Ukrainians, Cossacks, Mazepists

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

Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 2014 (New Series), pp. 884-895 (Review)

Published by Slavica Publishers
DOI: 10.1353/kri.2014.0053

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Viktor Brekhunenko, *Kozaky na stepovomu kordoni Ievropy: Typolohiia kozats´kykh spil´not XVI–pershoi polovyny XVII st.* (Cossacks on Europe's Steppe Frontier: Typology of Cossack Communities in the 16th and First Half of the 17th Centuries). 504 pp. Kyiv: Natsional´na akademiia nauk Ukrainy, 2011. ISBN-13 978-9660258440.

Zenon Kohut, *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity.* 340 pp. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2011. ISBN-13 978-1894865210.

Tat´iana Tairova-Iakovleva, *Ivan Mazepa i Rossiiskaia imperiia: Istoriia "predatel´stva"* (Ivan Mazepa and the Russian Empire: A Story of "Betrayal"). 528 pp. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2011. ISBN-13 978-5227025784.

This review's title is deliberately at variance with Andreas Kappeler's 2003 article on the position of Ukrainians in the ethnic hierarchy of the Russian Empire. This informal order in Russia, as in other premodern multiethnic empires, was based on criteria of political loyalty, estate, and social and cultural affiliation. The stratification of Ukrainians made it possible to attribute them to different categories: *khokhly*, mostly peasants; *malorossy,* Russian-speaking Ukrainians loyal to the Romanov dynasty; or Mazepists (*mazepintsy*), those forging Ukrainian cultural and national identity. Kappeler noted that all these categories were interwoven, and the position of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire was therefore extremely complex.[1]

[1] Andreas Kappeler, "Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire," in *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian–Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, ed. Kappeler, Zenon Kohut, Frank Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen (Edmonton: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies Press, 2003), 162–81.

Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 15, 4 (Fall 2014): 884–95.

This complexity represents a key subject for several recent publications about early modern Ukraine. In particular, the Cossack past, construed as a historical precursor to the contemporary Ukrainian state, plays a crucial role both in scholarly debates and in the national narrative.[2] The issues of loyalties, identities, and cultural, religious, and political entanglements are also of key interest, and they occupy a prominent place in the studies under review here.[3] Writing in Canada, Ukraine, and Russia, the authors are acclaimed experts in early modern studies, and their new publications strengthen, advance, and sometimes revise their own earlier work. Collectively they offer a broad spectrum of approaches and methodological insights and show how complex and controversial research in Ukrainian history can be.

In a volume encompassing 12 articles published between 1977 and 2006 and three new studies, Zenon Kohut focuses on elite culture, predominantly in the 18th century, and on identity transformations.[4] The book spans the whole modern era from the 17th through the 20th centuries. Kohut offers a revisionist view on some positions and concepts declared in his previous publications and stresses that the construction of the modern Ukrainian state and nation began in the early modern period (xi). Working with the same

[2] Most prominent are the studies of Frank Sysyn, Zenon Kohut, and Iurii Mytsyk. See the bibliography of Sysyn's publications on early modern Ukraine in Olga A. Andriewsky, Zenon E. Kohut, Serhii Plokhy, and Larry Wolff, eds., *Tentorium Honorum: Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on His Sixtieth Birthday* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010). Zenon Kohut's publications on the Cossack past are listed in Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, eds., *SYNOPSIS: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Zenon E. Kohut* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005). For Mytsyk's contributions to the studies of Cossacks, see http://mytsyk.com/osnovni-naukovi-pratsi-prof-yu-mitsika (accessed 10 September 2014).

[3] Serhii Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See the recent historiographical review on nation building in early modern Ukraine: Frank Sysyn, "Die ukrainische Nationsbildung in der Frühen Neuzeit: Neuere Ergebnisse der Forschung," in *Die Ukraine: Prozesse der Nationsbildung,* ed. Andreas Kappeler (Cologne: Böhlau, 2011), 67–80. In addition, social history and historical anthropology paved new ways into Ukrainian early modern studies. See esp. the latest contributions of Natalia Iakovenko (www.ukma.kiev.ua/ua/faculties/fac_gum/history/index.php, accessed 10 September 2014); as well as the Kyivan journal *Socium,* which explores issues of religious devotion and early modern interfaith relations at the everyday level.

