CHAPTER SIX

# The Communist Party of Ukraine: From Soviet Man to East Slavic Brotherhood

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The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was founded in 1918, allowing its modern successor to celebrate its "eightieth anniversary" with great pride in 1998. After a short period when it was banned following the Ukrainian declaration of independence (1991–1993), the party quickly returned to become the largest in Ukraine—no longer enjoying a monopoly on power but winning roughly one-quarter of the seats at both the 1994 and the 1998 parliamentary elections. Only in the 2002 elections did the party suffer its first serious reverse. The CPU's early successes came despite it being one of the most unreconstructed successor parties in the entire post-communist world. Technically, the party is a "new" one, but it still bills its congresses in awkward duality: the "1st (29th)" in 1993 through to the "5th (33rd)" in 2000 and so on. This chapter attempts to give both a brief account of the party's original relative success and an explanation of its continuing reluctance to reform.

## Soviet History

Much of the subsequent history of the Communist Party of Ukraine was already encapsulated in the first three months of its existence. One historians' faction—largely advocates of a more "Ukrainian" party—has emphasized the importance of the party's first conference (*narada*) at Tahanrih in April 1918, where delegates from Kiev led by Mykola Skrypnyk originally established the party as "formally independent and equal" with the Russian Bolsheviks in Moscow.[1] It has

also celebrated the parallel tradition of Ukraine's uniquely indigenous rival communist parties, the Borot'bisty (the "Fighters," more properly the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party of Communist Fighters, 1918–1920), and the Ukapisti (the "Ukrainian Communist Party," 1920–1925), and argued that they were instrumental in helping steer the mainstream Communist Party toward its eventual choice of a Ukrainianization policy in the early 1920s.[2]

The modern-day Communist Party, on the other hand, argues that Tahanrih was only a tactical step enforced by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (a nominally independent party for a temporarily independent Ukrainian state), subordinated to the overriding importance of maintaining the (then necessarily secret) "unity of the party and the revolutionary forces of Ukraine and Russia" against the "shameful" forces of Ukrainian nationalism backed by the occupying Germans and the "foreign bourgeoisie."[3] It was in any case immediately superseded by the party's first formal congress (*z'izd*) in Moscow in July 1918, where east Ukrainians ensured that the would-be Ukrainian "party" would henceforth act not even as a filial but as part of "a single Russian Communist Party" or RCP (bolshevik) "in subordination for all general programmatic questions to Congresses of the RCP and in general political questions to the Central Committee of the RCP."[4]

Furthermore, whereas to many Ukrainians the suppression of the Ukapisti in 1925 heralded the eventual end of the Ukrainianization movement, the modern-day Communists have argued that the rival party's "self-dissolution" came about "not because of 'pressure' or 'persecution' from the RCP(b) and CP(b)U, as bourgeois nationalist authors have asserted then and now," but because "the Leninist nationality policy" (*korenizatsiia*) adopted in 1923 and the need for a united front against common enemies rendered the existence of "an obscure party of the village rabble and Ukrainian populism" no longer necessary (the CPU included a "b" for *bolshevik* in its title until 1953). In 2000 the party journal reprinted two articles it first published in 1925 (Skrypnyk's farewell eulogy "On Ukapism" and Ukapisti leader Andrii Richyts'kyi's homily to democratic centralism "Towards a United Party") that supposedly proved the point.[5]

Why so much history? The dilemmas facing Ukrainian Communists today are starkly reminiscent of the 1920s. A "right-wing" fringe seeks true independence for itself as a party and for Ukraine as a state, whereas the vast majority of the party has still fundamentally to adjust to either fact—even more than a decade after Ukrainian independence in 1991. The dispute overshadows all questions of socioeconomic policy or, more precisely, allows the mainstream successor party to subsume such questions in nostalgia for the Soviet era. In no small part this is because, even if the modern Communist Party has

a myopic view of the 1920s, of the two rival traditions it is more broadly representative of the party's subsequent history after the final defeat of the Ukrainianization campaign in the early 1930s. Even under the relatively flexible Petro Shelest, party leader from 1963 to 1972, the party followed in the wake of changes emanating from Moscow.[6] The Communist Party "of Ukraine" remained a constituent part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) right up until the very last days of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Although it had its own Politburo and Central Committee, it never adopted its own program or struck out on its own. In fact, it vehemently denounced the Lithuanian Communist Party for so doing in 1990. After the abolition of Article 6—the notorious guarantee of the Communist Party's "leading role"—in the Soviet constitution in 1990, the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice registered the party as the "CPU" on July 22, 1991, but—on the very eve of the August coup—the nationalist opposition was seeking to appeal the decision, as it claimed the party was still the CPSU and not the CPU.

The local regime never made any "preemptive strike." There were no roundtable negotiations with the opposition, no "transplacement" of regime.[7] Even when so-called national communists began to reach out to the former opposition, most were increasingly semidetached from the party. The CPU was therefore always an integral part of the "patrimonial communist" regime in the USSR and was always likely to pass on its culture of authoritarian statism, personalized and highly clientelistic faction politics, and *apparat* intrigue to any successor party.[8]

Echoes of the ideological ferment of 1917–1930 were eventually heard in 1989–1991. But as before, the vast majority of left-wing debate focused on the all-important national question—either the promotion of Ukrainian "sovereignty" (eventually independence) or opposition to it; there was almost no discussion of "social democratization" before 1991 that could carry any impetus into the independence period. Furthermore, Ukraine's "alternative" left traditions were largely revived outside of a party seemingly incapable of revisiting its own past. It was always the right (Rukh in 1989) or center (in 1990, when the local Democratic Platform gave up on its attempts to democratize the party from within) that left the party, which never had to face defections or new challengers to its left. The all-union conservative group Unity had a strong local presence but was tolerated within the party because its views were close to leadership sentiments.

The splits to the "right" left the party more conservative than ever and would-be reformers even more isolated. Oleksandr Moroz, the relatively pragmatic leader of the Communists' parliamentary group, called on the

leadership to "distance themselves from the center" (i.e., Moscow) in summer 1991.[9] Borys Oliinyk, a former adviser to Gorbachev who had also played a part in the foundation of Rukh, helped set up an initiative group named Fraternity to press for a properly parliamentary party committed to "building sovereignty, the defense of working people from an untamed market and achieving national [i.e., interethnic] accord." When rebuffed, he began to think out loud in the first half of 1991 about forming some kind of Ukrainian "Party of Social Justice."[10] These were isolated voices, however. The party leadership under Stanislav Hurenko was more interested in opposing Gorbachev by building links with hard-liners in Moscow.

It was only after the failure of the coup attempt in August 1991, during the very parliamentary debate that produced the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence (August 24), that Moroz promised "to take responsibility on [him]self for the organization of a Ukrainian Communist Party."[11] By then it was too late. The last official party plenum on August 26 declared that it "considers it necessary to take a decision on the full independence of the Communist Party of Ukraine";[12] but the presidium of parliament voted to suspend the party's activities on the same day and then to ban it completely on August 30. Even then, it was unclear if the plenum had actually declared the party's independence or only its intention to do so at a proposed emergency congress that was never to take place.

## Revival

It has been argued elsewhere that those successor parties that emerged as a result of a long initial process of transition through bargaining with opposition elites (Poland, Hungary) are more likely to play by the new rules of the new democratic game.[13] In Ukraine this failed to happen. The previous regime legacy and the internal balance of forces during the late Soviet "transition" made it likely that a conservative successor party would emerge.[14] Moreover, the sudden political rupture in August 1991 forced the Communist Party into a two-year hibernation period when it had no real need to make any compromises. Compromisers tended to join the new "Socialist Party of Ukraine" set up by Moroz in October 1991. Some adjustments were necessary to win reregistration for the Communist Party in 1993 but not many. By then the authorities in Kiev were preoccupied with general economic and political discontent that many thought would endanger the stability of the new state itself.

The Communist Party, moreover, did not completely disappear in August 1991.[15] Many nominal members of the Socialist Party were in reality marking

time pending a proper communist revival. A second faction was the semi-secret committee entrusted by the last plenum of the old party Central Committee "to represent [the party's] interests" during "the period of temporary suspension of the activity of the party structures of the CPU"—and of course to work to overturn that "temporary suspension."[16] A third group of more impatient activists formed a series of tiny ultra-left parties in 1991–1992, in particular the hard-line Union of Communists of Ukraine, which had strong links with its Russian equivalent and made much of the running in reforming a communist grassroots in late 1992 and early 1993.[17] Ultimately, however, the first and second groups were better placed to revive the workplace networks of the Soviet era that would prove the key to the party's future success.[18] Whereas the Union of Communists was prominent at the first key revival meeting, the March 1993 "All-Ukrainian Conference of Communists" in Donets'k, its members had largely been purged (as with their counterparts in Russia) by the time the CPU's official revival congress was held in the same city in June 1993. As the presidium of the Ukrainian parliament had declared in May that "citizens of Ukraine who share communist ideas may establish party organizations in accordance with the laws of Ukraine"—but stopped short of granting permission for the revival of the party of old—the assembly was rather awkwardly billed as the party's "1st (29th)."[19]

The new party was radical enough—in many ways even more radical than the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF).[20] It gritted its teeth in formal compliance with the new order, promising to "act within the constitution and the existing laws" of Ukraine; but the party's underlying message was clear to all. It attacked the legal basis of Ukrainian statehood as the two-stage "counterrevolutionary, antisocialist coup" of August 1991 and December 1991 and called for "the rebirth on a new and exclusively voluntary basis of a union of the fraternal peoples of the independent states formed on the territory of the USSR." It made a blanket condemnation of "the forcible capitalization of all spheres of life"—even though real (partial and only partially successful) economic reform in Ukraine only began in October 1994.[21] Still, although Ukrainian nationalists immediately called for the party to be banned, they failed to notice that the more radical agenda of the Union of Communists (the party to join with the Russian Communists and declare itself the legal successor of the CPSU, demand restitution of all CPSU "property" from the state, and call for the full restoration of the USSR) had already been put to one side. The Ukrainian Communists would always be caught in two minds, almost apologizing for not really being the local branch of the CPSU but not legally allowed to be such.[22] The new party made no attempt to claim

that it had become "more Ukrainian" or to reposition itself in the national communist traditions of 1917–1920 or the Soviet 1920s.

