

Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cnap20

"After the putsch": Prospects for independent Ukraine

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Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: David R. Marples (1993) "After the putsch": Prospects for independent Ukraine, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 21:2, 35-46, DOI: 10.1080/00905999308408274

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999308408274

Nationalities Papers Volume XXI, No.2, Fall 1993

"AFTER THE PUTSCH": PROSPECTS FOR INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

David R. Marples

There has been considerable speculation as to which of the former Soviet republics could become viable economic entities following the Putsch of August 19-21, 1991, and the resultant dissolution of the USSR. The consensus is that after Russia, Ukraine has the best chances of survival as a European state with a highly developed economy. Yet the picture remains a bleak one. Although Ukraine has advanced industry and has been a major source of grain crops (of winter wheat in particular), a declining standard of living had been forecast by its economic experts for the period 1991-1995, even before the August 24 declaration of independence. The following study will show Ukraine's major advantages and weaknesses, and what sort of prospects lie ahead for an independent Ukraine. As with any statements on the future of the former territories of the Soviet Union, they have to be qualified with the phrase "pending future political developments." For the most part, the assumption is made that relations between Ukraine and its once and future economic partners will be amicable.

International Responses

In contrast to the Baltic republics, Ukraine's declaration of independence did not receive international recognition. During his visit to Kiev in early August 1991, President Bush was particularly careful not to make conciliatory comments to the more radical factions in Ukrainian society. Whereas Leowid Kravchuk, Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, was permitted a brief speech on the tarmac at the airport, the US President warned Ukrainians against adopting what he called "suicidal nationalism."[1] The remainder of the speech, while inoffensive in tone, supported Ukrainian aspirations only insofar as they did not run counter to those of the center, and Mikhail Gorbachev in particular. Given the delayed US recognition of the three Baltic republics—the 1940 annexation of which had never been officially recognized in that country—one can anticipate an even slower path to recognition for an independent Ukraine.

Arguably Canada has come very close to agreeing to recognize Ukraine if the referendum vote on the subject is a positive one. In particular, Canadian

External Affairs minister, Barbara McDougall, made what amounted almost to a pledge during a recent visit to Kiev. Her remarks on the subject followed those of Canadian Governor-General Ray Hnatyshyn, who informed a banquet in commemoration of one hundred years of Ukrainian settlement in Canada that the country should endorse a "free Ukraine." Prior to this speech, Hnatyshyn had received a personal request from Kravchuk that Canada recognize independent Ukraine.[2] However, Canadian diplomats generally have used more guarded language on the questions.

Only twelve days after the Ukrainian parliament almost unanimously endorsed independence, the Soviet Union's Congress of People's Deputies dissolved itself. The country was left under the authority of two parallel bodies: the Council of the Republics and the Council of the Union. Together they comprise the Supreme Soviet, the leading state organ in what has been termed "the transitional period."[3] Aside from the enormity of remaining problems, such as the question how far Russia will usurp the role of the Soviet Union or whether any kind of political entity will surface from the ashes, this event has rendered the future Ukrainian referendum superfluous. One can hardly hold a vote on separation from a Union that no longer exists. And since Ukraine is not legally bound to the Russian Republic, then even the August 24 vote may not have been necessary. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left Ukraine, like other republics, in limited charge of its political destiny, but subject to the good will of its more powerful and much larger Russian neighbor. However, as Roman Solchanyk has recently demonstrated,[4] aside from the question of who controls the Crimean peninsula, Ukraine does not have an internal "Russian problem" in the same way as Moldova or the Baltic republics. Although there are eleven million Russians living in Ukraine, they are, by and large, not a breakaway group but a cohesive and rooted community with lengthy historical ties to eastern Ukraine.

