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## FORMS AND METHODS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR AND ACTIVITY OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ON THE TERRITORY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1920–1923)

**Summary.** The article deals with negotiation process concerning formation of diplomatic relations between the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and foreign countries. The main directions were defined and activity of government and party organizations of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in the sphere of subversive operations on the territory of foreign countries were explained.

The role and place of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was defined by its geopolitical position. It has common state border with Romania and Poland and it was the shortest way to the Western Europe. The role of foreign political interests that is the necessity to be recognized officially by European countries, subversive operations on the territory of neighboring countries, liquidation of the top military of the Ukrainian People's Republic and military emigration, disorganization of Ukrainian political emigration have been ascertained.

**Keywords:** the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, foreign policy, emigration, Europe, border, intelligence agencies.

## ФОРМИ ТА МЕТОДИ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ УСРР І ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ РАДЯНСЬКИХ СПЕЦСЛУЖБ НА ТЕРИТОРІЇ ІНОЗЕМНИХ ДЕРЖАВ (1920–1923)

**Анотація.** У статті досліджено переговорний процес щодо встановлення дипломатичних відносин між УСРР та іноземними державами. Визначено головні напрями і висвітлено практичну роботу урядових і партійних організацій УСРР у сфері проведення підірвних операцій на території іноземних держав.

З'ясувано, що місце і роль УСРР у радянській зовнішній політиці визначалися її геополітичним становищем – наявністю спільного державного кордону з Румунією і Польщею, через територію якої проходить найкоротший шлях у Західну Європу, а також зовнішньополітичними інтересами – необхідністю офіційного визнання державами Європи, проведення підірвних операцій на території країн-сусідів спецслужбами УСРР, ліквідація керівництва армії УНР і військової еміграції, дезорганізація української політичної еміграції.

**Ключові слова:** УСРР, зовнішня політика, еміграція, Європа, кордон, спецслужби.

**The problem statement.** Realistic foreign policy is the main factor defining vital activity and secure life of a country. Active, systematic, purposeful and continuous process of foreign policy is the guarantee of political and economic security, which makes possible avoiding negative events of interior life of a country, supporting its life and further development. Consolidation of Ukraine as a sovereign state on international stage and its justified aim to occupy its rightful place at geopolitical space objectively causes an increased interest to its historical state-forming process including primary sources of Ukrainian diplomacy as a highly valued treasury of a positive historical experience in interrelations between countries and national traditions at foreign political stage.

**The analysis of the sources and recent researches.** The history of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission, State Political Directorate, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and documents about activity of these institutions has not been investigated for a long time. At the same time, former intelligence agencies as a

specific Soviet totalitarian system influenced all sides of social life defining those fundamental processes was going on more than seven decades of its history. It is practically impossible to imagine the history of the USSR as a whole and Ukraine in particular without definition of a place and the role of intelligence agencies in social life. V. Kozlov, the Head of the Main Archives Administration of the Russian Federation, confirmed this opinion. He had a possibility to be acquainted with documents of higher political authority and separate materials from archives of Federal Security Department and its regional managements. He said, "I think nobody knows the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century completely and nobody would know because intelligence agencies were creators of this history to a great extent" (Kozlov, 1997: 237). Document materials in scientific circulation, some liberalization of the regime of public archives and archives of a particular agency allow clarifying the main stages of forming former intelligence agencies, revealing their functions and characterizing documents about their activity.

**The presentation of the basic material.** The relations of Ukrainian diplomacy with bodies of national security were a noteworthy page. In particular, it was All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission and State Political Directorate of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, which had relations with intelligence and subversive activity of the Soviet intelligence agencies and Communist International with inspiration of revolutionary processes and forced the change of the existing state system in capitalist countries. This historical information is a noteworthy page.

In 1920, during the war between the Soviet Union and Poland, when the Red Army successfully moved into Warsaw, there were real prospects of the use of Russian experience with socialist revolution in Poland and this experience could be further used in other European countries. However, when Polish military campaign failed, it forced Councils of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic opened negotiations with Western countries about peaceful relations. Nevertheless, after this, the Bolsheviks continued the course to overcome "bourgeois" governments of the Western countries (Bilousov, 2001: 71).

The Bolsheviks considered the transition of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic to peaceful negotiations with the West as a forced step it was rest, which should be used to carry out a further battle.

