

V. Lypyns'kyj as a Philosopher of History

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Editor's note: *Dmytro Čyževskij (1894–1977), descendant of the Ukrainian Cossack nobility, was one of the twentieth century's most distinguished Slavists and a leading authority on Ukrainian literature, philosophy, and intellectual history. He studied at the universities of St. Petersburg (1911–1913) and Kiev (1913–1917), graduating from the latter in 1919. During his student years Čyževskij was involved in revolutionary politics as a member of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Mensheviks). At the time of the Ukrainian Revolution, as a member of that party's faction in the Ukrainian Central Rada's governing board (Mala Rada), he voted against the proclamation of the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic (22 January 1918). Until 1921, when for political reasons he left the Soviet Ukraine for Germany, he was affiliated with the Russian Social Democrats, and, until 1924, with the German Social Democrats. Discontinuing political activity in 1926, he joined the German ecumenical movement, an association that lasted to the end of his life.*

In Germany, Čyževskij studied at the University of Heidelberg (1921–1922), attending the lectures of Karl Jaspers, and at Freiburg University (1922–1924), under Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Richard Kroner. His revised doctoral dissertation, completed in 1933, was published in 1934 under the title Hegel in Russland / Gegel v Rossii. Čyževskij began his teaching career at the Ukrainian Higher Pedagogical Institute in Prague in 1924, and became a professor at the Ukrainian Free University in 1932. From 1932 until his death he taught at various German universities: Halle, Jena, Marburg, Heidelberg, and Cologne, as well as at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. From 1949 to 1956 he was a visiting lecturer at Harvard University. He was a founding member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Arts and Sciences.

*Čyževskij's scholarly production, embracing philological, philosophical, and literary fields in Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Slovak, and German intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte) and distinguished by great erudition and originality, is immense (over 1,000 items). For more specific information about his life and work, see Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Ševčenko, "Dmytro Čyževskij: In memoriam (23 March 1894–18 April 1977)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 3 (September 1977): 379–406.*

*Although Čyževskij was originally associated with the political left and did not sympathize with the Ukrainian political right (especially the independentist orientation), he held Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj in high regard both as a philosopher and as a political thinker. The essay published here is an English translation of his Ukrainian text entitled "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj jak fil'osof istoriji," which originally appeared in the conservative Catholic monthly *Dzvony* (Lviv), 1932, no. 6 (15), pp. 451–61. Of special interest is Čyževskij's emphasis on the fundamental difference between the political theory of Lypyns'kyj and those of fascism and communism.*

Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj, ideologist, historian, and politician, deserves no less attention as philosopher, particularly as a philosopher of history. In the last years of his life Lypyns'kyj managed to formulate the major tenets of his philosophy in greater detail and more thoroughly than historians usually do. In his *Lysty do brat'iv-xliborobiv* (Letters to fellow farmers), Lypyns'kyj sets out a philosophically well-grounded political system. He offers a philosophy not only of Ukrainian politics, but also of politics in general, in the belief that his conclusions can be applied to the solution of the political problems of all peoples throughout history. Lypyns'kyj sees politics as

more than a struggle between political groups and orientations—a struggle that, of course, differs between peoples and with the times. For him, politics is a manifestation of the eternal and profound tendencies and laws of the entire historical process. Lypyns'kyj's philosophy of history deserves a book-length study. Here, we focus only on the most important philosophical and historical views underlying his political outlook.

Lypyns'kyj's philosophy of Ukrainian history per se is not our subject, due to considerations of space. His original and fruitful analysis of the historical development of the concept of Ukrainian statehood (*deržavnist'*) arose on the foundation of his historical studies. But those historical studies, together with the study of the political life of all peoples and states, caused him to pose general questions of historical development. In all his work Lypyns'kyj's attention has focused on the creative and disintegrative processes and on the constructive and destructive factors in the lives of peoples and states.

Our tasks here are to formulate the basic concepts underlying Lypyns'kyj's philosophy of history and to explain the general philosophical premises from which he proceeds, without always dwelling sufficiently on their analysis. We note in advance that the concepts of Lypyns'kyj's philosophy of history and the basic premises of his thought are in many respects original and distinctive. This originality of his ideas is often overlooked because Lypyns'kyj uses common terms to express them. As soon as one turns from studying his words to studying his ideas, however, one encounters the full magnitude of a profound originality in almost all aspects of his philosophy of history.

