The Foreign Relations of the Ukrainian SSR

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I.

When President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev agreed in 1974 to open consulates in Kiev and New York City, it appeared that the policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union was acquiring some of the subtlety that had characterized American attitudes toward Eastern Europe since the 1960s. Washington's attempts at "bridge-building" and "peaceful engagement" and its encouragement of "different roads to socialism" in the Soviet bloc marked a positive shift from the Cold War policy of treating the "satellites" as little more than appendages of the Soviet monolith. They also represented a major step forward in American awareness of the complexity of dealing with Communist states.

On 9 January 1980, however, President Jimmy Carter ordered the withdrawal of seven United States consular officers from Kiev, in reprisal against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, thus unwittingly dealing a far more serious blow to American than to Soviet interests. The real and potential benefits of encouraging a "Ukrainian road to socialism" by extending even such minimal diplomatic recognition to the Ukrainian SSR would surely have outweighed whatever disadvantages may have accrued from recognizing the Soviet status quo. An American consulate in the Ukrainian capital could have reduced the international isolation of the Ukrainian republic, underscored the distinctly Ukrainian character of the Ukrainian party and state, and, as a result, increased centrifugal tendencies within the Soviet Union. At the very least, a consulate in Kiev would have given the American and international media better access to the Ukraine and to news about the Ukrainian dissident movement.

Even if general Soviet-American political considerations are set aside, the size, economic weight, and international activity of the Ukrainian SSR argue for Washington's acknowledgement of its poten-

tial importance to American interests. It goes without saying, of course, that the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations ("foreign policy" is clearly too strong a term) are a function of those of the Soviet Union. That reality, however, is hardly a reason to regard such a state of affairs as desirable, inevitable, or immutable, especially since historically the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations have undergone (and therefore can undergo) significant variations in response to outside stimuli.

Western interest in the Ukraine's foreign relations is apparent in a growing body of scholarly literature. In English, books by Vernon Aspaturian, Konstantyn Sawczuk, and Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj are devoted either exclusively or primarily to the Ukraine's involvement in foreign affairs.[1] Yaroslav Bilinsky, Roman Szporluk, Robert Sullivant, Basil Dmytryshyn, and Richard Pipes have also written on the topic.[2] A number of works in French and German, mostly by Ukrainian émigrés, have appeared.[3] Outstanding among the more numerous Ukrainian-language publications, also by émigrés, is Vsevolod Holubnychy's short study of the Ukraine within the United Nations.[4]

Soviet Ukrainian writers have also produced a substantial body of scholarly and official literature on the Ukraine's foreign activity. In 1959 and 1966, respectively, there appeared the first two volumes of *The Ukrainian SSR in International Relations,* containing Ukrainian-language translations of "international agreements, conventions, covenants, and other acts, of which the Ukraine was a participant" between

[1] Vernon V. Aspaturian, *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy* (Geneva, 1960); Konstantyn Sawczuk, *The Ukraine in the United Nations Organization: A Study in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1944–1950* (Boulder, Colorado, 1975); Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra, 1970).

[2] Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964), pp. 264–82, 436–40; Roman Szporluk, "The Ukraine and the Ukrainians," in Zev Katz, ed., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York, 1975), pp. 29–31; Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917–1957* (New York, 1962), pp. 245–62; Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918–1953* (New York, 1956), pp. 173–74; Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1974), pp. 250–54, 263–66, 269–76.

[3] See, in particular: Vasyl Markus, *L'Ukraine soviétique dans les relations internationales, 1918–1923* (Paris, 1959); Romain Yakemtchouk, *L'Ukraine en droit international* (Louvain, 1954); Stefan Horak, *Ukraine in der internationalen Politik* (Munich, 1957); Jürgen Arnold, *Die nationalen Gebietseinheiten der Sowjetunion: Staatlichkeit, Souveränität und Autonomie im Sowjetföderalismus* (Cologne, 1973), pp. 132–47.

[4] Vsevolod Holub, *Ukraina v Ob"iednanykh natsiiakh* (Munich, 1953).

