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Author(s): Andrii Bovgyria

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## Echoes of Poltava: Trials of Mazepists and Mazepism in Eighteenth-Century Ukraine

ANDRII BOVGYRIA

IN POLITICAL AND SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE the terms Mazepists (*mazepyntsi*) and Mazepism (*mazepynstvo*) are rooted in Hetman Ivan Mazepa's decision to ally himself with the Swedish king, Charles XII. These terms, which refer to the Ukrainian separatist movement in the Russian Empire, acquired a broader significance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Depending on the ideological context, they assumed a symbolic content indicating either treachery and treason or heroic action and the struggle for independence. The designation of Mazepist was applied to any individual who had participated either directly or indirectly in Mazepa's cooperation with the Swedes, or to one who expressed sympathy with the hetman at any time after the events of 1708–9. Such individuals were regarded as particularly infamous criminals of the state, and their deeds fell under the category of the “sovereign's word and deed” (*slovo i delo Gosudarevo*). The Russian imperial government kept a vigilant watch over any separatist tendencies in the Hetmanate, and throughout the eighteenth century anything even remotely associated with Hetman Mazepa was carefully monitored by the authorities.

In Russian court practices of the time, unlawful actions against the monarch, who personified not only power but the state as a whole, were regarded as state crimes. Therefore, physical or verbal acts directed against the monarch were considered especially heinous and were punishable by torture, bodily harm, permanent exile, or capital punishment. Rules and regulations regarding crimes committed against the monarch are clearly proscribed in the 1649 *Ulozhenie* of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, which was based on the *Sudebnik* of Ivan III (1497), the *Sudebnik* of 1550, and the decisions of the Stoglav Council of 1553. In all these codices the category of crimes against a monarch is clearly forbidden. Thus, nine chapters of *Ulozhenie* are devoted to this very question.<sup>1</sup>

The concept of offense against the monarch gained wide currency during the reigns of Ivan IV and Boris Godunov, and the Time of Troubles.<sup>2</sup> It was during the Time of Troubles that the legal category of the “sovereign's word

and deed,” under which fell particularly serious state crimes, including those directed against the monarch, was finally established. Deciding such cases was the monarch’s prerogative. The subsequent legal formulation of this concept was connected to the strengthening of the tsar’s absolute power and the necessity to sacralize his person. Thus, the tsarist authorities reacted brutally toward any manifestations of opposition to them.<sup>3</sup>

The gradation of crimes against the state followed this order: crimes against the church, crimes against the tsar, and crimes against the state government. Crimes against the person of the tsar (categorized as the “sovereign’s word and deed”) were further subdivided into three categories: (1) rebellion and treason; (2) “abusive words against the sovereign”; and (3) *zemskaia izmena*—the surrender of a city to the enemy during a siege, the transfer of territory, and so on.<sup>4</sup>

A similar gradation of state crimes was still in place in the early eighteenth century. By adopting new legal acts governing the investigation of state crimes, Peter I simply advanced a legal basis for the concept of crimes against the state. The most important of these legal acts was the Military Statute (*Voinskii ustav*) of 1716, which incorporated “Military Articles” and a “Brief Outline of Trial Procedures.” Civilians were subject to military regulations since offenses against the monarch, who was seen as a sacred ruler, were also viewed as insubordination to the ruler, who was the supreme military commander.<sup>5</sup>

The European model was adopted as the basis of these legal documents, in particular a set of similar military articles that existed in Sweden, Denmark, Brandenburg, and Holland. They were formulated during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) in order to maintain discipline among troops and protect civil populations from the highhandedness of soldiers;<sup>6</sup> the *ordonnances* of the French kings also influenced the formulation of these codes. In seventeenth-century European legal practice, so-called contentious legal proceedings, marked by openness and the participation of witnesses and an advocate, were gradually eliminated and replaced by secret inquisitions, which included the wide use of torture.<sup>7</sup>

Peter’s decree of 25 January 1715 emphasizes the highest category of crimes “according to three points,” in which, unlike the *Sobornoe ulozhenie* of 1649, “malicious intention against the Person of His Majesty” (*zloi umysel protivu Persony Ego Velichestva*) occupies first place.<sup>8</sup> This was followed by points concerning rebellion and looting of the state treasury.<sup>9</sup> The accusations listed in the first two points were viewed as particularly grave, and the formula “word and deed” was applied specifically to them; this action instantly placed the key figures in a trial on an exclusively legal plane.

