

## 6 Redefining ethnic and linguistic boundaries in Ukraine: indigenes, settlers and Russophone Ukrainians

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This chapter focuses on the politics of symbolic and cultural representation between (and within) three key groups of roughly equal size in Ukraine: Ukrainophone Ukrainians, Russophone Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. The threefold division is a simplification, but a useful one. It helps to explain why the titular nationality in Ukraine is divided within itself and has been unable to impose a nationalising agenda in the manner of Estonia and Latvia, or even some of the Central Asian states. It also helps to shift analysis away from ethnicity as the sole factor of importance in Ukrainian society and to focus attention on Russophone Ukrainians as a vital swing group. On the other hand, this chapter also seeks to deconstruct such categories by analysing the three groups as social constructs. It is not argued that they have immutable essences and boundaries.

According to Soviet census methodology (there has been no national census in Ukraine since independence in 1991; the first is scheduled for 1999), 64 per cent of the population of Ukraine in 1989 were classed as 'native tongue' Ukrainians, 9 per cent as ethnic Ukrainians who identified Russian as their 'native tongue' and 22 per cent were 'Russian' in terms of both ethnicity and language. The use of the term 'native tongue' in Soviet censuses (*rodna mova* in Ukrainian, *rodnoi iazyk* in Russian), however, was highly ambiguous. It tended to be interpreted in ancestral terms and therefore overlapped with ethnicity to an exaggerated extent. Moreover, ethnicity was further reified by the refusal to allow respondents to classify themselves by using multiple or (surprisingly) Soviet identities, by the practice of encoding father's ethnicity in ambiguous cases, and, by fixing ethnicity in passports, hindering the possibility of ethnic re-identification.

In Ukraine, however, ethnic and linguistic boundaries are exceptionally fluid. The raw figures of the 1989 census obscured the extent of Russian-language penetration of everyday life, and were unable to express the complicated and contested nature of the Ukrainian–Russian cultural 'border'. More recent studies have attempted to address realities of day-to-day language use in Ukraine by asking Ukrainian citizens about their language of *preference* in sociological surveys conducted by bilingual inter-

viewers. According to these, approximately 40 per cent of the population are Ukrainophone Ukrainians, 33–4 per cent Russophone Ukrainians and 20–1 per cent ethnic Russians.<sup>1</sup> However, although the latter approach is clearly more in line with observed reality in Ukraine, it can be readily accepted that as sociological categories the three ‘groups’ are currently highly amorphous entities for which clear-cut bounded identities and even agreed definitions do not yet exist. What, for example, is one to make of individuals who can move between Ukrainian and Russian at ease, those who speak the Ukrainian/Russian mixture known as *surzhyk* or those who are perfectly happy with a situational or mixed identity, all of whom are common identity types in Ukraine?<sup>2</sup>

It is the contested nature of identities in modern Ukraine which are their most interesting characteristic. We therefore take a different approach by concentrating on *discourse* as a constitutive feature of emerging group identities. Our argument is that it is precisely the processes through which each ‘group’ represents the other that are likely to define group boundaries and shape inter-group relations in the future. Identity formation and the creation and maintenance of group boundaries are very much ongoing processes. Both are inherently social phenomena, in which ‘identity formation and self/other relations’ are best explained ‘in terms of *different* discourse practices’.<sup>3</sup> Each group, or more exactly the ethnic entrepreneurs who claim to speak for the group, operates within a given field of discourse in which a variety of different elements are combined, but where there is also a characteristic core of ethnopolitical concepts which attempt to define the supposed essence of both the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Moreover, the structure of intra-group discourse helps to determine the status claims made by each group for itself and, correspondingly, the status it would apply to others. Negative stereotyping serves to reinforce differences and promote policies of exclusion, while a more open-ended discourse helps to prevent group polarisation.

However, once again, although each ‘group’ tends to reify the other, it should be stressed that ‘groups’ are socially constructed entities. The boundaries constructed by ethnic entrepreneurs are not immutable in reality. Indeed, in the Ukrainian case they are particularly fluid, and political entrepreneurs opposed to ethnic categorisations have sought to keep them so. Each side’s attempts to refute the characterisations of the other are overlain by voices that deny the significance of ethnic or linguistic boundaries at all. Nevertheless, it is also characteristic of ethnopolitical discourse to ignore such fluidity and assert that rival groups are always and everywhere ‘other’ and even alien.

This chapter seeks to examine the different discourse practices con-

structed by Ukrainophone Ukrainian, Russophone Ukrainian and Russian ethnic entrepreneurs, and also by those who deny the importance of ethnolinguistic identities in Ukraine. Ukrainophone Ukrainians have a characteristic ethnopolitical discourse that focuses on their unique rights as an 'indigenous' people or 'core nation', and correspondingly depicts ethnic Russians as outsiders, even as 'immigrants' or 'settlers', thereby potentially delegitimizing their long-term moral claim to the rights which the Ukrainian state has granted them since 1991. Ukrainophones characteristically also have a dismissive attitude to Russophone Ukrainian culture, wishing away its long history as the result of forcible 'Russification'.

Ethnic Russians on the other hand use totally different concepts in their characteristic cultural and political discourse. To a much greater extent than Russians in the Baltic states or Central Asia (Kazakhstan excepted), it can be claimed that Russians are also an indigenous people in Ukraine, especially in designated territories in the east and south. They should therefore enjoy the same rights as Ukrainians, including the right to the public use of the Russian language and to be left undisturbed in traditional cultural patterns. In fact some Russians go further and attempt to paint nationalist Ukrainophones as the 'aliens', the product of Habsburg, Polish or German 'intrigue' and an artificial implant into the Ukrainian body politic preventing Ukrainians and Russians from living in their natural state of fraternal harmony.

The third group, Russophone Ukrainians, are the crucial swing group. Although they share some of the same symbolic concepts as their Ukrainophone siblings, they deny the Ukrainophone nationalist assertion that cultural and linguistic crossover into the Russian space is the result of forcible 'Russification' alone, and claim that their own tradition has always existed in parallel with the nationalist vision of the Ukrainian 'self'. Again, Russophone Ukrainians assert that theirs is also a genuine indigenous tradition with deep historical roots.

Finally, attempts by ethnic entrepreneurs to reify the boundaries of the three groups are offset by a broad set of discourse practices that depict cultural and linguistic crossover as historical and natural (as with Russophone Ukrainians) and seek to avoid unnecessary group polarisation.

Our key argument is therefore that questions of national identity in Ukraine cannot be understood via a crude contrast between 'Ukrainians' as the eponymous state-bearing nation and 'Russians' as a diaspora group of the Russian Federation, but only through an examination of the complex interrelationships between the three 'groups' outlined above.

Although Ukraine is often presented as a model civic state, this study will demonstrate how underlying tensions between the three groups are likely to shape the future Ukrainian polity and the possibilities for ethnolinguistic accord.

### **Ethnic Ukrainians: the discourse of indigenous rights**

The key concepts structuring Ukrainophone identity and Ukrainophone attitudes towards the other two groups are indigenoussness, colonialism and Russification.<sup>4</sup> Together they form a classic nationalist argument for the privileged rights of the titular people. In addition, when speaking on behalf of all Ukrainians, Ukrainophones assume that their 'European' past distinguishes them from Russians. A final factor to be considered is the tension between historical-political and linguistic conceptions of the Ukrainian 'national idea', that is, of national identity.

#### *The Ukrainians as an indigenous people*

Ukraine is not an 'ethnic democracy'. It has not attempted to confine political rights to the titular nation. In sharp contrast to Estonia and Latvia, the citizenship issue was largely defused in the immediate aftermath of independence. The Law on Citizenship passed by the Ukrainian parliament in October 1991 granted citizenship to all those then resident in Ukraine, and this open-ended commitment has since been reinforced by Ukraine's accession to a series of international treaties and organisations, such as the Council of Europe in 1995 (paradoxically many members of the Ukrainian left welcomed this particular step as a means of increasing third-party leverage over 'minority rights' issues in Ukraine).<sup>5</sup>

In practice, however, political debate has continued around questions of group identity and group rights. In the early phase of 'national revival', most 'national-democratic' groups consciously avoided explicitly ethnic appeals and promoted the concept of a 'Ukrainian political nation', a 'single socium' of all Ukraine's various ethnic and linguistic groups.<sup>6</sup> However, on closer examination this was never a purely civic concept. Ukrainian national-democrats have always said at the same time that the 'core of this union is the Ukrainian people'.<sup>7</sup> Significantly, when it came to adopting a new Ukrainian constitution in the early 1990s, they attempted to insist that it define sovereign power as residing with the 'Ukrainian people [*ukraïns'kyi narod*]', with the clear understanding that this means – as, in essence, in Latvia and Estonia – the titular nationality alone.<sup>8</sup> The same elision is evident in such alternative formulae as 'we, the

Ukrainian people – the union [*sukupnist*] of citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities, the basis of which is formed by the Ukrainian nation'.<sup>9</sup>

Many national-democrats have demanded more straightforwardly that 'the constitution should fix that the Ukrainian state is established on the basis of the sovereign self-determination of the Ukrainian nation', that Ukrainians should be the 'leading element' in the state, and that 'the national character of Ukrainian statehood', 'a state of the indigenous Ukrainian people', should be recognised.<sup>10</sup>