I

The fundamental concepts with which Lypyns'kyj characterizes the foundations of the historical life of every group of people are *tradition*, *aristocracy*, and *nation*. These three terms are, of course, used by every philosopher of history. Lypyns'kyj uses them in a positive sense, which has caused him to be characterized as a conservative, an aristocrat, and a nationalist, as, indeed, he was. But his conservatism, his aristocratism, and his nationalism are not at all the same as those that are written about in the news, in the newspapers, what Lypyns'kyj's political opponents, with polemic fervor, identify with "reactionaryism," "class egoism," and "chauvinism."

1. Lypyns'kyj is fond of speaking about the first of these concepts, "tradition," as the foundation for the existence of every historical creation (*tvir*). "Traditionalism" is usually thought of as a quiet, passive life led within the limits of motionless and static forms, as a quiet, "happy" course, or as hostility against any change, however small, that is, against movement, against development, and against creativity. Tradition as Lypyns'kyj understands it has nothing in common with such stagnancy. For Lypyns'kyj the essence of tradition lies precisely opposite, in its creative character. The task of tradition is the "preparation of a new creative tradition" (p. 23).¹ Tradition is movement and creativity. Only the "multifarious, accidental, and unviable forms" of tradition are constant and immobile. Most

¹ Given in parentheses are page references to the edition of *Lysty do bratv-xliborohiv* published in Vienna in 1926.

dangerous, he goes on to say, is "literary romanticism. . .the delicate fragrance of a flower that has long since withered, a melancholy love for long dead forms of national life—a love without the force of enthusiasm, without the capacity for *creating* new life" (p. 101).

Tradition yields no happiness or peace for those who seek quiescence or who aspire to passivity. For Lypynys'kyj tradition is the personal lot that imposes on every human being the duties of labor and creativity; of struggle and movement. "Each of us must occupy his place in those ranks where life has placed him." Also, he "must fulfill his duty as his conscience commands him." This means that he must struggle to create something new, basing himself on tradition and proceeding from it (see p. 351).

2. Just as in Lypynys'kyj's philosophy of history "tradition" is not passive or immovable, so "aristocracy" as he understands it is not rigid or static. The aristocracy is "the group of the best people in a nation at a given historical moment; they are the best in it precisely because they are the ones who *at the given moment* are the organizers, the rulers, and the helmsmen of the nation" (p. 131). "In a given historical moment"—these words already suggest that the concept of "aristocracy" is for Lypynys'kyj just as dynamic as the concept of "tradition." Lypynys'kyj stresses this dynamism. He adduces examples of the "aristocracy" of different peoples at various times: "As aristocracy should be considered the feudal knights during the times of the development of feudalism, the French nobility during the times of absolutism, the officers of Napoleon, the Prussian Junkers during the times of the development of the German Empire, the financial bourgeoisie that rules present-day France or America, the Russian bureaucracy of the times of the Petersburg Empire, the English working aristocracy organized in the English workers' organization. . . . Similarly, even the present-day Russian Councils of People's Commissars (*sov'narkomy*) would have to be called an aristocracy if they organized and secured the further development" of the Russian nation.

In other words, then, an aristocracy is not an a priori component of every nation. Instead, its creation is a challenge faced by every nation. An aristocracy must be "created" (p. 132). More precisely, every aristocracy must create itself; it must secure and develop its own right to existence. The essence of the process is "the constant renewal of the aristocracy" (p. 51). This is the essence of the aristocracy's existence. In the process of the aristocracy's "renewal" ever more various classes and groups take on an organizational and ruling role. Thus, for example, in contemporary England Lypynys'kyj observed a transfer in authority from the landed aristocracy to the "working aristocracy" (p. 131). It is unimportant whether his observation has been confirmed by history since the writing of the *Lysty*. What is important is that Lypynys'kyj's concept of the "aristocracy" is thoroughly dynamic.

3. Lypynys'kyj's concept of the "nation," too, is most distinctive. He stresses the same elements in that concept as did the Romantics and contemporary writers influenced by Romantic ideas (e.g., O. Špak). He advances the idea of the "organic-ity" of the nation, or the nation as an "organic collective" (p. 21). On this organic nature of the nation Lypynys'kyj builds his entire theory of the classocracy (pp. 218 ff.). Yet this idea is subordinate to "autarchy," that is, the self-sufficiency of national life, which is insular or closed (*zamknene*) and should not depend on any external forces: "No one will build a state for us if we do not build it ourselves, and none of us can make a nation if we ourselves do not wish to be a nation," he declared (p. 67). From this idea stemmed Lypynys'kyj's sharp criticism of the "Varangian theory."

