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ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS IN THE RURAL UKRAINE

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

A UNIQUE OCCASION FOR OUTSIDE OBSERVATION of Soviet local administration arose when the German forces invaded the USSR in 1941. While they generally appear to have devoted little study to this aspect of the Soviet system, German military authorities did compile extensive information on administration in nine predominantly agricultural Ukrainian *rajons*. Analysis of these reports provides detailed statistical data on the Soviet administrative apparatus in what was probably a typical area of the Ukraine.¹

The constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937, provides for the following departments of *rajon* administration:

| | | |
|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Roads | Agriculture | Finance |
| Public Health | Social Security | Planning Commission |
| Public Education | Trade | Cadres Sector |
| General | | |

The constitution provides that additional departments of Municipal Economy and Local Industry may be formed in *rajons* where needed, but apparently these departments did not exist in the *rajons* discussed in this study.²

¹ The reports used in this study, compiled by an area headquarters of the Army Rear Area, are headed as follows:

Feldkommandantur (V) 248, Gruppe V, Verwaltung, "Bericht ueber die im Rayon [name of *rajon*] vorgefundenen Verwaltungsverhaeltnisse," [date].

No detailed citation of these reports will be made in this study, since (unless otherwise indicated) all information applying specifically to the *rajons* considered is drawn from them. The writer is grateful to the Department of the Army for permission to use notes on this document series.

² Article 73 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR in *Konstitucii Sojuza SSR i sojuznykh respublikh s prilozeniem polozhenija o vyborakh v verkhovnyj Sovet SSSR* (Moscow, 1937). The following table, based on the German reports, indicates the size and predominantly rural nature of the *rajons* studied:

| Area and Population | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| Rajon | Total Area (sq. km.) | Total Population | Population of Largest Town |
| Dikan'ka | 816 | 43,000 | 5,300 |
| Kishen'ki | 800 | 42,000 | 5,500 |
| Kozel'shchina | — | 49,000 | 3,800 |
| Kotovka | 674 | 40,000 | 4,400 |
| Nekhvoroshcha | 630 | 30,000 | 4,000 |
| Novo Sanzhary | 1,040 | 58,000 | 4,200 |
| Oposhnja | 526 | 37,600 | 10,000 |
| Poltava | 1,220 | — | — |
| Reshetilovka | 1,036 | — | 5,500 |

As is frequent in the Soviet administrative system, the departments of the *rajon* administration have a dual subordination: to the corresponding department of the next highest territorial administrative division (the *oblast'*), and to the executive committee elected by the *rajon* soviet (council). In theory, then, the departments of the *rajon* administration discussed in this section are sharply distinguished from the agencies described in the following section, which Soviet administrative law does not directly subordinate to the *rajon* authorities.³ In practice, this distinction is blurred because of the power of the higher levels of all administrative departments to issue directives covering the most important aspects of activity of their counterparts at the *rajon* level. Moreover, the directing role of the Communist Party, a highly centralized structure, assures conformity on major policies; the Party also exercises enormous influence over the *rajon* administration as a whole through its selection, or at least confirmation, of the most important administrative personnel. Nevertheless, there appears to be sufficient distinction between the *rajon* departments and the other administrative agencies in the *rajon* to justify treating the two groups separately.

Unfortunately, the *rajon* budgets, which would provide a good index of the overall scope of the departments of the *rajon* administration, are with one exception unavailable. The planned outlays de-

TABLE 1
Planned Budget Expenditures (Kishen'ki Rajon, 1941)

| | |
|---|------------------|
| Education, schools, library, etc. | 2,200,000 rubles |
| Health | 630,000 |
| Current outlays for employees and other expenses of the communes* | 360,000 |
| Agricultural work of all sorts, including veterinary services† | 320,000 |
| Road construction (aside from work furnished by the individual village communes) | 50,000 |
| Outlays for newly-formed industries (wagon factory and felt shoe factory) | 40,000 |
| Total | 3,600,000 |

* The descriptions given here are exact translations of the German report, though the items have been rearranged for convenience in descending order of importance. Possibly this item is meant to include expenses of administrative departments other than those listed separately, as well as the expenses of the communes (village soviets). The same report stated that the expenses of the Planning Commission and the Finance Department were not included in the *rajon* budget, however.

†Almost certainly not including MTS outlays which are included in separate budgets.

³ The legal nature of the "dual subordination" is, however, a complicated matter, with considerable variation from department to department. See especially A. A. Karp, "Pravovoe polozhenie ispolkoma rajonnogo soveta deputatov trudjashchikhsja," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 11 (1949), pp. 19-34.

scribed in the report on Kishen'ki *rajon* are probably typical, however, since, it was average in population and area.

General Department

The General Department of the *rajon* administration is concerned primarily with the overall direction of local government. It is essentially the staff of the principal administrative officials of the *rajon*—the chairman, the deputy chairman, and the secretary, who together with the heads of the most important departments constitute the *rajon* executive committee.⁴ In the *rajons* under consideration, the General Department frequently contained the following officials: one to three administrative inspectors (of commune and *kolkhoz* administration); a supervisor of accounts and records, sometimes with an assistant; an inventory director; an executive secretary in addition to the secretary of the *rajon* executive committee; and one or more clerks. In addition to these officials, whose roles in the overall administrative process are fairly obvious, there were several other specialized officials in at least some of the *rajons*. One was a cadres specialist, who apparently constituted the Cadres Sector provided for in the constitution. Another was a planning specialist, who was evidently the only permanent staff member of the Planning Commission.⁵ A third was the director of physical training, who, it was noted in the reports, was often the secretary of the *rajon Komsomol* (League of Communist Youth). In the seven *rajons* for which detailed descriptions of the staff in the General Department are available, the total number of officials (exclusive of charwomen, chauffeurs, messengers, and "auxiliary personnel" etc., but including the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and clerks) varied from five to eleven, but eight or nine seems to have been typical.

Finance Department

Among the most important departments of the *rajon* administration is the Finance Department, the tasks of which, according to a recent Soviet treatise on administrative law, are the supervision of the budget, state receipts, taxes, and levies on the population.⁶ In addition, the *rajon* Finance Department supervises the work of the

⁴ Formally entitled "executive committee of the *rajon* soviet of workers' deputies."

