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THE COSSACKS IN THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

VOLUME I: 1619-1624

by

GEORGE GAJECKY and ALEXANDER BARAN

ROME 1969

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THE COSSACKS IN THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

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INTRODUCTION

The Thirty Years War, which occurred in the first half of the seventeenth century (1618-1648), may be considered the first all European war in terms of its participants and its extent. The activities of the major European powers in this war have been examined in great detail by many scholars. However, little is known about the role of the minor participants, the Cossacks of the Ukraine, the Poles, and the Croats. This study is devoted to the investigation of the activities of the Cossacks throughout the Thirty Years War.

In the historical monographs investigating the Thirty Years War one finds only scattered references to the Cossacks. This occurs because there has been no study of the Cossack activities in central and western Europe. Even M. Hrushevskyi,¹ who is considered to be the leading authority on the Cossacks, has not investigated the activities of the Cossacks in the Thirty Years War.

The literature on this topic consists mostly of casual references about the "Lisowchyk" detachments which were sent by King Sigismund III of Poland to aid the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand II. Nevertheless, documentary evidence of the Cossack presence and their contributions throughout the period of the Thirty Years War exists. Most of the documents, however, lie scattered throughout various archival collections and have never been published. Those sources which have been published are often unavailable to the researcher because of the language barrier. We have found documents in the Italian, Latin, German, Hungarian, Polish, and Ukrainian languages.

Research for this book has been performed in the Vatican, Vienna, and Prague archives where we have discovered valuable diplomatic correspondence between the courts of Vienna and Warsaw.

¹ Michael Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukraïy-Rusi* (New York: Knyhospilka, 1956), VII-X. These volumes deal with the history of Ukrainian Cossacks.

Besides it, we found other important documents, such as dispatches and requisitions, which relate to the actual participation of the Cossacks during the war. Some of the more important documents will be published in the appendix.

This study is based primarily on the documents published in the last twenty years by the Czechs and Ukrainians. After World War II, the Czechs published six volumes of *Sources on the History of the Thirty Years War*.¹ This publication provides a useful index to the documents found in the Prague Archives. Entries are either by extract or by an abstract of a document in the archives. These consist of "the Agenda of War of the Bohemian Court Chancellery of the Bohemian Viceroy" and reports of the Bohemian Treasury. The third volume of this series, which covers the years 1618-25, provides a great deal of detail about the Cossack recruitment, their passage to Austria, and their subsequent actions in Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Germany, and Austria.

In 1959, the Ukrainian scholar, A.G. Welykyi, began publishing a series of volumes the *Letters of Apostolic Nuncios Which Illustrate the History of Ukraine*.² These letters, which were collected in the Vatican archives, were written for the most part by Papal Nuncios in Warsaw and Vienna and by the diplomatic representatives of the Venetian State. Dispatches to Venice concerning the progress of the Thirty Years War were especially useful because they devoted considerable space to the role of the Cossacks. These reports were then routed to Rome. In the third and fourth volumes of this series, there are hundreds of documents which describe in great detail the actions of the Cossacks in the Thirty Years War.

During our research, we also found some documents in older publications. The reports concerning Cossack raids into northern Hungary are contained in the many volumes published by the distinguished Hungarian scholar, Sandor Szilagyi, before World War I. Documents which relate to the activities of the Cossacks in Moravia and Silesia may be found in several editions put out by the Czech

¹ Vaclav Liva (ed.), *Prameny k dejinam tricetilete valky* (Praha: Nase Vojsko, 1951-).

² A.G. Welykyi (ed.), *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantes* (Romae: P.P. Basiliani, 1959-).

and German scholars.¹ Valuable information is available in the eyewitness account of Wojtech Dembolecki,² who acted as the chaplain of the Lisowchyk detachments and took part in the 1620 and 1622-23 campaigns. This last source has to be approached very critically since Dembolecki intersperses factual accounts of the campaigns with violent attacks on heretics and often attributes success directly to divine intervention.

The monograph has been based primarily on archival materials and published sources. The secondary works are used for background, reference, and comparison. In the monograph, we hope to show the reasons for the participation of the Cossacks in this war, their military contributions, and the significance of their actions.

The chapters have been organized chronologically. This was not an arbitrary decision. In the seventeenth century, the campaigning season usually began in late spring and ended in late fall. The Imperial envoys usually recruited mercenary troops for the spring and summer campaign and dismissed them in the fall. Thus, almost each year the process of recruitment of the Cossacks, their transport, amalgamation into the Imperial army, and their disbanding was repeated. Therefore, the division of chapters according to years provides for a comprehensive study of each campaign and also gives the narrative its necessary continuity. Furthermore, the events in which the Cossacks took part will be given particular attention and emphasis.

This monograph is a pioneering attempt in the field and, as such, is limited in its scope and coverage. The first volume is restricted to the period of 1619-1624 and covers the Bohemian phase (1618-1620) and the Palatinate phase (1621-1624). The second volume, which will cover the period of 1625-1648, is in preparation. Also, we intend to publish a third volume composed of documents that we found in the various archives of Europe.

¹ The most important are the two following: František Hruby (ed.), *Moravske Korespondence a acta z let 1620-36* (Brno: Kramerius, 1934-37), I-II. Christian d'Elbert (ed.), *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Rebellion, Reformation des dreissigjährigen Krieges und der Neugestaltung Mährens* (in the series *Schriften der historisch-statistischen Sektion der K.K. Mähr.-schles. Gesellschaft zur Beförderung des Ackerbaues der Natur und Landeskunde* (Brunn: Buch. U. Ritsch, 1867-78), I-VI.

² Wojtech Dembolecki, *Pamiętniki o Lisowczykach czyli Przewagi Elearów Folskich* (Krakow: Nakl. Bibl. Polskiej, 1859).

CHAPTER I

THE COSSACKS PRIOR TO THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

The appearance of Cossack forces in Central Europe was a result of the interest which many European rulers exhibited toward them. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Cossacks fought several times for the Holy Roman Emperor. A sketch of their origins and early history is presented here to provide a background information. The great steppes, which extended from Asia to the Danube River, have attracted nomadic horsemen throughout the centuries. These nomads were pastoralists, who supplemented their income by ravaging sedentary societies within the range of the steppes. The latter used countermeasures to stop the infiltration of the steppe raiders and in turn moved into the steppe to place it under their domination. This struggle between the sedentary and nomad societies had continued for many centuries. In the thirteenth century, the nomadic incursions contributed greatly to the fall of the Kievan state. Within the next three centuries, Poland, Lithuania, and Muscovy, the states which bound the steppes, expanded southward and eastward, and secured control over part of the region under the sway of the Khanate of the Golden Horde.

The weakening of the Tatar Khanates was used by these states to consolidate their holdings and to launch a colonization of the northern fringes of the steppe. Simultaneously with the official colonization, the East Slavic peoples had been infiltrating the steppes, on their own initiative. The great river systems, Dniester, Boh Dnieper, Don, and Volga, served as convenient highways for the penetration of the steppes.

The steppe has always been very alluring to the civilized agricultural societies due to the fertility of its soil and the abundance of game, fish, and fowl. It also has served as a place of refuge for

the fugitives from justice and the adventurous. Only these courageous and desperate men would brave the great dangers of severe climate, loneliness, and exposure to attack by the ever present nomads.

Due to the difficulty of surviving in the steppes throughout the whole year, the steppes were being exploited on a seasonal basis by hunters, fishermen, trappers, and even farmers. These people were called *ukhodniks*, and they organized themselves into bands numbering ten to fifty men, elected a leader, and went into the steppes for the spring and summer. They brought back furs, smoked game and fish, honey, and tales of an abundant and free land. Often they would return with booty taken from Tatar bands whom they encountered and defeated in the steppes. The following spring other groups would venture out, and some of them might choose to remain in the steppes for the winter instead of returning to the villages only to have the local administrators take one-half of their produce as taxes. The *ukhodniks* learned how to exploit the steppes and also how to fight the nomadic Tatars in their own milieu. In time these *ukhodnik* bands provided the nucleus from which the Cossack bands developed.¹ They emulated the free Tatar warriors, who were called Cossaks and whose life consisted of raiding, plundering, and vagabondage. This type of life attracted many adventurers of Slavic origin who also began to be called Cossacks.²

Most of the *ukhodniks* and, consequently, the Cossacks came from the provinces of Kievshchyna and Podolia. Their numbers were swelled by many run-away peasants from western and northern Ukraine and White Russia, who left their villages when their landlords demanded more labor, services, and rents.³

¹ Hrushevskiy, *op. cit.*, VII, 52-57. The origin of the Cossacks was a matter of controversy for historians for several centuries. It is still not completely cleared. For a review of the theories on the origin and development of Cossacks see Gunther Stockl, *Die Entstehung des Kozakentums* (Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953), 17-32 and Lubomyr Wynar, « Ohliad istorychnoi literatury pro pochatky Kozachynty », *Ukrainskyi Istoryk*, II (1965), nos. 1-2, pp. 28-37; nos. 3-4, pp. 17-38.

² Stockl, *op. cit.*, 26, 31; Hrushevskiy, VII, 76-81. Similar developments occurred on the southern border of the Muscovite state where the Don Cossacks were in an embryonic stage. This study, however, deals only with the Cossacks of the Ukraine.

³ V. A. Golobutskii, *Zaporozhskoe Kozachestvo* (Kiev: Gos. izdat. pol. lit. URSS, 1957), 25-29. He believes that the Polish Statute of 1423 and the Lithuanian Privileges for the Nobility of 1447 began the process of definite enserfment of the peasantry in the Polish and Rus-Lithuanian state.

The provinces of Kievshchyna and Podolia were vulnerable to attacks by the Tatars since they bordered the steppes. The Polish and Lithuanian authorities, always distracted by other matters, devoted little effort to an organized defense of their southern frontier.¹ The destructive raids by the Tatars were especially intensified after 1478, when the Crimean Khanate became a vassal of the Ottoman Turks.² The Turks needed male slaves to man their galleys, women for their harems, and little boys for the janissary troops.³ Therefore, they spurred the Tatars to continuous aggressive action against the northern Christian states. The frequent Tatar raids and the apparent inability of the authorities to organize an adequate defense forced the population of the southern provinces to provide their own protection.

The native population relied upon Cossacks for defense. Throughout the sixteenth century, the Cossacks, as an institution, evolved from mere exploiters of the steppes and skirmishers with the Tatars into a warrior caste *par excellence*. They were often aided in this development by the governors and administrators of the towns and castles on the frontier. The frontier officials did not command adequate manpower and resources to defend effectively their charges against Tatar attacks. To provide some measure of protection, the officials encouraged, often contrary to orders from the capital, the formation of a viable defense force from the inhabitants. As a result, some attracted Cossack bands to serve as guard units. The Cossack bands, so attached, either garrisoned the town fortresses or, as patrols, scouted the steppe for Tatars. Often, an advance warning of the presence of a roving Tatar force near a settlement saved the populace, who fled to the neighboring fortress. The governors of these fortress-towns used these Cossack bands as an effective means to strike back at the Tatars. Several of the officials united small Cossack bands into larger formations and at their command raided Tatar and

¹ During the fifteenth century, the Lithuanian government constructed a series of forts (*Zamki*) along their southern frontiers. Hrushevskiy, VII, 35-40.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 329-334; VII, 22-23. Some forty major raids were recorded between 1480 and 1530.

³ D. I. Evarnitskii, *Istoriia Zaporozhkikh Kozakov* (St. Petersburg: Skorokhodov, 1892), I, 393; Hrushevskiy, VII, 61-62.

Turkish settlements and merchant caravans.¹

In mid-sixteenth century, an organization arose which had sufficient force to defend itself, to send reports of the movement of the Tatar horde, and which could disperse small raiding parties before the latter entered the civilized area. These were the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, the *starosta* (governor) of Cherkassy constructed a castle on the Khortitsa Island of the Dnieper River around 1554.² This outpost, the *Sich*, three hundred miles south of Kiev, served as the first headquarters of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Vyshnevetskyi was greatly interested in the conquest of the Khanate of Crimea, and he hoped that his castle would serve as an advanced post on the road to elimination of the Khanate. He realized that he would not be able to achieve it with his Cossacks only. Therefore, he tried to bring about an expedition composed of Polish, Lithuanian, and Muscovite troops. He was unsuccessful because of the rivalry between Muscovy and Lithuania. Nevertheless, he showed the Cossacks the power they wielded as an organized force committed to struggle with the Tatars and Turks. They fought with Vyshnevetskyi under the Lithuanian, Muscovite, Polish, and Moldavian flags³ He was regarded by Cossack tradition as the first great leader (*hetman*) of the Zaporozhian Cossa-

¹ Prince Bohdan Hlynskyi, *starosta* (governor) of Cherkassy, captured Ochakov in 1493 with a large group of Cossacks. Senko Polozovych, administrator of Cherkassy, defeated Tatars in 1508, 1511, 1523 at the head of Cossack detachments. Ostafii Dashkevych, *starosta* of Kaniv and Cherkassy, became famous for his many raids against Tatar settlements in the 1520's. Bernard Pretvych, *starosta* of Bar, was engaged in seventy battles with Tatars during the years 1530-1550's at the head of Cossack war bands. Hrushevskyi, VII, 89-95; I. M. Kamanin, « K voprosakh o Kozachestve do Bohdana Khmel'nitskoho », *Chteniia v Istoricheskoi Obshchestve Nestora Letopistsia*, VIII (1894), pp. 60-70.

² Hruhsevskyi, VII, 115; Lubomyr Wynar, *Kniaz Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi* (Munich: Ukr. Free Academy of Sciences, 1964), 24-28. (Henceforth cited as Wynar, *Kniaz*).

³ Wynar, *Kniaz*, 38-43; Hrushevskyi, VII, 122-127. During 1557-1561, Vyshnevetskyi served Tsar Ivan IV of Muscovy. One year later he became involved in a civil war in Moldavia which resulted in his capture and execution by the Turks in Istanbul. The Cossacks followed their leader's example in pursuing an independent policy in regards to the foreign states. They were involved in a dozen campaigns in Moldavia between 1567 and 1618.

cks.¹ who brought them out into the larger arena of East European politics.

The Cossacks became an effective organized force by the last quarter of the sixteenth century. They were composed of two groups: the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who lived on the *Sich*; and the town or "registered" Cossacks, who stayed in southern Kievshchyna and were admitted to service by the Polish Crown. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were the *elan* group, tightly knit with peculiar customs, a unique social structure and pride in their calling. They called themselves knights (*lytsari*) and developed along the lines of a military order (*Viisko Zaporozhskoe*) whose *raison d'etre* was war with the infidel.²

The increased warlike activities of the Cossacks became an embarrassment to the Polish-Lithuanian government. Constant attacks by the former against the Tatars, Turks, and Moldavians by land and sea brought repeated complaints and threats from the Ottoman Sultans and Crimean Khans. Therefore, the Polish kings tried to control to some extent the raiding which the Cossacks launched on their own initiative. Several kings enlisted a number of Cossacks into the Polish service while the rest were to disperse. This was an unsuccessful attempt to solve the Cossack problem since only a small percentage of all Cossacks were admitted into the service.³ The remainder disregarded the orders to disperse and merrily pursued the raids and expeditions against foreign states.

At this time the Cossacks learned how to bargain with different governments who wanted to use their services as mercenaries. In 1579-81, 2500 Cossacks fought in the Polish-Muscovite War against

¹ The name Zaporozhian Cossacks was used by the Dnieper Cossacks as their official name. It differentiated them from the Cossacks living in southern Kievshchyna and Podolia. It meant "the Cossacks beyond the Dnieper Cataracts."

² The best description of the customs, traditions, and lore of the Zaporozhian Cossacks may be found in Volume I of D. I. Evarnitskii's three-volume work, *Istoria Zaporozhskikh Kozakov*.

³ In 1570, King Sigismund II recruited three hundred Cossacks for service in the Polish army. Eleven years later, King Stephan Batory increased the number to five hundred. It grew in 1588 to one thousand "registered" Cossacks and further increased to three thousand in 1590. Hrushevskiy, VII, 142-144; 154-159, 172, 176.

Muscovy.¹ Service against Muscovy would provide a rewarding field for the Cossacks in the near future. During the Interregnum, following the death of King Stephen Batory, Cossacks participated in the civil war and took part in the Battle of Byczyna (1588), which gave the Polish throne to Sigismund Vasa.²

During the 1590's, the Cossacks were approached by the Papal and Imperial envoys, who wanted to sway the Cossacks to fight the Turks in the service of the Emperor Rudolph II. In 1593, Pope Clement VIII sent his Nuncio, L. Comulovich, to offer the Cossacks service in his name.³ He brought 12,000 *zloty* as down payment, promising more after the Cossacks launched an expedition. In response to Comulovich's request, three thousand Cossacks under H. Loboda marched into Wallachia in December 1593. There they destroyed several towns, including Djurdjevo and Olvia, and returned laden with plunder.⁴ In the spring of 1594, Cossacks offered to serve the Emperor and launched several campaigns. In March, 1594, a detachment of Zaporozhian Cossacks reached Akkerman on the lower Dniester where the Turkish forces were collecting for the march to Hungary. The Zaporozhians attacked the Turkish camp and killed fifteen hundred troops and eight thousand non-combatants.⁵ Imperial approval, money, and flags arrived at the *Sich* in May 1594, and the Zaporozhians launched a naval expedition to prevent the Tatars from fording the Dnieper. This expedition did not achieve its end since the ford was guarded by ships from the Turkish fleet.⁶ In the meantime, other cossacks under Nalyvaiko paid by the Papal Nuncio, began attacking the Tatars on the march and captured a part of their baggage train. Nalyvaiko advanced into Wallachia where the Cossacks captured and sacked the town of Kilia on the Danube. He was defeated on his way back from the expedition.⁷

¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 163.

² *Ibid.*, VII, 172.

³ *Ibid.*, VII, 198; L. Wynar, "Ukrainian Cossacks and the Vatican in 1594," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, XXI (1965), pp. 64-78.

⁴ Hrushevskyi, VII, 199; E. Barvinskyi, "Prychynki do istorii znosyn Tsisaria Rudolfa II i Papy Klymenta VIII z Kozakamy v 1593-1593 rokakh," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva, im. Shevchenka*, X-XI (1896), pp. 1-34.

⁵ Hrushevskyi, VII, 199; Evarnitskii, II, 117.

⁶ Hrushevskyi, VII, 199-200; Barvinskyi, *op. cit.*, 7-8.

⁷ Hrushevskyi, VII, 202-203.

An Imperial envoy, Erich Lasota, reached the Zaporozhian *Sich* in June, 1594, and presented them with eight thousand *ducats* as down payment for service with the Emperor.¹ The Zaporozhian Cossacks agreed to enter the Emperor's service and sent two envoys to him to settle the details of monetary compensation, terms of service, etc.² In October, 1594, the Zaporozhian Cossacks under Loboda united with the Cossack army of Nalyvaiko. The joint force, numbering twelve thousand men, advanced into Moldavia to force its ruler to accept the Hapsburg overlordship. They defeated a Moldavian army under the city of Soroka and captured Iassy, the capital, which they plundered and burned. The Cossack army divided into two forces, the Zaporozhians plundering along the Danube and the other Cossacks entering Transylvania and Hungary.³ Only a large Turkish army which advanced into Wallachia in 1595 was able to repel these Cossack forces. This campaign was the first occasion that Cossacks served the Hapsburgs, who recalled their service at other times when need arose for mercenary troops.

During the Hungarian Protestant Revolt of 1603-1604, several bands of Cossacks served as mercenaries with the rebels while others were fighting on the Imperial side.⁴ Two years later, the Cossacks were recruited in substantial numbers for the Imperial service. On this occasion they were under the command of General Carl Lichtenstein. They fought against the forces of Stephen Bocskay of Transylvania, who rose in rebellion against the Hapsburg Emperor, Rudolph II.⁵

Meanwhile, the Cossacks who returned from the campaigns in Moldavia and Wallachia in 1595 raised standards of revolt against the Poles. A full-scale war was waged for two years in which the Cossacks were defeated and deprived of many privileges which they had enjoyed previously. But the Cossacks were not destined to be suppressed, since Poland needed cheap troops for her many wars. Therefore, in 1600, four thousand Cossacks took part in the cam-

¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 200.

² Evarnitskii, II, 116-119. He gives the text of a letter dated 3. VII. 1594, sent with the Cossack envoys to Emperor Rudolph II.

³ Hrushevskyi, VII, 203-205; Barvinskyi, 19-20.

⁴ Welykyi, *Litterae*, II, nro. 957, 959, ff., 210-211; nro. 805, 820, 823, ff., 235, 236, 242, 244.

⁵ Josef Polisensky, *Tricetileta Valka a Český Narod* (Praha: Naše Vojsko, 1960), 62-63; Welykyi, II, nro. 839, 251 ff.

paign of the Polish army in Moldavia.¹ In 1601-02, six thousand Cossacks participated on the Polish side in the Livonian War.²

The Time of Troubles in Muscovy, which commenced with the death of Tsar Boris Godunov, provided a continuous employment for many thousands of Cossacks who fought mostly for the Polish side. In 1603, the First False Demetrius set out from Poland with an army to obtain the Muscovite throne, and the Cossacks were offered favorable terms to serve in the various detachment organized by Polish officers. In 1609, thirteen thousand Cossacks took part in the campaigns in Muscovy.³ Throughout the next fourteen years, bands of Cossacks crossed Muscovy from south to north, and east to west. They plundered, pillaged, burned, and killed wherever they went. In 1608, there were thirteen thousand Cossacks at the camp of Tushino.⁴ Within two years, there were fifteen thousand Cossacks in the province of Severia alone.⁵ By the end of the war, there were twenty thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks with Hetman Sahaidachnyi and ten to twenty thousand other Cossacks in Muscovy.

The Treaty of Deulino, signed in December, 1618, left these thousands of Cossacks unemployed. They were unhappy with the attitude which the Polish government took into response to their requests for the back pay and the fulfillment of other promises. While waiting for the results of their demands, the Cossacks began a series of large scale raids against the Crimean Tatars and Turks to pressure the Polish government into granting their demands. The danger that these attacks would lead to a general war between Turkey and Poland became apparent,⁶ and the Polish government had to use all measures to prevent a war it neither wanted nor could afford. To appease the demands of the Cossacks and to stop further raids against the Moslems, King Sigismund of Poland appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the problem and to satisfy the grievances of the Cossacks.⁷ Investigation by the commission showed that the Cossacks were promised large rewards and special privileges at the beginning of the war, which the government did not

¹ Hrushevskiy, VII, 247-250.

² *Ibid.*, VII, 315-317.

³ *Ibid.*, VII, 323.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VII, 325.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VII, 334.

⁶ Welykyi, III, nro. 1298, ff., 198-204.

⁷ Hrushevskiy, p. 181-184.

fulfill after the Deulino Treaty. The Cossacks demanded retroactive pay for all who participated in the war, while the Royal Commission had the authority to settle all claims by payment of 25,000-30,000 florins and to insist on the ending of raids against the Tatars.¹ The Cossacks would not accept because the lump sum settlement was insufficient to satisfy their claims. The Polish government had two alternatives: 1) either to defeat the Cossacks in the field and force them to accede to the above terms, as proposed by S. Zolkiewski, the Commander-in-chief of the Polish army,² or 2) to accept the Cossacks' conditions. It did the latter, and after lengthy negotiations, the "Cossack Reversal"³ was drawn up. Its terms were the following: Only the "true" Zaporozhian Cossacks were to be enrolled in an official register and payed for the Muscovite campaign. All those who joined the Zaporozhians only during the Polish-Muscovite War or who fought as independent Cossack detachments were to return to their pre-war pursuits. As a result, only 8,000 Cossacks were recognized as the official "registered" Cossacks of Sahaidachnyi and King Sigismund allocated 40,000 florins for their support.⁴

This "Reversal" left 30,000 Cossacks without a means of subsistence. The terms of the Reversal forbade the launching of new expeditions into Crimea or into the Ottoman Empire, and the Polish government did not intend to contribute anything to their support. They could have settled on lands of the Polish Crown and colonized the southern Ukrainian steppe under the jurisdiction of royal officers.⁵ However, after a long period of soldiering, few desired to settle down as pioneer settlers under Polish administration. They were looking for new military adventure.

King Sigismund was worried that continued unemployment of the Cossacks might result in a new rebellion against Poland, akin to Nalyvaiko's revolt of 1596-98. However, the arrival of Count Althan, the emissary of the Hapsburg Ferdinand, solved his problems since still maintaining his neutrality, the King allowed Althan to

¹ Welykyi, nro. 1311, 205-206.

² *Ibid.*, p. 206; Hrushevskiyi, p. 379.

³ Hrushevskiyi, p. 385.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 385-386; Welykyi, nro. 1320, 214.

⁵ Hrushevskiyi, p. 384. Under royal administration the Cossacks would lose their special privileges.

recruit Cossacks as mercenary troops for the Emperor.¹ The unemployed Cossacks who heard that the Imperial envoy was recruiting troops agreed to serve in the Imperial service. However, they demanded their pay in advance and also asked for guarantees from Sigismund that no repressive measures would be taken against the Cossacks in their absence.

Among the numerous detachments of independent Cossack groups which were neither Zaporozhian nor "registered" Cossacks, the most important group was the Cossacks of Lisowski or Lisowchyks. The Lisowchyks belonged to a category of Cossack bands that had been organized by Polish officers during the Time of Troubles. This group merits special attention since they figure prominently among the Cossacks who fought in the Thirty Years War.

The organizer and the best known leader of the Lisowchyks was Alexander Lisowski. He came from a noble family whose holdings were in the present White Russia. He was a soldier who became familiar in his early campaigns with the Cossacks, their customs, and their mode of fighting. At the onset of the Moscow campaign, he formed a detachment (*choragwa*) of 200 light cavalry. Throughout the campaign, this detachment swelled in size as many loose Cossack formations joined Lisowski. His squadrons did not serve for pay but lived off booty and plunder. At the end of the war, the Lisowchyks numbered nearly 4,000 men commanded by several elected officers.²

The Polish writer Dzieduszycki, who studied the Lisowchyks in the mid-nineteenth century, states without sufficient proof that the Lisowchyks were ethnically Poles who fought in Cossack style.³ This statement we consider untrue since several contemporary sour-

¹ Excerpt from the Royal Charter of Sigismund III: "Quod cum Serenissimus Princeps Dominus Ferdinandus Hungariae et Bohemiae Rex, frater et affinis noster et pro necessitudine sanguinis et mutuorum iure pactorum id a nobis postulasset, ut in ditionibus regni nostri militis sumptibus et impensis Suae Maestatis colligendi, atque extra illud educendi, Illustri Domino Adolpho Comiti ab Althan hoc tempore, quo ipse a rebellibus subditis oppugnatur, potestatem concederemus." Szabo Karoly, "Bethlen Gabor fejedelem politikai levelezese" *Torstenelmi Tar* 1881, p. 329.

² "Kleczkowski," *Słownik Naukowy*, Vol. IV, p. 1682; "Lisowczyki," *Encyklopedia Powszechna*, Vol. VII, p. 185-186.

³ Maurycy Dzieduszycki, *Krotki Rys Dziejow i Spraw Lisowczykow* (Lwow: Druk. J. Schnaydera, 1843), I, 96-99.

ces indicate otherwise; e.g. the Crown Marshal of Poland, Lubomirski, in a letter to Bethlen Gabor, emphasizes the fact that there was "little Polish blood" among the Lisowchyks.¹ The authors believe, after examining the evidence, that many officers and some of the common Lisowchyks were Polish; however, among the offices we find many Ukrainian and other names.² Furthermore, the main body of the Lisowchyks was composed of Cossacks from the Ukraine.

The Lisowchyks, accustomed to live by plunder in the Time of Troubles, continued their depredations inside the Polish Commonwealth after the Treaty of Deulino (1618). King Sigismund desired to remove the Lisowchyks and pointed them out to the Imperial envoys as potential mercenaries of the Hapsburg Emperor. The Lisowchyks, likewise, accepted the offer to serve the Emperor and preparations began for launching a campaign.

Once again the Cossacks were recruited for the service of the Emperor and the stage was set for the appearance of Cossacks in Central Europe in the ranks of the Imperial troops.

¹ "in qua paucissimi sunt sanguinis Polonici." Szabo, "Bethlen Gabor...", *op. cit.*, 321; Dembolecki explains the difference between Cossack rank and file and Polish officers to German High Command when the Lisowchyks were crossing the Rhine in 1622. Dembolecki, *op. cit.*, 93-94.

² Dzieduszycki himself names the following: Karas, Sadowski, Wesolowski, Rucki, and Poplawski. Poplawski's detachment was composed completely of peasants (*z samego chłopstwa*). Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, II, 293, 308, 348; Dembolecki names several Lisowczyk leaders with Ukrainian names: Iwanicki, Hanusia, Russin. Dembolecki, 32, 39.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR (1618-1619)

The Thirty Years War began, in 1618, as a struggle between the Protestant Bohemians and Catholic Holy Roman Empire and gradually developed into a major European war. It was also the last and the greatest of the European religious wars involving the majority of states throughout its duration.


The religious background of this conflict may be traced to the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century which had destroyed the superficial unity of Christendom, and divided Europe into two antagonistic camps, the Catholic and the Protestant. The distrust which the antagonists felt towards each other communicated itself in frequent recourses to arms. In addition, the opposing camps were divided among themselves over questions of political or sectarian differences. Wars, betrayals, diplomatic intrigues, and general political instability, therefore, were characteristic of Europe in the sixteenth century.

This religious division existed also in the Holy Roman Empire and greatly complicated the government of the realm. In 1555, the Diet of Augsburg, in Germany, had attempted to bring peace to the Empire by decreeing that men had to adopt the religion of their rulers. This policy known as "*cujus regio, ejus religio*", was instrumental in preserving a precarious peace in the Empire until the first decade of the seventeenth century. This balance was finally destroyed by the fanaticism of militant Calvinists and over zealous Catholics.¹

In 1608, the Calvinist-inspired Protestant Union was formed comprising of the Palatinate, Württemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Ba-

¹ Carl J. Friedrich, *The Age of the Baroque, 1610-1660* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), 162.

Map I: CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE



den-Durlach. The next year, the Catholic League was organized by Duke Maximilian of Bavaria which consisted of Bavaria, Cologne, Treves, Mainz, Würzburg, Augsburg, and others. The two allied blocs accentuated the hostility that prevailed in Germany among the Catholic and Protestant rulers, and hastened the armed confrontation between the two camps.