In accordance with the *Sobornoe ulozhenie* of 1649, Mazepa’s defection to the side of Charles XII qualified as high treason (*bol’shaia izmena*) because it involved the removal of a major territory from the sovereign rule of the

Russian monarch.<sup>10</sup> The Ukrainian hetmans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were considered the exact counterparts of the fifteenth-century princes and boyars, vassals (*gosudarevy kholopy*) whose disengagement from subordination to the tsar, along with their lands, was perceived as “thievery” (*vorovstvo*) and “treason.” Consequently, imperial institutions of political investigation devoted particularly diligent attention to Mazepism and to everything connected with it.

The implementation of legal proceedings against Mazepa’s supporters took place in keeping with the *Sobornoe ulozhenie*, and was influenced by the circumstances of wartime and the personal stance of Peter, who viewed all-out terror as the principal method of dealing with the Hetmanate. Hence, it is doubtful that the organizers and executors of trials against Mazepists were guided solely by their knowledge of jurisdiction pertaining to this question and the application of legal norms. The following popular principle often came in handy: “A personal confession is the best testimony in the world.”<sup>11</sup> Confessions were frequently extracted by torture. Since investigations and trial procedures took place behind closed doors, the arbitrariness demonstrated by officials involved in these processes was often grounded in the principle espoused by Prince Fedor Romodanovskii, head of the Preobrazhenskii Department: “Torture them until they croak or confess.”<sup>12</sup> Thus, defendants often did not live to see the outcome of their trial. Peter often took part in investigations and torture sessions. One interrogation report contains a phrase that describes the behavior of the tsar and his favorite, Grigorii Romodanovskii: “On whichever day the Great Sovereign and the stol’nik, Romodanovskii, drink some blood, that day they are merry, but when they do not drink [blood] then even bread does not go down well.”<sup>13</sup>

The mechanism of implementing the legal procedures involving “word and deed” crimes merits special attention. The most typical investigative procedure began with a denunciation. The denouncer served as the main eyewitness of the crime. The most proximate legal authority (on the level of company, regiment or the city), first considered the accusation.<sup>14</sup> The main task at this stage was to establish the veracity of the denunciation and, consequently, the importance and category of the case. In the majority of cases, institutions of the Hetmanate examined cases in relation to the so-called “untruthful/false utterances of word and deed,” in which the denouncer initially declared that someone had violated the “sovereign’s word and deed” and afterward repudiated his words, using the argument of weak-mindedness or drunkenness. According to the legal practices of the time a “false word or deed” was interpreted as a crime, but it did not entail severe punishment. The accused was sentenced to a beating with whips in order “to instill fear in others, so that in future they would not do such a thing.” In the majority of such cases, the verdict contained these words. However, if the essence of the uttered “word and deed” were known—

for example, the content of the “obscenities” was mentioned, such a case was immediately transferred to the Secret Chancellery.<sup>15</sup>

The accused and the denouncer eventually found themselves in the Main Military Office, which was responsible for carrying out the first step of the investigation. The case was then transferred to the Secret Chancellery, where the investigation continued and usually involved torture, confrontation, and the questioning of witnesses. A denunciation was considered legitimate only if the accuser maintained his claims after enduring three types of torture. The accused also had to endure three types of torture before he could be acquitted. If the denouncer withstood the torture, then the accused was declared guilty; otherwise, the accusation was considered to be false and the author of the denunciation faced punishment. The penalties for “word and deed” crimes were extremely severe. During Peter I’s reign such crimes were punishable by death or permanent exile. These sentences were later reduced by Peter’s successors.

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In 1700 Kostiantin Mokiievs’kyi, a servant of the colonel of Kyiv, expressed his feelings about Mazepa and Peter I during a quarrel with a Russian soldier: “I don’t know your tsar, we have our own little tsar. Just as you heed your tsar, so do we [heed] our hetman, he is our second tsar. Your tsar has an army, and our little tsar will find just as many troops.”<sup>16</sup> This quote illustrates both the authority of Mazepa as a sovereign ruler and the clear awareness on the part of the inhabitants of the Hetmanate of the difference between *ours* and *theirs*. After 1709 this distinction remained in force and led to a specific form of latent opposition. Along with eighteenth-century narrative representations of Mazepa that are preserved in contemporary official imperial documents and Cossack chronicles, there exists an alternative perception recorded in the documents of Russian institutions of political surveillance. For many Ukrainians Mazepa was a symbol of past freedoms, a lost opportunity, and one facet of a distinct national identity.