[4] These articles also appear in Zenon Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988); and Kohut, *Korinnia identychnosti: Studii z ranniomodernoi ta modernoi istorii Ukrainy* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies Press, 2004).

sources, he emphasizes new aspects: for instance, in his reading of the famous 17th-century Kyivan *Synopsis.* While Kohut previously delineated the linkage between Ukraine and Russia through dynasty, religion, state structure, and ethnicity, he now refers to this text as an address to "all the Slavs, not to any specific East Slavic people or nation" (xii).[5] Kohut's novel emphasis on proto-nationalist and nationalist movements is linked to an acknowledgment of the multiplicity of trajectories leading from the Ruthenian to the contemporary Ukrainian nation. This variety of paths, often interwoven and complex, are the focus of Kohut's book. For the 17th and 18th centuries Kohut defines two competing state-building projects: the Hetmanate and the Russian Empire. He identifies a major conflict between the idea of the centrally regulated absolutist monarchy and the notion of Little Russian "rights and liberties." For Kohut these were two incompatible poles, and the clash was inevitable.

In this regard, the analysis touches on the classical question of whether contemporary Ukraine can be considered "a non-historical nation."[6] Kohut denies the validity of such a concept and instead discerns the existence of a certain historical tradition among the Ukrainian elite: "The nobles of the Hetmanate provided a modicum of continuity from the post-Khmelnytsky period well into modern times" (61). It is exactly this continuity in the Hetmanate historical tradition across the centuries that, according to Kohut, provides legitimacy for the modern Ukrainian nation. In his essays on 18th-century written culture in Ukraine—the most insightful ones in the volume—Kohut addresses the problem of assimilationist and traditionalist attitudes of the Ukrainian elite. In his analysis of the political projects of Vasilii Kapnist (1758–1823) and Hryhorii Poletyka (1723/25–1784), Kohut traces the attempts of Ukrainian elites to secure and preserve the local juridical system and the remnants of gentry democracy. This, however, conflicted with the Russian policy of imperial incorporation and led to perennial conflict. Kohut establishes historical continuity when he interprets the loss of Ukrainian church autonomy in the 1780s in quite a similar way. These events, writes Kohut, were linked to Catherine II's imperial policy, her attempts to abolish the Hetmanate´s self-administration and to end "various peculiarities of the social structure, legal relationship, and customs" (150).

Among the other "adamant oppositions" and "perennial conflicts" that Kohut tackles is one of the most painful and debatable pages of early modern

[5] Zenon Kohut, "Origins of the Unity Paradigm: Ukraine and the Construction of Russian National History (1620s–1860s)," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35, 1 (2001): 70–76.

[6] See the overview of historical debates on this issue in Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 300–38.

Ukrainian history: the Koliivshchyna Uprising in Right-Bank Ukraine (1768). Kohut discusses various historiographical interpretations from the 1960s and 1970s and explains his own view on the Haidamaka movement. He identifies important religious and national issues in the conflict but above all emphasizes the social roots of the protest and indicates the main targets of the popular protest—the Roman Catholic magnates and clergy, as well as the Jewish population. For Kohut, the rebels attempted to reconstitute the Cossacks' political and social structures but not the Cossack state, because such an effort was prevented by both their conservative attitude and their disinterest in a coherent political program (292).

Only in addressing the Haidamaka movement does Kohut first touch on the issue of Polish influence on Ukrainian culture and self-consciousness. Unfortunately, it is also the last time. His major emphasis rests on relations between Ukrainian and Russian elites, and everything that goes beyond this agenda is not really of interest to him. He thus leaves out not only important Polish patterns in Ukrainian nation building—there is, for example, little mention of Galicia and Ukrainian lands within the Habsburg Empire—but also its oriental aspects.[7] Histories of territorial transfer from Crimea and the Ottoman Empire remain untouched in Kohut's narrative of the "making of modern Ukraine." This may be because the issues of borders and borderlands appear only on the margins of his story, which is even more striking considering the recent rise of interest in Ukrainian borderlands studies. Other scholars have paid particular attention to the frontier thesis,[8] to regional history and its consideration of Ukrainian lands as "imagined places,"[9] and finally to Ukrainian borderland mythology and discourse analysis.[10] Much

[7] This issue was critically addressed by Robert I. Frost in his review of *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* in *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 46, 1 (2012): 164–66.

