The Intellectual Development of V. Lypyns'kyj: His World View and Political Activity before World War I

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Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj (Wacław Lipiński) was born on 17 April 1882 in Volhynia, to the landlord of Zaturci, Kazimierz Sylwester Antoni Lipiński, and his wife, Klara Lipińska, née Rogal-Rokicka.[1] The noble family of the Lipińskis settled in Podolia in the first half of the eighteenth century, having come probably from Mazovia,[2] and took an active role in the political life of the province. Like most nobles of the Right-Bank Ukraine, the Lipińskis considered themselves to be part of the Polish nobiliary nation and identified with Polish culture.

Having suffered a setback in the uprisings of 1830–31 and 1863–64, the Right-Bank nobility had divided into two main camps: whereas one camp longed for the old order and nurtured dreams about the restoration of the Commonwealth within its former boundaries (*od morza do morza* 'from sea to sea'), the other tried to secure its privileged position in the Ukraine and to expand its rights in the Russian Empire at the price of political loyalty to the imperial system.

The nobility in the Right-Bank Ukraine on the eve of the First World War was economically stratified. Apart from the landless nobles who lived in towns and were overwhelmingly Polish and Catholic, the nobles of the Right Bank could be divided into two groups: (1) 4,638 great landowners who possessed 4,535,807 desiatins (in Ukrainian *desjatyna*; a unit of land area equal to 2.7 acres), of whom 2,124, owning 2,202,000 desiatins, considered themselves to be Poles, and of whom 2,514, owning 2,333,000 desiatins, were Russians; (2) 23,082 middle and small landowners who possessed 273,543 desiatins of land, of whom 3,932, owning 103,000 desiatins, were Poles, and 19,150, owning 369,000 desiatins, were Ukrainians (*malorosy*). The remaining arable land, some 6,159,000 desiatins, belonged to Ukrainian peasants. The development of industrialization in the Ukraine at that time was weak, and land ownership carried not only

[1] For a genealogy of the Lipiński family, see the appendix to this article.

[2] *Herold* (Warsaw), 1931, no. 2, p. 140.

economic but also social status. From these statistics,[3] it is evident that the Polish nobility enjoyed the leading position in the Right-Bank Ukraine.

The moderately wealthy Lipiński family was considered to be Ukrainophile. Until the age of 12, the young Vjačeslav was taught at home in Zaturci by a private tutor; he also studied French with a Parisian, Mademoiselle Vol, for six years.[4] In 1894 Vjačeslav enrolled first in a preparatory school in Luc'k and then in a high school (*gymnasium*) in Žytomyr. The last two years of his secondary education were completed at the First Classical Gymnasium in Kiev, from which he graduated in 1902.[5]

Already in the Luc'k and Žytomyr secondary schools Lypyns'kyj was enthusiastically reading historical novels by Michał Grabowski and Michał Czajkowski, writers born in Volhynia, as well as literary works by representatives of the so-called Ukrainian school in Polish literature. He showed great interest in the history of his native land, especially in the history of the Cossacks.[6] Those interests were encouraged by his maternal uncle, Adam Rokicki, who expressed to the young boy the ideas that the Right-Bank nobility now considering itself Polish was Ukrainian by origin, and that it was the leading stratum which, in the past, had created the history of the Ukrainian nation.[7] It was only since that class had become Polonized that the Ukrainian nation was transformed into an uneducated, unconscious mass.

At the Kiev gymnasium the young Lypyns'kyj became friends with the Ukrainian students K. Kvitka, B. Matjušenko, and Bohdan Ryl's'kyj (son of Tadeusz Rylski), among others. Already a member of the Polish school circle, or *koło,* Lypyns'kyj joined the Ukrainian school organization called *hromada.* He then began to persuade his Polish friends to join the Ukrainian group. When, after heated debate, his proposal was rejected at the convention of Polish high school students that was held in Kiev in 1902, Lypyns'kyj left the Polish circle. That experience apparently ended the first stage in his intellectual evolution.

[3] Based on Lypyns'kyj's articles published in *Rada* in 1910–1911 and in *Ukrainskaja žizn,* 1912, no. 12. Lypyns'kyj relied on the data from an official 1911 census.

[4] According to information provided by Wanda Żmijewska, sister of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj (V. Lypyns'kyj Archives, W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute, Philadelphia).

[5] Some writers dispute this educational biography of Lypyns'kyj. For example, Markijan Kozak, in *Dzvony,* 1932, no. 6, pp. 420 ff., speaks only of the Luc'k and Kiev gymnasia, as does Władysław Lipski (quoted in a letter by Mrs. Ewa Gołkowski, daughter of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj, dated 29 February 1977).

[6] See fn. 7, below. Dorošenko relied on the memoirs of Borys Matjušenko, Lypyns'kyj's schoolmate at the Kiev gymnasium.

[7] Dmytro Dorošenko, "Wacław Lipiński," *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński,* 1934, no. 9 (44) and 11 (46). Dorošenko most probably got this information from Lypyns'kyj himself.

Having served in the Russian army for a year after his graduation, Lypyns'kyj went to Cracow to pursue higher education. He stayed there, with interruptions for study in Geneva, medical treatment at Zakopane, and frequent trips to the Ukraine, until the spring of 1914. The stay in Cracow and studies in Geneva acquainted Lypyns'kyj with modern philosophical and political trends, and certainly contributed to his intellectual development.

Arriving in Cracow in the fall of 1903, Lypyns'kyj enrolled at the Agricultural College (Studium Rolnicze) of the Philosophy Faculty of Jagiellonian University. He completed that course of study after four semesters, in 1905. Among his teachers were the well-known economist and politician, and later Ukrainophobe, Stanisław Grabski (1871–1949), as well as the lawyer and conservative politician Władysław Leopold Jaworski (1865–1930).

There is no documentary evidence about Lypyns'kyj's activities from the end of 1905 through the first half of 1906 (his sister, Wanda Żmijewska, has maintained that he studied history in Cracow). At that time, influenced by the revolutionary events in the Russian Empire and in the Ukraine, he must have developed an interest in social issues. Lypyns'kyj married Kazimiera Szumińska of Cracow on 30 August 1906, and together they left for Geneva, where he enrolled in the university's Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences.

In the summer of 1907, the Lypyns'kyjs left Geneva, whose humid climate had adversely affected Vjačeslav's health, and returned to Cracow. In the fall and through the winter of 1907/08, at Zakopane, he was already undergoing treatment for lung disease. In Cracow the young couple lived together with Kazimiera Lypyns'ka's grandmother, Regina Szumińska, née Jabłońska, who managed their household. In the next year, 1908, Lypyns'kyj enrolled as a special student at the philosophical faculty of Cracow University; there he attended the lectures of the historian Wincenty Zakrzewski and the philosopher Maurycy Straszewski.[8]

At that time Lypyns'kyj began to write articles for the Ukrainian press and to publish scholarly articles on Ukrainian historical themes. On travels to the Ukraine, he, together with a circle of like-minded people, began to campaign for the access of the Right-Bank nobility to the Ukrainian movement. He began to publish a journal in the Polish language, *Przegląd Krajowy*, in Kiev (1909–1910). After twelve issues, the journal failed, due to a lack of subscribers. In 1912, the memorable study *Z dziejów Ukrainy* appeared in Cracow, through the efforts of Lypyns'kyj, who was its editor.