The extension of the Soviet power on the whole territory of Ukraine created favorable conditions for the Bolsheviks to do a party-strategic task – "creating the world socialist republic organizing the world revolution". The Communist International had to do this task. The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine as a component of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the section of the Communist International took part in attempts to organize export of the Bolshevik revolution to European countries. Therefore, the Communist International and People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs according to the Soviet foreign political strategy acted as two instruments of the double policy: using the first of this they tried to bust up the governments in Western countries and using the second one, they tried to establish business relations.

When the plan to create the Soviet Poland was failed, the realization of the idea about the world revolution in the end of 1920 – the beginning of 1921 reduced its speed. The Bolsheviks made a conclusion that it was necessary to postpone the idea about the final victory of the world proletariat. The change of international situation required the change of the tactic of the Communist International. It was evident that the idea "to break the world capitalism using the Red Army attack" was failed. A considered and planned preparation for a revolution was essential. To make this, it was necessary to have and use different forms and methods of fight. In particular, the Third Congress of the Communist International (June–July/1921), made a conclusion that

“the world revolution is the process, which does not develop according to the straight line”. The wide use and systematic combination of legal and unofficial methods of fight was recognized as necessary.

The importance of the participation of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in the Soviet system of the export of the Bolshevik revolution was defined by peculiarities of its military-strategic location. The creation of anti-Bolsheviks front from Poland, Romania and Hungary and a real possibility to organize armed aggression of the given military block against the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (using the common state border) defined three possible versions for the Red Army to attack. The first version is in the direction of Poland across the Eastern Halychyna when the Carpathian Mountains is the only protection and Polish front is cut from Romanian one and their mutual support is impossible. The second version is in the direction to Romania across Bukovyna and the third is to attack Polish front in the south of the Carpathian Mountains in Hungary. The possibility of a simultaneous attack against Romania and Poland was also suggested (CSAPO of Ukraine. F.1, op.20, File 620: 84–87).

The specific of the Soviet political system (combination, de facto, authoritative executive functions between state and party bodies), influenced the foreign political line of the Soviet Ukraine. On the one hand, official one, the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic established diplomatic relations with European countries; on the other hand, unofficial one, the ruling party of the Republic, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine focused on the export of the Bolshevik revolution to European countries within the context of international communist movement. To realize the secret Soviet policy, it was necessary to combine efforts of the next party members: Foreign Department and Propaganda Department (subdivision of national minorities); state members of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; Special Departments, Registration Department, Foreign Department of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission (since 1922, it was Foreign Department of the State Political Directorate (Foreign Department) – bodies of political and military intelligence, and counterintelligence of the establishments of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.

The most representatives of higher state authority of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic were not only leading party officials of the republic but active participants of international communist movement. Kh. Rakovskiy, the Head of People’s Commissariat and People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and an active participant of the 1<sup>st</sup> -3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the Communist International. He was elected to the Executive Committee. D. Manuyilskyy and M. Skrypnyk, the members of the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, participated in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the Communist International. F. Kon, a participant of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the Communist International, signed an agreement with Lithuania on 14/February/1921. He was appointed to the position of the Head of Foreign Department at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. In 1922, he was appointed to the position of the Head of Ukrainian Political Directorate, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. During November-December/1922, at the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist International, he was appointed to the position of the Secretary of the Higher Commission of the Communist International. A. Hlynskyi, was appointed for the position of the Head of the Central Office of the Foreign Department during February/1–March/1/1921. Earlier he was the Head of the Ukrainian part of Russian-Ukrainian Delegation. O. Shumskyi was elected as a representative of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine at the meeting of the Higher Commission of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist International on 13/July/1921 and later he was elected as a representative of the Ukrainian Social Soviet Republic in Poland. Generally, representatives of higher governmental authorities of the Ukrainian Social

Soviet Republic, diplomats, command of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army were active participants of international communist movement directed on the export of revolution (Datskiv, 2013: 538).