Investigations and arrests of individuals suspected of treason followed Mazepa’s defection to the Swedish side. Denunciations played an extremely important role in the trials of Mazepa’s associates and those suspected of sympathy toward the hetman. Denunciations in both Muscovy and the Russian Empire were a mechanism that, owing to the extraordinarily large expanse of territory and weak communications system, safeguarded the central government’s jurisdiction over the provinces.<sup>17</sup>

Scholars have estimated that 98 percent of all “word and deed” court cases were sparked by denunciations.<sup>18</sup> The prevailing atmosphere of terror following Mazepa’s defection, as well as material incentives, encouraged denuncia-

tions. The law stated that if an informant's denunciation were proved, s/he was entitled to part of the traitor's estate.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, denunciations were made by all those who had grounds for making them, as well as those who had the desire and opportunity. "A noble deed! All are traitors! Carry me, God, to His Tsarist Majesty, and I will begin denouncing everyone," declared a Ukrainian named Danylo Zabala in 1722.<sup>20</sup> Zabala's words illustrate the credo of many of the informants.

Whereas in peacetime "word and deed" crimes fell under the jurisdiction of the Preobrazhenskii Department, and from 1718 were overseen by the Secret Chancellery, in 1708–9 and immediately afterwards the Field Ambassadorial Chancellery dealt with such crimes. Created in 1706 as a branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs specifically for wartime conditions, the chancellery always accompanied the tsar during military campaigns and performed diplomatic functions.<sup>21</sup> The Field Ambassadorial Chancellery served as a transitional institution between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the College of Foreign Affairs founded in 1718.

In the Hetmanate the Field Ambassadorial Chancellery had a punitive character. Initially based in Hlukhiv, it was later moved to Lebedyn, in Sloboda Ukraine, where its activities reached their murderous apogee. As a result, Lebedyn came to be associated with horrific terror in the consciousness of various contemporaries and their descendants. This is confirmed by eighteenth-century narrative sources and reports of foreign eyewitnesses. Unfortunately, the majority of the chancellery documents are not extant. Thus, it is impossible to establish the number of Mazepa supporters in the Hetmanate who were executed en masse. There is, however, indirect evidence. For example, documents from a 1716 court case mention stakes (*kol'ia*) arrayed in the central squares of Sumy and Hlukhiv, on which were impaled the heads of decapitated traitors.<sup>22</sup> Clearly, these executions were the results of the activity of the Field Ambassadorial Chancellery in Hlukhiv and Lebedyn. The very fact that these terrifying sights remained on view eight years after the executions attests to their importance as a preventive method aimed at instilling fear and influencing public perception.

The majority of the extant documents of the Field Ambassadorial Chancellery deal with strategic and military aspects of Mazepa's campaign.<sup>23</sup> One such document, dated 1708 and entitled "Interrogations of Little Russians regarding Mazepa's Treason," features reports on the interrogations of thirty individuals and includes information on the circumstances of Mazepa's defection to the Swedish king, troop deployment, enemy positions, and so on.<sup>24</sup> The document does not provide information regarding the fate of the captives. The same is true of a similar document, dated 1709, which records the interrogations of civilians, Cossacks, and Cossack leaders, including the colonel of Myrhorod, Danylo Apostol.<sup>25</sup> During his interrogation a Zaporozhian Cossack named Ivan

Nykyforov testified that the Otaman Kost' Hordiienko had tried to persuade the Cossacks to take Mazepa's side by claiming that the tsar wanted to exile all Little Russians (*zagnat' za dolgu reku*) and by alleging that Muscovite troops would create mayhem in all the Little Russian lands.<sup>26</sup>

After 1709, when the activities of the Field Ambassadorial Chancellery began to abate in the Hetmanate, court cases against the Mazepists continued to be pursued. Although the Field Ambassadorial Chancellery still handled some of these cases, the Preobrazhenskii Department and, later, the Secret Chancellery dealt with the majority of "political" cases. Even though the Mazepists no longer posed a real threat to the imperial government, a witch-hunt inspired by numerous denunciations submitted by their comrades in arms was launched. A striking example of this phenomenon is the "Letter of an Unknown Well-Wisher about the Inclination toward the Swedish Side of Certain Little Russians" (*Pis'mo neizvestnogo dobrokhota o sklonnosti na shvedskuiu storonu nekotorykh malorossiian*). This anonymous letter, which does not list anyone by name, appeals to all Ukrainians not to heed Mazepa's successor in exile, Pylyp Orlyk, but to remain loyal to the tsar.<sup>27</sup>