1945 and 1966.[5] There followed in 1970 a collection of essays by prominent Soviet Ukrainian scholars entitled *The Ukraine and the Foreign World,* which covered the period from 1917 through 1969.[6] The publications of L. O. Leshchenko also stand out as examples of above-average Soviet scholarship.[7]

Of greatest value to study of the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations are the volumes of "documents and materials" published under the title *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena.* As of this writing, four volumes have appeared. The first (published in 1963) covers the years 1944–1961; the second (1966) deals with 1917–1923; the third (1977) covers 1962–1970; and the fourth, covering 1971–1975, was published in late 1981 and is still unavailable in the West.[8] The volumes contain documents relating to Soviet Ukrainian foreign-affairs institutions and officials, rather than to the international organizations with which the Ukraine is associated. In other words, the series tries to shed light on the Ukrainian SSR's own contribution to the "international arena."

In discussing the Ukraine's foreign relations, it is important to specify what precisely one is looking at, lest conceptual confusion produce analytical confusion. One can, for instance, examine the role Ukrainians play in the foreign affairs institutions of the USSR. Or one can study the influence of the Ukrainian SSR on Soviet foreign policy formulation, as Hodnett and Potichnyj did with respect to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Or one can adopt the approach that is taken here — investigation of the Ukrainian SSR's own foreign relations, particularly with non-Soviet countries and in the United Nations. The specific question posed is whether Soviet Ukrainian foreign relations are or can be in any way distinctly Ukrainian.

[5] *Ukrains'ka RSR u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh: Mizhnarodni dohovory, konventsii, uhody ta inshi dokumenty, iaki skladeni za uchastiu Ukrains'koi RSR abo do iakykh vona pryiednalasia (1945–1957)* (Kiev, 1959); *Ukrains'ka RSR u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh: Mizhnarodni dohovory, konventsii, uhody ta inshi akty, uchasnykom iakykh ie Ukraina (sichen' 1957–hruden' 1965 rr.)* (Kiev, 1966).

[6] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit* (Kiev, 1970).

[7] See, in particular, L. O. Leshchenko, *Ukraina na mizhnarodnii areni, 1945–1949* (Kiev, 1969). An exhaustive, although somewhat outdated, discussion of Soviet Ukrainian works on the Ukrainian SSR's international role is provided by A. V. Santsevych, *Problemy istorii Ukrainy pisliavoiennoho periodu v radians'kii istoriohrafii* (Kiev, 1967), pp. 203–22. Also very valuable is *Soviet Ukraine* (Kiev, 1969), pp. 548–61.

[8] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv 1944–1961 rr.* (Kiev, 1963); *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv* (Kiev, 1966); *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i*

The Ukraine's current foreign relations are, for all practical purposes, confined to participation in the United Nations and other international organizations, and to ties with the East European and several Third World countries.[9] As a founding member of the United Nations, the Ukraine holds a permanent seat in the General Assembly; at various times it has been a member of the Security Council (13 November 1947 to 31 December 1949) and of the Economic and Social Council.[10] Currently the Ukraine belongs to the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid and to the Committee on the Implementation of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.[11] The Ukraine has been a member of UNESCO since 1954 (which, in 1980, endorsed a resolution on participating in Kiev's 1,500th anniversary celebrations in May 1982),[12] and has permanent representations at the United Nations (since 1958) and other international organizations in New York City, Paris, and Geneva.[13] A Soviet Ukrainian source describes the Ukrainian SSR's role in the United Nations thus: "Together with the delegations of the USSR, Belorussia, and the fraternal socialist countries [Ukrainian delegations] have come out in defense of peace, have fought against the threat of another world war, for general and complete disarmament, for enhancing international friendship and cooperation."[14] The passivity implicit in this bland description is somewhat mitigated by initiatives taken in 1958 and 1961, when the Ukrainian SSR proposed the holding of the International Year of Health Protection and co-authored the United Nations resolution approving the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, respectively.[15]

By 1980, the Ukrainian SSR was signatory to over 120 international agreements, treaties, and conventions (many of which are translated in

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materialiv 1962–1970 rr. (Kiev, 1977); *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv 1971–1975 rr.* (Kiev, 1981).

[9] On the Ukraine's relations with Eastern Europe, see *Ukrainskaia SSR i zarubezhnye sotsialisticheskie strany* (Kiev, 1965); and Borys Lewytzkyj, "Die Sowjetukraine und die europäischen volksdemokratischen Länder," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, 9, no. 1–2 (1961): 189–200.

[10] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), p. 530.

[11] Volodymyr Martynenko, "Ukrainian SSR in International Organizations," *News from Ukraine,* 1981, no. 42, p. 4.

[12] Martynenko, "Ukrainian SSR," p. 4.

[13] Stanislav Lazebnyk and Pavlo Orlenko, *The Ukraine Today* (Kiev, 1980), p. 69.