The main directions in secret activity of intelligence agencies of the Ukrainian Social Soviet Republic on the territory of foreign countries were the following:

1) in the sphere of intelligence – collecting military and economic information, organization of intelligence service in political societies, disorganization and split of emigration;

2) in the sphere of counterintelligence – accounting of unreliable and counter-revolutionary elements, neutralization of activity of gendarmerie, revealing and destruction of agents of counterintelligence of enemy;

3) in the sphere of diversionary and terrorist operations – diversions, preparation of rebellions under the slogans of “national movement”, “organizations of Petlyura”, terrorist acts;

4) in the sphere of material and technical, and ideological support – newspapers, leaflets for abroad, documents for agents in abroad, technical support of diversion and terrorist operations (Kupchuk, 2011: 188–190).

The party intelligence service – Foreign department, which support cooperation with security agencies including All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission was created at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine to realize export of revolution to Poland and Romania on 26/May/1920. Weapon was supplied from the centre (in Kharkiv) to regional departments (in Kyiv and Odesa). Further, by the support of the border guards, it was supported abroad to the Bolsheviks rebellious detachments and underground resistance movements. V. Balytskyi, the Deputy Head of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission, dealt with cooperation and coordination between All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission and Foreign Department (Kupchuk, 2002: 44–48).

F. E. Dzerzhynskyi, the Head of All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, performing the task of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) to improve intelligence work, issued an order № 169 dated on 20/December/1920 that established foreign intelligence service of the Soviet Army – Foreign Department of All-Russian Extraordinary Commission. Despite of the objection of the Head of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic H. Chycherin, at the beginning of 1920, at Soviet diplomatic representatives in Germany, Poland, Finland, Baltic countries, Persia and Afghanistan, residents for foreign intelligence are opened and in those countries where there were not diplomatic mission, illegal residents are opened. Less important embassy officials headed embassy residents but they have independent from the ambassador channels of code and courier communication and secret assistants. Ukrainian Diaspora introduced the position of the assistant of the resident in residents of Foreign Department of the State Political Directorate – Joint State Political Directorate in European countries with big Ukrainian emigration (Vednyeyev, Budkov, 2006: 212).

Foreign Department at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine “About new forms of work abroad” was closed down on 30/October/1921. The process of creating allied nation and attempt of Moscow to have the total control over all institutions of foreign political influence explains this closedown. However, after the liquidation of Foreign Department, the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine concerning the export of revolution to Europe continued. The project about new work abroad dated by 31/October/1921 (V. Mantsev, the Head of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission, sent it to F. Markus) shows the following information: the central office of Foreign Department in Kharkiv and Kyiv department should be liquidated. Odesa department was not

liquidated and continued to work as the part of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission. It was “Secret Department of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission”. It had control over the next: 1) management of party work abroad, 2) intelligence and foreign counterintelligence. Nevertheless, party work was considered the main and urgent (Datskiv, 2013: 539).

The Central Committee had a control over the Party work of “Secret Department of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission” and All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission had a control over intelligence. The Central Committee appointed the Head of “Secret Department of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission” and he managed party activity and intelligence. Secret Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine and All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission were financed: the first covered expenses for party activity; the second – expenses for intelligence. A member of the Central Committee managed the activity of Secret Department. The position of secretary for foreign affairs was appointed at this department. The office of secret-directive part of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine fulfilled the functions of technical department (Kupchyk, 2011: 193–194; CSAPO of Ukraine. F.1, op. 20, File 408: 171).

Therefore, after the liquidation of Foreign Department, Odesa Foreign Department reorganized into “Secret Department” of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission managed the export of revolution to Europe. Further, intelligence agency the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine functioned as the part of security state body.

Khrystyan Rakovskiyi, the Head of People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, participated in preparation of the export of revolution to European countries. Researchers write about the participation of the Head and government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in secret subversive operations on the territory of neighboring countries. Kh. Rakovskiyi’s secretly communicated with Foreign Department of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission (since spring of 1922). Only some aspects of these contacts were traced in testimony of the agent of State Political Directorate Pavlovskiyi (Yakshyn), which was arrested in Germany in 1922. Being the Head of Foreign Department of All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission, with approval of Rakovskiyi, he organized secret residents in Germany, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Balkan countries. He reported about espionage and subversion to the Head of People’s Commissariat of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Holovko, Stanchen, Chernyavskiyi, 1994: 96, 99).

Therefore, having achieved a positive result in “export” of the Bolshevik revolution to neighboring countries required a close cooperation of party departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine with government institutions.