Their position therefore crosses over to opinions held on the political fringes, where radical Ukrainophones have had no qualms in referring specifically and frequently to the need to create a 'national state', and have attacked the idea of building a community based on 'cosmopolitanism or false internationalism'.<sup>11</sup> They have argued that 'by means of [such] perfidious formula[e] the Ukrainian people, an indigenous [*korinnyi*] people on their ancestral territory, are deprived of the right to create their own state . . . a right that is given over to national minorities . . . to create a cosmopolitan state [with the assistance of] outside forces'.<sup>12</sup> Radical nationalists have talked instead of a state tailored 'to the customs and tastes' of Ukrainians,<sup>13</sup> and have revived the slogans popular in western Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s of a 'national dictatorship [*natsiokratiiia*]',<sup>14</sup> and 'Ukraine for the Ukrainians'.<sup>15</sup> (The idea of a *natsiokratiiia* is a state in the service of the nation, 'understood as an ethnos, building its own statehood, with power over itself and over national minorities'.)<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, since 1990 the dynamics of political competition within the Ukrainophone camp have encouraged outbidding to the nationalist right.<sup>17</sup> All elections since 1990 have shown that Ukrainophone nationalists could make only limited inroads into the Russophone electorate (that is, neither to ethnic Russians *nor* to Russophone Ukrainians). In core support areas of western and central Ukraine, national-democrats have therefore had to compete with the radical right rather than risk appealing across linguistic boundaries, and the discourse of a 'Ukrainian political nation' has gradually been superseded by the rhetoric of ethnic revival.<sup>18</sup>

However, it should not be assumed that all Ukrainophones are nationalists. Many have continued in the attempt to define ethnicity out of the political equation by promoting the idea of the 'people of Ukraine' (*narod Ukrainy*), as in Lithuania, where sovereignty is vested in a political abstract, the 'nation of Lithuania' rather than the 'Lithuanian nation',<sup>19</sup> or have preferred to use the explicitly multiethnic concept 'the peoples of Ukraine'.<sup>20</sup> Both formulations, however, are anathema to Ukrainophone nationalists: the former because it threatens to dissolve the Ukrainian nation into a new and 'artificial' imagined community, the latter because

it contradicts the fundamental nationalist belief that only the Ukrainians (and Crimean Tatars and Karaïm) are real indigenous peoples *of* Ukraine – other minorities simply live *in* Ukraine. They have ‘homelands’ elsewhere.

The 1996 constitution compromised by adopting the formula, ‘we, the Ukrainian people – citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities’, a rather awkward combination of a singular (though collective) noun with a liberal policy commitment.<sup>21</sup> It also defined the ‘right to self-determination’ as somehow belonging jointly to ‘the existing Ukrainian nation, all the Ukrainian people’.<sup>22</sup> In contrast, a draft Law on Indigenous Peoples prepared in 1996 promised to grant certain rights to groups such as the Crimean Tatars, whilst at the same time promoting ‘the renewal and free development of the *dominant nation*’.<sup>23</sup>

Ukrainophone nationalists have not, therefore, been able to impose a narrow nationalising agenda on Ukrainian politics. In part this is because they have to share power with ethnic Russians and/or Russophones. In fact, the latter are arguably dominant in government. Without the support of at least Russophone Ukrainians, Ukrainophones do not have a sufficient critical mass to enforce a wholesale Ukrainianisation policy. Ukraine is therefore not a paradigmatic ‘nationalising state’ in its political practice, although this does not mean that many nationalist Ukrainophones would not like it to be so.<sup>24</sup>

### *Colonialism*

Ukrainophone attitudes towards the rights of ethnic Russians in Ukraine are also coloured by the assumption, hotly disputed by most Russians, that the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 began a process of Russian ‘colonisation’ of Ukraine (see also chapter 2).<sup>25</sup> The ‘natural’ order of affairs in Ukraine has therefore supposedly been turned upside down by the experience of empire, and Russians continue to enjoy the rights that ought to be reserved for the titular nation. As with Estonian or Latvian nationalism, the Russian presence on the national ‘homeland’ is delegitimised by characterising it as the result of imperial policy rather than voluntary migration. Formal legal equality for Ukrainians and Russians is therefore desirable on an abstract level, but it should not be allowed to perpetuate an unnatural situation brought about by force.

Moreover, many Ukrainophones would argue that quasi-colonial conditions still pertain in Ukraine, or at least that Ukraine still has to live with the consequences of the colonial experience that has turned Ukrainians into a minority in their own country, particularly in the east

and south. According to one of the leaders of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, for example, 'today in the large towns of the east and south of Ukraine we still see the unnatural, artificial . . . priority and privileges created by Russian tsarism and Bolshevik Moscow for the Russian ethnic minority, most of whom [arrived as] parasites in the state-bureaucratic structure and security apparatus created by the empire, [or occupied] colonial functions in the sphere of production and spiritual culture and participated in well-known policies of Russification [*rosiishchennia* – see below, pp. 127–8] and brutal repression of the Ukrainian word, the Ukrainian individual'.<sup>26</sup>

More moderate Ukrainophones are prepared to accept that Russians, having lived in Ukraine for centuries, are in some sense also 'rooted', but they would still deny that the Russians are truly indigenous: Russians do not live in Ukraine *as a nation* in the same manner as they do in their own homeland.<sup>27</sup> In a standard formula, Ukrainophone nationalists tend to confine the promise of 'national-cultural autonomy to those national minorities who do not have their own state beyond the borders of Ukraine' (i.e. excluding Russians).<sup>28</sup>

#### *Discourses of Europe*

To Ukrainophone nationalists, the presence of Russians in Ukraine also means the presence of 'Asia' in 'Europe'. As with many other east European peoples (see also chapter 5), Ukrainians conceive of themselves as an *Antemurale*, an outpost of European civilisation against both Islam and 'Asia'.<sup>29</sup> In this respect, it is Russia which is 'Asia' and therefore radically 'other',<sup>30</sup> while 'Europe', albeit mediated largely through Poland, was supposedly historically always a part of Ukrainian life until the imposition of Russian influence in 1654, 1793–5 or 1945.<sup>31</sup>

The consequences for perceptions of national identity are clear. The myth of Europe versus Asia places a very clear boundary marker between Ukrainians and Russians, widening an otherwise relatively narrow cultural gap. It also explains why the most common Ukrainian name for 'Russian' uses a place-name – *Moskaly* (a pejorative version of 'Muscovite'). The other side of the coin, however, is that a geographical definition of 'otherness' would also allow local Russians in Ukraine to be 'European', although for many nationalist Ukrainophones 'Asia' is a cultural phenomenon that affects all Russians alike.<sup>32</sup>

Russophone Ukrainians, on the other hand, should obviously also be 'European'. Hence Ukrainophone nationalists' incomprehension and anger when they prefer to assert the cultural solidarity of the eastern

Slavs, often against a common European or Atlantic 'other'. Ethnic Russians, presented with the equation of 'Europe' and 'Ukraine', may well reject both, or promote the idea of a 'Eurasian', pan-Slavic Ukraine, cleansed of its Galician 'Europeans'.

*The 'national idea'*

The Ukrainophone assumption that Russophone Ukrainians must lie on the same side of the cultural divide is a result of their essentially linguistic conception of the 'national idea'. Roman Szporluk has argued that the founding fathers of the Ukrainian national revival in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries originally framed Russian–Ukrainian difference in terms of rival myths of descent and of national 'character', and that the revival of this concept by Ukrainian dissidents in the 1960s helped establish a modern Ukrainian civic nationalism.<sup>33</sup> National identity was therefore essentially framed by a historical-political conception. However, during the nineteenth century, the Herderian equation of language and ethnicity also entered nationalist discourse.<sup>34</sup> Ukrainians did not, after all, then enjoy statehood. Nor were the territories they inhabited clearly bounded by administrative divisions, and they were often far removed from the key historical Ukrainian homelands of the Kievan and Cossack periods. It was therefore to an extent predictable that the founders of Ukrainian political geography used language as the primary determinant of ethnicity,<sup>35</sup> and by equating the two felt able to assert the existential unity of all Ukrainians. Moreover, in the multilingual states of eastern Europe, retention of one's 'native' language has always been a key status issue, and assimilation implies a loss of 'authenticity'.

Most contemporary Ukrainophone nationalists simply assume that ethnicity and language naturally coincide. Even those who are committed to the idea of a 'civic nation' would build it around their own ethnolinguistic 'core', and language revival is always to the forefront of their programmes.<sup>36</sup> In part, following Herder, this is conceptual: 'language', they argue, 'is the main sign of the ethnos . . . the genetic code of the nation',<sup>37</sup> but it is also due to the historical argument that Ukrainians who speak Russian do so only as a result of forcible Russification (see below, pp. 127–8).

Ukrainophone activists tend to assume that mobilisation strategies which rely on the myths and symbols of the Ukrainian-language group can in fact appeal to *all* ethnic Ukrainians. However, in practice their conceptual framework makes unwarranted assumptions about Russophone Ukrainian identity, which is much more of a *mélange* of ethnic, linguistic, cultural and historical influences.<sup>38</sup>



*Russification*

Ukrainophone Ukrainians tend to deny that Russophone Ukrainians, unlike ethnic Russians, are in any real sense 'other', and that any departure from this situation must be the result of artificial 'Russification', itself a product of Ukraine's past colonial status. Ukrainophones argue that the sheer depth of penetration of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the unnatural division 'between Russian Ukraine and Ukrainian Ukraine',<sup>39</sup> can be explained only as a consequence of forcible administrative pressure, rather than in terms of natural cultural affinity or free choice. The only point of dispute is whether the normal Ukrainian term for 'Russification', *rusyfikatsiia*, is capable of giving full expression to this phenomenon. Radicals have argued that it should be replaced by *rosiishchennia* or *Moskovshchennia*, as *rusyfikatsiia* is supposedly a Germanism derived from the malapropism *Rus'*, actually the name of the medieval (for nationalists proto-Ukrainian) Kievan state, whereas the real historical agent of enforced acculturation has been the modern Russian state (*Rosiia* or *Rossiia*), or, more succinctly, Moscow. Moreover, the broader terms help to emphasise aspects of acculturation beyond the mere loss of language.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, the term 'Sovietisation', which would arguably provide a more accurate insight into the nature of Russophone Ukrainian identity, is rarely used.