[8] Based on information from the senate and faculty records of the university.

The volume's purpose was, as he wrote in the preface, "to spread knowledge about the Ukrainian past among those Polonized strata of the Ukrainian nation—that is, the nobility—who use the Polish language as their vernacular." At this time Lypyns'kyj was devoting more and more attention to the founding of an independent Ukrainian press organ, and to the organization of a political party calling for the complete independence of the Ukraine.

In the spring of 1914 Lypyns'kyj finally left Cracow for the Rusalivs'ki Čahary estate near Uman', which he had inherited from his uncle, Adam Rokicki, and which he was now to manage. His wife and their daughter Ewa were supposed to leave Cracow and join him in the summer of 1914. Vjačeslav was caught there alone, however, by the outbreak of the First World War. As an officer in the reserves, he was drafted into the Russian army.

II

Cracow, where Lypyns'kyj had begun his higher education in 1903, was the intellectual and to some extent even political center of Polish life at the turn of the twentieth century.[9] Naturally, it became an arena of conflict between Western intellectual trends, which took on Polish national forms in that ancient Polish capital. The wave of idealistic irrationalism, and the worship of feeling and subconscious instincts which then came from the West, clashed with the positivism, rationalism, and materialism that were dominant in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The new trends made themselves evident first primarily in art—music, painting, literature—but soon also appeared in historiography.

Before the wave of irrationalism under the label of neoromanticism made its impression on the generation of the 1880s, Cracow had been, from the 1860s, the center of Polish conservatism. It was here that the so-called Cracow historical school came into being and functioned, through the work of such historians as Walerian Kalinka, Józef Szujski, Michał Bobrzyński, Stanisław Smolka, and Count Stanisław Tarnowski, among others. Cracow was also the seat of the political party called the Stańczycy, whose members included the leading Polish politicians in Austrian Galicia and representatives at the Vienna parliament. The most prestigious conservative publications, such as *Przegląd Polski* and *Czas*, were then published in

[9] For more information about the role of Cracow in Polish life during that time, see my introductory essay to volume 2 of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj, *Tvory* (Philadelphia, 1980), entitled "Krakiv, Ženeva i filijacija 'Kryčevs'koho,'" pp. xix–xlvii.

Cracow. The conservative school and ideology based at Cracow, which changed over the decades as had conservative thought throughout Europe, radiated from the city to all the lands of the Russian Empire where Poles lived, including the Ukraine.

The fact that it was historians who became promoters of Polish conservatism has to be attributed first to the Poles' own loss of statehood, which had a great impact on Polish public opinion and on Polish social and political life in general. The fall of the Polish state, virtually sealed by the futile uprisings of 1830–31 and 1863–64, compelled Polish historical thinking to undertake a "settling of accounts with the past" (*rozrachowanie się z przeszłością*).[10] The result of that settling of accounts by the Cracow historical school was the idea that the fall of the Polish state should be blamed not on its "bad neighbors," as Polish Romantic historiography had been doing (which, in the conservatives' opinion, shared responsibility for the failed uprisings and their tragic consequences), but on the Poles themselves. Szujski, a leading historian of the Cracow school, saw the cause of everything bad that befell the Polish nation as the flawed Polish national character and, later, also as the "wrong form" of government, that is, the democratism of the Polish republican political system. The only way out of that "vicious circle" was a change in the soul (*metanoia*) of Poles. As long as the inclination to anarchy—which, in the name of the "most free republic in the world," destroyed the Polish monarchy erected by the Piasts and did not allow a strong state authority to develop—continued, one could not dream about the restoration of a Polish state. The disease of the "social organism" could be healed, however, if all social strata clearly realized their moral sins and political errors.[11] A firm decision to repent would bring the Polish nation a moral recovery and would create lasting foundations for "a new organization of society which will make it possible to mobilize all forces in the hands of the state, where it is necessary for the defense of Polish interests."[12]

The conservative historians and activists considered "organic work" by generations and by each particular individual to be the second precondition for a better future. It was the only means capable of lifting the nation out of the almost hopeless situation to which it had been brought by a groundless faith in a fictitious Polish superiority and exclusivity, which had inclined

[10] Józef Szujski, *Dzieje Polski podług ostatnich badań*, vol. 1 (n.p., 1862), p. 1.

[11] The older generation belonging to the Cracow school—Kalinka, Szujski—saw the causes of Poland's fall in the "sins" of the Polish nation, that is, placed it in the context of religious and moral guilt and punishment. The younger generation—among them Bobrzyński—saw them on the positivistic plane of a politically correct or mistaken action.

[12] Michał Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie*, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (1887), p. 55.

Poles to ignore all the laws and principles governing the development of mankind.[13]

Having thus provided reasons for the fall of historical Poland, the issue which had agitated Polish public opinion, as well as answered the question of what direction to take in order to build a new Poland, conservative thinking had to find solutions to two more problems: (1) Who would decide the political fate of the Polish nation?; and (2) How can one ensure the existence of a nation which has no state of its own? The evolution of Polish conservative thinking up to the attainment of Polish statehood in 1918 can be perceived as a series of attempts to provide answers to those questions.

The first question involved an intellectual confrontation of the historical identification of the nobility with the Polish nation, which was not easily to be removed from the consciousness of the Polish nobility. Here the uprisings of 1830 and 1863 constituted a turning point. Insisting on the importance of the elite (*warstwa przodkująca,* or "leading stratum") that is to lead the nation, Szujski extended it to include the "nobility by spirit," defined by the criterion of "education and participation in the political life of the nation"; he sometimes also speaks of a "moral nobility" or "aristocracy of spirit." Bobrzyński, who understood that the representation of the whole nation by the nobility was an anachronism in contemporary conditions, pursued the same issue further. The aggravated struggle between great noble landowners and peasants for "forests and pastures," together with the appearance of peasant political parties, inclined Bobrzyński to take a positive stand towards the inevitable representation of peasants in the parliament. He spoke in favor of seeking a common language with the peasants based on agrarian conservatism, and in favor of making a deal first with the well-off landowning peasanty. His arguments for that policy were both that the national and political consciousness of that stratum had grown, and that the Polish raison d'état (not to speak of the interests of the nobility itself) required it. Once attracted to participation in political life, the richer peasantry would become the ally of the nobility in the political arena. The same idea was developed further by Lypynkyj's teacher, Władysław Leopold Jaworski.