The immediate cause of the war was the rebellion of the Bohemian Estates against the newly elected King of Bohemia (1617), the Hapsburg Archduke Ferdinand of Styria and the nephew of Emperor Matthias. The conditions which led to the beginning of the rebellion were the culmination of grievances, unsatisfied claims, and mistrust which existed between the Bohemian Estates and the Hapsburgs. The breaking point in their relation is traditionally considered to be the Defenestration of Prague (May 23, 1618). By this violent physical ejection of the Emperor's representatives, Martinitz and Slawata, from the royal castle the Bohemian Estates broke relations with the Hapsburgs. Support for the Bohemian Estates came from the Protestant provincial Diets of Silesia, Upper Austria, and Lower Austria.¹ War became inevitable and both sides began diplomatic and military preparations for the conflict.

The anti-Hapsburg and mostly Protestant Estates commenced lively diplomatic activities among the princes of the Protestant Union for support against the Hapsburgs. Support for Bohemia came immediately from Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, who sent an experienced general, Ernest von Mansfeld, with 2,000 mercenaries. Mansfeld joined the Bohemian army under Generals Thurn and Hohenloe and the united forces stopped the army of Ferdinand in southern Bohemia. Then Mansfeld besieged Pilsen (Plzen) and captured it in November, 1618.² The political situation improved greatly for the Bohemians, when the Elector Frederick of Palatinate accepted the throne that the rebellious Estates offered him.

¹ Anton Gindely, *History of the Thirty Years War* trans. by Andrew Ten Brook (New York: Geo. Putnam's Sons, 1898), I, p. 80, 83-84. (Henceforth cited as Gindely, *History*); A.W. Ward. "The Outbreak of the Thirty Years War," *The Cambridge Modern History* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1907), IV, p. 26. The province of Moravia remained neutral until its occupation by the army of Bohemia under Thurn in April, 1619.

² C.V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War* (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 83.

In the meantime, the unseated Hapsburg, Ferdinand, began gathering forces for the suppression of the revolt and the regaining of the Bohemian throne. He became crowned King of Hungary in July, 1618, in face of opposition of many Protestant Hungarian noblemen and his chief rival for the Hungarian Crown, Bethlen Gabor, the Prince of Transylvania. In the coming struggle, Ferdinand had to rely on his own resources since the reigning Emperor Matthias, his uncle, favored moderation and the appeasement of the rebellious Bohemian Estates. Therefore, only a small army of 14,000 under the command of Counts Bucquoi and Dampierre had been assembled. Ferdinand's army entered Bohemia in August, 1618¹ but was stopped by the Bohemian army, as related above, and forced to retreat. Upon their withdrawal, the Bohemian army occupied Moravia, which still recognized Ferdinand as King of Bohemia, and advanced upon Vienna in June, 1619.

During this campaign, Emperor Matthias died and his nephew, Ferdinand had been elected Holy Roman Emperor in Frankfort.² The Imperial dignity, however, did not improve Ferdinand's success in reoccupying the Bohemian possessions. The Austrian provinces which had always provided the power base for the Hapsburgs, were either in revolt or showed great sympathy for the Bohemian Revolution. Ferdinand received help from Archduke Leopold of Tyrol, his brother, and from King Philip III of Spain, who sent troops and money. But this aid was insufficient to destroy the Bohemian army and occupy Bohemia. He turned, therefore, to King Sigismund III of Poland, who was bound to the House of Hapsburg by treaty and marriage — Queen Constance of Poland was Ferdinand's sister.

In August, 1619, Ferdinand sent Count Adolf Althan and his private secretary Peter Fuchs, as envoys, to King Sigismund to ask for military aid against the rebellious Bohemians. In December, the Emperor sent his envoys specific instructions which have survived in the Viennese Archives.³ These instructions detailed Ferdinand's

¹ Gindely, *History*, p. 91-93; Ward, p. 23.

² Emperor Mathias died March 20, 1619, and Ferdinand was elected Holy Roman Emperor on August 28, 1619.

³ Wien. Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv, Seria Polonica. Carton 54, 1622: Extraordinem, F.2-7v. Instruction of the Emperor Ferdinand II dated December 23, 1619, (Henceforth cited as Vienna. Staatsarchiv. Polonica).

hopes that Poland would be persuaded to declare war on the rebels, but barring this he hoped that lesser objectives would be met. To persuade Sigismund, the envoys were instructed to bolster their arguments with political, religious, and dynastic appeals.

Politically, the envoys had to persuade the King to take notice that the Protestant Prince Bethlen Gabor was manoeuvring for the Hungarian Crown and that for this reason he had allied himself with rebels from Bohemia, Silesia, and other provinces. Furthermore, if Bethlen were to become King of Hungary, his strengthened realm would then become a menace to Poland. Should Bethlen emerge victorious, Hungary would become completely Protestant — so ran the religious appeal — and the many Polish Protestant noblemen would invite him to become King of Poland. Bethlen would be accompanied by the Turkish army and Poland would be conquered. The danger to Poland and the Catholic religion was great and the only way to forestall it was to help Ferdinand destroy Bethlen and the rebellious subjects. The dynastic argument of the Emperor focused on the possibility that the fall of the Imperial authority would be the beginning of unrest and discontent in both countries. Poland might conceivably lose several of its provinces through the spreading of the insurrection. The Bohemian rebels, having denied the natural authority of the Holy Roman Emperor by bringing in a foreign king, Frederick of Palatinate, must, therefore, be severely dealt with.¹

Failing in these arguments, the envoys were to invoke the articles of the Treaty of Pozsony (Pressburg) of 1613, which stated that the Polish King would send military aid to the Hapsburg Emperor upon request. To persuade the King further, Althan and Fuchs were to appeal to Queen Constance and to Crown Prince Wladyslaw, both favorable to the armed intervention in the Emperor's behalf. The Queen and the Crown Prince would then add their influence and press the King to intervene. Furthermore, the ambassadors were to persuade the members of the Polish Diet, *Sejm*, that aiding the Emperor would be in the national interests of Poland.²

In the event that the above arguments were unable to sway the King and the Diet to full scale intervention on the Hapsburg

¹ *Ibid.*, F.4v.-5. See Appendix: Doc. I.

² *Ibid.*, F.3-5v.

side, then the Emperor allowed his envoys leeway to obtain the lesser objectives, the permission to recruit troops in Poland. As enticement, Althan and Fuchs were to offer the confiscated property of rebels in Silesia and Northern Hungary to the Crown Prince and influential Polish noblemen. The money for the recruitment of the mercenaries would be provided by King Philip of Spain and would arrive shortly.

The envoys were further instructed by Ferdinand to encourage the enemies of Bethlen Gabor in Poland, Count Homonnai and others, to launch an expedition into Hungary and divert Bethlen from aiding the Bohemians. However, the envoys were to discourage any armed forays into Transylvania, which was under Turkish suzerainty and not to endanger the relations between Turkey and the Empire.¹

This detailed instruction points out how desperately Ferdinand needed military aid from Poland, and that he was willing even to alienate certain portions of Silesia and Northern Hungary in return for Polish aid. Ferdinand's plea for help, however, placed Sigismund in an awkward position. Poland had just ended a long and costly war with Muscovy which left the treasury empty and the country exhausted. As a result, the King had little desire to plunge his country into another war, especially since the Hapsburgs were never popular among the middle and lower nobility of Poland, and the *Sejm* was unwilling to allocate funds necessary to conduct a war. However, to please a strong pro-Hapsburg party among the clergy, higher nobility, and at court, Sigismund was willing to permit the Imperial envoys to recruit mercenaries in the kingdom. The King was especially interested in sending away the many thousands of Cossacks and Lisowchyks who were disturbing the peace in the Ukraine.

Before making a final decision, the King wrote to General Stanislaw Zolkiewski in reference to the following: first, he notified Zolkiewski of writing Bethlen Gabor and the Bohemian Estates to cease waging war against the Emperor and to return to their former obedience; second, that Count Althan demanded to recruit in Poland, according to the Treaty of Pozsony; third that he, Sigismund, wanted to aid the Emperor since it would be in the interest of Poland; and fourth, he suggested to Althan that the undisciplined

¹ *Ibid.*, F.6-7v.

Lisowchyk detachments ought to be recruited at once. Sigismund asked Zolkiewski for support, since Zolkiewski was strongly anti-Hapsburg and would sabotage the King's efforts unless consulted beforehand. Sigismund enclosed a letter from Archduke Charles, Ferdinand's brother, to the Archbishop of Gniezno, the Primate of Poland and a staunch Hapsburg supporter. In this letter the Archduke intimated that Poland would receive a part of the province of Silesia.¹

The King sent a similar letter to another important officer, the *castellan* of Poznan, Lukasz Opalinski. Opalinski enthusiastically agreed with Sigismund, and in a return letter, he advised the King to send the Lisowchyks, and to permit the Imperial envoys to recruit additional troops because the return of Silesia to Poland would be an important event. Besides, "the Silesians hate the Germans and remember fondly the reigns of the Piasts and Sigismund I."²

After these consultations, Sigismund allowed Althan to recruit mercenaries for the service of the Emperor and encouraged him to employ the Lisowchyk Cossacks at once. At the same time, Sigismund declined to commit Poland to declare war on the Bohemians or on Bethlen Gabor. The decision to send thousands of Cossacks to fight for the Emperor, however, saved Vienna and gave Ferdinand time to negotiate a working alliance with the Catholic League. In the meantime, Cossack cavalry forces went to Hungary and Vienna to bolster the crumbling defense of the Imperial army.

In retrospect, Ferdinand profited most from the treaty. The Cossacks, nominally Polish subjects, aided the Catholic side to occupy the rebellious provinces and to win the war. Meanwhile, the province of Silesia offered as enticement to Sigismund had not been returned to Poland and Sigismund was blamed by several leading Polish historians for missing a golden opportunity to reoccupy Silesia.³

¹ J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje Panowania Zygmunta III* (Krakow: Wyd. Bibl. Polskiej, 1860), III, 127-128. Niemcewicz quotes from "Listy Zygmunta III do Lukasz z Brina Opalinskiego, Kasztelana Poznanskiego i do Stanislava Zolkiewskiego h. w. k. z....." Sigismund's letter from September 30, 1619.

² *Ibid.*, III, 128.

³ O. Halecki, *A History of Poland* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966), 148.

CHAPTER III
COSSACKS IN HUNGARY (1619-1620)

The first military operation of the Cossacks in the Thirty Years War occurred in Northern Hungary. As mentioned previously, the Prince of Transylvania, Bethlen Gabor, did not want to recognize Ferdinand II as King of Hungary because of political and religious reasons. He launched a military expedition against the Hapsburgs in August, 1619. After several months of campaigning, he occupied all of Northern Hungary and joined forces with the Bohemian army of Thurn, Hohenloe, and Horn. The allied enemy army reached Vienna by October 26, 1619, and the siege began.¹

In the meantime, friends of Ferdinand were preparing an expedition in Poland to invade Hungary. The leading figure was Count George Drugeth Homonnai, lord of Ungvar (Užhorod) and the most influential nobleman of the county (*comitat*) of Zemplin in Northern Hungary. Homonnai had been Bethlen Gabor's chief rival for the Transylvanian throne and, in 1616, led an unsuccessful attempt to oust Bethlen from it.² Two years later, Homonnai again tried to unseat Bethlen, with Ferdinand's backing, but failed, and subsequently fled to Poland.³ He needed money and Ferdinand's support to launch a third attempt against Bethlen. Upon arrival of Count

¹ Szilágyi Sándor, "Oklevelek Bethlen Gábor 1619-21 évi hadjaratai történetéhez," *Történelmi Tár*, (1857, p. 198-199. Henceforth cited as Szilagyi, "Oklevelek."

² Szilágyi Sándor, "Oklevelek a Homonnai-fele mozgalom történetéhez 1616-ban," *Történelmi Tár* (188), p. 401-449. Henceforth cited as Szilagyi, "Oklevelek a Homonnai."

³ Szilágyi Sándor, "Bethlen Gábor fejedelem uralkodásának történetéhez," *Történelmi Tár* (1879), p. 250. "Ipse Homonnay in vicinam Poloniam confugit, cum esset capiendus."

Althan from Vienna, Homonnai joined him, and together they began to organize an army against Bethlen.¹

As previously stated, King Sigismund of Poland permitted Althan to recruit mercenaries among the Lisowchyk Cossacks who were encamped at Brailov in Podolia, on the southern Polish frontier, after the end of the Muscovite war.² Althan was aware that light cavalry, especially as mobile and experienced as the Lisowchyks, was useful to any army. Therefore, without much hesitation he recruited 4,000 Lisowchyks under the command of Balenty Rogawski.³ Count Homonnai consented to the hiring of Lisowchyk troops but insisted that Althan employ other Cossack detachments since the Lisowchyks presented too small a force to achieve any significant success.⁴ The Imperial envoy became perplexed at Homonnai's suggestion, since the 30,000 florins which Ferdinand allocated for the recruiting were almost gone.⁵ Nevertheless, both Althan and Homonnai were able to recruit 6,000 Cossacks more through extravagant promises of loot and by a generous down payment.⁶ The army was ready by the middle of October, and on October 19, 1619, Homonnai left Brailov and advanced to the Hungarian border with a Cossack force of 10,000 men.⁷

The commander of Transylvania's forces in Bethlen's absence was General George Rakoczy. He wrote to Bethlen concerning the danger of Homonnai's invasion and asked for reinforcements, but

¹ Angyal David, "Magyarország története II. Mátyástól III. Ferdinánd haláláig" in S. Szilágyi (ed.) *Magyar nemzet története*, (Budapest: Atheneum, 1898), p. 240.

² Szabo Karoly, "Bethlen Gábor fejedelem politikai levelezése," *Történelmi Tár* (1891), p. 316. "Ut itaque et securitati ab ista parte consulator, et desiderio Sacr. Caesariae Maiestatis satis fieret, propter mutua pacta nuper in Prespurgensibus Comitibus renovata, ut exercitum Lisoviensem proprio sumptu conducere possit, concessimus..."

³ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, III, p. 207; Dembolecki, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁴ Szilágyi, "Oklevelek a Homonnai," p. 401-449. Homonnai employed Cossacks during his unsuccessful revolt in 1616.

⁵ Szilágyi Sándor, I. *Rákoczy György*, (Budapest: Tört. Tarsulat, 1893), p. 67. Homonnai suggested in a letter that Althan used the money for his private needs. Henceforth cited as Szilágyi, *Rákoczy*.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 68-70; Welykyi, III, p. 209.

⁷ Antonin Gindely, *Dejiny Českého Povstání leta 1618* (Praha: Mekl. F. Tempskeho, 1878), II, p. 221. Gindely states that Homonnai left October 21, 1619 with 11,000 troops. Henceforth cited as Gindely, *Dejiny*; Szilágyi, *Rákoczy*, p. 69; Dembolecki, p. 18.

MAP II: MORAVIA AND NORTHERN HUNGARY



Bethlen did not believe that the Emperor's ally would be able to recruit enough troops to defeat the forces under Rakoczy. The general noticed the calm with which Bethlen received his news and became convinced that Homonnai's forces were too insignificant to do much damage. Therefore, he advanced leisurely towards the Carpathian Mountains, whose passes he was to occupy and fortify in order to deny the enemy access into Northern Hungary.¹

On October 27, Rakoczy received word that Homonnai was crossing the Carpathians, and he ordered his army to meet the enemy on the border.² Three days later, Homonnai entered Hungary and advanced westward toward his domain, the town of Humenne.³ Nearly three weeks later, Rakoczy's force of 4,000 Hungarians met Homonnai's Cossack force in the vicinity of Ztropka (Stropko on the Ondava River).⁴ To stop the advance of the Cossack army, Rakoczy decided to attack. On November 22, 1619, he fell on the Cossack *avant-garde* under Rusinowski and Kleczkowski. The Cossacks feigned retreat and drew the whole Transylvanian force upon the main army. Rakoczy tried to extricate his troops by an orderly withdrawal, but his Haiduks misinterpreted his intentions, and the entire army began a disorderly flight.⁵ In several minutes, the Hungarians became a mob and the Cossacks pursued the fugitives, killing over two thousand Hungarians, including many officers.⁶

The door to Northern Hungary became opened to the Cossacks. In a few days, their detachments in search of booty spread throughout the country, from Spisky Hrad (Zips) along the Hernad River to Mihalovci on the Laborec River.⁷ Count Homonnai sent out a proclamation to all counties of Northern Hungary on November 27 announcing his victory and asking them to return to the allegiance of Emperor Ferdinand II.⁸ With the main army, Homonnai advan-

¹ Szilágyi Sándor, "Bethlen Gábor levelei" *Történelmi Tár* (1885), p. 467; Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 70.

² Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 70-71.

³ *Ibid.*, Welykyi, III, p. 209.

⁴ Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 71; Gindely, *Dejiny*, II, p. 21.

⁵ Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 71; Dembolecki, p. 18-19.

⁶ Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 71; Welykyi, III, p. 214-215; Dembolecki, p. 19. He gives Hungarian casualties as 7,345 which is an obvious exaggeration since the army of Rakoczy only had 4,000 troops; Gindely, *Dejiny* II, p. 221. Gindely comments that Rakoczy escaped with only five men.

⁷ Welykyi, III, p. 214-215; Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 72.

⁸ Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 72.

ced southward to Mihalovci, where a skirmish took place with a small Hungarian detachment, and reached Košice (Kaschau) on November 30.¹

Homonnai established his headquarters at Mischle and began negotiations with the garrison of Košice for the surrender of the town. He was also awaiting the nobility from rural districts to rally to his cause. However, neither of his plans materialized. The Hungarian nobility did not recognize him and hid before his army in the numerous castles and fortified towns while Kosice failed to open its gates.² Homonnai knew that he could not lose precious time besieging Košice without heavy artillery and sufficient infantry because Rakoczy was busy collecting another army in Transylvania. Besides, Bethlen, upon learning of Rakoczy's defeat, sent his light cavalry under General Szechy to aid Rakoczy in expelling the Cossacks.³ Therefore, on December 2, 1619, Homonnai withdrew from Košice and directed the Cossacks northwards towards Prešov (20 miles north of Košice). Here he was also unable to persuade the town to open its gates to him and to recognize Ferdinand as their overlord.⁴ Ill-luck followed him because all his adherents were either imprisoned or cowed by Bethlen and Rakoczy in the last few months. The House of Hapsburg could count on few followers among the Hungarian nobility at this time due to the repressive policy of the Transylvanian ruler.⁵

The final reason for the failure of Homonnai's plans was his lack of money to pay the Cossacks. By December 1619, the Cossacks began to demand their pay, to disobey orders, and to mutiny. The Cossack Council removed Rogawski from command and elected Adam Lipski in his place.⁶ Since this did not satisfy their demands for money, they decided to abandon the campaign. On December 16, 1619, the Cossacks left Homonnai in Northern Hungary and returned to Poland after three months service. They asked Count Althan for a new contract and to be sent elsewhere in the Emperor's service.⁷ Homonnai returned to his domains, but after a brief

¹ Dembólecki, p. 19.

² Szilagyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 72; Welykyi, III, p. 214-215.

³ Szilagyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 72.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Angyal, p. 242.

⁵ Szilagyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 58-62.

⁶ Dembólecki, p. 19.

⁷ Angyal, p. 242; Welykyi, III, p. 216-219.

period also recrossed the Carpathians to Poland, where had several holdings.¹

This first Cossack campaign in Northern Hungary left no lasting effects and did not alter the position of the Emperor in Hungary. However, this expedition, even though ineffectual as a military venture, had a decisive bearing upon the war. Bethlen was besieging Vienna with the Bohemian troops under the command of Thurn during November, 1619, and the capture of Vienna had become quite certain since the Imperial generals, Dampierre and Bucquoi, were unable to defend the city effectively due to their small forces. On November 27, 1619, the Hungarians and Bohemians were preparing for a grand assault upon Vienna when a messenger arrived from Rakoczy telling of Homonnai's invasion and his victory. The message was greatly exaggerated, and Bethlen was told that Homonnai led 32,000 Cossacks.² Bethlen feared that this great army would cut him off from Transylvania. Therefore, he left Vienna and withdrew to Pressburg (Bratislava).³ To prevent Homonnai from seizing Northern Hungary, Bethlen sent all his light cavalry (15,000) under General Szechy to join with Rakoczy.⁴ As a result of this Vienna was saved, and the Hapsburg Emperors were able to continue war for another twenty-nine years.

The Cossack expedition also had another positive result. In the seventeenth century, the eastern part of the province of Northern Hungary was inhabited by the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) while the western part was Slovak. There were few Hungarians. Nevertheless, most of the nobility and the administration of the country was Hungarian, the bulk of the population being Ukrainian and Slovak serfs. The serfs welcomed the Cossacks exuberantly and aided them in plundering the Hungarian nobles and their servants. As the Hungarian writer, David Angyal, points out on the basis of contemporary sources, the Ukrainian serfs wanted to revenge themselves on their masters and consequently joined the Cossacks in bands.⁵ But the untrained peasant groups were of little military value to Homonnai; rather they became a hindrance since the Hungarian

¹ Szilágyi Sándor, "Gróf Batthyány Jozsef kopesenyi levéltárából," *Történelmi Társ* (1888), p. 404-405.

² Szilágyi, "Oklevelek Bethlen," p. 198-199.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Szilágyi, *Rakoczy*, p. 72.

⁵ Angyal, p. 242.

nobility had little sympathy for the serfs' revolt. But it must be stressed that the peasantry felt akin to the Cossacks and manifested their solidarity with their blood brothers. This expedition provided one of the few chances of national identification of the Carpathian Ukrainians with the Cossacks of the Ukraine to occur in the 17th century.

Homonnai tried to raise another Cossack force in Poland against Bethlen in 1620. He asked the Emperor for 200,000 florins in the summer of that year.¹ King Sigismund also recommended him to Ferdinand as worthy of his trust.² The Emperor sent Homonnai some funds and the latter recruited a similar number of Cossacks. With this force, he made another invasion into Northern Hungary in the beginning of August, 1620.³ But this expedition was even more unsuccessful. The Cossacks had to break through the fierce resistance of the Hungarian army guarding the mountain passes on the borders, and after several weeks they returned with Homonnai to Poland where Homonnai died shortly afterward in Poland.

Homonnai's second expedition into Hungary tied up considerable numbers of Hungarian troops for the defense of Northern Hungary and deprived the Bohemian army of the necessary reinforcements to stop the Catholic forces from capturing Prague. This factor prevented a more vigorous prosecution of the war by the Hungarians and contributed to the defeat of the Protestant cause. Twice the Cossacks under Homonnai proved valuable allies to the Emperor and contributed to the victory of the Catholic side.

¹ Welykyi, III, p. 260; Sasinek Ferencz. "Regesták," *Történelmi Tár* (1892), p. 167.

² Sasinek, "Regesták," p. 166. "Sigismund III, rex Poloniae, scribit imperatori Ferdinando II, Georgium Drugeth, comitem de Homonna, dignum esse favore et adiumento imperatoris."

³ Welykyi, III, p. 261-262.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROUTES AND CROSSINGS OF THE COSSACKS (1620)

The participation of the Cossack forces in the campaigns of the Thirty Years War had presented many interesting problems to the researcher. Among these, one stands out which we found was necessary for the comprehension of this study; to identify the routes used by the Cossacks from their bases in Poland to the theatre of war and their conduct while crossing through hostile or neutral territory.

The revolt in the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia severed the normal communication routes between Austria and Poland. Therefore, all troops which came from Poland to the Emperor, in Vienna, had to fight their way through hostile territory. These movements were trying ordeals for both the Cossacks and the inhabitants and generally may be described as crossings. The Cossacks encountered numerous ambushes and clashes with Moravian, Silesian, and Bohemian border troops, and a hostile populace. Often one-half of their original number had been lost in crossing hostile territory on the way to Vienna or the camp of the Imperial army. The populace, on the other hand, suffered from requisitions, lootings, arson, and other excesses of the passing troops. The constant threat of incursions kept considerable numbers of Silesian and Moravian troops in their respective provinces on guard and patrol duty to prevent further invasions and to protect the populace.

Several routes led from Poland into Lower Austria, the theatre of war in the early 1620, and the Cossacks used most of them. These routes were commercial thorough-fares connecting Poland with the Empire and Western Europe. To facilitate identification, they may be divided into eastern routes which lay across the province of Northern Hungary, the middle routes traversing Moravia, and western routes that crossed Silesia.

One eastern route began at Krosno in Poland and went southward through the Dukla Pass of the Carpathian Mountains to Prešov and Košice. The Cossack expedition under Homonnai took this route. The second eastern route began at Nowy Sącz and entered Northern Hungary along the Poprad River. It followed the Poprad River westward past the towns of Kežmarok and Poprad and then ran along the Váh River to Trnava, Pressburg, and Vienna. The Moravian route branched off from the second eastern route at Trenčín and ran westward to Uherské Hradište, Hodonin, Pressburg (Bratislava), and Vienna.

There had been three main western routes from Poland which crossed Silesia. One ran from Cracow through Tešín, N. Jičín, Hranice where it branched off into the west to Olomouc and into the south to Kromeríž, Uherské Hradište, and Vienna. The second route came from Neisse (Nisa), through Jagerndorf (Krnov), Opava, Sternberk, Olomouc, Kromeríž, to Vienna. The third route began in the province of Great Poland and went through Glogow, Legnica, Hradec Králové (Königgratz). Kolin, Prague, and led to Austria, Bavaria, and Germany.¹ The Cossack detachments used any of these routes to get to the war zone in Austria. Often, they avoided towns and went cross-country in order to escape ambushes and patrols. Nevertheless, their crossings usually followed one of the above mentioned routes as may be determined from the various chronicle accounts.

In August, 1619, the first Cossack group left Poland for Austria. This group, consisting of 3,000 men, had been dispatched by Prince Wladyslaw of Poland in answer to Ferdinand's request.² The Cossacks departed from Neisse in Polish Silesia and travelled to Vienna via the second western route. The first Cossack crossing was carried out in a disciplinary manner since the contemporary chroniclers registered no complaints about their movement. This Cossack force had been sent by Emperor Ferdinand II, in September, 1619, to the city of Brno (Bruenn) to safeguard the evacuation of Cardinal Dietrichstein against the approach of the Bohemian army.³

The Lisowchyks were the second Cossack group which crossed the rebellious provinces from Poland to Austria. As previously

¹ These trade routes were taken from Map 12-13 of the *Školni Atlas Československých Dějin* (4th ed., Prague: Kart. Nakl., 1967), edited by Petr Cafourek.

² Welykyi, *op. cit.*, III, nro. 1292, 194-195; nro. 1307, 203.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1311, 204-205.

stated, they left Count Homonnai in December, 1619, and returned to Poland. Their leaders met Count Althan in Warsaw and obtained a new contract in the Emperor's service. Althan directed them to Vienna for the protection of that city against the besieging Hungarian and Bohemian forces.

On February 2, 1620, 4,000 Lisowchyks under the command of Wojtech Kleczkowski departed from the town of Krosno for Vienna.¹ They followed the first western route which ran from Cracow via Těsin, N. Jičín, Valasko, Meziříce, Bystrica, Holešov, Kromeríž, Uherské Hradistě, Nicolsburg to Vienna.

Their crossing which lasted only seven days had been the swiftest and the most ferocious. They fought two battles with the Moravian troops near the towns of Ponti and Luxembourg (Zerotín).² Near Valasko Meziříče, the Lisowchyks disrupted a wedding by killing the groom and kidnapping the women and their jewellery.³ At Bystrica, they destroyed the castle of a Lutheran nobleman, Vaclav Bitovsky and killed a Protestant pastor. On February 6, they killed another pastor, Pavel Kapita, at Napajedla.⁴ Near Olomouc, the Lisowchyks seized a nobleman called Hort, by their campsite. They accused him of spying for the Bohemians and upon his denials asked him to recite the *Ave Maria*. When he did not know it, the Lisowchyks killed him.⁵

From the above mentioned, it seems that the Lisowchyks directed most of their hatred against Protestant pastors.⁶ The Lisowchyks identified Catholicism with loyalty to the Emperor and Protestantism with rebellion. For that reason, they killed the Protestant pastors as leaders of the Bohemian rebellion. We will return to this ideological problem in the last chapter.

During the Lisowchyk crossing of Moravia, an incident occurred which created a religious legend for the Moravians. As the Lisowchyks approached the town of Holešov, a Catholic priest who was

¹ Dembolecki, *op. cit.*, 21-22.

² Welykyi, III, nro. 1337-1339, 218-220.

³ Rudolf Dvořák, *Dejiny Moravy* (Brno: Akc. Knihtiskarna, 1899), Vol. 1-3, p. 555.

⁴ Welykyi, III, nro. 1339, 219. Napajedla lay 20 miles north of Uherske Hradište.

⁵ *Ibid.*, nro. 1338, 219.

⁶ Dembolecki, 12-13, 15-16. Dembolecki served as the chaplain of the Lisowchyks in 1620 and 1622. He calls the Lisowchyks the "Elect" (*Eleary*) who fought for God and the 'Holy Roman faith.'

residing there, Jan Sarkander, met them at the city gates with the Holy Sacraments and assured them that the population was Catholic. The Cossacks did not disturb the town, but the Moravian Protestant authorities seized Sarkander, charged him with being a Polish spy, and sent him to Olomouc. The provincial authorities in Olomouc tried Sarkander and executed him for treason against the state.¹ Later in the century, the Catholic Church recognized him as a martyr for the Catholic faith and called Sarkander "blessed."

The Lisowchyk Cossacks reached Vienna on February 8, 1620, and were welcomed enthusiastically by the inhabitants of Vienna and enrolled into the Emperor's service. They agreed to serve the Emperor for the sum of 53,000 florins, which was to be paid every three months.²

This crossing of the Lisowchyk Cossacks caused great panic among the provincial governments of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. On February 7, 1620, King Frederick of Bohemia ordered the Silesian Estates to muster out troops for guard duty along the Polish border.³ Next day he ordered the Count of Glatz (Kladsko) to call out the local levies of infantry and cavalry, to fortify all roads leading from Poland, and to keep in contact with the Silesian and Moravian levies.⁴ On February 7, 1620, Frederick also ordered mobilization of the local levies in Moravia against further Cossack raids.⁵ These levies, which included 1,500 cavalry, were to be commanded by Ladislav Velen from Žerotín.⁶ The preparations to meet new Cossack invasions bore fruit later that month.