Economic Assets

Some economic experts have posited that Ukraine is in a strong position to assert an independent role in terms of its economic power. It is expected that a new currency developed in Canada will soon replace the ruble (though the mechanics of exchange with other republics remain to be elaborated). Ukraine is developing its own banking system. Trading agreements with Russia and Belarus ratified late last year have been confirmed since the failed putsch. Yet Ukraine's industry remains closely linked to that of the Russian Republic, and Ukraine has been dependent on Russian fuel for the past several years for its energy, metallurgical and machine-building industries. The Donbass coalfield, a source of valuable coking coal, has been the locatiion of unrest for over two years, and 15 percent of this coal basin lies on Russian territory. Aside from the Crimea, the Donetsk Oblast has the highest proportion of Russian dwellers

in Ukraine (though as noted, this is not necessarily significant).[5] Nonetheless, relations with Russia are likely to be very important in this region. During the three coal miners' strikes of 1989, 1990, and 1991, close relations were forged between miners of the Donetsk and Kuznetsk Basins.

Ukraine is the second most populous territory of the former Soviet Union, with a population of 51.6 million, after the Russian Republic (146 million). It is the third largest in territory at 603,700 square kilometers, after Russia and Kazakhstan.[6] In area and population it is comparable to larger Western European nations such as France. It accounted for about 25 percent of the Soviet GNP under the USSR, and in certain sectors the percentage was much higher. But these figures do not necessarily indicate economic health. In 1989, Ukraine accounted for 16.2 percent of the general national income produced. This placed the republic in second place in the USSR, after Russia. However, if one looks at the generation of per capita national income, Ukraine falls to sixth place, behind the three Baltic republics, Russia, and Belarus.[7]

What are Ukraine's main strengths? First, it possesses a number of key industries. It is, as noted, a vital repository of coking coal. In 1989, the republic accounted for 24.3 percent of total Soviet coal production. It has a well-developed metallurgical and machine-building industry that dominates the Soviet field in several areas. Again using figures for 1989, Ukraine was responsible for the output of 40.8 percent of cast iron, 34.2 percent of steel, and 45.5 percent of iron ore. It has accounted in the past for the production of a significant portion of the USSR's chemical industry, particularly caustic soda and sulfuric acid (for details, see Table 1).

Table 1

Ukrainian Industrial Output Within the Soviet Union, 1989
(in percentages of the all-Union total)

Electricity	17.2	Chemical equipment	28.5
Oil	0.9	Agricult. machines	27.9
Natural gas	3.9	Calcium soda	3.0
Coal	24.3	Caustic soda	14.8
Cast iron	40.8	Televisions	35.9
Steel	34.2	Granulated sugar	2.6
Sheet metal	34.5	Meat	21.3
Steel tubes	33.5	Animal butter	25.4
Iron ore	45.5	Vegetable butter	33.2

SOURCE: *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1989g.: statisticheskii ezhegodnik*, (Finansy i statistika, Moscow, 1990),p. 340.

Turning to industrial grain crops, Ukraine is the largest producer of sugar. In 1989, it accounted for more than 52 percent of granulated sugar produced in the USSR (7 million out of 13.3 million tons, see Table 1).[8] In agriculture, Ukraine accounted for 22.4 percent of total output in the USSR in 1990;[9] it has also been known as an important source of winter wheat, and feed crops. Besides, it has been posited that Ukraine's shipbuilding industry might be an important source of future exports that would bring needed hard currency into the republic.[10] Ukraine has a high proportion of people with middle or higher education, and a significant number of able scientists who have been able to apply their research to the industrial workplace.[11]

Economic Weaknesses

a) *Industry.* Alongside these perceived advantages, one must counterpose some serious weaknesses. Ukrainian economists have used the example of Poland as a state in a comparable position. When Poland moved toward a market economy at the end of the 1980s, it experienced a sudden decline in living standards.[12] Comparatively, Ukraine is in a worse position because a decline in living standards had been projected even before the application of a "shock program" to introduce a market economy. Ukraine has a high proportion of unskilled labor. It has been projected, for example, that there is approximately 15-20 percent overemployment, i.e., jobs occupied by unskilled labor that could be replaced through modernization. In July, the director of Ukraine's National Occupation Service, Volodymyr Yerasov, noted that some 300,000 workers could soon acquire the status of unemployed.[13]