One can find a confirmation in archive materials that the territory of neighboring countries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic became the field of activity of intelligence agencies of the Soviet Ukraine at the beginning of 1920. Subversive operations on the territory of Turkey were complicated because of its Islamic religion, strong Islamic feelings of the population and tough Turkish language. Materials are absent in archives, which would confirm meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine concerning the export of the revolution to this country. The meeting of the referents of the Department of Diplomatic Relations of People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic valued at a low rate the prospects of subversive activity in Turkey. At the same time, it should be noted that after the liquidation in January/1921, Crimean Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine headed by A. Pavlov, agent-information net of intelligence organization in border zone with Turkey could still existed (CSAPO of Ukraine. F.P, 4 p, op. 1p., File 682: 56–58).

In the sphere of intelligence operations of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, Foreign Department of State Political Directorate, Directorate of Intelligence of Central Command of Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea, and Foreign Agency of People's Commission for Foreign Affairs paid attention to military information in particular, to the possibility of aggression of Poland and Romania against the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Secret agents of intelligence agencies of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic collected information and reported about organization of different armed formations, their intentions in details concerning the protection of attacks on Ukrainian settlements near Polish and Romanian border zones during 1921.

Secret agents moved rebellious parties, which were formed on the territory of Ukraine, to the territory of Poland and Romania. These subdivisions ruined railway bridges, communications, made armed attacks on banks, Polish and Romanian state institutions and military objects with the aim of disarmament. All combat subdivisions had to form rebel army, which should be later reorganized into regular at the time of planned "national rebellious" on western Ukrainian territory – Eastern Halychyna and Western Volyn during August/1921. The possibility of this appearance and positive result was predicted by party intelligence organization. In directives of F. Markus reported for party intelligence agents it was ordered to organize on the base of national Ukrainian elements, provocative combat detachments, which could act as the army of Ukrainian national Republic. As a result, strong proofs were formed on the base of which Poland could be accused for not fulfillment peaceful agreement, its participation in organization and support of evil combat detachments for the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Therefore, Foreign Department tried to provoke the war between the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and Poland in order to break down the state system and form the Soviet power. Foreign political project of the forming of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was complicated because the government of Ukrainian National Republic was in exile. People's Commission of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic took measures directed to disorganization of the activity of Ukrainian emigration, which was 40 000 people in the end of 1920 (Troshchynskyy, 1994: 20).

Establishment of diplomatic relations and beginning of the work of authorized representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in Warsaw, Prague, Wien and Berlin that is in centers of the main mass of political emigration supported the fulfillment of the given task by the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Measures of People's Commission of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in this sphere were caused by the threat because of the activity of Ukrainian emigration abroad in particular the following:

- 1) discovery the main part of emigrants on the territory of neighboring Poland and Romania and possibility of their quick return to Ukraine for further struggle;
- 2) availability of military fighters of the army of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in Poland and Romania, the status of interned (that is they preserved military organization) but not war prisoners;
- 3) existence of organizations of Ukrainian emigration and the government of Ukrainian National Republic in exile on the territory of Poland (Kupchyk, 2011: 216).

After the defeat of the second Winter campaign of the army of Ukrainian National Republic commanded by Yu. Tyutyunnyk, many ordinary people and officials of Ukrainian National Republic without prospects for further anti-Soviet struggle, were forced to be communists, change priorities and guidelines in political activity, radically turned to the perception of Soviet ideology. Therefore, the Bolsheviks used those emigrants who accepted communist positions to organize protest action under the title "movement for the change of signposts" (collection "Change of signposts" appeared in Paris in July/1921) or "turning movement" and was directed for the further split and

liquidation of military and political emigration and neutralization of leaders (Bilokin, 1999: 315). However, state and party leaders of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic did not evaluate the importance of the development of “movement for the change of signposts”, which appeared in 1921, the possibility to use it in disorganization of Ukrainian emigration. The government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic paid attention to participants of the “movement for the change of signposts” only in 1922. The main archive material mass dated by this year confirmed this fact.