¹ František Hruby, "Knez Jan Sarkander, moravský mučienik doby belohorske a jeho legenda," *Cesky Casopis Historicky*, XIV (1935), pp. 262-271; Dvorak, *op. cit.*, v. 1-3, 556; B. Dudík (ed.), *Mährens Geschichts-Quellen* (Bruenn: KlMuniser, 1850), I, 55; *Olmutzer Sammel-Chronik* (in *Quellen-Schriften zur Geschichte und Osterr. Schlesiens*, Bruenn, 1861), p. 46-47. Sarkander was executed at Olomouc on March 17, 1620 by the order of Herr von Lobkowitz, Landeshauptman in Moravia.

² Welykyi, III, nro. 1338, 219-220.

³ Vaclav Liva (ed.), *Prameny*, III, 53. Letter of February 7, 1620 to the Silesian Estates. (Henceforth cited as Liva.)

⁴ *Ibid.*, 53. Letter of February 8, 1620.

⁵ Frantisek Dostal, *Vallaška povstani za tricetileté valky, 1621-1644* (Praha: Nase Vojsko, 1956), 60, footnote. The Moravian Estates ordered all peasants and townsmen to capture and slay Cossacks as enemies of the state: Law of March 17, 1620. The Law of April 20, 1620 ordered every tenth man in Moravia to report for duty against the Cossacks.

⁶ Frantisek Hruby, *Ladislav Velen z Žerotine* (Prague: Historick, y Klub 1930), 96-95.

Later that month, the third group of Cossacks, numbering 2,000 men, crossed into Moravia. Near Olomouc, they were surprised by a force of local levies and were soundly defeated. The Cossacks had over 400 casualties in this encounter.¹ This Cossack detachment had been later approached by four Moravian envoys, who offered them service with the Moravian Estates.² This approach was probably a trick to obtain time for the levies to take a favorable position. At any rate, the Cossacks did not listen to their request and killed two of them as traitors to the Emperor and released the other two to spread the word of how the Cossacks were punishing the rebels against the Emperor.³ The third group reached Vienna later in the month.

In March, 1620, the fourth group numbering 8,000 Cossacks, gathered on the Silesian borders to attempt a crossing to Vienna. They burned several villages, captured a castle in the county of Jagerndorf (Krnov), and killed six Protestant pastors.⁴ These Cossacks were engaged by the Silesian border troops numbering 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.⁵ A brisk engagement took place near the fortified village of San Michele where the Cossacks were at first driven off, but they returned with reinforcements and captured it.⁶

The Cossacks faced fierce opposition and as a result, they separated into smaller groups for the advance to Vienna. Throughout April and May of 1620, companies of 200 and 300 men arrived in Vienna and reported on the many battles which they had to wage through Silesia and Moravia. They had many wounded with them, and often their original numbers were greatly depleted by the crossings. However, they all wanted to be admitted into the Emperor's

¹ Welykyi, III, nro. 1341, 221, nro. 1346, 224; Liva, III, 54. Letter dated February 13, 1620 from the Chancellor of Bohemia to Count David Jindrich of Czernhaus in Kladsko.

² Welykyi, III, nro. 1341, 221; nro. 1345, 223-224.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1345, 223-224.

⁴ *Ibid.*, nro. 1361, 232; nro. 1363, 232-233. The documents give conflicting figures of the number of Cossacks who were preparing to invade Silesia in March, 1620. One indicates 24,000, another 15,000 and a third 8,000. The last figure we take to be the most realistic: Dzieduszycki enumerates several Cossack commanders from this campaign: Rucki, Sadowski, Wysocki, and Tworzianski.

⁵ Welykyi, III, nro. 1361, 232.

⁶ *Ibid.*, nro. 1368, 235.

service and proclaimed that they desired to fight for the Catholic faith.¹ Some of them wanted to receive regular pay and others wanted booty only.²

Continuous incursions of the Cossacks forced the Silesians to order provincial mobilization and to ask King Frederick and Bethlen Gabor for additional troops for the defense of their frontiers. In May, 1620, the Silesian Estates mobilized every twentieth man for duty on the Polish-Silesian frontier. After the mobilization, the provincial levies, numbering 25,000 troops, patrolled the border,³ but these troops proved to be inadequate to safeguard Silesia. Therefore, they appealed to King Frederick and Bethlen Gabor to help them in the defense of the Silesian borders. Frederick sent them, in May, 1620, one regiment of 2,400 English volunteers, who came to fight for the Protestant cause. This regiment under the command of Lord Gray was to be stationed in the province of Upper Lusatia and protect the Silesian border from the north. It was quartered in the town of Sestimento (sic) and remained there until August, 1620. Further reinforcements arrived from Bethlen Gabor who sent the Silesians 2,000 light cavalry.⁴

The consolidation of the Silesian border forces, which were to prevent further Cossack crossings, lasted several months. In the meantime, Cossack raids continued unabated. On May 9, 1620, a large Cossack force captured and looted the town of Opava (Tropau) in southern Silesia.⁵ Smaller Cossack forces still managed to cross Silesia but these ventures became more dangerous as the border troops increased. Several Cossack detachments were bribed by the Silesian authorities to return to Poland but many were defeated in

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 1376, 239. "Per defendere la fede Cattolica Romana": Dembolecki provides the names of two commanding officers who brought their troops to Vienna: Stanislaw Lahodowski, N. Iwanicki. Dembolecki, 31, 32.

² Welykyi, III, nro. 1341, 221.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1385, 243; Karel Tieftrunk (ed.), *Pavla Skaly ze Zhoře Historie Česka od r. 1602 do r. 1623* (Praha: I.L. Kober, 1867), III, 123. (Henceforth cited as Tieftrunk.)

⁴ Prague. Archiv. F.M. Carton 30 (1620: I-VII, F. 12). Frederick's letter of May 9, 1620 to the Administrator of Upper Lusatia; Josef Polisensky, *Anglie a Bila Hora, 1618-1648* (Praha: Karlov Univ., Fak. Historicky, 1949), 140-141.

⁵ Welykyi, III, nro. 1380, 240-241; nro. 1385, 243; nro. 1389, 245.

⁶ *Ibid.*, nro. 1379, 240. A large group of Cossacks who were trying to enter Silesia from Torun were bribed to return for the price of 800 florins.

battle, captured, and executed.¹ The Silesian Estates were aided in their task of destroying Cossack bands by many Polish noblemen, whose holdings were plundered by the Cossacks, and who often gave the Silesians information to the whereabouts and the numbers of Cossacks.²

The fighting in Silesia illustrates the problem of the Cossack movements from their bases in Poland to the theatres of war. They did not intend to subjugate the province of Silesia for the Emperor. Their aim was to reach their destination in Lower Austria, but because their route lay through the hostile lands, they had to fight their way through with arms in hand. Since they usually rode without baggage camps and lived off the land, they had to choose their way through populous areas. This in turn resulted in many casualties for the Cossacks and turned their crossings into particularly vicious ones.

In the summer of 1620, the Cossacks again used an eastern route since the Silesian crossings were too well guarded. This was the eastern route, which ran through Northern Hungary along the Poprad and Vah Rivers. On July 4, 1620, a fifth group, numbering 2,000 Cossacks, arrived in Vienna by this route. They had suffered extremely heavy casualties due to the battles that they waged with the Hungarian troops.³ They told that a further 2,000 Cossacks under the command of Assan Trasso (*sic*) would try to go by this route.⁴

The Cossacks under Assan Trasso were the sixth group to make the crossing. Along the eastern route, they captured and looted the town of Sillein (Žilina) on the Vah River. However, nearby they were engaged by a Hungarian brigade, lost 150 men in battle,

¹ Fifty Cossacks were hung in Moravia, twenty-nine in Breslau; another sixteen were executed by the Polish authorities. Welykyi, III, nro. 1385, 243; nro. 1390, 245-246; nro. 1391, 246. A contemporary chronicler reports that 900 Cossacks were killed by the Moravians near a lake at Mezerice in May. The Silesians captured thirty Cossacks and executed them on May 28. Tieftrunk, III, 125, 186.

² Welykyi, III, nro. 1386, 244; nro. 1387, 244.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1409, 255-256.

⁴ *Ibid.*, nro. 1413, 257-258. The name, obviously distorted, could belong to Taras Triasyła, a famous Cossack leader of 1630. This document indicates that there were 5,000 Cossacks in this group but further reports reduce it to 2,000.

and 28 Cossacks were captured and taken to the castle of Spiš.¹ Later on, near Pribitz (present Prievizda, on the Nitra River), the Cossacks killed 4,000 Anabaptists. In Moravia, they attacked a roving Hungarian-Moravian force and killed 400 Hungarians and 25 Germans. The Cossack losses were 186 dead and 217 captured.² After this they reached Vienna. This was the last large group which ventured from Poland in 1620. A Turkish and Tatar invasion of the Ukraine was imminent, and the Cossacks stayed in the Ukraine to defend it from them. Therefore, no more detachments set out for Vienna that year.

The trade routes which led from Poland to Vienna through Silesia were used by the various Cossack detachments. Since they led through the most populous section of the land, the bloodiest encounters took place upon them. The whole Silesian frontier between Neisse and Tešin was the scene of constant skirmishes and battles between the hostile forces. In addition to the devastation of the lands, border warfare in Silesia had a further effect. It detained thousands of provincial troops from joining the Bohemian army fighting with the Imperial forces in Lower Austria. In effect, the conflict in Silesia and Moravia may be called a second front, not intended as such, which prevented the insurgents from uniting all their forces and using the interior lines of communications more effectively to win their independence from the Hapsburgs.

¹ Tieftrunk, III, 186. Pavel Skala states that the Cossacks came in two waves of 1500 and 1800 men.

² Welykyi, III, no. 1416, 259; nro. 1419-20, 260-261; nro. 1437, 263.

CHAPTER V

COSSACKS IN THE BOHEMIAN WAR (1619-1620)

In the beginning years of the Thirty Years War great battles were few and far apart. The Bohemian War was mostly a war of raids and manoeuvres, where the greatest blows fell upon the non-combatants. This is due for the most part to the character of the rivals. Both sides employed large numbers of irregular troops whose tactics were to avoid major battles. Instead, they ravaged and plundered the countryside, thus denying vital supplies from reaching the main armies.

The siege of Vienna was abandoned by Bethlen Gabor in October, 1619, when news reached him that Homonnai invaded Hungary. The Hungarian troops under Bethlen withdrew to Pressburg (Bratislava) where a truce was agreed upon by the Hungarian and Imperial troops (January, 1620). Meanwhile, Bethlen's ally, the Bohemian army under Thurn, withdrew to Langenlois where they established winter quarters and continued to menace Vienna. Imperial strategy called for the destruction of the Bohemian army and the invasion of Bohemia for the eventual capture of Prague. However, the successful execution of this plan was delayed by the inability of the Imperial troops to defeat the Bohemian army screening Bohemia. Only by the end of September, 1620, the Imperial General Bucquoi and the army of the Catholic League under the command of Count Tilly launched a successful invasion of Bohemia. The Catholic armies defeated the Bohemian troops, captured Prague, and ended the Bohemian rebellion during the fall of 1620.

At the same time, another Imperial force was defending the eastern border of the Hapsburg dominions from the ally of the Bohemians, Bethlen Gabor who had re-entered the war in the summer of 1620 after the expiration of the truce.

The Cossacks took part in the fighting on both fronts during this

year and were used extensively as scouts, raiders, screening parties, and skirmishers. They served as the *avant garde*, the rear guard, and protected the lines of communication for the Catholic armies.

The arrival of Lisowchyk regiments, as recounted in Chapter IV, coincided with the renewed siege of Vienna by the Bohemians under Thurn. The Lisowchyks arrived from Poland after a short and bloody passage and encamped in the vicinity of the city. While their commanding officer, W. Kleczkowski, was negotiating for terms to be incorporated into the Hapsburg army in Vienna, the Lisowchyk campsite was attacked and captured by 6,000 Moravian troops under General Stampfel.¹ The Lisowchyks fled their camp, regrouped in the woods nearby, and charged the Moravians who were returning to their quarters after the attack. An inconclusive encounter ensued but the Lisowchyks claimed victory.

Meanwhile, another Imperial general, Dampierre, crossed the Danube in early February, 1620, with three thousand other Cossacks and invested Nicolsburg, which surrendered four days later.² The Cossacks were then sent by Dampierre to capture Noimill (Novy Mlyn) and Moreg and to seize the surrounding countryside.³ At Moreg they also captured four high-ranking officers of the Moravian army and much booty. This action turned the Bohemian army's left flank and drove a wedge between the Bohemian army and Hungary.

After the arrival of the Lisowchyks in early February, General Bucquoi received orders from the Emperor to advance up the Danube River from Vienna and to destroy the winter quarters of the Protestant forces from Lower Austria and Bohemia which menaced Vienna from the west. His army included four thousand Lisowchyks, who had entered the Emperor's service. During this campaign at Langenlois, Bucquoi outflanked the enemy troops and defeated them near Krems. By the end of February, 1620, bad weather and the defeat by the Bohemians at Messau forced Bucquoi to retreat from Krems to effect a juncture with Dampierre's forces near Vienna.⁴

¹ Welykyi, III, nro. 1340, 220-221; "Kleczkowski," *Słownik Naukowy*, Vol. IV, p. 1682.

² Gindely, *History*, I, 216-217; Welykyi, III, nro. 1345, 223.

³ Welykyi, III, nro. 1345, 224.

⁴ Gindely, *History*, I, 217.

Map. III: BOHEMIAN PROVINCES AND NORTHERN HUNGARY



After Bucquoi's defeat, Ferdinand ordered Dampierre to return from the eastern sector and to join Bucquoi. When the Imperial army united, it began a second thrust toward southern Bohemia. In early March, 1620, twenty thousand men, including seven thousand Cossacks and Lisowchyks, advanced northward into Lower Austria. On their way, the Cossacks captured and pillaged the towns of Giglier and Aupbruna in the county of Ardem.¹ The Imperial army met the Bohemian army under the command of Anhalt, Hohenloe, and Mansfeld near the town of Eggenberg. The position of the Bohemian forces was easily defensible, since it was based upon three hills and a forest from which Mansfeld's troops continually attacked the Imperial camp. Due to bitter cold weather, extensive offensive operations could not be undertaken by the entire Imperial army. The Cossacks as light cavalry were given extensive tasks to perform since they were accustomed to fight in cold weather. On March 7, the Cossacks raided the enemy's camp, killed four hundred Bohemian soldiers, and returned with booty and four battle flags.² A week later, the Cossacks were sent to dislodge Mansfeld's troops from the forest. The Cossacks captured the forest after a long battle with heavy losses - their commanding general, V. Kleczkowski and four captains were killed.³

Despite the Cossack efforts, the Imperial army was unable to capture Bohemian positions and General Bucquoi ordered the retreat to Krems on March 28. The Cossack cavalry covered the retreat but suffered casualties in doing so.⁴ The Imperial failure to capture the enemy camp was attributed by the commanders to severe cold and a lack of sufficient ammunition and provisions. The many references to Cossack activity during the early months of 1620 in the sources indicate that they were the only active element during the campaign.

From the Imperial camp at Krems, Bucquoi sent raiding columns of Cossacks deep into rebellious provinces to spread confusion, fear, and anxiety among them. One such column penetrated as far as

¹ Welykyi, III, nro. 1361, 232. The place names cannot be identified.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1354, 228-229. The dispatches of the Papal Nuncio in Vienna and Venetian ambassador comment widely on the part the Cossacks played in the Battle of Eggenberg.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1363, 232-233; Dembolecki; *op. cit.*, 28-29. The Lisowchyks then elected Stanislaw Rusinowski as their commanding officer (polkownik).

⁴ Welykyi, III, nro. 1368, 235.

Brno, where it destroyed the headquarters of a Moravian detachment, killed three to four hundred soldiers, scattered the rest¹. These Cossacks captured two battle flags which they sent to the Emperor with a missive, that "they came to serve the Emperor by fighting his foes and not by sitting in winter quarters."²

One report relates how a raiding party of five hundred Cossacks from Krems approached the city council of Brno for passports-granting them free access through Moravia, since they were returning home. The Moravian authorities granted them these passports and appointed a convoy of fifty soldiers to escort them to the frontiers. As soon as they left Brno, the Cossacks surrounded and decimated their guard and burned several villages before returning to the Imperial camp.³

Miscellaneous Cossack activities continued throughout the spring of 1620. During April, Cossack columns captured rebel strongholds at Lips, Nichelspurg, and Lupienburg and plundered their environs. In the same month, another Cossack cavalry detachment, one thousand strong, reached Vienna from Poland after three weeks of continuous riding and fighting, losing half of its men as casualties due to skirmishes and battles with Moravian and Silesian levies.⁴

The Imperial army at Krems, reinforced and reequipped, began a third thrust into Bohemia. On April 12, the vanguard, which consisted of two thousand Cossack cavalry and one thousand Imperial infantry, fell upon the Bohemian camp at Sinzendorf near Horn, destroyed a small Czech detachment, and provoked a general attack by the Bohemian generals, Hohenloe and Baron Felz. The Cossacks pretended to flee and led the charging Bohemian troops into the forest where Bucquoi lay in ambush with the rest of the army. The Bohemians were defeated with heavy losses: 165 nobles captured, 1200 troops killed, and much booty seized.⁵ The Cossacks contributed greatly to the winning of this battle. The swiftness of their charges was such that the Bohemians were not given a chance to reload before the Cossack cavalry was upon them. One Cossack

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 1364, 233.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1369; Dembolecki, 33-36. He recounts several other such raids.

⁴ Welykyi, III, nro. 1372, 237.

⁵ *Ibid.*, nro. 1375, 238; Franz. C. Khevenhiller, *Annales Ferdinandeï...* (Leipzig: Verlag M. G. Weidmann, 1724), IX, 1035.

officer was made a "knight of the Holy Roman Empire" as a result of his valour in this battle; he killed seven Bohemian noblemen single-handed and captured an enemy ensign.¹

The cavalry battle before the city of Horn followed shortly after the battle of Sinzendorf. Dampierre, Bucquoi's executive officer, approached the city with 3,000 cavalry and unspecified number of Lisowchyks. He was met by the Bohemians, who in the resulting battle were completely routed, leaving several thousand troops dead, including 370 noblemen. The city of Horn surrendered to the Imperial troops after this defeat.²

From Horn, a part of the Imperial army, including the Cossacks under Dampierre marched to the city of Prachatice in southern Bohemia. It besieged the city, after being reinforced by a detachment of General Marradas, who commanded the Imperial garrison at Budweis (Česke Budějovice). The Cossacks took part in the five day storm of the city, its capture, and its plunder. Among the casualties of Prachatice were the 5,000 local levies and the whole civilian population of the city.³ The city, however, had to be evacuated by the occupying troops since Mansfeld threatened to sever communication with the main army of Bucquoi.

For the third time this year, the thrust toward Prague was blunted by the valorous defense of the Bohemians and a retreat to Krems was ordered by Bucquoi. Meanwhile, independent of the retreat, a column of Cossack and Walloon cavalry was raiding the rebellious provinces of Upper and Lower Austria, pillaging, burning, and taking captive many of the rebels.⁴

In May, 1620, the Cossacks in the Imperial army at Krems received reinforcements. On May 2, 1620, a small detachment of two hundred arrived in Vienna from Poland and told of battles throughout Moravia and Silesia wherein their large detachment of Cossacks was defeated by Moravian levies. More Cossack bands filtered through during the next two weeks and raised the number to one thousand. They reported that they were to be followed by

¹ Welykyi, III, nro. 1381, 241.

² Dembolecki, p. 29-30. The account of this battle the authors were unable to verify. The only other author who mentions it is J. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje Panowania Zygmunta III*, v. 3, p. 130. It occurred on Palm Sunday (W kwietnia niedzele), 1620.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 30; Gindely, *History*, I, 221.

⁴ Welykyi, III, nro. 1375, 238.

another Cossack host numbering twelve to sixteen thousand men which was gathering on the Polish-Silesian frontier.¹

In early June, 1620, Bucquoi launched from Krems a fourth expedition into northern Austria and Bohemia. He occupied Drosendorf and advanced toward Gmünd. Near Gmünd, he evaded the Bohemian army, but the opposing forces engaged in a brisk cavalry battle in which the Florentine and Cossack cavalry defeated a detachment of Hungarian horsemen whom Bethlen sent to reinforce the Bohemian force.² On June 20, the Cossack cavalry attacked five thousand troops of Mansfeld who were leaving the main Bohemian camp to suppress a peasant revolt in the hinterland and killed several hundred of them.³

The situation for the Emperor worsened during the late summer of 1620. Hungarian raids increased in number and intensity as Bethlen Gabor again sent his forces against the Emperor from Northern Hungary. His hinterland became secure when Homonnai's second attempt to invade Northern Hungary in the summer of 1620, as discussed in Chapter III, failed. Therefore, Bethlen could concentrate fully on prosecuting the war. His main army again began to menace Vienna, while his light cavalry ranged far and wide, plundering and looting.

In June, 1620, the Imperial High Command ordered Bucquoi back from Gmünd to Krems to cover Vienna from the north. Dampierre and the Cossacks were ordered to Pressburg to protect Vienna from the east. Most of the Cossacks and Lisowchyks had been placed under Dampierre's command to counteract Bethlen's Hungarian light cavalry called Hussars. The effectiveness of the Hungarians was, therefore, curtailed when they met the Cossacks who equalled or excelled them in tactics and mobility of warfare. The eastern sector became predominantly a Cossack-Hungarian war and was characterized by numerous battles, fights, skirmishes, and raids. It was waged principally in the provinces of Moravia, but also in Lower and Upper Austria during the summer and fall of 1620.

We first hear of Cossack-Hungarian skirmishes in May of 1620. By June, the skirmishes turned into regular clashes. On June 18,

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 1372, 237; nro. 1376, 239; nro. 1385, 243.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1392, 247; nro. 1401, 252. This battle occurred on June 13, 1620.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1402, 252; nro. 1405, 253.

a battle occurred near the town of Langenlois "where three thousand enemies were killed by the Cossacks."¹ At Vucitra (on the Austro-Moravian border), the Cossacks defeated a large Hungarian detachment, killing three hundred and capturing three battle flags and 1500 head of cattle.²

The favorite Cossack tactic was the launching of raids (*czaty*) behind Hungarian lines to spread confusion. Once in the enemy hinterland, they were able to attack small concentrations of the enemy, capture and pillage towns, and inflict great damage. Several such raiding parties were sent out by Dampierre in the summer of 1620 to keep the Hungarians busy patrolling the countryside and prevent the Hungarians from raiding behind Imperial lines. At the end of June, a Cossack raiding party attacked the town of Litschau (Licov) in northern Lower Austria. The town was plundered, and the Lisowchyks raided as far as Rozmberk in southern Bohemia. They defeated a combined Hungarian-Bohemian force of 1200 and burned the suburbs of Rozmberk. The raiding force, which included Lisowchyks and several cavalry squadrons of Wallenstein, had been commanded by the Lisowchyk officer, Stanislaw Strojnowski.³ Another detachment embarked under the command of Rusinowski. It reached the town of Laa on the Dyje River. The town had been seized by a surprise attack, and 1500 Hungarians and rebellious Austrians were killed. This raiding force was severely mauled by a pursuing detachment of 800 Hungarians who attacked the Lisowchyks on their return journey.⁴

Some of the raids ended disastrously for the Cossacks. In August, a Cossack force of 800 raided throughout southwestern Moravia. There they destroyed a Hungarian detachment of 300 which was quartered in the border villages. After the victory, the Cossacks celebrated by drinking too much captured wine. Their guard was lax, and near the town of Raabs in Upper Austria they were intercepted by a combined Hungarian-Moravian force and destroyed. Nearly 500 Cossacks were killed while the rest scattered, losing their flags and booty.⁵ Besides engaging in raids, they

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 1396, 249.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1406, 254.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1398, 250; Karel Tieftrunk III, 186.

⁴ Dembolecki, 34-36.

⁵ Tieftrunk, III, 245.

also took part in the battles between the Imperial force and the Hungarian army. The Cossacks under Dampierre fought in the battle of Estdorf (middle of July), where they killed three hundred Hungarians and took several of their officers into captivity.¹

During early September, Bethlen intensified his pressure on Vienna to distract Bucquoi and Tilly from advancing on Prague. Cossack and Hungarian encounters, therefore, became more frequent. On September 5, a skirmish took place by the Danube crossings.² Three days later, Dampierre attacked Bethlen Gabor's troops, who were besieging Lord Esterhaft in his castle. Dampierre defeated the besieging force which lost 1500 men killed, 800 horses, and 40 battle flags.³ The next day, the Hungarians revenged themselves by engaging a Cossack cavalry force near the castle and killed two hundred Cossacks.⁴

The Protestant allies continued to apply pressure to distract the main Catholic army from invading Bohemia. On September 19, near Deggenndorf in Bavaria, Moravian and Hungarian troops destroyed a large raiding Cossack detachment, killing two hundred of them, including forty of their officers, while sustaining heavy losses themselves.⁵ This Hungarian-Moravian force comprising over three thousand cavalry men, crossed the Danube and launched a raid into Upper Austria to prevent Bavarian troops from effectively pacifying that province. The Emperor showed great concern over the defense of Linz, the capital of Upper Austria, which was menaced by this raid and detached Dampierre with four thousand German regulars and two thousand Cossacks to destroy this raiding force. Dampierre was able to repel them in late September, 1620, in a series of small battles.⁶

Next month the Cossacks under Dampierre took part in the defense of Amberg from the Hungarians. This town, only four miles from Vienna, had been assaulted unsuccessfully several times by Bethlen's entire force. Dampierre's troops arrived opportunely from Linz and attacked Bethlen's army from the rear, captured his camp, and killed many Hungarian troops. The Cossacks were

¹ Welykyi, III, nro. 1418, 260.

² Khevenhiller, *Annales Ferdinandei*, IX, 959.

³ *Ibid.*, 959-960.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 958.

⁵ Welykyi, III, nro. 1434, 265; nro. 1439, 268.

⁶ *Ibid.*, nro. 1439, 268; nro. 1441, 269; nro. 1444, 270.

credited by contemporary observers for killing four hundred Hungarian and capturing fifteen battle flags in this battle.¹ This action forced Bethlen to retire from Vienna and to ask for a truce. The Emperor granted Bethlen a truce, but raiding by both Cossacks and Hungarians continued until January, 1621. A Hungarian raiding party entered Austria, but it was met by a Cossack cavalry force near Pruch, on the Danube (November 14, 1620). After a bloody engagement, the Hungarians had been driven into the Danube with a loss of one hundred dead and many wounded.²

While Dampierre was holding Bethlen Gabor from capturing Vienna on the eastern front, the fate of the rebel Bohemian kingdom was being decided in the western sector of the war. On September 26, the army of the Emperor under Bucquoi and the army of the Catholic League under Tilly jointly crossed into Bohemia.³ Three thousand Cossacks rode with them. On October 5, the Cossacks burned the town of Nove Hradý (Neuhaus), but they were forced out by the Bohemian cavalry under Prince Anhalt the Younger, with a loss of three hundred men.⁴

Throughout October, 1620, the allied armies, numbering twenty thousand men, advanced on Prague. The way was defended by the Bohemian army of Prince Anhalt and reinforced by eight thousand Hungarians, having a strength of twenty thousand men. The allied armies reached Rakovnik by the end of October. For six days the Bohemian army defended the city from the allied attacks. On November 5, the Bohemian army withdrew and the allied armies pursued it on its way to Prague. The Bohemian generals Anhalt and Thurn decided to defend the approaches to the capital; so on November 8, 1620 the two armies faced each other at White Mountain, just outside Prague. In the battle that followed, the Bohemian forces along with their allies were soundly defeated by the armies of the Emperor and the League. In the battle formation, the Cossacks were assigned to the extreme left wing to cover the Bavarian left flank.⁵ During the battle they captured fifty flags,

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 1447, 271; nro. 1448, 272; Dembolecki, 37. Dampierre's command included two Lisowchyk regiments under Iwanicki and Kalinowski.

² Welykyi, III, nro. 1464, 280; nro. 14666, 280.

³ Wedgwood, *op. cit.*, 121.

⁴ Welykyi, III, nro. 1466, 280.

⁵ Khevenhiller, IX, 1102.

including King Frederick's royal ensign.¹ "The Cossacks fought bravely and more than all the other detachments of the Imperial army," reads the official description of the battle which Maximilian of Bavaria sent to the Pope.² The panic following the defeat spread into Prague. King Frederick despaired of continuing resistance and left Prague the same night with his wife and children. On November 10, 1620 Prague fell without effort and was sacked for a week by the Imperial and Bavarian troops.³

The fall of Prague coincided with a great disaster which occurred in Poland and which influenced the course of the Thirty Years War only indirectly, but had a definite bearing upon the future of the Cossacks. The Polish army, under Hetman S. Zolkiewski, met a superior force of Turks at Cecora and was annihilated on October 7, 1620. The main army was lost, and the Polish Government sent its envoys, M. Przerembski, to recall the Lisowchyks and the Cossacks campaigning there. The Lisowchyks were commanded by Polish officers, so they obeyed the summons and returned to Poland in December, 1620.⁴ The Cossacks, however, felt no such compulsion because the Cossack Hetman Peter Konashewych-Sahaidachnyi did not wish to cooperate with the Polish government until he obtained certain concessions from Sigismund III. Therefore, the Cossack did not return to Poland and the Ukraine. They participated in the pacification of Moravia and Silesia, both of which surrendered after several months of fighting. This will be the topic of the next chapter.

The chief contribution of the Cossacks to the Imperial effort was their mode of fighting as light cavalry. Accustomed as they were to lightning attacks, manoeuvrability, and living off the land, they were used for similar roles by the Imperial generals. The Cossacks were sent as scouts and raiders; they served as *avant garde* and rear guards; they provided cavalry screens, set up ambushes, and cut off enemy supply lines. In a war of attrition, their value was recognized even by an unfriendly writer, A. Gindely, a prominent authority on the Thirty Years War.

¹ Dembolecki, 39.; Niemcewicz, *op. cit.*, III, 131.

² Welykyi, III, nro. 1467, 281.

³ Wedgwood, 126-128.

⁴ Welykyi, III, nro. 1468, 281.

By the plundering and laying waste for miles around all those sections in which they were stationed in the course of a campaign, they inflicted upon the Emperor's enemies the kind of losses which were most deeply felt and thus fulfilled the end for which they had been called into service.¹

In this campaign they proved especially useful against the Hungarian light cavalry called Hussars, whose tactics, valor, and ferocity they could match or even outdo. The best proof of their value lies in the fact that in most of the succeeding campaigns, the Emperor thought it desirable to have sufficient numbers of light cavalry. When the Cossacks became unavailable later in the war, the Emperor recruited Croats and Grenzers as light cavalry troops.²

¹ Gindely, *History*, I, 194.