By western standards, labor productivity is low in the republic and work discipline is comparatively poor. Alongside this, one must take into account a relatively high degree of unionization at the workplace in the form of a national strike committee. Similarly, in L'viv in July, the founding congress was held of the Coordinating Council of Trade Unions of the Western Region of Ukraine, the ostensible goal of which is to protect the interests of workers during the transition to a market economy.[14] It is plausible to suggst that this committee or Council could readily disrupt production if economic difficulties continue to mount, thus creating a vicious circle. Both political and hunger strikes have achieved significant success in the past,[15] and there is no reason to believe that they would not be used again if the situation was perceived to warrant such actions.

Many of Ukraine's factories are lacking in modern and new equipment. About 11 percent of the equipment currently used in Ukraine's enterprises has been in service for more than twenty years.[16] In the steel industry, open-hearth furnaces are still prevalent and outnumber the more advanced electrical convertors. In short, Ukraine's production potential in heavy industry may

have reached its saturation point, and opportunities for future industrial development are limited by depleted resources and lack of space. Moreover, Ukraine's economy possesses a certain imbalance in that the weight of its industrial power lies in the Don-Dnieper Basin, in which the density of the population is exceptionally high. These industries in the past have been closely connected with the all-Union economy and that of Russia in particular. In addition to being outdated, many are regarded as dangerous both from the perspective of the workers and the surrounding environment.

Ukraine's coal industry, for example, has been the subject of special attention of late. Coal mines are highly dangerous and the accident rate in Ukrainian mines is among the highest in the world.[17] Since the failed putsch, the problems have been exacerbated by the nondelivery of pitprops to the mines of Horlivka and Dzerzhinsky. Acording to Kravchuk, who met with coal miners at the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine in September, about 100,000 Donbass miners face unemployment as a result of this supply problem.[18] One could append to this statement that the lifespan of the Donbass mines, which have become very deep and in which coal is no longer easily accessible, is limited to perhaps one or two decades. Countries with analogous mining problems have shut down coal mines.

b) *Agriculture.* It has been speculated elsewhere that Ukraine's economic future may lie with agriculture.[19] However, the difficulty in this sphere has been the continuing decline of the agricultural population. Between 1975 and 1990, the rural population of Ukraine decreased by 16.5 percent (from 20.3 to 17 million people). The decline has occurred mainly because young people are migrating from the villages to the towns. As a result, the elderly are left behind and there has been a corresponding increase in the death rate and decline of the birth rate in Ukrainian villages. With the exception of the Crimea, in every oblast of Ukraine, the natural increase of the rural population has been less than that of the urban. In some regions, such as the Donetsk-Dnieper Basin, the difference exceeds 300 percent.[20] This has led some economists to suggest that rural jobs might be given to urban unemployed workers, but thus far there is little to suggest that one might see a return of people to almost abandoned villages.

The food question is of immediate and pressing concern. Kravchuk has been relatively optimistic, noting, for example, that it may not be necessary for Ukraine to purchase grain abroad, but that the country is in dire need of about three million tons of concentrated feed for livestock. In order to import such a quantity, Ukraine would require about $600 million, which could be attained only by government borrowing from its own enterprises.[21] Ukraine's premier, Vitold Fokin, however, is more pessimistic. He has pointed out that drought in the south and heavy rainfalls in Western Ukraine have reduced the 1991

harvest to well below normal and necessary levels. To feed the population of Ukraine, the state required in mid-September, 17 million tons of grain, whereas only 10 million tons had actually been procured.[22] Comparisons with the period of the 1932-33 famine have not been infrequent and, while exaggerated, it seems that there will be a deficit of at least several million tons from the minimum amount of grain required to feed Ukraine's population.[23]