⁵ This commission, though constitutionally a part of the *rajon* administration, is part "of a single system of the planning organs" subordinated "directly to the Gosplan of the USSR" (V. A. Vlasov, *Sovetskij gosudarstvennyj apparat: osnovnye principy organizacii i dejatel'nosti* [Moscow, 1951], p. 163).

⁶ S. S. Studenikin, V. A. Vlasov, and I. I. Evtikhiev, *Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo* (Moscow, 1950), p. 428.

rajon branches of the savings bank and the state insurance system.⁷ The local branches of the State Bank (Gosbank), on the other hand, while ultimately subordinate to the Ministry of Finance (in 1941 the People's Commissariat of Finance) of the USSR, are organized on the basis of strict subordination to the Gosbank of the USSR; consequently, they will not be considered in this section.⁸

The importance and extent of the work of the *rajon* Finance Department is indicated by the large number of officials employed in this branch of administration in the *rajons* for which information is available.

TABLE 2
Finance Department Staff

| | | | |
|---------------|----|--------------|----|
| Dikan'ka | 32 | Nekhvorosha | 23 |
| Kishen'ki | 27 | Oposhnja | 30 |
| Kozel'shchina | 46 | Poltava | 41 |
| Kotovka | 29 | Reshetilovka | 14 |

Except in the case of Reshetilovka, where the number of tax collectors reported is probably much too low, the totals appear to be fairly closely correlated to the populations and areas of the *rajons*.

About half of the total personnel appears to have consisted of tax collectors, with the average *rajon* having about sixteen officials in this category. In addition, a large proportion of the remaining personnel was concerned with taxes. Each *rajon* had a chief tax inspector and several additional tax inspectors, usually including an inspector for direct taxes, an inspector for the turnover tax (a kind of producers' sales tax), and tax inspectors for the rural districts. There was also a special bookkeeper for taxes.

The central administration of the Finance Department included the director, a chief bookkeeper (the deputy director), an assistant bookkeeper, a cashier, an auditor, and one or two clerks or secretaries. There were also a few officials concerned with supervision of the budgets of state institutions: in most cases, a budget inspector (three in Poltava *rajon*), and sometimes one or two budget bookkeepers.

The following schedule of annual tax collections in Reshetilovka *rajon* (including only taxes in which the *rajon* administration shared) suggests the scope of the tax collection function. The tabulation below does not include the very important turnover tax, which in Kozel'shchina *rajon* amounted to 5,494,000 rubles.⁹

The considerable importance of the state insurance system, even

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 429.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

⁹ The year during which these taxes were collected was not reported, but it was very likely 1940.

TABLE 3
Tax Collections (*Reshetilovka rajon*)

| | |
|--|------------------|
| Income tax on individual collective farm members | 2,700,000 rubles |
| Income tax on collective farms | 2,300,000 |
| Levy for education and health | 730,000 |
| Cultural tax | 408,000 |
| Income tax on salaries and wages | 162,000 |
| Turnover tax (non-commercial items) | 41,000 |
| Building tax (paid to <i>rajon</i> on basis of land occupied by enterprises) | 16,000 |
| Land rent (paid to town of Reshetilovka by enterprises) | 12,000 |
| Tax on privately owned animals and means of transportation | 11,800 |
| Market tax (on sales in collective farm market) | 11,000 |
| Income tax on non-agricultural co-operatives | 3,000 |

in these predominantly rural *rajons*, is indicated by the total of 200,000 rubles in annual premiums collected in Reshetilovka *rajon*. All major items of *kolkhoz* and state enterprise property had by law to be insured, either on the basis of assessed value, or according to a complicated scale of fixed rates per item. In order to carry out this work, the Finance Department of the *rajon* included an insurance inspector, and frequently a special insurance bookkeeper.

Agriculture Department

"There is no doubt," writes a recent Soviet student of the *rajon* administration, "but that the questions of *agriculture and procurement of agricultural products* constitute the most important branches of the activity of the executive committee of the *rajon* soviet of workers' deputies."¹⁰ Because this sphere of local administration is so important, it appears desirable to present the whole picture of agricultural organization, insofar as information is available in the German reports, without limiting the consideration to the organization and staff of the Agriculture Department itself. Moreover, since they were so intimately connected with local agricultural operations, a number of agencies not under the jurisdiction of the *rajon* executive committee will also be considered in this section.

As in all major agricultural regions of the USSR by 1941, the predominant form of farm organization was the *kolkhoz* (collective farm). The following tabulation indicates the very high proportion of the total area of the *rajons* studied held by the *kolkhozes* as cultivable land; it should be noted, however, that an additional part, in most instances probably about fifty percent of the *rajon* area, was held by the *kolkhozes* as woodland, meadow, or other uncultivable area.

Next in importance agriculturally to the land cultivated directly by the *kolkhozes*, in most of the *rajons* studied, were the household

¹⁰ Karp, *op. cit.*, p. 26. Cf. Lazar Volin, *A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture* (Washington, 1951), pp. 26-27.

TABLE 4
Kolkhoz Lands

| Rajon | Total Area (hectares) | Number of Kolkhozes | Cultivable Land in Kolkhozes | Average Area Cultivable Land per Kolkhoz |
|---------------|--------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| Dikan'ka | 81,603 | 73 | 52,250 | 716 |
| Kishen'ki | 80,000 | 63 | 35,000 | 556 |
| Kotovka | 67,400 | 35 | 47,200 | 1,349 |
| Nekhvoroshcha | 63,000 | 46 | 45,000 | 978 |
| Novo Sanzhary | 104,000 | 87 | 66,471 | 764 |
| Oposhnja | 52,576 | — | 36,698 | — |
| Poltava | 122,000 | 84 | 69,000 | 821 |
| Reshetilovka | 103,626 | 88 | 71,434 | 812 |

allotments left in the hands of individual families which were grouped in the collective farms. The information reported in this case is, unfortunately, much less complete. For Dikan'ka *rajon* the figure was 5,000 hectares; for Kotovka, 4,850; for Nekhvoroshcha, 4,120; and for Oposhnja, 4,210. In each instance, the household plots were one-tenth as extensive as the cultivable land in the *kolkhozes* proper.¹¹ While no exact information on the standard size of the household allotment is available for this area in 1941, it appears likely that it was one-half hectare.¹² Thus the *rajons* would have averaged about eight to ten thousand *kolkhoz* households, a reasonable figure in view of their populations (30,000-50,000), and the probable predominance of *kolkhoz* members in the total population.

