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THE KULAK IN POST-WAR USSR: THE WEST UKRAINIAN EXAMPLE

By DAVID R. MARPLES*

In a pioneering article in 1966, Moshe Lewin¹ made an attempt to define the kulak in Soviet agriculture. Lewin noted that the problem had not been confronted by the Soviet authorities, and that no clear definition had emerged despite the fact that collectivisation of agriculture was only achieved after the ‘elimination of the kulaks as a class’. Although the topic has not generated discussion lately, in part because there are few clear answers to the problems raised by Lewin, it is fair to say that Lewin’s article leaves room for further study. By and large, it was confined to the period 1929–33. After 1939, however, the westward expansion of the USSR saw the incorporation of a wide area encompassing the Baltic republics, Right-Bank Moldavia, Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine. Collectivisation in most of these areas did not begin on a mass scale until 1948–9, but according to Soviet sources, it took place once again after an ‘acute class struggle’ with the kulak. It is pertinent then to ask whether the post-war kulak, the kulak in the Soviet borderlands during the last years of Stalinism, was the same kulak as his predecessor in the great social upheaval in the countryside during the 1930s.

I should stress that my conclusions can only be tentative. This essay is based largely on Soviet statistics, which cannot be considered reliable. Moreover, this paper does not purport to discuss all aspects of the kulak question in the western oblasts of the Ukraine. The relationship between the so-called kulaks and the Ukrainian nationalists in the Western Ukrainian village is too complex a question to be compressed into the boundaries of this study, but clearly merits future analysis.

This paper will concentrate largely on the Western Ukrainian regions, and especially those annexed from Poland after September 1939, in the areas of Galicia and Volhynia. The area constituted about 88,000 square kilometres,² with a Ukrainian population of between 4.4 and 5.6 million.³ The Polish population of the area need not concern us here since it was largely removed in 1939–40 and during a population exchange between the Ukrainian SSR and Poland in 1944–46.

The most basic difference between most areas of the USSR in 1929–33 and the Western Ukraine in September 1939 was that in the latter case the major landholders were not from the ‘native’ population. The large landowners, in particular, were predominantly non-Ukrainians. In 1921, for example, 81.5% of *pomishchyky* were Polish, 7% were Ukrainian, 5% Jewish and 3.8% Russian, according to a Soviet source. Only in Volyn was there a sizeable stratum (17.6%) of Ukrainian landowners.⁴ The Ukrainian farms were predominantly small affairs. In Ternopil, for example, it has been estimated that about 86% of all farms were under five hectares in size, and over 96% were under 10 hectares.⁵ In fact, one of the main reasons cited for the invasion of the Western Ukraine, by the Soviet authorities, was precisely to ‘free’ the poor West

Ukrainian peasant from the 'yoke of landlord [dominated] Poland'.⁶ How then was the West Ukrainian peasantry divided up into the various social strata of kulaks, *serednyaks* (middle peasants) and *bidnyaks* (poor peasants)?

The 'Indices of Kulak Farms', quoted in Lewin, notes five criteria for 'kulak farms', only one of which had necessarily to apply to cause the process of 'dekulakization' to be implemented. These criteria consisted of hiring labour, owning an enterprise such as a flour mill, hiring out agricultural machinery, hiring out premises for business, and the presence of family members with sources of income not derived from labour.⁷ In defining the number of kulak farms at the start of the 1939–41 period of Soviet rule in the Western Ukraine, the Soviet scholar Varetsky adheres to the use of hired labour, declaring that about 60,000 farms in the Western Ukraine used hired labour in the Polish period.⁸ In addition, he refers to kulak farms in terms of sown area, a convenient simplification frequently used by Soviet scholars when they refer to the Western Ukraine. Varetsky states that the West Ukrainian peasantry was divided as follows at the beginning of Soviet rule: *bidnyak* farms (under five hectares), made up 76.0% of total farms; *serednyak* farms (5–10 hectares), 18.4%; and kulaks (10–50 hectares), 5.6%.⁹ We thus have two categories of kulak: a farm with a sown area of more than 10 hectares, and a farmer who used hired labour. Are we to assume, then, that the 60,000 farms cited by Varetsky fell into the 10–50 hectares category?