The proliferation of terms indicates a certain confusion as to the exact identity of Ukraine's 'other'. Nevertheless, in all variants it is assumed that a genuine Ukrainian identity existed in the past before it was 'Russified'. It can therefore be restored. Because it is assumed that Russophone Ukrainians are simply 'denationalised [*vynarodovlenni*] Ukrainians' or 'cultural hermaphrodites',<sup>41</sup> the hapless victims of 'Russification', Russian-speaking culture is not regarded by Ukrainophone nationalists as having a legitimate historical foundation in Ukraine (indeed, it is denied that it is a *culture* as such), which cannot but cast doubt on the solidity of legal guarantees on language rights, however generous. The formal position of legal tolerance has to be set against the nationalist desire to 'unite a disjoined [*rozporoshenyi*] people into a single national organism',<sup>42</sup> that is, the hope that in the long term the historical tendency of Ukrainians to assimilate to Russian language and culture will be reversed.

Despite such statements as 'for us nothing would be sweeter than the national enlightenment of the Russian population of Ukraine',<sup>43</sup> 'national revival' is in fact targeted in the first instance at Russophone Ukrainians and is predicated on the assumption that they will automatically respond to any Ukrainianisation campaign,<sup>44</sup> as indicated by the demand that 'the percentage of Russian-language schools in Ukraine should be reduced

[from just under 50 per cent] to the percentage of Russians in the population – 20 per cent [sic].<sup>45</sup> This, however, assumes a community of identity and interest that is not necessarily present. As Ukrainophone nationalists reject the historical foundations of the (putative) Russophone Ukrainian identity out of hand (see below, p. 133), they fail to grasp the true significance of potential boundary markers between the two groups.

*The assault on 'Little Russianism'*

The conceptual and historical framework of Ukrainophone nationalists has resulted in a long tradition of disdain for the local 'Little Russian' complex allegedly possessed by many Russophone Ukrainians and by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in general. Dmytro Dontsov, the ideological mentor of west Ukrainian nationalism between the two world wars, argued that the 'Russian complex', 'spiritual lameness', 'provincialism' and 'Moscowphilia' of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was the key reason for the relative weakness of the Ukrainian national movement.<sup>46</sup> Significantly, his views were echoed in the 1920s by the Soviet Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvyly'ovyi, who also attacked the 'psychological servility' and 'cultural epigonism' of the Russophone Ukrainian intelligentsia, who 'could not imagine themselves without the Russian conductor', because they were 'unable to defeat within [themselves] the slavish nature which has always worshipped the northern culture'.<sup>47</sup>

This theme was further developed by the émigré author Ievhen Malaniuk, who viewed 'Little Russianism' as a 'national disease' with 'pathological characteristics', a form of 'national defeatism . . . capitulation before the battle', creating 'a nationally defective type, maimed psychologically and spiritually, and – in consequence – even racially'.<sup>48</sup> 'Little Russianism' was therefore seen mainly as the product of weakness of character. Unlike political Austrianism under the Habsburg Empire, it did not result from rational calculation and free choice, but was a 'brutal, mass-mechanical fabrication', the product of 'the terrorist-police machine of a totalitarian state'.<sup>49</sup> Unlike Austria, Russia was incapable of creating a true synthesis of identities, only of 'tearing up the living organisms of the conquered and powerless nations'. It was Ukraine's misfortune that not only the peasant 'dark masses' but also the 'semi-intelligentsia and intelligentsia' were so 'denationalised', depriving the nation of its 'brain centre'.<sup>50</sup>

The theme of betrayal by one's own brethren has often crowded out a more honest analysis of the deep-seated historical reasons for the bifurcation of ethnic Ukrainian culture. Even after independence in 1991, and

especially after the election of Leonid Kuchma as Ukrainian president in 1994, many nationalist Ukrainophones have argued that state power was being hijacked by slavish Russophiles.<sup>51</sup> The October 1995 'Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia', for example, attacked the 'higher echelons of power' in Ukraine, 'vulgar cosmopolitans',<sup>52</sup> who were accused of 'turning on orphan [*bezridnykh*] lumpen elements, who are indifferent to who feeds them or controls their national riches', to conduct a *de facto* 'Russian nationalist' policy of 'turning their native land into a colony of Russia'. 'The majority of politicians speak the language of a foreign country', it continued, and had allowed what was 'in essence ethnic cleansing to be conducted against Ukrainians in Ukraine'.<sup>53</sup>

#### **Ethnic Russians: a diaspora in the making?**

Ethnic Russians have lived in Ukraine for centuries. On the other hand, they have never really developed a fully formed identity attuned to the circumstances of being 'Russians-in-Ukraine'. Nevertheless, they also have a characteristic political discourse relating to their history and perceived status, directed in particular at two of the key fundamentals of the Ukrainophone nationalist worldview, 'colonialism' and 'indigenoussness'.

Firstly, in contrast to the Ukrainophone view of history, ethnic Russians tend to argue that local population movements have been voluntary and multidirectional, and that the gradual influx of ethnic Russians to the south-east of Ukraine represented a process of peaceful settlement rather than colonial 'occupation'. Secondly, ethnic Russians would therefore also claim that they are no less 'indigenous' than Ukrainians in large areas of eastern and southern Ukraine.<sup>54</sup> They should certainly not be classed as a 'national minority' (in Soviet times 'national minorities' came low in the ethnic pecking order, below the titular nationalities of the fifteen union republics and twenty autonomous republics).<sup>55</sup>

For example, the Crimean 'Congress of the Russian People' declared in 1996 that 'the Russian people [*Russkii Narod*] has lived continuously [*izdrevle*] on the territory of the modern state of Ukraine and in Crimea [sic] since the time of Kievan Rus', and cannot consider itself a newcomer or an occupying people, as some historians and politicians are trying to depict them . . . [The latter are in fact] representatives of other ethnic groups that arrived and formed themselves on the territory of Crimea and other regions of the state of Ukraine much later than the Russians, [although they] are now trying to claim exclusive national rights and priorities.'<sup>56</sup>

A draft law on the use of the Russian language in Ukraine prepared by

the Congress of Russian Organisations of Ukraine and Civic Congress of Ukraine in 1996 began with the following demand: 'considering the deep historical roots of Russians in Ukraine, their special role in the expansion and opening up of Ukrainian lands, and also their immense importance in the modern life of Ukraine, in agreement with Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution of Ukraine, [we call on the Ukrainian authorities] to recognise Russians alongside Ukrainians as an indigenous people of Ukraine'.<sup>57</sup>

According to one survey undertaken in 1991, 90 per cent of the Russian inhabitants of Crimea and 89 per cent of Russians in eastern Ukraine agreed with the statement, 'I do not consider myself a foreigner [*chuzim*] on the territory of this republic.'<sup>58</sup> 'Rootedness' has its consequences, however. In regions such as the Donbas it has supposedly meant the development of both a 'borderland'<sup>59</sup> and a 'melting-pot' identity,<sup>60</sup> shared with many ethnic Ukrainians. It is often argued that local Russians are therefore different from 'Muscovites' (*Moskaly*), because they 'have taken on certain local values and attitudes, which have created clear differences between them and Russians in Russia'.<sup>61</sup> Russians in Crimea might speak 'Moscow' Russian and could be compared to 'true Russians, but their language is fundamentally different from the Russian-Ukrainian mixture of the south-eastern tracts [*smuhy*] of Ukraine . . . for the inhabitants of the Donbas the [mixed] language of Kiev or neighbouring Rostov is closer than Crimean-Russian'.<sup>62</sup> In so far as this is a point sometimes made by Ukrainophones, it undermines the radical othering of 'colonial' Russians that is otherwise characteristic of Ukrainophone discourse.

On the other hand, this possible 'southern Russian' identity has yet to be properly articulated at an elite level. In the past Russian elites in Ukraine tended to think in all-Russian terms. Indeed, many were violent Ukrainophobes, such as Vasili Shul'gin, editor of the main Kiev daily *Kievlianin* before the 1917 revolution, or the author Mikhail Bulgakov, who grew up in Kiev.<sup>63</sup> Before 1914 Ukraine was a strong centre of Russian nationalist activity.<sup>64</sup> Local Ukrainophobe discourse, however, has been mainly negative. The claims of Ukrainophiles have traditionally been refuted on all-Russian grounds, with little sense as yet of building up a positive understanding of what it means to be a Russian in Ukraine. Ukrainian independence therefore suddenly cut local Russians off from their traditional source of myths and symbols, and without an obvious identity map political mobilisation has been surprisingly difficult.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, like Russophone Ukrainians, Russians in Ukraine do not have an influential culture-forming intelligentsia. There was a Russian intelligentsia in cities such as Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa before the revolution, but it did not survive Soviet rule.

Ethnic Russians in Ukraine therefore have an ambiguous notion of 'homeland', located partly in Ukraine, partly in the Russian Federation and partly in both at the same time. Russians in Ukraine do not yet define themselves as a 'diaspora', in terms of an irredenta of a broader homeland. Many are as confused by the appearance of the Russian Federation as they are by the emergence of an independent Ukraine. Most would define not only themselves, but also all their fellow eastern Slavs, as part of 'Eurasia'.<sup>66</sup> The logic of the Russian position therefore drives them towards support for the restoration of some kind of overarching political unity between Ukraine and Russia, rather than towards local separatism (Crimea excepted).

However, identity politics amongst Russians in Ukraine also depends in turn on the discourse and policies adopted by official and unofficial actors in the Russian Federation. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet break-up Russia has lacked the resources to make a serious bid for the identity and loyalty of Russians abroad. This is a political fact in itself, encouraging such Russians towards strategies of accommodation with the new host states. However, there remains considerable cultural capital in Ukraine on which Russian nationalist political entrepreneurs, either from Russia or in Ukraine itself, could draw in the event of worsening confrontation between the two states, especially if Ukrainophone nationalist discourse serves to 'other' and to alienate local Russians, or even Russophones en masse.