In addition to the lands cultivated by the *kolkhozes* and their households, a relatively small portion of the agricultural area of most of the *rajons* studied was farmed by state farms, or *sovkhozes*, directed by the People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes, or Commissariats for specialized branches of agricultural production.

TABLE 5
Sovkhoz Lands

| Rajon | Number of Sovkhozes | Cultivable Land in Sovkhozes |
|---------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Dikan'ka | 1 | 1,510 |
| Kishen'ki | 3 | 4,000 |
| Kotovka | 1 | 4,850 |
| Novo Sanzhary | 1 | 1,300 |
| Oposhnja | none | none |
| Poltava | 7 | 26,000 |
| Reshetilovka | 1 | 5,878 |

¹¹ This is about the proportion of cultivable land in household allotments in the Ukraine and the USSR, if the average allotment was $\frac{1}{2}$ ha. (cf. figures in Volin, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49). The statement that household allotments constituted 2.3% of *kolkhoz* lands in Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance* (Stanford, California, 1949), p. 340, refers to the total area of the *kolkhozes* in the USSR, which included (in contrast to those in the *rajons* studied) large expanses of unploughed land.

¹² The USSR average was .49 ha. in the late thirties (Jasny, *op. cit.*, p. 341).

The available information on the *sovkhoses* indicates that their main function was to serve as model agricultural enterprises and testing stations, rather than as producers of specialized ("technical") crops. An agricultural technical school was attached to the *sovkhos* in Dikan'ka *rajon*. At the same time, however, seed-testing stations were also maintained on several of the *kolkhozes* (Poltava report).

As elsewhere in the Soviet Union where extensive farming is an important activity, the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), functioning under the Agriculture Department,¹³ were institutions of major importance in both agricultural activities and political and economic control. Unfortunately, the reports forming the basis for this study furnish comparatively little material on these institutions. The following tabulation gives some idea of their number and size, however (Table 6).

TABLE 6
Machine Tractor Stations

| Rajon | Number of MTS | Number of Tractors | Number of Combines |
|----------------|------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Kishen'ki | 2 | 109 | — |
| Kozel'shchina | 2 | — | — |
| Kotovka | 2 | 115 | 43 |
| Nekhvorooshcha | 2 | 84 | 44 |
| Oposhnja | 1 | 72 | — |
| Poltava | 2 | — | — |

The information on the staffs of the MTS is much more fragmentary. Those in Kishen'ki *rajon* were reported to have had a total of one hundred employees. In Poltava *rajon* there were nineteen agricultural specialists (agronoms) working in the two MTS stations; the two MTS in Kozel'shchina *rajon* are reported to have had eighteen agronomes, while the two in Kotovka *rajon* employed twelve agronomes. It should be remembered, moreover, that the most important category of workers in MTS operations, the tractor drivers, were paid in part by the *kolkhozes* and retained membership in them.¹⁴

Considerably more information is available on the staffs directly employed by *rajon* agriculture departments themselves. The total number of employees reported varies from twenty-three (Novo Sanzhary) to sixty-seven (Poltava), with most of the departments employing thirty to fifty. In addition to the director, the central office staff consisted of one or more statisticians, a bookkeeper, and one or two clerks or secretaries. An important group of employees was

¹³ On the relation of the *rajon* Agriculture Department to the MTS, see Volin, *op. cit.*, p. 59, and Alexander Vucinich, *Soviet Economic Institutions: The Social Structure of Production Units* (Stanford, California, 1952), pp. 63, 113, 120.

¹⁴ Vucinich, *op. cit.*, p. 118; Volin, *op. cit.*, p. 60; Jasny, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

concerned with assisting or checking the activities of the *kolkhozes*. It included one to four surveyors, whose duties were apparently to see that the household allotments were not extended at the expense of *kolkhoz* farmland, and perhaps to prevent the encroachment of one *kolkhoz* upon another's land. There were one or two bookkeeping inspectors or instructors to supervise the *kolkhoz* accounting systems. One or two construction specialists assisted the *kolkhozes* in building problems.

More directly concerned with agricultural activity was the chief agronom, who acted as deputy director of the department and was usually assisted by several specialized agronomists for fields such as fruit culture, insect control, seed diseases, vegetable culture, and grain culture. A forestry specialist was present at least in some of the more wooded *rajons* (Novo Sanzhary and Dikan'ka). The large veterinary staffs included a chief veterinary, usually with assistant veterinaries or veterinary inspectors for specialized work such as selection of breeding animals, fish raising, bee raising, care of horses, horned cattle, and game or fur-bearing animals. The veterinary staffs also included a chief veterinary inspector, assisted by four to twelve veterinary inspectors each assigned to a rural district; and up to seventeen veterinary *feldshers* (a *feldsher* in either human or animal medical practice is a kind of medical technician), assistant veterinary *feldshers*, and veterinary druggists. Most of this lower veterinary personnel was organized in "vetpunkts" or veterinary stations in the localities, or in "ambulatory" veterinary stations. In several *rajons* there were veterinary hospitals; the one in Oposhnja had a staff of one veterinary, two veterinary *feldshers*, two veterinary nurses, and other employees.

As noted previously, several of the *rajons* maintained seed-testing stations; these employed up to six persons each. Novo Sanzhary *rajon* contained a forestry institute with several employees.

The following table, though based on obviously incomplete data for several *rajons*, gives a fairly comprehensive picture of the most numerous categories of specialists supervised by the agriculture departments.

As the quotation at the beginning of this section suggests, Soviet authorities consider the procurement or supply of agricultural products for use by the state to be on the same plane of importance as their production. In the period under consideration, this task was delegated not to the Commissariat of Agriculture, but to the centralized (All-Union) People's Commissariat of Procurements, probably because the latter was considered less susceptible to local influences.