This clearly was not the case. The Polish countryside in the inter-war period was the scene of chronic rural overpopulation. According to the Polish census of 1931, almost 300,000 holdings employed hired labour. Of this number, 58.7% were *under* 10 hectares in size (there are no figures on individual voivodships, so it is not possible to calculate the percentage in the West Ukrainian areas).¹⁰ In other words, the majority of farms employing hired labour could not be categorized as kulaks according to sown area. The hiring of labour was practised by all sectors of peasant society.

If, on the other hand, we estimate the number of kulaks in the Western Ukraine according to sown area alone, the percentages of farms over 10 hectares were very low: Volyn, 8.4; Lviv, 1.5; Stanislav, 1.5; and Ternopil, 2.2, making up a total of about 35,900 farms.¹¹ Thus on both counts—hired labour and sown area—Varetsky's total of 60,000 kulak farms mentioned above seems erroneous. Moreover, the above percentages would have included landholdings of Polish landlords and military settlers, who had been moved into the area according to laws of 1920 and 1925 and were removed by or fled from the Soviet authorities in the autumn of 1939.¹²

An additional factor to be taken into consideration in estimating the number of kulaks in the period of pre-war Soviet rule in West Ukraine is that the Soviet authorities may have tried to raise the number of farms that fell into the kulak category of landholding during the 1939–40 land reform in West Ukraine. During the socialization of land in 1939, according to Soviet figures, the authorities confiscated from the Polish landowners and others about 2.7 million hectares of land but only 1.13 million hectares had been redistributed by the end of the year.¹³ The bulk of the land had been retained by the state, ostensibly for the creation of state farms. But the net result was that while a few households increased the size of their landholdings, the majority remained land hungry. It is possible that the authorities were deliberately withholding the land in order that social differentiation might develop in the West Ukrainian countryside.

By April 1940 the percentage of kulak farms in Lviv oblast, for example, had reportedly increased from 1.6% at the end of the Polish period of rule to 2.2%, measured in terms of sown area.¹⁴ The Soviet regime had thus removed the (predominantly Polish) landlords, but had retained and evidently added to the landholdings of the kulak stratum. In the 1930s collectivization in the USSR generally had been accompanied by a 'class war' between the kulaks and the poor peasants. It is probable therefore that in the West Ukraine the lessons of the past were being applied and a similar 'conflict' was being fostered prior to collectivisation. The latter had already begun on a small scale in the spring of 1940, so preparations were being made for another mass campaign. In this way we can speak of an attempt to *create* kulak farms. The Soviet view was that the greater the social differentiation in the countryside, the more likely it was that the poorer peasants would become resentful toward those with more land, and the more likely they would begin to see the 'advantages' of joining a collective farm.

Two other factors point to a Soviet attempt to create social divisions in the villages: first, although it is known that the vast majority of West Ukrainian peasants were living close to the poverty level, only 35% of peasant households were exempted from taxation;¹⁵ second, restrictions on land tenure were not implemented until March 1941, some 19 months after the commencement of Soviet rule. (The latter law restricted land tenure per peasant household to seven hectares in Galicia and 10 hectares in Volhynia, with slight increases for certain areas.)¹⁶ This delay in implementation gave some time for differences in peasant landholding to emerge. That this was related to the collectivisation campaign seems clear. In the Chernivtsi oblast (made up of the Khotyn *uezd* of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna), which had been annexed from Romania in June 1940, restrictive norms on land tenure were implemented as early as 26 September 1940, yet collectivisation had not got under way prior to the outbreak of war in June 1941.¹⁷ The collectivisation campaign required the presence of the class enemy in the village, the exploiter, the rich peasant. In Chernivtsi, mass collectivisation was left until after the Galician and Volhynian areas of the Western Ukraine had been propagandised. This is not the place to enter into a detailed explanation of the reasons for this: in brief, the largest areas of arable land were in the former Polish regions so it made sense to begin collectivisation there; and second, Chernivtsi had been under Soviet rule for only a year when war broke out.