Over the long-term also, Ukraine's agricultural prospects do not look healthy, mainly as a result of the way the land has been exploited during the Soviet period. The urbanization and industrialization of Ukrainian society has had an adverse effect on agriculture. Thus every year since 1950, an average of 12-14,000 hectares of agricultural land has been taken out of circulation as a result of different types of construction and industrial development. In this forty-year period, while the Ukrainian population rose from 36 to 52 million, the amount of land used for agriculture was reduced by three million hectares, including 1.8 million hectares of arable land.[24] It is sometimes overlooked by observers that the areas that have been most intensively industrialized in Ukraine, such as the oblasts of Dniepropetrovsk, Ki'iv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk—which together accounted for over 40 percent of the republic's total industrial output in 1988—have also been the regions that produced the most significant agricultural output. In this same year of 1988, these four oblasts produced over 21 percent of Ukraine's agricultural products.[25] Thus the depletion of agricultural land may continue if Ukraine should embark on a period of industrial expansion.

The Environment

Ukraine's environmental situation has given rise to great concern. Indeed, the head of the Urainian Green Party, Yurii Shcherbak, is standing for election to the Ukrainian presidency as an ecological candidate and the Minister of the Environment. Annually, Ukraine releases about eleven million tons of dangerous byproducts into the atmosphere, which has been calculated as 0.22 tons per year per resident. By comparison, the figure in Belarus is 0.12 tons; Moldova, 0.11, and Latvia, 0.07. Forest resources have been greatly depleted over the past eight years, while a significant quantity of humus in the soil has been depleted through soil and wind erosion. Conversely, recultivation of the land has been limited because of shortage of funds over the period 1976-1990. Finally, although less developed industrially than some other regions, a crisis situation has been declared in some parts of Ivano-Frankivsk (and Prykarpattya in general) because of the presence of dangerous chemical factories.[26] The link between industrial pollution and environmental protest is clear, and in fact it is unlikely that Ukraine could continue the development of industries involving hazardous byproducts without open civic protest. Again, one can posit, ultimately, a major reorientation of the Ukrainian economy

away from traditional industries.

The effects of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster continue to weigh on Ukrainian agriculture. According to one account, some 96,000 hectares of agricultural land have been taken out of agricultural use as a result of this accident, but 3.5 million hectares have been contaminated with radioactive isotopes.[27] Using figures for the area of agricultural land in use in 1986, this would mean that 8.2 percent of Ukraine's agriculatural land has been damaged or permanently lost as a result of Chernobyl.[28] Moreover, radioactive fallout affected primarily a major area of land improvement in Ukraine, namely the marshlands of Polisya, which crisscross the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. Some three milion hectares had been drained and redrained in an effort to create a new region for the development of dairy farming. Today, however, in the zone adjacent to the Chernobyl station, the number of cattle has reportedly been reduced by 99,000 head; that of pigs by 15,000 head; and that of sheep by 31,000 head. In four oblasts—Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr and Rivne—agricultural products are not considered fit for consumption.[29] This represents not merely a dangerous situation for the local population, it also has signified that large-scale investment in land improvement will not be recouped.

Other factors also need to be taken into consideration in an assessment of Ukraine's potential as a primarily agricultural nation. Rainfall occurs in an uneven fashion. The black earth (*chernozem*) areas of the steppe, for example, receive only about one-quarter of the amount received in the Carpathians. The dearth of water and regular droughts here have given rise to ambitious irrigation schemes; while swampy lands in northern Ukraine have been drained. Thus far, however, land improvement schemes do not appear to have suceeded in raising crop production significantly. Indeed the drawbacks of land improvement - damage to the land, salination of lakes through irrigation, soil erosion, etc. - far outweigh the advantages.[30] Ukraine is an intensive user of water for industry and faces a severe water shortage in the years ahead. Of the energy industries, nuclear power and hydroelectric stations are the largest consumers of water supply. While there is little opportunity for hydroelectric stations to expand further in the republic, nuclear power stations, though extremely unpopular, will likely be needed to forestall short-term, but serious energy deficits.