In dealing with a situation conditioned by the Polish nobility's historical role as the only vehicle for the life of the Polish state, Polish conservative thinking referred to Western thinking, to its understanding of the nation as a political "community of the living, the dead, and the unborn" (Edmund Burke's definition) formed by history, a community distinguished by common traditions and institutions. The fall of the Polish state has the effect of

[13] See "Krakiv, Ženeva i filijacija 'Kryčevs'koho,'" pp. xxii–xxxi.

increasing the importance of the national community, because the nation must then also take on the functions of a state. At the same time, Polish conservatives believed conservatism to be a state-generating idea, because the state was, in their eyes, a "necessity" which ensures the "naturalness" of an organic society,[14] and which should educate the nation for its future independent existence. Concurrently, the Cracow conservatives staunchly supported the Austrian monarchy, to which they owed their participation in the government and leading role in land administration. That aspect of their political outlook certainly contributed to their on the whole negative attitude toward any active struggle to establish a Polish state.

Other features of Polish conservatism coincided with those of European conservatism in general. The conservatives believed in a constant operation of Divine Providence, in the existence of a moral order which manifested itself in history, in the inadequacy of human reason as an instrument for establishing a new, "better" world order and the ensuing social relations. They believed that a "harmony" established by the Creator is evident everywhere in the world, or, like Bobrzyński, they assumed that natural and social laws or rules conducive to a social "balance" operate in place of the Creator. Society, in their understanding, is not a conglomeration or sum of individuals, but rather a natural extension of the family, clan, and tribe, a gradually developing organism which culminates in the state. Hierarchy is an inseparable part of both family and state. The individual is a constituent component of society, but only a component, because the general social interest is higher than the particular interest of an individual, who must subordinate himself to it. No society can exist without the authority and tradition through which ancestral wisdom manifests itself. A sober assessment of reality and a consideration of the experience of history are much more important than speculative thinking and an abstract system: they make it possible to recognize unmistakably what is possible in politics and what is not.[15] An important role in the conservatives' thought was played by their understanding of human nature. On the one hand, following Plato and Aristotle, they considered it to be unchangeable; on the other, in accord with the teachings of the Christian Fathers of the Church, they thought it to be corrupted by sin, and composed of a mixture of rational and irrational elements. As history shows, people are not of the same ilk, and natural

[14] Michał Jaskólski, *Historia-naród-państwo: Zarys syntezy myśli politycznej konserwatystów krakowskich w latach 1866–1934* (Cracow, 1981), pp. 102–105; Szymon Rudnicki, *Działalność polityczna polskich konserwatystów, 1918–1926* (Wrocław, 1981), p. 151 and passim.

[15] Francis Graham Wilson, *The Case of Conservatism* (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 12.

human inequality requires a differentiation of human rights and duties, above all, political ones.[16] Conservatives, for once agreeing with liberals, considered private property to be the basis of social and political life and of public liberty in general. Unlike liberals, they attributed special importance to land ownership. Emphasizing the importance of being settled on and "rooted" in the land, they saw in land ownership not merely the only "natural" way of human life, but also a value which cannot be measured in monetary terms.

Prewar Polish conservative thought reached its height in the person of the professor, lawyer, and politician W. L. Jaworski, who, as already mentioned, was Lypyns'kyj's teacher at Cracow University. In a letter to his teacher dated 22 March 1926, Lypyns'kyj wrote that it was Jaworski who "taught me the principles of law and political thinking."[17] W. L. Jaworski, who held the chair of civil law at Jagiellonian University from 1897, promoted the so-called neoconservative orientation that took form at the conservatives' club established in Cracow in 1896. In contrast to the older generation of conservatives, the neoconservatives understood the decisive role of the agrarian problem in the fate of the landed gentry as well as in the political solution of the Polish question; therefore they proposed agrarian reforms. In Jaworski's case, that understanding found its expression on a philosophical-political plane, on the one hand, and in specific legal proposals and commentaries on existing laws, on the other. He suggested that the socioeconomic structure of the country be modernized and that the anti-landlord attitude of the countryside be dissipated by support for the more well-to-do, middle private landowners abiding by clear legal norms. These middle landowners should practice self-government, based on a corporate system, and, through a constitutionally guaranteed, supreme economic chamber, should influence state policy. Thus Jaworski proposed a society based on an "organic" structure of corporations whose task it would be (in some analogy with medieval times) to fill the "gaps" between the "natural" societal cells that are families and the "artificial" structures of political organizations. Observing differences between the modern economic structures of Western and Eastern societies, he explained these as resulting from the impact of "intellectual" or "irrational" elements on an understanding of the world. "A rationalistic thinking prevails in industrial

[16] Gustav E. Kafka, "Konservatismus," *Staatslexikon*, 6th ed. (Freiburg, 1959).

[17] V. Lypyns'kyj Archives, W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute (Philadelphia), roll I.S.95. Concerning W. L. Jaworski, see Jaskólski's 1981 monograph (fn. 14, above), the latter's "Myśl polityczno-prawna W. L. Jaworskiego" (Ph.D. diss., Cracow University, 1975), and the entry by Józef Buszko, "W. L. Jaworski," in *Polski słownik biograficzny*.

Western societies, whereas Eastern agrarian societies are pervaded with irrational elements,'' he later wrote.[18]

Although Jaworski enjoyed great authority as a scholar in Polish society, his proposals departed too much from reality to be realizable. The great landed nobility were, of course, unwilling to relinquish their land and their political and economic position to benefit the peasantry; and the peasantry, which had already begun to organize political parties and which rallied around the sentiment of the ''injustice to peasants'' caused by the lords, had no desire at all to cooperate with that great nobility, i.e., to remain under its protection. As for a corporative system, that no longer had any basis for a rebirth in Poland.

Some of Jaworski's ideas undoubtedly seemed convincing to Lypyns'kyj (besides, they were not new), but he understood that they could not be transplanted to Ukrainian soil. Lypyns'kyj had to recognize that Polish conservatives lacked not only a clear concept, but any concept for solving the Polish political problem, let alone the Ukrainian one. Nor did they have any idea about how a Polish state could be built without a political organization of their own.

III

As noted above, Lypyns'kyj was already trying to attract Polish students to the Ukrainian cause when he was a high school student. He did not seek to ''win over'' individuals of Polish nationality to the Ukrainian nationality so that they might ''melt away'' in the Ukrainian peasant mass, as had the ''peasant enthusiasts'' (*xlopomany*) of the previous generation. What he had in mind was a shift *in corpore* of whole groups, or, perhaps, of the whole noble stratum, to the Ukrainian political movement, while preserving its language, religion, and culture; the shift was necessary in order to strengthen that movement and to create, together with the still numerically weak Ukrainian intelligentsia, a new political stratum that would lead the Ukrainian masses in the struggle for their own national state. Lypyns'kyj remained faithful to this idea, formed in his early youth, to the end of his life. What interested him later was the means by which it could be realized.