## Early Successes

It seemed the party did not need to. Soon after their revival in 1993, the Communists could once again claim to be Ukraine's largest party in membership terms, although an initial 130,000 was in no way comparable with the party of old—a peak of 3.3 million in 1989, down to 2.73 million in August 1991.[23] Nevertheless, membership crept up to 160,000 by January 2000. Only in the very late 1990s was the party overtaken in size by some of Ukraine's new "oligarchic" parties, such as the United Social Democrats, which had rather different motives for building a mass membership. However, Communist Party members were undoubtedly disproportionately elderly—67.6 percent were over fifty in 2000, and 45.1 percent were retired or unemployed.[24]

The Communists' electoral success was also fairly immediate. The party benefited from the preservation of the Soviet system of single-mandate voting for the parliamentary elections in spring 1994, which, while handicapping political parties in general, gave a comparative advantage to the party as the strongest contender in a weak field. In a highly fractured parliament, the Communists won ninety-five seats (28.1 percent of the total; only 338 of 450 constituencies were initially able to elect deputies); its nearest rival, Rukh, the main Ukrainian nationalist party, won only twenty-seven. The CPU could afford to "loan" six deputies to the Socialists and five to the Rural Party to help them form factions of their own (for which a minimum of twenty-five deputies was necessary). The Communists' initial starting strength was therefore eighty-four—still the largest faction by far.

The CPU, however, chose to sit out the presidential contest in summer 1994. The party had only been registered in October 1993; and most of its leaders, including new head Petro Symonenko, had only emerged onto the national stage as people's deputies in March. Moroz stood for the Socialists and won 13.1 percent, but this was far less than the total left vote for parliament (as the Socialists originally won another fourteen seats, and the Rural Party won eighteen, the left won 37.6 percent of the seats in all). An additional reason for remaining on the sidelines was that the Communists were prepared to pay almost any price to unseat first president Leonid Kravchuk, whom they detested for his role in the destruction of the USSR, and they backed his former prime minister Leonid Kuchma as the man most likely to achieve this aim.[25]

After a four-year farce with a quarter-empty parliament, the electoral law was changed for the next contest in 1998. Again, the Communists benefited from the new system—as in Russia 50 percent were now to be elected from single-mandate constituencies and 50 percent from a national party list. In the constituencies, the Communists slipped back, winning only thirty-eight out of 225 (16.9 percent). In the party list, however, they again easily outpaced their nascent rivals with an impressive 24.6 percent of the national vote, and 84 out of 225 seats (37.3 percent). Only one feature of the system, the adoption of a 4 percent rather than a 5 percent barrier, held the party back.[26] Overall, the party won 122 seats (27.1 percent)—largely a repetition of its performance in 1994. The Socialists won thirty-four seats in alliance with the Rural Party; Vitrenko's Progressive Socialists won sixteen. Rukh won forty-six seats, and four centrist "oligarchic" parties won a total of eighty-eight. In the consequent hung parliament, the Communists came close to securing the powerful position of chairman for Symonenko, who stood seven times in the protracted contest, coming closest on June 18, when he got 221 votes, only five short of the necessary majority. The eventual winner was Oleksandr Tkachenko of the Rural Party, a fellow traveler of the CPU. The Communists' Adam Martyniuk was appointed one of his two deputies, and Communists chaired six out of twenty-two parliamentary committees.

## Marking Time

The 1999 election was a different matter. "left bloc" unity disappeared, and nascent political divisions were painfully exposed, with the leaders of all the main left parties (now four in number) running as much against one another as against President Kuchma. Electability became a more obvious issue once, in their first winner-takes-all vote in independent Ukraine, the Communist electorate was revealed as stable but inherently limited.

In narrow party terms, the Communists could still claim to be the most successful left force. Symonenko fought his way through to the second round after winning 22.2 percent in the first (Kuchma won 36.5 percent)—although this was exactly the scenario that Kuchma had long sought to engineer to maximize his chances of reelection. Socialist leader Moroz won 11.3 percent; and Nataliia Vitrenko of the breakaway "Progressive Socialists" (see below) won 11 percent. Oleksandr Tkachenko, Moroz's successor as chairman of parliament and de facto head of the Rural Party, withdrew at the last moment in favor of Symonenko (he had been polling around 2–3 percent). Symonenko was easily beaten by Kuchma in the second round, by 56.2 percent to 37.8 percent.

The Communists were not really running for victory in 1999. The party had explicitly rejected the Socialists' idea of a left-center or "popular front" strategy in 1998–1999, refusing to consider entering any "coalition of political forces" with such different "class interests" and preferring to preserve its self-image as "the only remaining political force that openly and principally stands for the Socialist perspective."[27] Only in the weeks between the two rounds did the CPU leadership make any attempt to change course, when six other leftist candidates were persuaded to sign a joint declaration with Symonenko denying any threat of a "red revanche" (the others were Moroz, Tkachenko, and the minor candidates Yurii Karmazin, Oleksandr Bazyliuk, Volodymyr Oliinyk, and Mykola Haber—Nataliia Vitrenko being the one notable absentee). Symonenko brazenly but implausibly sought to compare himself to Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, whom "nobody would think to accuse of such a political dye" (redness). Symonenko also promised a coalition government, a voluntary renunciation of some presidential power, no Bolshevik methods of persecution, "the equality of all forms of property, and [strikingly] the promotion and support of the development of private industry." Equally striking was the statement that "the aim of the program is the building of a sovereign, independent, democratic and law-based state." We "will not," Symonenko pledged, "join any [new, post-Soviet] union, which limits this sovereignty or draws it into military conflict."[28]

A week before the election was obviously too late to make such sweeping changes—or at least, they did not carry the conviction or make the dramatic impact they would have earlier in the campaign. Moroz was a much more likely Ukrainian version of Kwaśniewski and had constantly stressed that only a center-left candidate, that is, himself, was electable.[29] Symonenko's 37.8 percent in the second round was considerably less than the combined left candidates' 45.1 percent in the first and even less than the 40.7 percent Gennady Zyuganov had won in Russia in 1996.

The only hint that some Communists were seriously addressing the electability issue came with rumors that leading members, such as Heorhii Kriuchkov (the main party ideologist and head of the parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense Issues), preferred to support Tkachenko, who was running on a more obviously East Slavic nationalist ticket, or back Moroz. After Moroz visited Moscow in September 1999, several newspaper reports claimed Zyuganov had leaned on Symonenko to withdraw in Moroz's favor.[30] Symonenko, however, stayed in the race for narrow party reasons, and the concessions made between the rounds were soon forgotten—at least by the party leadership, which preferred to blame its defeat on electoral violations and the mass media's power to persuade

"a significant part of the population to vote against their own objective interests."[31] In his postelection reports to the party Central Committee in December 1999 and March 2000 Symonenko chose to interpret the result as a demonstration of "an intensification of the class struggle" by the new Ukrainian bourgeoisie and a vindication of the party's defensive priorities. Having met the party's real goal, if not the general left interest, in maximizing a losing position, Symonenko was probably safe until 2002. He even ventured to call the campaign "a success . . . because it became a great stimulus to the growth of [our] party organization," as well as strengthening the party's "avant-garde" function and spreading its general "influence in society."[32]

The party would have to wait for generational turnover to produce real change. Relative "modernizers" like Kriuchkov in fact proposed little more than less stridency in rhetoric. At the 2000 party congress, Symonenko denied there was any need to update the 1995 party program. Its declared tasks had not been met.[33] Only a few voices sounded notes of alarm beneath the surface.[34] In reality, the Communists have grown used to the luxuries of permanent opposition. Like their Russian counterparts, they have no real desire to make the compromises that would facilitate, and of course result from, their participation in government. One Communist, Ivan Sakhan', was minister of labor under Kuchma (like Yurii Maslyukov, the Communist who was Russian first deputy prime minister in 1998–1999) but was semidetached from the rest of the party, which is safely immune from patriotic appeals to share the burdens of office.

At a local level, the Communists emerged as the largest single organized force in both 1994 and 1998, winning 168 seats on oblast councils in 1994 (out of the 333, 21.4 percent of all deputies, who were members of any party) and 273 in 1998 (councils then had more seats, but the Communist deputies actually represented a higher proportion, 33.1 percent, of the 679 who were party members).[35] The Communists also emerged as the largest single party in the Crimean Assembly after the 1998 elections with thirty-six out of 100 seats, allowing their local leader Leonid Grach to become chairman of the assembly.

After 1999, the easy optimism of 1994 or 1998 was no longer possible. Some, pointing to the 45.1 percent the left candidates had in fact achieved in the first round, stuck to the Fabian belief that support for the left was still on a rising trend (see Table 6.1).

In practice, the atmosphere had changed completely after 1999.[36] Kuchma's supporters had made it very clear they were not prepared to let the left take power. Moreover, after the election they attacked the left's

**Table 6.1. Electoral Performance of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1994–2002**

| | *Territorial Seats* | *% List Vote* | *List Seats* | *Total Seats* | *Overall* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994 Parliamentary Election | 95/338 | | | 95/338 | 28.1% |
| 1998 Parliamentary Election | 38/225 | 24.6% | 84/225 | 122/450 | 27.1% |
| 1999 Presidential Election | | Petro Symonenko: 22.2% first round, 37.8% second round | | | |
| 2002 Parliamentary Election | 6/225 | 20% | 59/225 | 65/450 | 14.4% |

*Sources*: Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social-Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe–Asia Studies* 49, no. 7 (November 1997), p. 1303; Andrew Wilson and Sarah Birch, "The 1998 Ukrainian Elections: Voting Stability, Political Gridlock," *Europe–Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (September 1999), p. 1040; Oleksii Haran', Oleksandr Maiboroda et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi: Mizh leninizmom i sotsial-demokratiieiu* (Kiev, 2000), pp. 182–193.

strongholds in parliament (see the section "The Political Factor" below). To Symonenko, appealing to the Socialists at their Eighth Congress in May 2000, the left's priority had to be mere survival, making the preservation of the "left bloc" strategy even more vital.[37] The Socialists, on the other hand, accepted that adaptation was the key to survival and continued to drift away from their erstwhile allies.