Whether a full-scale class war would have been developed in the West Ukrainian countryside is not known. The German and Romanian invasion not only delayed the process of collectivisation—evidently West Ukrainian peasants tried to disband most of the kolkhozy during the war—but also complicated the crucial kulak question. Before discussing the early post-war years in the Western Ukraine, it should be stated that the war had a profound psychological impact on the peasants of the Soviet western borderlands. Whereas Lewin's kulaks faced seemingly insuperable odds as the Soviet authorities and police forces entered their villages, in the western borderlands many of the peasants had had a chance to fight against Soviet rule, and perhaps more important, had seen the Soviet regime on the verge of total collapse. In all the western regions the Soviet forces faced guerrilla movements when they re-annexed the territories in 1944–45, and these insurgents were especially strong in Estonia, Right-Bank Moldavia and the Western Ukraine.¹⁸

As a result of this opposition, the category of kulak was expanded by the authorities to include the following:

(1) those households that fitted the old pre-war formula of more than 10 hectares of arable land.

(2) those who were opposed to the creation of kolkhozy.

(3) those who were opposed to Soviet rule.

Whereas the recalcitrant peasants of the 1930s had resisted Soviet anti-kulak measures passively, by trying to conceal grain and similar actions, the postwar opposition faced the authorities with active resistance for the first time.

In Soviet ideology the kulak has always been the principal opponent of 'socialization' in the village. In the 1930s anti-kulak campaign which preceded the onset of mass collectivisation the kulak was isolated from his fellow peasants by discriminatory measures, while the Committees of Poor Peasants carried out grain and livestock requisitions from 'kulak' farms. But the post-war situation presented new problems, because opposition to Soviet rule pervaded all sectors of rural society.¹⁹ In order to maintain the line that the kulak again was principally responsible for resisting Soviet policy, the authorities either included the 'nationalists' within the category of kulak, or used the terms 'nationalist' and 'kulak' as synonymous in party and government reports. Like the small landowners, the churches and the monasteries, the nationalist insurgents in the Western Ukraine and the other western borderlands were included in the list of those to be expropriated in the post-war land reform imposed throughout these newly-annexed territories in 1944–45.²⁰

At this time in the Western Ukraine a new phenomenon emerged in Soviet reports, namely the 'Ukrainian–German nationalist'. The name, which was apparently first coined by Khrushchev in March 1944,²¹ indicates the Soviet attempt to forge a direct link between the Ukrainian insurgents and the Nazi–German occupation regime. Both kulaks and insurgents were thus portrayed as 'lackeys' and 'active abettors' of the Germans. A further premise was that the Germans and their supporters were responsible for all the damage to industry and agriculture during the German–Soviet war. In the Western Ukraine the attacks of UPA insurgents were portrayed as a part and continuation of this purely destructive tendency. As a Soviet source declared, with reference to the spring of 1945: 'Kulaks and nationalist bands tried in every way to hinder [reconstruction] work, destroyed documents, burnt down the residences of the village Soviet'.²²

While the 'class enemies', adhering faithfully to German policy, were carrying out the destruction, the line went, the Soviet regime was concerned solely with the reconstruction of the economy and cultural life in the Western Ukraine. The prevalence of UPA insurgents in the post-war years suggests that this propaganda campaign enjoyed only limited success, but it nonetheless formed an integral part of early post-war Soviet policy.

Once the Soviet western borderlands had been re-annexed (or, in the case of Transcarpathian Ukraine, annexed for the first time), the authorities implemented a major land reform, which saw the redistribution of about 3.2 million hectares of land, confiscated from the landowners, kulaks, churches and monasteries, among one million peasant households.²³ In the Western Ukraine, it is reported that approximately 354,000 households received some 513,000 hectares of land,²⁴ or an average of 1.6 hectares per eligible household. Soviet reports claim that this land reform constituted a major attack

on kulak landholding.²⁵ In Lviv oblast, for example, it is reported that in 1944 there were 2,600 households with more than 10 hectares of land. By the end of the year, the authorities had reportedly confiscated 6,300 hectares of this kulak land and divided it among bidnyak households, and the process is said to have continued throughout the following year.²⁶

Despite the apparent scale of the reform, it affected only about 32% of West Ukrainian peasant households, and there was a marked reluctance on the part of the peasants to accept the land.²⁷ There were probably two main reasons for this attitude. First, there was in all likelihood a natural reluctance on the part of the individual farmer to take land that was not his own—Soviet sources refer to this as the ‘private farming mentality’. Second, there was a fear on the peasants’ part that if they took the land, they might at some point be reclassified as ‘kulaks’. The implication is that a campaign which one Soviet source has termed ‘serednyakisation’ (i.e., the creation of a large stratum of middle-sized peasant holdings of about 3–10 hectares), was but the forerunner of a major campaign against both serednyak and kulak households, under the guise of dekulakisation. Because of the hostility toward the Soviet regime in the Western Ukraine, the term ‘kulak’ was extended to include members of the serednyak stratum. As this did not comply with Leninist land policy, the authorities declared blandly that the kulaks were ‘concealing land and livestock’.²⁸ In other words, serednyak farms were perceived often as kulak farms, the owners of which were trying to hoodwink the authorities.