Besides the problem of the creation of a Ukrainian political class—which he was the first to place clearly before the Ukrainian movement—another problem drew Lypyns'kyj's attention. This problem, which was already perceived, although as yet vaguely, by the young Ukrainian intelligentsia, was the education and national enlightenment of the Ukrainian

18 ''Notatki'' (Cracow, 1926), p. 56; quoted after Jaskólski, *Historia-naród-państwo*, p. 107.

masses, as a precondition for the emergence of a modern Ukrainian society. Lypyns'kyj realized that the education and enlightenment of the people could not be an end in itself, that at issue was their organization and involvement in the struggle for their own state. Nationalization of the masses was by then no longer a peculiarly Ukrainian problem, caused by the backwardness of the Ukrainian nation, but was also pressing in the West, where its causes lay in, among other things, industrialization and proletarianization.

Tied to the second problem was that of how to sway the masses, that is, the problem of ideology and political propaganda. Only ideology expressed through propaganda could activate the energy and readiness to sacrifice which are required for great initiatives, including the building of one's own state. In general, only ideology and propaganda could deal with the establishment of a new authority—both political and moral—and, indeed, with the problem of morality in general, which had been undermined by technical-industrial progress and revolution, and was neglected or negated by the so-called progressive democrats and liberals.

Lypyns'kyj raised all these problems in his historical studies, publicistic essays, and letters written between 1909 and 1913. He regarded not only publicistic writings, but also scholarship as a means to conduct political activity in a situation in which real political activism was still impossible. In fact, throughout his life (setting aside his brief ambassadorship to Vienna in 1918–19), Lypyns'kyj could work only on the establishment of the preconditions for normal political action. He, a born politician, certainly suffered spiritually from those circumstances.

The revolutionary events of 1905–1906 sparked a resurgence in the political life of the Polish minority in the Right-Bank Ukraine. In that situation, as Lypyns'kyj wrote,[19] the left wing of the Polish political spectrum, previously represented by the so-called progressives, could not hold its own. Also, the right wing loyal to the Russian government and grouped around the St. Petersburg weekly *Kraj* (which was then attempting to put out the journal *Kresy*) was soon forced to surrender its position. The advocates of that "conciliatory" orientation joined the League of Landowners of the Southwestern Land (*Sojuz zemlevladelcev Jugo-Zapadnogo Kraja*), formed by Russian landowners, but their numbers and influence on Polish society in the Ukraine decreased.

Advocates of the concept of a "historical Poland," the camp strongest already before the revolution, were able under the new conditions to increase their influence further and to become the virtual spokesmen for

[19] "Na novyj šljax," *Rada* (Kiev), 5 August 1910.

Polish society. *Dziennik Kijowski* became their journalistic tribune. The leadership of the party, which was comprised of conservative landlords, adopted the political program of Polish National Democracy (*Narodowa Demokracja*), but redirected it toward "an increasing 'conciliatoriness' to Russian official circles and an increasing social and political conservatism," in Lypyns'kyj's words, because the original program was "too democratic and too official." "What remained unchanged was only nationalism, with its desire to unite the whole Polish community on a national and Catholic foundation . . . with a hostility toward other nationalities, above all to Ukrainians."[20]

Already in the classroom, as a young boy, Lypyns'kyj had understood that should the integral nationalism propagated by National Democracy dominate the Polish public, it would paralyze his plan for winning the Polish nobility over to the Ukrainian movement. The nationalism of any one nationality living in the Ukraine, he often wrote, would inevitably arouse the nationalism of all the others, and, as a result, would transform the Ukraine into an arena of struggle between foreign elements alien to the true interests of its inhabitants, and would destroy their common efforts to achieve a better life. Lypyns'kyj considered nationalism a dangerous disease which for the time being affected only the Polish nobility but which could, in case of an acute crisis in a disintegrating Russian state apparatus, infect all other nations, bringing about a general, anarchic upheaval that might reduce the Ukraine to the status of a foreign colony.

The danger posed by Polish integral nationalism also became clear at that time to a handful of foresighted Poles who were sympathetic to the Ukrainian movement, such as Leon Radziejowski, Antoni Staniewicz, Jan Mioduszowski, Franciszek Kotowicz. Together with Lypyns'kyj, and at his initiative, they began in 1909 to publish the biweekly *Przegląd Krajowy* in Kiev.[21]

The idea of territorialism as a political platform that could bring about the cooperation of all nationalities living in the Ukraine was not as novel as it may now seem. All European nations and countries, before they stabilized and organized as modern states, went through a territorial phase during which they defined themselves. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, too, the nobility lived an organized life on a territorial basis, sent representatives to territorial dietines, and defended its regional autonomy there,

[20] "Na novyj šljax," *Rada* (Kiev), 5 August 1910.

[21] For more details, see my article "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj i 'terytorijalizm,'" *Sučasnist'* (Munich), 1962, no. 2 (February), pp. 95–111, and no. 3 (March), pp. 61–72.

especially concerning the Ruthenian lands of the Commonwealth.[22] The territorial idea was seized by Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj in 1905, who stated: "Awakening of the consciousness of society . . . should be done not on the basis of national feeling alone, because it . . . is very weak in the Ukraine, or on the basis of mere historical or ethnographic traditions, because they are even weaker. It should be done also, and even more so, on the basis of the interests of the country: the economic and internal interests of the Ukrainian territory, its emancipation from state centers and from exploitation to serve interests alien to the Ukrainian territory, alien to its national, cultural, and economic development, to the autonomy and self-government of the country."[23]

The idea of territorialism had its own traditions precisely among the nobility of the Right-Bank Ukraine. But it was very difficult to breathe new life into it at the very time that an extremely strong offensive of pan-Polish nationalism was being unleashed by Dmowski's National Democrats.

The program of territorialism, Lypyns'kyj wrote, meant "a continuation of our traditional historical struggle for the decentralization of the Russian state, for the autonomy of its individual territories."[24] Launching the slogan "the Ukraine for its citizens," Lypyns'kyj maintained "we do not negate at all the principle of national self-determination," because "although the Ukraine is our common homeland and we feel ourselves to be first of all its citizens, as members of individual nations we do not renounce a spiritual and cultural unity with those of our kinsmen (*naszymi spółplemieńcami*) who live outside the boundaries of our country. . . . Through the common good of the Ukraine to the welfare of its citizens, and through the welfare of its citizens to the welfare of those nations to which these citizens belong—this is how we understand our allegiance to the country and our national patriotism." The concepts of "country" (territory) and "nation" are not only mutually non-exclusive, but "unite into one harmonious and organic whole. A country, as we understand it, is an external form, with constant and invariable external conditions which surround us and which depend on a given territory, conditions in which we are fated to live in common; and a nation is an idea, an embodiment of general (collective) thought, of human

[22] See Frank E. Sysyn, "Regionalism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility's Grievances at the Diet of 1641," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 1982): 167–90.

[23] Quoted after a collection of articles by M. Hruševs'kyj, entitled *Z bižučoji xvyli* (Kiev, 1906), pp. 9–10, first published in *Literaturno-naukovyj vistnyk*, 1905.