## Dynamics of Left Competition and Support

### Axes of Competition

Superficially at least, the dynamics of intra-left party competition in Ukraine differ significantly from those in Russia. First, Ukraine has competition along the Communist–Socialist axis, which has no real parallel further north or indeed in many states of the former Soviet bloc. Lithuania had both the Democratic Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party, with the latter a historical party from the interwar era—although it faced similar problems to the Ukrainian Socialists in defining an image distinct from the former Communists (Democratic Labour)—until the merger of the two parties in 2001 under the name of the Social Democratic Party.[38] In Russia, would-be socialists and social democrats tend to be found in the moderate wing of the CPRF.

Second, because in Ukraine (Ukrainian) nationalists and Communists are polar opposites, the CPU does not have to compete, as the CPRF must, with

far right parties such as Russian National Unity or Spiritual Heritage. Ukraine does have a political fringe of Russian and East Slavic nationalist parties, but to date it has remained small indeed, largely because the Communist Party itself has proved better suited to representing the vague nostalgia nationalism of Ukraine's ethnic Russian and Russophone population (see the section "Ideology" below).

Third, because the Ukrainian Communists (and superficially the Progressive Socialists) are themselves so left wing, there has been no real political space to organize on their left. In contrast to the ultraradical neo-Bolshevik Russian Communist Workers' Party, which won 4.5 percent of the vote in 1995 and 2.2 percent in 1999, none of the dozen or so fringe leftist parties in Ukraine managed to collect the 200,000 signatures needed to stand in the 1998 elections (only a couple had been really active in 1994). Nor would any meet the full definition of a "successor party."

In theory, therefore, the Ukrainian Communists ought to be most concerned with competition from the Socialists to their right. Other factors have prevented this from happening, however. First, the party leaders remain counterfactually concerned by the potential growth of a far left in southeast Ukraine, especially given their early rivalry with the Union of Communists, still eking out a perilous existence.[39] Its remaining members, including party leader Tamil' Yabrova, now have close contacts with, even shared membership in, the Russian Communist Workers' Party. Other "true" fringe parties include the several Ukrainian branches of Nina Andreeva's All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks—renamed the Party of Communists (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in 1993 in order to gain official registration. The party considers itself the true heir of the original CP(b)U, which supposedly betrayed its principles after its change of name in 1953. This is an interesting argument but, unfortunately, not even one that was made in the 1950s. The party is one of Ukraine's smallest, with only forty reported members as of January 1998. Other groupuscules include the Union of Labor set up in 1997; the Communist Party (of Workers), established in 1998; and the tiny Renovation Communist Party of Ukraine, active only in Odesa. A Trotskyist group, the Young Revolutionary Marxists, has existed since 1992.[40] The existence of such groups indicates the presence of a potential electorate in east Ukraine—but one that has been contained to date by the positioning of the Communist Party. In the 1990s there was no equivalent of the "communist pluralism" to be found in Russia. When it finally emerged in 2000–2001, it was an artificial phenomenon (see "The Political Factor" below).

There are other factors that have helped to minimize competition between the Communists and the Socialists. First, although the Socialist

Party was formed first, in its original incarnation (1991–1993) it was something of a holding operation for would-be Communists. Second, the Communist Party emerged as the dominant party on the left in 1993–1994 largely through displacement rather than competition. Half the Socialists' members (some forty thousand) simply transferred to the Communists. Adam Martyniuk, first editor of the Socialist paper *Tovarysh* (Comrade), became the first editor of its Communist rival, *Komunist*. A third factor was the "left bloc" strategy adopted in 1994. There were several instances of direct Communist–Socialist competition in the elections but considerably fewer than among the parties of the right and center (and rather more in 1998, when the two parties competed in 111 out of 225 constituencies).[41] That said, there have always been tensions over defining the nature of the "bloc." For the Communists, it is an alliance of principle, based on all the parties' "affinity in origin from a common womb—the Leninist Party of Bolsheviks, the former CPSU."[42] The Socialists, however, saw the arrangement as largely tactical and became increasingly nervous that the Communists would always dominate such a bloc. The key reason limiting Communist–Socialist competition, however, is that the two parties' support bases only partially overlap.

**Bases of Support**

Broadly speaking, at least until Moroz adopted his "New Course" shifting the Socialist Party in a more social democratic direction after 1998, the main difference between the Communists and Socialists (and the reason why one or two suggestions of merger in 1993–1994 were ignored) was their different line on the national question.[43] This has provided the Socialists with their most obvious niche, all the more so because on socioeconomic questions, as in Russia,[44] it has proved difficult to establish a more general profile for either democratic socialism or social democracy between the better known brand names of market reform and nostalgia communism. Consequently, the Socialists' support base is basically an ethnolinguistic and regional subset of the general "protest" electorate, tilted toward central Ukraine and rural and small-town Ukrainophones.[45] Voters with strongly negative attitudes toward the market can be found in either Communist or Socialist camp; voters who also have strongly negative attitudes toward Ukrainian nationalism tend to gravitate toward the Communists.[46] As a proxy party of ethnolinguistic protest (see below), the Ukrainian Communists have that extra edge compared with the CPRF and extra depth of support in southeast Ukraine.

Some surveys have also pointed to age as an important differentiating factor in the two parties' support bases, although here the available evidence is

more ambiguous. The left electorate as a whole is undoubtedly relatively elderly. Craumer and Clem claim that the Socialist-Rural electorate in 1998 was somewhat older than the Communist, in part because it was also more rural and more female.[47] However, another 1998 survey found that the elderly (fifty-five and over) were more than twice as likely to vote Communist in 1998 (37.8 percent) than voters under twenty-nine (10.8 percent), compared with 50 percent more likely to vote for the Socialist-Rural bloc (5.2 percent compared with 3.4 percent) and rough equality for Rukh (10.5 percent to 10.8 percent).[48] Underestimation of the Socialist-Rural electorate may have been the problem here. My own research confirms that language and ethnicity, region of residence, and attitudes toward "national" values are all-important.[49] Because this is the main reason for the Socialists' existence, however, the party does not exercise the "pull" on the Communists that it otherwise might.

## Ideology

There is an obvious threat to democratization in post-communist states if successor parties "cling to their pre-transition political identities and organizational practices."[50] In Ukraine it is political identities that have proved most resilient. The Communist Party, which defines itself as "the inheritor of the *ideas and traditions* of the CPU, as it existed until its banning in August 1991,"[51] has placed a high premium on nostalgia culture since its revival. Hence the survival of the resolutely uncharismatic Petro Symonenko as party leader. Like Gennady Zyuganov in Russia, he is actually an appropriate symbol for a party that seeks to depict itself as the honest second echelon, the rank and file betrayed by the egotistical leadership of the Gorbachev era, the honest toilers of *nasha strana* (our country) versus the cosmopolitan elite of *eta strana* (that country).

As in many parts of the former Soviet bloc, left conservatism has sought to revive itself through the co-option of local nationalism, but in Ukraine this has to date meant the nationalism of a vanished state, the USSR. Despite the passage of time, the Communist Party has remained completely loyal to the Soviet past, painted in particularly glowing colors in the *Historical Theses* produced by the party to celebrate its eightieth anniversary in 1998.[52] The party relaunched its theoretical journal *Communist of Ukraine* in 1999, proudly proclaiming its continuity with the original first published in 1925, but its function is more to confirm the true faith than to serve as a forum for new ideas.[53] The party rarely uses the word *mistakes* in reference to the Soviet period and rarely mentions dangerous topics such as the Purges or the Famine of 1932–1933. Indeed, the party is capable

of giving the impression that things Soviet only began to go wrong with Khrushchev's "adventurism" (as late as 1999, the party was publishing material that cast the Stalinist period in a favorable light); although its normal formula (for any period) criticizes only "departures from Leninist principles."[54] Lenin himself is still sacrosanct, the guiding genius of "the Leninist Communist Party of Ukraine," a party proud to continue "speaking in the words of Lenin."[55]

Symonenko has therefore turned the accusation of "conservatism" on its head: "Our party does not deny its history . . . the tragic events of the recent past have not swayed our devotion to true socialism, to the ideals of Great October [1917]"; "We are 'conservative' only because we keep faith in the ideas of socialism, workers' power, and a voluntary union of the peoples of a USSR that was criminally destroyed."[56] It was, moreover, "important to remember what is indisputable: a mighty economic legacy was created in the years of Soviet power that Ukraine has been living off in all the subsequent years of 'independence.'"[57] The only concession to new circumstances, buried deep in the 1995 party program, was the admission that "it would be utopian to try and revive a socio-economic system of different relations, which existed in different conditions, under different principles and different organisations of production and distribution, different social-class structures of society, a different level of consciousness."[58]

Even if circumstances had changed, the party's analytical tools—in particular the faith in historical materialism and the class struggle—had not.[59] The first convinced the party that despite the setbacks of 1989/1991, socialism was still the society of the future. If anything, the prospects for real, eventual socialism were brighter, now that careerists like Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk had left the party. The second led the party to claim that, whereas the "postindustrial West" now had only a "quasi proletariat," many parts of Ukraine were actually being *de*modernized, economically and socially disconnected by "globalization," and dramatically repauperized. "People are surviving on what they accumulated in the years of Soviet power," the party has claimed. "That is, they are not yet a classic proletariat as they still have much to lose (a flat, a car, a dacha, etc.). But their full proletarianization will come sooner or later."[60] Given the "rebirth of class antagonism and class struggle" since 1991, and the oppression of the new proletariat by "a comprador bourgeoisie . . . behind which stands world imperialism headed by the USA," there were, in short, plenty of reasons why the Ukrainian left should be "more left" than the parties of social democratic Europe.[61] There was, Symonenko therefore claimed, "no basis for social democracy of the Western type in Ukraine." The "softening of class antagonism" in the West was only pos-

sible because the local working class, as part of the "golden billion," lived "as parasites on the labor of the countries of the world periphery" to which Ukraine was rapidly being consigned. Ukraine, on the contrary, could not expect any "lessening of class antagonism, only the reverse."[62]