TABLE 7
Agronomists and Veterinary Specialists

| Rajons | Total Agronomists | Agronomists directly under Agriculture Department | Agronomists in MTS | Veterinarians and Veterinary Inspectors | Veterinary Feldshers and Druggists |
|---------------|----------------------|--|-----------------------|--|---|
| Dikan'ka | 6 | 1 | 5 | 5 | — |
| Kishen'ki | 11 | 3 | 8+ | 10 | 4 |
| Kozel'shchina | 18 | 4 | 14 | 10 | 16 |
| Kotovka | 16 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 16 |
| Nekhvoroshcha | 14 | 5 | 9 | 7 | — |
| Novo Sanzhary | 14 | 6 | 8 | 12 | — |
| Oposhnja | 10 | 4 | 6 | 8 | — |
| Poltava | 19 | — | 19 | 22 | 17 |
| Reshetilovka | 16 | 5 | 11 | 6 | 8 |

Statements in the Ukrainian Party press for this period frequently stress the importance of this commissariat and its local agents, which at the *rajon* level consisted of "plenipotentiaries for procurements."¹⁵ Little information is available on the role of this official in the *rajons* studied. The report from Oposhnja *rajon* notes the presence of an "inspector for quotas of the *kolkhozes*," while the report from Reshetilovka *rajon* refers to two inspectors "for collections." In both cases these agents are listed under the Agriculture Department, with which they would naturally have worked; probably they actually represented the Commissariat of Procurements.

Trade

The Trade Department had a very small staff. In the *rajons* for which it was reported at all, its personnel was confined to a director and a secretary. Probably most of the retail trade (other than the important *kolkhoz* market trade) was carried on by the co-operatives, with only supervision by this department.

Roads Department

While the Roads Department was far smaller than the Agriculture Department, its importance was considerable.¹⁶ Its permanent staff was small; apparently the average was about twelve. The staff included, in addition to the director, one or two office employees, such

¹⁵ See Burmystenko's speech in *Kolhosnyk Ukraïny*, July 5, 1939, p. 1.

¹⁶ The most important highways (those of "all-Union importance") were, however, under supervision of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs). The report on Reshetilovka *rajon* notes that the two strategic roads crossing the *rajon*, the Kiev-Poltava and the Reshetilovka-Kremenchug highways, were in this category. A road inspector was assigned to each 10-kilometer stretch of these highways, and a highway master to each 30-50 kilometers. Cf. Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, *op. cit.*, p. 377, which notes that highways of "all-Union" significance are under the Administration of Main Highways of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its local agencies.

as a bookkeeper; a chauffeur and a truck or tractor driver; and two or three road construction foremen. There were also occasionally specialists, such as an engineer or a bridge construction technician. Equipment was apparently very limited; the department in Novo Sanzhary had one 1½ ton truck; that in Oposhnja had a tractor.

The staff and equipment of the Road Department could be so limited because the task of this department was primarily supervisory, while by far the larger part of the actual work of constructing and maintaining the highway systems was carried out by labor furnished on a quota basis by the *kolkhozes*. In Novo Sanzhary *rajon*, for example, each *kolkhoz* furnished five or six men and a team; consequently the Roads Department there had 300 laborers and eighty teams at its disposal every day.¹⁷ According to the Poltava *rajon* report, the Roads Department was also able to draw on other *rajon* departments for specialists when these were needed to carry out its tasks.

Education Department

From the standpoint of the total number of persons employed, the Education Department was the largest in the *rajons* studied. By far the greatest number of these employees, of course, were teachers, as the following table indicates.

TABLE 8
Educational Systems
Number of Schools*

| Rajon | Complete Secondary (10-Year) | Incomplete Secondary (7-Year) | Elementary (4-Year) | Total Number of Teachers |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Dikan'ka | 6 | 14 | 20 | — |
| Kozel'shchina | 6 | 20 | 21 | 242 |
| Kotovka | 5 | 14 | 12 | 256 |
| Nekhvorošcha | 11 | 12 | 15 | — |
| Novo Sanzhary | 5 | 12 | 31 | 266 |
| Oposhnja | 4 | 10 | 21 | 302 |
| Poltava | 10 | 26 | 37 | 477 |
| Reshetilovka | 8 | 20 | 30 | — |

* In addition there were a few technical schools—one for textile weaving in Reshetilovka *rajon*, with 12 teachers and 45 students; and one for agriculture in Nekhvorošcha *rajon*. The latter, at least, was not under the Education Department but was controlled by an agricultural worker's trust in Poltava.

¹⁷ Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, *op. cit.*, p. 377, states that "kolkhoz members and individual peasants—men from 18 to 45 years of age and women from 18 to 40—are enlisted for work on the roads. Those so enlisted are required to work without pay six days per year and to furnish to the road authority the animal draft power and wagon transport means, and inventory belonging to them. On the recommendation of the administration, the *kolkhozes* organize permanent road brigades in order to facilitate work. The work of the permanent brigade is credited to the general plan of labor participation of members of the given *kolkhozes* in road construction."

For most *rajons*, no breakdown of the teaching personnel by type of school is available. In Poltava *rajon*, however, the apportionment was as follows: complete secondary, 161 teachers; incomplete secondary, 233 teachers; elementary, 83 teachers.¹⁸ There is, unfortunately, little data on the number of pupils; in Kotovka *rajon* the total was 4,950, giving a ratio of teachers to pupils of 1:16, while in Novo Sanzhary *rajon* there were 3,000 and the ratio 1:11.

In comparison to the large number of teachers, the central administrative staff of the Education Department was rather small. In Poltava *rajon* it numbered fourteen: a director, three inspectors, a bookkeeper, a statistician, an office manager, and seven clerks. This appears to have been the typical pattern; most *rajons* are reported to have had a director, two to four inspectors, a bookkeeper, one or more clerks, and sometimes a statistician. For Dikan'ka *rajon*, specialized inspectors are reported: a political inspector of cadres; an inspector for combatting illiteracy, in charge of adult elementary education; and an inspector of kindergartens.