After the Battle of Poltava, many of the Ukrainians who had followed Mazepa and Charles into forced emigration began returning to the Hetmanate, encouraged by the tsar's manifestos promising mercy. The interrogations of these people at the Chancellery were all essentially identical, since they were probably conducted according to the same pattern. The "turncoats" were most often asked about the circumstances of their defection to Mazepa—whether they had acted voluntarily or whether someone had persuaded them. They were also questioned about military-technical issues: the number of Swedish troops, the Swedish king's intentions, and the Ukrainians' moods.<sup>28</sup> During his interrogation a Zaporozhian Cossack named Nestulia was asked why he had come by himself, instead of bringing other Cossacks with him. He replied that he had barely managed to escape from his comrades who, realizing his intentions, wanted to kill him because, as Nestulia noted, there was "much ill-will toward Russia among them."<sup>29</sup>

The investigations focused on Mazepa's relatives and supporters, since contemporary legal notions and practices held that members of the hetman's family who were accused of "word and deed" crimes were also treated as criminals. One article of the *Sobornoe ulozhenie* stated that all members of a household, as well as close relatives of the accused, bore responsibility for the crime, the reasoning behind this being that it was impossible for family members not to know about a relative's criminal intentions, and therefore they were faulted for not informing on the accused.<sup>30</sup> Thus, punishments that were meted out to family members constituted a type of governmental revenge. Analyzed documents reveal that relatives of the Mazepists were detained at the Department of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Eventually all those arrested, including children,



were sentenced and exiled to various locations. Clergymen were sent to the Solovetskii Monastery, while civilians were exiled to Siberia, from where they were never permitted to return.<sup>31</sup>

The case of Andrii Voinarovs'kyi, Mazepa's nephew, deserves mention in this context. In 1716 he was arrested in Hamburg as part of a carefully planned operation, and taken to St. Petersburg. The investigative materials in his case include a report of his interrogation, and reveal that Voinarovs'kyi did not offer any evidence that proved useful to the Russian authorities, nor did he betray any of his compatriots.<sup>32</sup> Voinarovs'kyi spent seven years incarcerated in the prison of the Peter and Paul Fortress and was eventually exiled to Siberia, where he died in approximately 1741. The archive of the Preobrazhenskii Department contains an interesting document that sheds light on Voinarovs'kyi's life in exile. This is a denunciation submitted in 1725 against the archimandrite of the Holy Savior Monastery in Eniseisk, who had frequently invited the hetman's nephew to his residence, despite the fact that all of the other monastic inhabitants shunned Voinarovs'kyi.<sup>33</sup>

The trial of Voinarovs'kyi was the last investigation of genuine Mazepests who, in one way or another, had participated in Hetman Mazepa's actions. In the 1710s and later, the punitive activities of Russian imperial institutions of political surveillance and investigation focused almost exclusively on verbal transgressions, including obscenities, vilifications, and threats leveled against the tsar or imperial rule in Ukraine, as well as utterances of sympathy toward Hetman Mazepa and his comrades in arms. Expressions of support for Mazepa and his followers were treated as a form of treason and met with appropriate punishment. In contemporary juridical practice the need to safeguard the authority of the monarchy helped define verbal transgressions as serious threats against the person of the monarch. In the eighteenth-century context, words were widely perceived as having magical powers capable of bringing harm to the person against whom they were uttered. Such notions of the power of the word help explain the harsh degree of punishment that was meted out for verbal transgressions.

These types of documentary materials provide extraordinarily valuable information on the political climate of post-Poltava Ukraine. Some of them reveal how the inhabitants of the Hetmanate perceived recent historical events, the person of Mazepa, and imperial governance. Given that relatively few sources contain information of this nature, they require careful interpretation and great vigilance in order to extrapolate general conclusions regarding the notions of collective identification in the eighteenth-century Hetmanate. They are nonetheless interesting and valuable indications of the mentality of contemporary Ukrainians. It is worth considering several examples of "word and deed" crimes that were associated with Mazepa and current in post-Poltava Ukraine. In general, most of the complaints were instigated by representatives



of the imperial administration, and they concern the limitation imposed on the rights and freedoms of the Ukrainian population by the quartering of troops, taxes, and control over autonomous institutions.

