

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Russia, Ukraine, and the West: What are America's Interests?

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As things stand at the moment, neither side, neither the British government nor Sinn Fein, is thinking of blinking. And we don't want to think in those terms either. We want to change the context and the atmosphere gradually, and our proposal would do this.

Finally, I will touch on one other matter that we discussed with President Clinton yesterday. We look forward to the presidential visit to Northern Ireland. It is, I think, something that could make a very real contribution simply because it took place, simply because President Clinton came with his entourage, with the press, with a number of industrialists (we expect six to seven hundred people), people, like yourselves, who will have a significant influence on decisions that will be taken politically and economically. They will see Northern Ireland as it really is. They will see, well, I'll not draw comparisons with some American cities, that Belfast is not as it has been represented by the media. It is in fact a very nice place, and a very safe place. And we hope that will encourage people to think of utilizing the opportunities for business and for investment in Northern Ireland because that is a very real contribution that people can make. We are delighted to have peace and the increased opportunity for travel, tourism, and investment. But peace will lead to downsizing. There's a bloated public sector in Northern Ireland, and that will gradually diminish over the course of the next few years. It is bound to if the cease-fire holds. The downsizing can practically be quantified in terms of lost jobs over the course of the next few years. We hope that there will be an upside through increased economic activity. The upside is a matter of hope, and we hope it happens. We know that the presidential visit will help it to happen. I would hope that those present would use whatever influence you have in that direction. Thank you.

* Address delivered on November 2, 1995, in New York City.

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Alexander J. Motyl

The United States may be on the verge of committing an egregious strategic blunder. By pursuing the enlargement of NATO without regard to timing or to the larger geopolitical setting of Eastern Europe, Washington may bring about the outcome that expansion is supposed to forestall. By addressing the exaggerated security concerns of countries that face no immediate threat—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—the United States stands to promote the neoimperial inclinations of a possibly authoritarian Russia, undermine the security of those states trapped in the geopolitical vacuum between an expanded NATO and Russia—the Baltic states, Belarus, and, above all, Ukraine—and effectively harm every state involved, including the entire region of East Central Europe. Seen in this light, Russia, Ukraine, and the Russo-Ukrainian relationship appear central to the security and stability of all of Europe and, as such, are the yardsticks against which such policies as the expansion of NATO must be measured.

Russia and Ukraine and American Interests

American policymakers are absolutely right in their conclusion that Russia is of overriding importance to the United States. As the world's largest country, as the repository of enormous natural resources, and as a diminished superpower in the throes of wrenching change, Russia has the capacity to affect directly the stability and security of Eurasia. This point is, I submit,

indisputable and lies at the heart of Western concern with Russia's transformation into a "normal" state.

Compared to Russia, Ukraine seems insignificant, at first glance at least. Regardless of its current impoverishment, even a vibrant Ukraine could at most be a middle power, one doomed by geography to remain in Russia's shadow. Although Ukraine is the size of France, has a highly educated population of 55 million, and possesses impressive economic potential, it is unlikely ever to be in Russia's league.[1]

But geography also works in favor of Ukraine's geopolitical stature. Strategically situated between Russia and Central Europe, Ukraine can significantly affect Russia's relations with its European neighbors, and thus the United States and its interests, in a variety of ways. Just as Russo–Ukrainian cooperation can enhance European security and stability, so too can Russo–Ukrainian competition erode it. And just as Ukraine's independent existence translates into an objectively diminished Russian threat, so would Russia's incorporation of Ukraine mean nothing less than a redivision of Europe and in all likelihood a resumption of the cold war.

Strategically situated between Russia and Central Europe, Ukraine can significantly affect Russia's relationship with its European neighbors, and thus the United States and its interests, in a variety of ways.

Consider these four propositions in greater detail. The first two are premised on the commonsensical view that conflict between a great power and a middle power is necessarily destabilizing for their neighbors, whereas cooperation would probably accrue to everyone's advantage. Even more commonsensical is the proposition that the mere fact of Ukraine's existence increases the physical distance between Western Europe and Russia and despite all talk of global villages, this distance partially reduces Russia's capacity to influence events in East Central Europe and, by extension, in the West. The final proposition is also obvious. Inasmuch as Russia's absorption of Ukraine could occur only by means of military force, it would necessarily entail Russia's transformation into an antidemocratic, unstable, and, most probably, aggressively chauvinist state. It is hard to imagine how such a Russia, bordering on Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, would not produce a profound worsening of East–West relations.