Medium-Term Benefits

Overall, the disadvantages outlined appear to outweigh the advantages, but one can append what might be termed "medium-term benefits" for Ukraine. It may have the option, for example, of exporting grain or coal for hard currency once its economy has been taken from the former Moscow ministries' control and the present food crisis has been weathered. Ukrainian management of its own economy will enable more rational allocation of

resources and strategic planning for the future that is not geared (or not necessarily geared) to union demands.[31] The republic is already receiving technical assistance from Canadian managers and farmers, from the Harvard University Project on Economic Reform in Ukraine (which has developed the first MBA program at Kiev's International Management Institute), and others.[32] Business contacts between Ukraine and the West have begun to develop. Several European countries, the United States and Canada have recently opened consulates in Kiev, which can be changed into full embassies if the referendum vote on independence is positive. The West European countries have a large and visible presence in Kiev. Canada is assisting Ukraine in the development of its own currency.

The Political Dimension

The forthcoming presidential elections have elicited great interest in Ukraine. There are more than forty would-be contenders, though not all have managed to secure the 100,000 supporters necessary to contest the presidency. Among these eight, the clear front runner is Leonid Kravchuk, the current chairman of the Ukrainian parliament. Research conducted by sociologists in July 1991—admittedly more than a month before the putsch—suggested that Kravchuk had the support of about 25 percent of voters and an even higher proportion in regions such as Luhanske and Donetske. Only in L'viv Oblast was his rival Viacheslav Chornovil ahead.[33] Of the other contenders, the most serious appear to be Levko Lukyanenko, the chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, parliamentary deputy Yu. Yukhnovsky, and Green Party leader, Yurii Shcherbak.

Kravchuk is an astute leader, though it is difficult to ascertain his sincerity as a democratic reformer.[34] A former Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine with responsibility for ideology, he left the party after the putsch but claimed to have written his resignation letter as early as August 19.[35] Kravchuk has, according to one appeal to Ukrainian citizens offered by his supporters, all the qualities needed of a president: competence, authority, a progressive outlook and belief in a future Ukraine as a "free, independent, powerful world state."[36] He has consistently promoted the notion of an independent Ukrainian state; has defended the rights of minorities living in Ukraine; and has stated that there can be no question of Ukraine signing a Union Treaty before the December 1 republican referendum.[37] In short, like other prominent ex-communists in the Soviet Union, he has adopted popular policies and adhered to them tenaciously.

Kravchuk has also been somewhat fortunate to espouse popular policies at a time when Ukrainian citizens have been able to identify a common enemy: first, the center in Moscow which controls Ukraine's natural resources through bureaucratic ministries; second, the Emergency Committee that carried out

the putsch; and third, though temporarily, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who made comments that Russia might lay claim to Ukrainian territories if Ukraine were to leave the Union. That comment, according to one observer, "provoked anxiety among every political force in the Ukraine."[38] The problem for the other parties in the political sphere is precisely the lack of a viable, acceptable rival to Kravchuk, with a broad power base and clearly identifiable policies. While the Communist Party was outlawed in Ukraine on August 30 and its property is now being confiscated,[39] there is no clear successor political party to take over its mantle.[40]

Within the Ukrainian parliament, which was elected before pluralism was established in Ukraine, the collapse of the Communist Party of Ukraine left the *Narodna Rada* (People's Council) in a dominant position. Reportedly, the Rada's position has been supported for the most part by Kravchuk. However, there will likely remain some opposition from the eighty party secretaries who currently remain in the Ukrainian parliament, though all are expected to resign eventually as a result of their support for the August putsch. One can anticipate, therefore, some cooperation between pro-sovereignty communists and the Rada in establishing Ukrainian independence. On the other hand, radical nationalist deputies oppose the proposed formation of a new Cabinet of Ministers in Ukraine, insisting that both Chairman Kravchuk should resign and the current parliament be dissolved, as it no longer represents the array of political forces n Ukrainian society.[41]

Outside parliament, there are a plethora of political parties under and outside the mantle of Rukh with a toehold in Ukrainian political life. Possibly the various parties in Ukraine that have been labelled democratic will band together for short-term goals, stepping into the void left by the Communist Party leadership. But a more likely scenario is that parties such as the Ukrainian Democratic Party, operating under Rukh, will continue some form of cooperation with remnants of the former Communists, led by Kravchuk. This is not a recipe for long-term success; few such compromises are. But in the current economic predicament, the republic requires a period of political tranquility. Ukraine is fortunate to have avoided thus far the sort of civil war situations that beset Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Tadzhikistan. By comparison, Ukraine is a haven of stability.