Two cases, one dating to 1710 and the other to 1712—both chronologically close to the Poltava events—are particularly interesting in this regard, as they illustrate contemporary popular sentiments in the Hetmanate. In 1710 the Chyhyryn captain, Nestulia, denounced one of Hetman Ivan Skoropads'kyi's servants, a man named Nevinchanyi, who had spread rumors about the tsar's intention to relocate all Ukrainians beyond the borders of the Hetmanate and to resettle the territory with Russians.<sup>34</sup> When the captain asked if the Zaporozhian Cossacks intended once again to accept the tsar's rule, the servant replied: "They are idiots if they do; they would do well to muster the horde, then all of Ukraine will be free; as it is, all of Ukraine has perished because of the Muscovites.... In Ukraine they beg to be freed so as not to perish under Muscovy."<sup>35</sup>

Nestulia also found fault with Mazepa because the former hetman had not been forthright about his intention to switch allegiance: "[The hetman] did not initiate his cause well, he did not inform all the Cossack officers and the common people [of his intentions]." Nestulia was not happy however, with the new state of affairs and confided his views on the situation to his interlocutor: "The [Russian] ministers attached to the hetman inspect all sorts of letters sent from anywhere." Nestulia declared that Hetman Skoropads'kyi planned to write the tsar and ask for the reinstatement of former freedoms should these freedoms not be restored: "We will think differently. What is the value of our freedom and noble rank! Moscow is conceiving something different with regard to us."<sup>36</sup>

The theme of liberties trampled by Peter also figured in the words of the Lubni regimental commander Petrunchenko, who, according to the denunciation brought by Lubni Colonel Andrii Markovych, had issued an appeal not to heed the tsar's ukases. Petrunchenko declared, "We should thank God that we have broken free of the Muscovite yoke. Through the efforts of Lord Hetman Mazepa, His Royal Majesty has taken all of Ukraine under his protection.... The Muscovite dragged us around other lands, but His Royal Majesty encouraged us to be a Ukraine separate from the Muscovite aristocracy."<sup>37</sup>

The main object of hatred among the Cossack elites was the tsar himself. Zakhar Patoka, the secretary of the Pryluky regiment, accused Hryhorii Voloshenko, the captain of Ivanytsia (from the same regiment) of insulting the tsar with the following words: "[He] is a devil, not a ruler; a German and a Lutheran. There was no one to kill him during the Swedish conflict. And the Swede [Charles XII] would have been safe and it would have been better for us if today he [the tsar] traveled to our Ukraine like to Sweden. I would have killed him [the tsar] without a second thought, even if I myself had perished; at least then he would no longer be tormenting the world."<sup>38</sup>

The denunciation of Zakhar Patoka was lengthy and names seven other individuals, including Pavlo Polubotok, the colonel of Chernihiv. In the consciousness of the population of the Hetmanate in the post-Poltava era, Polubotok and Hetman Skoropads'kyi, both of whom figure among the accused in Patoka's denunciation, are presented as representatives of opposing political values. In 1715 Fedir Strychyns'kyi, a resident of the village of Sosnytsia, declared: "It was not Mazepa who was the accursed Judas, the accursed Judas is the current hetman, who does not defend Ukraine when the Muscovites are ravaging [her], but when the Chernihiv colonel becomes hetman it will not be so in Ukraine, and the Muscovite will not ravage her, and [so] today all of Ukraine hopes that he will be hetman."<sup>39</sup> Similar remarks were expressed by a Russian (!), the collegiate commandant, Petr Zybin, who was accused of insulting Hetman Skoropads'kyi and demonstrating sympathy to Mazepa because he had torn up a letter in transit bearing Skoropads'kyi's signature. He was heard shouting: "There was only one hetman—Mazepa—but there are many hetmans like you (he abused Hetman Skoropads'kyi foully). I do not listen to him, and I spit on his letter in transit!" Here Mazepa is portrayed in opposition to Skoropads'kyi, who is unable to counteract the centralizing efforts of the Russian emperor.<sup>40</sup>

Despite his loyalty to the tsar, Skoropads'kyi was often the subject of denunciations. One such accusatory document reflects on the hetman's relations with Orlyk and raises the issue of his intention to destroy the Russian regiments that were with him. The document quotes the hetman as saying that he hopes that "the same fate befalls them as befell us in Baturyn." The author of another denunciation, a captain from Korop, claims to have heard from Hetman Skoropads'kyi's servant that the hetman said: "We are placing our hope on our old master, Orlyk, who remains hetman; soon there will be recompense for us."<sup>41</sup> The captain envisions an entire conspiracy against Russian rule in Ukraine, whose organizers and participants were uniting around the hetman. The quintessence of this denunciation is captured in words reportedly uttered by "a former member of Mazepa's entourage," to the effect that "Mazepa has died, but the Mazepests are alive and will drive Muscovy out."<sup>42</sup>