In 1947, a year after the land reform was allegedly completed in the Western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities tried to create a ‘class war’ in the countryside by adopting several measures against alleged kulak farms. First, they raised the obligatory deliveries of agricultural goods to the state. A decree of 3 June 1947 stated that, beginning immediately, kulak farms were to be subject to increased norms for the delivery of agricultural products to the state: for grain, sunflower, soya, potatoes, vegetables, straw, meat and milk, by 50% more than the norms established for other peasant households; and for wool, an increase of 100% over the established norm. The time limits for the delivery of these products to the state were reduced on kulak farms: by one month for grain, potatoes, vegetables, sunflower, soya and straw; by two months for meat and wool; and by three months for milk. The oblast executive committees were instructed to take steps to ensure that the confiscation of land, livestock and other property from kulak farms did not occur ‘fictitiously’.²⁹

Significantly, however, the decree gave no indication of what was meant by a kulak farm. It also did not state what happened to those ‘kulak farms’ which failed to make the required delivery quotas on time. A non-Soviet source, however, states that the failure to make the deliveries of milk, for example, for which the time limit had been most drastically reduced, could result in the confiscation of the cow. For the non-delivery of meat, it was possible that the authorities would confiscate a farmer’s horse.³⁰ In this way, not only were ‘kulak farms’ punished and ostracized, but the authorities obtained livestock and draught animals that could be transferred to the newly established collective farms. For the most part, the latter appear to have been made up of landless and land hungry peasants,³¹ i.e., those households which had absolutely nothing to lose by joining, but which, since they were landless, lacked draught animals. These early collective farms lacked the basic prerequisites for farming.

This confiscation of draught animals was undoubtedly one of the main reasons why peasants began to dislike the kolkhoz so intensely. For one thing, the horse or ox in most cases was the farmer's principal means of farming. But since in the West Ukraine the majority of his compatriots lacked even a draught animal (and about 35% of West Ukrainian peasant households lacked a horse at the end of 1945),³² he was raised by the authorities to the rank of 'kulak' on a comparative basis. The problem was not unique to the West Ukraine, but applied to all areas of the USSR at the time of collectivisation to a greater or lesser degree. Perhaps the matter became especially acute in the newly annexed Ukrainian areas as the number of horses (and other animals) actually decreased in the early post-war years (see below). We have to allow also for the Ukrainian farmer's viewpoint. One eyewitness (describing the 1939–41 period) declared that he was 'heartbroken' to see the horse he had himself reared confiscated for the use of the kolkhoz.³³ Throughout the post-war period prior to the time of full collectivisation, the Soviet authorities had problems collectivising personal livestock (in theory, the peasant was allowed to retain his own cow or horse). The 'kulak' resisted this. But we should bear in mind that we are not speaking of the 'rural rich', but of those peasant households that were fortunate enough to own a horse. After the destruction of warfare, such ownership elevated a peasant above his fellows, and thus he became a prime target of Soviet anti-kulak policies.

A second decree, adopted on 23 August 1947, 'Concerning the taxation of peasant households of the Ukraine', which applied almost exclusively to the western oblasts, implemented an income tax on the 'wealthy'. It established an increase in taxation of 50% on those earning up to 10,000 rubles per annum, 75% on incomes up to 15,000 rubles per annum, and 100% for those with incomes exceeding 15,000 rubles.³⁴ Since this decree has not been published thus far, it is not known whether it contained other clauses giving a more precise definition of a kulak. But the differentiation had now begun in terms of income.

Although Soviet sources do not give details about the precise amount of taxation paid out by alleged kulak households in the Western Ukraine, the identical measures carried out in the other western borderlands (implemented in most cases one week later on 30 August 1947) permit a revealing insight into the predicament of the so-called class enemy. In Right-Bank Moldavia the average taxation paid by a kulak household is said to have increased from 553 roubles in 1947 to 1,274 roubles in 1948, or by 230%. At this time, the kulak household was paying 44 times more in taxes than kolkhoz households and 7.6 times more than individual *bidnyak* households.³⁵ Thus the kulak's livelihood was being brought quickly to ruin. How did these policies affect Western Ukrainians?