Lypyns'kyj's regarding of *territory* as an attribute of a nation is not original. What is original, and simply unprecedented in contemporary literature, is Lypyns'kyj's considering territory a basic and constructive component of a nation's being. "Territory" is perhaps an inadequate word, for it implies only the amount of space that a nation occupies. A better word, and one that Lypyns'kyj uses intermittently, is "land" (*zemlja*), in its concrete being (*danist'*): that is, territory, with all its geological, topographical, economic, and even aesthetic properties. One's attachment to the land, to one's own native land, supports and strengthens national consciousness. Lypyns'kyj therefore considers it possible to speak of a "Territorial Nation," founded on a "sense of territorial patriotism" (p. 256). "Territorial patriotism underlies every organic nation and results from the instinct for a settled way of life," he writes (p. 277).

The unusual definition that Lypyns'kyj gives for who is a Ukrainian is well known: "A 'Ukrainian,' one's fellowman, an individual of the same nation, is everyone who is organically (place of abode and work) connected with the Ukraine; a non-Ukrainian is an inhabitant of another land" (p. 417). This definition has given rise to endless arguments. Nevertheless, the definition, for all its unusualness, is based on a deep metaphysical sense of the organic unity of the nation that lives on the land, grows from the land, and is psychically influenced by the natural geographic environment. The definition stands on a conviction that the feeling of love for one's native land as an organic whole—a deep bondedness with one's native land—is the absolute condition for the most close-knit association of humankind on earth, called the "nation."

For Lypyns'kyj a person's bond with the land creates a specific psychology that lives by creative tradition, the psychology by which the soul of the creative aristocracy lives. Along with the contrast between the "black" and the "yellow" peoples, the "farmers" and the "nomads," one of Lypyns'kyj's most brilliant conceptions is his contrast between the "law of the land" and the "law of capital." The struggle between them is the "struggle of two irreconcilable world views": the human being as the head of his own farm versus the human being as a member of an anonymous joint-stock company; the worker of the land versus the player on the stock exchange. The producer of material values necessary for life, who struggles directly with nature, versus the clipper of coupons, who invents stock-exchange maneuvers. Faith in the labor of one's own hands and the necessity (*konečnist'*) of the struggle with the harsh natural laws of the land is set against faith in cunning, fortune, speculation and the possibility of "general peace." The need for a religion or an idea as a preserve of strength in the difficult struggle with nature, versus complete religious indifference and the self-assured bookkeeping of the denizens of bank offices. Aestheticism in the whole of daily life—in the orchard, in the homes, in the field, in decorated yokes and embroidered shirts—is contrasted with art for sale, art "after dinner," and art "as luxury..." (p. 33). Lypyns'kyj goes on to draw a brilliant characterization of the social, familial, and political systems that grow out of the "law of the land" versus those out of the "law of capital."

This definition of the nation as a unity resulting from the unity of "territory" or land has an extraordinary originality. Lypyns'kyj is more radical and more profound in the concept than the Russian "Eurasiasts," for whom, too, "geographical" unity was one constructive factor in the concept of nation. Serious thought must be given to whether Lypyns'kyj's theory of nation reveals deeper motives of the Ukrainian national spirit, in contrast to the West European theories that advance the

state, race, language, and national consciousness to the foreground in the concept of the nation.

II

We already have pointed to the "dynamic" features in Lypyns'kyj's philosophy of history. They appear even more strikingly when we turn to another group of concepts in his philosophy of history: *idea*, *word*, *morality*, and *will*.

1. "Ideas" are incessantly created in the historical process and, when developed in part or in full, yield their place to yet others. Ideas do not fall from heaven, but are formed by humans for other humans. They grow out of elemental material life, and this essential quality of human social (*hromads'ke*) existence predetermines them. Alterations in the forms of "social existence" or "material life" of society lead necessarily to corresponding alterations in ideology. That is why Lypyns'kyj rejected all romantic enthusiasm and idealization of the past. "While riding on a motorcycle with a newspaper in one's pocket, it is no longer possible to have the old thoughts of the Zaporozhians. People should not be set on a motorcycle like a Cossack—with a tuft of hair on their head and wearing long-skirted coats (*župany*) and old-style baggy pantaloons." Every age must create new ideas. Since it is no longer possible to have Cossack thoughts, "the same spirit of the community-nation must now create other ideas, other thoughts."