[8] The frontier thesis advanced by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner in relation to the American democracy is often applied to other borderland communities. As related to Ukraine, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, "Bol´shaia granitsa Ukrainy: Etnicheskii bar´er ili etnokontaktnaia zona?" in *Etnokontaktnye zony v evropeiskoi chasti SSSR: Istoriia, dinamika, metody izucheniia,* ed. E. M. Pospelov and Igor´ Krupnik (Moscow: Moskovskii filial Geograficheskogo obshchestva SSSR, 1989), 7–21; *Ukraina moderna,* no. 18 (2011); and Serhii Lepiavko, *Velykyi kordon Ievropy iak faktor stanovlennia Ukrainskoho kozatstva (XVI st.)* (Zaporizhzhia: RA Tandem-U, 2001).

[9] Most notably, Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Kharkov/Kharkiv: Stolitsa pogranichia* (Vilnius: EHU, 2010); Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Iryna Kolesnyk, "Regionalna istoriia v ukrainskii istoriografii: Praktyka i refleksiia," *Regionalna istoriia Ukrainy,* no. 1 (2007): 205–20.

[10] Andrew Wilson, "National History and National Identity in Ukraine and Belarus," in *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands,* ed. Graham Smith et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge

research has also been done in the field of Ukrainian borderlands as "regions of communication,"[11] the phenomena of coexistence and violent conflict.[12] Many of these studies also relate to elite cultures as well as to nation building. Ignoring the blossoming borderland approach in studying cross-cultural influences and transfer makes any analysis of Ukrainian nation building somewhat one-sided.

This is particularly obvious in Kohut's interpretation of the Haidamaka movement. Speaking of the Polish Catholic landlords and Jewish innkeepers as those who "exploited the Ukrainian Orthodox and nominally Uniate peasantry and Cossacks for economic gain" (291), the Canadian historian misses an important target of the Koliivshchyna violence—the Uniate clergy, an issue critically addressed by Barbara Skinner in 2005.[13] Explicitly embracing a borderland perspective, Skinner argues that only the tensions between the Orthodox and the Uniates can sufficiently explain the violence: "The new Dnepr River border that divided Ukrainians from Ukrainians had become by the mid-eighteenth century the confessional border carrying political and

University Press, 1998), 23–47; Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Steven Seegel, *Mapping Europe's Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Seegel, *Ukraine under Western Eyes: The Bohdan and Neonila Krawciw Ucrainica Map Collection* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Jana Bürgers, *Kosakenmythos und Nationsbildung in der postsowjetischen Ukraine* (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 2006); Tatiana Zhurzhenko, *Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2010).

[11] Regions of communication are characterized by a dense inner interaction, multiple cultural practices and experiences (Wolfgang E. J. Weber, "Die Bildung von Regionen durch Kommunikation: Aspekte einer neuen historischen Perspektive," in *Kommunikation und Region,* ed. Carl A. Hoffmann and Rolf Kießling [Konstanz, UVK, 2001], 58–59). For Ukrainian regions, see Stefan Rohdewald, Stefan Wiederkehr, and David Frick, eds., *Litauen und Ruthenien: Studien zu einer transkulturellen Kommunikationsregion (15.–18. Jahrhundert)/ Lithuania and Ruthenia: Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone (15th–18th Centuries)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007), 7–33; Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Provintsiia na perekhresti kul´tur: Doslidzhennia z istorii Slobids´koi Ukrainy* (Kharkiv: Kharkivs´skyi pryvatnyi muzei mis´koi sadyby, 2007); John Czaplicka, ed., "Lviv: A City in the Crossroads of Culture," special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 24 (2000); and Paulus Adelsgruber, Laurie Cohen, and Börries Kuzmany, *Getrennt und doch verbunden: Grenzstädte zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1772–1918* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011).

[12] Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds., *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Christoph Mick, *Kriegserfahrungen in einer multiethnischen Stadt: Lemberg 1914–1947* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010); Mick, "Nationalisierung in einer multiethnischen Stadt: Interethnische Konflikte in Lemberg 1890–1920," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 40 (2000): 113–46.