Because a secure and stable Europe is clearly in the interest of the United States, it follows from the above propositions that it is also in the American interest that, minimally, Russia not be expansionist and that Ukraine survive and that, maximally, their relationship be based on a pragmatic recognition of mutual interests. Not surprisingly, all three goals have figured, with varying degrees of prominence, in American policy since 1991. Accordingly, Washington has centered most of its attention on Russia.

Although the attention has been justified, the premises on which policy was based were not—the premise that Russia's rapid transformation into a market democracy was inevitable and the premise that a democratic, market-oriented Russia would be the best guarantee of a nonexpansionist Russia. The first assumption was based on an utterly unrealistic assessment of the inherent difficulties of Russia's historically unprecedented move from totalitarianism and empire to democracy and statehood. The second assumption derived from the fashionable social science theory that democracies never fight one another.[2] However appealing to liberal sensibilities, the theory is still only a theory and one based on a rather small data set at that. Even if true, the theory would not apply to Russia until it became democratic, a development that might take decades. Indeed, there is a larger body of evidence for another theory, namely, that democratizing states such as Russia may be especially inclined to war.[3] And even if Russia were to become democratic more or less quickly, there would be no reason to expect it not to get involved militarily with nondemocratic states, such as the "near abroad."

Both assumptions held that developments internal to Russia were the keys to Russia's external behavior. This view was not wholly incorrect, but it had the unintended consequence of preventing the United States from playing an active role in molding Russia's foreign policy behavior. Because there was little that Washington realistically could do to drastically effect post-Soviet Russia's political evolution, focusing on democratic development essentially condemned the United States to a policy of inaction commingled with unrealistic hopes.

It was only after Russia's alarming turn to great-power chest-thumping and away from unconditional cooperation with the West, a development that appeared undeniable even to inveterate optimists by 1993, that American policymakers began to shift their attention from encouraging Russia's internal development to actions affecting its external behavior. The immediate beneficiary of this change in assumptions was Ukraine.

Generally vilified because of its lack of economic reform and obstreperousness on nuclear disarmament, Ukraine was suddenly transformed from a nuisance state to a strategic asset not primarily because of anything the Ukrainians did, although the election of the pro-reform Leonid Kuchma as president in 1994 helped, but because the emergence of a potentially predatory Russia had transformed Ukraine into a possible buffer between Russia and the West.[4] As I suggested at the beginning of this article, Ukraine's importance in the East–West balance would have been obvious from looking at the geopolitical map had not unrealistic assumptions regarding the ease of democratic transformation in Russia gotten in the way.

At present Russo–Ukrainian relations are stable, if not effusively friendly. Disagreements over nuclear weapons, Soviet assets, and the status of the Crimea appear to have been resolved, and Russia effectively subsidizes Ukraine by overlooking or rescheduling its oil and gas debts. Nevertheless, the Black Sea Fleet has not been divided; the issue of dual citizenship, upon which Russia insists, remains unresolved; a friendship treaty remains in limbo; and most Russians still believe that Ukrainian statehood is a historical aberration, if not an insult.[5] President Kuchma has generally been credited with a marked improvement in Russo–Ukrainian relations, but the fact is that his rhetoric and policies toward Russia have differed little from President Kravchuk's.[6] More important in accounting for the real and imagined thaw are Kuchma's exaggeratedly pro-Russian image, the moderating impact of the West's increasingly pro-Ukrainian policies, and Russia's difficulties with Chechnya.

Although the current condition of Russo–Ukrainian relations is stable, there is no guarantee that a change for the worse will not occur in the foreseeable future. Much will depend on internal developments in both countries, especially in Russia, and on policies adopted by the West. As I will argue, Russia's possible transformation into an authoritarian state, in conjunction with the West's support of NATO expansion, may produce everyone's worst-case scenario—a predatory Russia, imposing its will on an isolated and vulnerable Ukraine and thereby reigniting the cold war.