² Gunther Rothenburg, *The Austrian Military Frontier in Croatia 1522-1747* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1960), footnote 51, p. 74.

CHAPTER VI
THE PACIFICATION OF MORAVIA (1621)

The Battle of White Mountain ended the independence of the rebel province of Bohemia. The victorious Catholic forces began the occupation of the neighboring provinces of Moravia and Silesia. The two Lusatias were occupied by the Saxon troops, and the Upper and Lower Austrias were held by Bavarian and Imperial armies respectively. The House of Hapsburg overcame rebellion in all the rebellious provinces. Nevertheless, peace did not come, since Bethlen Gabor's forces still raided Moravia, and some towns held out against the Emperor in Silesia. Therefore, the Imperial troops, including the Cossacks, were sent to Moravia and Silesia from Prague to secure these provinces, to liquidate all internal opposition, and to defend them from Bethlen Gabor.

The Imperial army under the command of Bucquoi included about five thousand Lisowchyks and Cossacks who re-entered the Emperor's service for three months.¹ The Lisowchyks who remained were independent bands who defied the official summons to return to Poland. The activity of the Cossacks (and Lisowchyks) after the Battle of White Mountain consisted of raiding and plundering in the Bohemian and Moravian provinces and fighting with the Hungarian light cavalry.

During the pacification campaign which will be discussed in this chapter, the pillage of the former rebellious provinces by all Imperial soldiers was encouraged initially by the army commanders and the newly appointed Imperial Viceroy of Bohemia, Prince Carl of Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein assured the merchants who bought loot from the soldiers, that the "objects seized by the soldiers after the Battle of White Mountain from the nobility and towns-

¹ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, IV, nro. 1476, 8.

people of Prague and elsewhere" were legitimate since the people were not yet protected by their oath of allegiance to the Emperor.¹ The pillage of defeated enemies was a custom of war during the seventeenth century. As such, it was tolerated by the government and the officers. The pillaging of the Cossacks and others, in this instance, was used by the Emperor as an instrument to punish the Czechs for their rebellion against him. The punishment was very effective; appalling misery of the inhabitants and the economic ruin of the provinces were the results.

After the fall of Prague, the Cossacks took part in the general pillage of the city which lasted for three days. They remained in Prague for two weeks and launched several successful plundering raids into the countryside.² In December, 1620, most of the Lisowchyks, numbering about 3500-5000, were placed under the command of Bucquoi and were sent to Moravia, which still defied Ferdinand.

The chronicler of Holešov describes vividly how the process of pacification was carried out in parts of Bohemia and Moravia by the Cossacks. The route which the Cossacks took from Prague into Moravia went through Kutna Hora (Kuttenberg), Pardubice, Hradec Králove (Königgratz), Sumperk, Valašské Meziříčie, and Přerov. They passed Kutna Hora on November 18, 1620, but the town was spared because its citizens paid them a ransom of 150 *kup* (*sic*).³ Near Hradec Králove, the Cossacks clashed with local peasants. The latter were thrown back, but heavy losses occurred on both sides, according to the above mentioned source.⁴ In the Rosice county, they invaded the village of Vaslovanech and tortured the peasants into revealing where they hid their gold and valuables.⁵ This practice seemed quite prevalent and was often applied, especially by the Lisowchyks. The chronicler of Velké Meziříčie recounts the

¹ Praha. Statní Úřední Archiv. Fond Militare. Carton 32. February 9, 1621: "Z věci, které vojáci po belohorske bitve pobrali šlechta a mestum v Prazi jinde a jež žide na sebe prevedli koupici smenou, nemusí tito vrateti nic, čeho se zmocnili předtím než šlechta slib vernosti cisari... (henceforth, cited as Prague. Archiv. F. M.).

² Prague. Archv. F. M. Carton 32. February 13, 1621.

³ Frantisek Hruby (ed.), *Moravske Korespondence a Akta z Let 1620-1636* (Brno: Tisk. Krameruisa, 1934-37), I, Document No. 8, p. 9 (Hereafter cited as Hruby).

⁴ Hruby, I, nro. 15, 19. Letter of E. Žerotinska to K. Žerotinska.

⁵ *Ibid.*, nro. 29, 40/41. Letter of O. Krhovský, official of Košice to K. Žerotinska.

many misfortunes that occurred in the vicinity of the town. The Lisowchyks, or Polaky, as they were called by the chronicler, used to torture the peasants with fire to obtain their valuables. Many of them fled into the forests to escape the Lisowchyks. So when the Lisowchyks discovered this, they went to the forest's edge and called out "Jan, Matteo, Martin, Vaclav, Pavel." The peasants thought that their friends were calling them and that the danger had passed. They came out with their possessions and were captured by the Lisowchyks.¹ This detailed account presents a fairly complete picture of how the Cossacks and Lisowchyks operated. Their cruel and rapacious conduct brought the war among the lowest classes and hurt the Czechs the most, since the Cossacks ruined the agricultural classes and destroyed the economy of the country completely. The same result occurred in the towns who were so taxed by the various contributions, taxes, ransoms, and plunders that they ceased to be the viable economic centres of the state.

In December, 1620, our chronicler continues, General Bucquoi was marching to the Moravian-Hungarian border with his troops and passed through Velke Meziřice. When the city council learned that Lisowchyk Cossacks (Polaky) were among them, they went to Bucquoi and offered him a large ransom to spare the city from ravages of the Cossacks. As the city council expected, the Cossacks asked Bucquoi to plunder the city for half a day. He refused, and the Cossacks began to grumble and insist: "They killed my brother in the forest" and "They executed my uncle." Bucquoi remained adamant and told them to disperse or he would order his artillery to commence firing. Thus, Velke Meziřice was saved from being plundered, but its citizens had to pay an enormous ransom to Bucquoi.² This city was luckier than many others. At Tisnov near Pershtyn, a welcome procession of Catholic townspeople was met by a Cossack cavalry charge. Two hundred burghers were killed and the town was pillaged. The Catholic monastery was not spared either, since the nuns had to flee to the neighboring castle at Pershtyn.³ The town of Perlouc was plundered so thoroughly by the

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 38, 53. Excerpt from the city chronicle of Velke Meziřice: 1620.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 94, 135 f. Information related in a footnote to a letter written by the abbeſs to Emperor Ferdinand II; B. Dudik (ed.), *Mahrens Geſchichts-Quellen* (Brunn: K. Miniser, 1850), I, 253.

Polish Cossacks that people only had hard bread and water for food.¹ These two examples illustrate fully the depredations which the Czech towns suffered from the Cossacks. It should be stressed again that these plunderings were not perpetrated only by the Cossacks, for all the regiments of the Imperial army committed all sorts of crimes upon the civilian population in the war zone. Furthermore, Catholic towns often suffered from the depredations of the Imperial army, which made war on the rebellious province and did not investigate the status of the local populace.

The Moravian Estates capitulated to the Emperor on December 18, 1620, and he appointed Cardinal Dietrichstein viceroy. The remaining rebel forces under Anhalt, Thurn, and Jagerndorf withdrew to Upper Hungary where they encouraged Bethlen Gabor to renew the war against the Emperor. Bethlen, however, did not believe in fighting for a hopeless cause and began negotiations with Ferdinand at Hainburg, which is located near Pressburg.² In the meantime, the renewed three-month employment of the Cossacks and remaining Lisowchyks was coming to an end. Ferdinand believed that the war came to a successful conclusion and decided to dismiss them in February, 1621. Their conduct was causing him embarrassment since they were now looting a loyal province. Therefore, on February 2, 1621, the Lisowchyks were paid their allowance and released from Imperial service.³ Three weeks later, most of the Cossacks went home. Only 2,000 Cossacks were given further employment and placed under the command of General Fugger at Straznice in Moravia.⁴

The negotiations between Bethlen Gabor and Ferdinand broke down in March, 1621, and hostilities began anew. Some of the Cossack and Lisowchhyk squadrons that were already returning to Poland were attacked by Hungarians and rebellious Moravian peasants near Zlin.⁵ However, the presence of the Cossacks near Zlin frustrated the merger of the rebellious Moravian peasants with

¹ Liva, *Prameny*, III, 153. Letter of the town official to General Maximilian Liechtenstein.

² Gindely, *History*, I, 309.

³ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1477, 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, nro. 1476, 8. It seems that these 2,000 Cossacks were the remainder of the 3,000 corps of Zaporozhians whom Wladyslaw Vasa sent to the Emperor in 1619.

⁵ *Ibid.*, nro. 1477, 8.

Hungarian forces who awaited the peasants near Povazi (now Povazka Bystrica, 16 miles south of Zilina).¹ At Stražnice (35 miles east of Nicolsburg) the 2,000 Cossacks under Fugger stayed in winter quarters. On March 4, they were attacked by 6,000 Hungarians who broke into the town. In a spirited defense, the Cossacks battled the Hungarians and forced them out of town. Hungarian losses numbered 1,000 dead, and twelve battle flags which were captured by the victors.²

The campaign in Hungary began successfully for the Emperor. Pressburg was besieged by Bucquoi in March and fell after a two month siege. In May, 1621, the Imperial troops invaded Upper Hungary and besieged Neuhausel. The siege was unsuccessful and ended in June when Bethlen sent a 6,000 relief column. In July, the Imperial troops retreated and were defeated at the battle of Nitra (Neutra) by the Hungarians where Bucquoi was killed. The Imperial army was besieged, and the new commander, Maximilian of Liechtenstein, was unable to prevent Bethlen from seizing Trnava (Tyrnau) in August. The victorious Bethlen besieged Pressburg and sent marauding expeditions into Moravia. General Liechtenstein asked the Emperor repeatedly to recruit more Cossacks since his need for light cavalry was great. The Emperor complied and promised Liechtenstein to obtain 4,000 Cossacks.³ In January, 1622, Ferdinand sent a special ambassador, Curz, to Warsaw to enlist several thousand Cossacks for the Emperor.⁴ The recruitment took time, and in the meantime, the Peace of Nicolsburg was signed between Bethlen and the Emperor on January 5, 1622.⁵ The hostilities were ended, and the ambassador was told to stop the recruitment.

The Cossack detachment under Fugger served with the Imperial army throughout the year. However, lack of information in the various sources does not permit us to elaborate on the role of this detachment during this period.

In summary, the role of the Cossacks in the campaign of the pacification of Moravia in December, 1620 and January, 1621 was a punitive one. We have a wealth of information about the move-

¹ Polisensky, *Tricetileta valka*, p. 121.

² Welykyi, IV, nro. 1479, 9.

³ Liva, III, 217. Letter of M. Liechtenstein to Viceroy Karl Liechtenstein.

⁴ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1537, 42.

⁵ Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

ment of various Cossack detachments during the winter of 1620-21, which show that the Cossacks aided Ferdinand ably by spreading the reign of terror throughout Moravia. When Moravia had been pacified, the Cossacks became an embarrassing liability due to their continual raiding and most of them were dismissed to Poland.

During the summer and fall campaign in 1621, the Imperial commanders asked the Emperor repeatedly for Cossack light cavalry to fight the Hungarians effectively. Lack of Cossacks throughout 1621 forced the Emperor to sign the Treaty of Nicolsburg, which gave favorable terms to Bethlen Gabor.

CHAPTER VII
CAMPAIGN ON THE RHINE (1622)

The last four chapters described the role of Cossack service in Eastern and Central Europe. Beginning with the year 1622, the Cossacks were used by the Imperial generals in all European battlefields. Light cavalry troops were as essential for the campaigns along the Rhine as much as on the frontiers of Moravia and Hungary. Therefore, ten thousand Cossacks and Lisowchyks were recruited by agents of the Emperor and sent out as reinforcements for the Imperial army in Lower Palatinate.

A new threat to European peace began when the Bohemian War was approaching its end. The Spanish army under General Spinola left Flanders and approached the Lower Palatinate in August, 1620. Spinola seized the Rhenish cities of Mainz, Kreuznach, and Oppenheim in two months and cut off communication between Bohemia and Lower Palatinate. On January 29, 1621, the Emperor placed Frederick under the Imperial ban,¹ and his estates were forfeited. The members of the Protestant Union protested but were helpless before Spinola's army. To avoid being invaded, the Union signed the Mainz Accord with Spinola. The Protestant Union agreed to abandon Frederick and evacuated their troops from Lower Palatinate.²

In the negotiations of major European powers, none considered Mansfeld, who was nominally employed by Frederick. He evacuated Pilsen, but stayed in nearby Upper Palatinate. In July, 1621, Mansfeld's troops invaded Bohemia from Upper Palatinate in conjunction with the invasion of Moravia by Hungarians under General Jagerndorf.³ Tilly was ordered by Duke Maximilian of

¹ Wedgwood, *op. cit.*, 143.

² *Ibid.*, 134.

³ Gindely, *History*, I, 321.

Bavaria to rout Mansfeld and to pursue him all the way to the Rhine. The following three months were devoted to the defeat of Mansfeld, the occupation of Upper Palatinate by Tilly and the pursuit of Mansfeld by Tilly to Frankenthal on the Rhine.¹ Despite his success in routing Mansfeld, Tilly was unable to capture Frankenthal, which was held by English troops under Vere, without the aid of Spanish troops under Cordova. The Spanish were unwilling to aid since Anglo-Spanish negotiations were under way in London and Madrid. Therefore, Tilly withdrew to Upper Palatinate in November, 1621, frustrated.²

The winter and spring months were used by Frederick to forge a new coalition against the Emperor. The Margrave of Baden-Durlach raised 15,000 troops, Christian of Halberstadt another 10,000, and Mansfeld's army numbered close to 20,000.³ This formidable force was opposed by the army of the League commanded by Tilly and the Spanish army of Cordova. They were reinforced by a large detachment of the Imperial army under Marquis of Montenegro and the Archduke Leopold's Alsacian troops.⁴ All these armies were separated by many miles from each other and what ensued could be called a war of manoeuvring. Mansfeld won the first round by defeating Tilly at Mingolsheim (or Wiesloch) on April 27, 1622. Tilly withdrew and joined Cordova. Together, they completely destroyed the army of the Margrave of Baden at Wimpfen (May 5, 1622). Then they moved down the Rhine and met Christian's forces at Hochst. In the ensuing battle, they routed Halberstadt's troops in sight of Mansfeld, who watched it across the Main River (June 20, 1622).⁵ After this defeat, Mansfeld withdrew into the Netherlands and left Lower Palatinate almost defenseless.

The campaigns of 1622 ended gloriously for the Emperor and Maximilian of Bavaria, but in the first stages of the campaign the

¹ Wedgwood, 142.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 146-147. Gindely, *History*, 333-335. Gindely gives the different figures: Halberstadt: 15,000-20,000; Mansfeld: 35,000; and the Margrave of Baden: 15,000-20,000.

⁴ Gindely places the combined armies of the Catholic party as 100,000; Tilly: 55,500; Cordova: 20,500; Archduke Leopold: 11,000; Montenegro: 6,000 and others: 7,000 (this could include the Cossacks who came later during the year). These figures are overexaggerated since the following campaigns show that the Catholic party sometimes was outnumbered. Gindely, *History*, 336.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 338, 340; Ward, *op. cit.*, 80-81.

outcome was far from certain. After the defeat of Mingolsheim, Tilly was threatened by the juncture of Mansfeld, Baden, and Halberstadt. The army of the League needed reinforcements, and messengers were sent from Duke Maximilian to Ferdinand asking for recruitment of Cossack troops. The Emperor, in turn, delegated his Bohemian viceroy in Prague, Carl Liechtenstein, to arrange all the details connected with recruitment, transportation, supervision, and payment of the Cossack expeditionary force.

As discussed in Chapter VI, a truce with Bethlen Gabor had been negotiated by Ferdinand II in January, 1621, and the Cossacks were released from Imperial service within several weeks. They were received coolly by the Polish administration and told to proceed home after dispersing into small groups. The reason for this curt treatment was their previous conduct inside Poland when they engaged in pillaging and ravaging the population of the province of Cracow. The Lisowchyk leaders asked for service within the Polish forces, but only the veterans and the officers were accepted while the rest were told to offer their services to Secchi (or Szechy) György, a Hungarian who raised the standard of revolt against Bethlen Gabor.¹ They refused to serve the Hungarian rebels since they said that the wages were uncertain. Thirteen hundred were accepted by Sigismund III in to the Polish army, and the rest were sent home.² Many of the latter joined the Zaporozhian Cossacks under Sahaidachnyi.

Throughout the months of August through October of 1621 the Cossacks were occupied in the Khotyn (Choczim) campaign against the Turks. An enormous Turkish army was stopped by the combined Polish and Cossack forces after many hard battles. Poland was saved but was unable to pay the wages of its various saviors—the Polish army and the Cossack force. This situation was quite common since the Polish *Sejm* hated to collect taxes from the nobility after the war was won. Instead, the *Sejm* tried to persuade the Cossacks to enlist in the army of Prince K. Radziwill who commanded the Polish troops against Sweden. Twenty thousand Cossacks answered the call and entered Lithuania to join forces with Radziwill's command. The Prince became anxious when he heard of the number of volunteers coming to him. He told the Cossacks envoys that

¹ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, IV, nro. 1487, 14; nro. 1491, 17.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1495, 18-19; nro. 1497/98, 19-20.

he only needed 1,000-2,000 Cossacks.¹ Therefore, a similar situation occurred in 1622, as in 1618, when many thousands of Cossacks were left unemployed after the peace treaty of Deulino. Some turned to raiding the Moslem powers, while others asked the Imperial envoys in Warsaw to renew their contract with the Emperor.

The Lisowchyk detachment also took part in the Khotyn campaign. Their wages were not paid, and they joined a soldiers' confederation for demanding their past due pay from the Polish *Sejm*. They were wintering in Volhynia in 1621 and laying contributions on the nearby villages and gentry. Their conduct was censured by the King, who asked the governor of Kiev to expel them by force.² The Lisowchyks, like the many thousands of Cossacks, were dissatisfied and ready for foreign adventure.

On April 6, 1622, Prince Liechtenstein of Bohemia sent a letter to Stanislaw Strojnowski, the Lisowchyk commander, asking him to recruit and lead 6,000 Cossack cavalry into the service of the Holy Roman Emperor.³ Strojnowski accepted the appointment and by the end of May, nearly 5,000 Lisowchyk Cossacks left their mustering place, the town of Krzepice, in southern Poland for the Empire.⁴ Dembolecki gives the breakdown of this army into fifteen squadrons: the Red squadron, (400 horsemen) and the Black squadron, (400), under S. Strojnowski; squadrons of W. Sulmiski, (300), P. Moislowski, (300), Jan Slawecki, (300), Adam Skolmiski, (300), Pawel Godlowski, (200), Remigian Nowomiejski, (200), Jerzy Chelmski, (200), Jan Lubowiecki, (200), Jan Grazewski, (200), Marcin Zarski, (200), Andrzej Zeima, (200), Maciej Dembinski, (200), and Jan Machalski, (200).⁵

This cavalry force arrived before the town of Opole (Oppeln) in Silesia and forded the Oder River several miles above. On June 1, 1622, they appeared before Neisse where they met the two commis-

¹ Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, VII, 488-489.

² M. Hrushevsky (ed.), *Zherela do Istorii Ukrainy-Rusi* (Lviv: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1908), VIII, 255-257. Hrushevsky published two letters of Sigismund to the Lisowchyk colonel Rusinowski. (*Do Rusinowskiego, polkownika kozackiego*) dated Jan. 5, 1622. Rusinowski was appointed to the staff of Koniecpolski, commander-in-chief of the Polish army, and Strojnowski became the leader of the Lisowchyks.

³ Dembolecki, *op. cit.*, 53-54. Dembolecki reproduces in full Liechtenstein's letter to Strojnowski.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

sioners of Archduke Charles, Viceroy of Silesia, who told them to return to Poland. These commissioners said they knew nothing about the Lisowchyks' service with the Emperor or with Maximilian of Bavaria.¹ Needless to say, they ignored the commissioners and advanced on Glatz (Kladsko). Here they were met by Charles di Dohna, general of the Silesian troops who was investing Glatz. The city still held out for Frederick under Count Thurn, the Younger.² The Lisowchyks lured several squadrons of Thurn's dragoons into an ambush outside the city and gave them a good trouncing. Several days later, the Cossacks aided General di Dohna's forces in defeating a large concentration of rebellious peasants near Habelswerd (Bystrica). The surrounding villages which supported the revolt were all burned, and all the males were killed. This policy was necessary, according to the report sent by the Silesian officials to Liechtenstien, to prevent a wholesale peasant revolt in Silesia.³

The Lisowchyks arrived at Prague on June 11 and demanded to be sent into Upper Palatinate immediately to join Tilly. However, Maximilian did not engage the Cossacks since he recruited several regiments of light cavalry from Lorraine.⁴ Liechtenstein tried to persuade Maximilian that the Cossacks would be a valuable addition to Tilly's forces. He wrote that "they are better for harassing purposes than for battles. But they are experienced, loyal troops, Catholics (*sic*), and eager to serve."⁵ However, Maximilian demur-

¹ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1550, 49; nro. 1551, 50. It seems that Archduke Charles was not notified that the Cossacks were recruited by Maximilian of Bavaria for service in Lower Palatinate. He sent several dispatches to Liechtenstein and Ferdinand asking for instructions to deal with what he thought was an invasion of the Cossacks. The Archduke also mobilized the Silesian forces to force the Cossacks back into Poland. The ignorance of Silesian officials is substantiated by Christian d'Elbert. *Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rebellion, Reformation des dreissigjahrigen Krieges und der Rengestaltung Mahrens* (Brunn: Buchh. U. Ritsch, 1878), III, 109-110; see Appendix: Doc. III.

² The city of Glatz (Kladsko) in Silesia held out until October, 1622. It was defended by Thurn's son and the remnants of the Moravian troops still loyal to King Frederick. Ward, *op. cit.*, 67.

³ Prague. Archiv. F.M. Carton 38. June 9, 1622: "Report of the official Jahn Puhl to Secretary Hajden"; Welykyi, IV, nro. 1553, 50; nro. 1555, 51; Dembolecki, 61-68.

⁴ Welykyi, nro. 1553, 50.

⁵ Prague. Archiv. F.M. Carton 38. Two letters of Liechtenstein to Maximilian of Bavaria dated 11.VI.1622 and 13.VI.1622 respectively.

red and Ferdinand instructed Liechtenstein to enlist the Cossacks into the Imperial service and to send them as reinforcements for Montenegro along with other Imperial troops. On June 13, the instruction reached Liechtenstein and he dispatched two Commissioners, Vaclav Bechynia and Adolf Wolfstirn, to administer the oath of loyalty to the Emperor, to supervise the training of the Cossacks, and to lead them into Lower Palatinate.¹


The Cossacks were led to Klatovy, thirty miles south of Plzen, where they rested, drilled, and reformed their squadrons. On June 20, the Commissioners administered the pledge of loyalty to the Emperor and drew the contract for service. The wages were to be 15 ducats a month to every horseman. The officers received handsome benefits, too. Strojnowski obtained 600 ducats as a monthly bonus, while his lieutenants received 120 ducats and the lower officers 10 to 60 ducats extra. They were paid retroactively to include their service near Glatz and Habelswerd. The Emperor recognized their right to be judged by their own court. The Cossacks in turn promised to obey all the Imperial commanders, to desist from looting his subjects, Catholic or Lutheran, to pay for their provisions and forage, to turn over all important prisoners of war to the Imperial generals, to exercise patience when the monthly payment was delayed due to dangerous roads, and to disband after a notice of thirty days had been given by the Emperor.² After the contract was ratified, the Lisowchyks left for the Palatinate. En route, at Stribro, they were joined by another 5,000 Cossacks who arrived from Poland and swelled the Cossack army to 30 squadrons and 10,000 men.³ The combined Cossack force left Bohemia at Waidhausen, July 7, and entered the duchies and bishoprics of Franconia.

¹ *Ibid.*, Instruction of Liechtenstein to Commissioners Bechynia and Wolfstirn dated 13.VI.1622.

² The Conditions of Service were completed after several drafts. The final draft contains seventeen points and was signed in Prague on June 24, 1622 by the Cossack representatives and Liechtenstein, and was sent to Vienna for final ratification by the Emperor. Prague. Archiv. F. M. Carton 38. June 24, 1622. Incomplete drafts are the "Conditiones" of the Cossack officers dated 19.VI.1622 in Klatovy and Liechtenstein's recommendations on the Cossack demands which are contained in his letter to Commissioner Bechynia of 20.VII.1622.

³ Prague. Archiv. F. M. Carton 38. Letter of Commissioner Bechynia to the city council of Cheb (Eger), dated 22.VI.1622.

Map IV: WESTERN BOHEMIA AND GERMANY



The passage through Franconia was accompanied by much distrust. The nobility of Bayreuth, Bamberg, Nürnberg, Ansbach, and Sulzbach mobilized 10,000 troops and throughout the Cossack stay in Franconia guarded their lands against possible depredations. Despite the protests of Cossack leaders, the Franconian forces watched them closely and did not permit them to linger or to pillage. Markgrave Christian of Bayreuth even demanded hostages as pledges of good conduct on the part of the Cossacks. The Franconians wrote the Emperor, Maximilian of Bavaria, and Prince Liechtenstein that these measures were necessary since the previous crossings of the Holstein and Saxon cavalry regiments were accompanied by great plunder and pillage of their lands. The Emperor and his officials agreed to these measures and sent letters to Strojnowski and reminded him to keep his Cossacks firmly in hand and to cross Franconia as soon as possible. Needless to say, the Cossacks grumbled and Dembolecki records many bitter expressions about their distrust of the neutralist Franconians. The only warm reception which the Cossacks received was in the Bishopric of Würzburg, where they camped for several days.¹

The original intention of the Imperial Council was to send Cossacks to reinforce Tilly's army. However, Strojnowski received orders from General Montenegro, commander of Imperial troops, to join forces with the Spanish army of Cordova on the Neckar River.² Upon arrival at Cordova's headquarters, new orders awaited them from Tilly who directed Strojnowski to march forthwith to Wimpfen and to join forces with the army of Archduke Leopold of Alsace.³ The Cossack forces crossed the Neckar at Wimpfen, but instead of advancing to meet the Archduke, whose camp was near Speyers, they went raiding southward toward the Margravate of Baden-Durlach. Near the town of Eppingen in Wurtemberg, they clashed with the guards, but the gates were locked and Cossacks had to camp outside the city. When they reached the province of

¹ There are sixteen letters of various Franconian officials to Liechtenstein and his replies during the period 28.VI.1622 to 14.VII.1622. They include demands to route the Cossacks through other lands, reports of mobilization by the Franconian nobles, reports of the Commissioner Bechynia, who led the Cossacks and was responsible for obtaining their provisions, forage, and quarters. Prague. Archiv. F. M. Carton 38 and 39; Dembolecki, 83-87.

² Dembolecki, 85-86. Letter of Marquis Montenegro dated June 24, 1622.

³ *Ibid.*, 88. Orders from Tilly dated July 11, 1622.

Baden, they turned their full fury upon it, and after their ravages it looked like "Jerusalem captured by the Romans."¹

At the village of Stein, the Cossacks defeated 800 infantry and three squadrons of heavy cavalry which belonged to the forces of the Margrave of Baden. On July 20, the village was burned, and small Cossack squadrons dispersed throughout the countryside.² Reports of Imperial officials mention that extensive pillaging took place in Baden and Wurttemberg. The villages of Elborem and Pil were among those destroyed, and the Duke of Wurttemberg and Margrave of Baden ordered the mobilization of all their forces to repel the invading Cossacks.³

The Cossacks were finally located by Colonel Spinello, who had orders to lead them to the Archduke Leopold's headquarters near Speyers. By July 27, the army reached the Rhine near Drusenheim and was reviewed by Leopold. He was impressed by them and defended them against the Duke of Wurttemberg and other nobles who complained to the Emperor and demanded restitution.⁴ Two days later, the Cossacks crossed the Rhine and reached Speyers in two days. The Cossack camp was established near Leopold's and they were paid their monthly wages. There was much grumbling since the Cossacks wanted to be paid in silver doubloons, but instead had to accept thalers and gold pieces (*czzerwony zlote*).⁵

On August 3, a Cossack scouting party under N. Wojkowski, set out from camp. They rode along the left bank of the Rhine from Speyers towards Frankenthal. The latter was commanded by the Englishman, Horace Vere, for Frederick. The raiding party had a skirmish with the English troops and captured several officers and men.⁶ Other raiding parties were launched throughout the

¹ *Ibid.*, 90.

² *Ibid.*, 89-90.

³ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1561, 53; nro. 1566, 56/57. The report from Frankfurt dated 8.VII.1622 states that the Cossacks were sent by Tilly to ravage the Margravate of Baden as punishment for the Margrave's part in the Protestant coalition. It is doubtful whether the Cossacks were able to launch a great raid on their own since the Imperial Commissioners accompanied the host.

⁴ Dembolecki, 91-92. He writes that many of the German troops and Spanish troops burned and plundered in the Duchy of Wurttemberg and blamed the Cossacks for all of them. Leopold investigated the charges and exonerated them.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 94-95.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 95.

province of Lorraine. They spread pillaging, ravaging, and burning many villages. Their fury was explained by Dembolecki in the following manner. The Cossacks thought that they were in the land of Luther, since the names Lotharingia, Luterburg, Lauterek, Kaizerzluter, Holmekluter, and others seemed to indicate that this was indeed so.¹ The Cossack raiding and scouting parties continued because they were always able to bring prisoners for questioning by the Imperial generals.

In August, 1622, the Emperor appointed Prince Sigismund K. Radziwill of Poland as commander-in-chief of all Cossacks and Lisowchyks in his service. Radziwill had been in the Emperor's service for several years and was familiar with the German language and the ways of the Imperial court. He took command of the Cossack army near Speyers on August 6, and on the next day the Cossacks joined Leopold's army in the siege of Speyers.² The city fell in two days, and the Cossack officers took part in the victorious celebration. Most of the month of August was spent besieging the fortress of Gernersheim, eight miles below Speyers, and raiding in Lorraine. Some of the raiding parties entered France in search of Mansfeld's army.³

The wily general Mansfeld retreated into France, after the forces of Halberstadt and Baden were defeated, and was recuperating in the estates of the Duke of Bouillon.⁴ The French government became alarmed that Mansfeld might offer his services to the Huguenots and approached the Emperor for aid. Ferdinand agreed and proposed to send 6,000 Cossacks and 2,000 German troops to pursue Mansfeld's army in France. This proved unnecessary in the end, since Mansfeld and Halberstadt were offered commissions by the United Provinces. Nevertheless, in the interval the Cossack forces were readying themselves for a march to France to take service under Louis XIII.⁵

The major cities of Lower Palatinate were besieged or isolated by the Catholic forces during the summer and autumn months of

¹ *Ibid.* The explanation of the dislike of the Cossacks for the Lutherans will be explained in the last chapter.