[13] Barbara Skinner, "Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy," *Slavic Review* 64, 1 (2005): 88–116.

cultural ramifications."[14] Unfortunately, Kohut's book misses such insights, as Skinner's article is not even mentioned there.

Despite these shortcomings, *Making Ukraine* represents a serious contribution to the history of Ukrainian elite culture. Kohut prefers the traditional view of Ukraine as a heartland and not as a borderland, but this does not make his study a piece of nationalistic propaganda.[15] On the contrary, his story is free of teleological, nation-focused interpretations. It is full of valuable insights into cultural continuities and interruptions, and provides well-balanced judgments.

Viktor Brekhunenko's recent book on Ukrainian Cossacks commences exactly where Kohut´s interpretation ends. The author's focus is on borders and borderlands, specifically the so-called "Cossack belt"—the region of the Bug, Dnieper, Don, Volga, and Terek rivers in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries. The application of Frederick Jackson Turner's thesis to the concept of Europe's steppe frontier is not new to historiography on Russia.[16] Recently, however, this approach has received new life in studies of early modern Cossackdom.[17] Brekhunenko brings this scholarship to a new level, offering a general overview of the "conflictual and nonconflictual contacts of the Cossack communities" with neighboring states (14). He suggests the existence of three "civilizational models—European, Asian, and the so-called Muscovite version of the East"—as competing structures that contributed to the formation of Cossackdom. Brekhunenko describes Cossack contacts

[14] Ibid., 115.

[15] Robert Pyrah, "From 'Borderland' via 'Bloodlands' to Heartland? Recent Western Historiography of Ukraine," *English Historical Review* 129, 536 (2014): 145–49.

[16] William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). For applications to Russia, see Mark Bassin, "Turner, Solov´ev, and the 'Frontier Hypothesis': The Nationalist Signification of Open Spaces," *Journal of Modern History* 65, 3 (1993): 473–511; Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Alfred Rieber, "Changing Concepts and Constructions of Frontiers: A Comparative Historical Approach," *Ab Imperio,* no. 1 (2003): 23–46; Andreas Kappeler, "Iuzhnyi i vostochnyi frontir Rossii v XVI–XVIII vekakh," *Ab Imperio,* no. 1 (2003): 47–64.

[17] Brian B. Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Lepiavko, *Velykyi kordon Ievropy;* Dmitrii Sen´, *Kazachestvo Dona i severo-zapadnogo Kavkaza v otnosheniiakh s musul´manskimi gosudarstvami Prochernomor´ia (vtoraia polovina XVII–nachalo XVIII v.)* (Rostov-on-Don: Izdatel´stvo IuFU, 2009); Christoph Witzenrath, *Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725: Manipulation, Rebellion, and Expansion into Siberia* (London: Routledge, 2007).

with the Christian and Muslim worlds in the period before the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. Based on abundant sources from the repositories of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, and Austria, his study covers an immense territory and tells a story of Cossacks' interaction with their neighbors. In contrast to Kohut's focus on nation and state building and Russian–Ukrainian relations, Brekhunenko is mostly interested in Cossack politics, rituals, transfer, and strategies for conflict resolution. His material is organized in four thematic blocks: the genesis of Christian Cossackdom; the ethic and social "codes" of the Cossacks; Cossacks and the Christian world; and Cossacks and their Muslim neighbors.

Brekhunenko affirms the existence of the "frontier's edge" (the Cossack enclaves) along the Christian–Muslim border (43–44). This flank, according to Brekhunenko, eventually tended to build structures that were independent of the centers of power. This comment particularly applied to the Volga, Don, Terek, and Yaik Cossacks (to a lesser extent, also their Ukrainian counterparts) even after the "closing of the border" at the end of the 17th century (89).

One of the most interesting questions that Brekhunenko addresses in this monograph involves the coexistence of various religious groups in Cossack communities. Brekhunenko affirms that until the early 17th century the leadership of the Catholic hetman over the predominantly Orthodox Ukrainian Cossacks was not a paradox (140–42). This point evidently contradicts the established historiographical stereotype about the Orthodox Cossacks as ardent fighters with the Catholic Poles. He also goes into detail analyzing facets of Cossack life, such as the division of the Don and Zaporizhia Tatars and the fate of Cossack children born of unions with Muslim women. For Brekhunenko, much of Cossack tradition, including its democratic forms of government, originated in the nobiliary traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and was later enriched by the so-called "borderland virus" modes of "free life on the border" (187).