It may seem that this is "relativism," that is, an avowal that each age and each nation has its own truth, and that there is not and cannot be a general truth. Lypyns'kyj addresses himself to this issue in completely different terms that recall Hegel's attempt to solve the same problem. "The truth of social life," he writes in the *Lysty*, "like every truth, is one. But it can be known from different sides and in its different manifestations, depending on from what point of view it is looked at and on what—in conformity with the point of view—real use is made of the known truth" (p. 353).

2. Ideas influence the masses or the human element not directly, but through the intermediary of the "word." For Lypyns'kyj the word plays an extraordinary role, as, perhaps, in no other system of philosophy of history. The human mass lives and is ruled by "elemental, subconscious, and irrational desire." Society and its separate groups "bring to consciousness" (*usvidomljujut' sobi*) this desire through the word (pp. 116ff.). This "bringing to consciousness" is connected with the manifestation of the desire "as an image arrayed in logical, verbal forms" (p. 117). "The image (formulated by the word in the cognizing work of writers) of the given group's elemental social (*socijal'ni*) wishes awakens in it the wishes hitherto slumbering in the subconscious" (p. 120). The *word* is just as dynamic and just as obliged continually to be recreated, while conforming to social and political changes and to historical processes, as are *tradition* and *ideas*. "The word, if it is to be creative, must serve life, and not fruitlessly endeavor to bend life to its laws. . . . The laws of the word—laws of logic, laws of dialectics—can acquire creative strength only when they serve not themselves, but the irrational, illogical, elemental desire from which all life, including the word itself, is born" (p. 115).

So we encounter in Lypyns'kyj a genuine cult of the word, an enormous respect for that immense instrument of human thought and will. That is why Lypyns'kyj hates nothing more than "littérateurs" in the negative sense, that is, persons who abuse words, who make of the word an end in itself, tearing it away from reality and

reducing the mightiest instrument of historical development into a means to serve their egoistic and petty interests.

3. Again and again Lypyns'kyj emphasizes the significance of *morality* and of the moral² foundations of social (*suspil'ne*) life and politics. Morality is the precondition of strength and authority, of "health and strength" in political constructs. "The foundations of all organized social (*hromads'ke*) life are the sense of legality and social morality," Lypyns'kyj writes (p. 107). He refers constantly to "moral health," "political honesty," and similar concepts. From his point of view, potent political forces, organizations, or groups are not those faced with morally simpler tasks, but exactly the contrary. The level of difficulty and of moral requirements posed by the tasks standing before a particular political group are symptomatic of the level of recognition of a political group or current. As the inner forces of historical development crystallize in the word, so they are revealed in the moral requirements and the moral norms of each age.

Lypyns'kyj examined the specific questions of his day from this viewpoint. Thus he wrote of the hetmanite movement: "The very element of life, as it makes greater moral requirements of us, will help us to overcome our inner weakness and to strike from us—as fire from flint—a maximum of energy and persistence. . . . It will receive us, it will nurture us with its tempestuous throes, but only when we shall have become worthy of it, only when we ourselves by our personal moral worth shall justify the greater moral requirements that the element of life makes of our creative ideas and of our moral faith" (pp. 107ff.).

It is no wonder, then, that Lypyns'kyj evaluates the significance of historical forces by their exaction of sacrifice and even self-sacrifice, or in any case, by their imposition of "limitation" and "self-limitation." For authority and strength, he believes, are based on those qualities.

4. Lypyns'kyj's position is diametrically opposed to the view widespread among the "positivists" that in society everything takes place in conformity with the principle of least expenditure of energy. On the contrary, he thinks that the highest intensity of strength, energy, and will are basic to the historical process and to historical creativity. He calls this condition *voluntarism*. "Voluntarism" he opposes to "fatalism." In other words, for him an avowal of voluntarism is an avowal of the active and creative role of the individual in the historical process. The aspirations and desires of the individual and of human groups—although not always conscious or clear to them—are not blind forces, but the factors that create history.

On this point Lypyns'kyj differs from such political theories as contemporary fascism or communism, which are "voluntaristic" in the same sense. If both fascism and communism believe that a new, ideal world can be created through human strength, then Lypyns'kyj knows the limits of the human will. A basic feature of his world view is a deep religiosity. The human will is limited by the will of God. A human desire or wish is impossible to satisfy without the faith that the aim of the desire in some sense fits into the divine plan of the historical process (p. 366). That is why Lypyns'kyj calls the aspiration of every nation to occupy a central place or one of the central places in the historical process "mystic imperialism" (pp. 364ff.).