² *Ibid.*, 96-97. Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, II, 209.

³ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁴ Wedgwood, 152.

⁵ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1567, 57; nro. 1570, 58; Dembolecki, 99.

1622. The army of Tilly besieged Heidelberg and Mannheim, and the Imperial army invested Speyers, Germersheim, Worms, and Frankenthal on the left bank of the Rhine. Siege warfare was not the strong point of the Cossacks, but their presence was a psychological weapon for the besiegers. The stories of Cossack atrocities which preceded them made the defenders realize that, if their city was captured, few would be spared. Therefore, the surrender of Speyers and Worms may be credited to some extent to the presence of the fierce Cossacks. A major Cossack contribution during this period occurred at Frankenthal. A Cossack raiding party captured the bridge which connected the two fortress cities of Frankenthal and Mannheim and destroyed it.¹ The bridge spanned the Rhine River and its fall isolated and facilitated the capture of both cities piecemeal.

In the beginning of September, the Cossacks raided the Palatinate of Zweibrucken and returned with plunder and large herds of cattle.² The price of foodstuffs had greatly increased during the previous month since the countryside was repeatedly ravaged and a small quantity of supplies was sent by the Emperor. Therefore, the raid replenished the dwindling supplies of food, but bought new complaints to the Emperor concerning the Cossack activities.

The Cossacks requested permission from the Archduke Leopold to transfer their campsite which lay near a swamp, because many Cossacks were dying of swamp fever. The Archduke approved and the Cossack camp was transferred to Gronstadt, closer to Frankenthal. During one of the clashes, the Cossack captain, Martin Zarski, was killed. The Cossacks also sent several squadrons to aid in the siege of Heidelberg at Tilly's request.³

The first Rhine campaign came to an end on September 19, 1622. Ferdinand instructed Archduke Leopold to dismiss the Cossacks from his employ. He wrote that his enemies had been dispersed and that the remnants were locked up in several towns which were besieged by the Catholic forces. The Cossacks had given valuable aid, he noted, but their usefulness had come to an end with the suspension of active campaigning. Therefore, they should be

¹ Dembolecki, 101.

² *Ibid.*, 102-103.

³ *Ibid.*, 105-106.

paid up, released from service, and taken to the Polish border.¹ This instruction was contested by Tilly who still wanted to keep the Cossacks near Heidelberg and Mannheim, but the Archduke withdrew them to the main camp at Gronstadt. They were paid on October 9, and the next day they crossed the Rhine and headed for the Bohemian frontier. On the road through Franconia, they met the Imperial Commissioners Bechynia, Wolfstirn, and Cherrin, who were assigned by the Bohemian Viceroy, Leichtenstein, to supervise their orderly return to Poland.²

The march through Franconia was again accompanied by wholesale mobilization of the local levies against the Cossacks. The Franconian troops permitted no pilfering by the retreating force. However, the tension which built up in the Cossacks burst near Nürnberg, where a bloody skirmish took place by the Cossack camp.³ Further conflicts were avoided, and on October 26, the Cossacks entered Bohemia at Waidhausen. The commissioners led the troops to Prague where Liechtenstein reviewed them and assigned their quarters.⁴

The Cossacks remained in Prague until their pay for October and for the first two weeks of November was delivered.⁵ Then the army left Prague for Silesia. Their route was well patrolled by detachments of Imperial troops to prevent any breach of discipline. They met a hostile reception, in Silesia, due to continual inroads by independent bands of Cossacks from Poland. A large group of peasants attacked the returning Cossacks in the Sudeten Mountains. The Cossacks defeated the armed peasantry near Smitberg and engaged in wholesale pillage and plunder to discourage any further attack.⁶ The Silesian Estates, alarmed by these Cossack atrocities, sent a large force to stop and defeat the Cossacks on the way to Poland. Near Leignitz (Legnica) the two forces met, but

¹ *Ibid.*, 106-108. Dembolecki inserts letters from Ferdinand II and Archduke Leopold which terminate the Cossack service; see Appendix: Doc. VI.

² Prague Archiv. F. M. Three letters of Liechtenstein dated 2.X.1622, 3.X.1622, and 5.X.1622 to Jan Richter, Strojnowski, and General Nagroloi.

³ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1580, 62; Dembolecki, 114.

⁴ Dembolecki, 116-119. Colonel Strojnowski was rewarded by Liechtenstein with a grant of land near the Polish-Bohemian border. Dembolecki gives the original patent in his book.

⁵ Prague. Archiv. F. M. Instruction of Cardinal Dietrichstein to General Taxis dated November 29, 1622.

⁶ Dembolecki, 119-120; Liva, III, 380.

after a brief encounter the Silesians protested that their mission was to see that the returning Cossacks reached Poland safely. On December 2, the Cossack army crossed the Oder River and entered Poland. They were met by the representatives of the Polish King and the nobility of the Province of Great Poland and told to disperse into small groups.¹ The Polish envoy threatened the Cossacks that failure to comply would result in punitive action by the Polish army and the provincial levies. The Cossacks broke up into smaller groups and returned to their homes without further incidents.²

The main Cossack effort in 1622 had been concentrated on the Rhine expedition under Radziwill. Many separate units attempted to join the main Cossack force later in the year. Often, they were prevented from entering the Empire by the Archduke Charles of Silesia, who disagreed with the Emperor in the wisdom of employing them. He wrote: "If we accept many more thousands into our service, they will capture some province of the Empire and they will then call upon all the other Cossacks, who number well over 80,000 to come. These people are very warlike and they will flood all of Europe since they cannot live in peace."³

Despite the opposition of the Archduke, almost 14,000 Cossacks crossed the Silesian border in August and September, causing an exchange of diplomatic notes, wherein the Emperor accused Sigismund of straining relations between their countries. This group defied the Polish officials who ordered them to disperse and crossed into Silesia against the will of Sigismund and Ferdinand.⁴ They arrived at Glatz and offered their services to General Quattori who was besieging the city. The Imperial commander refused to employ

¹ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1588, 66. The Cossack troops which returned to Poland numbered 11,000 men and 22,000 horses. This figure was given by a Venetian official based on the Silesian report from Breslau; d'Elbert, *op. cit.*, III, 111; see Appendix: Doc. VIII, IX.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1587, 66. Letter of the Papal Nuncio in Warsaw to Cardinal Ludovici in Rome from December 17, 1622.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1572, 59. Letter to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna to Rome (17.IX.1622). The quotation is an extract from Archduke Charles' letter to the Nuncio.

⁴ Prague. Archiv. F. M. Letter of Adam Ohonowski, the Polish Marshal of Little Poland to the Archduke Charles dated 7.XI.1622. Also report of the Polish official Orzechowski to the Polish marshal dated 9.IX.1622. The Polish delegation failed to persuade the Cossacks not to enter Silesia; see Appendix: Doc. IV, V, VII.

then, saying that he had no need of them.¹ The Cossacks then advanced deep into Bohemia, as far as Nymburk, 35 miles northeast of Prague. The Viceroy realized the gravity of the situation and ordered the Imperial commanders Marradas, Maximilian Liechtenstein, La Motta, Crepi, and Conti to mobilize their forces and expel the Cossacks by force.² The Cossack troops withdrew to Poland when they faced the Imperial troops, but the provinces of Bohemia and Silesia again suffered from the ravages of the invading force. This destructive expedition of the Cossacks in the late summer of 1622 reinforced the suspicions of the governor of Silesia, Archduke Charles, and led to the clash with Cossack troops returning from the Rhine. Their cool reception by the Polish government also stemmed from the unhappy experiences of Polish officials with earlier Cossack detachment.

The presence of the Cossack force in the Rhine campaign brought them to the attention of western European courts. They were considered sufficient to be sent to France as allies of the Emperor for the French king. Their performance during the campaign was valued by such generals as Tilly, Montenegro, Cordova, and Archduke Leopold. Furthermore, genuine contributions by the Cossack force led to the early and successful end of the military operations for the Catholic forces. The Cossacks became a steady factor in the latter campaigns and served on the other European battlefields as the Thirty Years War expanded and encompassed new powers.

¹ D'Elbert, III, 110. Message from Vienna dated September 16, 1622; Tieftrunk, *op. cit.*, V, 238.

² Prague. Archiv. F.M. Carton 40. Orders to Maximilian Liechtenstein dated 13.IX.1622, 19.IX.1622, to General La Motta, General Crepi, and General Conti dated 20.IX.1622; Welykyi, IV, nro. 1574, 60.

CHAPTER VIII
COSSACKS IN MORAVIA AND IN THE
LOWER PALATINATE (1623-1624)

After the departure of Radziwill and his Cossacks from Bohemia in the beginning of 1623, no Cossacks were left in the Imperial domains. On the Polish-Silesian frontier, however, Prince Radziwill lay encamped with a large number of Cossacks and awaited the summons of the Emperor with impatience. The Emperor was in Regensburg where the Imperial Diet met in January, 1623. Ferdinand desired to transfer the Electoral dignity from the Elector Palatine Frederick, the ex-king of Bohemia, to Duke Maximilian of Bavaria to compensate Maximilian for the expenditures that he incurred to help Ferdinand quell the Bohemian Rebellion. To overcome any opposition that the Protestant Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg would express to his scheme, Ferdinand kept a considerable Cossack force under Prince Radziwill ready to invade the Electorate of Saxony.¹

The force headed by Radziwill consisted of 22,000 Cossacks. It included 12,000 Lisowchyks under their leaders Strojnowski and Kalinowski, 4,000 Cossacks under Radziwill's immediate command, and 6,000 newly arrived Cossacks from the Ukraine.² The Cossacks who awaited Ferdinand's orders were a ready reserve and not officially in the Emperor's service. They were not paid and as they kept waiting through the winter and spring months, all their supplies were consumed and the Cossacks turned to raiding Moravia and Silesia. The raiding parties were often destroyed by Imperial generals who treated the Cossacks as outlaws. One Cossack party

¹ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, IV, nro. 1598, 73-74; nro. 1599, 74; d'Elbert, *op. cit.*, III, 112. Prague, 2.25.1623. The Emperor held the Cossacks in reserve on the Polish-Silesian border for use against the Elector of Saxony.

² Welykyi, IV, nro. 1617, 82-83; nro. 1618, 83; Liva, *op. cit.*, III, 411.

was dispersed by General Montenegro in March, 1623 and seventy Cossacks lost their lives.

Meanwhile, at Regensburg, Ferdinand had been able to overcome the opposition of the Protestant Electors and transferred the dignity of the Elector from Frederick to Maximilian. The Cossack force under Radziwill proved to be a pressure force upon the Elector of Saxony since the Saxon troops refused to begin hostilities against the Emperor or the Catholic League. On the other hand, the Cossacks were not being taken into the Emperor's service since the danger from Saxony passed.

The prospects for the employment of Cossacks by the Emperor improved in May, 1623, when Ferdinand learned of a new coalition of his enemies. On May 8, the Emperor received a dispatch from his commander in Northern Hungary that Bethlen Gabor with a large army, including 40,000 Turks, was advancing against Austria.² Meanwhile, in Germany two Protestant armies commenced their operations against the Catholic League. Mansfeld advanced from East Frisia with his army to Munster, and Christian of Halberstadt menaced the League with another army of 15,000. These forces outnumbered the troops of the League, consisting of Tilly's army of 17,000.³

The Emperor became anxious for the safety of his Austro-Hungarian frontier and ordered his ambassador in Warsaw, Count Althan, to dispatch 10,000 of the 22,000 waiting Cossacks.⁴ On May 24, 1623, 10,000 Cossacks under Prince Radziwill entered Moravia, and the Emperor ordered their pay for four months be paid in advance, as a bonus.⁵ These troops consisted of Radziwill's Cossacks that came from the Ukraine, while the Lisowchyks remained in Poland. Radziwill's troops travelled via the first Silesian route from Tešin through Hranice, Přerov, and Holič.⁶

General Montenegro, the Imperial commander, ordered these Cossacks, upon arrival in Moravia, to act as a cavalry screen to prevent the enemy from detecting the movements of the main Im-

¹ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1603, 76.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1617, 82-83, nro. 1618, 83.

³ Wedgwood, *op. cit.*, 179; Ward, *op. cit.*, 85-86.

⁴ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1617, 82-83.

⁵ *Ibid.*, nro. 1628, 88; d'Elbert, III, 114. Vienna, 6.21.1623.

⁶ Hruby, *Moravska Korespondence*, I, nro. 290, 444.

perial force. The Cossack cavalry patrols often skirmished with raiding Hungarian detachments, and as a result the campaign became principally a series of light cavalry clashes resembling the eastern campaign of 1620. Nevertheless, the Cossacks helped to attain the strategic objective of the Imperial army to stop the Hungarian advance column under General Budeani and Count Thurn the Elder.

The invading force under Bethlen Gabor was composed of three independent armies, and each one had to perform a specific task. Of the three armies, the Hungarian force, under Bethlen's personal command, had to advance westward from Transylvania through northern Hungary to Vienna. There the Turkish army, which had been moving up the Danube river from Belgrade, was to join the Hungarians. In the meantime, a third force, composed of Tatars and a Hungarian cavalry detachment under Jagerndorf, was planning to invade Moravia and Silesia in order that reinforcements from Poland would not reach Vienna. Bethlen's strategic plan was theoretically sound, but its execution was marred by delays and uncoordinated movements of the three armies. While the Hungarians opened the campaign in May, 1623, the Turkish force started in June and the Tatar force appeared only in August. Therefore, the Imperial generals were able to defeat the enemy forces piecemeal by concentrating their army against each enemy division. The Cossack actions in May, as discussed above, blunted the advance of the Hungarian army.

In mid-June, 1623, Prince Radziwill was called to Vienna by the Emperor. The Imperial High Command briefed Radziwill about new movements of the enemy forces. He was told that a large Turkish army was moving up the Danube to link with the main Hungarian force somewhere in Lower Austria or Northern Hungary. Radziwill learned further that the army of the Catholic League in Germany was greatly outnumbered and Tilly asked for reinforcements. As a result of these enemy concentrations, the Cossacks now guarding the eastern borders of Moravia were to be split into two parts. Four thousand Cossacks were to be sent to Styria to protect that province from raiding enemy columns.¹ The remaining 6,000 under Radziwill's command were to be sent to Germany to reinforce Tilly.² However, before the orders were issued, the Em-

¹ D'Elbert, III, 114. Bruenn, 6.15.1623; Welykyi, IV, nro. 1639, 92.

² Welykyi, IV, nro. 1625, 87; nro. 1626, 87.

peror learned that the situation in Germany worsened, further as Halberstadt advanced into the Lower Saxony Circle. He, accordingly, commanded that all 10,000 Cossacks were to be sent to Germany at once to reinforce Tilly.¹ The Emperor further asked Radziwill to return to Poland and to enlist up to 20,000 new Cossacks for the Imperial service.²

Meanwhile, 12,000 Lisowchyks under Strojnowski and Kalinowski remained idle on the Polish-Silesian border. Their leaders sent several messages to Vienna asking the Emperor for service but Ferdinand kept stalling them. The Viceroys of Bohemia and Silesia, Carl Liechtenstein and Archduke Charles, advised strongly against retaining the Lisowchyks whom they considered to be ferocious and bloodthirsty.³ As a result of their advice, Ferdinand failed to employ the Lisowchyks at this time and asked Liechtenstein to refuse Strojnowski's offers.⁴ At the same time, he demanded from Radziwill to enlist the Cossacks from the Ukraine whom the Emperor preferred over the Lisowchyks.

Meanwhile, Radziwill's Cossacks, probably under Colonel Lanikowski, joined Tilly in Germany in the first half of July, 1623.⁵ The Cossack light cavalry became Tilly's flexible arm and added to the general manoeuvrability of his army. On July 13, Tilly launched his campaign against the province of Brunswick, where Christian of Halberstadt was encamped. When Christian learned that Tilly's greatly strengthened army was approaching, he withdrew westward toward the United Provinces. He marched slowly and Tilly overtook him near Stadtholm by Greven. In the ensuing battle, August 6, 1623, Halberstadt was soundly defeated.⁶ The Cossacks played an important part on the battle and the pursuit, destroying many of the enemy. This defeat so disheartened Frederick of Palatinate that he opened talks with the Emperor three weeks later at the advice of his father-in-law, King James of England, and negotiated a truce.⁷

After the truce was established, the Emperor had no further need of the Cossacks in Germany, and their four month contract

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 1627, 88; nro. 1633, 90; d'Elbert, III, 114. Breslau, 6.16.1623.

² Welykyi, IV, nro. 1627, 88. Dispatch from Vienna dated 15.VI.1623.

³ Liva, III, 411. Letters of Liechtenstein to Ferdinand, Archduke Charles and Strojnowski; all from June 8, 1623.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 414.

⁵ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1633, 90.

⁶ Wedgwood, 179-181.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 181.

was running out. Hence, in the beginning of September, 1623, the remaining Cossacks of Lanikowski were released. An anonymous chronicler of Holešov in Moravia wrote that these Cossacks were returning to Poland through Moravia, and on September 23, they passed Rosice and encamped near Hustopečtky.¹ While waiting for safe conduct and a bonus payment from the Emperor, the Cossacks themselves began charging contributions from the local populace until the local Moravians sent a petition for the authorities in Olomouc to hurry the Cossacks to Poland.² The Cossacks were granted safe conduct and returned to southern Poland, where they heard that Crown Prince Wladyslaw was assembling a Cossack army to invade Transylvania and to usurp the throne from Bethlen Gabor.³ Some joined the Crown Prince, while others left for Moravia where the Lisowchyks of Strojnowski and Kalinowski had been fighting the Tatars.

The Lisowchyks had missed the summer campaign in Germany but many still awaited summons to the Imperial service. During the summer, small bands of impatient Lisowchyks had been conducting private raids into Silesia, plundering, looting, and laying waste the border districts. Their raiding was not limited to Silesia, but extended inside Poland. Many Polish noblemen complained to the *Sejm* that roving bands attacked their holdings and carried away as loot silver, household furnishings, and other valuables.⁴ The provincial Diets in Cracow, Mazowsze, and Sandomir declared a state of emergency and called out their levies to combat groups of rebellious Cossacks and Lisowchyks. The Polish nobility asked the King to use the army to disperse these bands and to outlaw all their officers, including Strojnowski, Kalinowski, and Lanikowski. The Polish nobility began pressuring the King through the *Sejm* to forbid the Imperial envoys all further recruitment of mercenary troops in Poland.⁵

The Lisowchyk organization was threatened with imminent dissolution by the *Sejm*; its leaders faced banishment and confiscation of their goods, and the men punishment for their plundering

¹ Hruby, *Moravska Korespondence*, I, nro. 290, 445.

² *Ibid.*

³ Welykyi, nro. 1623, 98.

⁴ Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, II, 270-275. The Polish provinces bordering Silesia and Prussia suffered most of the damage from Lisowchyks.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 280-283.

of the Polish provinces. However, the Imperial summons from Vienna took them out of Poland before the *Sejm* could persuade the King to abolish the Lisowchyks. When the Cossacks left Moravia for the German campaign in July, 1623, Bethlen's offensive intensified and his cavalry raided Moravia and Lower Austria. Again, the need for light cavalry overcame Ferdinand's dislike of the Lisowchyks and on August 7, 1623, he commissioned General di Dohna, commander of the Silesian troops, to enroll the Lisowchyks under Strojnowski and Kalinowski into the Imperial service.¹ It seems that Radziwill, whom the Emperor sent to Poland to enlist 20,000 Cossacks from the Ukraine was unsuccessful in his task. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt to re-enlist the Cossacks under Lanikowski who were returning from Germany in September of 1623.² The latter were unsatisfied and wanted to return home. They complained that the payment that they received was too small and that on their march through Silesia they had to fight off Silesian levies who attacked Cossack stragglers.³ Thereupon, only the Lisowchyks were available and di Dohna enrolled 12,000 troops under Strojnowski and Kalinowski in early September, 1623.⁴

The Polish author, Dzieduszycki, provides a detailed breakdown of the Lisowchyk force which took part in the Moravian campaign against Bethlen Gabor in the fall of 1623. The two colonels, Strojnowski and Kalinowski, commanded the force jointly. Their subordinate officers, Skorulski, Jaroszewski, Poplawski, Wakowski, Wesolowski, Miesobowski, Politanski, Zaleski, and Moczarski, each commanded a sizeable detachment.⁵

In the fall offensive, Bethlen's armies attacked Moravia and Northern Hungary from both sides. His main army which now contained the Hungarian and the Turkish forces, invaded southern Moravia in October, while the Tatars and Hungarians under Jagern-

¹ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1636, 91; nro. 1638, 92.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1639, 92; nro. 1640, 93; nro. 1641, 93.

³ D'Elbert, III, 118-119. Breslau, 9.17.1623 and Prague, 9.30.1623. Cossack detachments which were returning from Germany had been attacked by Silesians. In September, 1623, two Silesian noblemen, Duke Wenzel of Bernstadt and Duke of Briegg, defeated several large Cossack groups and inflicted heavy losses.

⁴ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1637, 91; nro. 1647, 96. These sources state there were 18,000 Cossacks but most of the documents agree that there were no more than 12,000 Cossacks.

⁵ Dzieduszycki, II, 293.

dorf advanced through Northern Hungary into Moravia from the north.¹ The Imperial garrisons in the occupied territory were besieged or captured. Only three towns, Neusohl (Banska Bystrica), Komorn (Komarno), and Neuhausel (Nove Zamky) remained in control of the Emperor. In November, Bethlen's army defeated the Imperial troops under Montenegro near the town of Hodonin (Göding).² The Imperialists retreated within Hodonin and were immediately besieged by the Turkish-Hungarian army. The Imperial staff expected a Cossack relief force to arrive shortly from di Dona's camp. This hope is reflected in two messages that Prince Leichtenstein sent from Prague to Vienna.³ The message of November 10, 1623, further informs the authorities in Vienna that the Turks seized 15,000 Moravians and sent them to the slave markets.⁴ The second dispatch of November 11, 1623, adds that Bethlen personally took command of the siege operations to reduce Hodonin and again hopes for the speedy arrival of the Cossack force to relieve the siege.⁵

The siege of Hodonin continued throughout November while the Cossacks were fighting the Tatars and Hungarians in northern Moravia and Northern Hungary. The coming of winter and the probability that the Cossacks would soon arrive before Hodonin forced Bethlen to re-evaluate his position. Bethlen knew that his Tatar and Turkish allies did not fight during the winter and would soon begin withdrawing their forces. On the other hand, the Imperial army and the Cossacks often campaigned during the winter months. In the winter campaigns Bethlen could rely upon only his own troops which were insufficient for the successful prosecution of the war. Expediency seemed to dictate that a truce was in order for the winter. Emperor Ferdinand readily agreed to Bethlen's suggestion since the Imperial army was badly shattered during the fall campaign and needed time for regroupment. An armistice was established and each side was to retain all the territory it held before the truce. Also, negotiations were opened towards a final peace settlement.

Meanwhile, the Lisowchyks whom General di Dohna led into Silesia in September, 1623, remained with him throughout the fall.

¹ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1639, 92.

² Dzieduszycki, II, 304-305.

³ Liva, III, 485.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 487.

di Dohna united the Cossack force to his 8,000 Silesian troops and fought with the Tatar-Hungarian army of General Jagerndorf that invaded northern Moravia and parts of Silesia. The enemy forces blocked the road in Moravia and prevented the march of the Lisowchyks southward to join with Montenegro's army. As a result of this situation the Cossacks of Strojnowski and Kalinowski fought under di Dohna and the Emperor was notified to this effect in November.¹ The Imperial Command needed the Cossacks to relieve the siege of Hodonin and commanded a Colonel Colloredo, who was returning from Poland from an unsuccessful attempt to recruit new Cossack mercenaries,² to lead the Cossacks to Hodonin. Colloredo fulfilled his mission and brought the Lisowchyks from northern Moravia to Hodonin in late December.³ By the end of the year, the chronicler of Holešov notes that the Cossacks were established in their winter quarters along the eastern Moravian frontier.⁴

During the months of the fall of 1623, the Lisowchyk Cossacks engaged in numerous skirmishes and battles with the enemy forces in Moravia and Northern Hungary. According to a Venetian source, the Cossacks killed over 700 Turks during the month of November.⁵ One of the Cossack raiding parties reached the outskirts of the town of Košice, which lies deep in Northern Hungary.⁶ The effectiveness of the Cossack light cavalry so delighted the Emperor, that he ordered his military advisers to disband several newly recruited companies of German infantry and, instead, he asked for additional Cossack troops from Poland.⁷

The unstable truce, which existed between the Imperial and Hungarian forces from November, 1623 to May, 1624, was severely disrupted at the end of February, 1624. On February 29, 1624, the Hungarians launched an attack on the Cossack garrisons in eastern Moravia. The attack was coordinated with a popular peasant uprising against the occupying Cossacks in the region of Moravske

¹ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1660, 101-102. Dispatch from December 9, 1623.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1659, 101.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1667, 105.

⁴ Hruby, *Moravske Korespondence*, I, nro. 290, 446.

⁵ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1661, 102; d'Elbert, III, 125. Vienna, 11.9.1623 and 11.15.1623. These two messages describe a Cossack Turkish battle over the possession of a bridge in Moravia.

⁶ Dzieduszycki, II, 309.

⁷ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1672, 107.

Valašsko. This action surprised seven squadrons of the Cossacks of Strojnowski which were encamped in the villages and towns of Velke Lukovce, Stipa, Kostelec, and Fryštak and drove them out. Nearly 500 Cossacks were killed in this uprising.¹ Simultaneously, 3,000 peasants attacked the Cossack detachments of Kalinowski in the towns of Sumbald, Lazuv, Troubelic, and Medle.² The peasant rebellion collapsed and the Hungarians were driven out when the Cossacks returned with other Imperial troops and re-occupied the region.

The truce negotiations led to a formal peace treaty signed on May 8, 1624, by Ferdinand and Bethlen Gabor and ended the hostilities between them. This treaty was based on the Nicolsburg Treaty of January, 1622. In May, Bethlen Gabor began to withdraw his troops from Austria and Moravia, and the Emperor likewise began to disperse his army.

The Lisowchyks were the first to be dismissed from Imperial service, but they were allowed by Ferdinand to stay in Moravia as garrison until they received their back pay.³ They remained until the middle of September, 1624, since the Emperor was unable to collect the necessary sum to send them away. Their stay became a heavy burden for the Moravian populace, who had to provide quarters, food, and forage for them. Our source, the chronicler of Holešov, writes that each Moravian family had to contribute two *riks-thalers* in money, one-half litre of oats, and one-half bucket of oil as Cossack tax.⁴ Besides this, the Cossacks who were undisciplined took from the population all that they could.⁵ On September 21, 1624, the Lisowchyks were paid 146,000 *riks-thalers* by the Emperor and left the Moravian province.⁶ Some of them enlisted into the regular Imperial army but most of them rode off to Poland.⁷

The Lisowchyks were not welcome by the Polish administration. When news reached Poland that the Lisowchyks were returning, the Polish nobility clamored in the *Sejm* to prohibit their return

¹ Hruby, *Moravske Korespondence*, I, nro. 290, 446-447.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 289, 441; Dostal. *op. cit.*, 88-89.

³ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1690, 114; nro. 1691, 115.

⁴ Hruby, *Moravske Korespondence*, I, nro. 290, 446.

⁵ *Ibid.*, nro. 290, 447.

⁶ *Ibid.*; Khevenhiller, *op. cit.*, X, 519; d'Elbert, III, 132. Prague, 8.3.1624. The Silesians contributed 600,000 florins to pay the Cossacks' salary.

⁷ Hruby, *Moravske Korespondence*, I, nro. 290, 447.

into the Polish kingdom.¹ The Emperor became worried when he heard of this, since the prospect of keeping all the Lisowchyks in his service for the next few years was displeasing. Therefore, Ferdinand petitioned the Polish Diet, asking it to forgive the Lisowchyks their transgressions since they fought for a good cause.² The Emperor also wrote several letters to King Sigismund and leading Polish senators, commending the Lisowchyks for bravery and fidelity to the Catholic cause and to him.

Other efforts were made on behalf of the Lisowchyks. The Emperor asked the Papal Nuncio in Warsaw and Vienna to intervene before the Polish government in favor of the Lisowchyks.³ Also, the Silesian Estates sent a petition to King Sigismund in which they enumerated the many wrongs they had endured from the Cossacks. They asked the King to admit them to Poland; otherwise, they would become brigands and a scourge to all the surrounding provinces.⁴ Sigismund decided to admit the Lisowchyks into the kingdom. We know this from a letter written to the Silesian Estates on October 23, 1624, wherein he promised them that the Lisowchyks would be admitted into Poland, if they would give up six of the most wanted Lisowchyks for just punishment, would disband upon entering Poland, and would send a humble apology to the *Sejm* for all their previous wrong-doing.⁵ The King also wrote to the Lisowchyks and ordered that they disband without opposition and return home individually.⁶

Meanwhile, the Lisowchyks remained in southern Silesia and awaited their fate. Their vigil was an unceasing travail to the surrounding Silesian villages and towns, who watched constantly for small raiding bands of Lisowchyk Cossacks. The Lisowchyks plundered the neighborhood often and engaged Silesian patrols in

¹ Ambrozy Grabowski (ed.). "Do historyi Lisowczyzkow," *Starozytnosci Historyczne Polskie* (Krakow: Dr. I. Czecha, 1890). I, 177-180, 191-194. During the winter of 1624 the Polish Diet proclaimed that all Lisowchyks were outlaws and that they were to be exiled. They also petitioned the King for the confiscation of the property of Lisowchyk officers.

² *Ibid.*, 176-177.

³ Welykyi, IV, nro. 1692, 115. See the Appendix for letters from Emperor Ferdinand II to Sigismund III, King of Poland.