Public Health Department

Next in size and importance among the *rajon* departments primarily concerned with the welfare of the population was the Public Health Department. In this case, too, the central staff was small. It was headed by a director, whom several of the reports noted was not trained in medicine, although in two *rajons* the directors were physicians. The deputy director was usually if not always a physician, and was in charge of health inspection.¹⁹ In most instances one to three other inspector-physicians are reported, frequently including a spe-

¹⁸ The three types of Soviet schools do not represent entirely distinct stages of the educational process, as do, for example, the American elementary, junior high, and senior high schools. The "complete secondary" school includes *all* ten grades of the standard Soviet school system, while the "incomplete secondary" school includes the first seven grades. Thus pupils in the first four grades may be enrolled in any one of the three types. Pupils finishing the first four grades in the elementary school, largely in the rural areas, transfer to one of the secondary types for further schooling.

The total number of schools (not including higher educational institutions but including technical schools not under the Commissariat of Public Education) in the Ukraine in 1941 was 29,999, with 6,543,000 students (Vlasov, *op. cit.*, p. 102). Since the total population was about 40,000,000, there was one school for about 1,300 population, as compared to one to about 900 in the *rajons* studied. There were about 230 students per school in the Ukraine as against 100 in Kotovka *rajon* and 50 in Novo Sanzhary *rajon*. The differences in ratios are probably due to the high proportion of small rural schools in the area studied.

¹⁹ See Studenikin, Vlasov and Evtikhiev, *op. cit.*, pp. 410 ff. on the role of the state sanitary inspection in the Health Departments. At the *oblast'* level, the state sanitary inspector, in addition to being deputy director of the Health Department, was himself directly responsible to the republic chief sanitary inspector. Probably a parallel arrangement prevails at the *rajon* level.

cialist for care of mothers and infants, and sometimes a health inspector. The central staff also included frequently one or more nurses and a *feldsher*. The office staff included a bookkeeper, plus in many cases a statistician, a secretary, and "auxiliary personnel."

Only a small portion of the total medical personnel in the *rajon* was included in the central staff, however. This is well illustrated by the following table on the distribution of hospital facilities.

TABLE 9
Hospital Facilities and Personnel

| Rajon | Hospitals | Beds | Beds per 1000 Population | Physicians | Total Personnel |
|---------------|-----------|------|-----------------------------|------------|--------------------|
| Dikan'ka | 3 | — | — | 3 | 52+ |
| Kishen'ki | 1 | 30 | 1 | 2 | 32 |
| Kozel'shchina | 3 | 125 | 3 | 3 | 150 |
| Kotovka | 2 | 120 | 3 | 3 | 76 |
| Nekhvoroshcha | 3 | 90 | 3 | 6 | 47+ |
| Oposhnja | 3 | 75 | 2 | 5 | 33+ |
| Reshetilovka | 2 | 120 | — | — | — |

As can be seen, the provision of hospital facilities was considerable; the ratio of beds to population is about 3:1000 in *rajons* for which information is available, except Kishen'ki, where the ratio is 1:1000. Kishen'ki is near the large city of Kremenchug, however, and may well have utilized the facilities there; likewise, the absence of reports of hospital facilities in Poltava *rajon* and the adjoining Novo Sanzhary *rajon* suggests that the Poltava city hospitals may have provided for the needs of these areas.

The hospitals reported were small and most were serviced by only one fully qualified physician. The total staff is very large, however, larger in many cases even than the above figures indicate, for they frequently do not include "auxiliary personnel." Most of the remaining personnel consisted of male medical attendants, midwives, nurses, and *feldshers*, in roughly equal numbers. Occasionally a dentist was included, or specialists in therapy or pediatrics.

The extent of medical facilities in the *rajons* studied is much greater than is indicated by a consideration of hospital facilities alone. Most of the *rajons* included a considerable number of "med-punkts," or stations for limited medical treatment in rural areas. Dikan'ka *rajon* had twelve, Oposhnja five, Kotovka eight. Each was directed by a *feldsher*, assisted by one or more nurses. Those in some *rajons* (Oposhnja, Nekhvoroshcha) were also each assigned a midwife; in Kotovka *rajon* (Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'*), on the other hand, the child delivery stations were separate, each staffed by a midwife and a nurse.

Probably of equal importance were the mobile medical units, usually numbering about four. Each was generally directed by a physician, who was assisted by a midwife, one or more nurses, and two to four *feldshers* and medical technicians.²⁰

Also important were two types of specialized units frequently found under the *rajon* health departments. One was the sanitary or disinfection station (reported for Novo Sanzhary, Oposhnja, Kotovka, Nekhvoroshcha, Kozel'shchina *rajons*), which was charged with combatting epidemic diseases by preventive medical techniques. The personnel seems to have averaged six, including sometimes a "sanitary physician"²¹ as well as *feldshers*, nurses, and specialists in vaccination. Several *rajons* (Novo Sanzhary, Reshetilovka, Oposhnja, Kotovka) also contained malaria-control stations staffed by two or more specialists whose principal duty was to study methods such as the drainage of swamps, which would reduce the prevalence of this disease.

The personnel of the various sections of the *rajon* Health Department is impressive in numbers; the average had probably well over one hundred concerned directly with medical care, not counting laborers, clerks, and other auxiliary personnel. It should be noted, however, that only a small number of this staff consisted of fully-qualified physicians; the report on Kozel'shchina *rajon* indicates that there were altogether only five, and it appears from the details given in the other reports that this must have been close to the average. Consequently, it would appear that the ratio of physicians to rural population was about one to eight to ten thousand, and that a very high proportion of what must have been rather profuse medical attention was provided by less-qualified personnel.²²

²⁰ This seems to have been the general pattern. In Kotovka *rajon* (Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'*), however, there was a very large mobile unit, including a surgeon, two therapeutic physicians, one physician specializing in venereal diseases, two *feldshers*, two nurses and a dentist. There was one additional mobile unit in this *rajon*, but no details are available concerning its staff.

²¹ According to Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, *op. cit.*, p. 411, the chief sanitary physician of the *rajon* is charged with regulation of sanitary conditions throughout the *rajon*.