In 1947 a Soviet source indicates that the farms of over 10 hectares in the Western Ukraine had now completely disappeared.³⁶ If we assume that the stratum disappeared by the end of the year (the source is unclear), when taxes became due, the question arises as to where these 'kulak farms' went. There are two possible answers. First, it is probable that many kulaks, anticipating restrictive measures on the part of the authorities, divided their lands up among family members (and possibly even among friends). It is known, for example, that the number of peasant households in Ternopil oblast increased considerably in these early post-war years.³⁷ Second, a large number of so-called kulak households moved to the kolkhozy at this time. This second point requires a brief elaboration.

During the period of mass collectivisation, Soviet sources (and this applies to all areas, not just the Western Ukraine) declare that the kulak, instead of offering resistance, 'changed his tactics', and 'wormed his way into the kolkhoz to destroy it from within'.³⁸ Whether or not the majority of kulaks entered the kolkhoz with such a precise aim in mind is not known, but it is true that many of those designated kulaks entered the kolkhozy. The reason for this was, as noted, in order to avoid the restrictive policies directed at kulak farms. But the number of those households entering the kolkhozy in the Western Ukraine at the end of 1947, when taxes were due, suggests that it was primarily the *serednyak* who was most affected by these laws. Thus for the former Polish regions of the Western Ukraine the percentage of households in kolkhozy increased from 5.4% at the start of 1947 to 41.2% at the end of the year.³⁹ By any definition only a tiny minority of these households could have fitted into the kulak category, yet the increase was largely due to taxes and delivery quotas placed on 'kulak farms'. As the Estonian specialist Rein Taagepera has noted, in Estonia during this same period, 'Anyone considered "anti-kolkhoz" could be secretly reclassified as a kulak and . . . the only way to escape the "anti-kolkhoz" label was to join a kolkhoz'.⁴⁰ It is not likely that the kulak joined the kolkhoz with much enthusiasm, but he was more or less obliged to join in order to survive.

Beermann notes that during mass collectivisation in the 1929–33 period, the kulaks were divided into three groups: criminals and terrorists; wealthy peasants who exploited labour; and others who employed labour, but were not so wealthy.⁴¹ The second category was scheduled for deportation, while the third was generally resettled outside the arable lands of the kolkhoz (the members of the first group were put on trial, but as straightforward criminals hardly qualified as 'kulaks'). In the Western Ukraine, it is known that in some regions (possibly in all) collectivisation on a mass scale was preceded by deportations. This is also known to have occurred in Estonia.⁴² For the Western Ukraine, let us look at the example of Volyn oblast.

According to a Western source, a report concerning the latter part of 1947 appeared in *Newsletter from behind the Iron Curtain* of the following year. This stated that on 20–21 October 1947, the Soviet authorities carried out an unprecedented deportation of persons from the oblast, totalling between 500,000 and 800,000 people, or between one fifth and one quarter of the oblast's population. These included all the prominent people who were put on the deportation list on charges of either collaborating with the UPA or with the German occupation forces during the war.⁴³

Were these people 'kulaks'? The facts from the Soviet side suggest that they might have been considered so. On 22 December 1948 the Ukrainian party newspaper, *Radyanska Ukraina*, declared that an essential measure for the success of collectivisation in Volyn had been the 'isolation of the kulak', and the 'liquidation' of his influence on the *bidnyaks* and *serednyaks*. At first, the paper stated, the kulaks were ostracized, but soon the bulk of peasants turned against them and 'demanded their liquidation as a class'. The statement is ominous. To the peasants are attributed the actual deeds of the authorities. An example of the authorities' attitude toward the kulaks in 1948 is provided by a raion secretary in Right-Bank Moldavia, who declared

"We must resolve the kulak question. In the report given, I have not heard directions on this problem. How is it that in the village Maramanovka, which has achieved full collectivisation,

there remain 22 kulak farms? What are we to do about them? You see, they will not sit quietly, they will do harm, they will wreck the kolkhozy, they will take every possible diversionary act against the kolkhozy. . . . It is absolutely vital to isolate these kulaks. . . . [Leaving them alone] is tantamount to capturing a fortress and leaving its defenders armed. We must disarm [the kulak], isolate him and wage a decisive struggle against him."⁴⁴

One can assume that this attitude prevailed generally throughout the western borderlands during the period of mass collectivisation.