### **Russophone Ukrainians: two Ukraines?**

The Ukrainophone nationalist position is that Russophone Ukrainians are simply denationalised or *déraciné* Ukrainians. It can certainly be accepted that, of the three 'groups', it is most difficult to speak of a fully bounded identity in the case of Russophone Ukrainians. A Russophone Ukrainian is still a Ukrainian, but is nevertheless a Ukrainian of a specific type – or perhaps several types, as there are many ways in which the consequences of speaking Russian or adopting Russian culture can impact on identity. Russophone Ukrainians therefore possess sufficient elements of a separate identity, historically that of the 'Little Russian' (*maloros*), to justify their separate treatment.<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, this identity has meant different things at different times and in different places, in circumstances very different to the conditions prevailing in the post-Soviet period.

Originally, 'Little Russianism' developed as an identity for *all* Ukrainians, when, as most of Ukraine became a part of imperial Russia between 1654 and 1795, it defined a combination of loyalty to the tsar with continued localist sentiments.<sup>68</sup> By the nineteenth century, however,

it came to refer to those Ukrainians who had been progressively absorbed into the Russian cultural sphere (as, to a degree, with 'Anglo-Scots').<sup>69</sup> It followed from Ukrainian activists' own essentially linguistic definition of national identity that Ukrainian *malorosy* such as the playwright Mykola Gogol who consciously rejected the Ukrainian for the Russian language were somehow 'less Ukrainian'. However, as many Ukrainians in the nineteenth century identified with Russian culture *tout court*, 'Little Russian' still implied a certain residual loyalty to a local Ukrainian identity. Gogol himself wrote in an identifiably Ukrainian cultural milieu. Moreover, the 'Russia' with which many Ukrainians linked their identity was *rossiiskii* not *ruskii*, implying a broader identity which could somehow accommodate both Russians and Ukrainians.

This historical model is less appropriate to the circumstances in which Russophone Ukrainians find themselves at the turn of the millennium. The *maloros* has never before had to consider the possibility of a permanent political division between Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, in so far as 'Little Russianism' was an *instrumental* identity, a rational calculation of the greater practical and symbolic benefits of Russian culture, it may be losing its appeal (for the philosopher V'iacheslav Lypyns'kyi, Little Russianism was specifically a 'disease of statelessness').<sup>70</sup> The imperial centre that provided such a pole of attraction in the past is no longer capable of drawing Ukrainians into its service bureaucracy, although it may continue to exercise a certain cultural pull. English-language 'global culture' may increasingly provide an alternative escape route for those who continue to seek an identity capable of transcending Ukrainian 'provincialism', although indirect access to global culture is often still through Russian, despite Ukrainophile attempts to create a 'unified information space'.<sup>71</sup>

On the other hand, some aspects of Russophone Ukrainian identity may be valued in themselves; it should not be too readily assumed that 'Little Russianism' must now wither away as political boundaries begin to firm up and kick over the traces of past patterns of cultural interaction. Russophone Ukrainians have an existential interest in contesting Ukrainophone stereotypes on at least two points. There is no logical need for Russophone Ukrainians to care about Ukrainophone attitudes to 'indigenoussness', as the claim applies to all Ukrainians. However, Russophone Ukrainians are likely to challenge the discourse of 'colonialism' and 'Russification' and to resist attempts to characterise past (and future) relations with Russia in purely negative terms, as, in order to assert their own identity, it is important to stress that their crossover into Russian cultural space has been voluntary. The Ukrainophone nationalist

equation of ethnicity and language as joint determinants of national identity is therefore also likely to be rejected.

Ukrainophone historiography that excludes Russians and Russian-speakers from its narrative also has little appeal to Russophone Ukrainians (see chapter 2). Their view of Ukrainian–Russian relations requires a more catholic historical myth. For prominent Russophone Ukrainians, such as the former deputy chairman of the Ukrainian parliament and leader of the Interregional Block for Reforms Volodymyr Hryn'ov,<sup>72</sup> 'on the majority of what is now Ukrainian territory', centuries of history have been marked by 'the common development of two peoples close in language, culture and historical past – Ukrainians and Russians'.<sup>73</sup> The two languages in fact were like 'a pair of boots [*sapogi*], one the "left" and the other the "right"',<sup>74</sup> the two cultures sufficiently intertwined to be considered a 'broad transitional stratum [*shyrokyi marginal'nyi shar*']'.<sup>75</sup> There was therefore no historical basis to consider that 'Ukraine was ever a Russian colony, the Ukrainian people the people of a colonised country or that the Russian people were ever the "conquerors" of Ukraine'.<sup>76</sup> Rather, the common 'Eurasian space' inhabited by both Ukrainians and Russians has always possessed a 'special cultural value', above all the harmonious unity of the east Slavic peoples.<sup>77</sup> If Russia is claimed to be Ukraine's 'natural' partner and Russia is in 'Eurasia' or both Europe and Eurasia, then so is Ukraine, making it difficult for Ukraine to adopt an unambiguous trajectory towards Europe. Even those who embrace 'European values' argue that Ukraine and Russia ought to proceed towards Europe in tandem, or that Ukraine should revert to its seventeenth/eighteenth century role as a bridge to Europe for the whole Russophone world.<sup>78</sup>

The philosopher Myroslav Popovych has pointed out that there was no real 'ethnic division of labour' in Ukraine under the USSR. Russians and Ukrainians worked side by side; the so-called "colonisers" [never] created separate social-cultural enclaves'.<sup>79</sup> There has always been a voluntary crossover between what were never in any case completely separate cultural spheres. The present language situation in Ukraine cannot therefore be explained solely in terms of the actions of 'zealous Russifiers'.<sup>80</sup> A greater cultural gap in fact supposedly exists between the common diapason of Dnieper Ukraine and the nationalist west. Artificial Ukrainian–Russian hostility supposedly resulted from the atypical environment of 'underdeveloped' western Ukraine.<sup>81</sup> Myths of common Russo-Ukrainian struggle against enemies such as Nazi Germany remain strong.<sup>82</sup>

Resistance to an enforced choice between 'Ukrainian' and 'Russian' cultural spheres that many Russophone Ukrainians regard as in any case

only partially distinct remains a defining feature of the Russophone Ukrainian identity. In the words of one (Russian) activist, 'in terms of national-cultural identification we belong to a single Russian-Ukrainian cultural space', and should not therefore be forced artificially 'to chose between a mono- and polycultural' identity.<sup>83</sup> According to one survey in the Donbas in September 1992, only 12 per cent of the local sample (18 per cent of Ukrainians, 11 per cent of Russians) agreed with the Ukrainophone nationalist view that 'the population of the Donbas is in the main Ukrainians who have acquired specific characteristics because of the particularities of their living conditions' (that is, they have been 'Russified'). On the other hand, 49 per cent (48 per cent of Ukrainians, 49 per cent of Russians) agreed that 'a special community has been created in the Donbas, linked equally with both Ukraine and Russia'. Moreover, 58 per cent (55 per cent of Ukrainians, 61 per cent of Russians) expected that situation to continue.<sup>84</sup> Historical intermingling and high levels of mixed marriage in eastern and southern Ukraine mean that 'passport' ethnicity is often fairly meaningless.<sup>85</sup>

The Party of Slavonic Unity of Ukraine has attempted to provide an alternative identity for *all* Russophones in Ukraine (Russians and Ukrainians) by attempting to revive the term 'Rusichi' for individuals with a mixed east Slavic parentage, arguing that they have been developing as a 'nation' since the seventeenth century and now number some 127 million throughout the former USSR. The party argues that between nineteen and twenty million such 'Rusichi' live in Ukraine, making up the majority population in border regions of the south and east, and in neighbouring oblasts in Russia, where there has been a constant 'exchange of populations' since the time of the Cossacks.<sup>86</sup> In so far as the term 'Little Russian' (or indeed 'Rusich') identifies a real historical phenomenon, several Russophone activists have argued that 'there is nothing belittling in the word' and it should continue to be used.<sup>87</sup>

Nevertheless, it can be accepted that both historical 'Little Russianism' and the idea of a new 'Rusich' nation are largely theories about the *origins* of Russophone Ukrainian culture, or about orientations to state formations that have disappeared. They are less well attuned to providing a coherent *future* identity for Russophone Ukrainians. Indeed, opinion polls indicate that their political attitudes have lagged behind developments. Significantly, it is disproportionately Russophones (ethnic Russians *and* Russophone Ukrainians) who cling to a vanishing 'Soviet' identity,<sup>88</sup> and who have also expressed nostalgia for some form of overarching political union between Ukraine and Russia.<sup>89</sup>

An additional problem for Russophone Ukrainians is the lack of an obvious ideologue to give moral and historical support to their position.



Possible mentors, such as Mykola Kostomarov and Panteleimon Kulish, nineteenth-century Ukrainian writers who argued that Ukrainian and Russian culture could coexist, have been co-opted by contemporary Ukrainian nationalists as prophets of national revival.<sup>90</sup> Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi, revered by many Russophones for uniting Russians and Ukrainians against the oppression of 'Poles and Lithuanians',<sup>91</sup> remains an ambiguous figure, as he also led the Ukrainian 'national uprising' of 1648. Moreover, Russophile Ukrainians, such as (in his later years) Iakiv Holovats'kyi in western Ukraine or Volodymyr Vernads'kyi, Iurii Kotsiubyns'kyi and Maksym Kovalevs'kyi in the east,<sup>92</sup> do not receive the prominence in recent histories that they deserve (as is also true of the powerful Russophile movement in Galicia before 1914).<sup>93</sup> Even Gogol, perhaps the best example of the mutual influence of Ukrainian and Russian culture, has been shifted more into the Ukrainian camp.<sup>94</sup> Without a culture-forming intelligentsia, however, Russophone Ukrainian identity is likely to remain amorphous and vulnerable to assimilation at either extreme.