The Communists have opposed every aspect of economic reform in Ukraine—including all privatization, whether large, medium, or small—unless an enterprise was small enough to have no employees to "exploit."[63] Despite the 1995 program talking of support for all forms of ownership, its preferences were clear: including "the preservation of state property in basic spheres of industry," "the restoration of state and workers' control," "renationalization" of illegally privatized industry, "a savage war against shadow business," "the restoration of planned price-formation, a moratorium on price increases for basic food products," "the restoration of a state currency monopoly and a monopoly on external economic activity . . . banking activity, other financial-credit institutions."[64] In the words of Symonenko's simpler summary, "Our task is not to ameliorate capitalism, but to have done with it."[65]

Communist nostalgia is also for the culture of the lost "new civilization" of the Soviet era. According to Communist Deputy Yurii Solomatin: "We are Soviet communists; we are Soviet people; we are Soviet patriots."[66] It might be pointed out that this residual Soviet "nationalism" does not refer to a specific "nation." It is still supranational, even pancultural, wrapped in a rhetoric of "antinationalism" and "the friendship of the peoples." But insofar as it refers to a "Soviet people" (*sovetskii narod*), located in a "Soviet homeland" (*sovetskaia rodina* or *sovetskoe otechestvo*), it also refers to a specific community, with its own group myths and boundary markers, a national identity of sorts.[67] There was certainly precious little evidence of loyalty to the new Ukraine, even of "national communism" in a party that specifically condemned the "danger . . . of the attempt to revive so-called 'Ukrainian communism.'"[68] Borys Oliinyk was often touted as the potential leader of such a movement, but it had no formal existence. Oliinyk's version of Ukrainian identity was in any case predicated on assumptions of East Slavic fraternity and pan-Slavic solidarity (in 1999 he vehemently denounced the NATO Kosovo campaign in a pamphlet provocatively entitled *Who's Next?*).[69] The party normally sidesteps the issue of support for Ukrainian independence by placing it in quote marks. That is, the party would be happy to support "real," socialist independence, rather than the current neocolonial quasi state, but was in no short-term danger of having its bluff called.[70]

Internally, the Communists have promoted the idea of Ukraine as a bicultural state, without any attempt to place "the interests, rights and specific traits of one nation above those of other nations and nationalities" and in

which "the Ukrainian language" should not be "over"-privileged but, rather, left alone to enjoy "its natural development, purged of the imposed language of the diaspora. The Russian language, as the native language of half the population of Ukraine, [should be given] the status of a state language alongside Ukrainian."[71] President Kuchma was first elected on a similar, albeit vague, platform of raising the status of the Russian language in 1994. After the election, however, he opted to maintain the linguistic status quo (which favors Russian), thereby desensitizing the issue among Russophones at least—apart from the radical fringe. The issue was therefore gifted to the Communists but, in the absence of any significant Ukrainianization pressure, was not particularly salient. After the 1999 election, Kuchma initially backed a state program on "broadening the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language" in February 2000. It proceeded in fits and starts, however—particularly after the Gongadze affair (see below) deprived the president of most of his support on the nationalist right. Despite their best efforts, the Communists were therefore unable to use the issue to revive their fortunes in 2002.

Nevertheless, the Communists' mix of policies has more appeal than pure Russian nationalism in Ukraine and has won the CPU much proxy support. Ethnic Russians are more likely to vote Communist in Ukraine, but so are many ethnic Ukrainians, particularly Russophones who share Russian values of Soviet nostalgia or East Slavic nationalism.[72] The party itself is broadly representative of Ukraine outside of the western region: 64.9 percent of members are Ukrainian, and 28.7 percent are Russian.[73] However, that constituency itself has a shifting identity. Soviet nationalism is still strongly supported by the party's powerful Donbas faction, led originally by Volodymyr Moiseienko (ironically head of the parliamentary committee in Kiev on "state building"), and the semiautonomous Crimean Party, led by Leonid Grach.[74] This internal party left was instrumental in forming the Soiuz (Union) group in the Ukrainian parliament in 1995 (twenty-four out of thirty-four members were Communists) and its successor "Communists for the Revival of the USSR" (twenty-five to thirty deputies). The latter was the driving force behind the all-Ukrainian Union "For the Revival of the USSR" set up in July 1998 and led by Moiseienko.[75] Members of the party left were also keen supporters of the "Union of Communist Parties-CPSU" set up with successor parties from other post-Soviet states in 1993, seeing it as a model of confederal relations for the parent states and the potential catalyst of a new union. The Ukrainians even opposed plans put forward by the CPRF in 1995 for a change of name that would allow the Union of Communist Parties to be-

come a deterritorialized supranational coordinating body, some kind of broader (i.e., not just post-Soviet) "International"—ironically ensuring that it would be sidelined as a nostalgia forum.

## East Slavic Man

Gradually and belatedly, however, the Ukrainian Communists have begun to supplement their nostalgia-heavy Soviet nationalism with a vaguer commitment to the "East Slavic idea." The latter is more likely to have more long-term appeal outside of the core territories of the Donbas and Crimea and is a more suitable vehicle for generalized nostalgia without specific policy commitment.[76] In January 2001 Moiseienko's group was succeeded by a smaller group of nineteen, "For the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia"—eleven of whom were Communists.[77] The USSR is, of course, not going to be restored tomorrow (Symonenko has ruled out unity "as a protectorate of the Russian bourgeoisie").[78] Fortunately, the Ukrainian Communists have rediscovered the natural link from Soviet to East Slavic or Eurasian nationalism in the supposed common "economic civilization" and proclivity for collective labor of all the East Slavic peoples: "Soviet man . . . did not emerge from nothing—before him stood the courageous Slavic-Rusich, the labor-loving Ukrainian peasant, the self-sacrificing Cossack."[79]

The 1999 Kosovo war helped spur this gradual evolution. Symonenko and Oliinyk, as with Zyuganov, have increasingly spoken of a world naturally divided into cultural "civilizations" and of the need to defend the "unity of canonical Orthodoxy" and the "Orthodox geocultural space" as the "common riches" and cultural foundation of the eastern Slavs in the natural struggle with the Islamic South and the expansionist West. Serbia's fate was therefore only a continuation of "centuries of intrigue of Catholicism against Orthodoxy." "Catholic Poland," it is claimed, "supported the bombers and Protestant Estonia even wanted to take part in the aggression."[80]

In the Ukrainian context, the main carrier of this "civilizational tradition" (the idea that "the Orthodox cultural-historical heritage is the common riches of the Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian peoples") is the branch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is still loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Communists have begun to speak out in its support.[81] Like the CPRF, the CPU has managed to make this transition from a militantly atheistic past largely without irony. During his keynote TV broadcast of the 1999 presidential campaign, Symonenko, having earlier revealed his youthful baptism, openly declared his sympathy for "canonical Orthodoxy," that is, the Moscow Patriarchate, the rightful representative of "the Church of Prince

Vladimir, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Taras Shevchenko, and now—the poverty-stricken, rightless, humiliated and plundered Ukrainian people."[82] The rival Kievan Patriarchate and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches were, in contrast, condemned as "pseudo-religious groupuscules" that aimed to take "Ukraine back to the religious wars of the late Middle Ages"; while "the Greek Catholics [were simply] carrying out their [traditional] traitorous mission in the eastern strategy of the Vatican"—not to mention the Western-sponsored "totalitarian sects" and their "attacks on Ukraine's traditional faith."[83] The Communists have therefore called for "political and Orthodox [*pravoslavnyi*] clerical circles to unite and stand in a common front in the defence of the orthodox [*ortodoksal'nyi*] religion of our fatherland, our peoples and countries against the serious Euro-spiritual threat."[84]

The developing tendency toward the ideological mimicry of Zyuganovism gained extra impetus from the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine in June 2001 and from the events of September 11, 2001. The CPU vehemently denounced the papal visit as an insult to the "majority" of believers in Ukraine, attacking his "Catholic proselytism," "interference" in local affairs, and "planned meetings" "with splitter-schismatics" as a violation of the spirit of Vatican II, a threat to all ecumenical dialogue (both Ukrainian and all-European) and to "social peace" in Ukraine, and a de facto breach of the constitutional separation of church and state.[85] The party joined the Moscow Patriarchate in boycotting and protesting against the visit (which was otherwise a great success).

The papal visit also prompted Symonenko (or his ghostwriters) to pen a long piece entitled "The Crusade against Ukraine," in which he takes Zyuganovite arguments further than ever. Under conditions of "globalisation and the conflict of spiritual values," he begins, "Orthodox values—collectivism, social solidarity and mutual aid" had to stand against "cosmopolitan universalism," the threat of fundamentalist Islam, and the "age-old historical opponent of Orthodoxy—Catholicism," which had always "gone to the East with fire and sword" (a reference to the popular 1999 film adaptation of Henryk Sinkiewicz's 1899 novel). Symonenko depicts all the papacy's allies in Ukraine as dupes. The Vatican was failing to help the Greek Catholics establish true independence and was manipulating the Kievan Patriarchate as its "fifth column," spreading the "myth of the 'original national' character of its Church" only as a cover for long-term Catholicization. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, on the other hand, the Kievan Patriarchate's alternative patron, was "triply dependent—on Turkey, Western Europe and the USA." Collectively, the "uncanonical" churches, which "couldn't achieve unity and accord amongst themselves," were

threatening the natural unity of the eastern Slavs with the same discord. Only the Moscow Patriarchate, again, by seeking to maintain such unity, truly represented the real "national identity of the Ukrainian people."[86]

The CPU's reaction to September 11 itself was understandably muted; but it vehemently denounced the Afghanistan campaign in the same (reverse) Huntingtonian terms it had used since 1999 as both a threat to East Slavic interests and a cover for American "mondialism," under the slogan "No to Terrorism! No to War!"[87] The Communists attacked Kuchma even for his limited role in permitting the use of Ukrainian airspace to supply Central Asian bases and joined the CPRF in its criticism of Putin for his tentative rapprochement with NATO. The CPU's anti-Americanism was given an extra edge by the party's simultaneous peddling of conspiracy theories of U.S. involvement in, or even initiation of, the Gongadze scandal. Nevertheless, as with Zyuganov, the CPU increasingly tried to site its anti-Americanism in what it perceived to be the universalizable message of antiglobalist anticapitalism.