²² This situation is in marked contrast to that in the urban centers. Even the small town of Kobeljaki (in Poltava *oblast'*) with a population of 12,000 had thirteen physicians attached to its 100-bed hospital and to the polyclinic (Feldkommandantur [V] 248, Gruppe VII [Verwaltung], "Bericht ueber die in der Stadt Kobeljaki vorgefundenen Verwaltungsverhältnisse," November 15, 1941). A Ukrainian nationalist source (*Krakivs'ki visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 3) maintains that there were 134 physicians in the city of Poltava even after German conquest. It seems clear that the ratio of physicians to population in the urban centers of the region studied here was far higher, probably in the neighborhood of one to one thousand, than was the ratio in the rural districts. No doubt, of course, the medical services of the urban centers were to some extent available

Social Security

The Social Security Department in the *rajons* studied was one of the smallest. In each case, where information is available, it consisted only of a director and one or two bookkeepers; the latter also acted as inspectors. The small size of this department is probably to be explained by the comparatively minor role of direct social security functions in the rural areas. A recent Soviet text on administrative law explains the functions of the social security system in general as follows:

- 1) Designation and payment of pensions
- 2) Arrangement of work for disabled persons who are able to perform some work
- 3) Provision of old-age homes and others necessary in special circumstances (homes for the disabled, boarding homes for the aged, etc.)
- 4) State direction of social organizations (the social insurance funds of the *kolkhozes*, the mutual insurance and mutual aid funds of the manufacturing co-operatives and the like).²³

Designation of pensioners, involving review of cases, is carried out by the *oblast'* Social Security Department and higher organs.²⁴ An old-age home was provided by the Poltava *oblast'* administration, in Kobeljaki; probably the *rajon* administrations were relieved of this and similar special social care. Apparently the principal remaining task, aside from purely financial administration, was supervision of the social welfare funds of the *kolkhozes* and other co-operatives, which are the principal sources of support for most aged or disabled members of these organizations.²⁵ The membership of these organizations included the vast majority of the population of the rural *rajon*.

to the inhabitants of the rural areas. Statistics on medical facilities and personnel for the Ukraine as a whole are as follows:

| | Total Number | Per 1000 Population |
|---------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Physicians | 30,000 | .75 |
| Feldshers | 42,000 | 1.05 |
| Medical technicians | 200,000 | 5.00 |
| Hospitals | 2,271 | .05 |
| Hospital beds | 128,000 | 3.20 |

All figures are for 1940, except that for *feldshers*, which is for 1941. L. Medved' (Minister of Health, Ukrainian SSR), "Na strazhe zdorov'ja trudjashchikhsja," *Pravda Ukrainy*, January 8, 1948, p. 2.

²³ Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

While the departments of the *rajon* administration account for most of the personnel of the local administrative apparatus, several of the most crucial functions are performed by the administrative agencies which are not subordinated to the *rajon* executive committee.²⁶ Unfortunately, the information provided in the German reports is much more fragmentary in regard to these agencies.

NKVD

In the case of the NKVD the Germans did make an effort to gather considerable information, doubtless because of the great importance of this agency in the Soviet system, and its possible use as a center for opposition to the German occupation authority.²⁷ The NKVD was a Union-Republic Commissariat, with a People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in Kiev nominally responsible to the government of the Ukrainian SSR. The lower territorial organs of the NKVD were not, however, responsible to the local soviet executive committees, but were solely responsible to the next highest echelon of the NKVD in the *oblast*.²⁸ The reports note that the pay records were kept at the higher headquarters to prevent the *rajon* administrative personnel from becoming acquainted with NKVD business.

Because the information available on the NKVD sections varies greatly, it seems best to present first the material on Nekhvoroshcha *rajon*, which is most detailed. In the NKVD central office in this *rajon* there was, in addition to the director, a cadres specialist, an incarceration specialist, an investigating officer, a typist, and three special sections: the "First Section" for major political crimes, the "Second Section" for civil questions affecting public affairs, and a "Third Section" for common crimes, each headed by a specialized officer.

The *milicija*, or police, was organized separately, but was completely subordinate to the NKVD headquarters.²⁹ The *milicija* had its own director, a deputy director, a director for the criminal section, a police instructor, two inspectors, a specialist for political crimes, and "auxiliary personnel." Routine police activities were carried on by a force of twenty-five policemen (apparently regularly employed staff) stationed in the *rajon* seat, while order in each rural area was maintained by "village policemen" (apparently a *sel'skij ispolitel'*, a sort

²⁶ For such agencies in agriculture, see the section on the Agriculture Department.

²⁷ See John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945* (New York, 1955), pp. 131, 139, on the role of the NKVD in anti-German underground and partisan activities in the occupied Ukraine. The Germans also desired information on police staffs because they found it necessary to set up local police authorities to handle routine matters.

²⁸ Cf. Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

of local constable nominated by the village soviet).³⁰ These non-professional policemen were supervised by three inspectors. In addition to these routine police arrangements, the *milicija* contained two special sections: one for administrative affairs, apparently concerned with investigation of crimes in state organizations, and the passport and report office, which controlled the movement of the population through the system of internal passports. The latter section, in addition to the director, included a record keeper.

The report for Nekhvoroshcha *rajon* outlined above fails to note two important sections of the NKVD administration: incendiary defense and registration. From information from other *rajons*, however, it is clear that these sections were present. In charge of incendiary defense was a chief inspector, whose duties were not only to supervise the fire-fighting organizations of the *rajon* but to maintain watch against fires started as sabotage.³¹ The registration section, on the other hand, was charged with routine duties in connection with the registration of vital statistics—births, deaths, marriages. Obviously, close control over such information was of concern to the NKVD. Apparently there was only one registration specialist on the NKVD staff, but of course he may have had the assistance of clerical personnel.