⁴ Grabowski, I, 182-183.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 183-185.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 186-190.

battle. The Silesian dukes Wenzel of Bernstadt and Prince Henry Ziemnicki, destroyed several raiding parties of Lisowchyks. In November, 1624, they captured the Lisowchyk colonel, Stanislaw Strojnowski, who commanded a raiding party in the county of Kreuzberg (Kluczbork), and held him for ransom.¹ Strojnowski was ransomed by his relatives in 1625.

In the end, the Lisowchyks had no alternative but to submit to the King's will. They surrendered six men most wanted by the Polish *Sejm* and went home without opposition.² Thus ended the story of the Lisowchyks, who won fame for their war-like spirit and bravery, but who also left behind a reputation of brigandage, pillage, and looting. Not all the Lisowchyks returned home at once. Many went to the Zaporozhian *Sich*, while others enlisted in the regiments of the "registered Cossacks" in the Ukraine.

During the campaign of 1623-24, the Cossacks rendered substantial services to the Emperor. They were instrumental in stopping Bethlen's spring offensive on the eastern front. They provided valuable assistance to Tilly, in pursuing the army of Christian of Halberstadt to the Netherlands. The Cossacks contributed greatly to stalemate the Turkish-Hungarian armies of Bethlen, and necessitated the peace treaty between Bethlen and the Emperor. However, they also contributed to many of the Emperor's problems by their undisciplined behavior, and Ferdinand was relieved to see them go.

¹ Dzieduszycki, II, 356.

² *Ibid.*, 348, 360-361. Several bands of the Lisowchyks under M. Karas fought their way through Polish border troops and returned to the Ukraine as a group.

CHAPTER IX

IDEOLOGY OF THE COSSACKS IN THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

After detailed analysis of the history of the Cossack involvement in the first phase of the Thirty Years War, there remains the somewhat tenuous problem of the ideological involvement of the Cossacks. As pointed out previously, the Thirty Years War was a religious war with, at least in the beginning, the Catholic League and the Protestant Union as antagonists.

The Cossacks were neither Catholics nor Protestants, and as mercenaries they could have joined either side. However, throughout the war, there was no incident when the Cossacks served on the Protestant side.¹ This warrants some examination into the motives of the Cossacks.

The Cossacks were recruited by the Imperial agents with the approval from the Polish king to aid the Emperor. Therefore, they had to join the Catholic League. Nevertheless, in 1622 and 1624 neither the Emperor nor the King wanted the Cossacks, and even threatened them with dispersion by force. But the Cossacks remained faithful to the Catholic side and did not attempt to negotiate with the Protestant powers. Some Cossack detachment, especially the Lisowchyks, were commanded by Polish officers who were Catholic and who would not negotiate with the Protestants. But often the Cossacks were commanded by their own officers who recognized no authority, and still they determined to serve only under the Emperor. As a matter of fact, these independent bands most often declared that their motives were to defend the Catholic religion ("per defendere la fede Cattolica Romana").² Their beliefs were

¹ In the 1640's the Cossacks fought against the Emperor within the French armies but never with the Protestant forces. On the other hand, the Cossacks refused to negotiate with the Protestants several times. Welykyi, *op. cit.*, III, nro. 1341, 221, nro. 1345, 224.

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1376, 239.

underscored by their hostile acts towards the Protestants¹ and friendly attitude towards Catholics. In the war zone and in Vienna itself,² the Cossacks dispersed Protestant assemblies, persecuted and tortured Protestant ministers, pillaged and burned settlements of Protestants.³ In contrast, they attended Catholic services and held some respect for the religious and private possessions of the Catholics.⁴

The antipathy of the Cossacks towards Protestantism came from the general attitude which was prevalent in the Polish state. In the sixteenth century, the Protestant Reformation gained many converts in the Polish dominions also.⁵ However, the Catholic Counter-Reformation had created such a reaction towards Protestantism that it lost its power and appeal by the beginning of the seventeenth century.⁶ This anti-Protestant reaction influenced greatly the Orthodox Ukrainians and White Russians. The Orthodox Metropolitan See of Kiev fought virogously against increased Protestant influences among the Orthodox. The rebuttal of the reformatory ideas of the philo-Protestant Patriarch of Constantinople, Cyril Lucaris, was conducted mostly by the Metropolitan of Kiev, Peter Mohyla (Moghila) in his work, *The Confession of the Orthodox Faith*.⁷

The Cossacks became acquainted with Protestantism during the fight against reformatory ideas. Therefore, they associated Protestantism as a negative ideology to be combatted by all means. Their knowledge of theology was only superficial and intuitive. The practice of faith was fulfilled by the traditional rites. They liked services full of mysticism, ceremony, and dedicated their church in the *Sich* to the Virgin Mary.⁸ Protestantism rejected mysticism

¹ *Ibid.*, nro. 1364, 233. Another Cossacks detachment declared that it also wanted to defend the Catholic faith (*per diffendere e dilatare la Religion Catolica*).

² *Ibid.*, nro. 1383, 242.

³ *Ibid.*, nro. 1339, 220, nro. 1361, 232, nro. 1427, 263.

⁴ Hruby, "Knez Jan Sarkander...", p. 262-271. The Cossacks spared the town of Holešov when the Catholic priest, Jan Sarkander assured them that all of the inhabitants were Catholic.

⁵ K. Chodynicki, *Reformacja w Polsce* (Warsawa: Ed. Bibl. Skladnicy, n.d.).

⁶ A.F. Pollard, *The Jesuits in Poland* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1892).

⁷ M. Jugie, *Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium* (Parisiis, Letouzey et Ane, 1926), I, 508-509.

⁸ In many Cossack lays (*duma*), the Virgin Mary is called the Protectress of *Sich*.

and fought against the cult of Mary. These practices irritated the Cossacks, and they often tested whether they were in hostile or friendly territory by asking the inhabitants to recite the *Ave Maria*.¹ Those who were unable to recite the prayer were treated as enemies.

In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Cossacks were used to Latin Catholicism as the alternate faith to Orthodoxy and they tolerated the Catholics. However, the Union of Brest which united many Orthodox with the Papacy was mistrusted by them. The anti-Uniate struggle in which the Cossacks took part in defense of Orthodoxy was more a national and a traditional struggle rather than a fight for a better faith. They fought against the Union of the Orthodox Church with Rome rather than against the Roman Catholic Church or the Latin Rite.

Despite any private reservations, the Cossacks fought loyally and bravely on the Catholic side during the Thirty Years War. Even though they were mercenaries, they suffered no ideological conflicts in rendering aid to the Emperor and the Catholics against the Protestant coalition. This fact should be stressed as an effective counter argument against those writers who see in the Cossacks nothing beyond their greed for plunder. Furthermore, the Cossacks returned home to defend their country when the danger of the Tatar or Turkish invasion was imminent.

The fighting practices of the Cossacks were cruel and blood-thirsty and repelled even the seasoned warriors of Western Europe. One has to remember that the mores and customs of the Cossacks crystallized during the incessant border wars with the Tatars, and that their ferocity had increased as a result of the long Polish-Muscovite War during the Time of Troubles. All these considerations should be taken into account before any prejudicial judgement is rendered.

¹ Welykyi, III, nro. 1338, 219.; Dembolecki, *op. cit.*, 95.

CONCLUSION

Previous historical studies of the Thirty Years War have included only scant references to the presence of the Cossacks in the conflict. We hope that this monograph has somewhat filled a gap in the study of the complex problem of the war. We wish, now, to summarize the reasons for the presence of the Cossacks in the Thirty Years War, their military achievements, and the overall effect of their efforts on the progress of the war.

The Bohemian Revolution against the Hapsburg Emperor was directly responsible for the Cossack participation in the Thirty Years War. Ferdinand, the heir apparent of the Holy Roman Emperor, tried to muster as much force as he could to crush the rebellious Bohemians and to secure an undivided realm. He turned to his brother-in-law, King Sigismund of Poland, and asked him for military aid. Sigismund decided to aid Ferdinand because of political, religious, and dynastic motives discussed in the text. Therefore, he allowed Ferdinand to send recruiting agents among the Cossacks who were at that time unemployed and who presented a potential danger to the Polish government. The agents of Ferdinand successfully recruited many thousands of Cossacks who preferred fighting on behalf of the Emperor to conflict with the Polish army. Cossacks had fought under the Imperial banners in the sixteenth century and were familiar with the demands of the Imperial generals. Therefore, they readily accepted service under the Hapsburgs.

The evaluation of the Cossack military contributions must proceed chronologically. In 1619, the Cossacks fought in Northern Hungary. Their inroad into Hungary succeeded in diverting the enemies of the Hapsburgs from capturing Vienna. The following year, Cossacks took part in the campaign of the Imperial troops to recover the rebellious provinces of the Bohemian Crown and rendered substantial services in the battles throughout. The Cossacks were instrumental in protecting the eastern boundaries of Austria

against the raids of the Hungarians. The Cossack light cavalry troops ranged the provinces of Silesia, Moravia, and Lower Austria and kept large numbers of provincial troops of these rebellious provinces from joining the main Bohemian army. In effect, they created a second front for the Bohemians and prevented a more efficient struggle against the Emperor and his allies. One may state without exaggeration that the contribution of the Cossack force along with the Bavarians under Tilly tilted the balance in the favor of the Emperor.

Furthermore, the Cossacks took an important part in the pacification of the province of Moravia in the winter of 1620-21 and in the subsequent campaigning against the Hungarians. In 1622 the Cossacks fought in Germany under Archduke Leopold and took part in the siege of several towns along the Rhine River. The following year, one Cossack force campaigned in Germany, while another force prevented a joint Hungarian, Turkish, and Tatar army from overrunning Moravia, Silesia, and Austria. The latter Cossack group remained in garrison in Moravia through most of 1624 to safeguard that province from renewed attacks by the Hungarians.

To evaluate the effect of the efforts of the Cossacks, one should examine again the Cossack campaigns individually. Most of the Cossack expeditions were *ad hoc* affairs and were launched by the Imperial agents annually. The 1619 Homonnai expedition was sent to seize Northern Hungary and to deny that provide to the Hungarians under Bethlen Gabor. The expedition failed to wrest control of Northern Hungary but it succeeded, indirectly, in relieving the siege of Vienna.

In 1620, six Cossack expeditionary forces left Poland for Austria. The total number who fought for the Emperor lay between 12,000 and 14,000. This large force of light cavalry performed such useful tasks as scouting, foraging, raiding, screening the main Imperial army, and covering the front, flanks, and rear of the army during the march. They effectively nullified the large contingents of light cavalry which Bethlen Gabor sent his Bohemian allies. In fact, the eastern borders of Moravia and Austria turned into a Cossack-Hungarian war.

The peculiarity of Cossack tactics contributed greatly to Imperial victories at the battles of Eggenberg, Horn, Prachatice, Estorf, Rakovnik, and the White Mountain. Cossacks used ambushes,

simulated flight, and simultaneous attacks on flank and rear to bedevil the Bohemians who had never fought such adversaries. A favorite tactic was the raid of a Cossack column deep into enemy territory to sow confusion, disorder, and terror among their enemies, and to seize prisoners and loot. Their indiscriminate looting and ravaging brought the horror of war among peasantry and burgher classes and contributed greatly to the political failure of the Bohemian Revolution and to the economic ruin of the rebellious provinces.

The notoriety of the Cossacks often preceded them in a campaign and acted as a psychological factor for the Catholic side. The fall of Speyers and Worms was attributed partly to the presence of Cossacks among the besieging force. The Cossacks performed effectively in the task of pacifying Moravia because of the aura of ferocity which surrounded them.

Analyzing the military exploits of the Cossacks in the period between 1619 and 1624, we conclude that during 1619, 1620, and 1623, the Cossacks proved the decisive force in obtaining victory for the Emperor and the Catholic side. They were most effective against the Hungarians of Bethlen Gabor whom they matched in military tactics and ferocity. Conversely, the Cossacks proved to be least effective in siege warfare.

The presence of the Cossacks was a mixed blessing to the Emperor. The undisciplined force ravaged provinces which were loyal, hostile, or neutral to the Emperor with equal intensity. Silesia and Moravia were among the worst ravaged areas because of frequent Cossack crossings and passages. Their excesses led to an instinctive distrust of the Cossacks by all Silesians and numerous encounters between the former and latter. Despite their negative characteristics, the Emperor continued to employ many Cossack detachments whose fighting ability he placed above other considerations. He realized that without Cossack troops, the situation of the Catholic side, at least in the beginning, would have been disastrous. The participation of the Cossacks did not end in 1624, but continued throughout the duration of the Thirty Years War. In our second volume, we will further present the part of the Cossacks in the Danish (1525-29), Swedish (1630-39), and the French (1638-48) phases of the war.

APPENDIX

DOCUMENT I.

SUMMARY: *Instruction for the Imperial envoys Count Adolph Althan and Secretary Peter Fuchs to King Sigismund III of Poland. — The Emperor sends Fuchs to Poland so that he, together with Count Althan, conduct negotiations with representatives of the Polish Kingdom on the Emperor's behalf.*

Let the Envoys explain to Sigismund the grave situation that exists at this time in the Empire.

Bethlen Gabor wants to obtain the Hungarian Crown and conspires with the rebels of Bohemia, Moravia, and other provinces. If Bethlen were to achieve his goal and become the King of Hungary, he would become dangerous to the Polish Kingdom. Therefore, the King ought to give the Emperor aid to destroy this menace.

Further, the Emperor ordered the envoys to demand military aid on the basis of kinship and according to the articles of the Treaty of Pozsony concluded in 1613. Besides, let the envoys plead their case before the Queen and Crown Prince of Poland.

If the King would be unable to send military aid without the permission of the Sejm, let the envoys send out letters to each member.

The envoys shall also stress the religious aspect. Polish Kings always supported and defended the Catholic faith. Bethlen, who has many supporters in Poland, would make the country completely Protestant. Also, should Bethlen become King of Hungary, he would conquer Poland with the aid of the Turkish army. To prevent this, the King should defend himself.

All the rebels are now attacking the authority of the Emperor, but if they succeed in destroying it, there will be no peace in our countries and Poland might suffer mutilation of her territory at the hands of the rebels.

The Emperor has done everything to satisfy the rebels and preserve their privileges. However, they disobey their lawful ruler and invite foreign kings to rule them. One cannot be too gentle with them, since they need severe punishment.

Using diplomacy, the envoys are to persuade the King to send aid to the Emperor. As enticement, the envoys may grant some rebel holdings in Silesia or Hungary to the Polish Crown Prince or other influential Polish lords. Also, the envoys should hire a mercenary force. The money will come from the King of Spain and Archduke Charles will send it when it arrives.

The Emperor gives his envoys a free hand to support Count George Drugeth of Homonnai. However, let them launch their expeditions only into Silesia or Hungary but avoid Transylvania, which belongs to the Turks.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; Karton 54:

Polonica 1622; extra ordinem, fol. 2.

Ferdinandus Secundus etc.

Instructio pro fidelibus nostris, nobis sincere dilectis, spectabili ac magnifico Comiti Adolpho ab Althan et Egregio Petro Fuchs, Consiliariis nostris, per nos ad Ser.mum Sigismundum tertium, Dei gratia Poloniae et Sueciae Regem Legatis destinatis.

Siquidem declaratorum Consiliariorum nostrorum industriam et in rebus feliciter beneque tractandis dexteritatem perspectam nobis habemus, hinc est quod eisdem, ad praefatam Regni Poloniae Regiam Serenitatem, aliosque eiusdem Regni Status Legationis nostrae provinciam sic imposuerimus, nihil quicquam deputantes, quin iuxta praescriptum nostrum, quae in Instru (2v.) ctione comprehensa sunt puncta, ad benignam nostram satisfactionem, pro opinione nostra de ipsis concepta, quaevis rite peracturi et executuri sint. Primum itaque omnium, quandoquidam in celeritate plurimum consistat, dictus noster Consiliarius Petrus Fuchs, itineri sese quamprimum accinget et profectionem accelerabit, et ut in itineris continuatione ac decursu securiorem transitum habeat, iuxta annexam consignationem locorum et viarum, per quas transeundum sit, non obstante quod longiori circuitu profectio isthaec per consignata illa loca conficiatur, iter suscipiet, hoc apprime curando, ne in progressu itineris, qua uspiam fieri possit, moram illam faciat.

Ubi itaque in Poloniam venerit, e vestigio Serenissimum et Reverendissimum Principem Carolum Archiducem Austriae et Episcopum Vratislaviensem, fratrem nostrum clar.mum accedet et eidem inscriptas nostras literas exhibebit, explicando eidem statum et totius rei seriem, iuxta Instructionis praesentis articulos; quo

facto similiter etiam Comitem ab Althan, si illum in Aula Regis praesentem deprehenderit, conveniet, offerendo ipsi nostras literas, cum uberiore relatione universae rei (f.3) summae, addendo quod Commissio haec ad id ordinata sit, ut eam Ser.mi Archiducis Caroli, fratris nostri clar.mi Dilectio plene dirigat, et omnia ex eiusdem consilio et voluntate decernantur et cuius cognitionem habere in hoc res et necessitas exigunt, fiant; et ut ne nos quippiam eius lateat, statim ubi Poloniam contigerit, rei statum, qualem illum reperit, et quam progressus felicioris spem, in legationis istius negotio, sibi constituat, nobis scriptis literis referet.

Quibus ita rite et praescripto ordine peractis, primum omnium assentiente sua Dilectione, Regi ipsi exhibendae erunt literae credentiales, tum Reginae, Regis item Sorori Principissae, ac Principi Regis filio, praemissoque salutationis et congratulationis actu honorifico, qui personas tales deceat; Exponendus erit praesens tam Hungariae quam Bohemiae et Austriae, imo et Romani Imperii lubricus status, iuxta speciales Consignationes: A.B.C.D., his adiunctas; non intermittendo et hoc declarare, quod nisi Gabriel Bethlem, insurrectione illa sua, et coniuratione cum rebellibus facta sese commovisset, hucusque res tam Bohemiae, Moraviae aliarumque Provinciarum, quam etiam Romani Imperii, in pacatum et pristinum rursus statum citra omne dubium, evidenti et gravi factiosorum iactura, (3v.) redactas fore; nunc autem accedentibus eius copiis, rem in ancipiti versare, et Bethlenium ambitione sua, Hungariae Coronam, communi hominum dicto, et affectare, et hereditarias Hungariae Regno conterminas provincias, in discrimen non leve adducere, eiusmodique enormia et quasi extrema sibi proposuisse, quae non nisi ultimum exterminium minitentur, uti illud fusius ex punctis sub litera E. apparet. Quam si ille Coronam consequeretur, dubium vix ullum esset reliquum, quin rebus suis firmatis, practicis horsum adhibitis, Regi quoque ac ipsi Regno Poloniae difficultates non leves posset ut velet facessere, exemplo praedecessoris sui Gabrielis Bathory, qui quas cum Ser.tis Rebellibus practicas habuerit, palam est.

Sollicitandae proinde forent Ser.tes Suae, ut ad vicinum incendium restringendum opem conferre, et eam militum manum, quam sponte offerret, mittendorum videlicet in Hungarian vel Silesiam, per totam sequentem aestatem subsidii loco, intertenere velit.

Ad quid obtinendum non ius consanguinitatis et affinitatis solum exinde offensae parti in omne auxilium (fol. 4) accurrendum, verum

insuper etiam vicinitatis et Ius foederis, ut id nulla in parte intermittatur plane suadet et iubet, cuius, in Anno Domini Millesimo Sexcentesimo Decimo tertio, Possonii, reiterati vigore (ad auxilia ferenda omnibus modis suam Ser.tem inducere admittentur). Idemet et quod opportunum ultra occurrerit, pro occasione, Reginae, Principi et Regni Primoribus, exponi per seriem poterit.

Siguidem autem nobis constet, iuxta compactatorum tenorem, Suam Ser.tem (si proficuum fore censuerit, publice hoc nomine aliquid proponere) nisi consentientibus Regni ordinibus illud vix fieri posse. Ea propter et hoc fine, non ad Ordines tantum, sed et insuper etiam Particulares nonnullas literas exarari et instructioni huic adiungi, hic praesentes mandamus.

Exponendo etiam ulterius Suae Ser.ti quam per hanc rerum turbationem et persecutiones, quas sub praetextu religionis contra religionis statum hactenus exercent et porro etiamnum exercere continuant, pacificationis leges in religionis negotio statutae, in earum vilipendium turbentur et evertantur. (fol. 4v).

Ex zelo proinde et pietate, qua ab immemorabili tempore, omnes omnium temporum Poloniae Reges, uti et modernus etiam, erga Religionem ferri toto mundo manifestum est, non patiatut aut comittat, ut tam per occulta dolosa stratagemata, aut technas et practicas, sicut etiam aperto Marte, hostilibus adversariorum moliminibus Religio opprimatur. Ex quo Sua Ser.tas, successu temporis, non aliud dum adversariorum conatibus non resistitur, quam simile malum et periculum sibi metuere possit. Quod vel ex eo manifestum evadit, siquidem in propatulo sit Bethlenum divulgare et in hoc gloriari, quod intenti et animi sui consocios et asseclas in Regno Poloniae plurimos habeat, quorum opera omnia possit. Hoc minus dubii est, quin eorum tanquam idoneorum instrumentorum opera usus esset, si, circumvicinis Regnis et Provinciis in suam sententiam pertractis, Regni illius, quos haberet asseclas, defectionem sollicitare deliberaret. Addendo etiam et hoc, Ser.ti Suae neque pro ratione status rem hanc silentio praeterire licere; siquidem quam incommodum, noxium et inconveniens et pessimi exempli res sit, omnibus apertum est. Fixa namque Sede in Hungaria, Bethlem (Sultani opera et adiuncto (f. 5) cuius ille cliens sit, et a protectione eius dependeat), facile simile quid, quod iam Hungariae, successu temporis, etiam Poloniae Regno, intentare possit. Fuit hoc semper Dynastis et quibus summa rerum gubernamina committebantur, commune et propium, ut aequitatem tuerentur et defenderent,

iniquitatem odio haberent et persequerentur.

Animadvertat S.tas Sua, quam per conspirationes, coniunctionesque, ante signatorum illorum Palatini Rheni, Bethlemii et aliorum nonnullorum Hungarorum, praeter omne demeritum, aut causam datam, Regna et Provinciae, signanter autem persona nostra Caesarea, hostiliter impetatur; unde metuendum facile sit, ne per eas hostiles coniunctiones dum adversantium potentia, vires et incrementum acquirit, Regno etiam Poloniae mutilatio aliqua irrigari possit, qua non tantum Regnum illud de praesenti turbetur, sed et universa posteritas in summum periculum et discrimen coniciatur, et restituendae spe securitatis omni in parte frustretur.

Haec recensenda Bohemorum molimina, quam illi perperam et indigne agant, dum absque omni causa, non obstante quod ipsorum omnium, et singulorum Privilegiorum confirmationem (f. 5v.) et ratificationem ipsis obtulerimus et etiamnum offeramus, tumultuantur, electum ipsorum et coronatum Regem et dominum repudiant, et commentis suis, ad exacerbendam contra eundem plebeculam repleta volumina, praelo etiam submissa, divulgant, alium sibi Regem eligunt et coronant, quaelibet in arce Pragensi, per piissimae reminiscentiae Imperatorem Matthiam relicta, distrahunt et sibi usurpant, suo exemplo id idemmet agendum Hungaros iugent et sollicitant. Qui licet in publica non ita pridem celebrata Diaeta, speciali hic opposito titulo, Regem eorum, et eiusdem actiones collaudarint et per typum divulgarint, comperiuntur et prodeant, qui ab huiusmodi statutis publicis resilientes, sese a debita et iurata obedientia, omnibus modis exonerare conentur. Exinde et sexcentis aliis apparet et clarum evadit, quae haec Regna et Provincias nisi forti manu temporis obviam eatur, plane maneant, quorum arcendorum respectu tanto impromptius (sic) Ser.tas Sua ad ferenda auxilia sollicitari possit. Quod si forte etiam haec publica auxilia praestare, rationibus allatis, non posset, et ob id private gravaretur, ex tunc ut vel mutui nomine plane faciat, omnibus modis persuadenda erit, data videlicet sufficienti (f. 6) super eo et necessaria cautela et assecuratione, penes Plenipotenciales Suae Dilectioni transmissas, quas hisce iunctas videt. Casu vero quo neque etiam mutui nomine a Sua Serenitate auxillia obtineri, et ad ea conferenda induci neutiquam posset, ex tunc is tractatus instituendus foret, ut Suae Ser.tis unigenitorum quam etiam aliis praecipuis magnatibus, quorundam Rebellium Bona, in Silesia et Hungaria vel titulo Inscriptionis in certa pecuniae summa, vel vero iure Feudi per Dil. Suam et dictos legatos

nostros, simul vel seorsim constitutos concederentur. Hoc tamen considerato utque eo modo inscripta, vel in Feudum tradita Bona fuerint, non secus atque ante, Regnis et Provinciis, quibus fuerant incorporata, cum omnibus suis iuribus et nostra pristina superioritate remaneant; sin quid cum ipsomet Rege totius Provinciae seu Principatus alicuius statum concernentem in Tractatum deveniret, id non absolute, sed ad nostram dumtaxat ratificationem per Dil. Suam, memoratosque legatos nostros concludendum erit.

Et quoniam ad requisitionem et instantiam Bethlemii (f. 6v) iam cum Hungaris Tractatum auspicati sumus, casu quo in illo ad aequas conditiones utrinque condescenderetur, tunc miles, ab Hungariae Confiniis amoveri et in Silesiae loca contermina, pro irruptione in illas partes intentanda deduci posset.

Quae autem et qualia Bona in Hungaria et Silesia in feudum dari possint, separato scripto, sub litera H. signato, tam Nost. Principatum, quae ad ratificationem nostram, quam privatorum Bona, quae absoluta autoritate et facultate concessa conferre liceat, praesenti Instructioni annectuntur; observata et illa cautela: Quod si vi et mediante armorum potentia Bona illa ac Provinciae recuperatae et retentae fuerint, ut tunc demum Feudum et inscriptio locum habeat; sin vero per aliquam compositionem et amnistam difficultates eae consopientur, in eo casu expensas illas factas nos refusuros esse; tam videlicet, quae ab ipsa Sua Ser.te, quam aliis particularibus personis et proceribus Regni ad hanc rem obtinerentur, relictis illis omnibus tamdiu et eosque in possessione, donec hoc nomine debita plenarie exoluta fuerint. (fol. 7)

Porro in re pecuniaria, in usus militiae conducendae tractatum est cum oratore Regis Hispaniarum, ut via Concambii per Mercatores transmittatur, quae universa pecunia ad manus Suae Dil. Archiducis Caroli, vel in absentia, aut ex ordinatione ipsius, ad manus praefatorum commissariorum nostrorum consignanda erit, ut iuxta necessitates in bellicos usus erogari queat.

Quicquid insuper etiam subsidiorum in Polonia a Sua Ser.te aliisque obtineri poterit, illud omne, iuxta praemissam ordinationem ad manus Suae Dil.nis, aut illa non praesente, commissariorum nostrorum, remitendum erit, ut eis et per se, et per Comitem Georgium Drugeth de Homonna in Hungaria et Silesia progressus facere possit. Iter tamen et negotium suscipiendae expeditionis scire in Hungariam aut vero Silesiam, ex directione et voluntate Suae Dil.nis fieri debeat; Turca vero, ut ne irritationis causam aut praetextum

praetendere possit, a Transilvania ut plane abstinence curabunt. In Hungaria vero et Silesia comites ab Altham, et Homonnay operam dabunt, ut Provinciae non tam devastentur, quam ad obedientiam et fidelitatem nostram reducantur.

Et quidem circa haec praerecensita omnia proponenda explicandaque sicut et reliquorum negotiorum agendorum, et (fol. 7v) tractandorum modum et rationem adhibendam, prudentiae et dextritati discretionique commissariorum nostrorum, ita tamen ut ab assensu et voluntate Suae Dil. nis dependeant et illa inconsulta nihil statuant, committuntur, qui rebus ita, iuxta praescriptum, plene peractis, nobis relationem coniunctim vel separatim, per litteras crebrius facient. Interea temporis, quicquid nobis momentum continens perscribendum occurrerit, id per zifras his annexas commode fieri poterit. Quibus de reliquo nos gratia et clementia nostra Caesarea et Regia benigne propensi manemus.

Datum Viennae, die vigesima tertia mensis Decembris. Anno Domini Millesimo Sexcentesimo decimo nono (1619). Regnorum nostrorum, Romani primo, Hungariae et reliquorum secundo, Bohemiae vero anno tertio.

DOCUMENT II.

SUMMARY: — *Emperor Ferdinand notifies King Sigismund that the brave Cossacks who aided the Empire in its time of need are now returning home since their fatherland is in danger of enemy invasion. The Cossacks, however, fear that they will be punished since they violated the laws of the kingdom and crossed into the Empire without the permission of the Polish authorities. Ferdinand intercedes for the Cossacks before Sigismund and points out that they contributed greatly to the suppression of the rebellion and rendered service to the Empire and also Poland. Furthermore, they did not take part in a foreign war but in the suppression of a rebellion and thus, did not violate the Polish laws against intervention.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1621, fol. 15.*

Ferdinandus etc. Ser.mo

Magnum certe, explorata Cosacorum virtus bellica, militiae nostrae praesidium attulit; gentem enim audacem, strenuam et in

omnia pericula promptam, reipsa experti sumus; Qui (a) nobis hac occasione stipendia meruerunt, nonnullis suisque desideratis, nunc in solatium patriae periclitantis, cui vitam atque sanguinem suum deberint, generoso animi ductu accurrunt, quibus benignum liberalioris commendationis nostrae testimonium apud Ser.tem Vestram haud gravatim tribuimus. Subverentur quidem illi, ne publicam offensam incurrant, quod citra Ser.tis Vestrae iussum, citra Regni permissum optimo zelo stimulati, in castra nostra properarint, quo etsi fortasse in leges patrias peccatum sit, faciliorem tamen erroris veniam consequuturos se confidunt, si innata Ser.tis Vestrae bonitas, nostrae quoque intercessionis suffragio provocetur. Peramanter itaque et pro singulari nostro altrinsecus gratificandi studio, enixe contendimus, ut noxam istam et si quid aliud naevi contractum est, Nobis, imo Reipublicae et Aug. Domui Nostrae, quam illi fortiter defensam inierunt, facilis condonet, praesertim, cum non tam belli alicuius (f. 15v) legitimi partes secuturi, quod fortasse leges prohibent, quam rebellionem quibuscumque gentibus abominandam restincturi provincia excessisse videri queant. Utut sit, illi se sistunt, et fiduciae pleni, nova pro Religione, pro Rege, pro patria sua contestandae fidei argumenta quaerunt. Neque Nos diffidimus, quin hoc potissimum tempore, quo viris et viribus undequaque collectis opus est, se ipsis tanto benigniorem Ser.tas Vestra exhibebit, ut viri militares, patrocinio gratiae nostrae Caesareae, quam sane promeriti sunt, non frustra sese innoxos reapse intelligant, quod m... ites fraterna benevolentia officio libenter agniture Ser.ti Vestrae auspiciatos rerum omnium successus ex animo precamur. Datum Viennae die 14, mensis Februarii, A.D. 1621.