[24] V. Lypyns'kyj, "Politika pol'skix rukovodjaščix sfer po otnošeniju k Ukraine," *Ukrainskaja žizn'*, 1912, no. 1, p. 35.

life draped in the dress of national individuality, that is, of eternal change and eternal development."[25]

This idea, wrote Lypyns'kyj elsewhere, is only "a further stage in the penetration of Rus'-Ukraine by Western civilization, which, bringing new ideas, was coming to us in Polish dress: politically, it is a product of the historical evolution of our Polish 'imperialism' which was once useful to us, of an evolution which, with the passage of time and according to new needs, led in the direction of an increasing decentralization and has finally ended with the idea of a complete separatism in relation to the heartland of Poland."[26]

As Lypyns'kyj later admitted, *Przegląd Krajowy*, which aimed "at the development and substantiation of the idea of cooperation... between Ukrainians of the Roman Catholic religion and our fraternal group of Polish territorialists... on the basis of a territorial-democratic program,"[27] failed, as some of its adherents (e.g., Józef Jurkiewicz, d. 1910) had foreseen, because "the Polish bourgeois nationalistic phraseology brought to us by colonizers from the Polish Kingdom caused great confusion in the minds of the local Polonized Ukrainian society, which had been taken by surprise by the events of 1905," and "it will take some time before this nationalistic noise subsides into its natural river bed among the Polish inmigrating elements of the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie who seek new and lucrative markets for Polish production in the Ukraine."[28]

Publication of *Przegląd Krajowy* was combined with a plan for producing scholarly literature in the Ukrainian language.[29] The need for such publications was referred to by Lypyns'kyj already in his first article, published in the Kiev-based *Rada*, in 1908: "The nationalization of the schools may considerably accelerate the tempo of the intellectual development of the broad peasant masses," which, "having passed through the crucible of revolution [1905–1906], having gone through the phase of great hopes and illusions, have now faced the harsh reality and have seen that one has to look for different means of struggle to win a better fate, and that the struggle has to be waged on sturdy foundations."[30]

25 V. Lypyns'kyj, "Kraj i naród," *Przegląd Krajowy*, 31 May (13 June) 1909, no. 3, p. 3.

26 V. Lypyns'kyj, "Dwie drogi," *Przegląd Krajowy*, 30 April (13 May) 1909, no. 1, p. 3.

27 *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Cracow, 1912), p. xv.

28 *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. xv.

29 Unfortunately, I have no information on what part of the plans for the publication of popular literature was successfully implemented.

30 V. Lypyns'kyj, "Pid uvahu našym vydavnyctvam," *Rada*, 27 March 1908, no. 62, pp. 2–3.

The cessation of *Przegląd Krajowy* due to the indiscriminate attacks on it by pan-Polish nationalists writing under the banner of *Dziennik Kijowski,* and the resultant lack of subscribers, meant that the first attempt to create a Ukrainian political class from the nobility and the Ukrainian intelligentsia had failed. In the best case, the effort had to be postponed until more favorable conditions emerged. It was clear to Lypyns'kyj, however, that time was passing and that the Ukrainian movement was facing a great test: war was approaching, for which the Ukrainian nation and its still frail Ukrainian leading stratum were by no means prepared.

In the collection *Z dziejów Ukrainy,* published in 1912 in Cracow, Lypyns'kyj tried to buttress his thesis about the necessity of creating a leading political stratum with historical arguments. Of his four larger studies that were part of the collection, the first, on the subject of *kozakujuča šljaxta* ("the nobility-turned-Cossacks"; pp. 157–328), documented a mass participation of Ukrainian nobility in the uprising of 1648 and the tremendous physical sacrifices which it gave to that struggle already in the first stage of the uprising; it also testifies to that stratum's great contribution to the construction of the Ukrainian Cossack state. The collection also included Lypyns'kyj's two studies bearing the common title "Dwie chwile: Z dziejów porewolucyjnej Ukrainy" (Two moments: From the history of the postrevolutionary Ukraine). The first study, subtitled "U szczytu potęgi" (At the peak of power; pp. 514–77), was expanded in 1920 into the monograph *Ukrajina na perelomi* (The Ukraine at the turning point). There Lypyns'kyj describes the motives of the nobility of Pinsk county in swearing loyalty to Hetman Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj and the Ukrainian state. The second study, entitled "Na przełomie" (At the turning point), focuses on the political errors of the Ukrainian ruling elite, mainly the nobility, which brought the Ukrainian state to ruin after Xmel'nyc'kyj's death (pp. 578–617).

The three studies just mentioned deal with the participation of the Ukrainian nobility in the statebuilding of the Xmel'nyc'kyj period, and clearly express the idea that without the nobility, the Ukrainian Cossack state would not have come into being. In his fourth study, on Myxajlo Kryčevs'kyj (Michał Krzyczewski; pp. 329–466), Lypyns'kyj, influenced by the Polish neoromantic school[31] and relying on certain historical sources, gives the reader an account of symbolic and mythical significance about the life and death of a fearless hero-knight, who, guided by the soldier's moral principle of either winning or dying in the fulfillment of his duty, enables his Fatherland to live through the sacrifice of his own life.

[31] Bilas, "Krakiv, Ženeva i filijacija 'Kryčevskoho,'" pp. xliii–xlvii.

A nobleman-turned-Cossack, Colonel Myxajlo (Stanyslav) Kryčevs'kyj personified the collective myth of noblemen who were followers of the great hetman, who nearly all perished in the struggle for the Ukrainian Cossack state, and whose main characteristic was, according to Lypyns'kyj, their "endless devotion to the idea which they came to love, their fanaticism aimed at one goal and their contempt for death—a characteristic which is always and everywhere the mark of all epoch makers, without which really great things in the life of nations do not occur. . . ."[32]

The myth of a Ukrainian political-nobiliary stratum as champions of Ukrainian statehood and followers of Hetman Xmel'nyc'kyj—fortified by Lypyns'kyj's portraits of individual Ukrainian noblemen of the Xmel'nyc'kyj period in a number of small monographs and biographical sketches written before World War I—was later, in the postwar years, complemented by the myth of a strong Hetmanate created by Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj. To the misfortune of the Ukraine, this state was brought to ruin by Vyhovs'kyj and his followers, advocates of a republican-anarchistic Ukraine modeled on nobiliary Poland. Their policy caused discontent and revolts among the common people and a fratricidal civil war which was exploited by Muscovy to liquidate the Ukrainian state. The myth of a noble and Cossack leading stratum that built the Ukrainian state only to bring it to destruction by class vices inherited from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, together with the myth of a strong monarchic state left by Xmel'nyc'kyj as a testament to succeeding generations, transposed a political historian's understanding of the past into an imperative for contemporary political action.

In his prewar Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian essays, Lypyns'kyj addressed above all the intelligentsia—the main readers of the press. Naturally, he had to use their vocabulary in order to appeal to their perceptions and feelings. Lypyns'kyj therefore made wide use of the then very popular concept of progress towards a better future,[33] which embodied the intelligentsia's social myth about an ideal social order of which they would be the leaders. Yet for Lypyns'kyj, "progress" and "progressive" were whatever fostered the political, economic, and cultural emancipation of Ukrainian territory from Muscovy. The same applied to such concepts as "democracy" and "democratic."