Denunciations involving the Orthodox clergy deserve special attention. Priests figured prominently in cases involving the utterance of obscenities against Peter I and statements sympathetic to Mazepa. On the one hand, Peter's policy of secularization and his non-Orthodox actions and conduct sparked widespread antipathy among the population, which was accustomed to long-established traditions. Thus, it is not surprising that many eighteenth-century individuals viewed the tsar as a persecutor of Orthodoxy, and even an antichrist. Hundreds of such documents are stored in the Preobrazhenskii Department and the Secret Chancellery.<sup>43</sup> It is likely that the enduring image of Peter as a persecutor of Orthodoxy led Kostiantyn, a monk at the Kyivan Cave Monastery, to report that he had seen the tsar walking about the caves, eager to throw out all the saints' relics. For uttering such statements, "he was

scolded and cursed by the bishops of Kyiv and Pereiaslav.”<sup>44</sup> After Peter’s death one of the monks living in this monastery wrote a letter to his sister, saying that Mazepa had been welcomed into heaven, unlike the “first emperor,” whose soul is now enduring torments “for his power over the bishops.”<sup>45</sup>

On the other hand, in spite of the anathema and the official negation of Ivan Mazepa, the Hetmanate’s elites continued to view him as a highly spiritual person, a generous benefactor, and a patron of churches. It should be noted that even the mere mention in a private conversation that a particular church had been founded by Mazepa served as grounds for persecution. Legal proceedings were launched in 1747 against a priest in the Chernihiv diocese. A fellow priest denounced him for uttering an “indecent and insolent word,” which boiled down to the fact that the accused had only mentioned the name of the church founder. Owing to the relatively liberal times, the case was transferred to the Chernihiv archbishop for his consideration, with the warning that such words were never again to be uttered under pain of death.<sup>46</sup>

Even the existence of any kind of positive contact with Mazepa in the past exposed such individuals to the threat of denunciations and attendant persecution. This is illustrated by the materials pertaining to two court cases. In 1714 the Secret Chancellery opened a case on a Russian officer named Aleksei Obukhov, who had been friends with the hetman when he headed a Russian military garrison in Baturyn. After he retired, he received some property near Moscow, which the hetman liked to visit during his trips to the capital. Hegumen Pakhomii, the informer and main witness in this case, bolstered his accusatory arguments with quotations from a collection of sermons entitled *Margarita: A Word on Heretics (Margarita: Slovo na eretikov)*: “A friend of the tsar’s enemy cannot be a friend of the tsar.” The investigators were not convinced by the defendant’s protests that his relations with the hetman dated to the period when “Mazepa was in the Sovereign’s great esteem, favor, and glory.”<sup>47</sup> Obukhov was saved from punishment only by Pakhomii’s death. No less telling in this context is an accusation that was brought in 1719 against a Gypsy named Fedor Vasil’ev, who was accused of treason. The accusation was based on an incident dating back ten years when he and his father were robbed by Swedish soldiers, which led them to seek help from the hetman. Mazepa organized an audience with the Swedish king for them, during which the king ordered the return of the stolen items and the punishment of the soldiers responsible for those outrages. Although the investigation did not uncover any facts pointing to further collaboration with the hetman, the arrested men were punished nevertheless.<sup>48</sup> After this time, it was no longer contact with Mazepa and the king that served as the basis of accusations, but representations of a positive image of the hetman and the king; this contrasted sharply with the official stance.

Even while languishing in exile, former priests did not neglect any opportunity to express admiration for Mazepa. In 1724, during the pronouncement of an anathema in a local church, Rohachevs'kyi, a former priest from Lokhvytsia exiled in Arkhangelsk gubernia, declared that "Our Mazepa is holy and will be in heaven, unlike your sovereign."<sup>49</sup> Three years later, during a similar event that took place in the church of the Solovetskii Monastery, a Ukrainian monk named Harvasii expressed a comparable sentiment, but in more radical terms: "Our Mazepa is saintly, but your Muscovite is a whore's son."<sup>50</sup> The verdict in both these cases is unknown, but according to contemporary practice, repeat offenders received additional punishment in the form of torture or a harsher prison regime. In addition, an offender accused of new "word and deed" crimes was immediately sent to the Secret Chancellery. The long road from the Solovetskii Islands to the capital offered faint hope for a possible escape or even temporary release from the horrors of the monastic prison during the journey. As a result, some prisoners deliberately committed new verbal political offenses.