Another pointer indicating that the deportations might have seen the removal of the 'kulaks' was the tremendous increase in the number of households collectivized in Volyn following the period of deportations: in percentages an increase from 9.9% to 71.2% over the course of the year.⁴⁵ This suggests that the deportations were directly related and a prelude to the mass collectivisation campaign. The class enemy had to be eliminated to 'encourage' peasants to enter the kolkhozy. The likelihood is that the terrified peasants joined the kolkhoz because this seemed to be the only way to be sure of avoiding deportation.

What is one to make of the *number* of those deported? First, the figures as stated are too large to have embraced kulak farms, if by the latter we mean farms that fell into that category in terms of sown area or hiring of labour. They could have included farms which hired labour during the war, however. This suggests that once a peasant landholder had been characterized as a kulak, he retained the label no matter what he did in the future, even if he divided up his lands or joined the kolkhoz. In fact, only in this way could the numbers of kulaks have been high enough to merit the 1947 measures. The numbers deported, however, also add weight to Lewin's statement that the kulak was anyone 'who is declared to be such by the authorities'.⁴⁶ Because of the terrorist attacks carried out by UPA bands in the Western Ukraine, especially on kolkhozy and on Soviet officials, the category of kulak, or class enemy was expanded to include anyone opposed to the Soviet regime.

Collectivisation in the Western Ukraine was reportedly completed by the end of 1950.⁴⁷ During this period the kulak was supposedly 'eliminated as a class'.⁴⁸ But was this true? The evidence suggests otherwise. In Soviet documents of late-1950 the 'kulak' in the Western Ukraine is still cited as the chief menace to collectivised society.⁴⁹ Events of the early 1950s also suggest that the 'class enemy' was still at work. In 1953 Ukrainian first secretary L. G. Mel'nikov was dismissed for, among other reasons, his failure 'to consolidate organizationally and economically the kolkhozy in the Western Ukraine'.⁵⁰ In plain language, this meant that many of the kolkhozy were disbanding themselves and proving unworkable, clear evidence one would have thought in Soviet eyes that the 'kulaks' were continuing their activities.

One should beware here of oversimplification. There were many reasons why West Ukrainian peasants should have opposed the kolkhoz. First, the pre-war experience has to be taken into account. Collectivisation in Chernivtsi, for example, and in the recently annexed Transcarpathian oblast (June 1945) took place much faster than in the former Polish regions of the Ukraine.⁵¹ This suggests that the process was more difficult in those areas which had some firsthand experience of collective farming in 1939–41. Second, the important factor of armed nationalist bands has already been noted. Other reasons also spring to mind.⁵² It is possible, however, that in creating the class enemy, the authorities

did their work too well, and managed to engender a real and lasting hatred for the kolkhoz and all that it symbolised. One of the reasons for this was the vagueness that applied to the category of kulak. Instead of creating a small minority of would-be exploiters, the regime had in fact antagonized a broad sector of the village community. Because of this, even in 1953, four years after the completion of collectivization in the Western Ukraine, the kolkhozy were still unstable.⁵³

In conclusion, we can say the following. Even before the first Soviet annexation, the so-called 'kulak stratum' in the Western Ukraine was small. Many households, from bidnyaks to landowners, employed hired labour, so this categorization is too vague to be used. The vast majority of West Ukrainian farms were short of draught animals and implements, and this situation persisted in the postwar years when the agricultural associations were created. The class war in the villages, noted in Soviet works, was fomented by the Soviet authorities. There are no indications of class antagonism between the various strata of peasants. In general, the differences between the peasants were too minimal to create friction, and also the West Ukrainians could remain united in the face of the common enemy: the Bolshevik, commonly represented in this region by Eastern Ukrainians and Russians in the *MVD*.⁵⁴