Thus far, the main political achievements lie in the assertion of independence and the dismantling of the Ukrainian KGB, though the head of the old organization, Mykola Holushko, is the acting head of the new Service of National Security of Ukraine.[42] There have also been events that might be categorized as symbolic, such as the dismantling of Lenin's statue in Independence Square and the replacement of the Communist flag with the blue and yellow flag on th parliamentary building. Statues to nationalist figues have replaced some of the Lenin statues in Western Ukraine. It is hard,

however, to avoid the conclusion that the Communists of some part of Ukraine remain a divided but far from impotent force.

Conclusion

There are too many imponderable factors for one to state unequivocally that Ukraine has a future as an independent nation. Over the long-term, Ukraine may be in a better position than most other former Soviet republics that possess fewer resources, small populations, and a history of ethnic conflicts that have arisen again today. Yet one is assuming that the territorial integrity of Ukraine will be respected. The independence of the Baltic republics has completely discredited the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, prompting Romania to raise questions about the USSR's acquisition of parts of Bessarabia and northern Bukovyna in 1940 and which currently form part of the Chernovtsy and Odessa oblasts. Poland, at least, is on excellent terms with Ukraine. Border questions with Poland might otherwise be extremely complex.

In the short term, Ukraine may have enough food to survive the 1991-92 winter, unlike other territories, but it is likely to experience a shortage of power. Indeed, a recurring energy crisis seems certain given the commitment to dismantle Ukrainian nuclear power plants that account for about 25 percent of the republic's electricity generation. The prognosis for Ukraine is not good, though it is significantly rosier than for most other former Soviet republics. While the republic should become a factor on the world scene as a new and large East European country, it can hardly expect substantial assistance from the European Economic Community, which is reportedly astounded by the requests for aid that it has been receiving of late from Moscow. For Ukrainians both in Ukraine and in the diaspora, the key task for the immediate future will likely be to convince Western governments that Ukraine's case for independence is particularly strong and that investment in the country will be a worthwhile endeavor. But there should be few illusions about the enormity of even this task.

NOTES

1. *Izvestiya*, August 2, 1991, p. 1.

2. The author attended the function in question. See also *Edmonton Journal*, August 30, 1991. On Barbara McDougall's visit to Kiev, see *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, September 10, 1991, p. 1.

3. According to the Law concerning organs of state power and the government of the USSR in the transitional period, signed by Gorbachev on September 5, 1991, the Council of the Republics is to be composed of members of the various republics as delegated by the state authorities of these republics. It is dominated by the RSFSR, which has fifty-two delegates in the Council. The other Union republics and autonomous regions have one vote each. See *Izvestiya*, September 6, 1991, p. 2.

4. Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: Relations Before and After the Failed Coup. Part One," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, September 22, 1991, p. 2. On recent negotiations between Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars, see *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, September 18, 1991, p. 2.

5. Recent statistics on the ethnic composition of Ukraine by oblast have been compiled by Washington researcher, Adrian Karmazyn. See *The Ukrainian Weekly*, September 8, 1991, p. 2.

6. *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1989g: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow, 1990), pp. 17, 19-24.

7. V. Heyets, "Makroekonomichnyi prohnoz rozvytku ekonomiky Ukrainy do 1995 roku," *Ekonomika Radyans'koi Ukrainy*, no. 4 (April 1991), p. 18.

8. *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1989g*, p. 495.

9. As calculated in rubles of output, based on 1983 prices, *Izvestiya*, September 6, 1991, p. 1.

10. John Tedstrom, "Industrial Conversion in Ukraine: Policies and Prospects," *Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 34, August 23, 1991, p. 15.