Analysis of court cases involving "word and deed" crimes enables one to reconstruct the Russian reception of Ukrainians in the eighteenth century. During arguments between individuals of these two nationalities, the terms "Mazepist" and "traitor" were frequently bandied about. These labels provided grounds for proclaiming "word and deed" crimes against both sides of the verbal conflict. There are many such examples. For example, in 1736 a Russian soldier from the Kyiv garrison shouted to his Ukrainian opponents: "We didn't kill enough of you Mazepists!"<sup>51</sup> In 1723 a Russian official was tried for offending the inhabitants of the village of Arkhypivka when he called them Mazepists.<sup>52</sup> A similar incident occurred in 1734, when a Russian called Captain Pavlo Sukhans'kyi an "evil Mazepist."<sup>53</sup>

During Empress Elizabeth's relatively liberal reign, a Russian courtier referred deprecatingly to his Ukrainian colleague as a *khokhlach* and Mazepist. The Ukrainian retorted that his counterpart "is acting against the imperial decree of Her Imperial Majesty because it is forbidden to call and abuse not only courtiers but any Little Russian [with the terms] *khokhlach* and Mazepist."<sup>54</sup> During the same period another Russian, who was protesting against the privileged position of Ukrainians in the empire and in the court, expressed the hope that soon the new tsar, Peter III, would assume the throne "and then there will be persecution in Little Russia similar to that which followed Mazepa."<sup>55</sup> Thus, the tradition of associating Ukrainians with Mazepa, which began in the aftermath of Poltava, continued over the rest of the century, with the terms Mazepist and *khokhol* expressing the negative attitude toward Ukrainians in the Russian Empire.

## NOTES

1. *Ulozheniie Gosudaria i Velikoho kniazia Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moscow, 1913), 167; Mikhail Vladimirkii-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava* (St. Petersburg and Kyiv, 1909), 223–25.
2. Vladimirkii-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 340.
3. Evgenii Anisimov, *Dyba i knut: politicheskii sysk i ruskoe obshchestvo v XVIII veke* (Moscow, 1999), 8.
4. *Ulozheniie Gosudaria i Velikoho kniazia Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, 167.
5. Anisimov, *Dyba i knut*, 54–55.
6. Pavel Bobrovskii, *Proiskhozhdenie Artikula Voinskogo i izobrazheniia protsessov Petra Velikogo po Ustavu Voinskomu 1716 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1881), 4.
7. *Ibid.*, 340.
8. Anisimov, *Dyba i knut*, 19.
9. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii* (St. Petersburg, 1830–1916), vol. 5, no. 2887.
10. Anisimov, *Dyba i knut*, 54–55.
11. “Собственное признание—лучшее свидетельство всего света”; Vladimirkii-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 641.
12. “Пытать пока не издохнет или не повинится.” Vasilii Veretennikov, *Istoriia Tainoi kantseliarii Petrovskogo vremeni* (Kharkiv, 1910), 196.
13. “Которого дня Великий Государь и стольник князь Ромодановский крови попьют, того дня они веселы, а коли не попьют, то и хлеб им не естца.” Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (hereinafter RGADA), fond 371 (Preobrazhenskii prikaz), delo 144 (hereinafter f., d.).
14. During Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi’s (1728–1803) rule as hetman, political crimes were investigated by the hetman.
15. The documents pertaining to “word and deed” crimes that were under the jurisdiction of the Hetmanate are found in the archives of the General Military Office and the Office of Hetman Rozumovs’kyi.
16. “Я вашего царя не знаю, у нас свой царик есть. Как вы своего царя слушаете, так и мы своего пана гетмана, он у нас второй царь. У вашего царя войско есть и наш царик съест столько же войска.” RGADA, f. 371, opis’ (hereinafter op.) 4, d. 132, list (hereinafter l.) 3.
17. Mark Lapman, “Political Denunciations in Muscovy, 1600–1649: The Sovereign’s Word and Deed” (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1981), 1.
18. Nina Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre I: Po materialam Preobrazhenskogo prikaza* ([Moscow], 1957), 17.
19. Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Het’man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba*, 2nd ed. (New York, 2001), 285–86.
20. “Знатное дело! Все изменники! Донеси меня Бог до Его Царского Величества, на всех стану доносить!” RGADA, f. 371, d. 1346. Danylo Zabyla was a son of