Brekhunenko also deals with forms of cooperation and competition with neighboring Christian rulers. He is right to insist that the Cossacks were ambivalent in their policies toward Polish kings, magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and Muscovite tsars. Within the traditions of early modern polyvassalage practiced by frontier communities, simultaneous obedience to different rulers or frequent changes of affiliation represented a means of survival, not a betrayal.[18] With regard to Cossacks specifically, this behavior was particularly obvious during the Muscovite Time of Troubles

[18] This problem has been recently addressed by Taras Tchuchlib in *Sekrety ukrains'koho polivasalitetu: Khmel'nyts'kyi—Doroshenko—Mazepa* (Kyiv: KMA, 2011), 13.

(1598–1613). Brekhunenko scrutinizes activities by the Ukrainian and Don Cossacks on the side of the Polish king against Muscovy several times in this chapter. He traces differences among Cossack groups: for the Ukrainians such raids offered the possibility to gain profit from the unstable situation, whereas the Don Cossacks aimed at putting their "Cossack-centered" tsar on the Muscovite throne (239, 320).

Another research problem connected with Cossack identities and political loyalties relates to the question of Ukrainian–Russian unity. To what extent did the Muscovite version of building these relations converge with Cossack ambitions and political tactics shortly before the Khmel´nyts´kyi uprising? Brekhunenko draws a sharp dividing line between the ideologies and the real politics of both parties. Here his version of Cossack history perfectly complements Kohut's book. The *Synopsis* and other writings by 17th-century Kyivan clerics "were not more than an exaggeration, if not a conscious tactic, aimed at recognition of the Orthodox hierarchy's rights." Brekhunenko is right in tracing discrepancies between the intentions of the Kyivan Orthodox hierarchs and the political tactics of the Cossacks themselves. Orthodox church leaders wanted to present the Cossacks as symbols of a fight for the "true faith" against the Tatar and Turkish threat (first declared in the 1620s) and the Polish-Lithuanian Catholic Church (from the second half of the 17th century). For that reason, they also urged for the Cossacks' union with Muscovy.[19] By the 1630s, however, Moscow already "did not believe in the reports of Cossacks' willingness to submit to the tsar." According to Brekhunenko, the Cossacks "demonstrated situational tactics in relations with Moscow," as well as with other rulers (344).

The last chapter of Brekhunenko's book aims to deconstruct one of the strongest myths about Cossacks—their role in the fight against the "Muslim threat." In considerable detail, Brekhunenko deals with questions of cooperation and confrontation across the border. He describes the role of the Cossacks as the greatest supplier of hostages on the Black Sea slave market (396) and recounts how the abovementioned Don Tatars took an active part in the Cossack raids against their Muslim neighbors (418). The "elasticity of the border" presumed that the Cossacks did not construct a "Tatar, a Turk, and a Nogai as an 'enemy' " (445). Analyzing the phenomenon of the *poturchentsy*—Cossack defectors to the Muslim side—Brekhunenko points to possible parallels with the early modern Croatian/Turkish border. This

[19] Liliya Berezhnaya, " 'Kazatskii bastion 17 veka'—vzgliad snaruzhi i iznutri," in *Religion und Integration im Moskauer Russland: Konzepte und Praktiken, Potentiale und Grenzen. 14.–17. Jahrhundert*, ed. Ludwig Steindorff (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2010), 265–96.

might be a fruitful perspective for further research about common patterns and peculiarities in the history of military frontier communities along the Christian–Muslim border.[20]

There is some difficulty, however, with the author's description of his main hero—the Cossack. Brekhunenko switches between a monumental figure and a group lacking individual features. His image of Cossacks is impersonal and faceless. The reader does not learn much about the individual fates of Cossack representatives or their changing life strategies. Speaking about Cossacks, Brekhunenko describes group policies in the variety of its forms, but he misses the chance to illustrate the story with at least some biographies.

Even so, *Kozaky na stepovomu kordoni Ievropy* is an important book that picks up on several crucial aspects of Cossack history and will hopefully stimulate further comparative research in this field.