11. Heyets, p. 19. This factor is listed as one of four major prerequisites for a highly developed market economy by one of Ukraine's leading economists. See I. Lukinov, "Rynok: nadii i real'nist'," *Ekonomika Radyans'koi Ukrainy*, no. 4 (April 1991), p. 9.

12. For an update on the economic situation in Poland, see Patrice Dabrowski, "The Foreign Investment Boom," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, Number 30, July 26, 1991, pp. 36-41.

13. *Radio Kiev-3*, July 9, 1991.

14. *Radio Kiev-2*, July 9, 1991.

15. The students' hunger strike in Kiev in October 1990 led directly to the fall of premier Vitalii Maso, for example.

16. Heyets, p. 21.

17. See, for example, David R. Marples, *Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 188-200 on working conditions in Ukraine's Donbass coalfield.

18. *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, September 14, 1991, p. 3.

19. Marples, p. 220.

20. M. Dolishnii, "Rehional'ni problemy ekonomichnoho i sotsial'noho rozvytu Ukrainy," *Ekonomika Radyans'koi Ukrainy*, no. 5 (May 1991), p. 14.

21. *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, September 14, 1991, p. 3

22. *Izvestiya*, September 17, 1991, p. 2.

23. *TASS*, September 20, 1991.

24. R. Ivanukh, "Ekolo-ekonomichni problemy rozvytu sil's'koho hospodarstva na Ukraini," *Ekonomika Radyans'koi Ukrainy*, no. 8 (August 1991), p. 41.

25. V. Popovkin, "Rehional'na polityka suverennoi Ukrainy," *Ekonomika Radyans'koi Ukrainy*, no. 3 (August 1991), p. 41.

26. Dolishnii, pp. 18-290.

27. Ivanukh, p. 45. See also, David R. Marples, "Chernobyl': Observations on the Fifth Anniversary," *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 7. No. 2 (1991), pp. 175-188.

28. Calculated from figures in *Narodnoe khozyaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR: yubileinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Kiev, 1987), p. 124.

29. Ivanukh, p. 45

30. See, for example, H. Khilins'kyi "Melioratsiya na Zhytomyrshchyni: uspikhy, nedoliky, shlyakhi pidvyshchennya ekektyvosti," *Ekonomika Radyans'koi Ukrainy*, no. 7 (July 1991), pp. 92-94. A more general outline of the problems involved is provided in Marples, pp. 100-105.

31. On October 1, the twelve republics that remain officially within the USSR (though with independent status) decided to form an economic union, at a meeting in Alma-Ata. At the time of writing, the details of this agreement had not been elaborated and its practicality remained unclear.

32. Based on discussions with Christopher Kedzie, associate director of the Harvard University project on Economic Reform in Ukraine (PERU), in Kiev, April 23, 1991.

33. *Radio Kiev-3*, July 8, 1991.

34. For an assessment of Kravchuk, see Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty," *Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 31, August 2, 1991, p. 26.

35. On Kravchuk during the coup, see Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine: Kravchuk's Role," *Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 36, September 6, 1991, pp. 47-50.

36. *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, September 11, 1991, p. 2.

37. *Radio Kiev*, August 28, 1991.

38. Vladimir Ruban, writing in the *Moscow News*, No. 36, September 8-15, 1991, p. 7.

39. See *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, September 13, 1991, p. 2. On some of the difficulties involved in this process prior to the coup, see, for example, *Moscow News*, No. 33, August 18-25, 1991, p. 6.

40. According to research conducted by sociologists before the coup, 13 percent of those polled intended to vote for the Communists in a new Ukrainian parliament. While not a large percentage, it was nonetheless higher than those for other parties. The Ukrainian Democratic Party, for example, was favored by 9 percent of those polled; the People's Party 8 percent; the Greens 5 percent; and the Republican Party 4 percent. These results, if accurate, suggest that the newly formed parties have not yet managed to capture the support of a large proportion of the electorate. See "News From Ukraine," No. 34, August 1991, p. 4.

41. For example, Stepan Khmara, the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, as cited by Ruban, p. 7.

42. *TASS*, September 24, 1991.