- General Flag-Bearer (*heneral'nyi khorunzhyi*) Vasyl' Zabila. He was accused of a false denunciation on hetman Mazepa and was exiled to Solovki in 1699; after his return he was imprisoned again for a denunciation on Hetman Skoropads'kyi. Aleksandra Efimenko, "Ssyl'nye malorossiiane v Arkhangel'skoi gubernii," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1882, no. 5, 399–401; "Ukaz Petra I o ssylke Zabely i Zagorovskogo," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1887, no. 8, 777–78; for Danylo Zabila's denunciation on hetman Ivan Skoropads'kyi, see RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 10 (1712).
21. Anna Sem'ianova, "Istoriia diplomaticheskogo prava v Rossii do kontsa XIX veka" (dissertation, Kazan, 2001), 12.
  22. RGADA, f. 165, d. 16, l. 37.
  23. Excerpts of these documents have been published; see Oleksandr Hrushevs'kyi, "Hlukhiv i Lebedyn (1708–1709)," *Zapysky NTSh* 92 (1909): 21–55.
  24. RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 54 (1708).
  25. RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 18 (1709).
  26. *Ibid.*, l. 3.
  27. RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 50 (1710).
  28. RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 6 (1711): "Povesti i doprosy o povedenii malorossiian, bezhavshikh s Mazepoiu i Orlykom"; d. 6 (1713): "Dela o prilichivshikhsia k izmene."
  29. "Великое к России недоброхотство." RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 6, l. 11 (1711).
  30. Anisimov, *Dyba i knut*, 176.
  31. RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 6 (1712); d. 6 (1713); d. 41 (1714); d. 5 (1715).
  32. The documentation of Voinarivs'kyi's interrogation is included in the archive of the eighteenth-century Russian historian Gerhardt Friedrich Müller: RGADA, f. 199, no. 40, vol. 1. The text has also been published by Volodymyr Radovs'kyi. Volodymyr Radovs'kyi, "Dopyt Voinarovs'koho—nebozha Mazepy," *Dzvin*, no. 7/8 (1992): 123–26.
  33. RGADA, f. 371, d. 2553.
  34. RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 18 (1710).
  35. "Дураки, если пойдут, они добрый способ сделают если орду подымут, то вся Украина свободна будет, а то от москалей вся Украина пропала.... Из Украины просят чтобы их вызволили для того чтобы от Москвы не пропали." *Ibid.*, ll. 2–4.
  36. *Ibid.*
  37. "Надобно благодарить Бога, что выбились из ярма московского. Старанием Пана гетмана Мазепы, Королевское Величество всю Украину взял под свою протекцию.... Москаль выволочил нас по иньших землях, а Королевское Величество обнадежил нас быть Украине отдельной от Московського панства." RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 47. p. 42 (1718).
  38. "Черт это а не государь, это немец и лютор. Некому его было забить в шведчину. И швед цел был бы и нам было бы лучше, корда б ныне он ездил в нашу Украину как в Шведчину. Я бы его [царя] явно забил, хотя б и сам

- пропал, уже бы он больше не колотил свет." RGADA, f. 165 ("Sekretnye dela"), d. 16.
39. "Не Мазепа—проклятый Иуда, а нынешний гетман проклятый Иуда, что не стоит за Украину, что москали ее разоряют, а как будет Черниговский полковник Гетманом, не так будет за Украину и не будут оную москали разорять и ныне всею Украиною надеяние имеем, чтоб он Гетманом был." Quoted in Viktor Horobets', *Prysmerek Het'manshchyny: Ukraïna v roky reform Petra I* (Kyiv, 1998), 132.
  40. "Един был гетман—Мазепа, а таких вас много гетманов (бранил гетмана Скоропадского матерно). Я его не слушаю, а на подорожную его плюю!" RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 26, p. 4 (1712).
  41. "Надеемся на старого своего пана Орлика, который зостае гетманом, будет скоро одплата нам." RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 14, l. 5 (1714).
  42. "Мазепа умер, а мазепинцы живы и будут Москву гнать." Ibid., l. 10.
  43. Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre I*, 132–54.
  44. "Архиереи киевские и переяславские его бранили и кляли." RGADA, f. 371, op. 2, d. 1850.
  45. "За власть над архиереями." RGADA, f. 7, op. 1, d. 5, vol. 2, l. 106.
  46. RGADA, f. 248, op. 5, kniga 323, ll. 117–18.
  47. "Мазепа был в большой чести Государевой, милости и славе." RGADA, f. 124, op. 1, d. 33 (1714).
  48. Ibid.
  49. "Наш Мазепа свят и будет на небе, а ваш государь нет." RGADA, f. 371, op. 1, vol. 1, d. 1140.
  50. "Наш Мазепа свят, а ваш москаль—скурвый сын." Ibid, d. 1262.
  51. "Мало мы вас мазепинцев били!" RGADA, f. 7, op. 1, d. 5, vol. 2, l. 106.
  52. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny, f. 51, opys 1, sprava 981.
  53. "...мазепинский нечистый дух." Ibid., spr. 797.
  54. RGADA, f. 7, op. 1, d. 1077.
  55. "Будет тогда на Малороссию гонение как после Мазепы." RGADA, f. 7, op. 1, d. 5, vol. 3, l. 115.