## Going Native?

It is no contradiction, however, that, cutting its cloth to suit its reduced circumstances, the Communist Party has also gradually adjusted to the new Ukraine—if largely for practical rather than ideological reasons. During the debate preceding the party's formal rebirth in 1993, Oleksandr Kotsiuba, then chairman of the Rada Committee on Legislation and Legality, was touted by many as a potential leader. Significantly, however, his stated preference for a "normal party of Ukrainian communism of a parliamentary type," which "should be a Communist party of Ukraine," not the USSR, "a party which will engage in state-building here in Ukraine," ruined his chances with a rank and file more in tune with Symonenko's Soviet patriotism (Kotsiuba was also distrusted for having originally been elected in a Kiev constituency in 1990 as a candidate of the anti-Communist "Democratic bloc").[88]

Nevertheless, de facto the Communist Party has been slowly evolving in this direction. It is not yet a "normal party of Ukrainian communism," but, though this may not always have been obvious to the party's critics, it has in fact steered a middle course since 1993. Its ultraradical wing has steadily lost influence. Leading "Soviet patriot" Moiseienko was expelled from the party in November 2000, only to set up a rival "true left" Communist Party of Workers and Peasants in April 2001.[89] Its acronym conveniently was "KPRS," the Ukrainian for CPSU.[90]

Increasingly, the party's formal documentation is in Ukrainian, although its weekly press is still mainly Russian language. The Soviet state emblem still appears on the masthead of the party journal *Komunist Ukraïny*, but the Communists have simultaneously sought to reclaim their version of Ukrainian identity, symbols, and heroes—most notably writers such as "Red" Shevchenko (1814–1861) and Ivan Franko (1856–1916), depicting them as "internationalist" advocates of the "friendship of the peoples" who were "always on the left flank, and will always remain so."[91]

The Communists' parliamentary faction has, moreover, often taken a more flexible and centrist line than the party leadership, most notably in the final vote on the new Ukrainian constitution in June 1996. The Central Committee fulminated against a "bourgeois" and "anti-Soviet" document,[92] but the party's deputies divided more or less in three, with twenty for and twenty-nine against, ten abstentions, and twenty present but not voting. Significantly, calls by party radicals for mass expulsion of the recalcitrants were initially confined to a purge of five but *did* eventually play a part in the selection of candidates for 1998.[93] That is, the rank and file remains more conservative than the leadership and can be expected to resist any wholesale change to the party's program.

However, varying numbers of Communist deputies have continued to back a variety of other government initiatives. The party's leftist critics have accused it of selling its support for a number of key privatization projects,[94] though arguably it was only logrolling with other factions as one would expect any powerful parliamentary caucus to do. Nevertheless, the party's "middle course" does not mean that formal "Ukrainianization" is likely anytime soon—despite Moiseienko's angry predictions.[95] The CPU has heaped so much scorn on the alternative Ukapisti tradition that it could hardly adopt it overnight.

## New Business Influence

The party leaders are of course happy to swim as bigger fishes in a smaller pool, but the most important factor encouraging the Communists' gradual accommodation to domestic Ukrainian politics has been the search for sources of finance. Political parties in Ukraine are often shells or fronts for business interests. This trend is most marked among the often entirely virtual parties of the "center," but it has not escaped the left,[96] including the Communists, who have increasingly accepted businesspeople "parachuted" into their ranks. For businesspeople seeking a free ride into parliament, the Communists were, after all, the largest party until 2002. The Communist Party

has also continued the Soviet practice of appointing many "ordinary workers" as candidates, but these are often the most susceptible to outside pressure from new monied interests. Moiseienko has argued therefore that the only "real" Communists were elected from the constituencies in 1998—not the party list (and there were only seven of these in 2002).[97]

That said, Communist businesspeople tend to represent state behemoths (such as Volodymyr Matvieiev, deputy general director of Mykolaïv's main shipbuilding concern, and numerous mine directors) or smaller private businesses (Volodymyr Petrenko of the Kiev firm Viktoriia-RUS) rather than Ukraine's new corporate giants. Ukraine's new banking class was noticeably absent from the party's 1998 list. The Socialist Party had (at least in 1998, many left in 1999) a much higher proportion of business cadres.[98] On the other hand, many old Communists are themselves born-again businessmen, including even Stanislav Hurenko, the last leader of the old CPU in 1990–1991 and now deputy head of the metals-trading joint-venture Navasko. The need to preserve even these limited interests has often moderated the party line.

In 2002 the party seemed unable to attract as many "sponsors" onto its list—though one or two eyebrows were raised by the appearance of the unknown Mykhailo Loboda (officially a "doctor") at number thirty. Moreover, in contrast to the furor over the passage of the constitution in 1996, the party caucus had largely acted as instructed in 1998–2002, and the leadership had 113 sitting deputies to accommodate. Most businesspersons were themselves party givens, such as Agrarian boss Omelian Parubok at number two, Donets'k "trade unionist" Vasyl' Khara at number sixteen, and Alla Aleksandrovs'ka from Kharkiv at number twenty-one.

## The Political Factor

It is impossible to give a true picture of left-wing politics in Ukraine without discussing the role of the purely political factor, in particular the well-practiced post-Soviet habits of political manipulation and *kompromat*. Under first president Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994) there were rumors that the Communist Party was established with a degree of official connivance as an alternative to the more radical Union of Communists—though Kravchuk would clearly have preferred someone like Oleksandr Kotsiuba as leader. At the same time, the new CPU was supported by many "red directors" in eastern Ukraine, who had the opposite aim of seeking to lever Kravchuk from power.

President Kuchma (1994–?) has worked on the party from both directions. Sometimes, he has threatened its electorate through the creation of artificial

"spoiler parties." In the 1998 elections this motley crew (Working Ukraine, the Party of Defenders of the Fatherland, the All-Ukrainian Workers' Party, and the Party of Women's Initiatives) won 4.8 percent of the vote. If the Agrarian Party (3.7 percent) and Progressive Socialists (4.05 percent) are included in the same category, the total "spoiler" vote was over 12 percent. The Agrarians are an obvious rival to the Rural Party (founded in 1992, originally a reliable Communist ally), created with "administrative resources" in 1996, and have largely replaced it as the main party in the countryside.

More seriously, it has frequently been alleged that Nataliia Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party was created and supported by the presidential administration, both to split the left-wing vote and to divert its mainstream parties into an unelectable gesture politics. Moreover, Ukrainian commentators have referred to Vitrenko as "Zhirinovskii in a skirt," pointing out a similar contrast between antigovernment rhetoric and a surprisingly loyal voting record. The rest of the left cried particular foul when the Progressive Socialists failed to support a motion of no-confidence against the government in October 1998, resulting in the attempt falling twenty votes short.[99] De facto, the party has certainly seriously disrupted the relative left unity of 1994. It has always stood alone—a planned alliance with the (unregistered) Workers' and Pensioners' Parties for the 1998 elections came to naught.[100] At the same time, Vitrenko's autocratic rule over her party and her constant conflict with colleagues and regional organizations "creates the impression that [she] is doing everything possible to prevent the Progressive Socialists from becoming a real force."[101]

On the other hand, Kuchma has periodically preferred to give covert support to the Communist Party as an easily defeatable opposition. Regime pressure to divide and rule in the buildup to the 1999 presidential election certainly worked in his favor. The Kuchma administration considered, quite correctly, that Oleksandr Moroz would be a more difficult opponent than a more radical leftist and devoted most of its energies to undermining his campaign.[102] Vitrenko was encouraged as an alternative,[103] allowing the more stable Communist vote to come through in the center.

After the election, Kuchma and his advisers seemed to swing back toward attempting to cut the Communists down to size. In February 2000 Rukh deputies introduced a provocative bill to ban the party; several oblast councils in west Ukraine did so on their own turf. Six deputies left the Communists proper in the spring—given the relative discipline of the Communist faction, not that substantial a breakaway. Then came the launch of the first spoiler parties aimed directly at the Communists rather than the Socialists or the left in general. A "Ukrainian Communist Youth Union" appeared in

March 2000. Its leader, people's deputy Oleksandr Starynets', attacked the former Komsomol and "the proponents of class struggle [that] in practice has led only to the loss of millions of our fellow-countrymen" and called for the creation of a "new type" of Communist Party "based on" the principle of Ukrainian statehood.[104]

Soon after, a "Communist Party (Renewed) of Ukraine," reportedly backed by leading "oligarch" Viktor Pinchuk, held a constituent meeting in July 2000.[105] This was a modified version of the project for the revival of the "Ukrainian Communist Party," also the subject of much speculation in 2000–2001. In the Ukrainian context, the use of the adjective *Ukrainian* rather than the more neutral epithet *of Ukraine* implies a more distinctly national orientation and, of course, harks back to the history of the Ukapisti between 1920 and 1925.[106] The "Communist Party (Renewed)" committed itself to work within the Ukrainian state, although its TV advertisements unashamedly exploited nostalgia for the Soviet era. Sensing the dual threat to both his party's electorate and policy direction, Symonenko launched a preemptive attack on any rival party, which he predicted would be an artificial force that would be "pseudo-Communist, nationalist and pro-presidential."[107] In fact, there were two such "clones." The authorities were also discreetly backing Moiseienko's Communist Party of Workers and Peasants—a possible indication that they preferred the CPU to maintain a relatively left position.

Several new potential rivals to the Communists also appeared on the center left. In parliament the Socialist–Rural alliance ended, with most of the latter's deputies joining the neophyte Solidarity grouping, which was basically a vehicle to tempt as many leftists as possible into pro-government positions (Solidarity was chaired by Petro Poroshenko, a businessman who headed the Ukrainian Investment Group).[108] The Socialists suffered another split when former Moroz confidante Ivan Chyzh defected to set up an "All-Ukrainian Union of the left," known as "Justice" when it was registered in May 2000 (with three sitting deputies as members). Having served its function, the Progressive Socialist faction in the Rada was dissolved in February 2000, after defections left it without the necessary minimum fourteen members, but the party continued to exist in the country, and Vitrenko survived to compete for the protest vote in 2002.