The great paradox for Russophone Ukrainians is that, while their numbers are much larger than has traditionally been assumed, organised collective action in defence of their interests has been less frequent and less formidable than might have been predicted from strength of numbers alone. Moreover, without a clear-cut sense of identity this situation is likely to persist. Significantly, both ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians have had difficulty in forming social movements and political parties without the relative advantages of the symbolic and institutional resources enjoyed by Ukrainophones.<sup>95</sup>

#### **Deconstructing boundaries: alternative narratives of identity**

Not all political leaders in Ukraine can be classed as ethnic entrepreneurs. Many politicians, including some of those already mentioned above, have used explicitly non-ethnic or pan-ethnic mobilisational strategies, or, if they accept that there is no natural 'ethnopolitical unity' in Ukrainian society,<sup>96</sup> have argued that different ethnic and language groups must enjoy equal status, as 'the interests, rights and specific traits and language of one nation' (i.e. Ukrainians) must not be placed 'above those of other nations and nationalities'.<sup>97</sup> As in Estonia and Latvia, pressure from international organisations such as the Council of Europe and OSCE has also worked against the reification of identities. Moreover, although 'civic' ideals command less of a consensus in Ukraine than they did in 1990–1, moderate voices are over-represented in government,

while nationalist entrepreneurs of whatever hue are confined to the wings.

Many elites, including many liberal Ukrainophones, have continued to promote the idea of subsuming all ethnic and linguistic differences in Ukraine into a single 'Ukrainian political nation'. The Donbas-based Liberal Party of Ukraine, for example, has called for 'international and interconfessional accord as the basis for forming the citizens of Ukraine into a Ukrainian political nation',<sup>98</sup> the Socialist Party of Ukraine for a new political culture anchored in a 'mass consciousness based on the ideas of internationalism'.<sup>99</sup> In another favourite formula of the parties of the left, it is argued that 'Russians and Ukrainians are two branches of the one people of Ukraine'.<sup>100</sup> President Kuchma and others have consistently defended the virtues of a multiethnic society (it helps that Kuchma is, in his background at least, an archetypal Russophone Ukrainian).<sup>101</sup> Others have talked of the simultaneous consolidation of a 'Ukrainian nation (ethnosocial definition)', that is, of disparate regional identities and ethnographic subgroups (Lemkos, Rusyns, etc.) within the ethnic Ukrainian group, and of a 'Ukrainian nation (ethnopolitical definition)', that is, all those subjectively oriented towards the Ukrainian state.<sup>102</sup>

A second political strategy open to those on the left is to continue to locate this pan-ethnic ideal in a still extant 'Soviet' identity. Mention has already been made of the persistence of 'Soviet' identity on a mass level, particularly in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine. It is tempting to classify this a generational phenomenon that will fade away in time but, as it also expresses the desire to maintain some form of overarching identity between Ukraine and Russia, it may prove surprisingly persistent. In regions such as the Donbas the percentage defining themselves as 'Soviet' has declined only slowly in the immediate post-independence period.<sup>103</sup> Many on the left continue to talk as if the 'Soviet people' still existed and remained an active social group.<sup>104</sup>

Advocates of the primacy of regional identities have also adopted pan-ethnic strategies on a smaller scale. The Crimean constitution adopted in September 1992 spoke of sovereign power resting with 'citizens of the republic of Crimea of all nationalities, who make up the people of Crimea [*narod Kryma*]'.<sup>105</sup> Similarly, political entrepreneurs in the Donbas have continued to argue for the primacy of a local (*Donchanin*) identity, as have some in Odesa (*Odessiti* or *Chornomorts'i*), Kharkiv (*Slobozhani*) and elsewhere.<sup>106</sup>

An alternative strategy has been the attempt to mobilise all Russophones (ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians) together against the 'nationalising' strategies of Ukrainophones, given the fact that 'almost half the population of Ukraine considers it [Russian] their native language'.<sup>107</sup> To this end, Russophone activists have argued that 'there is a

division *within* the Ukrainian ethnos' which is 'historical-cultural' rather than ethnic, between 'those who consider that Ukraine is a part of the general Russian ethnos . . . and those who think that Ukraine and Russia are different states and different cultures which are fundamentally opposed to one another'.<sup>108</sup> In part, this divide is held to overlap with that between the Uniate Catholic west and the Orthodox majority, although at the same time the common Orthodoxy shared by most Ukrainians and Russians has tended to diminish the salience of religious identity markers in Ukraine.<sup>109</sup>

Significantly, the founding father of the Ukrainian national movement, the historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, himself warned in 1906 (when Ukrainian territories were still divided between the Habsburg and Romanov Empires) that there was a danger of the Ukrainians, like 'the Serbs and the Croats' forming 'two nationalities on one ethnographic base'.<sup>110</sup> Modern Russophone activists have therefore often argued that Ukrainians in Dnieper Ukraine should make common cause with ethnic Russians against nationalist Ukrainophones in the west, thereby turning the Galicians with their peculiar history into the 'other'. 'Urban Galicians', according to the Party of Slavonic Unity of Ukraine, 'are a nation formed out of passive Slavdom, a national-aggressive type of world Jewry, relics and ethnically embedded Armenians, Germans, Hungarians, Tatars, Poles, Lemkos, Boikos and others, mixed together after the Austrian revolution of 1848–9' (see also chapter 2).<sup>111</sup> They, not Russians, are the true 'fifth column' in Ukraine.<sup>112</sup>

Although this 'historical-cultural' divide is not itself linguistic, it can interact with linguistic divisions, as in the 1994 presidential election, when anti-Ukrainophile activists successfully appealed for a common front of all Russophones against the incumbent president Leonid Kravchuk (who was supported on this occasion by both western Ukraine and the Right Bank of central Ukraine).<sup>113</sup>

Significantly, the Congress of 'Russian' (*Russkikh*) Organisations of Ukraine founded in March 1996 did not narrow its target constituency to ethnic Russians alone. It variously defined itself as 'a movement of citizens of Russian culture of all nationalities',<sup>114</sup> and of those who 'recognise the Russian language and culture as their own, alongside any other language and culture'.<sup>115</sup> Its leader (*starosta*), Aleksandr Baziliuk (also head of the Civic Congress of Ukraine), talked at various times of 'defending the rights of Russian-speaking [*russkoiazychnye*] citizens . . . of all citizens who consider Russia their homeland' (a Russia with 'a thousand-year history' from the time of Kievan Rus') and even of 'citizens of Russian culture'.<sup>116</sup> The Congress talked of uniting Ukraine's 'twelve million

ethnic Russians and thirty million Russian-speakers [sic].<sup>117</sup>

### Conclusions

The range of identity options in Ukraine is clearly wider than in many other post-communist states, despite the best efforts of ethnic entrepreneurs both to reify their own group and to firm up its boundaries by 'othering' outsiders. Significantly, survey evidence (from 1993–4) indicates that some 25–6 per cent of the population of Ukraine continue to think of themselves as somehow *both* Ukrainian and Russian.<sup>118</sup> (In a 1997 survey, 14.4 per cent saw themselves as both Ukrainian and Russian, 5.2 per cent as 'more Russian than Ukrainian' and 9.9 per cent as 'more Ukrainian than Russian'.)<sup>119</sup> Moreover, the boundary between the Russian and Russophone Ukrainian 'groups' is as fluid as that between Ukrainophones and Russophone Ukrainians. Indeed, when questions of language are to the forefront in the determination of identity it makes more sense to consider all Russophones together.

Ukraine may in the long run succeed in building a more culturally homogeneous society.<sup>120</sup> The political realities of independence are likely to shape identities to an extent. On the other hand, cultural groupings, especially those with such large critical masses (using the survey evidence cited above, there are something like 21 million Ukrainophone Ukrainians, 17 million Russophone Ukrainians and 11 million Russians), have often shown extraordinary resilience. Many other culturally divided societies, such as Canada and Belgium, have retained internal distinctions, despite periodic 'nationalising' pressures emanating from the centre.

In Ukraine therefore 'in'- and 'out'-group boundaries are likely to remain contested, with the efforts of ethnic entrepreneurs to promote the identity of their own group and to identify targets for assimilation opposed by those who would rather see boundaries remain fluid.

and Mayer Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

- 76 *Postimeses*, 30 October 1995.
- 77 The Baltic states are especially important to Russia in this regard given that three-quarters of all the diaspora in the post-Soviet states who have taken out Russian citizenship now reside within Estonia and Latvia.
- 78 *Pravda*, 15 April 1996.
- 79 For a consideration of the role of the ethnic patron as a political resource in the Donbas and north-east Estonia, see Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, 'Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora'.
- 80 *Izvestiia*, 4 July 1993.
- 81 For an earlier discussion of far right nationalist groups in Russia and their ties with the diaspora, see *Rossia*, no. 37, 2 October 1994, p. 3. This contrasts with those Russian political parties in Estonia who are committed to a sovereign Estonia but who want to see the political institutionalisation of a more multiculturalist society. Such political parties are quite open about their political links with more moderate political parties in Russia, notably with such democratic organisations as Yabloko and the Party of Russian Unity and Concord.
- 82 For a discussion of the Communist Party in Russia and its post-1991 geographical vision for Russia, see Yevgeny Vinokurov, 'Overdosing on Nationalism: Gennadii Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', *New Left Review*, 1997, pp. 34–52.
- 83 Robin Cohen, 'Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers', *International Affairs*, vol. 72 (3), 1996, pp. 507–20.