Cossack political strategies are also the focus of Tat´iana Tairova-Iakovleva's research on Ivan Mazepa and the Russian Empire. This is not the first study of Mazepa's life and political career written by Tairova-Iakovleva. Back in 2007, she released a monograph in the popular Russian book series *Zhizn´ zamechatel´nykh liudei* (Lives of Remarkable People).[21] That was the same year that Tairova-Iakovleva discovered a portion of Mazepa's famous archive, which was presumed to have been destroyed during the sacking of Baturyn by the Muscovite army in 1708.[22]

In her new book Tairova-Iakovleva takes issue with both the historical mainstream in Russia and the Ukrainian nationalist historical conception of Mazepa's alleged anti-Russian attitude. She argues that Mazepa made a great contribution to building the Russian Empire as one of the chief advisers to Peter the Great and as an outstanding ruler of the Hetmanate (11). The title of her book signals this approach, for Tairova-Iakovleva places the term

[20] There is an abundant literature on this topic. See the bibliography in Wendy Bracewell, "Frontier Blood-Brotherhood and the Triplex Confinium," in *Constructing Border Societies on the Triplex Confinium (1700–1750),* ed. Drago Roksandić and Nataša Štefanec (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 29–46. Unfortunately, Brekhunenko does not acknowledge these insights.

[21] Tat´iana Tairova-Iakovleva, *Ivan Mazepa* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2007).

[22] Tairova-Iakovleva has published a list of the found documents, with commentary, as a separate volume: *Getman Ivan Mazepa: Dokumenty iz arkhivnykh sobranii Sankt-Peterburga,* no. 1: *1687–1705 gg.* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel´stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2007). In 2008, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko awarded Tairova-Iakovleva the Order of St. Olga (Third Class) for these publications (http://for-ua.com/ukraine/2008/02/20/170116.html, accessed 13 October 2014).

"betrayal" in quotation marks and hints at the ambiguity of relations between Mazepa and Peter, which cannot be reduced to the "loyalty–betrayal" dichotomy.

Tairova-Iakovleva wants to impart to her readers the idea that the story of changing sides in the Great Northern War was not just a decision to please personal ambitions but rather the result of an inevitable clash of two state-building projects: that of the autonomous Hetmanate, supported by Mazepa; and that of the Russian Empire, reinforced by Peter. In this way, Tairova-Iakovleva agrees with the major postulates of Kohut's book. Yet her approach to the problem is different. While Kohut analyzes mostly elite perceptions in historical writings, Tairova-Iakovleva scrutinizes the personal relations between rulers. Her book also complements Brekhunenko's study and extends his findings, since it presents individual biographies—those of Mazepa himself, as well as the Cossack elders [*starshina*]). Moreover, Tairova-Iakovleva's biographies include passages about the emotional and physical state of her heroes, who love, hate, and suffer from chronic diseases.

But it seems that Tairova-Iakovleva's main goal is not to deliver a "light version" of scholarly biography but to deconstruct historical myths about Mazepa's life. To give just a few examples: Tairova-Iakovleva describes Mazepa's relations with Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, who supposedly fell victim to a false denunciation written by Mazepa and other Cossack *starshina*. After a detailed analysis of the original document, she concludes that Mazepa was not the one who initiated and composed the denunciation letter. She discerns the influence of the Muscovite boyar Vasilii Golitsyn behind the whole affair (51). The popular story of Mazepa bribing Golitsyn to advance his career is similarly criticized by Tairova-Iakovleva, who regards such gift giving as an accepted norm in pre-Petrine Russia. Yet the question of corruption and bribery in Muscovy deserves a more complex interpretation than Tairova-Iakovleva provides. The notions of *mzda* and *posul*, which described bribery, did exist in Muscovite society and indicated a crime.[23] The question of how Mazepa's gift of 10,000 rubles was judged by contemporaries is yet to be answered. This is one example where Tairova-Iakovleva's arguments against historical myths are not sufficiently supported with relevant sources.