All these maneuverings left the Communists isolated in parliament and the overall strength of the "left bloc" considerably reduced. The latter numbered 171 when Kuchma was reelected in November 1999 (122 Communists, 23 Socialists, 12 Rural Party members, 14 Progressive Socialists) but only 135 in March 2000 (115 Communists and twenty "left-center"

Socialists), plus a handful of now homeless individuals.[109] The Socialists, however, increasingly acted on their own. This was a considerable departure from the electorate's original verdict in March 1998—and a key factor enabling the creation of the pro-regime "New Majority" in January 2000.

During what the regime's supporters dubbed the "Velvet Revolution," the "New Majority" seized control of parliament from the left. The Communists lost all their leading positions on Rada committees. Their ally Oleksandr Tkachenko was forced out as chairman of parliament (he joined the CPU faction in February 2001), and their own Adam Martyniuk was forced to resign as his deputy. The Communists initially protested the constitutionality of the changes (for a time the Rada actually sat in two halves), but the party had no stomach for protracted struggle (this time Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party screamed betrayal). The "New Majority" forced through several important symbolic changes—abolishing the November revolution holiday, removing Soviet symbols from the Rada's physical facade, and renaming the then current convocation the "3rd" rather than the "14th" (that is, dating from 1990 rather than the 1920s)—and gave fresh wind to new prime minister Yushchenko's reform project—at least until the "Gongadze affair" undermined the "New Majority."

## Gongadze and After

Hryhorii Gongadze was an opposition Internet journalist who disappeared in September 2000. In October 2000 his decapitated body was found in woods outside Kiev.[110] In November the Socialist leader Moroz made the sensational allegation in parliament, backed up by tape recordings supposedly secretly made in the president's office, that Kuchma or his entourage had plotted Gongadze's disappearance.[111] The Socialist Party now associated itself with rightist opponents of the president, but the CPU dragged its feet, pandering to conspiracy theories of American involvement and fretting about the supposedly greater danger of "social disorder" or a right-wing takeover. The Communists preferred to concentrate their fire on the reform government of Viktor Yushchenko, who had successfully paid off the pensions backlog and was threatening to make inroads into one of the mainstays of the party's traditional electorate.[112]

In early 2001, therefore, Kuchma needed Communist votes to weather the storm, and the party seemed to be back in favor. With liberals, nationalists, and even some former oligarchs turning against him, it once again made sense for Kuchma (and rather more vehemently, his chief of administration,

Volodymyr Lytvyn) to claim that there was only one "real" opposition in Ukraine—the Communists—and this was at the least mutually convenient for the Communist Party. Communist abstentions saved state prosecutor Mykhailo Poteben'ko from censure for his lackluster role in investigating the affair. The Communists had backed his appointment in 1998; as the last prosecutor of the old Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, he had questioned the legality both of the ban on the party in August 1991 and of the dissolution of the USSR—he subsequently appeared at number twenty on the Communists' list for the 2002 elections. Communist votes were also crucial in securing the removal of the supposedly "pro-Western" Prime Minister Yushchenko in April 2001. Communist abstentions secured his replacement with the industrial apparatchik Anatolii Kinakh in May.

## The 2002 Elections

Commentators began to talk of an "oligarch-Communist majority," but it was unlikely that this would prove any more permanent than previous alignments. Kuchma failed to deliver the party any great change in government policy or greater control over parliament. Moreover, facing Yushchenko's challenge in the 2002 elections, the authorities decided they could no longer afford the luxury of such a large Communist vote. The two Communist "clones" were used to shave almost 2 percent off the CPU's 1998 total—the Communist Party (Renewed) won 1.4 percent, and the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants won 0.4 percent—and possible malpractice added 1 or 2 percent more. The official score for the CPU was around 20 percent, giving the party 59 of the 225 list seats, but a parallel count by the For Fair Elections Committee put the party at 21.2 percent.[113] Other things being equal, the dramatic population loss revealed in the 2001 census (down four million to 48.4 million) cost the party 2 or 3 percent more.[114]

Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" bloc (which included Solidarity) emerged as the overall winner with an official 23.6 percent; the government coalition "For a United Ukraine" struggled to win 11.8 percent. The Socialists were a surprise success with 6.9 percent. Vitrenko reappeared on state TV to take 3.2 percent from her rivals. "Justice," on the other hand, seemed to have been discarded as an aborted project. Bereft of serious official support, it won a minuscule 0.08 percent. However, the mainstream Social-Democratic (United) Party (the party of Kiev oligarchs) won 6.3 percent.

But the real shock for the Communists came in the other half of the election. "For a United Ukraine" deployed its "administrative resources" much more ruthlessly in the 225 territorial constituencies, winning sixty-six

compared with the "Our Ukraine" bloc's forty-two. The Communists were almost completely shut out, winning only six seats (the Socialists won three). Most significantly of all, the Donbas clan—the Party of the Regions in the "For a United Ukraine" bloc—mobilized so effectively that the CPU was only able to win one seat each in Donets'k and Luhans'k. Therefore, despite only slipping 5 percent in the list vote, the CPU's overall strength in the new parliament was almost halved, with fifty-nine plus six seats giving the party a faction of only sixty-five, only 14.4 percent of the total—possibly less than even the authorities may have wished.

On the other hand, as often in the past, a divided parliament would allow the Communists to play the pivotal role on key occasions. There was no equivalent of the deal between Unity and the CPRF in the Russian Duma after 1999, but the other opposition parties once again accused the CPU of opportunism when it seemingly welshed on a deal with Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko, and the Socialists to back a joint slate for the parliamentary leadership, allowing For a United Ukraine and the Social Democrats to win all three main positions on May 28.[115] When the Communists again received the chairs of six committees—much more than their numerical strength merited—the opposition smelled a clear reward.

In the simultaneous Crimean elections the Communists suffered further setbacks. The local Communist leader, Leonid Grach, had made some powerful enemies in 1998–2002. Kuchma was annoyed that his Russian campaign managers encouraged him to play the nationalist card, whereas in Moscow Grach's close links with Mayor Luzhkov harmed his relations with Putin; powerful local business interests (particularly in the Donbas) resented his overtures to Russian capital. Grach lost control of the local assembly, winning only twenty out of one hundred seats—having set a target of more than sixty. His campaign was spectacularly sabotaged by his own disqualification (for failing to give a correct declaration of his assets), although Symonenko may have been privately pleased that one of his main rivals for the party leadership had been publicly humiliated.

Amid the electoral disappointment, there was one piece of good news for the Communists. In December 2001 the Constitutional Court ruled the banning of the party in 1991 illegal—although it failed to address the potential consequences of the decision. The question of restitution of former party "property" remained open, but the Communists at least had a green light to revive the "original" or "canonical" CPU, holding a special "unity congress" on May 26, 2002, that announced the formal union of the "new" and "old" parties. The maneuver was not just a sop to the rank and file but, in fact, was also designed to boost morale in the wake of the March elections and, the

CPU leadership hoped, reinvigorate, if not necessarily rejuvenate, the party's ranks with "old Communists" who were so conservative they had previously held off joining the party.

Symbolic reunion was also designed to boost links with post-1991 business interests. Symonenko remained in charge, although Hurenko, as the last leader of the "old" party in 1991, strengthened his position as party financier and his powerful position in the party apparatus. Symonenko remained popular with the party grassroots (who resented Hurenko's opt out in 1993) but might need the president's support to see off any future leadership challenge. With the strong performance of the various non-Communist oppositions in 2002, it might once again be in Kuchma's interest to try to revive the party to a degree, and it is not impossible that he could switch his backing to Hurenko or even Grach.

## Conclusions

Using the categories suggested by Ishiyama and Urban and Solovei, the dominant strategy of the Ukrainian Communists has to date clearly been one of "leftist retreat"—that is, highly conservative policies and a ghetto mentality.[116] Other possibilities were only just beginning to emerge in 1998–2002. The "social democratization" or "pragmatic reform" option is one that the Communists have been happy to leave to Oleksandr Moroz's Socialist Party. The 1998 election was therefore the last outing for the "left bloc" strategy that had helped to constrain potential divergence between the two main left parties since 1993–1994. The adoption by the Communists of a "Gaullist" or "national-patriotic" strategy was unlikely to involve any significant changes to the party's socioeconomic program—the main aim of which was to mobilize the nostalgia vote—although it would strengthen the party's tendency toward de facto compromise with "national business." Finally, the Ukrainian Communists' particular version of a "national-patriotic," namely, East Slavic "nationalist solution," in current circumstances was not a *governing* strategy and would not make the party any less of a pariah.

The Communist Party therefore seems likely to play its part in keeping Ukraine trapped in an alternative "blocked society" variant. Despite the authorities' demonizing the party for its "anti-system" politics, they are in fact happy to leave it blocking the path for any alternative and more vital opposition. Paradoxically or not, as yet there is little internal pressure on the party to reform. The Communist Party only seems likely to change once the political system around it has moved on.

## Notes

1. Ivan Diiak, *Khto zakhystyt' nash narod i derhavu: Komunistychna partiia Ukraïny chy Ukraïns'ka komunistychna partiia? Shtrykhy do istoriï ta s'ohodennia Kompartiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 2000), p. 12.

2. Ivan Maistrenko, *Istoriia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny* (Munich: Suchasnist', 1979). According to Maistrenko, at the Tahanrih conference thirty-five delegates backed Skrypnyk's resolution calling for an independent party to be an individual member of the Comintern, and only twenty-two supported Kviring's rival motion that it be subordinate to the Russian Bolsheviks (*Istoriia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny*, p. 46).

3. *Tezy do 80-richchia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (1918–1998 rr.)* (Kiev, 1998), pp. 7, 4.

4. *Tezy do 80-richchia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (1918–1998 rr.)*, p. 7.