[14] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 68.

[15] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 68.

the volumes of *The Ukrainian SSR in International Relations*); it was, moreover, "a member of 15 inter-governmental organizations and their 55 permanent and temporary bodies" — most important of which are the International Labor Organization (which it joined in 1954) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (1957).[16] The number jumped after Stalin's death: the Ukrainian SSR belonged to 14 international organizations in 1953, and to 29 just two years later, in 1955.[17]

Article 74 of the Ukrainian SSR's Constitution grants it the right to "enter into relations with other states, conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and consular representatives and take part in the work of international organizations." But the Ukraine has not, as Roman Szporluk diplomatically puts it, "taken advantage of its constitutional prerogative to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and foreign consuls in Kiev are there through arrangement with the USSR government."[18] At present, Kiev is host to the consulates-general of only the East European countries — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia — whereas Odessa seats the consulates of Bulgaria, Cuba, India, and, until recently, Egypt.[19] Numerous foreign delegations (Soviet sources include "delegations" of collective farmers, dancers, athletes, and the like) visit the Ukraine annually. Expressly political delegations, however, appear to make stopovers in Kiev not for reasons of state, but more as courtesy calls while en route to or from Moscow.

Cultural matters are an important aspect of the Ukraine's relations with the outside world. The vehicles for maintaining cultural ties are the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, founded in 1925, and the more important Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad (also known as the Ukraina Society), founded in 1960. The Ukraina Society, reputed to have connections to the KGB, publishes a variety of Ukrainian- and English-language brochures (mostly denunciations of the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist" émigrés) and two tabloids, *Visti z Ukrainy*

[16] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 69. For a list of international organizations of which the Ukraine is a member, see *Soviet Ukraine,* p. 552.
[17] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 413.
[18] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 69; Szporluk, "Ukraine and Ukrainians," p. 30.
[19] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 69; Szporluk, "Ukraine and Ukrainians," p. 30.

and *News from Ukraine.*[20] It also broadcasts programs intended for foreign audiences on Radio Kiev.[21]

Ukrainian contacts with the Third World are confined to the activities of Ukrainian educational, technical, and scientific (presumably including military) specialists working abroad under the auspices of all-Union institutions. "Education experts" from the Ukraine have worked in Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, Indonesia, Algeria, Mali, the United Arab Republic, Syria, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, and Ethiopia, whereas "economic specialists" have worked in India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Guinea.[22] Although this involvement probably has little effect on the Ukraine's standing in the countries of the Third World, it may mean a good deal to the Ukrainian intelligentsia and contribute to national consciousness and pride.

III.

Although the Ukrainian SSR, founded on 25 December 1917, did not bind itself militarily and economically to Soviet Russia until three years later, on 28 December 1920, two circumstances severely limited its potential for independent action from the outset: first, the nationalists, and not the Bolsheviks, exerted the greater degree of control in the Ukraine during these years;[23] and second, the Communist party of the Ukraine — unlike the social-revolutionary and social-democratic versions of the Ukrainian Communist party — did not, initially, represent indigenous Ukrainian forces, but was largely an *agentura* of the Russian Communist party.[24] Furthermore, after bilateral treaties be-

[20] The circulation of *News from Ukraine* was 18,000 in 1971. Szporluk, "Ukraine and Ukrainians," p. 33.

[21] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 74.

[22] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* pp. 429, 483.

[23] Foreign relations were not the exclusive domain of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, however: extensive ties were maintained at various times by the Central Rada, the Directory, the West Ukrainian People's Republic, and Skoropads'kyi's Hetmanate.

[24] Indicative of the Ukrainian SSR's limited diplomatic capacities in 1920, even prior to its treaty with the Russian SFSR, was that Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the former head of the Directory who desired to enter the Ukraine in order to join the Soviet struggle against Petliura, had to travel to Moscow from Vienna and engage in fruitless negotiations with Chicherin before being allowed to go to Kharkiv. See Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk, 1911–1920* (Edmonton, 1980), pp. 427–82.