32 V. Lypyns'kyj, *Tvory*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1980), p. 241.

33 See my "Geschichtsphilosophische und ideologische Voraussetzungen der historischen und politischen Konzeption Mychajlo Hruševs'kyjs," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1956, no. 3, pp. 262–92.

Lypyns'kyj's prewar democratism was based on his analysis of the actual, overall political situation and of the condition of the Ukrainian nation and its potential, as well as on his understanding of Ukrainian history. He realized that the outcome of the Ukrainian movement's struggle against the hostile Russian state apparatus and against the Polish and Russian nobilities and bourgeoisie who were largely hostile to everything Ukrainian, would depend on the extent to which the still weak Ukrainian intelligentsia and other supporters of the idea of emancipation (still few) would succeed in nationalizing the Ukrainian masses and transforming them into a political nation. He understood the Ukrainian "Ruin" of the seventeenth century to have been caused by the politically and socially mistaken policy of the Ukrainian political class, because the cause in which "the representatives of the Cossack masses, the more democratic Cossack elements, played a secondary role and functioned only as tools in the hands of the small group of Vyhovs'kyjs, Lisnyc'kyjs, and Nemyryčes, had to collapse."[34] Lypyns'kyj, together with the intelligentsia, also emphasized the democratism of such phenomena in Ukrainian history as the Orthodox brotherhoods of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Arianism of the seventeenth century,[35] stating that "we ('the territorialists') are democrats, and we see the future of the Ukrainian movement in its democratism."[36] But democracy or "democratism" in politics was never a goal in itself nor a "principle of faith" for Lypyns'kyj, but only a more or less useful means in the struggle for complete political independence. This explains his rejection of democracy after 1918, when he found that the organization of the masses (and of power) "through a democratic method" had not yielded the desired result, and that, consequently, the Ukrainian intelligentsia—the bearers of that method—had failed the hopes pinned on it and had become, in his eyes, the culprit in the collapse of national strivings.

To understand clearly the prewar positions of Lypyns'kyj one must examine two documents: an article designated for the collection *Vil'na Ukraina* (A free Ukraine), entitled "Druhyj akt" (The second act), written at the end of 1911, which provides an analysis of the contemporary situation;[37] and the "Memorijal do Ukrajins'koho komitetu pro naše stanovyšče suproty napruženoji sytuaciji v Evropi" (Memorandum to the Ukrainian

[34] V. Lypyns'kyj, "General artyleriji Vel. Kn. Rus'koho," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenka* (Lviv), 87 (1909): 45. Hereafter *Zapysky NTŠ*.

[35] V. Lypyns'kyj, "Arians'kyj sojmyk u Kyselyni," *Zapysky NTŠ*, 96 (1910): 56–57.

[36] V. Lypyns'kyj, "Między młotem a kowadłem," *Przegląd Krajowy*, 5 January 1910.

[37] Published in this volume, from the V. Lypyns'kyj Archives of the W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute (Philadelphia).

Committee concerning our position with regard to the tense political situation in Europe) of December 1912. In the first, Lypyns'kyj concluded that the Ukrainian peasant masses are now in the grip of a deep physical, spiritual, and moral crisis because, in the gusts of the revolution of 1905–1906, "the former world outlook of the old serf and peasant Ukraine collapsed" and a new one is only slowly being formed. Perishing with that outlook was the old national content of the life of the masses, so that "the tremendous capital of national energy" they accumulated in their difficult and bloody fight for liberation is slowly becoming dead capital. That struggle against economic and political enslavement and against Polish statehood the Ukrainian nation had waged in national forms. Its new struggle against a new enslavement is being waged in forms that are largely no longer national. The process of assimilation into the state, which had long denationalized the Ukrainian nobility, higher clergy, prosperous burghers, and even the common urban population, has, since the revolution, spread also to the peasants and the workers.

If Russia were a state of nationalities, Lypyns'kyj believed the nationalities' assimilation into the state would have to be considered "a desirable process aimed at consolidating a strong state." In the actual situation, however, "Russia is the state and organization of the Russian (Great Russian, Muscovite) nation, and therefore the growth of the state is a growth of the nation, the assimilation into the state is at the same time a national assimilation." All the most important aspects of political life in the Ukraine have taken on Russian national forms: new political parties are turning to the masses in Russian as if to Russians and not to Ukrainians, and they are all neglecting Ukrainian political demands. As a consequence, the whole content of past Ukrainian national life is slowly becoming unintelligible to the Ukrainian masses and will soon become only of folkloristic interest. Even such an external indicator of nationality as language must perish if the soul of the people dies. Yet Lypyns'kyj deeply believed that "our people is not worse than others" and that "we, too, will be able to find our way in the general progress of mankind." But the Ukrainian people faces a difficult, unrelenting, and bitter struggle for its right to live. "Our national decline has reached its maximum. . . . Therefore we call on everyone who has a living soul to fight." Trying to establish "the place of the present crucial moment in the development of the internal forces of our nation," Lypyns'kyj concludes that "the first act" in the Ukraine's struggle for national liberation has ended with the complete destruction of the Polish state on the Ukrainian lands. Russia, which was supposed to aid the Ukraine in that struggle, has, by a physical debilitation of the Ukraine since the times of Xmel'nyc'kyj and by an economic exploitation of the Ukraine

in favor of Muscovy, been moving slowly toward the goal of complete assimilation; in addition, it has been destroying the Ukrainian nation morally. The conclusion is clear: as long as a Russian state armed with the machinery of coercion exists in the Ukraine, it will block the Ukraine's development from the very embryo through violence, deceit, and demoralization. Russia has brought into Ukrainian life a divisiveness which is devastating it and pitting its best forces against each other in an internal conflict.

The time has come, therefore, for a "settling of accounts" with Russia—for "the second act" in the struggle for a complete liberation of the Ukraine. "We are not Mazepists, we are Xmel'nyc'kyites: we do not intend to 'fool the Muscovite' with diplomacy.... We believe that the Ukraine will achieve its freedom through struggle and that only the Ukrainian masses can wage that struggle." For the Ukrainian people are neither so satiated nor so satisfied with their present situation that they do not desire to wrest themselves from it. "The old Ukrainian revolutionary feeling" has not yet "evaporated" in them, Lypyns'kyj declared.

The second document, the "Memorandum to the Ukrainian Committee" of 5 December 1912,[38] was not only not intended for publication, but had a markedly clandestine character. Hence it provides us with Lypyns'kyj's candid thoughts about "our position with regard to the tense political situation in Europe," over which the specter of an Austro-Russian armed conflict hung.