² Lypyns'kyj sometimes uses the word "moral" in the sense that the word has in French—as a synonym of the word "spiritual," in opposition to "material." We make use, of course, only of those passages in which Lypyns'kyj uses the word "morality" in the *ethical* sense.

To use the terminology consistently, one should also call Lypyn's'kyj's voluntarism "mystic" or "religious" voluntarism. Here, too, Lypyn's'kyj's world view, which at first encounter seems to follow one or another popular theory, is in essence original and distinctive.

III

The originality and distinctiveness of Lypyn's'kyj's philosophy of history lie in the premises of his world view, which has been characterized as pessimistic. Such a characterization can be made only if focusing on his use of certain words and terms and of particular separate sentences and assertions, while ignoring the deep well-springs of his thought.

Lypyn's'kyj sometimes speaks of the "catastrophism" (p. 120) of his world view. Perhaps it would be better to speak of its "tragicness." But this "catastrophism" or "tragicness" of his philosophy of history is only an expression of the religious nature of his world view. The possibility for historical catastrophe or tragedy stems precisely from the fact that neither human aspiration nor the human will is by any means the single, decisive factor in the historical process. For Lypyn's'kyj history is indisputably "divine justice." The aspirations and struggle of human beings and nations may be condemned to failure; this indeed is catastrophe. But as regards the historical process as a whole, Lypyn's'kyj's philosophy of history is maximally optimistic. Every truly religious philosophy of history is optimistic.

This maximal optimism in Lypyn's'kyj's philosophy of history is manifested in his understanding of the negative and destructive forces of the historical process. For Lypyn's'kyj these forces have no autonomy; they are not active factors of historical movement. Negative forces obtain their being, their forms, and their content from positive ones. Negative forces exist only as deviations, reversals, parodies, or caricatures of the positive, creative forces of history. Thus the victory of destructive over constructive forces is fundamentally impossible. Lypyn's'kyj does not develop this point of view systematically, but he does illustrate it with a number of examples. All of Lypyn's'kyj's analyses of negative historical forces and his interpretations of their effects are built on this understanding of them as dependent, ontologically short-lived, and unstable imitations (*nasliduvannja*) of creative and positive forces. This is also true of political forms. Only aristocracy and tradition impart strength to revolution: "Without part of the old aristocracy, which assumes . . . other forms but retains its old aristocratic, creative, and constructive spirit, no republic's rebellion on the ruins of a monarchy is possible" (p. 39). Elsewhere Lypyn's'kyj writes: "It is impossible for a candidate to be a national Napoleon where the people still lack the tradition of national monarchs" (p. 92). The anti-hetmanites are obliged in their political work to "imitate (*pidrobytys'*) the hetman. . . or disappear. This is a general law, not simply the law of the Ukraine alone" (p. 92). Thus the Bolshevik Revolution lasts only because it rests on tradition: "The Bolsheviks have behind them decades of state and national thought; their revolution was prepared by the work of the Russian intelligentsia not only in the social, but also in the national and state arena." When a "new Pugačev" appeared, there remained for him "merely to organize what had been prepared by generations of Russian revolutionaries—by statesmen (*deržavnyky*) and patriots." Thus even in the sphere of ideology, rationalism can exist only as a form of mysticism, which merely conceals its real content (p. 201, fn.). The same features of imitation of positive phenomena and currents

occur in such negative forms of historical existence as modern anonymous capital, the intelligentsia—that “declassé, nonproductive, landless, and classless parody on the aristocracy”—and literature in its contemporary form, which is only a weak imitation of the traditions of the creative word. Even a destructive political ideal is called “utopia,” that is, a land that is nowhere—the territorial idea of the nation underlies utopian ideas.

Such insubstantial and dependent forces cannot be a serious danger to positive, constructive, and creative forces. Lypyns'kyj has the right, then, from his point of view, to be a resolute, “extreme” optimist of the philosophy of history.

IV

The general philosophical premises, theses, and schemes upon which Lypyns'kyj bases the constructs of his philosophy of history deserve our careful attention.