Soviet Legacies

Although outwardly alike, Russia and Ukraine were actually quite different at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse. Both had been victimized by totalitarianism and thus lacked the autonomous institutions that characterize democracy: the rule of law, civil society, a market economy, and an independent culture. But Ukraine and most of the other non-Russian republics had also emerged from the Soviet collapse without bona fide states and the skilled elites that go with them. In contrast, Russia inherited the Soviet state's central ministries, army, and secret police as well as the legacy of the Soviet empire's cultural domination.[7]

The self-proclaimed task facing all post-Soviet elites was to introduce democracy, the rule of law, civil society, and a market economy. Democracy involves an effective division and balance of governmental powers, elite circulation by means of elections, and the aggregation of popular interests in the form of political parties. The rule of law entails regularized and transparent procedures for running state agencies and regulating their relations with society. Civil society refers to a matrix of interconnected social institutions existing independently of the state. The market presupposes private property and a set of legal procedures for exchanging capital, land, and labor.

Generally vilified because of its lack of economic reform and obstreperousness on nuclear disarmament, Ukraine was suddenly transformed from a nuisance state to a strategic asset.

It was hard enough for post-Soviet policymakers to construct all those institutional clusters in a setting of social disarray, political uncertainty, and economic collapse. The task was doubly difficult for Ukraine, where, following independence, former communists became fervent nationalists while retaining their influence within the government, economy, and society. Although some desired change, most did not. Perhaps inevitably, therefore, change in Ukraine had to be piecemeal and slow. In any case, change had to be sequential, for some desired ends were the preconditions of others. For instance, it is as hard to imagine genuine democracy without the rule of law as it is impossible to conceive of the rule of law without a state. But not all ends are the preconditions of others. Elites, states, and nations do not require the prior existence of markets, civil societies, and the rule of law. Nor do elites, states, and nations presuppose one another.[8]

Russia's position was markedly different. Because it possessed a state and a well-trained elite that had

emerged victorious from a struggle with the communist nomenklatura, an attempt at radical reform was both possible and likely. But because the kind of post-imperial, post-totalitarian state that Russia inherited consisted of parasitical central bureaucracies and an excessively strong secret police and military, elite attempts at attaining radical ends were virtually guaranteed to fail.

Different legacies also influenced respective approaches to nation-building. The unresolved ethnic character of Ukraine's inhabitants—some claimed to be Ukrainian, others Russian, and many, if not most, some Soviet variation—virtually excluded a strongly nationalizing policy. By the same token, the Great Russian character of most of Russia's population and the neo-imperial understanding that it inherited from Soviet ideology represented an overpowering force that pushed Russian elites toward a self-centered and imperious, if not downright chauvinist, national self-definition.

"Post-totalitarianism" is thus the appropriate term for Ukraine's current political system, one evincing many striking continuities with its Soviet predecessor.

Not surprisingly, nation-building in Russia and Ukraine interacted with state-building. Although plagued with doubts about the boundaries that defined its nationhood, the imperial nation expressed allegiance to the great state that Russia still claimed to be, while the centralized agencies of the great state utilized the imperial discourse of the great nation as an ideological and social prop for state-building and as an excuse for imperial saber-rattling. In contrast, the slow, plodding, sequential process of reform and state-building in Ukraine reinforced and was reinforced by the halting, inclusive, unself-confident process of nation-building.

Post-Totalitarianism in Ukraine

Although Ukraine had made considerable progress with respect to state-building and the formation of elites by 1995, the continued prominence of the former nomenklatura within a malfunctioning state-controlled economy produced a kind of state that eluded the simple designation of transitional. New elites had been trained and self-styled democrats occupied positions of authority, but the lion's share of state power still remained in the hands of the so-called party of power, former Communist party apparatchiks who retained their positions of regional and local dominance. "Post-totalitarianism" is thus the appropriate term for Ukraine's current political system, one evincing many striking continuities with its Soviet predecessor.[9]

Although the Ukrainian state appeared monolithic, it was actually rent by severe divisions. Regional elites, personality-based elites, generational elites, and functional elites were involved in continual struggles to increase power and to formulate policy.[10] Had the system been economically stable, elite contestation might have resembled that found in Soviet times: Policy goals, although not unimportant, would have taken a backseat to power struggles. But because the economy was visibly collapsing and because the imperatives of state-building were clear to all, policy had to figure prominently in elite struggles. And, indeed, as the election of Kuchma as president in 1994 showed, it did. It is clear that the post-totalitarian state was more open-ended and capable of movement than its origins suggested.