## 6 REDEFINING ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC BOUNDARIES IN UKRAINE: INDIGENES, SETTLERS AND RUSSOPHONE UKRAINIANS

- 1 Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko, 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', *Harriman Institute Review*, vol. 9 (1–2), March 1996, pp. 81–91; Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, 'The Political Orientations of Different Regions and Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Ukraine Since Independence', in Taras Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
- 2 See Paul S. Pirie, 'National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48 (7), November 1996, pp. 1079–1104, and Yuri L. Shevchuk, 'Citizenship in Ukraine: A Western Perspective', in John S. Micgiel (ed.), *State and Nation Building in East and Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: Columbia University, Institute on East Central Europe, 1996), pp. 351–69, for some preliminary thoughts on the open-ended nature of identities in Ukraine.
- 3 Iver B. Neumann, 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2 (2), June 1996, pp. 139–74, at p. 162; emphasis in original.
- 4 See also Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. ch. 6.

- 5 See Iukhym Kachurenko (ed.), *Prava liudyny: mizhnarodni dohovory Ukraïny* (Kiev: Iurinform, 1992). Whereas the 1991 citizenship law allowed for the possibility of dual citizenship if appropriate bilateral agreements were negotiated, this provision was withdrawn in 1996.
- 6 *Prohrama i statut Narodnoho Rukhu Ukraïny (zminy ta dopovnennia vneseni III Vseukraïnsk'ymy zboramy Narodnoho Rukhu Ukraïny 1 bereznia 1992 r.)* (Kiev: Rukh, 1992), p. 13.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 See the appeal in *Chas/Time*, 28 June 1996; and also Iurii Badz'o, 'Ukraïna: chetverta sprobna, abo chy vyzhyvut' ukraïntsi?', *Rozbudova derzhavy*, nos. 9 and 10 (September–October), 1995; Mykhailo Vivcharyk, 'Etno-natsional'na polityka na etapi ukraïnsk'oho derzhavotvorennia', *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 12 (December), 1994; Ihor Pas'ko, 'Natsional'na ideia: varianty na tli ievropeisk'oi kul'tury', *Skhid*, nos. 4 and 5–6, 1996.
- 9 Volodymyr Doroshkevych, 'Nadiliiuchy vladoiu, spodivaiut'sia na vid-dachu', *Holos Ukraïny*, 9 April 1996.
- 10 'Postanova Konhresu Ukraïnsk'oi Intelligentsii', *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 16 November 1995; 'Prohramovi zasady Kongresu natsional'no-demokratychnykh syl', *Samostiina Ukraïna*, no. 31 (August), 1992. In *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s* (at p. 151), I defined this as a form of 'ethnic-led territorialism'. Cf. Oleksii Haran', 'Ukraïnsk'ku derzhavu ne mozhna buduvaty na kosmopolitychnii osnovi', *Den*', no. 5, 9 October 1996.
- 11 *Prohrama Ukraïnsk'oi konservatyvnoi respublikansk'oi partii* (Kiev: Party document, 1992).
- 12 Stepan Khmara, 'Konstytutsiinyi protses i bezpeka natsii', *Holos Ukraïny*, 30 April 1996. Although Khmara is on the far right, the views expressed by Iurii Badz'o, former leader of the supposedly moderate Democratic Party, are little different; see his 'Osnova pravdy nashoi', *Holos Ukraïny*, 6 May 1996.
- 13 Hryhorii Prykhod'ko, *Politychni vizii* (L'viv: Ukraïnsk'kyi chas, 1994), p. 12; Volodymyr Iavors'kyi, 'Vidlunnia velykoi Ukraïny: suchasna kontseptsiiia ukraïnsk'oho natsionalizmu', *Napriam*, no. 3, 1992.
- 14 Roman Koval', *Pidstavy natsiokratii* (Kiev: DSU, 1994). 'Natsiokratia' was the title of a book published by Mykola Stsibors'kyi in 1942 (Prague: Proboem).
- 15 'DSU – orhanizatsiia Ukraïntsiiv', *Neskorena natsiia*, no. 14, 1993; Ivan Kandyba, 'Khto my?', *Neskorena natsiia*, no. 2, 1992.
- 16 'Politychna filosofiiia DSU', copy in author's possession, dated May 1991.
- 17 See also Lee Kendall Metcalf, 'Outbidding to Radical Nationalists: Minority Policy in Estonia, 1989–1993', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 2 (2), July 1996, pp. 213–34.
- 18 Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*, ch. 5.
- 19 Graham Smith (ed.), *The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 189.
- 20 Volodymyr Zolotor'ov, 'Rubikon ishche poperedu?', *Den*', no. 1, 1996. See also the discussion in Oleksandr Derhachov and Volodymyr Polokhalo (eds.), *Modeli derzhavnosti ta derzhavnoho ustroiu Ukraïny na porozii XXI stolittia* (Kiev: Politychna dumka, 1996).

- 21 Some have therefore argued that the phrase ‘Ukrainian people [*ukraïns’kyi narod*] now has two meanings – narrow and broad, the traditional-ethnic and the general-civic’: Iurii Badz’o, ‘Istorychni nebezpeky na nashomu shliakhu do hromadians’koho suspil’stva’, *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 6 March 1997.
- 22 *Konstytutsiia Ukraïny* (Kiev: Secretariat of the Ukrainian Parliament, 1996), p. 3; also in *Zerkalo nedeli*, 13 July 1996.
- 23 ‘Concept of the National Policy of Ukraine in Relation to Indigenous Peoples (Draft)’, English version, p. 1; emphasis added.
- 24 Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Dominique Arel, ‘Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State’, in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 157–88.
- 25 See for example the statement by the veteran dissident Levko Luk’ianenko at the spring 1992 congress of Rukh that, until 1991, ‘we were a colony and regarded our government as an occupying administration’: *III Vseukraïns’ki Zbory Narodnoho Rukhu Ukraïny 28 liutoho–1 bereznia 1992 roku (Stenohrafichnyi svit)* (Kiev: Rukh, 1992), p. 97.
- 26 Serhii Zhyzhko, ‘Meta i zavdannia ukraïns’koho natsionalistichnoho rukhu’, in *Materiïaly pershoho zboru Kongresu Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv* (Kiev: Holovnyi Provid Kongresu Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv, 1995), pp. 31–4, at p. 32.
- 27 Author’s interview with Pavlo Movchan, 26 October 1994.
- 28 *Prohrama i statut Narodnoho Rukhu Ukraïny*, pp. 12–13.
- 29 The Ukrainian version of this myth is considered in more detail in my *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*, ch. 7. See also Ivan Dziuba, ‘Ukraïna i svit’ and ‘Ukraïna i Rosiia’, in Ihor Ostash (ed.), *Quo vadis, Ukraïno?* (Odesa: Maiak, 1992), pp. 10–54.
- 30 Ievhen Hutsalo, *Mental’nist’ ordy* (Kiev: Prosvita, 1996); Leonid Zaluzniak, ‘Ukraïna na Evraziïsi’komu rosdorizzi’, *Vechirniï Kyïv*, 16 August 1996.
- 31 Cf. Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine Between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), 1996).
- 32 Roman Koval’, *Chy mozhlyve Ukraïno-Rosiïsi’ke zamyrennia?* (L’viv: Stryi, 1991).
- 33 Roman Szporluk, ‘Des marches de l’empire à la construction d’une nation’, *L’autre Europe*, no. 30–1, 1995, pp. 134–50; and his ‘The Ukraine and Russia’, in Robert Conquest (ed.), *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 151–82.
- 34 Valerii Soldatenko, Volodymyr Kryzhaniv’skyi, Iurii Levenets’ et al., *Ukraïns’ka ideia: istorychnyi narys* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1995); and Soldatenko et al. (eds.), *Ukraïns’ka ideia: pershi rechnyky* (Kiev: Znannia, 1994).
- 35 The key works of Stepan Rudnyts’kyi, the founder of Ukrainian political geography, are reprinted in *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoï Ukraïny* (L’viv: Svit, 1994).
- 36 See the letter to President Kuchma signed by over 170 parliamentary