1. A certain ontologism is characteristic of Lypyns'kyj. He is not satisfied with indicating the forces that have a spiritual and ideal character and that are active in the historical process. He also wants to point out the “material” in which these forces are “embodied” or realized. For that reason Lypyns'kyj puts the “soul” of the historical process together with its “body.” He seeks, for example, “forms of the manifestation of the people’s unconscious, mystic, and irrational will for a free and independent existence” (p. 84). Together with “moral” forces there stand “material” relations: “Material relations find expression in the statics of moral life: in what has already been created by the human spirit from passive material” (p. 195). But the relationship is mutual: “Without the development of social morality there is no development of the technology of material life; without the development of the technology of material life there is no development of social morality” (p. 197). Without the “regeneration” of faith, without the “upsurge of the spirit, the creation of a higher social morality. . . , there cannot be a higher technology and a higher material culture” (p. 205).

This dualism of spiritual forces and of the “material” in which they are realized is advanced at different points in Lypyns'kyj’s philosophy of history. Desire and word, authority and strength, active and passive elements (the “yellow” and the “black”), the aristocracy and the masses, freedom and equality, state and society—all these pairs are like the pair of spirit and matter (pp. 356ff.). That is, in each of the pairs, which in their totality embrace nearly all of the philosophy of history (to them can be added yet other pairs that are analyzed or merely mentioned in Lypyns'kyj’s works), there exists an opposition between an active spiritual force and the matter without which the force would not have attained reality; without the material element, the force cannot be embodied or realized. Lypyns'kyj’s entire political ideology, and his idea of “classocracy,” is founded on this premise of his philosophy of history.

2. The second basic feature of Lypyns'kyj’s philosophy of history is his avowal of the specific character of every historical object and historical action. According to Lypyns'kyj, there does not exist, say, a “nation in general,” “a tradition in general,” or “an aristocracy in general,” but only specific individual nations, aristocracies, and traditions, which, moreover, are such that at each given moment in time they are being modified, recreated, and renewed. Each historical creation is such as it is due to the process of history: “Each nation has only the tradition that it has created for itself in its history” (p. 94). Lypyns'kyj even suggests—in our view

hardly correctly—that national individuality is not a certain psychic “characterological” given, but rather a “product of the historical process of the social life of the given collective; it is a creation, a formation of history” (p. 129). But if we take into account that the present is also “history,” the national individuality will have to be said to be the history itself of the given nation.

Lypynys'kyj's work *Religija i cerkva v istoriji Ukrajinny* (Religion and church in the history of the Ukraine; 1925) demonstrates the attention and respect with which he treated the concrete history of an individuality. A practicing Roman Catholic who accepted the teachings of the Catholic church in full, Lypynys'kyj believed that the denominations now living on the territory of the Ukraine should live side-by-side. For he believed that the sharp break of those historical individualities from their specific traditions was impossible.

3. We have already stressed more than once that Lypynys'kyj's philosophy of history has a marked religious coloring. A sense of higher values is the basic emphasis in Lypynys'kyj's philosophy of history.

It is precisely this sense of eternal values that gives to Lypynys'kyj's philosophy of history its particular character. A philosophy of history that leaves man to his own powers, that blindly and groundlessly holds (and for the most part does not at all notice its groundless and blind faith) that human beings can attain everything that they want by their own powers, is a dangerous (because groundless!) optimism that degenerates into its opposite—hopeless pessimism—as soon as people's hopes and efforts are dashed by historical fate. A sense of eternal values that stand above the historical process as timeless, unchanging, and immovable fundamental ideas—in particular, religious faith (which is a sense of highest value)—saves the individual from both extremes. A superficial optimism is impossible for him who knows that all of a person's efforts and good intentions are realized only when they fit the divine plan of the historical process. Hopeless pessimism cannot prevail over him who believes that history is not a flow of meaningless events, that mankind has a higher aim on earth, and that the incessant movement of history implements a higher truth.

To characterize the basic mood of Lypynys'kyj's philosophy of history is to point out that when Lypynys'kyj views the historical process his attitude is one of respect—respect for the values that are realized in the historical process, for the individuals and collectives that are the bearers of those values, and finally, for the Higher Power that directs the process. Like all social existence, and all the world, the historical process is built hierarchically, that is, it has levels higher and lower, subordinate and dominant, accidental and historical. Only from the upper and dominant levels can one understand the lower and subordinate ones.

That Lypynys'kyj's philosophy of history is essentially optimistic is best shown by quoting Lypynys'kyj himself. In one passage of the *Lysty* he summarizes, in only a few lines, his philosophical and historical views:

Even the most difficult task can be accomplished given the following: an elemental, innate desire; a clear idea bringing the desire to consciousness; will and reason, which are necessary for the implementation of the idea; faith in God and that the given idea is in harmony with God's laws; and love for humankind among whom and for the land upon which the given idea is to be implemented.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Richard Hantula