Equally open to a double-edged interpretation was the Ukrainian presidency's longstanding struggle with the parliament. To be sure, deadlock resulted in an absence of meaningful reform measures. But deadlock was neither deadly nor undesirable.[11] The imperatives of sequencing would have ruled out the premature development of a market economy anyway, and deadlock contributed to the consolidation of desperately fragile post-Soviet institutions, the executive and legislative, and to the emergence of an elite consensus that approximated an elite culture.

Ukraine seemed to be moving, albeit at a snail's pace, toward some form of political and economic normalcy.

Even after several years of devastating economic developments, most of Ukraine's elites still occupied the center of the political spectrum. Extremism was rare partly because the social consequences of radical change were yet to be seen but mostly because the inertia of the political process created a sense of moderation that facilitated the formation of a genuine Ukrainian elite. The parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 and the smooth transfer of power from Kravchuk to Kuchma testified to the growth of real institutions within the Ukrainian state.

Although the progressive consolidation of political institutions reinforced Ukrainian statehood and provided some foundations for democratic development

and the rule of law, Ukraine still was, as of late 1995, a very imperfect protodemocracy. The party of power remained in power and the development of a market economy was minimal. On the other hand, civil society was beginning to take root, hypernationalism was marginal, ethnic strife was virtually nonexistent, and radical economic reform was at least logically possible and increasingly politically unavoidable. Ukraine seemed to be moving, albeit at a snail's pace, toward some form of political and economic normalcy.[12] The last thing it needed was a security threat that could induce its squabbling elites to close ranks, rally around the flag, ignore internal reforms, and proceed to engage Russia on unfavorable terms in an unwinnable contest.

Protofascism in Russia?

Unlike Ukraine, Russia opted for immediate, radical reform under conditions that militated against its success. Thus Yeltsin's push for revolutionary change necessarily placed him on a collision course with the conservative parliament. As a result of the armed confrontation of October 1993, the emerging institutional balance between the presidency and the parliament was destroyed, and democratic deinstitutionalization actually ensued. The president emerged and was constitutionally enshrined as the dominant, if not the absolute, dictatorial player in the political arena. And the destruction of the conservative opposition effectively deprived Russia of a viable political center.[13]

These developments had a direct impact on the feasibility of introducing the rule of law. A law-governed state presupposes that the agencies of the state inhabit a common political space within which legal procedures regulate their relations. If no such space exists, there is little that legal procedures can do to create it. The Communist party defined this space in Soviet times; it was up to Yeltsin to do the same in post-Soviet Russia. By staging an assault against the state and its institutions, however, Yeltsin compelled them to retreat into their fortresses and retrench. The upshot was the fragmentation of the state as a whole, on the one hand, and the consolidation of individual state institutions, on the other. Under conditions such as these, with multiple sovereignties characterizing the state arena, the rule of law became a chimera.

The weakening of democracy and the rule of law have had a deleterious impact on the evolution of civil society in Russia. Just as civil society presupposes a minimally institutionalized political and legal environment, democratic deinstitutionalization and state fragmentation deprived Russian social organizations of that kind of setting. It should have come as no surprise, then, that "comrade criminals" captured the incipient market.[14] The dominance of the former nomenklatura, the fragmentation of the state, the absence of the rule of law, and the weakness of civil society meant that strategically situated state elites could accumulate privatized resources, amass vast fortunes, and form de facto alliances with organized crime.

In addition to setbacks on four fronts—democracy, the rule of law, civil society, and the market—a significant deformation of the state had also taken place. Virtually all state institutions, including the president's administrative apparatus, had grown in size and in strength. All had acquired greater autonomy, and all had seized control of significant parts of the economy. In effect, Russia's political and economic systems came to be dominated by elite cartels, ranging from the ministries to the military to the secret police, each of which staked a claim to a defined space within which its interests and its authority would be paramount. Not unexpectedly, the ideology of great power messianism and national pride came to serve as the least common denominator of all Russian elites and the most effective channel for communicating with the populace. Bureaucratic authoritarianism, perhaps even *protofascism*, may be the appropriate label for a system that has assumed such characteristics.

