 1948 and July 1949, it increased quickly, enveloping almost 60 percent of peasant households by 1 July 1949 (see Table 4). Thereafter it appears to have slowed down dramatically. Over the next six months, as Table 4 indicates, it increased only to 66.4 percent. The cause of the delay was probably due to the fact that in the autumn of 1949, resources were being shifted to several small republics (Moldavia and Estonia), although nationalist opposition may again have caused some delay. Table 4 shows that by the end of 1949, the total households collectivized in Estonia and Right-Bank Moldavia had temporarily surpassed those in Western Ukraine.

In Western Belorussia, however, Soviet authorities, according to a Soviet source, met with extraordinary difficulty. In January 1947 a CC CPSU decree complained that in this region, the local authorities "were not applying practical measures for the movement of peasants toward agricultural cooperation."⁶³ A year later, only about 2 percent of all peasant households had been united in collective farms (see Table 4). In 1950 the total was still less than 40 percent — it had reportedly *declined* during that year — and the fifth plenum of the Communist Party of Belorussia (CPB) issued a decree "concerning deficiencies in the CC CPB's leadership over agriculture." At the same time, 45 new MTS were created the same year, which suggests that the party organizations were considered too weak to supervize collectivization unassisted.⁶⁴ As guerrilla forces in Western Belorussia were virtually nonexistent, one must assume widespread passive resistance to collectivization and firm peasant adherence to the formerly prevalent *khutir* (homestead) system of agriculture. Only in 1952-53 was collectivization in Western Belorussia brought to completion.⁶⁵ It is also possible, however, that the Soviet authorities deliberately left this area alone until the main grain-producing western borderlands, such as Western Ukraine and Right-Bank Moldavia, had been collectivized (see below).

In the second half of 1949 and early 1950, the nationalist underground clearly had a delaying effect on collectivization in Western

63 M. A. Vyltsan, M. P. Danilov, V. V. Kabanov and Iu. A. Moshkov, *Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva v SSSR: puti, formy, dostizheniia* (Moscow, 1982), p. 327.

64 E. P. Beliazo, "Sotsialisticheskoe pereustroistvo selskogo khoziaistva zapadnykh oblastei BSSR." In *Tridstat let po sotsialisticheskomu puti: Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii vsesoiuznoi nauchnoi konferentsii, posviashchennoi problemam kollektivizatsii selskogo khoziaistva Pribaltiki, zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainy, Belorussii i Moldavii*, vol. 1 (Vilnius, 1979), pp. 77-78.

Ukraine. Although there were reportedly guerrilla-type activities in the other border areas (although evidently not in Western Belorussia), it appears that the authorities were able to bring them under control more quickly. In Estonia, for example, collectivization was close to completion by the end of April 1949, and the guerrillas were rounded up and deported, along with other actual and potential recalcitrants.⁶⁵ Yet in Western Ukraine, at the end of this year (as noted earlier), the authorities were still issuing appeals promising amnesty to those insurgents who gave themselves up. Although it is known that deportations occurred in Western Ukraine, they evidently did not encompass all the guerrilla forces. But there were perhaps two other sources of opposition. First, it seems that the degree of anti-Soviet feeling in Western Ukraine ran wider than the insurgency, embracing a large proportion of the West-Ukrainian rural population. The Soviet authorities themselves were quite candid about this, maintaining that the region had been for too long under the influence of "bourgeois state" and "bourgeois influence."⁶⁷ Second, party forces in the raions and villages had been badly weakened by the purges, and by the authorities' failure to promote local cadres, as noted repeatedly by *Radianska Ukraina*.

As a result of these difficulties, in December 1949, the authorities introduced the MTS political sections into Western Ukraine to complete collectivization. They seem to have achieved this objective quite successfully. Thus collectivization in Western Ukraine was completed before that of the other western borderlands. Whereas 98.7 percent of peasant households in Western Ukraine had been collectivized by the end of 1950,⁶⁸ the Baltic republics attained this figure only in July 1953. Collectivization in Right-Bank Moldavia followed quickly after that in Western Ukraine.⁶⁹

Although the Soviet authorities were evidently anxious to bring the process to completion in all regions, the Ukrainian and Moldavian areas appear to have taken priority. There were probably three main reasons for this. In the case of Western Ukraine, the attainment of full collectivization also signified the demise of the nationalist opposition, since it severed the latter's close connection with the West-Ukrainian villages. As demonstrated, the extent of the opposition was considerably greater than in the other western borderlands. Second, the authorities felt it important to complete collectivization

65 Ibid., p. 79.

66 Taagepera, op. cit., p. 387.

67 See, for example, V. Cherednychenko, *Natsionalizm proty natsii* (Kiev, 1970), pp. 157-67, a virulent anti-UPA tract.

68 *Sots. pereb.*, vol. 2, p. 259.

69 Jacobs, op. cit., p. 509.

quickly in Western Ukraine in order to set an example to the Polish authorities, who were evidently having great difficulty in implementing collectivization in Poland.⁷⁰ Third, as suggested by a Western scholar,⁷¹ Western Ukraine and Right-Bank Moldavia were major grain-growing regions, and the wheat crop in particular was politically more important to the regime than other crops. Moreover, grain-producing regions were more adaptable to collectivization than the animal-breeding Baltic republics.

Some valid comparisons can be made between collectivization in Western Ukraine after the war and that in Eastern Ukraine in the 1930s. In both cases, it took some time for the process to get started. Although there was no nationalist resistance in Eastern Ukraine, the coercive measures employed by the authorities provoked opposition to the kolkhozy. Also in both, the MTS political sections played a key role in completing the process, using harsh, coercive methods to attain this.⁷² In both cases, mass collectivization was implemented very quickly once it got under way. But in Western Ukraine, it was implemented before sufficient cadres had been trained, and thus the kolkhozy were established without the personnel capable of running them.⁷³ This adds weight to the argument that the establishment of the kolkhozy was a political rather than an economic maneuver; that it was more important to ensure that households were moved into the kolkhozy and thus be under Soviet control than it was to ensure that the kolkhozy in question would be efficient operating units.

Collectivization in Western Ukraine was completed in 1950-51. As we have seen, the entire process was accompanied by repressions and armed warfare in the villages, which contrasted with the passive resistance offered by Soviet peasants in the early 1930s. It was completed by the MTS political sections and party workers brought in from the eastern oblasts of Ukraine and other areas of the USSR. The most notable feature of the West-Ukrainian campaign was the similarity in Soviet methods over two decades. This suggests two things: first, that there was an alarming poverty of new ideas within the Soviet leadership; and second (which may negate the first), that the old methods — those of force — were considered the only reliable means to ensure that reluctant peasants joined the kolkhozy.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Korbonski, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-91, and especially pp. 189-90.

⁷¹ Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 509.

⁷² In Drohobych oblast, for example, the MTS political sections, upon formation, at once began a purge of "kulak elements" in kolkhozy. See *Radianska Drohobychchyna*, p. 128.

⁷³ See, for example, Ivasiuta, *op. cit.*, p. 145.