The memorandum states that "the Ukrainian nation has the right to a free and independent political life on its own territory." Because it is deprived of a proprietary social class, its development is "closely connected with political democratization and the implementation of social reforms economically beneficial to the broad masses of the people." Proceeding from these premises, Lypyns'kyj concludes that "our main and unreconcilable enemy" is centralist Russia, both liberal and Black Hundred nationalist; however, Austria "is not our ally" either. Russia understands well that "the beginning of the Ukraine is the end of the Russian bureaucratic-centralist state," whereas Austria "in relation to us is guided by the interests of the Polish nation that rules over us."

[38] The committee was founded in Lviv, in March 1911, mainly by Ukrainian political émigrés from the Russian Ukraine. In sending this document to Andrij Žuk, Lypyns'kyj asked him not to disclose his authorship to anyone except Volodymyr Dorošenko and Volodymyr Stepankivs'kyj. A copy of the memorandum is preserved in the V. Lypyns'kyj Archives of the W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute.

The coming Russo-Austrian armed conflict could, in Lypyns'kyj's estimation, lead to the following outcomes: (a) The war might end on Ukrainian territory in a status quo, and Austria might expand in the Balkans, toward the Adriatic Sea; (b) Russia might occupy Eastern Galicia and Bukovina; (c) Austria might occupy part of the Right-Bank Ukraine. Situation (a) would bring Ukrainians "an even greater weakening of the national organism" because of the blood Ukrainian soldiers would shed on both sides of the front; situation (b) would be an unmitigated catastrophe for the Ukraine; situation (c) would also be very disadvantangeous, because "Europe will not allow Austria to take the whole Right-Bank Ukraine, nor even a considerable part of it." Lypyns'kyj pursues that thought in more detail, whereas "the annexation of a small part of the Right-Bank Ukraine will not force Austria to change radically its policy" towards Ukrainians, and it will continue, in its expansion into the Ukraine, "to base itself on Polish and Jewish elements, which are economically the strongest and the most compatible with Austria." In this Austria will also be forced to act by the Poles, who "stand behind Austria with all their might" and who "are for us an element no less hostile than the Russians and equally dangerous because of their denationalizing policy." Therefore it is a historical necessity for Ukrainians to "fulfill the testament of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj: that a political border must arise between Poland and the Ukraine." The guideline for the political orientation of the Ukrainian side should be: "in a future Austro-Russian war one should not stand consciously, clearly, or loudly either on the side of Austria or, even less, on the side of Russia."

In those provinces of the Ukraine that remain outside the arena of the future Austro-Russian war, in the regions of Katerynoslav, Kiev, and Kharkiv, conscious Ukrainians, at the outbreak of war, should "start a mass movement for the complete liberation of the Ukraine from the yoke of foreign states." Agitation among the masses should be conducted under the following banners:

(1) "The Ukraine within its ethnographic boundaries shall become an independent state[39] (the form of government—a constitutional monarchy; the eventual question of dynasty—German, Austrian, or even Russian—will depend on a Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly and the position of Europe) under the protectorate of Russia or Austria, and it pledges itself to maintain complete neutrality towards those two states."

[39] Originally Lypyns'kyj wrote "konstytucijnoju monarxijeju," then crossed out the term and wrote "deržavoju."

(2) (among workers) For an 8-hour working day, social insurance, etc.

(3) (among farmers) The Ukrainian land is for the Ukrainian nation. Concretely this means that Ukrainians—without regard to religion or origin—who own no more that 500 desiatins land will remain landowners; "all the land of all non-Ukrainians and everything that surpasses 500 desiatins of Ukrainian land is to be redeemed at a just price." Land will be confiscated from those who oppose Ukrainian emancipation, and all state lands will be confiscated. "Out of the land redeemed and confiscated a national land reserve is to be established, from which plots will be apportioned as private and hereditary property, according to the working people's quota, to all those who, with arms in hand, will take part in the struggle for the liberation of the Ukraine." Private property will be legally limited to 500 desiatins of land, and the ownership of land by non-Ukrainians will be forbidden.

(4) All religions are guaranteed complete freedom, with first place reserved for the Orthodox church.

An independent Ukrainian state will be desirable to the European states that do not want to strengthen Austria at the expense of Russia—that is, to England and France.[40] A neutral Ukrainian state would be the best outcome to an Austro-Russian war for the states that want to weaken Russia—that is, above all for Germany and Sweden. Also, the Balkan League will be "on our side" in the case of a victory over Turkey:[41] Serbia—because it does not want a strengthened Austria; Bulgaria—because the Ukraine would not have any such ambitions as Russia does concerning the Constantinople question; and Romania—because it will get Bessarabia and the Romanian part of Bukovina in the process. A Ukrainian uprising will also arouse "similar social and national movements in Austria and Russia, thus weakening both neighbors that are dangerous to us."

Should the Ukrainian struggle for independence not end with complete victory, "they would at least have to reckon with us." And even "in the case of complete defeat, a clear and distinct Ukrainian political idea, not polluted by either Russophile or Austrophile mud, would remain among the Ukrainian masses and in Europe," an idea which "at the first opportunity would rise again."

[40] Interestingly enough, Lypyns'kyj did not see that the proposal of a Russian or Austrian protectorate might limit Ukrainian independence.

[41] In October 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece—the so-called Balkan League— started a war against Turkey which ended with their complete victory. The Turks had to cede to the victors all possessions beyond the Enos-Midia line.

To realize that program Lypyns'kyj suggested the founding of a *Sojuz ukrajins'kyx deržavnykiv (imperijalistiv)* (Union of Ukrainian Statists [Imperialists]), or a *Sojuz vyzvolennja Ukrajiny* (Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine),[42] which would immediately start to agitate for those goals. At the outbreak of an Austro-Russian war, the organization would form a bloc with those Ukrainian parties that stand for the political independence of the Ukraine. If that turned out to be impossible, then, in the case of war, the union would have to "behave quite passively, while continuing political and organizational work on this side of the border."

Yet in practice Lypyns'kyj at the same time declared himself "against agitation now, and against a congress, and against starting a [press] organ. Let us not make unnecessary noise and uproar," as he wrote to Andrij Žuk.[43] In another letter to Žuk he explained himself as follows:

> To organize a party in the Russian Ukraine from here, from Galicia, is impossible.... An organization must arise locally, it must be led by local people, and it must have... its legal organ. But in our land people are only now being born for such an organization; therefore there is no one to be organized.... But what remains is ideological agitation, which we must conduct; the question is only in what form.... I consider the only advisable thing now to be the founding of a special publishing house dedicated to the publication of political pamphlets which would, in a serious and quiet way, propound the idea of Ukrainian political independence.... A publishing house is non-partisan and unites all those who stand for the democracy and political independence of the Ukraine.... If a war breaks out soon, then we will have no chance to prepare for that situation, and we will be completely dependent on external circumstances.... Therefore a war now would be a misfortune for us.[44]

The foreseen "misfortune" broke out the next year, in 1914.