- deputies, 'Hrih smiiatysia nad matir''iu', in *Holos Ukraïny*, 4 February 1995, and Mykhailo Kosiv, 'Bez movy nemaie narodu: bez narodu nemaie derzhavy', *Holos Ukraïny*, 16 September 1994.
- 37 Pavlo Movchan, 'Bula, ie i bude!', *Visnyk Prosvity*, special issue no. 1, 1994, p. 3. See also Tamila Pan'ko and Mariia Bilous, *Slovo v dukhovnomu zhytti natsii* (Kiev: Znannia, 1995).
- 38 Survey evidence analysed by Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko shows that Russophone Ukrainians are closer to ethnic Russians on the language issue, but lie between Ukrainophones and ethnic Russians on political issues, such as the maintenance of statehood: 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', at pp. 86–8.
- 39 Badz'o, 'Istorychni nebezpeky'.
- 40 Vasyl' Lyzanchuk, *Navichno kaidany kuvaly: fakty, dokumenty, komentari pro rusyfikatsiiu v Ukraïni* (L'viv: Akademiia nauk Ukraïny, Instytut etnologii, 1995), pp. 17–19. See also Leonid Poltava (ed.), *Rosiishchennia Ukraïny* (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1984; reprinted in Kiev, 1992).
- 41 The first term is from the article by Iurii Badz'o, 'Ukraïna: chetverta sprobha, abo chy vyzhyvut' ukraïntsi?', *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 9 (September), 1995, p. 5; the second from the polemic, 'Nova Ukraïna chy nova koloniia?', signed by sixteen nationalist deputies and academics and designed as a rebuttal of the book published by Volodymr Hryn'ov (see nn. 72–3), published, *inter alia*, in *Holos Ukraïny*, 12 December 1995. Cf. Mykola Zhulyn's'kyi, 'Ukraïna: formuvannia dukhovnoi nezalezhnosti', *Suchasnist'*, no. 5 (May), 1995, pp. 90–9, at pp. 96–7.
- 42 Levko Luk''ianenko, 'Ne dai smiiatys' voroham nad ridnym kraiem', *Holos Ukraïny*, 3 September 1995.
- 43 Dmytro Pavlychko, 'Pro robotu rady natsional'nosti rukhu', speech to the second Rukh congress, October 1990, in author's possession.
- 44 Oleh Rudakevych, 'Polityko-kul'turna ukraïnizatsiia iak suspil'nyi fenomen i naukove poniattia', *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 11 (November), 1996, pp. 60–2.
- 45 Author's interview with Levko Luk''ianenko, 23 October 1994. One prominent centrist, the philosopher Myroslav Popovych (the original spokesman for Rukh in 1988) has written that 'the problems of "Ukrainianisation" or, as it is beginning to be called, "de-Russification", provoke [zachipaiut'] Russophone Ukrainians more than Russians': *Ievropa–Ukraïna – pravi i livi* (Kiev: Kyïvs'ke bratstvo, 1997), p. 97.
- 46 Dmytro Dontsov, *Rosii's'ki vplyvy na ukraïns'ku psykhyku* (L'viv: Russica, 1913); *Rosiiia chy Evropa?* (London: Union of Ukrainians of Great Britain, 1955); *Za iaku revoliutsiiu?* (Toronto: League for the Liberation of Ukraine, 1957) – most available in modern Ukrainian reprints.
- 47 Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, 'Kul'turnyi epigonizm', in his 'Dumky proty techii'; and 'Ukraïna chy malorosiiia?', in the collection of essays *Ukraïna chy malorosiiia?* (Kiev: Smoloskyp, 1993), pp. 83–154 and 219–66, at pp. 110 and 241. The former essay was originally published in 1926, the latter circulated only in manuscript. Selections from some of Khvyl'ovyi's main works can be found in English in Myroslav Shkandrij (ed.), *The Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine*.



- Mykola Khvylovy: Polemical Pamphlets, 1925–1926* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1986).
- 48 Ievhen Malaniuk, *Malorosiistvo* (New York: Visnyk ODFFU, 1959), pp. 10, 12, 13 and 8.
- 49 *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 51 For similar themes in Kazak nationalism, see Bhavna Dave, ‘National Revival in Kazakhstan: Language Shift and Identity Change’, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 12 (1), 1996, pp. 51–72.
- 52 ‘Shchob ne zhasla svicha: z Konhresu Ukraïns’koï Intelligentsii’, *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 23 November 1995.
- 53 ‘Manifest Ukraïns’koï inteligentsii’, in *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 12 October 1995. See also *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 16 and 23 November 1995, and Mykola Tomenko, *Iaku Ukraïnu buduie komanda Prezydenta Leonida Kuchmy?!* (Kiev: Ukraïns’ka perspektyva, 1996).
- 54 Andrew Wilson, ‘The Donbas Between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 30 (2), April 1995, pp. 265–89. For some typical examples of such claims, see Dmitrii Kornilov, ‘Zemlia – uteriannykh bogov’, *Donetskii kriazh*, 5 March 1993; and the series *Problemy politicheskoi istorii Kryma* (Simferopol’: Ministerstvo obrazovaniia respubliki Krym, 1996–).
- 55 I. B. Pogozhinkov, ‘Russkie v nashem gosudarstve – eto ne natsional’noe men’shinstvo, poetomu russkii iazyk i literatury nado ne zapreshchat’, a berech’, leleiat’ . . .’, *Vidrodzhennia*, no. 1, 1994.
- 56 ‘Deklaratsiia o natsional’nom edinstve Russkogo Naroda (proekt)’, document prepared for the founding congress (*s’ezd*) of the Congress of the Russian People in Simferopil’, Crimea, on 5 October 1996, Article 2. See also Sergei Kiselev and Natal’ia Kiseleva, *Razmyshleniia o Kryme i geopolitike* (Simferopil’: Krymskii arkhiv, 1994), p. 26.
- 57 ‘Zakon Ukrainy (proekt) “Ob osobom poriadke ispol’zovaniia russkogo iazyka kak iazyka odnogo iz korennykh narodov Ukrainy”’ (draft in author’s possession). Articles 10 and 11 of the constitution refer to language and minority rights.
- 58 E. I. Golovakha and N. V. Panina, ‘Natsional’no-gosudarstvennaia identifikatsiia i formirovanie sotsial’no-politicheskikh orientatsii russkogo men’shinstva v Ukraine’, in Golovakha and I. M. Pakhomov (eds.), *Politicheskaia kul’tura naseleniia Ukrainy: resul’taty sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniï* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1993), pp. 98–111, at p. 104. The sample size was 95 in Crimea and 276 in eastern Ukraine.
- 59 Ludmila Chizhikova, *Russko-Ukraïnskoe pogranich’e: istoriia i sud’by traditsionno-bytovoï kul’tury (XIX–XX vv.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).
- 60 Valentin Mamutov, ‘Dikoe pole – ne terra-inkognita’, *Donetskii kriazh*, 8–14 October 1993; V. A. Pikro, ‘Zaselenie v XVI–XVIII vv.’, in A. A. Slin’ko (ed.), *Novye stranitsy v istorii donbassa* (Donets’k: Donbas, 1992), pp. 26–43.
- 61 Iaroslav Hrytsak, ‘Ukraïna, 1991–1995 rr.: nova politychna natsiia’, *Skhid*, no. 4, 1996, pp. 12–19, at p. 15.
- 62 Iurii Iurov, ‘Kryms’ka karta v donbas’komu pas’iansi’, *Henezs*, no. 1, 1995, pp. 188–93, at p. 188.
- 63 Maria Popovych, ‘*The Days of the Turbins* by Mikhail Bulgakov in the Light of

- the Russian–Ukrainian Literary Discussion’, in Lesley Milne (ed.), *Bulgakov: The Novelist-Playwright* (Luxemburg: Harwood Academic Press, 1995), pp. 50–60.
- 64 V. B. Liubchenko, ‘Teoretychna ta praktychna diial’nist’ rosiis’kykh natsionalistychnykh orhanizatsii v Ukraïni (1908–1914 rr.)’, *Ukraïns’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2, 1996, pp. 55–65, at p. 63. See also Don C. Rawson, *Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 91–103.
- 65 Dmytro Vydrin, ‘Rosiiany v Ukraïni: pid chas referendumu, do i pislia’, *Politolohichni chytannia*, no. 1, 1992, pp. 237–49. See also Valentyna Ermolova, ‘“Russkii vopros” v Ukraine’, *Vseukraïnskie vedomosti*, 6 December 1994.
- 66 Kiselev and Kiseleva, *Razmyshleniia o Kryme i geopolitike*, pp. 16, 18 and 21–5; ‘Ievraziiskii soiuz: kontseptsiiia (proekt)’, *Grazhdanskii kongress*, no. 1, 1993. For a foreign policy view backed by the Communist Party of Ukraine, see V’iachoslav Kudin, ‘Ukraïna v systemi suchasnoi heopolityky’, *Komunist*, nos. 12–15 (April), 1996.
- 67 See also Myroslav Popovych, *Istoriia Ukraïns’koi kul’tury* (forthcoming).
- 68 Zenon E. Kohut, ‘The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding’, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 10, 1986, pp. 559–76.
- 69 See Paul Robert Magocsi, ‘The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework’, *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, vol. 16 (1–2), 1989, pp. 45–62, and Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyi, ‘Rusyfikatsiia chy malorosiiinizatsiia?’, *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*, Spring 1978, pp. 78–84. See also Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
- 70 Oleksandr Derkachov et al., *Ukraïns’ka derzhavnist’ u XX stolitti* (Kiev: Politychna dumka, 1996), pp. 55–72.
- 71 Orest Subtelny, ‘Russocentrism, Regionalism and the Political Culture of Ukraine’, in Tismaneanu, *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, pp. 189–207.
- 72 Hryn’ov was deputy chairman of parliament from 1990 to 1993, stood for president in 1991 and received 4.2 per cent of the vote, and co-founded the Interregional Block in the winter of 1993–4 with Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma appointed him an advisor on regional affairs after he became president in July 1994. Hryn’ov is bilingual, but in identity terms is an archetypal Russophone Ukrainian.
- 73 Volodymyr Hryn’ov, *Nova Ukraïna: iakoiu ia ũ bachu* (Kiev: Abrys, 1995), p. 60.
- 74 Ivan Shapovalov and Volodymyr Aleksieiev, ‘Demokratychnyi pohliad na rosiis’ku movu ta Ukraïns’ku derzhavu’, *Holos Ukraïny*, 27 July 1995.
- 75 Popovych, *Ievropa–Ukraïna*, pp. 49 and 97.
- 76 Hryn’ov, *Nova Ukraïna*, p. 61. See also Petro Tolochko, ‘Imet li Ukraina natsional’nuu ideiu?’, *Kievskie novosti*, 20 October 1995; the interview with Tolochko in *Kievskie vedomosti*, 12 February 1996; and the attack on ‘Russophobia’ by Oleksii Tolochko, ‘Mental’nist’ Iasyru’, in *Den*, 25 December 1996.