Ironically, Russia's cartelized authoritarian system may actually promote its decentralization and disintegration.

Ironically, Russia's cartelized authoritarian system may actually promote its decentralization and disintegration. After all, strong cartels amount to a weak, more or less fragmented state. The relative weakness of central authority in combination with the growing strength of provincial authority can, over time, encourage regional power brokers to exploit centrifugal tendencies for their own ends. The fact that most of Russia's federal units have a non-Russian coloration and thus also function as emotionally appealing ethnic homelands only adds fuel to the potential fire.

These considerations seem to point to a relatively brittle, outwardly imposing, and inwardly illiberal state. Although democracy would not flourish under such

conditions, democratic forces and autonomous social institutions should be able to find some space to maneuver. Such a turn of events would call for guarded pessimism, even if an authoritarian, cartelized, and possibly protofascist Russia did not give pride of place to the forces of coercion and revel in the language of hypernationalist pride and neoimperialism. The implications of authoritarianism are thus especially worrisome for Russia's neighbors in the "near abroad."

Russia and Its Neighbors

The question is not whether Russia will follow in the interventionist footsteps of other authoritarian states but whether it will stop doing so. Its military involvement in Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya, its wrangling over the Black Sea Fleet, and its unwillingness to recognize the political independence and national boundaries of its neighbors in general and Ukraine and Kazakhstan in particular suggest that Russian policymakers have already embarked, even if unwittingly, on the road to hegemony and expansion. The necessary or minimally facilitating conditions of such a policy—a cartelized, authoritarian system, a neoimperialist ideology, and a record of intervention—are already in place.

Should Russian expansionism become a reality, some of Russia's neighbors will board the bandwagon and accept Finlandization. Others, in particular Ukraine, the Balts, and possibly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, will seek either to balance or to increase their military capability. They may be able to escape vassalage or enhance their security, but the overall stability of the former Soviet space will surely deteriorate and produce untoward consequences for Europe and Asia.

Moreover, although Russia may embark on neoimperialism, its brittleness will not permit it to engage in sustained and successful expansion in the medium to long term. This fact hardly need deter Russian policymakers from pursuing such foolhardy policies. Chechnya notwithstanding, the Russian military is still infinitely stronger than the armies of its neighbors. Imperial blueprints rarely figure in the calculations of actual empire builders, especially if they are housed in competing cartels and hence are incapable of projecting the characteristics of a unitary state actor, and cost-benefit analyses can be made to support just about any course of action, especially one that might evoke glorious overtones. Thus, like interwar Italy, Russia will not be able to engage in successful military and political adventurism; like Italy, it may do so anyway. However, unlike Italy, Russia may not only experience enervation, rather, in conjunction with the growth of internal centrifugal forces, it may actually implode.

Implications for the West

There may be little that the world community can do to prevent Russia's slide toward protofascism. Although the West's lack of domestic influence may be a fact, the United States and its allies can—and of course do—influence the international behavior of states. Russian foreign policy behavior is thus open to some influence from outside.

Weimar Germany comes to mind as an instructive analogy. Although internal dynamics largely accounted for its development into a fascist state, Germany's expansionist proclivities were facilitated indirectly by the international community when it humiliated Germany at Versailles and, directly, when it did not resist Germany's initial expansionist probes. The lessons of Weimar suggest two policy rules. First, it makes sense to avoid gratuitous slights to Russian pride. Because there is no point to isolating Russia for bad reasons, every effort should be made to include a responsible Russia in the international community and to assign to it a role commensurate with its status as an impoverished great power.

The choice before the West, therefore, is simple if also portentous: Ukrainian independence or cold war.

Equally important is the flip side of this injunction. It is imperative that the West indicate clearly what the limits of Russian foreign policy behavior are both in the "near abroad" and with respect to Ukraine as the largest and geopolitically most important non-Russian state. Russian policymakers must understand that the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all its neighbors are nonnegotiable items. Relegating Central Asia to Russia's sphere of influence stokes the fires of Russian neoimperialism and is a profound disservice to Ukraine and its Visegrad neighbors. Rationalizing Russian neoimperialist rhetoric as mere talk slated only for domestic consumption blithely ignores the way that inclusive discourse can set the boundaries and terms of policy debates and thereby affects the range of possible policy choices and outcomes.