In other respects, the reports from the remaining *rajons* tend to correspond to that from Nekhvoroshcha concerning NKVD administration. There is less detail on the nature of the duties of the various officials, especially in the staff of the NKVD proper, but generally it is indicated that there were one to seven special officers in addition to the director, and a number of clerical workers. The organization of the *milicija* staff also appears fairly uniform, with five to eleven officials exclusive of inspectors and policemen. Inspectors vary from three to eight. There are unaccountably large variations in the numbers of policemen, from five to thirty for those in the *rajon* seat, and from eight to forty in the rural areas, though the smaller numbers in the latter instance may not include the village police. It seems fairly safe to conclude, however, that the total personnel under control of the NKVD in the average *rajon* was about fifty, exclusive of the village policemen. This does not, of course, take into account the secret

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

³¹ That the Soviet authorities were especially concerned with efforts of disaffected elements to burn crops is clear from the Soviet Ukrainian press of this period. See O. D. Balychev, Director of Anti-Incendiary Defense of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, "Doderzhyvatys' pravyl protypozhezhnoj okhorony," *Kolhosplynky Ukraïny*, June 23, 1939, p. 2. On the work of the incendiary defense section cf. also Studenikin, Vlasov, and Evtikhiev, *op. cit.*, pp. 286 ff.

agents of the NKVD, which several of the reports suggest were very numerous.

Courts

The basic unit of the Soviet court system, the usual court of original jurisdiction, is the people's court. While it is administratively controlled by the Ministry of Justice, according to Soviet law it is to act independently in carrying out its adjudications.³² Both the professional judge and the two "lay assessors" who participate with him in deciding cases are elected. The electoral district and jurisdiction of the court do not necessarily correspond to the territory of the *rajon*, however. Of the six *rajons* for which information is available, three (Oposhnja, Kishen'ki, and Nekhvoroshcha) each contained one people's court, while three (Novo Sanzhary, Kozel'shchina, and Reshetilovka) contained two each. In the *rajons* having only one court, it was located in the *rajon* seat; in Reshetilovka *rajon* both of the courts were located in the *rajon* seat, while in the other two having two courts, one court was located in the *rajon* seat, one in another town. The staff of the courts, in addition to the judge and assessors, usually included a marshal, a record clerk, and a secretary.

Closely connected with the court system is the college of advocates, composed of lawyers other than judges and the procuratorial staff, and available to act as defense counsel. The report for Kishen'ki *rajon* states that there was "usually" one lawyer in the *rajon*, while Kozel'shchina *rajon* is reported to have had two.³³

State Procurator

The procurator is not an official of the local administration, but is subordinate directly to the procurator at the next highest administrative level, and ultimately to the Procurator of the USSR.³⁴ The territory served by the procurator corresponds to the jurisdiction of the people's court. Thus there were reported two procurator's offices each in Novo Sanzhary, Kozel'shchina, and Reshetilovka *rajons*, one each in Kishen'ki and Nekhvoroshcha. In each case, the procurator was assisted by an investigating officer and sometimes a deputy procurator or a legal clerk, as well as one or two secretaries.

³² See Andrej Ja. Vyshinskij, *The Law of the Soviet State*, tr. by Hugh W. Babb, introd. by John N. Hazard (New York, 1948), pp. 521-22.

³³ The ratio of lawyers to rural *rajons* suggested by these reports corresponds to a report from a Ukrainian nationalist source in *Krakivs'ki visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 4, which states that there were a total of 250 lawyers in Khar'kov *oblast'* under Soviet rule, of whom 200 were in Khar'kov city. Thus, on the average, there would have been about one each in the rural *rajons*.

³⁴ On the role of the procurator see Vyshinskij, *op. cit.*, pp. 525-37.

State Bank

As previously noted, the branches of the State Bank are organized on a centralized system, directly subordinate to the State Bank of the USSR rather than to the local Finance Departments. In most of the *rajons* studied there was a branch of the State Bank; the number of employees varied from fifteen (Kishen'ki *rajon*) to twenty-six (Reshetilovka and Novo Sanzhary *rajons*), but no details were given on their duties.

Press

In reality the *rajon* press is under direct control of the Communist Party rather than the state administration,³⁵ although the typical *rajon* newspaper in the Ukraine was designated as the "organ of the *rajon* committee of the KP (b)U [Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine] and the *rajon* executive committee." Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine the rather small amount of evidence available on the press in these *rajons*. The paper in Novo Sanzhary *rajon* appeared three times per week, in an issue of 3,000 copies, and employed twelve persons. Those in Kishen'ki and Kotovka *rajons* also appeared three times a week; the paper in Kotovka was printed in 2,500 copies and employed eighteen employees, while the one in Kishen'ki had only twelve employees and 1,200 copies. The Dikan'ka press employed twelve, that in Kozel'shchina *rajon* six. There is no clear explanation for these variations, which bear little relation to differences in population; it is conceivable that they are an index to the extent of Party membership or activity.

Miscellaneous

There is a scattering of information on the operation of a number of state agencies, such as the post office, the telephone and telegraph system, the motion picture trust, and radio stations. The small amount available does not contain any significant data on the organization of these agencies or the size of their staffs; consequently, it is of little value to this study.

The data presented in this study, necessarily approximate in many instances, and in any case limited to a very small portion of the rural administrative system of the USSR, scarcely warrant very extensive generalizations. A number of the more general aspects of the information presented do appear worth noting, however.

While it is fairly clear that the general organization of *rajon* administration conformed to constitutional and legal prescriptions, be-

³⁵ Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 153-54, and Sidney Harcave, *Structure and Functioning of the Lower Party Organizations in the Soviet Union* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1954), p. 15.

cause of the numerous gaps in the German reports it is much more difficult to assess the degree of uniformity of minor aspects of organization. There were very marked differences from *rajon* to *rajon* in the number of personnel in specific classifications, and even from department to department. Some of these variations can be explained by differences in population or economic activity, but in other cases there is no close correspondence of these factors to differences in personnel reported. There is at least a suggestion that, within the prescribed organizational framework, the administrative apparatuses exhibited variations of considerable practical significance for the actual conduct and efficiency of the administration.