tween the non-Russian republics and the Russian SFSR were signed in 1920–1921, "the close relations established with the R.S.F.S.R. rendered any independent foreign policy virtually impossible. The bulk of the diplomatic relations of the Republics consisted of activity among themselves . . . and where non-Soviet powers were concerned, the diplomacy of the Republics was conducted jointly with the R.S.F.S.R. or with its explicit approval."[25] In testimony to the Ukraine's economic and political importance, however, its treaty with the RSFSR was, as Aspaturian notes, "loosest" and provided for the most diplomatic leeway.[26] By this time, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were determined to preserve their prerogatives. Thus at the Twelfth RCP Congress (17–25 April 1923) the "Ukrainian delegation . . . proposed that the Constituent Republics in the Union retain not only their separate diplomatic establishments, but suggested that the Foreign Trade Commissariats be decentralized as well. . . ."[27]

During this period the Ukrainian SSR had its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, consisting of a collegium and four departments — general-secretariat, diplomatic, economic-legal, and press and information — which maintained diplomatic relations with Poland, Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as, unofficially, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey, and Italy.[28] After the Treaty of Union of 30 December 1922, however, the Ukrainian SSR's consular and diplomatic services were merged with those of the Russian SFSR (on 5 August 1923) and its Foreign Commissariat was abolished (on September 20). While the 1924 Constitution of the USSR did not allow for republican foreign commissars, it did grant the republics the right to appoint representatives, counselors, and secretaries to represent their interests at Soviet consulates and embassies abroad.[29]

As formally circumscribed as the Ukrainian SSR's capacity to engage in foreign relations was, its external involvement nonetheless attests to a not inconsiderable diplomatic weight, as borne out by volume 2 of *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena* (1917–1923). The fluidity of the existing political and military situation, and the Ukraine's direct involvement in the fighting between pro- and anti-Soviet forces, could not but have increased the scope of its

[25] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 35.
[26] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 34.
[27] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 37.
[28] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* pp. 38–39.
[29] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 41.

diplomatic maneuverability and, indeed, forced it actively to participate in events of vital concern to its survival. Testimony to this is the Ukrainian SSR's many official letters, notes, and protests addressed to the governments of Poland and Romania, which were abetting, directly and indirectly, the anti-Soviet activity of Ukrainian "counter-revolutionaries." The spring and summer of 1920, the time of the Piłsudski-Petliura offensive, marked the high point of this diplomacy of protest. Another, somewhat smaller crisis demanding feverish note-sending occurred a year later, in November 1921, when Petliura's forces, backed by Warsaw and Bucharest, launched a shortlived intervention in northwestern Ukraine.

To a great degree, the Ukrainian political emigration in Poland, Romania, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and France, ever toying with interventionist schemes, continued to concern the Ukrainian SSR's government and its representatives abroad throughout the interwar period.[30] In this sense, a Soviet Ukrainian "foreign policy" can be said to have existed even after 1923. In the mid-1920s, for example, in keeping with its "Ukrainization" policies at home, the Ukrainian government hoped to divide the émigrés with a campaign of "re-emigration" to the Ukrainian SSR, and did, in fact, succeed in attracting a large number of prominent émigré political and literary activists formerly opposed to Soviet rule. Most prominent of the "re-emigrants" was Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, at one time president of the Central Rada.[31]

Attempts at political rapprochement, however, were supplemented by infiltration and subversion of émigré organizations. The latter tactic appears to have become dominant after the founding of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929 — a revolutionary movement whose right-wing ideology, undisguised militancy, and willingness to cooperate with German military and intelligence circles posed a clear threat to the Ukrainian SSR. (Not surprisingly, defendants at the Ukrainian purge trials of the 1930s were often accused of having ties to the OUN.)[32] Soviet countermeasures were most successful in 1938, when an agent who had infiltrated the nationalists'

[30] For a study of the Ukrainian emigration in the 1920s, see Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), pp. 23–60.
[31] Motyl, *Turn to the Right,* p. 59.
[32] See Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine* (Munich, 1960).

innermost circles by posing as an escapee from the Ukrainian SSR assassinated the OUN leader, Ievhen Konovalets'.[33]

IV.

The Ukrainian SSR's diplomatic powers were revived on 1 February 1944, when the USSR Supreme Soviet amended the Soviet Constitution with a "Law Granting the Union Republics Plenary Powers in the Sphere of Foreign Relations and on Reorganizing the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in this Connection from an All-Union into a Union-Republican People's Commissariat."[34] Six days later, on February 7, the prominent Ukrainian writer Oleksandr Korniichuk, then deputy foreign commissar of the USSR, was appointed foreign commissar of the Ukrainian SSR.