Between the pre-war kulak and the West Ukrainian example lies a profound difference. In his analysis of the 1929–33 Soviet kulak, Lewin did not have to allow for a genuine opposition movement based on a clearly developed ideology like that in the Western Ukraine, which can be loosely termed Ukrainian nationalism. This meant that whereas Lewin's kulak had the utmost difficulty in thinking or organising as a group, those opposed to Soviet rule in the Western Ukraine had no such problems. This is why the problem of the kulak (and collectivisation) in the Western Ukraine was declared to be so difficult.⁵⁵ The Soviet authorities actually failed on two counts: they did not manage to create serious class divisions in the West Ukrainian villages, but they did create an attitude of hostility among the peasantry that persisted in addition to nationalist opposition and continued long after the nationalist bands had reportedly been eliminated. The Western Ukraine had had no NEP to foster a peasant hierarchy. But the Polish period had, for all its problems, helped to produce a closely knit Ukrainian community. The kulaks in the Western Ukraine were those who utilised this community network to oppose the kolkhoz in the early post-war years. Once one dispenses with the superficial Soviet categories—exploiter of peasants, hirer of labour, leaser of land—which clearly do not apply to the Western Ukraine, the kulak of 1944–50 emerges as what he was, namely a political opponent of the Soviet regime who had to be taken very seriously. In contrast, Lewin's kulak was a more ethereal figure, who offered limited resistance to the authorities only when forced to do so by the most unmitigating of circumstances.

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¹ M. Lewin, 'Who Was the Soviet Kulak?' *Soviet Studies*, vol. XVIII, no. 2 (October 1966), pp. 189–212.

² *Pravda*, (1 November 1939).

- ³ S. Horak, *Poland and her National Minorities, 1919–1939* (New York, 1961), p. 84.
- ⁴ V. L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR* (Kiev, 1960), p. 44.
- ⁵ M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopilshchyni*, (Kiev, 1958), p. 7.
- ⁶ See for example, Declaration of the People's Assembly of the Western Ukraine, 27 October 1939, 'Pro vkhodzhennia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy do skladu Ukrainiskoi Radyanskoi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliki', cited in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainiskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1976), pp. 18–19. [Referred to hereafter as *Z ist.*]
- ⁷ Lewin, *op. cit.* 196.
- ⁸ Varetsky, *op. cit.* 48.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰ *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland* (Warsaw, 1938), p. 63.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² *Pravdu ne zdolaty: trudyashchi zakhidnykh oblastei URSR v borotbi proty ukrainskykh burzhuaznykh natsionalistiv u roky sotsialistychnykh peretvoren.* (Lviv, 1974), p. 12; Horak, *op. cit.* p. 153.
- ¹³ *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainiskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1968), vol. 2, p. 88; M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolhospnogo budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainiskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1962), p. 76.
- ¹⁴ Report of Lviv oblast committee CPU at the first oblast party conference, 23 April 1940, 'Pro stan silskoho hospodarstva oblasti', cited in *Z ist.*, *op. cit.* p. 115.
- ¹⁵ *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, *op. cit.* vol. 2, p. 89.
- ¹⁶ Decision of the CC CPU and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, 24 March 1941, 'Pro vstanovlennia hranychnykh norm zemlekorystuvannya na odyń selyanskyi dvir', cited in *Z ist.*, *op. cit.* pp. 43–44.
- ¹⁷ According to *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, *op. cit.* vol. 2, p. 93, there were 62 kolkhozy in Chernivtsi oblast on 1 June 1941, uniting about 4,600 households. But in the former Polish regions, 2,589 kolkhozy had been created, with a total of 172,518 peasant households.
- ¹⁸ *Sovetskaya derevnya v pervye poslevoennye gody 1946–1950* (Moscow 1978), pp. 352–4.
- ¹⁹ *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, *op. cit.* p. 95.
- ²⁰ *Sovetskaya derevnya*, *op. cit.* p. 354.
- ²¹ The first evidence of this was in a speech by Ukrainian first secretary Khrushchev on 1 March 1944. Cited in Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964), p. 127.
- ²² See, for example, Act of the oblast commission to examine the damage perpetrated by the German-fascist plunderers on the territory of Drohobych oblast, 12 April 1945, cited in *Z ist.*, *op. cit.* p. 208.
- ²³ *Istoriya selyanstva URSR*, (Kiev, 1967), vol. 2, p. 375.
- ²⁴ *Sovetskaya derevnya*, *op. cit.* p. 353.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 354.
- ²⁶ Ivasyuta, *op. cit.* (1962), p. 78.
- ²⁷ I. A. Teterin, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia v silskomu hospodarstvi zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy*, (Kiev, 1954), p. 11.
- ²⁸ *Sovetskaya derevnya*, *op. cit.* pp. 352–3.
- ²⁹ Decision of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, 3 June 1947, 'Pro poryadok zahotivel silskohospodarskykh produktiv u kurkulsykykh hospodarstvakh Lvivskoi, Stanislavskoi, Drohobyskoi, Ternopilskoi, Rovenskoi, Volynskoi ta Chernivetskoi oblastei', cited in *Z ist.*, *op. cit.* pp. 67–8.
- ³⁰ *Arkhiv misii UPA pry ZP UHVR*, folio 6, no. 1, p. 29 (Bolekhiv raion). Consulted with the kind permission of Professor Peter J. Potichnyj.
- ³¹ A description of one such kolkhoz is given in *Istoriya mist i sil Ukrainiskoi RSR: Rovenska oblast* (Kiev, 1973), p. 359.
- ³² *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, *op. cit.* vol. 2, 250, notes that this number of horseless farms were served by the agricultural associations. The total figure of horseless farms was probably much higher.
- ³³ Interview, I. Kuzma, Sheffield, April 1977.
- ³⁴ *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, *op. cit.* p. 170.
- ³⁵ *Sovetskaya derevnya*, *op. cit.* p. 386.
- ³⁶ *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, *op. cit.* vol. 2, p. 251.
- ³⁷ Report of Ternopil oblast land section to the oblast executive committee, after 10 December 1948, 'Pro stan kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva oblasti', cited in *Z ist.*, *op. cit.* p. 372.
- ³⁸ For the Western Ukraine, see for example, *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, *op. cit.* vol. 2, p. 257.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 259.
- ⁴⁰ R. Taagepera, 'Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase', *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXXII no. 3, (July 1980), p. 386.
- ⁴¹ R. Beermann, 'Comment on "Who was the Soviet Kulak"', *Soviet Studies*, vol. XVIII no. 3 (January 1967), p. 374.