Authorized representatives of the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic abroad were directed to the following according to the protocol of the meeting of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine dated by 23/June/1922:

1) start organization of groups of Ukrainian emigration, which agree with Soviet positions according to the example of members of “movement for the change of signposts” and give them the possibility to have their own publishing houses;

2) receive from the representatives of these groups compromise documents about representatives of political and military emigration and members of the Directorate;

3) allow the representatives of these groups entering Ukraine only after their full use abroad (CSAPO of Ukraine. F.1, op. 20, File 1029: 92).

Yu. Kotsyubynskyi (Austria), V. Aussem (Germany), M. Levytskyi (Czechoslovakia), and O. Shumskyi (Poland), authorized representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic abroad, were instructed in details about foreign agencies of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. These instructions concerned disorganization of Ukrainian emigration as it was written in a secret letter of D. Manuyilskyi, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, given to the heads of diplomatic missions dated by 27/June/1922. Ambassadors had to do the following:

1) use the moods of members of “movement for the change of signposts” among emigrants to create a group from former participants of Ukrainian National Republic, which were unaffiliated persons and spoke for the protection of the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and led struggle against slanders spread by the representatives of emigration;

2) those figures had to publish materials compromising the government of Ukrainian National Republic;

3) corresponding figures had to be used fully abroad before entering the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and negotiated with them in such way that not only to make them legal but cut them all ways to retreat;

4) costs for publishing literature about “movement for the change of signposts” had to be given after complete check of their desire to work in the direction of the schedule of emigration. Bodies of Petlyura press had to be transformed into bodies of “change of signposts” direction after publishing declaration blaming their past activity;

5) special attention had to be paid to disorganization of Petlyura parts in intern camps (achievements of authorized representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in this direction were not considerable), hence, according to the results of fulfillment of this task, the party made a conclusion about the ability to work of diplomatic representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic abroad. Communist parties of those countries had to be attracted, where there were intern camps with Petlyura soldiers. Therefore, each diplomatic mission sent abroad according to the resolution of Organizing bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine dated by 28February/1921, “About forms and methods of communication with Ukrainian communist movement abroad”. Official had to define relations with Ukrainian communist groups abroad, their regular support by literature, costs etc (Datskiv, 2013: 543).

To behead political and military emigration (in particular, return to Ukraine and court trials of the leaders of Ukrainian national movement – Pavlo Skoropadskyyi, Symon Petlyura, Yuriy Tyutyunnyk and Nestor Makhno, which were rejected to be given an amnesty by Soviet power), intelligence agencies of Soviet Ukraine did a lot of work in illegal revealing, catch and physical liquidation abroad of different dangerous for Soviet power elements and leading political and military persons of the government of Ukrainian National Republic in emigration. Soviet agents had to trace and reveal leading members of Ukrainian National Republic in emigration (Hromyko, 1960: 391). A lot of work was done to trace leaders of Ukrainian national movement in order to exterminate them physically.

To take representatives from socialist and communist parties into parliaments of neighboring countries was an important direction in secret activity of intelligence agencies. Forming Soviet deputy groups, governments of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic tried to support lobbying their own interests in legislative bodies of foreign countries.

**Conclusions.** Therefore, it should be noted that establishing official relations with European countries the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic makes subversive operations. The Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine had the next main spheres of work in secret foreign policy: subversive operations on the territory of neighboring countries, "export" of the Bolshevik revolution to European countries, warning about possibility of military aggression against neighboring countries and army of Ukrainian National Republic, disorganization of Ukrainian political emigration, liquidation of top army of Ukrainian National Republic and top army emigration.

Party and state bodies of authority closely cooperated in export of the Bolshevik revolution to neighboring countries. Foreign Department at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine – party intelligence service of Ukrainian Bolsheviks had the task of the liquidation of existing political system and establishing Soviet power in neighboring countries with the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.

Undoubtedly, any concrete foreign political service of new formed state adds to the characteristic of the model stated above its peculiar features and completes it with its experience. However, those peculiarities revealed during the existence of the Soviet Ukraine should be investigated in future.

The place and role of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in Soviet foreign policy were defined by its geopolitical position. It was common state border with Romania and Poland, where it was the shortest way to Western Europe. The foreign political interests were expressed in the necessity to be officially recognized by European countries. Subversive operations made by intelligence agencies of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on the territory of neighboring countries, liquidation of the top army of Ukrainian National Republic and military emigrations and disorganization of Ukrainian political emigration defined the place and role of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in Soviet foreign policy.

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