DOCUMENT III.

SUMMARY: *A Draft of a Military Contract.* — 1) *The Marshal (Pocillator) of Poland is preparing three detachments of mercenaries for the Emperor. These soldiers are veterans of the Polish campaign against Turkey. They consist of 2,000 Hussars or lancers, 2,000 Cossacks, and 1,000 Haiduks or infantry.*

2) *The Marshal will have them ready in the designated time and will bring them to the designated place for inspection and payment by Imperial envoy. All officers and men will swear allegiance to the*

Emperor and they will promise to desist from plundering the subjects of the Emperor. Only in enemy territory, with the Emperor's permission, they will engage in plunder.

3) *He will remain with the troops until the specified time. Then he will advance into Hungary and respect those provinces and poor people who will swear allegiance to the Emperor. He will also cooperate with George Zichi (Secchi) Murano.*

4) *He will inform the Emperor concerning all his actions to achieve the expected victory.*

5) *If the Emperor will appoint the Marshal as commander-in-chief of the Polish troops, then the Marshal will have to give all due respect to the orders of the Emperor and Imperial commander-in-chief.*

6) *The general of this army will receive 1500 florins a month from the Imperial envoy.*

7) *The captains and other officers of the Hussars will get 1 florin per month per horse, as is customary.*

8) *The captains and officers of the Cossacks will negotiate for terms of payment.*

9) *The same applies to the officers of Haiduks.*

10) *Each Hussar will get 15 florins a month, each Cossack 12 florins, and each Haiduk 4½ florins.*

11) *The Emperor will enlist all of them in January for three months and the Emperor will pay them in advance.*

12) *If the Emperor will need them further, he will pay them in advance for extra every month that they remain in Imperial service.*

13) *The Emperor will terminate their service with a fifteen day notice but will continue to pay them to the end of the month.*

14) *The Emperor promises to recompense the general of this force with confiscated rebel goods.*

15) *To obtain the good will of the soldiers, let the envoy present as a down payment one month's pay in Cracow or another city in Poland.*

16) *If the Emperor concludes a peace treaty with his enemies, he will be obligated to pay them only one month's pay instead of three month's pay.*

17) *The general will have judicial authority and powers over the soldiers of the force.*

18) *These articles are to be ratified by the King of Poland and Imperial envoy.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54*, an. 1622, fol. 71 - 73, 21. Januarii 1622.

1) Seliget Ill.mus D.nus Pocillator Regni, ex eis militibus, qui nupero bello Polonico contra Turcam militarunt, duo Millia Husariorum sive Lanceariorum; Item duo Millia Cossaccorum, et Mille Haidones sive Pedites, bene armatos, atque associatos pro more gentis; quibus et Caesareae Maestati utilitatem, et sibi gloriam parere possit.

2) Eos omnes simul habebit ad diem Januarii nunc currentis; in loco ut eos, si ita visum fuerit, Legato Caesareo commonstrare et conventum stipendium recipere possit. Iurabuntque omnes Duces et milites Caesareae M.ti sese in omnibus illud et non secus facturos, quam quod strenuos milites deceat, neque inconditis devastationibus, aut direptionibus deservituros, nisi in locis plane hostilibus, ubi illis licitum et iniunctum expresse fuerit, ita ut Suae M.tis fidelibus nulla in parte quippiam plane damni aut iniuriarum inferatur.

3) Ad diem loco manebit; et recta Hungariam superiorem petet; Regioni et pauperibus, quam maxime fieri poterit, parcat; eas qui in fide Caesaris permanserunt, vel ad eam redire parati fuerunt, imprimis vero Georgium Zechii Muranii degentem in tutelam recipiet; eaque omnia prout strenuo belli Ductore decet perficiet, quae locus (f. 71) et occasio suadebunt, tam in beneficium Caesareae Maestatis, quam ipsiusmet gloriae et famae militaris, qua pollet, incrementum.

4) De omnibus suis progressibus S.C. M.tem, quam sepissime id fieri poterit, informabit; ut ipsa occasionibus commodis arreptis, suppetias etiam, ubi necessum fuerit, ferre et prosperos, qui sperantur, successus promovere possit.

5) Cum Sacra Caesarea Maestas supradictum Ill.mum D.num Pocillatorem nomine et titulo sui supremi huius Poloniae Militiae Ducis sive Generalis condecoratum velit, aequum econtra erit, eum omnem respectum et obedientiam memoratae S.C. M.ti eiusque supra totum exercitum Locumtenenti Generali exhibere; omnibus illorum ordinationibus exacte parere; locaque recepta, ad omnem Suae Maestatis nutum et iussionem cuicumque ad id deputato, absque tergiversatione restituere.

6) Econtra, et a potestate S.C. M.tis promittit eiusdem Legatus vigore plenipotentiae ad finem hunc eis quorum interest comonstrandae: praefato Ill.mo huius militiae Supremo Ductori a die

supranominata, ad personam propriam et eiusdem salarium Menstruos Mille quingentos florenos; qui ipsi tempore inferius declarando, absque ulla mora et contradictione, fideliter numerabuntur.

7) Pro Capitaneis et caeteris officialibus Hussariorum (f. 72) ut eis pro more Regni exinde salaria ipsorum distribuat; numerabuntur ad singulos equos supremo huic Duci floreni singuli, qui menstruos bis Mille florenos conficiunt.

8) Pro Capitaneis et officialibus Cosaccorum numerabuntur eidem in eundem finem menstrui..... floreni.

9) Eidem ad eundem menstrui..... floreni pro officialibus Haidonum persolventur.

10) Singulis vero equitibus Hussaris constituuntur in stipendium menstrui floreni quindecim; Cossaccis duodecim; Haidonibus vero floreni quatuor et medios, qui eis omnibus modo et tempore mox dicendo numerabuntur.

11) Omnem hanc strenuam militiam, una cum Supremo eius, reliquisque Ducibus, Sacra Caesarea Maestas in suam fidem suumque servitium recipit a die Juramenti, quae erit..... Januarii, in trimestre sive spatium trium mensium; ante quod elapsum exauthorandi minime sint, sed ipsis conventa stipendia omnino debeantur.

12) Quodsi vero Caesarea Maestas hac militia ulterius indigeat, tum ab elapsu praefatorum trium mensium non ultra quam in singulos menses (id est de mense ad mensem) conducti censeantur; ad quorum singulorum finem ipsis conventa stipendia per Commissarios Caesareos, ad id deputatos, praevia lustra memerentur.

13) Casu quo Caesarea M.tas praefatorum Militum operas diuturniores non postulet, id medio mense ante (72v) exauthorationem ipsis intimabitur, quo facto atque ad finem mensis stipendio ipsis plene persoluto, pacifice et absque illius laesione quamprimum abscedere teneantur.

14) Promittit enim S.C. M.tas saepedicto Supremo huius militiae Duci, re bene gesta, atque regione in potestatem fidemque S.M.tis redacta, recompensationem et gratiam realem ex bonis rebelorum, Suae M.tis liberalitati et D.ni Generalis personae dignitati convenientem.

15) Ad magis magisque promovendum hoc negotium, persolventur ad diem..... Januarii, Cracoviae vel alio in loco commodiore, stipendio unius mensis et dimidiis et quamprimum in ditiones S.C. M.tis deventum fuerit, lustraque peracta, item tantundem, et sic trium mensium salarium anticipatim erogabitur.

Sicque contingat hanc militiam ulterius continuare servitium, ad finem deinceps eiusque mensis stipendium in bona currentique moneta integre persolvetur.

16) Si tandem contingeret, quod vix putandum, ut ante praefatam diem Januarii S. M.tas pacem cum hostibus suis iniret, atque ita militiae huius opera non egeret, tum teneantur honorario, medii ad summum mensis, accepto, acquiescere; nec possint trium horum mensium integram exposcere solutionem (f. 73).

17) Ad Iustitiae administrationem quod attinet, ea ipsi Supremo Duci libera reliquitur; ita tamen, ut excessus in exemplum et terrorem malevolorum puniantur atque pro more gentis articuli conficiantur, eusque legato communicent, quibus adstricti milites in officio contineantur.

18) Totus hic tractatus, haecque inter partes facta convenito, non aliter conclusa intelligatur, nisi sub autoritate et consensu Ser.mi Potentissimi Poloniae et Svetiae Regis, ad quem impetrandum, saepedictus D.nus Legatus Caesareus, inter alia quae cum S. Regia M.te tractanda habet negotia, primo quoque die Warsaviam proficiscetur; eumque obtentum, Ill.mo D.no Pocillatori intimabit, quo deinceps absque mora negotium hoc ad effectum deduci et optatum finem sortiri possit.

DOCUMENT IV.

SUMMARY: — *Strojnowski is writing to Archduke Charles in regards to his expedition. He learned from the Archduke's Commissioners that the Emperor does not want them in the Imperial service. Strojnowski states that this is very cruel because they (the Cossacks) came out of love to serve the Emperor and braved many difficulties to get here.*

The news they were not needed by the Emperor struck them like a lightning bolt. They cannot return home because it would be unfortunate for their army. Therefore, they are determined to proceed to Maximilian of Bavaria and it would be affarce if, the Duke would not take them into his service. Strojnowski cautions the Archduke that it would be suicidal for any force to try and stop them and he hopes that the Emperor will not be angry at their attitude.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Kriegs-Akten, Karton 49, fol. 24.*

Serenissime Archidux, Domine Clementissime.

Inspertam Celsitudinis Vestrae resolutionem excepimus, per

Rev. Dom. Bonaventuram Orlik de strictiori observantia, Honoricum Bambovskij de Bambowit, et Andream Schadewskij, asserentes, undique res et rem inimicis iam ferme compositas esse, proindeque S.C.M.H. D.N. Clem.mum servitio nostro non indigeri. Crudele auditu, quod post toties totque modis obtestatam olim fidelitatem nostram, posteaquam postpositis plurimis expeditionibus Invictissimi Regis nostri, ad Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis vocationem, ex singulari erga eundem affectu, eum cum non sine maximis expensis, atque in summa egestate, fame conquassati, procedimus, en clamor in plateis castrorum nostrorum, quod Sacra Caesarea Maestas servitio nostro non indigeat, et quod Celsitudo Vestra, ut revertamur in patriam exoptulet seu potius praecipiat. Quamobrem cum Sacra Caesarea Maestas servitio nostro (si ita est) non indigeat, reverti quoque ad illudendum nobis non liceat, clamitaret namque totus Invictissimi Regis nostri Exercitus. En Vester Caesar, propter quem tot expeditiones sprevistis! Proinde in nostri Dei affectu, nostri conscii, nulla retia impedimentorum, quae nobis praefati Commissarii Celsitudinis Vestrae ante oculos proiiciunt, timentes, ad Serenissimum Ducem Bavariensem recte progredimur. Ridiculum enim est ipsum servitio nostro non indigere. Quod si autem transitum huic probatissimo in re militari acervo nostro insidias struere voluerit, quisquis ille sit, spes nobis in Deo est, quod sibi ipsi mortem generabit. Petimus tanto, ut propter hanc nostram ad Serenissimum Ducem Bavariensem diversionem, Sacra Caesarea Maestas, Dominus Noster Clementissimus, ad quem finaliter tendimus, nos gratia sua non privet, imo sub eadem, qua ante conservet. Cum his nos omnes gratiae Celsitudinis Vestrae dedicamus.

Data Friolandiae, 1 Junii 1622.

Serenissimae Celsitudinis Vestrae

Servi addictissimi

Stanislaus Strojnowski, Supremus Capitaneus Exercitus Polonici, ad S.C. Maestatem progredientis.

Copia responsionis Supremi Capitanei Polonici Exercitus in finibus Silesiae progredientis — Serenissimo Archiduci Carolo Commissariisque data.

DOCUMENT V.

SUMMARY: — *The Emperor notifies the King of Poland that the Cossacks ignored the warnings of Archduke Charles and entered the Empire to seek military service.*

The Cossacks arrived without the knowledge of the Emperor violating the treaty between the Empire and Poland and plundered his provinces in their crossings. By their acts, the Cossacks created ill-will and suspicion, in the provinces that they crossed, towards the Emperor and the Polish King. Therefore, the Emperor requests the King to take all measures to prevent further incidents of this type.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1622, fol. 21.*

Ferdinandus etc.

Audivimus Cosaccos magno numero et expansis vexillis, sub eo praetextu, quod iure nostro conscripti militatum veniant, per Silesiam et Bohemiam in Imperium tendere, neque Ser.mi Fratris N.ri Archiducis Caroli dehortationibus locum dare voluisse. Id cum praeter scitum nostrum et non sine violatione pactorum, quae militum excursiones et violentos transitus utrinque prohibent, accidat, quantumcunque illi protestentur de bona sua intentione nobis, et statibus Imperii nobis addictis auxiliandi, quorum plerasque ditiones a Proscriptis miserum in modum devastari et iniquissime opprimi publica fama inaudierint. Unde variarum traductionum et suspicionum apud malevolos, etiam diffidentiarum apud digniores nobis status facilis ansa praeberi posset. Aestimabit itaque Ser.tas V.ra pro eximia sua prudentia, tali subditorum suorum irruptione, quacumque illi tandem intentione venerint, et inopinate (21v.) in Ditiones nostras et Imperii sese effuderint, non solum auctoritatem nostram Imperialem, verum etiam Regiam vestram dignitatem offendi. Proinde benevolenter, et ex praescripto foederum, quae inter nos reciproce videntur, a Ser.te V.ra postulamus, ut pro auctoritate sua istiusmodi conatus, etiam ex commiserationis affectu proficiscentes, si non debito tam nostro quam Ser.tis V.rae consensu fiant, in posterum praecaveret. Hoc ut fiat, et nostra et Ser.tis V.rae interest. Cui pacatos et tranquillos Reginis successus precati, constantem benevolentiam nostram amice deferimus.

Datum Sopronii, 8 Junii 1622.

Regi Poloniae de Cossaccorum adventu in Imperium non dissimulando.

DOCUMENT VI.

SUMMARY: — *The Polish King replies to the Emperor's previous letter in regards to the Cossack incursion. He regrets that the unauthorized eruption of the Lisowchyks into Silesia has eclipsed some of the jubilation over the Emperor's victory over his enemies.*

The King's hopes that this incursion will not lessen the amity strengthened by formal pacts, which has existed between the Polish Kingdom and the Empire. The Lisowchyks invaded the Empire without the King's knowledge while fleeing his just punishment as rebels and outlaws.

When our (Polish) army had returned from campaigning in Wallachia, the King disbanded his light cavalry. A part of this cavalry had been assigned new missions, while another part of them began robbing the populace. The King outlawed the robbers and ordered the army to disperse them. The army succeeded in destroying some of the robbers but the rest fled to the border and with arms in hand invaded Silesia.

The King hopes that the Emperor will be able to subdue the rebellious troops as they deserve it.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1622 fol. 17-17v: June 25, 1622.*

Ser.mo et Excel.mo Principi (Imperatori) Domino Ferdinando II, etc. Sigismundus III, Dei Gratia, Rex Poloniae etc.

Salutem et mutui amoris continuum incrementum. Ser.me et Excel.me Princeps, Domine, congnate et affinis noster clar.me.

Quam nuper ex gloriosa M. V.rae victoria, amplissimisque trophaeis caepimus voluptatem, eam nuncius de inopinata, ac insolenti planeque hostili militis Lissoviani in Silesiam iruptione, ex litteris M.tis V.rae aliorumque ad nos delatus, gravi inspexit molestia. Nihil sane nobis molestius, nihil acerbius accidere potuit, quam M.tem V.ram in hac communi Orbis Catholici laetitia effrenata huius militis licentia affici, sinistrae traductionis occasionem ignaris, ac malevolis inici ac laedendae insuper vicinitatis, pactorumque ansam, atque occasionem praeberi. Quae omnia ita nos quoque afficiunt, ut ad graves Reipubliciae Regnique nostri curas, nova haec longe caeteris gravior adiecta esse videatur. Cum enim perpetua sit animi nostri sententia, amicae vicinitatis pactorumque iura sancte tueri,

cumprimis vero auspiciatissimum M.tis V.rae Imperium felicibus votis prosequi, ac illius decus atque gloriam, perpetuumque firmiter in Deo Optimo Maximo precari, est sane quod nos anxios atque sollicitos haec insolentis militis in Silesiam excursio vehementer reddat, qui sicut hoc turbulento Imperii M.tis V.rae statum rebus ipsius quantum in nobis erat, commodare adnixi sumus, ita illis amplissima victoria firmatis, ac pene iam in eum (177v) pacis atque tranquillitatis portum provectis, qui sanctissimae M.tis V.rae causae ardentibusque omnium bonorum nobis inveterataeque M.tis V.rae ac inclytae ipsius Domus felicitati, gloriae atque virtuti debebatur, minime hac excursionem praeter spem, et voluntatem nostram ab effrenata hac militis manu facta officere volumus. Itaque persuasum M.tis V.rae habeat, hunc militem insciis et inconsultis nobis isthuc excurrere, idque metu paenarum, quas, uti in rebelles, publicaeque pacis atque tranquillitatis violatores per edicta nostra quorum exemplum M.ti V.rae mittimus, contra ipsos promulgavimus. Postquam enim anno superiore ex Vallachia deducto exercitu, eundem exauthoravimus, levioris armaturae miles, quo solo haec manus potissimum constat, partim missione accepta dilapsus, partim praedabundus per Regnum diffusus, rapinis in eius Incolas, atque etiam coedibus grassari coepit. Cumque aliter in officium redigi nequisset, eum ubique locorum, uti Patriae hostem armis persequi mandavimus. Itaque pars ipsius in compluribus locis oppressa, pars vero fuga ad confinia Silesiae elapsa, ibique, auctoris tumultuarie ex perdita et proscripita hominum manu copiis, in Silesiam improvise erupit. Quare nobis insciis, immo invitis id factum esse M.tas V.ra pro sua singulari prudentia facile iudicabit, simulque ut huius insolentissimi militis in ditionibus M.tis V.rae temere grassantis, licentia reprimatur mature providebit. Atque ea sunt quae M.ti V.rae officii erga ipsam nostri causa aperienda duximus. Cui longaequam felicitatem perpetuamque gloriam ex animo precamur.

Dat. Varsoviae, die XXV Junii MDCXXII, Regnorum nostrorum Poloniae XXXV, Sueciae XXIX.

Eiusdem M.tis V.rae bonus affinis

Sigismundus Rex.

Regis Poloniae excusatio de irruptione Kozaccorum... finium in Silesiam quod fuerint...

DOCUMENT VII.

SUMMARY: — *Archduke Charles writes Strojnowski that he recalls the terms which ordered Strojnowski and the Cossacks to be subordinated to the Marquis of Montenegro, the commanding general of the Imperial forces. Meanwhile, the general situation had altered and now the Archduke commands Strojnowski to subordinate himself to General Cordova.*
 STATNI UREDNI ARCHIV V PRAZE: Fondo - ML: Karton 39, 1622,
 VII-VIII: 5 Julii 1622.
 Carolus etc.

Etsi quidem recenti teneamus memoria nos vigore erectae Capitulationis, in eo demum acquievisse, Dominationem Vestram cum Exercitu suo solius Domini Supremi Locumtenentis Marchionis de Monte Nigro, dato Ordinibus et mandatis bellicis, parere obligatum fore; nihilominus, metuentes ne forte Gratiis Marchio, nonnullis expeditis negotiis, ad Vestras inferioris Palatinatus, ubi Miles Caesareus moratur, necdum pro voto, appulerit, debita autem Sac. Caes. Mti servitia tamen usque solerter promoveri oporteat; Quare necessum erit, interim D.ni (*tit.*) de Cordua iussis et ordinationi militari obtemperare, et si quam ab eo acceperit, pro tenore eiusdem congruae sese gerere, Sac. Caes. M.ti devota servitia, sibi imprimis commendata habere. De quo non ambigentes, D.ni V.rae omnia felicia exeamur.

Data, Praga 5 Julii 1622.

Stanislao Strojnowsky

DOCUMENT VIII.

SUMMARY: — *The Emperor writes to the Cossacks and praises their valorous service as his mercenaries in a time when internal rebellion placed him in a very difficult position. Now, however, the enemies have been dispersed and a peace treaty will be concluded in a short time. The Emperor appointed Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau, to pay the Cossacks for their service, to dismiss them, and to lead them to the borders of the Empire.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica*, Karton 54, an. 1622, fol. 6-6v.

Ferdinandus etc. Strenui, Nobiles fideles Nobis dilecti.

Optime Vobis constat, quaemamodum eo tempore, cum potens Rebellium factio et Nobis et Imperio gravis esset, operam vestram

militarem stipendiis conduxerimus, quae ita strenui hactenus meriti estis, ut universae Germaniae testimonio censeatis gentis vestrae valori plusquam abunde sit satisfactum. Caeterum postquam nunc causa viribusque diffusus hostis omnis retrocessit, Sacri Romani Imperii Status et Ordines universi communibus votis et animis pacem expostulant (cuius adsequendae causa bellum omne suscipitur), Reverendissimo et Serenissimo fratri nostro Archiduci Leopoldo, Episcopo Argentinensi, Passaviensi etc. Commissionem benigne iniunximus, ut supra dictis rationibus et residuis stipendiis exsolutis, copias vestras exauctoret et usque ad Imperii Confinia, citra noxam vel offensam, prout moris est, reducere curet...

I. Septembris 1622.

Cosaccis in Imperio, de illorum exauctoratione Arciduci Leopoldo missa.

Strenuis Nobilibus fidelibus nobis dilectis N.N. Supremis Capitaneis, Praefectis, Tribunis, Centurionibus, omnibus et singulis Cosaccis et Polonis sub stipendiis nostris in Imperio militantibus.

DOCUMENT IX.

SUMMARY: — *King Sigismund of Poland explains to Emperor Ferdinand the nature of the Cossack army which occupied part of the Emperor's domains against his will.*

A great part of his army assembled near Lviv (Leopolis) where they received their pay, elected their leaders, and told the King's emissaries that they were launching the expedition to serve the Emperor. Since they ignored all public edicts and proclamations to disperse, the King issued an order proclaiming them rebels and outlaws. He also ordered the Polish Commander-in-Chief, to disperse them with the Royal Army. Many detachments of them were scattered by Royal Army units or by provincial troops; but the main body of them fled to the Silesian border at the approach of the Royal Army. There they quickly crossed the frontier, forced the Oder River, and began their ruinous advance.

The King further explains that these people ignore the law, are unafraid of just punishment, and are rebels against their king. Sigismund blames their expedition on the cupidity of these people (Cossacks) who want to enrich themselves in the war which embroils the

Empire. This is the reason why the King's subjects along with the Emperor's subjects have to bear continuous depredations from roving Cossack armed bands. But these conditions will cease to exist when the outlaws will receive just punishment for their invasion of a friendly neighbor and for breaking the law.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica, Karton 54*, on 1622, fol. 10-11; september 30, 1622.

Ser.mo Excell.mo Principi D.no Ferdinando II etc...

Sigismundus III Dei gratia Rex Poloniae etc.... Salutem et mutui amoris continuum incrementum.

Ser.me et Excell.me Princeps, D.ne cognate et affinis noster car.me.

Accepimus litteras M.tis V.rae, in quibus M.tas V.ra amanter a nobis pro iure pactorum, bonaeque vicinitatis atque necessitudinis officio postulat, ut exercitum ex milite Polono nuper a nobis exauctorato conflatum, a Ditionibus M.tis V.rae vi aut imperio arceamus. Quam M.tis V.rae postulationem multo ante cum litteris ad Ser.mum Archiducem Carolum, affinem et cognatum nostrum clar.mum scriptis, in quibus de temerariis eius militis licentiosi consiliis Ser.tem V.ram certiore fecimus, tum omni studio, atque conatu, quo haec ipsius consilia turbare nitebatur praevenimus. Postquam enim ad nos delatum erat magnam eius exercitus partem, qui Leopoli stipendia et missionem a Commissariis et Ducibus nostris acceperat, electis sibi Ducibus atque Praefectis ad M.tem V.ram praetento militiae ipsius nomine expeditionem parare, litteras statim ad Ser.mum Archiducem Carolum ea de re scripsimus, militem vero ipsum severissimis mandatis, publicisque edictis a proposito avocare, ac deterre conati sumus, cumque nec litterae, nec secretarius ad ipsos saepius missi, nec Ducum nostrotum auctoritas, poenarumque metus apud ipsos valuisset, verum eo magis cum numero, ac potentia temeritas, ac insolentia ipsius cresceret, atque invalesceret, edicta demum nova contra ipsos uti rebelles, pacisque, ac pactorum, atque vicinitatis violatores, promulgari mandavimus; ac insuper Campiductori Regni iniunximus, ut exercitu in finibus Russiae, atque Podoliae excubante, in interiora Regni admoto, ipsos armis persequeretur. Itaque posthac haec edicta cum et una equitum turma Petricoviae caesa, insignioresque aliquot una cum Tribuno et Centurione supplicio affecti essent, et Nobilitas Regni arma passim capesseret, Campiductorque cum copiis in procintu (f. 10v.) iam esset, subita ac tumultuaria fuga,

ad confinia Silesiae prorupere uniusque diei itinere ad Odram fluviam pervenere. Qua res eo graviore animum nostrum molestia affecit quod vehementer subvereamur, ne temerarius iste caecoque impetu tuens miles ab omni spe militiae atque stipendiorum M.tis V.rae exclusis, adversariis ipsius sese adiungat, novandarumque rerum occasionem, earum cupidis, pacisque osoribus praebeat; subveremur etiam ne sinistrae malevolorum atque invidiorum traductiones, id aut M.tis V.rae opera et conniventia, aut voluntate nostra factum calumnientur, ex alienoque ausu atque temeritate, quae nec legitimi magistratus imperio nec proposito animadversionis exemplo, nec promulgato proscscriptionis edicto, armorumque terrore refranare potuit, gravem invidiae molem in nos coniiciant. Cum eius rei culpa neque in nos, neque in M.tem V.ram merito reiici possit, verum in eos ipsos, qui rebellione contra legitimum Principem facta, violataque nefariis armis subiectionis fide, externo militi aditum isthuc patefecerunt, bellique per ipsos contra fas et aequum concitati occasione allexerunt. Inde enim origo harum ex Regno nostro excursionum, inde fons omnium malorum atque calamitatum, quas non minus nostrae, quam M.tis V.rae Ditiones ab insolentia militari perpetiuntur promanavit. Quare persuasum habebit M.tas V.ra, nos uti magnopere contendisse, ne miles is contra pacta vicinas Provincias infestis agminibus adoriretur, ita nunc summo eo nomine affici angore, quo ex tali ipsius ausu M.tas V.ra, cuius nos rebus in utraque fortuna constanter semper favimus, molestiam capiat. Caeterum fore confidimus, ut incondita hac, et tumultuate collecta manus facili quoque ratione, violatae vicinitatis, vilipensi Magistratus spretarumque legum paenas isthic brevi luat. Quod reliquum est M.tem V.ram omni gloria atque faelicitate florentem quam diutissime imperare cupimus, ipsique studia ac officia nostra amanter deferimus.

Datae Varsaviae, die XXX Septembris, Anno D.ni MDCXXII.
Regnorum nostrorum Poloniae XXXV, Sueciae vero Anno XXIX.

Eiusdem M.tis V.rae bonus affinis

Sigismundus Rex.

DOCUMENT X.

SUMMARY: — *Archduke Charles notifies Strojnowski that an Imperial edict had been issued which proclaimed that the enemy had been vanquished. As a result of this victory, the Emperor decided to disband part of his mercenary troops and among them, the Cossacks*

of Strojnowski. Further, the Archduke states that he has been ordered by the Emperor to officially terminate their contract. The Cossacks are to return to the Bohemian border where two Imperial commissioners will meet them and formally muster them out of the service of the Emperor.

STATNI UREDNI ARCHIV V PRAZE: Fondo ML: Karton 40, 1622, IX-XII; 3 octobris 1622.

Illustrissime D.ne, Amice Nobis Dilecte.

Cum Sacra Caesarea Regiaque Maestas Imperator noster clementissimus gratiose nobis denuntiaverit, qualiter tandem, divina gratia fracto inimicorum robore, sopitaque potissimum, per Regna et Provincias suas haereditarias, adversariorum hostiliter saeviente insolentia, partem nonnullam Exercitus sui, atque hactenus certo conscriptum stipendio militem, ut et Cosacorum, Dominationis Vestrae auctoritati parentium equestres turmas, redditis nominibus, gratiosa venia exauthorare statuerit, atque illud Dominationi Vestrae eiusdemque copiis quantocius vigore stabilitae Capitulationis, pro debita informatione significare ordinaverit. Ideo, praefato obsequentes imperio, hanc Dominationi Vestrae totoque eiusdem Cosacorum Exercitui datam licentiam et dimissionem antedenuciamus, nil ambigentes quin, accepta ordinatione, iam in procinctu sit versusque Bohemiae Confinia progrediatur. Cui fini certos ad confinia Commissarios delegavimus, qui Dominationem Vestram ejusdemque militem ibidem recipere, atque inde in locum exauctorationi fixum deducere teneantur. Atque hoc Dominationi Vestrae ejusque Exercitui pro ulteriori informatione serviat. Cui Nos de caetero omnia felicia optamus.

Datum 3 Octobris 1622.

Domino Stanislao Stroiowski

DOCUMENT XI.

SUMMARY: — *The Emperor asks the King of Poland for clemency for his subjects, the Cossacks, who invaded Silesia under the pretext of serving the Emperor, and thus endangered peace among their realms. These Cossacks are now returning home. Therefore, the Emperor hopes that the King will overlook their trespasses and breaking of the law in Poland and the Empire and will allow them to return home without*

reprisals. He asks the King, furthermore, to remember that the Cossacks had good intentions of helping the Emperor.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1622, fol. 12-13.*

Ferdinandus etc. Ser.mo etc. ...