⁴² A detailed account of the Estonian deportations is given in Taagepera, *op. cit.* pp. 379–97.

⁴³ *Ukrainian Bulletin*, 1 February 1949.

⁴⁴ *Sovetskaya derevnya*, *op. cit.* p. 389.

⁴⁵ *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, *op. cit.* vol. 2, p. 259.

⁴⁶ Lewin, *op. cit.* 195.

⁴⁷ Ivasyuta, *op. cit.* (1962), p. 123.

⁴⁸ According to *Istoriya mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR: Ternopil'ska oblast* (Kiev, 1973), p. 55, 'in the wake of the successful completion of the collectivization of agriculture, the kulak was totally liquidated'.

⁴⁹ For example, report of the secretary of Yavoriv raion committee CPU, Lviv oblast, F. K. Zhurba, at the raion party conference, 9 December 1950, 'Pro hospodarski uspikhy kolhospiv raionu', cited in *Z ist. op. cit.* p. 453.

⁵⁰ See for example, Y. Bilinsky, 'The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine', in R. Szporluk, ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR* (New York, 1975), p. 183.

⁵¹ Ivasyuta, *op. cit.* (1962), p. 123.

⁵² In 1946 a severe drought occurred in the USSR, which caused widespread famine in the Eastern Ukraine. According to a Soviet account, Ukrainian nationalists, in their propaganda, were able to point to the hordes of starving East Ukrainians entering the western oblasts in search of food, as evidence of the bankruptcy of the kolkhoz system. In the Western Ukraine there was no famine, despite the drought. See I. K. Sas, 'Vysvitlennya sotsialistychnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, (1960), no. 4, p. 105.

⁵³ For the purposes of simplification we have omitted from this essay the campaign to amalgamate kolkhozy that occurred in 1950. If anything, however, this should have served to strengthen the kolkhozy since it radically increased party representation in them. There is a good account of this in V. Yurchuk, *Borotba KP Ukrainy za vidbudovi i rozvytok narodnoho hospodarstva (1945–1952rr.)* (Kiev, 1965), p. 209.

⁵⁴ See e.g., *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 14, no. 32 (Zalozets raion, October 1946).

⁵⁵ See Ivasyuta, in *Z ist.*, *op. cit.* p. 10.