- 77 Andrei Derkach, Sergei Veretennikov and Andrei Iermolaiev, *Beskonechno dliashcheestia nastoiashchee. Ukraina: chetyre goda puti* (Kiev: Lybid', 1995), pp. 43–5. See also Dmytro Vydrin and Dmytro Tabachnyk, *Ukraina na porozhchynni XXI stolittia: politychnyi aspekt* (Kiev: Lybid', 1995), pp. 37 and 126–36.
- 78 Popovych, *Ievropa–Ukraina*, pp. 48–9.
- 79 Myroslav Popovych, 'Shcho poperedu: ievropeistvo chy fundamentalizm?', *Henezha*, no. 1, 1994, pp. 35–7, at p. 35.
- 80 Petr Rabinovich, 'O zakonodatel'nom reshenii iazykovykh problem v Ukraine', *Sovest'*, no. 19 (November), 1992. See also the material from the conference 'Russian Culture in the Context of the Social-Historical Realities in Ukraine at the End of the Twentieth Century', held in Kiev in October 1993, in *Vidrodzhennia*, no. 1, 1994.
- 81 Hryn'ov, *Nova Ukraina*, p. 62.
- 82 Popovych, *Ievropa–Ukraina*, p. 80.
- 83 Iu. G. Morozov, 'Russkie Ukrainy – nositeli dvukh iazykovykh kul'tur – russkoi i ukrainskoi . . .', *Vidrodzhennia*, no. 1, 1994.
- 84 Eleonora Vilens'ka and Vasyl' Poklad, 'Natsional'no-kul'turni oriientsatsii meshkantsiv Luhans'koi oblasti', *Filosofs'ka i sotsiologichna dumka*, no. 4, 1993, pp. 48–59, at pp. 52 and 54. The survey questioned 968 residents of Luhans'k, the more easterly and more radical of the two oblasts of the Donbas.
- 85 Pirie, 'National Identity'.
- 86 Analiticheskii otdel Partii Slavianskogo Edinstva Ukrainy, 'Rusichi – novaia slavianskaia natsiia?', *Slavianskoego edinstvo*, no. 2 (March), 1995.
- 87 'Vse my – brat'ia', *Brat'ia slaviane* (a paper published in Luhans'k by the Rus' society), no. 9 (December), 1996.
- 88 On the persistence of a 'Soviet' identity, particularly in eastern and southern Ukraine, see Iaroslav Hrytsak, Oksana Malanchuk and Nataliia Chernysh, 'Ukraina: skhid i zachid', *Sovremennoe obshchestvo* (Kharkiv), no. 3, 1994, pp. 70–5, at p. 73; 45 per cent of their sample in Donets'k identified themselves as 'Soviet'.
- 89 Arel and Khmelko record 38 per cent of Russophone Ukrainians supporting the assertion that 'Ukraine and Russia must unite in one state', as against 22 per cent of Ukrainophones and 56 per cent of ethnic Russians: 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', p. 87.
- 90 I. L. Mykhailyn (ed.), *Panteleimon Kulish i ukrains'ke natsional'ne vidrodzhennia* (Kharkiv: Kharkivs'kyi derzhavnyi universitet, 1995).
- 91 *Grazhdanskii kongress*, no. 3, 1995, p. 1. The Civic Congress Party used as its emblem Mikhail Mikeshin's statue of Khmelnyts'kyi in St Sophia Square, Kiev (finished in 1888), with his mace pointing north towards Moscow.
- 92 Vernads'kyi founded the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1918; Kotsiubyns'kyi was a leading Bolshevik. See also Elizabeth Luchka Haigh, 'Was V. I. Vernadsky a Ukrainian Nationalist?', *Ukrainian Review*, vol. 43 (2), Summer 1996, pp. 55–62.
- 93 Dmitrii Kornilov, 'Tak kto zhe bol'she liubit Ukrainu?', *Donetskii kriazh*, no. 50, 21–7 January 1994; Natal'ia Shapiro, 'Russkoe dvizhenie v Galitsii (1848–1939)', *Sovest'*, no. 17 (September), 1992.
- 94 Cf. the statement by the Christian-Democratic Party of Ukraine that

- 'Ukrainian culture without Gogol is unimaginable, as is Russian [culture]': 'Slovo pro khrystyians'ku demokratiuu', *Khrystyians'ko-demokratychna partiia Ukraïny: prohrama i statut* (Kiev: Party publication, 1994), pp. 1–4, at p. 2.
- 95 See also Graham Smith and Wilson, 'Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora'.
- 96 V. Iakovlev, 'Obshchenatsional'nye idei sovremennoi Ukraïny', *Tovarysh*, nos. 1 and 2 (January), 1996.
- 97 Speech of Petro Symonenko to the June 1993 congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, *Partiia Kommunistov vrozhdetsia: dokumenty i materialy vtorogo etapa Vseukraïnskoi konferentsii kommunistov i s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukraïny* (Kherson: Party document, 1993), p. 23.
- 98 'Statut Liberal'noi partii Ukraïny (proekt)' (Kiev: Party document, 1996), p. 2.
- 99 'Programme of the Socialist Party of Ukraine' (Kiev: Party document, 1995; in English), p. 13.
- 100 Petro Symonenko, "'Natsional'na ideia": mify i real'nist', *Holos Ukraïny*, 21 March 1996, p. 7; Heorhii Kriuchkov, 'Shche o dyn krok do dyktatury? (Pro novyi variant proektu Konstytutsii Ukraïny)', *Komunist*, no. 49 (December), 1995, p. 5.
- 101 See for example Kuchma's inauguration address, *Holos Ukraïny*, 21 July 1994.
- 102 'Osnovy derzhavnoi etnonatsional'noi polityky', in Mykola Tomenko, *Ukraïns'ka perspektyva: istoryko-politohichni pidstavy suchasnoi derzhavnoi stratehii* (Kiev: Ukraïns'ka perspektyva, 1995), pp. 60–7, at pp. 65 and 66.
- 103 In a 1995 survey, 33 per cent of a sample of 402 in Donets'k still considered themselves first and foremost 'population of the former USSR': 'Sotsial'no-politychnyi portret chotyrokh mist Ukraïny', *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny* (Kiev: Demokratychni initsiatyvy, no. 13, 1995), p. 46. See also the 1994 survey by Viktor Nebozhenko and Iryna Bekeshkina, 'Politychnyi portret Ukraïny (skhid, pïvden)', *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny*, no. 9, 1994, when the figure was 34 per cent (at p. 45).
- 104 *Krasnoe znamia* (the organ of the Kharkiv branch of the Communist Party of Ukraine), no. 8 (August), 1996, p. 1, refers to 'our [Soviet] homeland' in the present tense.
- 105 *Konstitutsiia respubliki Krym* (Simferopil': Verkhovnyi soviet Kryma, 1993), p. 2.
- 106 Svetlana In'shakova, 'Odeskie Mankurty', *Pravda Ukraïny*, 6 February 1991; author's interview with Dmitrii Kornilov, 31 April 1994.
- 107 *Partiia Kommunistov vrozhdetsia*, p. 25.
- 108 Dmitrii Kornilov, interviewed by the author and Dominique Arel, 14 July 1993; Kornilov, 'Federatsiia – de-fakto. A de-iure?', *Donetskii kriazh*, no. 23, 25 June–1 July 1993. Samuel Huntington also argues that there is a *civilisational*, rather than an ethnic divide in Ukraine; see his *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 165–8.
- 109 Natalia Dinello, 'Religious Attitudes of Russian Minorities and National Identity', in Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich and Emil Payin (eds.),

*The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 195–205.

- 110 Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Halychyna i Ukraina', *Literaturno-naukovyi vistykyk*, vol. 36, 1906, pp. 489–96.
- 111 'Rusichi – novaia slavianskaia natsiia?'
- 112 V. Popov of the Congress of Russian Organisations of Ukraine, 'Prishla pora ob' ediniat'sia', *Brat'ia slaviane*, no. 9 (December), 1996.
- 113 Khmelko and Wilson, 'The Political Orientations'.
- 114 *Grazhdanskii kongress*, no. 3, 1995, p. 3.
- 115 *Ustav Kongressa Russkikh Organizatsii Ukrainy* (Kiev: private document, dated 1996), p. 2.
- 116 Interview with Baziliuk, 'S Rossiei – na vechnye vremena!', *Brat'ia slaviane*, no. 4 (July), 1996; 'Partiia Grazhdanskii kongress Ukrainy, Kongress Russkikh Organizatsii Ukrainy – obrashchenie k grazhdanam Ukrainy i ikh ob'edineniiam', dated 2 February 1997.
- 117 Popov, 'Prishla pora ob' ediniat'sia'.
- 118 Khmelko and Wilson, 'The Political Orientations'.
- 119 Information provided by Dr Khmelko. The survey size was 3,479, with 3,327 answering the national identity question. A total of 58.8 per cent saw themselves as 'only Ukrainian' and 10.8 per cent as 'only Russian'.
- 120 Taras Kuzio, 'National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 2 (4), Winter 1996, pp. 582–608.

## 7 THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES AS NATIONALISING REGIMES

- 1 Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 79–106.
- 2 This study excludes the Central Asian state of Tajikistan from examination for the simple reason that, since the outbreak of civil war there in 1992, regional identities have become consolidated and any concept of a unified national identity has been eroded.
- 3 Although primary identification may lie with the local language and culture, most members of the native intelligentsias are none the less fluent in Russian.
- 4 The terms 'Kazakstani', 'Uzbekistani', 'Turkmenistani' and 'Kyrgyzstani' are used in this chapter to refer to citizens in those states, irrespective of their ethnic nationality. 'Kazak', 'Uzbek', 'Turkmen' and 'Uzbek' refer to members of those ethnic groups, irrespective of their citizenship.
- 5 Nurlan Amrekulov and Nurbulat Masanov, *Kazakhstan mezhdru proshlym i budushchim* (Almaty: Beren, 1994), pp. 165–7.
- 6 *Mankurt* is a term of chastisement and derision used by nationalist-minded Central Asians (primarily Kazaks and Kyrgyz) to describe their Russified, urban co-ethnics who have only a superficial knowledge of the customs and language of their elders. It originally referred to a character in a novel (*I dol'she veka dlii'sia den'*) of the renowned Kyrgyz writer Chinggis Aytmatov.