IV

Let us look closely at the deep convictions and spiritual attitude that underlay Lypyns'kyj's world outlook and political activity. The traditions that allow the nation to live consciously are the preconditions for its historical and state life: they are the integrating factor for any political and spiritual community, which, as Rousseau put it, "keep the whole people on its destined path."[45] The memory of Ukrainian Cossack traditions was preserved and cultivated by the "middle and petty Polonized noble stratum on the

[42] In Lypyns'kyj's original, "vyzvolu." Žuk founded such a union only in 1914, on the eve of war, without the participation of Lypyns'kyj, who was then in the Russian Ukraine.

[43] Lypyns'kyj's letter to Žuk dated 7 December 1912.

[44] Lypyns'kyj's letter to Žuk dated 4 January 1913.

[45] "Chaque peuple renferme en lui quelque cause qui les ordonne d'une manière particulière"; J. Rousseau, *Contrat social*, chap. 2, p. 11.

Right Bank,''[46] although it had already lost, to be sure, an understanding of the Ukrainian state aspirations by which the generation of Xmel'nyc'kyj lived. The Ukrainian common people, too, had lived by traditions until recent times—memories of their former free life in the Cossack period. The revolution of 1905–1906, and the changes it wrought, threatened those traditions with a final uprooting and the Ukrainian peasant and worker with transformation into ''members of the Russian nation.''

The imperative to return to the threatened traditions is not an invented ideological postulate for Lypyns'kyj: the struggle for their revival is among the duties whose fulfillment rests with every generation. Our ancestors' struggle for a free life and for political freedom, which, through the fault of some among them, ended with a tragic defeat that brought about the political, social, and cultural enslavement of the whole people, has to be carried on to a victorious conclusion. In this situation, the educated part of society has a moral obligation to lead the masses and to achieve, through struggle, an independent state.

A sense of moral obligation among ''those who have been given much'' in relation to those who are less fortunate is characteristic of conservative thinking, as is the emphasis Lypyns'kyj placed on ''the categorical imperative which orders every generation of a people to take upon itself the whole heritage—the sins and merits of the previous ones—and to make up for those sins.''[47] Therefore Lypyns'kyj constantly reminds his countrymen of ''the ethical and moral duty to give one's work back to those people on whose . . . bloody sweat one lives.''[48] This duty culminates in the sacrifice of one's own life for the nation.[49]

The postulates of ''repentance'' and ''sacrifice'' reveal a religious foundation to Lypyns'kyj's thinking and world outlook, characteristic of European conservative thought, as well as a secularization of related spheres of thought. For the ''sins'' requiring repentance are sins against one's own *politeia*, against one's homeland and people, and it is for their intention that he demands ''a sacrifice on the altar of an idea''—of course, the idea of an independent Ukraine. But Lypyns'kyj can impart a new political sense to those religious concepts only because the religious sphere from which he

[46] V. Lypyns'kyj, ''Bohdan Zales'kyj,'' *Rada*, 29 December 1911.

[47] V. Lypyns'kyj, ''Deščo pro neofitiv,'' *Rada*, 12 July 1910.

[48] Lypyns'kyj, ''Deščo pro neofitiv,'' *Rada*, 12 July 1910.

[49] For example, Lypyns'kyj wrote about ''the sacrifice . . . of the hero-martyr Adam Koc'ko for the idea of the free life of the Ukrainian nation,'' and about ''the supreme sacrifice of his life that he laid down . . . on the altar of an idea,'' in ''Deščo pro neofitiv,'' and in ''Pam''jati V. Domanyc'koho,'' *Rada*, 20 September 1910. See also Bilas, ''Krakiv, Ženeva i filijacija 'Kryčevs'koho,' '' pp. xxix–xxx.

takes them is completely real to him. Lypyns'kyj still feels an inner moral and religious duty to serve the idea of a liberated Ukraine, thus to repent for the political sins of his ancestors, and to sacrifice himself in the struggle for the achievement of that goal. From him this was no empty rhetoric, as it frequently was among his contemporaries. No less important is that for him a nation or state is not a goal in itself, not a secularized deity taking the place of religion, but only a means towards the actual goal: an independent political life for the national collective, as the only thing able to secure the collective and to ensure the development of its separate strata, groups, and individuals. Lypyns'kyj as a *homo politicus* is still throughout a *homo religiosus*, a truly believing person.

The question remains, how does one reconcile the unquestionable conservatism of the nobleman and landowner who always felt himself to be a representative of the noble environment to which he belonged "body and soul,"[50] with the revolutionariness of which he himself was well aware, for instance, in invoking "propaganda for the *revolutionary* idea of a free Ukraine"?[51]

Lypyns'kyj understood that a mere "political revolution"—the attainment of a Ukrainian state through struggle—had no chance for success, because the masses, that "source of energy" which alone can accomplish the task, would not engage in a campaign for political freedom which they found too abstract and for which, in any case, they were unprepared. A prerequisite for political revolution in the existing conditions is a revolutionary economic and social policy, involving the breakup of great land estates and other economic and social measures benefiting the peasants and workers. Only revolutionary propaganda, together with the struggle for the implementation of all these postulates, has a chance to capture general popular support and achieve the major political goal: the establishment of the state. Only its own state will guarantee, in the long run, the existence of the noble stratum. Without a close link with its nation, that stratum would be unable to hold on in the Ukraine, just as without a leading stratum the people would have no better tomorrow.

Aldrans, Austria

Translated from the Ukrainian by Bohdan A. Struminsky

50 V. Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv* (Vienna, 1926), p. 61.

51 V. Lypyns'kyj's letter to Levko Jurkevyč of 13 March 1911.

APPENDIX:

The Genealogy of the Lipiński Family, Coat of Arms "Brodzicz"

Józef Antoni Lipiński,
armored cavalryman, steward of Drohiczyn,
vice-steward of Czersk in 1757,
purchaser of the village of
Teremkivci in Podolia

↓

Antoni, ~ Justyna Kaczkowska,
subcamerarius of Kam''janec', marshal daughter of Kazimierz
of that county's nobility from 1805,
owner of Jampil'čyk in Podolia

↓

Fabian, ~ Józefa Jaroszyńska,
standard-keeper, marshal of the nobility daughter of Mikołaj and Marjanna
of Ol'hopil' county (1820–26), chairman Siematów-Skobejkowicz-Kardyszów
of the supreme courts of the Podolian
governorship, hereditary owner of Lojovyči
in Ušycja county, of Rybne in Mohyliv
county, et al.

↓

Włodzimierz Seweryn Marian, ~ Emilia Dryj-Bieczkowska,
student of the Krem''janec' lyceum, daughter of Józef, subcamerarius
owner of estates in Podolia (later lost) of Volodymyr, and Tekla Janiszowska,
owner of Zaturci in Volhynia

↓

Kazimierz Sylwester Antoni, ~ Klara Rogal-Rokicka,
hereditary owner of Zaturci (later of Turčyn, daughter of Apolinary, hereditary owner
in Luc'k county), died in Kiev in 1915 of Černivci and Mervynci in Podolia,
and Teofilia Wołoszynowska

↓

Wacław, ~ Kazimiera Szumińska,
born 17 April 1882, hereditary owner of Cracow
of Rusalivs'ki Čahary in Volhynia