5. See *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), pp. 68–74. The quotations are from the commentary "Pisliamova 'Komunist Ukraïny,'" *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), pp. 77, 75.

6. On the last days of the old Communist Party of Ukraine, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 4; Zenovia Sochor, "From Liberalization to Post-Communism: The Role of the Communist Party in Ukraine," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 21, nos. 1–2 (1996), pp. 147–163—which carries over into the period after 1991; and Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukraïny: Diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi* (Kiev, 1994).

7. Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radosław Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 29; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 276.

8. Andrew Wilson, "Reinventing the Ukrainian Left: Assessing Adaptability and Change," *Slavonic and East European Review* 80, no. 1 (January 2002), pp. 21–59.

9. Oleksandr Moroz, "Zapyska v prezydiiu plenumu TsK KPU (lito 1991)," in the collection of speeches and documents, *Kudy idemo?* (Kiev, 1993), p. 115.

10. Borys Oliinyk, *Dva roky v Kremli* (Kiev, 1992), p. 37; Vasilii Sekachev, "Sotsialisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy i osobennosti ukrainskoi partiinoi sistemy," in *Ukraina i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudarstva*, ed. Dmitrii Furman (Moscow, 1997), p. 206. The latter is a useful study in its own right.

11. *Holos Ukraïny*, August 28, 1991.

12. "Postanova plenumu TsK Kompartiï Ukraïny," in *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy: Khronika zapreta*, ed. Stanislav Hurenko et al. (Donets'k, 1992), p. 51.

13. Helga Welsh, "Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 4 (1994), pp. 379–394; Michael Waller, "Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East Central Europe: A Case of Democratisation?" *Party Politics* 1, no. 4 (1995), pp. 473–490.

14. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems*; John T. Ishiyama, "The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 3 (1997), pp. 299–330.

15. There is very little English-language literature on the new Ukrainian Communists. A notable exception is Joan Barth Urban's *The Communist Movements in Russia and Ukraine* (Washington, D.C., 1998), which was updated as Joan Barth Urban, "The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections: Similarities, Contrasts, and Interactions," *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 1 (1999), pp. 111–134. See also Joan Barth Urban, "Kommunisticheskie partii Rossii, Ukrainy i Belorussii (bezuspeshnyi poisk edinstva v raznobrazii)," in *Belorussiia i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudartsva*, ed. Dmitrii Furman (Moscow, 1998), pp. 393–415. The party now has a website at www.kpu.kiev.ua. There are two excellent studies in Ukrainian on the politics of the left in general: Oleksii Haran' and Oleksandr Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni: Chy vidbuvaiets'sia dreif do sotsial-demokratiï?* (Kiev, 1999); and Oleksii Haran', Oleksandr Maiboroda et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi: Mizh leninizmom i sotsial-demokratiieiu* (Kiev, 2000).

16. "Postanova plenumu TsK Kompartiï Ukraïny," p. 51.

17. Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 24–25.

18. Sarah Birch, "Nomenklatura Democratisation, Electoral Clientelism, and Party Formation in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Democratization* 4, no. 4 (1997), pp. 40–62.

19. Valentyn Yakushyk, ed., *Politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1996), p. 44.

20. The Socialist Party cheekily reprinted a Ziuganov article on "abandoning dogmas" in the party journal *Tovarysh* 10 (1999).

21. This is from the party program developed in 1993–1994 and finalized in 1995. See Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social-Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe–Asia Studies* 49, no. 7 (November 1997), p. 1300; and *Partiia Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsia: Dokumenty i materialy vtorogo etapa Vseukrainskoi konferentsii i s" ezd KPU* (Kherson, 1993).

22. See Petro Symonenko's introduction to the relaunch of the journal *Komunist Ukraïny*, "Z vidrodzhenniam, 'Komuniste Ukraïnu'!" *Komunist Ukraïny* 1, no. 787 (1999), pp. 3–7; and Petr Simonenko (Petro Symonenko), *Istiny rozhdaiutsia v sporakh . . .* (Kiev, 1999).

23. Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukraïny: Diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi* (Kiev, 1994), p. 223.

24. "Kompartiia Ukrainy v tsifrakh," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), pp. 36, 38.

25. The CPU would later try to deny it had backed Kuchma, but the call to arms against Kravchuk published in *Komunist* 16 (1994) was a pretty clear message in a two-candidate election.

26. Only five parties would have crossed a 5 percent barrier. The CPU would then have won 104 out of 225 list seats (46.2 percent); these calculations are from *Parlament* 1 (2001), p. 23.

27. Petro Symonenko, *Tovarysh* 32 (1998). The Socialists repeated the appeal in December 2000—see *Tovarysh* 50 (2000). For the distinctly unenthusiastic reply, see the open letter, "Politychnii Radi Sotsialistychnoï partiï Ukraïny," *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2001), pp. 42–43.

28. "Do hromadian Ukraïny: Zvernennia kandydativ u Prezydenty Ukraïny," *Komunist* 45 (1999), p. 1.

29. See also Yuliia Tyshchenko, *Vybory-99: Yak i koho my obyraly* (Kiev, 1999), especially pp. 212–244.

30. *Den'*, September 15, 1999; *Kommersant'-Daily*, October 26, 1999; *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, August 27, 1999. The story was strongly denied by Valerii Mishura, then editor of *Komunist*, in an interview with the author and Sarah Birch, November 12, 1999. See also the denial of party splits in *Komunist* 42 (1999); and, for a socialist critique of Communist tactics, see Iosyp Vins'kyi, "Uroky vyboriv Prezydenta Ukraïny," *Tovarysh* 49 (1999).

31. Central Committee member Borys Novikov, speaking at the roundtable, *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), p. 21.

32. Petro Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," *Komunist* 26 (June 2000), p. 2; Petro Symonenko, "O politicheskikh itogakh vyborov Prezydenta Ukrainy," *Komunist* 49 (1999); Petro Symonenko, "O politicheskoi situatsii i zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii," *Komunist* 10 (2000), p. 3.

33. Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 4.

34. As part of the party's postelection analysis, Ivan Myhovych and Oleksandr Baryshpolets' have pointed out that "the idea of Ukrainian statehood has become a serious ideological value in the east and south of the country, not just in the west," and that the party had yet to face the importance of "the growth in our society of left-center sentiments" (*Komunist Ukraïny* 1 [2000], pp. 22–23).

35. Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left," p. 1308; information from the *Ukrainian Regional Project: Data Book*, information compiled and kindly supplied by Eugene M. Fishel of the U.S. State Department, regtab. 051, 052.

36. See the speech by Iosyp Vins'kyi, head of the Moroz campaign, "Uroky vyboriv Prezydenta Ukraïny."

37. *Tovarysh* 22 and 23 (2000).

38. See the chapter on Lithuania in this volume by Algis Krupavicius, "The Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002." Cf. Charles Bukowski and Barnabas Racz, eds., *The Return of the Left in Post-Communist States: Current Trends and Future Prospects* (London: Cheltenham, 1999).

39. The party journal *Marksizm i sovremennost'* displays a clear all-Soviet mentality. See, inter alia, *Marksizm i sovremennost'* 1 (1998).

40. *Workers' Power* (United Kingdom), March 2000, p. 13.

41. Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 116.

42. "Deklaratsiia pro spil'ni diï ta yedynoho kandydata livykh syl," *Komunist* 12 (1999).

43. Sekachev, "Sotsialisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy i osobennosti ukrainskoi partiinoi sistemy," p. 213.

44. See Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*.

45. This is argued by Oleksandr Moroz himself for the Socialists. See *Novyi kurs Ukraïny*, pp. 13–15; and *Tovarysh* 25 (1998). See also Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, pp.

124–132; and the highly detailed maps in Yurii Shaihorods'kyi, ed., *Vybory '98: Dokumenty, statystychni dani, analiz* (Kiev, 1998), end maps nos. 12, 27.

46. Andrew Wilson and Sarah Birch, "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Europe–Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (September 1999), pp. 1047–1051, 1053–1057; Peter R. Craumer and James I. Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economy* 40, no. 1 (January–February 1999), pp. 18–19, 22–23; Vicki L. Hesli, William M. Reisinger, and Arthur H. Miller, "Political Party Development in Divided Societies: The Case of Ukraine," *Electoral Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998), pp. 235–256.

47. Craumer and Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography," p. 18.

48. Iryna Bereshkina, "Vybory-98 yak protses politychnoho samovyznachennia naselennia," *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny* 21 (1998), p. 24.

49. Wilson and Birch, "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock," pp. 1046–1049.

50. John T. Ishiyama, "Sickles into Roses? The Successor Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Politics," *Democratization* 6, no. 4 (1999), p. 70.

51. *Prohrama Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1996), p. 47, emphasis added. The formulation is more typical than that appearing a few pages earlier, defining the party as both an "ideological [*ideina*] and *organizational* successor" (*Prohrama Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny*, p. 3, emphasis added).

52. *Tezy do 80-richchia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (1918–1998 rr.)*. The "theses" were in fact so conservative—even more conservative than the survey published by the old party in 1990—that the party leadership decided not to publish them. See also Petro Symonenko, "O 80-letii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy," *Komunist* 29 (1998). For the 1990 version, see "Zaiava XXVIII z'ïzdu kompartiï Ukraïny pro stavlennia do istorychnoho mynuloho," in *Materialy XXVIII z'ïzdu Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (Druhyi etap)* (Kiev, 1991), pp. 110–112. After 1999 Symonenko shifted slightly, accepting the danger of "the alienation of youth from the party" and claiming that "the Communist Party . . . has never distanced itself from the repressions and abuses which were committed in the course of building socialism"—at the same time as stressing that many of Stalin's achievements "were great, historical" ("Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 3).

53. Oleksandr Hosh, "Ideolohiia derzhavy—chy mozhlyva vona?" *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (1999), pp. 42–49.

54. *Komunist* 46 and 52 (1999); Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 234; Volodymyr Orlov, "Leninskaia partia avangardnogo tipa," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), p. 22; Petro Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), p. 7.