Non ambigimus Ser.tem V.ram probe meminisse, quid ad eandem ratione Cossaccorum, qui militiae nostrae suppetias (ultro) laturo validis agminibus Silesiae appropinquabant, e Comitibus nostris Soproniensibus perscripserimus, quemadmodum et Nos Serenitatis vestrae responsum, quo solitam nobis et Imp. benevolentiam humanissime contestabatur, recte consecuti, Ill.mo Saxoniae Electori et aliis, quorum non uno tantum respectu intererat, communicari iussumus. Interim vero ad sinistras ubique suspiciones magis magisque eximendas tum litteris, tum legationibus perquam diligenter apud copias illas militares id egimus, ut cursum sisterent neque ulterius, nobis invitis, progredierentur, tum quod optata pacis portus e proximo sese nobis ostentaret, tum vero (12v) quod plurimum interesset adversus phalanges, quae nobis gratificationis venissent, exacerbata principum Imperii vim atque potentiam, quod metuebatur, haudquaquam coniungi, adeoque Nobis et belli administrandi et pacis consiliandi rationes longe ubique difficiliore reddi. Nunc itaque, postquam exercitus ille hortatu nostro in patriam retrogreditur, eum sane benevolentia nostra Caesarea fructum, quem sponte in auxilia nostra accurrens, promeritus est libenter tribuimus, ut quam possumus efficacissime apud Ser.tem V.ram intercedamus, quo in gratiam et protectionem Suam Regiam, abolita proscriptionis nota, quam in Regno incurrerunt, jussu nostro revertentes haud gravatim suscipiat, et culpa, cui se gens armis assueta contra leges fortasse patrias obnoxiam reddidit, nobis imo toti Reipublicae Christiane condonet; quod illi quidem (13) constante deinceps fide et obsequio erga Suum et inclutum istud Regnum promerebunt. Nos quibuscumque mutuae amicitiae et propinquam necessitudinem nostram decentibus officiis, quae Ser. V.rae grata accidere queant, recognitari, veram eidem felicitatem et secundissimos rerum omnium eventus ex animo precamur.

Datum ex itinere, in Monasterio Leissenstettensi, prope Confinia Austriae Nostrae Superioris.

(1) Kalendas Novembris 1622

DOCUMENT XII.

SUMMARY: — *The Emperor addresses himself to the Cossack officers and men. He praises them for their devotion to the faith, for which they often shed their blood and lost their lives. By their faithful service, they earned the esteem of the Emperor and of the Christian world.*

But the war ended, the enemy was vanquished, and peace negotiations were opened. Nevertheless, the Cossacks, by their skirmishing on the borders of the Empire, have raised suspicions as to the good will and sincerity of the Emperor to re-establish peace. Therefore, he asks them to return home. To make their return to Poland more smooth, the Emperor has asked the Polish King to take the Cossacks under his protection.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica*, Karton 54, an. 1622
fol. 14-14v; November 1, 1622.

Ferdinandus etc.

Benigne intelleximus tum ea quae literis die 5 Octobris Vidavia exaratis, nunc vero vivo sermone ablegati V.ri, Nicolai Porzecki nobis significare voluistis. Utrumque sperabat ardens virtutis et militaris fortitudinis vestrae ad religionem propugnandam et in Aug. Domus V.rae obsequia re ipsa contestanda desiderium, quod alias quoque a generosae nationis V.rae suppetiis magno cum fructu experti nunc tanto profundius memoriae nostrae infixum haeret, quo promptius et alacrius etiam ultra quam necessitas requirat, sanguinem vitamque vestram ultro nobis devovetis. Quaecumque vero deinceps belligerandi occasio sese obtulerit, requisitis quae nunc tam liberaliter offertis auxilliis militaribus in explorato labore Sarmatico plurima fiducia Romanorum Imperatorem collocasse univ-ersus orbis Christianus intelliget (14v). Nunc autem, post insignes hostium strages et partas divina benignitate victorias, publicae restaurandae pacis tractatione per nos suscepta quorsum communis electorum et principum in Imperio voluntas et patientia concurrat, valde inopportunum acciderit, si durante in confinibus militiae Vestrae strepitu suspiciones passim foveat, quasi non bona fide toti Imperii exoptatae redintegrandae tranquillitatis publicae curam in nos suscepissemus, plurimum sane interest ut pro hac vice copiarum Vestrarum agmina publico sui virtutis optimeaque voluntatis pre- conio decorata ad lares patrias revertant atque illic porro de repu- blica bene mereri satagant. Reliqua a supradicto Porzecki distinctius

intelligetis, uti gratia atque benevolentia nostra Caes. vobis omnibus et singulis peculiariter inclinati, quemadmodum nunc apud Serenissimam Poloniae Regem, consanguineum affinem et vicinum nostrum clarissimum (...) Vestri causa diligens interponimus officium, ita aliis quoque argumentis et occasionibus Imperiale vobis patrocinium nostrum clementer impertituri simus.

Datum ex itinere, in municipio Divi Petri, penes Confinia Austriae Superioris.

(I) Kal. Novembris, 1622.

Generosis Strenuis Nobilibus sincere nobis dilectis Alexandro Alberto Lanikowski, nec non Generali Capiteano, Praefectis, Tribunis, Centurionibus, omnibus et singulis militibus Polonici exercitus.

Cosacis in confinibus Silesiae per ablegatum suum Nicolaum Porzezki, ut in Poloniam revertant.

DOCUMENT XIII.

SUMMARY: — The Emperor writes to the King of Poland concerning the Cossack depredations. Many Electors or their emissaries complain in the Imperial Council that the Cossacks had committed many outrages in the Empire. Due to this, the Emperor foresees a deterioration of friendly relations between the Empire and Poland.

The Emperor demands of the King again and again that all further unauthorized armed bands be prohibited from crossing the frontiers of the Empire.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1623, fol. 83.*

Ferdinandus etc. ... Ser.mo etc. ...

Graviter Nobis conquerantur praesentes in hoc Imperiali Comitio Principes Electores et absentes Legati de damnis, quibus Cosacci per diversas Imperii Provincias grassabant, saeviant, neque aliis omnibus nequaquam tentatis, remedium superesse videatur, quam ut Principes et Districtuum Imperialium communitas pro postulanda hinc iniuria publica rationes ineant. Et haec quidem ad alias curas quam plurimas sollicitudo Nobis accedit; praevidemus enim hinc exorituram tempestatem gravissimam, quae vix aliter fieri queat, quam ut benevolentia quaeque vicinitatis studia hactenus inter Sacrum Rom. Imperium et Nob. Nationem Polonam ultro citroque diligenter culta vehementer convitiat.

Meminimus porro ad calamitatem eam Reip. avertendam, iampridem Nos Ser.ti V.rae semel utrimque scripsimus anxie postulando, quod et nunc instantissime flagitamus, (f. 83v) sua quoque ex parte Regiam auctoritatem adhibeat, quo ferocia eae turbae militaris, confestim sine ulteriore damno vel noxa Imperii fines excedat, quod tum fiet, quando sublato proscriptionis metu — Ser.ti V.rae gratiam redimiti gratam sibi intellexerint. Enixissime id contendimus a Ser.te V.ra quae isthac ratione utilitati tranquillitatieque publicae consulet et Nos caeteroquin in omnes eadem gratificandi occasiones valde propensas, omnesque Imperii Ordines singulariter sibi demerbitur. Ita divini numinis bonitas animum hunc felicissimum et respondentem in desideria successus Ser.ti V.rae largiatur.

Datum in Comitio nostra Imperiali, Ratisbonae, Kalendas Januarii 1623.

DOCUMENT XIV.

SUMMARY: — *King Sigismund writes the Emperor that he had tried to bring an end to the unlawful and dangerous actions of the inflamed troops but to no avail since they (the Cossacks) became even more enraged upon receipt of the Emperor's letter.*

The King further states that he always attempted to live in amity with the Emperor as may be seen from their treaty and the marital relation. To retain their harmonious relation, he tried to keep those wild men from entering the borders of the Empire. Several times he had sent warnings to the Emperor and Archduke Charles that some new expedition might cross over into the Empire. Therefore, no one could accuse him of straining the harmonious relations between their countries. Furthermore, those men who invaded the Empire fled from Poland and from punishment. They would rather live by plundering lives than by peaceful lives. Laws are useless; only an army would force them to obedience. These people cannot be persuaded by any men in authority or through logical arguments—they understood force alone.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 51, an. 1623, fol. 83.*

Ser.mo et Excell.mo Principi D.no Ferdinando Secundo, etc.

Sigismundus III Dei Gratia Rex Poloniae, etc.

Etsi in praesentibus Comitibus cum universis Regni Nostri Ordinibus in eam comprimis deliberationem, summa cura, atque solli-

citudine incumbimus, ut insolentia licentiosorum hominum ditionibus, atque incolis Regni nostri, vicinarumque Provinciarum admodum gravis, atque periculosa reprimi possit; tamen litterae M.tis V.rae paucis ante diebus nobis redditae, multo magis nos Regnique proceres in ea deliberatione, adiecto novae sollicitudinis cumulo, inflammaverunt. Cum enim nihil prius, aut antiquius habemus, quam cum pacatis et amicis vicinis iura amicitia pactis, atque foederibus ultro citroque stabilita studiose tueri, omnemque offensionis, atque inimicitiarum ansam, quantum in nobis est avertere, summe id comprimis, atque religiose cum ditionibus M.tis V.rae Imperio subiectis, nobis tenendum esse ducimus, cum ob vetusta pactorum iura, novis tabulis, mutisque bonae vicinitatis officiis fulta, tum M.tis V.rae causa, quacum nobis constans ac perpetua necessitudo duplicis cognitionis nexu obstricta intercedit. Verum cum multa saepe humanis in rebus, nobis invitis, et inopinantibus eveniant, plusque interdum temporum, et hominum iniquitas afferat incommodi, quam sana ratio remedii, accidit quoque, non invitis modo nobis, Regnique nostri Ordinibus, verum etiam omni cura, atque consilio renitentibus, ut in unum coadunata perditorum hominum, et in omne (f. 85v) rapinarum genus caeca libidine, atque impetu effusorum manus et incolas Regni gravibus incommodis affecerit, et infesta signa in vicinas Provincias, ementito Imperialis militiae nomine intulerit. Qua in parte nos conscientiam officii nostri M.ti V.rae non semel iam per litteras purgavimus, officioque benevolentissimi, atque coniunctissimi cognati, integerrimique atque amicissimi vicini hactenus ita functi sumus, ut neque omiserimus quidquam amicitiae, atque necessitudini consentaneum, neque admiserimus a bona vicinitate, atque pactis alienum. Nam et exempla edictorum nostrorum, quibus eam coluviem ubique locorum caedi mandabamus, M.ti V.rae anno superiore transmiseramus, et mature ea de re tam ad M.tem V.ram, quam ad Ser.mum Archiducem Carolum affinem, et cognatum nostrum clarissimum perscripseramus. Itaque etsi M.tem V.ram, pro sua prudentia, constantique in nos voluntate, atque studio, aliam a nobis excusationem minime desiderare arbitremur, tamen et inpraesentia id certo certius affirmamus, nos non modo iussu, aut conniventia ulla huius licentiae ausus, atque temeritatis causam non praebuisse, sed etiam, quantum in nobis erat, obstitisse. Quare nemo iuste eo nomine de nobis queri, nemo amicitiae violatae, vicinitatis laesae, pactorum, atque foederum convulsorum causam ex alieno scelere tenere, ac in nos Remque publicam rejicere ullo modo

potest. Ceterum cum iam haec militum, si hoc nomen merentur, manus ditionibus Imperii excesserit, operam dabimus, ut quoad eius fieri poterit, temeritatis suae paenas ex praescripto legum publicarum luat, ceterique inposterum a tali ausu, exemplo severioris animadversionis deterreantur. Nec est, quod exemplo M.tas V.ra existimet, illos suae petulantiae veram causam praetenuisse, quasi metu paenae ditiones M.tis V.rae pro refugio habere necessum illis fuerit; cum inde colluvies illa non alio, quam in Regni nostri ditiones regressa sit. Ubi cum et consientiae propriae et paenarum (f. 86) publicarum metu constrictos se esse animadvertant, nec tantum in patria locum se habere confidant, subverendum est, ne quid iterum tanta hominum, latrociniis potius, quam honesta militia inhiantium multitudo primo vere, uti ad nos deferitur, attentare, nobis nequiquam obsistentibus, nihilque legibus, et armis contra effrenatam licentiam proficientibus, voluerit. Ac proinde M.tas V.ra una cum Principibus Sac. Rom. Imperii id consilii capiet, eamque inhibet rationem, quo haec colluvies, et a fronte praesidiis M.tis V.rae et a tergo armis nostris castigari possit. Nescit enim insolentia modum, nescit temeritas atque audacia insigni facinore obstricta frenum; ac nisi semel armis vindicetur, atque opprimatur, nulla eam honesti ratio, nulla Magistratus auctoritas, legumque severitas reprimere, atque compescere potest. Porro de nobis M.tas V.ra et sibi et Principibus Imperii polliceatur, nos tam studiose, et acerbe, summaque cum animi nostri molestia praeteriti temporis commissa facinora ferimus. Quod reliquum est, M.ti V.rae felicia novi anni exordia, longaequamque felicitatem a Deo Opt. Max. precamur.

Datum Varsaviae, die XIII Mensis Februarii, Anno Domini MDCXXIII. Regnorum nostrorum Poloniae XXXVI, Sveciae XXIX.

Eiusdem M.tis V.rae bonus affinis

Sigismundus Rex, m.p.

(Fol. 86v.) 23. Febr. 1623: Polon. Rex ad litt. Caes. Collum Cosaccorum

ext. (obtenta) 23 Martii 1623: Rex Poloniae in Negotio immixtionis Kosakorum.

DOCUMENT XV.

SUMMARY: — *Cossack Captain, S. Szachrowicz, writes to the Emperor through the priest, N. Porzecky. The Captain thanks the Emperor for pardoning all their robberies and other unlawful acts that they committed. Now all the Cossacks are ready to die for the Emperor. Szachrowicz begs the Emperor to keep the Cossacks in his favor in the future.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 74, an. 1623/2, fol. 22.*

Sacrat.ma Caesarea Majestas et D.ne,
D.ne Clementissime et Augustissime.

Sincerrima et fidelissima obsequia nomine Dominorum Capitaneorum et exercitus nec non mea Sacratissimae Majestati V.rae D.no Clementissimo demississime deferro.

Licet in negotiorum et molestiarum incredibilium Sacratissima Majestas Vestra, Dominus Noster Clementissimus vix obrutus, nihilominus petitionis nostrae demissae, per Reverendum D. Nicolaum Porzecky oblatae memor, innatae indicium clementiae (nobis benignissime respondendo et ad Serenissimum Regem nostrum Imperialem auctoritatem ardentem interponendo) declarare, Sacratissima Majestas V.ra extra merita et condignum nostrum dignata fuit. Quo nomine D.ni Capitanei cum exercitu ingentissimas Majestati V.rae Sacratissimae non solum morem gerere, sed etiam pro quavis iniuria, semper et ubique locorum pro incolumitate, et exaltatione Majestatis V.rae Potentissimae, Domini Clementissimi vitam exponere, tanta clementia et tot beneficiis devincti sunt paratissimi. Iterato, sub gravissimo onere ingemiscentes, ad protectionem Majestatis V.rae Sacr.mae D.ni Clem.mi demississime confugiunt, ad pedes suplices ruunt, totam spem et perfugium in afflictis rebus suis ponunt post Deum in Sacr.ma Majestate V.ra, D.no Clem.mo; quid demum petant et quid opus habeant, R.dus D.nus coram explanabit, qui plurimum pro nobis laboravit et impetus in quibusdam furentibus resolutionibus, nomine Sacr.mae Majestatis V.rae firmissimis persuasionibus repressit; posteaque advertimus Malevolum malae mentis et animi esse, latrociniaque augere, suggestit nobis R.dus Pater dimissionem, quae consultissime ut nunc perpendimus demissa est, tot gliscentibus malis. Dignetur Sacr.ma Majestas V.ra integerrimam fidem, aurem fidam et patientem eidem adhibere, quae nomine

nostro dicet, et postulabit, demississime petimus. Interim fidelissima Sac. M.ti V.rae D.no Cl.mo humilissime comendamus.

Leopoli, 27 April, 1623 datae.

Humillimus semper paratissimus servitor Stanislaus Szachrowicz, Capitaneus.

(Fol. 22v): 27 Apr. 1623. Stanislaus Szachrowicz, Capitaneus Exercitus Cosacorum... in Nicol. Porzecky.

DOCUMENT XVI.

SUMMARY: — *The Emperor Ferdinand writes King Sigismund that he will send Prince Carl Sigismund Radziwill to Poland. Radziwill had served the Emperor for a long time and has been taken in the Imperial favor.*

Ferdinand asked Radziwill to recruit new soldiers in Poland and to lead them into the Empire. Ferdinand notifies Sigismund of this and begs the King to allow Radziwill to recruit and to give him assistance in this task.

HAUS-HOF-STAAITS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1623/2, fol. 24.*

Ferdinandus etc. ... Ser.mo etc. ...

Hinc ad Ser.tem V.ram proficiscitur Ill.mus fidelis nobis dilectus Carolus Sigismundus Princeps Radziwil, Cubicularis et Colonellus noster et Ser.mi Archiducis Leopoldi, Fratris nostri clarissimi, supremus stabulo praefectus, qui ultra maiorum suorum merita Divis Antecessoribus nostris praestita, singularem Nobis et Aug. Domui observantiam, ex quo tempore in Imperio et in Aula nostra Caesarea moram traxit, religiose comprobavit, quique animi, ingenii atque fortunae dotibus praeditus est, ut non vulgarem in modum benignitatem gratiamque nostram Imperialem sibi conciliavit. Eum itaque Ser.ti V.rae de ratione nostra fraterno effectu commendamus, ut tanto magis in omnibus, quae occurrent, favore, promotione atque patrocinio Ser.tis V.rae adiutus, hasce inclinatae propensionis nostrae indicis profuisse ab effectu intelligat. Habet a nobis in commissis, ut ad favendam, quae vixdum in hisce provinciis coaluit, atque etiamnum pro rerum temporumque vicissitudine subinde nutat, tranquillitatem publicam certum Nobis militum numerum in Polonia conscribat, habitoque delectu inde ad Nos traducat. Factura proinde erit Ser.tas V.ra officium propinquaе necessitudini et communi Resp.

necessitati dignum, quod peramenter poscimus (f. 24v) et commissionem hanc nostram domino Principi iniunctam autoritate Sua Regia faciliorem reddat, locumque copiis illis lustrandis in Regno suo haud gravatim promittat. Quidquid vicissim in gratiam Ser.tati V.rae a Nobis proficisci poterit, nulla nunquam occasione, nullo tempore frustra desiderari patiemur, qui Ser.ti V.rae felicissima Regiminis tempora ex animo optamus.

Datum in Arce nativa Coloniae Bohemorum, die 16 Maii 1623.
16 Maii 1623: Regi Poloniae pro Principe Radzivil.

DOCUMENT XVII.

SUMMARY: — *The Emperor writes to King Sigismund regarding Captain A. Lanikowski. Lanikowski arrived in Vienna with a detachment of Cossacks and asked to be taken into the Emperor's service. However, there exists at this time no need for his services and he was ordered to return to Poland.*

Ferdinand asks Sigismund to forgive Lanikowski's action and lift the ban that was placed upon Lanikowski, as a result of his incursion. Lanikowski acted in good faith and came to wage war against the rebels.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1623/2, fol. 26.*

3 Augusti 1623: Regi Poloniae in favorem Capitanei Alex. Alberti Lanikowski aliorumque Cosaccorum.

Ferdinandus etc. ... Ser.mo etc. ...

Venit in hasce partes cum lectissimis militum Polonorum copiis Capitaneus Alexander Albertus Lanikowsky, vir strenuus, suamque Nobis virtutem militarem et in armis valorem humiliter praesentavit. Verum cum is sit pro tempore Provinciarum nostrarum status, ut operam eius non usque Nobis necessarium videamus, gratum illi animi nostri Caesarei affectum benevolentiamque contestantem, ut cum benigna licentia nostra in patriam retrogrediatur hortati sumus. Quare a Ser.te V.ra pro amicitia nostra mutua peramenter et benevole poscimus, ut virum illum militari gloria clarum, una cum copiis suis militaribus revertentem, in gratiam te protectionem Regiam haud gravatim suscipere, et quam forte proscriptionis notam Regiamve offensam, quod contra Regni statuta patriis finibus agressus sit, incurrisse videri queat, condonando, pristino honori et dignitati vel ideo restituere dignetur, quod generoso spiritu excitus contra Nostros et Augustae Domus nostrae (cuius salus et conservatio propter arctam

sanguinis necessitudinem et propinqua affinitatis iura merito tam Ser.ti V.rae, quam Nobis singulari curae esse debet) rebelles, nobis (f. 26v) militatum venerit. Gratissimum certe Nobis Ser.tas V.ra fecerit, et dictis militibus armis assuetis, ut in communem defensionem adversus Ser.tis V.rae eiusque Regni hostes quibuscumque occasionibus certatim alacriter concurrant, occasionem egregiam praebuerit. De caetero nostra ex parte omnem vicissim Ser.ti V.rae benevolentiam et propensam gratificandi voluntatem sincere offerimus.

Datum Vienna, 3 Aug. 1623.

DOCUMENT XVIII.

SUMMARY: — *The Emperor writes to the Vice-Chancellor of Poland, W. Leszczyński. The Emperor notifies the Vice-Chancellor that he wrote a letter on behalf of Captain A. Lanikowski to the King. Lanikowski came to the Empire contrary to the laws of Poland and the Emperor had ordered him back.*

The Emperor further asks the Vice-Chancellor to forgive Lanikowski's action, to return him to all the graces of the Polish Court, and to aid Lanikowski by taking him under his (Leszczyński's) protection.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1623/2, fol. 28: Augusti 1623.*

Vice Cancellario Poloniae, Venceslao Leszczynski
in favorem Capitanei Alex. Alberti Lanikiwski.

Ferdinandus etc. ...

Scribimus Ser.mo Poloniae Regi, Cognato, Affini et vicino nostro Ser.mo in favorem Capitanei Alexandri Alberti Lanikowsky, qui in hasce partes cum lectissimis copiis Nobis militatum incurrit, quod contra publica Regni statuta eiusdem finibus egressus sit, clementer illi condonare, pristinoque honori et dignitati restituere dignetur. Quod cum benevolis officiis tuis accedentibus haud difficulter impetratum iri confidamus, benigne clementerque te requirimus, ut auctoritate tua locis oportunitis interposita hoc negotium ea diligentia curandum suscipias, quo ab effectu, quam Nobis gratificari cupias, liquido constare possit. Quod Nobis singulariter gratum futurum, qui perpetuam tibi gratiam benevolentiamque nostram Caesaream constare volumus.

Datum Vienna, 3. Augusti 1623.

DOCUMENT XIX.

SUMMARY: — *This document is a petition of the Polish officer, M. Przerembski, to the Emperor.*

Przerembski tells the Emperor that he had persuaded the Cossack commander, Kalinowski, to enter the Imperial service with all his troops. The petitioner calls himself a devoted legate and a loyal servant of the Emperor and hopes that the Emperor will recompense him for the above service.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1623/2, fol. 37.*

Sua Caesarea Majestas, Domine, Domine Clementissime.

Miror summopere, doleo vehementer, obsequia mea a Majestate Vestra Caesarea postponi, eius nimirum, qui inclitae Domui Austriae ab ineunte adhuc aetate, totum me dedicarem, crescente ad hunc usque punctum, servitorem profitebar. Dum autem agerem legatum ad V.C.M., submissem sed ferventer, opera et servitia commendavi mea; iis ut ex arbitrio, oblata sibi occasione, uteretur M.V.C. subnixè rogavi. Ecce ego eam (licet nullum intercessisset M.V.C. mandatum) lubens arripui, Praefecto quoque V.M.C. Generoso Domino Egidio Kalinowskij, viro gratia V.M.C. digno, obviam ivi, qui ut iter maturaret, et celer cum exercitu advolaret, persuasi, invitavi, non indigebat ut vidi calcari, superatis namque periculis omnibus et difficultatibus, laetus ac generosus cum exercitu accurit, fausto utinam ac felici omine. M.V.C. interim iteratis vicibus rogatam velim, in posterum nullius fidem, promptitudinem, nostris in partibus, me praeponat. Fateor facile vires meas tenuas esse, vixque correspondere posse V.C.M. mandatis, quiquid tamen virium est, substantiae et sanguinis, totum id in servitium M.V.C. et inclitae Domus Austriacae profunderè lubens et promptus sum. His humilia mea obsequia M.V.C. commendo.

Datum in Skrzidlow, prima Decembris A. 1623.

Sac-ae ac Ser-mae Caes-ae M.tis

Servitor humillis

Maximilianus de Przeremb

Castellanus Siradiensis, Regni Senator Mosciensis, Welicensis (?) Capitaneus

(Fol. 37v): 1. Decembris 1622: Maximil. de Przeremb, quomodo adventum Kalinowsky et Cosaccorum promoverit.

DOCUMENT XX.

SUMMARY: — *Ferdinand writes Sigismund in regards to recruitment of troops. The Emperor wants to enlist only Polish soldiers without Cossacks, who in the past destroyed and plundered Imperial and Electoral provinces. Now that a prospect of peace is in the air, enemies of peace are starting rumors that the Emperor wants to subject Germany a new to plunder by foreign troops. Therefore, he does not want Cossacks.*

Ferdinand also demands that Sigismund employ all means to contain the Cossacks within the Polish Kingdom. If the Cossacks would cross into the Empire, the Electors would suspect the Emperor of double dealing in regards to the coming peace.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN; *Polonica, Karton 54, an. 1625, fol. 45.*

Ferdinandus etc. ... Ser.mo etc. ...

Quid inter Nos et Serenitatem Vestram convenerit de milite Polono sive Cosaccis, haud aliter quam praevia requisitione nostra et Serenitatis Vestrae permissu aere nostro conscribendis et ad confinia traducendis, non dubitamus quin recenti etiamnum memoria teneat. Eo vero non obstante, certis (f. 45v) relationibus intelligimus, Cosacos rursum magno numero ferocientes sub praetextu obsequii nostri Imperialis, auctoritate propria, finitimis ditionibus terrorem incutere, quod vicinis quoque Electoribus Saxoniae et Brandenburgico merito suspectum, et aliis Sacri Imperii, praesertim Ditionibus Inferioribus Saxoniae Principibus indemnitati suae, collecto milite, cavendae, jampridem causam dedit, atque maiores facile, dissipatis quae nunc agitamus pacis consiliis, turbas ciere queat, si rerum novarum cupidi, Pacis quidem nomen et umbram per Nos inaniter ostentari, interim Germaniam externo militi Nobis dissimulantibus in predam dari crimentur. Ubi et hoc metuendum, ne insolentiae et lasciviae militaris pertaesi Status et Ordines Inclyti Regni Poloniae occasionem sibi datam existiment ea retractandi, quae nuper de (f. 46) copiis istiusmodi, si necessitas flagitaret, colligendis, inter Nos et Serenitatem Vestram pacta intercesserant, quod multis nominibus utriusque nostrum dignitati et provinciarum saluti queat esse inoportunum. Benevolenter itaque et pro mutua necessitudine nostra fidenter a Serenitate Vestra requirimus, ut, auctoritate Sua serio interposita, phalanges illas revocari iubeat, neque aliis modis aut rationibus quam quae mutuis Capitulationibus, pactisque inter Nos

initis, consentaneae sint, signa militaria Confinibus ditionibus Nostris appropinquare sinat. Id quod Serenitatem Vestram, uti confidimus facturam, ne caeteroqui institutos de pace tractatus sinistrae suspensiones inturbent, supradictis Electoribus et Imperii Ordinibus, per proprios cursores innotescere volumus, et Serenitati Vestrae in quaevis gratificandi (f. 46v.) studia propensi optimam voluntatem nostram, quo decet affectu, offerimus.

Datum in Civitate Viennae, die undecima, mensis Julii. Anno Domini Millesimo sexcentesimo vigesimo quinto, Regnorum nostrorum, Romani Sexto, Hungarici Octavo, Bohemici vero Nonno.

Eiusdem Serenitatis Vestrae

bonus Cognatus

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p. Joanikij OSBM
 Roma, 26.02.2021

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND PLACE NAMES

The authors used the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Transliteration System to render Slavic names into English. The most familiar place names to the English reader were used: e.g. Prague not Praha, Kiev not Kyjiv, Warsaw not Warszawa. However, when the place names were equally unfamiliar we used the Czech version: e.g. Hodonin instead of Göding, Krnov instead of Jagerndorf. The reader will find the variations of place names in our index.

ANNALS OF THE ORDER OF SAINT BASIL THE GREAT

The publication of the «Analecta O.S.B.M.» was begun in Lviv (Western Ukraine) 1924 by the Basilian Fathers of St. Josaphat. The six volumes published from 1924 to 1941, comprise the "I Series". These are no longer available.

After World War II the publication was revived in a new center, Rome, and now composes the second series: "II Series".

With the revival of the publication the scope was greatly broadened, and for this reasons it is now divided into three sections:

Section I: WORKS

Works, and complete dissertations of various authors concerning Eastern Europe and the Eastern Churches.

1. Wojnar M., *De Regimine Basilianorum Ruthenorum*. Roma, 1949, XX-218 pp., US \$ 4.80
2. Solowij M., *De Reformatione Liturgica H. Lisovskyi (1784-1809)*. Roma, 1950, XII-128 pp. Not available, US \$ 4.80
3. Wojnar M., *De Capitulis Basilianorum*. Roma, 1954, XVI-202 pp., US \$ 3.60
4. Nazarko I., *Saint Vladimir the Great-Ruler and Baptist of Rus-Ukraine* (in ukrainian). Roma, 1954, XXXII-228 pp., US \$ 3.60
5. Nahajevskij I., *Cyril-Methodius Christianity in Rus-Ukraine* (in ukrainian). Roma, 1954, XVIII-178 pp., US \$ 3.00
6. Sonevytskij L., *Ukrainian Episcopate of the Peremysl and Cholm Eparchies in the XV-XVI centuries* (in ukrainian). Roma, 1955, 108 pp., US \$ 2.40
7. Pekar B., *De Ereptione Canonica Eparchiae Mukačoviensis (1771)*. Roma, 1956, 136 pp., US \$ 2.40
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