The February amendments opened the door for Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on 28 August 1944 that all sixteen Soviet republics be admitted to the future United Nations organization. Following initial Western opposition and continued Soviet insistence, a compromise was finally reached, whereby only the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR were to be granted United Nations status. In spite of continued disagreement as to their exact role, both Soviet republics came to the San Francisco conference the following May and became founding members of the United Nations.[35]

In the years that followed, the Ukrainian SSR's enhanced diplomatic status allowed it to negotiate directly with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), participate at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, sign peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Italy, and Finland in 1947, and play a not insignificant role at the Danube Conference in 1948. Perhaps in recognition of the Ukraine's greater international role (or, perhaps, "more in jest than in earnest"),[36] the British ambassador to Moscow suggested to Molotov in 1947 that "London was interested in exchanging represen-

[33] For a detailed account of events preceding the assassination, see Iaroslav Kut'ko, *Pekel'na mashyna v Rotterdami* (New York, 1952–1953).
[34] Another amendment granted the republics the right to have their own Commissariats of Defense and military formations. For the text of both amendments, see Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* pp. 215–17.
[35] For a detailed discussion of these events, see Sawczuk, *Ukraine in the United Nations,* pp. 3–48.
[36] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 197.

tatives with the Ukrainian Republic," but "Molotov retorted with evident annoyance that Kiev was not interested in expanding its diplomatic contacts."[37]

A controversial question among Western scholars — usually, alas, formulated imprecisely — is what motivated Stalin to grant the Ukraine (as well as, of course, Belorussia) enhanced international status.[38] Answers generally fall into two categories: (1) international — that Stalin, with an eye on the future United Nations organization, was primarily motivated by diplomatic concerns; (2) national — that he desired to appease Ukrainian national aspirations or to utilize Soviet Ukrainian statehood for legitimating his annexation of the Western Ukraine. Much of the resulting debate on the question has tended to be more scholastic than scholarly. A general flaw has been the inability to distinguish between two distinct stages in the Ukraine's elevation to international status: the Ukrainian SSR was *first* granted certain diplomatic prerogatives in February 1944, and only then, some months later, was the proposal made that it, along with the other republics, join the United Nations. If these two stages are collapsed, Stalin is made to appear either largely oblivious of the advantages of additional representation in postwar international organizations or remarkably prescient in appraising their importance. Of course, both sets of motivations were probably present at both stages; nevertheless, separating the two stages allows one to make analytic distinctions and to perceive whether each had a different primary motivation.

Yaroslav Bilinsky does not differentiate between the "reasons for admitting the Ukrainian SSR to the UN" and the question of "why Stalin granted a modicum of international representation to the Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics" in the February amendments.[39] Adam Ulam treats the granting of diplomtic powers in early 1944 as little more than a preface to the more interesting events of the next year. With regard to the Soviet demand that "*all* sixteen of the Soviet republics be represented in the General Assembly," he notes: "the

[37] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 197.

[38] The Soviet explanation is not very helpful: "With the development of the specific economic and cultural needs of the union republics, the existing forms of external ties were no longer satisfactory. These needs could have been better satisfied by establishing direct ties between the republics and foreign countries. The entrance of the Soviet republics onto the foreign-political arena acquired special significance in connection with the approaching end of the war, which was to be marked by the creation of a new international organization of security" (*Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 327).

[39] Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic,* p. 269.

Supreme Soviet had passed some time before — and this was undoubtedly done with a view to such a contingency — a constitutional amendment enabling the republics to have their own foreign and defense ministries."[40] Dmytryshyn is more guarded in his argumentation, but he, too, confuses the uses of the Ukraine's enhanced diplomatic status with the reasons for it. According to him, the "concessions" made to the Ukraine prior to and during February 1944 "were also aimed at the foreign audience. They served as important factors in extracting Western agreements for the UkSSR and the Belorussian SSR to have seats in the new world organization. . . ."[41] Aspaturian and Sawczuk recognize that both sets of motivations were important, but appear to be uncertain as to what motivation was primary at what stage. On the one hand, writes Aspaturian, "the constitutional innovations of 1944 were designed to enable Soviet diplomacy to exploit . . . the wide latitude provided by international law for the creation and manipulation of fictional entities in the pursuit of vital state interests"; on the other, the "architectonic design of the two Amendments was to transmute serious separatist forces released by the German occupation into useful levers of centripetalization. . . ."[42]