55. Symonenko, "Z vidrodzhenniam, 'Komuniste Ukraïnu'!" p. 7.

56. Symonenko, "Z vidrodzhenniam, 'Komuniste Ukraïnu'!" pp. 3, 5.

57. Volodymyr Orlov, "Takie raznye predvybornye programmy," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (1999), p. 15. The original is in Russian, with the word *independence* mockingly printed in Ukrainian.

58. *Prohrama Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny*, p. 26.

59. Volodymyr Balenok, "Bezsmertne vchennia pro bezsmertnu ideiu," *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (1999), pp. 8–16. According to Symonenko, "The striving [by some] to avoid the class approach disorientates the workers and objectively aids the further capitalization and colonization of Ukraine" (*Komunist Ukraïny* 3 [2000], p. 23).

60. Comments made by Communist Deputy Vasyl' Tereshchuk, speaking at the roundtable, in *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), p. 28.

61. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," pp. 11, 10, 15. See also the comments made by the Communist theoretician Ivan Khmil' at a roundtable in Kiev to discuss Haran' and Maiboroda's first book in September 1999, in *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (1999), pp. 93–94. Compare the argument by Iryna Terlets'ka of the Socialist Party of Ukraine that the "Communists' links are not with any leading group or social strata, but with those people oriented to the past" (quoted in Haran' and Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni*, p. 17).

62. Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 2.

63. However, twenty-nine Communists actually voted in support of Kuchma's October 1994 reform program (forty-six were against), totally misreading his intentions.

64. From the version of the 1995 program prepared for the 1998 elections in Hryhorii Andrushchak et al., *Vybory* '98 (Kiev, 1998), p. 10; and the version in *Politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1999), p. 100.

65. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," p. 9.

66. *Komunist Ukraïny* 4 (2000), p. 47.

67. Simonenko, *Istiny rozhdaiutsia v sporakh . . .* , pp. 35, 87. On this issue during the USSR's actual existence, compare Rogers Brubaker, who argues that the "emergent [Soviet] entity was explicitly conceived as supra-national, not national" (*Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 28); and Roman Szporluk, who states that "I continue to believe that the Soviet state tried to create a Soviet nation and in the course of several decades claimed to have succeeded" (*Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000], p. xxxv).

68. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," p. 9.

69. Borys Oliinyk, *Khto nastupnyi?* (Kiev, 1999). See also the selection of Oliinyk's poetry under the title "Khto zh tse nashu khatu rozvalyv?" in *Tovarysh* 30 (2000).

70. Ivan Hrushchenko, "'Natsional'naia ideia.' Chto eto?" *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 (2001), pp. 52–54. After nine years of independence, the party's 2000 congress finally inserted a phrase into its traditional formula of "voluntary reunion"—that this would have to be "on the basis of preserving state independence" ("Za vriatuvannia Ukraïnu, za sotsialistychnyi shliakh rozvytku," *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 [2000], p. 44)—although in Symonenko's speech this phrase became "state sovereignty" (*Komunist Ukraïny* 3 [2000], p. 15).

71. From Symonenko's speech to the 1993 party congress, *Partiia Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsia*, p. 23; and the 1998 program, Andrushchak et al., *Vybory* '98, p. 10. *Natural development* is a euphemism for maintaining the linguistic status quo.

72. Wilson and Birch, "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock," p. 1049.

73. "Kompartiia Ukrainy v tsifrakh," p. 36.

74. Serhii Hrabovs'kyi's "Petro Symonenko oholosyv v Ukraïni rekonkistu" (*Den'*, April 22, 1997) uses the populist term *Soviet national-socialism*.

75. *Komunist* 36 (1998).

76. Serhii Syrovats'kyi, "Dukhovnoe edinstvo Sviatoi Rusi," *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 (2001), pp. 55–57.

77. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, January 18, 2001. The news digest *Chto delat'?* published by the CPU now has a regular section called "Slavic Unity."

78. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," p. 16.

79. Serhii Syrovats'kyi, "Pravoslavia i stanovlenie dukhovnykh osnov obshchestva," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), p. 76.

80. Syrovats'kyi, "Pravoslavia i stanovlenie dukhovnykh osnov obshchestva," p. 74.

81. Petro Symonenko, "Komunisty pro tserkvu ta ïï rol' u zhytti suchasnoï Ukraïny," *Holos Ukraïny*, May 26, 1999, pp. 6–7; Haran' and Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni*, p. 50.

82. Vadym Halynovs'kyi, "Problemy mizhrelihiinykh stosunkiv u prohramakh kandydativ u Prezydenty Ukraïny," *Vybory-99* 1 (1999), p. 32 (referring to Symonenko's broadcast on September 28). See the Communists' preelection appeal to the faithful: "Pobeda i spasenie Rodiny budut zaviset' segodnia i ot nas s vami," *Komunist* 43 (1999). See also the declaration by the CPU parliamentary faction: "Zaiavlenie po povodu vizita Papy Rimskogo v Ukrainu," available at www.kpu.kiev.ua/Arhiv/2010514.htm (accessed on May 15, 2001).

83. Syrovats'kyi, "Pravoslavia i stanovlenie dukhovnykh osnov obshchestva," p. 74; Symonenko, "Komunisty pro tserkvu ta ïï rol' u zhytti suchasnoï Ukraïny"; Simonenko, *Istiny rozhdaiutsia v sporakh . . .* , pp. 214–216.

84. Vladyslav Suiarko, "Relihiinyi i politychnyi klerykalizm," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (1999), p. 43.

85. "Zaiavlenie po povodu vizita Papy Rimskogo v Ukrainu."

86. Petro Symonenko, "Krestovyi pokhod protiv Ukrainy," available at www.kpu.kiev.ua/Arhiv/si011205.htm (accessed on December 5, 2001).

87. See the party declaration, available at www.kpu.kiev.ua/Arhiv/2011008.htm (accessed on October 8, 2001).

88. "Komunizm: Real'nist' chy utopiia?" *Holos Ukraïny*, April 30, 1993.

89. See Volodymyr Moiseienko's interview attacking the party leadership, in *Donetskii kriazh* 43 (November 23, 2000).

90. See "Livi takozh mozhut' blokuvatysia," *Ukraïns'ka pravda*, September 28, 2001.

91. On Shevchenko and Franko, see material from the conference "Shevchenko and Today," in *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2001), pp. 3–18; and Borys Shliakhov, "Sotsializm velykoho Kameniara," *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 (2001), pp. 15–26. Quotes from Polikarp Markov, "Dostoianie dvukh bratskikh narodov," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2001), pp. 11–13; and Borys Oliinyk, "Shevchenko—tse sama Ukraïna," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2001), p. 6.

92. See the blistering attack by Petro Symonenko and Heorhii Kriuchkov, "Ne mozhna nekhtuvaty voliu narodu. Chomu komunisty ne mozhut' pidtrymaty novyi proekt Konstytutsiï?" *Holos Ukraïny*, December 26, 1995.

93. Haran' and Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni*, p. 14; author's interview with Valerii Mishura, November 12, 1999; Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 114.

94. For a critique of the CPU's voting record in parliament, see the article by Volodymyr Marchenko of the Progressive Socialist Party, "KPU—levaia podporka rezhima prezidenta Kuchmy," *Dosvitni ohni* 35 (2000).

95. Interview with Moiseienko, in *Donetskii kriazh* 43 (November 23, 2000).

96. Sarah Birch and Andrew Wilson, "Political Parties in Ukraine: Virtual and Representational," in *Political Parties at the Millennium: Emergence, Adaptation and Decline in Democratic Societies*, Paul Webb et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

97. Interview with Moiseienko, in *Donetskii kriazh* 43 (November 23, 2000).

98. The Socialist Party had fully one-fifth of the thirty-three eventually elected with the Rural Party; see Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 114.

99. See the vote analysis and consequent criticism in *Komunist* 43 (1998).

100. The two parties were originally supposed to be allocated 25 percent of the places on the Progressive Socialists' list; see Vasyl' Yablons'kyi and Yaroslav Latko, *Suchasni politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1999), p. 17.

101. "Nataliia Vitrenko: Nezakinchena istoriia populizmu," in *Naperedodni: Vybory '99*, ed. Volodymyr Ruban (Kiev, 1999), p. 33.

102. See the litany of complaints in *Tovarysh* 46 (1999).

103. Discerning fact from rumor is of course difficult; but, unlike Moroz, Vitrenko was extremely prominent on state TV in early 1999—only to disappear just as quickly.

104. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, March 13, 2000.

105. *Eastern Economist*, July 24–30, 2000. Would-be party leader Mykhailo Savenko, then a member of Pinchuk's faction Working Ukraine, had originally been elected as a "Progressive Socialist" in 1998.

106. Sergei Rakhmanin, "Chernaia koshka v komnate bez zerkal," *Zerkalo nedeli*, February 26, 2000; *Komunist* 10 (2000).

107. Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 4.

108. Sergei Rakhmanin, "Fraktsiia 'deputatskoe assorti,'" *Zerkalo nedeli*, March 4, 2000.

109. *UNIAN*, March 21, 2000; *Parlament* 1 (2001), p. 49. The Communists were down to 111 members by December 2000 but back up to 113 in July 2001 after former Rada Speaker Tkachenko joined their ranks.

110. Initially, the prosecutor's office held out the possibility that the body was Gongadze's, but they were the only party entertaining serious doubts.

111. On the Gongadze affair, see the three articles in *East European Constitutional Review*, summer 2001.

112. See the interview with Petro Symonenko available at www.part.org.ua (accessed on February 16, 2001); and the party's summary of the year's events, "2001 god: 'Torgovat' khlebom, a ne zemlei'," available at www.kpu.kiev.ua/kommunist/specpage4.htm.

113. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, April 16, 2002.

114. Numbers for the 2001 census are available at www.part.org.ua or www.ukraina.ru.

115. Having seemed to abstain on the first vote, the CPU formally did so again when For a United Ukraine secured the chairmanship of parliament for its leader Volodymyr Lytvyn on May 28. Bizarrely, Poteben'ko was expelled for being the one Communist to vote in favor.

116. John Ishiyama and András Bozóki, "Adaptation and Change: Characterizing the Survival Strategies of the Communist Successor Parties," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 17, no. 3 (September 2001), pp. 32–51; Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, pp. 190–192.