It is worth noting in this connection that the presence of a report on Kotovka *rajon*, Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'*, along with the eight Poltava *oblast'* *rajons*, affords some evidence on possible inter-*oblast'* as well as inter-*rajon* variation. In fact, few such variations appeared. To be sure, Kotovka *rajon* differed considerably in certain respects, especially in regard to agricultural organization, from the average Poltava *oblast'* *rajon*. These differences can be explained, however, by the more extensive grain culture prevailing in Kotovka *rajon*. The bordering Poltava *oblast'* *rajons* with a similar economy resemble Kotovka *rajon* in respect to agricultural organization more than they do the more northeasterly Poltava *oblast'* *rajons*. The only Kotovka administrative branch which appears to have had an organization clearly different from those in the other *rajons* is the Public Health Department, which had distinctive arrangements for providing medical services to the rural areas.

An important series of observations concern the nature and extent of the administrative "overhead" in the *rajons* studied. It is difficult to assess this overhead, for the imprecision arising from incomplete figures in the German reports on individual departments or categories of officials is compounded when one endeavors to arrive at totals for the entire apparatus. Moreover, it is difficult to define overhead in meaningful terms. If, however, one assumes that all personnel primarily engaged in directing, controlling, adjudicating, reporting, and record-keeping may be called "overhead" from the standpoint of the productive process, it seems reasonable to assign the entire personnel of the General, Finance, Trade, and Social Security Departments, the NKVD and *milicija*, the Procurator's office and the courts, and the State Bank to this category. A rough estimate of the average personnel of these agencies would be 110.³⁶ In addition, personnel of the Agriculture, Roads, Education, and Public Health De-

³⁶ Exclusive of the village policemen and, as noted below, laborers and "auxiliary personnel."

partments concerned primarily with duties such as those described above should be included, making a total of about 150, or perhaps one-half to one percent of the total labor force of the *rajon*.³⁷ Aside from policemen, this figure includes only "white-collar" personnel, or what the Soviet authorities would designate "intelligentsia," although a high proportion consisted of ordinary clerks. The considerable number of laborers, charwomen, and "auxiliary personnel" also constituted part of the overhead in any real sense, but there is insufficient information to form even an approximate estimate of their numbers. It should also be pointed out that the 150 "white-collar" workers of the *rajon* administrative agencies would be only a small part of the total personnel of this type working in the *rajon*; the manufacturing and co-operative organizations, branches of outside agencies such as the transportation systems, the motion picture trusts, undoubtedly employed many such persons, as did the Party apparatus, the MTS stations, the *sovkhozes*, and even the *kolkhozes*.³⁸

It is interesting to note that the administrative overhead, as defined above, was very considerably smaller than the number of personnel of a technical or professional nature, performing specifically nonadministrative duties, employed by the same group of departments. By far the largest group of this type consisted of teachers—about 300 per *rajon*. The total nonadministrative personnel of the Public Health Department, about 130, was next largest, while the average Agriculture Department employed about forty agricultural and veterinary specialists, aside from an average of 100 employees in the MTS, most of whom were undoubtedly nonadministrative. In numbers the Roads Department's engineering and mechanical technicians were inconsiderable, but they did perform an essential function providing technical guidance to the great mass of *kolkhoz* road laborers.

It is interesting to note—especially in connection with the medical and agricultural services—that the practice appears to have been to rely on large numbers of partially-qualified technicians guided by a few fully-trained personnel. The very large number of *feldshers*, druggists, midwives, and nurses in comparison to the five or six qual-

³⁷ The labor force of the average *rajon* of 45,000 population was probably in the neighborhood of 25,000. Cf. Warren W. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," pp. 107-8 in Abram Bergson, ed., *Soviet Economic Growth: Conditions and Perspectives* (Evanston, Ill., 1953).

³⁸ On the extensive *rajon* Party apparatus (i.e., permanently employed Party officials), see Harcave, *op. cit.*, p. 15; for a discussion of MTS overhead, see Vucinich, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-16, and Volin, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60; on *sovkhoz* overhead, see Vucinich, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-6; on *kolkhoz* overhead, see Jasny, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-37, Vucinich, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-83, and Volin, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.

ified physicians available in each *rajon* is perhaps the most clear-cut example of this practice. The high degree of specialization among agronomists and veterinarians (e.g., the bee specialist!) probably indicates that a similar system was employed in agriculture, with a few broadly-qualified men directing the activities of a number of narrowly-trained specialists. In addition, a considerable number of junior-grade or apprentice specialists were employed in agricultural activities.

Reliance on partially-trained technicians for routine work undoubtedly represented an economical use of trained manpower in a country where (in 1941 at least) this was a scarce resource. Probably, however, this practice did not arise entirely on rational grounds, but was due partly to the difficulty of inducing well-qualified specialists to forsake the amenities of urban centers for the frequently drab and coarse life of the Soviet countryside. Even if the predominance of semi-qualified technicians could be explained as a rational allocation of human resources, however, it obviously carried certain disadvantages of an administrative nature, aside from any decrease in the quality of services. It probably increased the size of the total administrative apparatus considerably above that which would have been necessary in a country with a higher proportion of fully-qualified technical personnel. Quite possibly some of the differences in number of personnel from *rajon* to *rajon* may be explained by an effort to make up for some deficiency by assignment of large numbers of additional technicians—the common Soviet practice of relying on quantity. The predominance of the semi-qualified probably also led to a certain rigidity of operation, and failure of the technical staffs to grasp the full implications of the problems they encountered.³⁹

As a whole, the German reports used in this study contain few revelations, but rather tend to confirm concepts of the Soviet apparatus derived from other sources. To the student of Soviet government, this is in many ways a satisfying result. At the same time, the very considerable amount of detailed information, scarcely obtainable from other sources, provides a more precisely defined picture of the rural administrative system and, it is hoped, will be of value in more generalized studies of Soviet administration.

³⁹ See Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 251, for the frequent Ukrainian nationalist criticisms of the lack of initiative of the "half-intelligentsia" in the administrative apparatus of the occupied areas. The following comments by a Soviet critic on agronomists in Makarov *rajon* (Kiev *oblast'*) are revealing: "Each of these agronomists rarely appears in the *kolkhoz* and is only interested in matters 'concerning his speciality'; he is not interested in the *kolkhoz* as a whole economy, he does not penetrate deeply into the economics of the *artel*. . . . Each agronomist frequently gave directions to the *kolkhoz* without knowing what another agronomist had recommended." (*Pravda*, December 16, 1940, p. 2).