As suggested earlier, the way out of this confusion lies in treating the constitutional amendments and the question of admittance to the United Nations as two analytically distinct issues, with analytically distinct sets of motivations. Robert Sullivant, although only peripherally concerned with the question of the Ukraine's international status, comes closest to understanding its complexity. He correctly sees that the amendments were part of the chain of "modest concessions to demands for greater republic autonomy and authority" granted the Ukraine (and the other republics) before February 1944.[43] Hence Molotov was probably sincere in saying "We cannot help but see in this [the amendments] a new important step in the political working-out of the national problem in our multi-national Soviet state."[44] Once the amendments were passed, however, the republics could be used to implement Soviet diplomatic and international ends. Whether the proposal at Dumbarton Oaks was intended to increase Soviet voting strength or to enlarge the scope of Soviet diplomatic maneuverability

[40] Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67* (New York, 1973), p. 373.
[41] Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and Ukraine,* pp. 173–74.
[42] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* pp. 20, 53.
[43] Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* p. 245.
[44] Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* p. 245.

is probably indeterminable and, for present purposes, unimportant. Again, Sullivant has come closest to understanding this: "For the Ukraine and Belorussia a further remarkable concession came twelve months later when Stalin and Molotov pressed successfully at the Yalta Conference for United Nations membership for the two republics. It seems clear that Stalin was interested chiefly in enlarging the Soviet Union's role in the United Nations."[45] Admittedly, this analysis implicitly views both sets of motivations as centering on the Ukraine. But considering the Ukraine's vital importance to the USSR in general and to the Soviet war effort in particular — an importance of which Stalin was very well aware — is that view unreasonable or unjustified?

V.

Volumes 1 and 3 of *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena* deal with the period from 1945 to 1970. They make for dry reading and, at first glance, appear to offer conclusive proof that the search for distinctly Ukrainian foreign relations is bound to be futile. *The Ukraine and the Foreign World* supports this gloomy view: "The Ukrainian SSR, as an integral and inseparable part of the Soviet Union, completely supported and furthered the implementation of the Leninist foreign policy of the USSR."[46] Or: "In all questions examined at the UN, as well as in other international organizations, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR always acted together with the delegations of the USSR and the BSSR, jointly defending the interests of the Land of the Soviets, the interests of peace and security in all the world."[47] Yaroslav Bilinsky has arrived at a similarly depressing conclusion: "a careful reading of a dozen or so speeches by the Ukrainian delegates to the UN have convinced this writer that they contain very little of what might affect Ukrainian patriots."[48] Likewise, he writes, "A scanning of the accounts in the Soviet Ukrainian press . . . from 1946 to 1962 leaves the impression that the activity of the Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations does not differ in any significant way from that of the delegation of the USSR."[49] A close

[45] Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* p. 246.
[46] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 374.
[47] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 382.
[48] Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic,* p. 280.
[49] Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic,* p. 266.

reading of the works under review, however, suggests that the reality of the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations is far more complex than that.

Volume 1 of *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena* (1944–1961) contains a section on "The International Ties of the UkSSR" (for some reason, the section does not appear in volume 3) consisting primarily of press reports of visits to Kiev by foreign statesmen and politicians. The foreigners are usually met at the airport or train station by high-level Soviet Ukrainian government officials, greetings and welcoming speeches are exchanged, the guests laud Kiev's beauty, and, as far as one can tell from the communiqués, very little of substance is conveyed by either side. Nevertheless, the *pattern* of foreign visits to the Ukraine reveals a great deal about the Ukrainian SSR's ability to engage even in this, the most superficial kind of foreign relations.[50] Between 1945 and 1948, a time of growing East-West tension, for example, Kiev was visited by seven foreign dignitaries: significantly, six were from Eastern Europe, while the seventh, Harold Stassen, was from the United States. Between 1949 and 1953, the height of the Cold War and of the Stalinist terror throughout the entire Soviet bloc, no visits appear to have been made. Following Stalin's death, the pattern changes once again: in 1954, one East European and two Western (here somewhat arbitrarily defined as including Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand) dignitaries visited the Ukrainian capital. The number rose to nine in 1955: one East European, six Westerners, and, for the first time, two dignitaries from the Third World. Indeed, following 1955, the year of the Bandung Conference, when Soviet efforts to court the countries of Asia and Africa increased, a steady stream of Third World statesmen visited the Ukraine: three in 1956, two in 1958, seven in 1959, four in 1960, and seven in 1961. East European contacts jumped to six in 1956, then dropped to two in 1957 (due to events in Poland and Hungary?) before leveling off at three in 1958, two in 1959, two in 1960, and two in 1961. The number of Westerners visiting Kiev fell to three in 1956 and to none in 1957–1958 (due to the chilling in Soviet-Western relations that followed the Polish-Hungarian revolts and the Suez Crisis?), rose to three in 1959, and then dropped to two in 1960 and one in 1961. After a twelve-year hiatus, Americans appeared in Kiev twice in 1959 and