In particular, Russian policymakers must understand that Ukraine, however vulnerable geopolitically and however evocative of Russian glory emotionally, is off-limits. As I noted at the outset of this article, the integrity of Ukraine as a genuinely independent state is the best guarantee of Russia's nontransformation into a neo-imperial state, and its continued existence is the best guarantee of stable Western relations with Russia. And, to complete this line of reasoning, Ukraine's continued existence amounts to the best guarantee of no future cold war. The choice before the West, therefore, is simple if also portentous: Ukrainian independence or cold war.

But consider NATO enlargement in this light. Even the possibility of expansion is perceived as humiliating and threatening by virtually all Russians. Enlargement will therefore strengthen the forces of coercion, promote national-imperialist rhetoric, and undermine democracy. It will benefit those countries that have no immediate reason to fear Russia—the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary—and strategically isolate those that rationally do have reasons—the Baltic states and Ukraine. Enlarging NATO therefore amounts to a counterproductive policy of accelerating the protofascist and expansionist tendencies that it is intended to prevent. Worst of all, by exposing Ukraine to possible Russian predations in a strategic no-man's land, NATO's expansion will have unintentionally goaded Russian neo-imperialism and provided it with a possible victim. Surely, a new division of Europe into two opposing blocs is no way to deal with Russia, to safeguard Western security, and to alleviate Polish, Hungarian, and Czech—not to mention Ukrainian and Baltic—security concerns. Saving the East Central Europeans from their phobias by redirecting their *Drang nach Westen* into the institutional channels of the European Union seems a small price to pay for the genuine enhancement of the security of Europe and the United States.

Naturally, should Russia obstinately pursue a policy of adventurism and expansion in the "near abroad," despite all honest Western efforts at mediation, moderation, understanding, and assistance, then there may be no alternative to expanding NATO's security umbrella —not only to East Central Europe but to the Baltic states and Ukraine as well. That option should be uppermost in the minds of Western strategists as they contemplate appropriate responses to possible Russian attempts at hegemony. But there is no reason today to pursue either this maximal version of NATO's expansion or its minimal, East Central European, variant. If Russia embarks on neoimperialist policies that bring back the cold war, there is no doubt that a terrified West will translate its active support of East Central Europe and Ukraine into formal security guarantees. But there is also no doubt that anticipating such an outcome may be a self-fulfilling prophecy of the worst kind.

Notes

1. For useful overviews of recent developments in Russia and Ukraine, see John Dunlop, "Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire," and Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: The Politics of Independence," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 43–72, 75–98.

2. See Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, 1993).

3. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): pp. 79–97.

4. See Anders Åslund, "Ukraine's Resurrection," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, vol. 17, no. 3 (June 1995): pp. 12–17.

5. Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Agendas," *U.S. Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe* (Washington, 1995), pp. 37–40. See also Roman Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 4 (1993): pp. 337–65.

6. See Kuchma's speech on the fourth anniversary of Ukraine's independence in *Ukraina: khronika podii*, Ukrainform, August 27, 1995.

7. This section draws on my "Structural Constraints and Starting Points: Postimperial States and Nations in Ukraine and Russia," unpublished manuscript, April 21, 1995.

8. For an elaboration of this argument, see Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York, 1993).

9. Volodymyr Polokhalo prefers the term "neototalitarian." See "Vid Ukrainy komunistychno-totalitarnoi do Ukrainy neototalitarnoi?," *Politychna dumka*, no. 2 (1994): p. 19.

10. See Dmitrii Vydrin, "Ukrainskaia politicheskaia elita," *Kievskie Vedomosti*, September 3, 1994, p. 4.

11. For an especially alarmist view, see "Ukraine: The Birth and Possible Death of a Country," *The Economist*, May 7, 1994. See also *The New Ukraine: Radical Economic Change Replaces Political Expediency* (New York, 1995).

12. For a guardedly optimistic assessment of Ukraine, see Alexander J. Motyl, "Will Ukraine Survive 1994?" *The Harriman Institute Forum*, January 1994.

13. This section draws on my "Toward Fascism? The Soviet Legacy and Russian Reform," unpublished manuscript, November 3, 1995.

14. Stephen Handelman, *Comrade Criminal* (London, 1994).

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The views of Dr. Motyl do not necessarily reflect those of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.