A similar example of Tairova-Iakovleva's attempts to deconstruct historical mythology relates to Mazepa's participation in the Naryshkin coup d'état in 1689. According to Tairova-Iakovleva, Mazepa, with a 500-person

[23] Vadim Volkov, "Patrimonialism versus Rational Bureaucracy: On the Historical Relativity of Corruption," in *Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s,* ed. Stephen Lovell, Alena Ledeneva, and Andrei Rogachevskii (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 35–47.

escort in Moscow, guaranteed Peter's victory against his sister Sophia and her favorite, Golitsyn.[24] To support this statement, she mentions copperplates featuring Sophia as an almighty tsarina, which were ordered by the Muscovite nobleman Fedor Shaklovity from the Ukrainian painter Leontii Tarasevych, an enterprise that she believes had Mazepa's backing (70). If true, Mazepa's contribution to a gift for the tsarina might well have appeared to Peter as a sign of opposition, yet after Peter's victory the Ukrainian hetman returned home safe and sound. For Tairova-Iakovleva, this is proof of a previous agreement between the hetman and the tsar. She may be right in her assumption, taking into account the fact that the painter Tarasevych also managed to get back home unharmed.[25] Was it due to Mazepa's support or just luck? There is no clear answer to this question. The vulnerable point in Tairova-Iakovleva's argumentation in this case is the lack of proof of Mazepa's involvement in the copperplates' production. She provides no documents to support her case, which weakens her general argument.

Tairova-Iakovleva's disposition to fight with the imperial master narrative—which presupposes that Ukraine was (and is?) an integral part of Russia—is noticeable across the whole book. This orientation imparts a polemical taint to the narration, which is hardly acceptable in a scholarly work. Still, *Ivan Mazepa i Rossiiskaia imperiia* is a serious contribution to early modern East European history and a *must read* for anyone dealing with Ukrainian–Russian relations in that period. Tairova-Iakovleva presents the category of mazepists as an identity marker (as Kappeler, too, has suggested) without pejorative connotations, and she provides a strong argument for giving it more scholarly attention. To further strengthen this point, one could suggest that the events described also signified the transformation of the Hetmanate from an autonomous polity into an imperial borderland. The fact that this transformation occurred along the steppe frontier of all Europe is confirmed by other recent studies, including that of Kohut and Brekhunenko.[26]

[24] Tairova-Iakovleva has proposed this idea before (Tat´iana Tairova-Iakovleva, "Priiatel´ getmana-zlodeia: Kak Mazepa Petra k vlasti privodil," *Rodina,* no. 11 [2007]: 26–31). Several Russian historians have objected to it: "Obsuzhdeniie monografii."

[25] Dmytro Stepovyk, *Leontii Tarasevych i ukrains´ke mystetstvo barokko* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1986), esp. 122.

[26] For instance, Brian Boeck argues for the transformation of the Don region from frontier to imperial borderland at this time (*Imperial Boundaries,* 134–58).

With Kappeler's thesis on Ukrainians in the Russian Empire in mind, it is possible to trace both continuities and shifts in recent historiography on early modern Ukraine. All three books reviewed here deal with the problems of both political loyalties and the ethnic, estate, and social affiliations of early modern Ukrainians in Muscovy and the Russian Empire. Each of the studies employs Kappeler's thesis in its own ways. Kohut interprets the *maloross* and mazepist categories in a manner similar to Kappeler, yet he insists on the existence of the Ruthenian (early modern Ukrainian/Belorussian) nation as a direct predecessor of modern Ukraine.

Brekhunenko also operates with the notions of "Ukraine" and "nation" while addressing the complexities of imperial projects. In contrast to Kappeler and Kohut, he situates his research within the scholarship on borderlands and approaches the transformation of the frontier region into the political entity of the Hetmanate from a comparative perspective.

Tairova-Iakovleva's study follows and unwraps Kappeler's argument in several ways: it demonstrates the flexibility of ethnic hierarchies within the Russian Empire, as well as the complexity of 18th-century political and sacral languages and the contemporary meaning of terms such as "political loyalty" and "betrayal." Yet Tairova-Iakovleva's mazepists differ from those in Kappeler's and Kohut's interpretations. In her view, the most crucial aspect for Mazepa was not his Ruthenian/Ukrainian national identity in juxtaposition to imperial loyalty, but the Cossack (borderland) traditions of polyvassalage.

The studies reviewed here reveal a significant pluralization of perspectives in early modern Ukrainian historiography. Borderlands, multiple identities, and state building are of major interest. Following this perspective might be a fruitful field for further research.

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