[50] A recent visitor to Kiev has been United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who, on 7 May 1981, held "talks" with the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, V. Shcherbyts'kyi (Martynenko, "Ukrainian SSR," p. 4).

once in 1960 and in 1961 — undoubtedly reflecting the improvement in American-Soviet relations at the time.[51] Clearly, then, the extent of the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations is a function of the international environment: in times of heightened international tension, the Ukraine is forced into isolation; in times of reduced tension, the Ukraine has the opportunity, however slight, to assert its foreign relations identity. For instance, the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev consular agreement came at the height of Amerian-Soviet détente.

Another indicator of Ukrainian distinctiveness in foreign relations is the speeches by Ukrainian delegates at the United Nations General Assembly in 1946–1970. Of the ten speeches delivered between 1946 and 1955, only one, by D. Z. Manuil'skyi in 1947, gives an expressly, even if superficially, Ukrainian perspective on an issue. In the rest, the term "Ukrainian SSR" appears only perfunctorily, first as an introduction and then to express support for the USSR's position.[52] Indonesia, for example, was usually discussed in language that barely indicates that the speaker represented not the USSR, but the Ukrainian SSR.[53] Starting with 1956, however, every speech (except for three made in 1959, 1961, and 1968) provides the Soviet Ukrainian government's perspective on world issues:[54] "The Government of the Ukrainian SSR considers . . ." and "The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes . . ." are typical of this phraseology. Is it merely coincidental that the Ukrainian SSR's profile at the United Nations sharpened in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech at the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 1956?

Study of the speeches reveals an additional, probably not insignificant, nuance. From 1946 to 1961 and from 1965 to 1970, the speakers almost invariably invoke the "Ukrainian SSR." Only very rarely does the phrase "delegation of the Ukraine" or "government of the Ukraine" arise. Between 1962 and 1964, on the other hand, the

[51] This information has been compiled from *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), pp. 431–528.

[52] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* pp. 123–99.

[53] Sawczuk explains Manuil's'kyi's propensity to "speak on behalf of the USSR" as a "conscious effort to impress on UN members and the world that in the Soviet federal state, not only does the Soviet Union speak for its members, but Soviet Union republics can also speak on behalf of the USSR." (Sawczuk, *Ukraine in the United Nations,* p. 141.) My study suggests, instead, a conscious effort to keep the Soviet Ukrainian profile low at a time of Cold War tensions and Stalinist repression.

[54] Information derived from *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), pp. 200–65; *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1977), pp. 23–116.

standard usage is not "Ukrainian SSR," but the more nationally-minded "Ukraine."[55] Is the change in usage simply a matter of chance, or does it reflect a heightened Soviet Ukrainian awareness of the Ukrainian SSR's distinctly Ukrainian international role? If the latter is true, the changes that occurred between 1961 and 1962 and between 1964 and 1965 are surely attributable at least in part to changes in the internal Soviet political climate — that is, to the 22nd Communist Party Congress in October 1961, which gave an additional impulse to de-Stalinization, and to Khrushchev's ouster and replacement by Brezhnev and Kosygin three years later, in October 1964.

The preceding analysis suggests that Soviet Ukrainian foreign relations are a variable phenomenon, responsive to both the international and the internal Soviet contexts. Even if this proposition is only marginally true, Western policymakers would do well to address themselves to the Ukrainian SSR's potentially significant foreign-relations role and to attempt to influence the course of its development. Ideally, a farsighted Western policy would treat the Ukrainian SSR's pretensions to international politics as an excellent opportunity for promoting Western interests *within* a context of reduced East-West tensions.

VI.

The question raised at the beginning of this study — does the Ukrainian SSR enjoy distinctly Ukrainian foreign relations? — has been answered only in part. Obviously, the Ukraine's membership in the Soviet Union greatly restricts the scope of its activity in the international arena. Nevertheless, there is one foreign actor with whom the Ukraine may reasonably be argued to have its own relations —namely, the Ukrainian emigration in North America and Western Europe. Indeed, Soviet Ukrainian actions towards the emigration resemble the kind of relations the Ukrainian SSR might enjoy with a bona fide state. Public relations, propaganda, cultural and educational exchanges, and "foreign aid" are supplemented with attempts to "interfere" in the other's "internal affairs" via subversion and assassination attempts. Largely missing from this scheme, of course, is reciprocity, since the émigrés, despite their pronouncements to the contrary, for the most part lack anything even closely resembling a "foreign policy" capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Ukraine.

[55] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1977), pp. 23–46.

As noted previously, the émigrés remained a constant Soviet Ukrainian concern throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This concern appears to have increased after World War II, because of the existence in the western oblasts of an armed Ukrainian nationalist underground with strong ties to the émigré community. Significantly, Manuil's'kyi made use of an international forum, the United Nations General Assembly, on 22 September 1947, to denounce émigré nationalists.[56] Although the underground was liquidated by the mid-1950s, the dissident movement that followed in its wake in the 1960s and 1970s found strong resonance among Ukrainians abroad, thereby aggravating the Ukrainian SSR's difficulties with the émigrés. The United Nations continued to serve as a forum for attacks on them: in his speech of 10 October 1960 at the General Assembly, Nikolai Podgorny denounced the émigré "Hitlerite scum which committed crimes against the Ukrainian people."[57] On 11 October 1966, the foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR, D. Z. Bilokolos, chastized the "traitors of the Ukrainian people, who, together with the Hitlerite fascists, escaped from the Ukrainian land and found haven in the United States and West Germany."[58]

Current Soviet Ukrainian émigré "foreign policy" is specifically directed at three more or less distinct groups: (1) the so-called "progressives," that is, openly pro-Soviet Ukrainians who receive various forms of material support from the Ukrainian SSR; (2) the relatively apolitical majority, whose support is courted by the Ukraina Society's propaganda and visits by dance ensembles, choirs, and the like; and (3) the "bourgeois nationalists," whom the Soviets continue to try to neutralize by disinformation, infiltration, diversion,[59] and assassination.[60] At this point, the case for the Ukrainian SSR's pursuit of its own émigré "policy" becomes blurred, since the orders for neutralizing anti-Soviet groups probably come as much or more from Moscow as from Kiev.

[56] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), p. 134.
[57] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), p. 250.
[58] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1977), p. 70.
[59] Yaroslav Dobosh and Andrew Klymchuk, two young Ukrainian tourists caught "red-handed" in the 1970s while trying to contact dissident circles in the Ukrainian SSR, appear to have been "set up" by Ukrainian KGB operatives working abroad. The Dobosh case, in particular, served as a pretext for the 1972 crackdown on Ukrainian dissent. Regarding Dobosh, see Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era* (The Hague, 1980), pp. 197–99.
[60] The last nationalists to have been assassinated, both in West Germany, were OUN leaders — Lev Rebet, in 1957, and Stepan Bandera, in 1959. Their assassin was a Ukrainian from the western oblasts, Bohdan Stashyns'kyi.

Is the Ukrainian SSR's policy toward Ukrainian émigrés really a form of "foreign policy"? The answer, of course, is both yes and no. On the one hand, the émigré community is the object of tactics usually reserved for legitimate foreign policy concerns; on the other hand, the Ukrainian regime probably views its struggle with them as an integral part of its struggle with oppositionist elements at home. Seen in this light, the Ukrainian SSR's "foreign policy" toward Ukrainian émigrés is an extension of its domestic "anti-bourgeois nationalist" policy: the former may be pursued because it does not overstep the limits placed on the Ukrainian SSR's international involvement.

Extending these limits, however, lies at least partly within the powers of the West in general and the United States in particular. Western insistence on consulates in Kiev, on expanded cultural, scholarly, and tourist relations with the Ukrainian SSR, and on a more active Soviet Ukrainian role in international forums would be consistent with the Ukrainian SSR's formal prerogatives and with the kind of foreign relations it has enjoyed at various times in the past. The coming years should offer the West a particularly good opportunity to pursue these ends: with the Kremlin preoccupied with the USSR's economic difficulties and the succession crisis sure to erupt after Brezhnev's departure, the Ukrainian SSR may very possibly come to enjoy a greater degree of political "breathing space." At that point, American willingness to expand this space will prove crucial for the Soviet Ukraine. But will the United States be sufficiently foresighted to advance such a policy? In view of the current administration's Manichean view of East-West relations, the prospects for such a development appear, alas, doubtful.

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