

Edited by Bohdan Krawchenko

Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present

Selected Papers from the Fourth World
Congress for Soviet and East European
Studies, Harrogate, 1990

General Editor: Stephen White



UKRAINIAN PAST, UKRAINIAN PRESENT

**SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS FOR
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, HARROGATE, 1990**

*Edited for the International Council for Soviet and East European Studies by
Stephen White, Professor of Politics, University of Glasgow*

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and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990**

Edited by

Bohdan Krawchenko

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Preface

This volume consists of selected papers presented or offered to the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, held in Harrogate, England in July 1990. Since that time the object of the study of the international gathering has changed beyond recognition. The USSR is no longer. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been banned. Ukraine is an independent state.

The 24 August 1991 proclamation of independence by Ukraine's parliament was overwhelmingly endorsed by the 1 December 1991 referendum. Given Ukraine's difficult and tragic past, the fact that that country achieved its independence without the loss of a single life borders on the miraculous. However, the full import of the events of 1991 can only be appreciated when viewed in historical perspective.

The first three papers in this volume discuss aspects of Ukrainian national identity in the nineteenth century. In that century, that identity appeared to have a tenuous future. Much has been written about the problems confronting the Ukrainian national self-assertion in Russian-ruled Ukraine. All too often, however, this topic has been treated in isolation from intellectual and social developments in Russia. The authors in this volume have taken the opposite approach and have presented interesting case studies of the relationships between the two.

The other essays deal with key questions of twentieth-century Ukraine. Two papers discuss population loss. They examine migration, and the demographic consequences of the tragedies of the 1930s and 1940s. Given the enormous controversy which surrounds this question, the papers serve as an antidote to studies of population loss not grounded in modern demographic methods. The study on the establishment of Soviet power in Kharkiv is one of few regional case studies of the Bolshevik take-over of Ukraine. Another paper portrays the impossible choices confronting the Ukrainian nationalists during the Second World War. Finally, two authors deal with Ukraine under Gorbachev, and two developments which set the stage for Ukraine's declaration of independence: the rise of autonomous political organisations, and the formation of an opposition in parliament in the wake of the 1990 elections.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences for arranging for the translation of Serhii

Pirozkov's contribution, and to note that a modified Library of Congress transliteration system has been used throughout.

BOHDAN KRAWCHENKO

General Editor's Introduction

The fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies took place in Harrogate, Yorkshire, in July 1990. It was an unusual congress in many ways. It was the first of its kind to take place in Britain, and the first to take place since the launching of Gorbachev's programme of *perestroika* and the revolutions in Eastern Europe (indeed so rapid was the pace of change in the countries with which we were concerned that the final programme had to incorporate over 600 amendments). It was the largest and most complex congress of Soviet and East European studies that has yet taken place, with twenty-seven panels spread over fourteen sessions on six days. It was also the most representative congress of its kind, with over 2000 participants including – for the first time – about 300 from the USSR and Eastern Europe. Most were scholars, some were activists, and a few were the new kind of academic turned part-time deputy: whatever their status, it was probably this Soviet and East European presence that contributed most directly to making this a very different congress from the ones that had preceded it in the 1970s and 1980s.

No series of volumes, however numerous, could hope to convey the full flavour of this extraordinary occasion. The formal panels alone incorporated almost a thousand papers. There were three further plenary sessions; there were many more unattached papers; and the subjects that were treated ranged from medieval Novgorod to computational linguistics, from the problems of the handicapped in the USSR to Serbian art at the time of the battle of Kosovo. Nor, it was decided at an early stage, would it even be desirable to attempt a fully comprehensive 'congress proceedings', including all papers in their original form. My aim as General Editor, with the strong support of the International Council for Soviet and East European Studies (who co-sponsored the congress with the British Association for Soviet, Slavonic and East European Studies), has rather been to generate a series of volumes which will have some thematic coherence, and to bring them out as quickly as possible while their (often topical) contents are still current.

A strategy of this kind imposes a cost, in that many authors have had to find outlets for what would in different circumstances have been very publishable papers. The gain, however, seems much greater: a series of

real books on properly defined subjects, edited by scholars of experience and standing in their respective fields, and placed promptly before the academic community. These, I am glad to say, were the same as the objectives of the publishers who expressed an interest in various aspects of the congress proceedings, and it has led to a series of volumes as well as of special issues of journals covering a wide range of interests. There are volumes on art and architecture, on history and literature, on law and economics, on society and education. There are further volumes on nationality issues and the Ukraine, on the environment, on international relations and on defence. There are Soviet volumes, and others that deal more specifically with Eastern (or perhaps more properly East Central) Europe. There are interdisciplinary volumes on women in Russia and the USSR, the Soviet experience in the Second World War, and ideology and system change. There are special issues of some of the journals that publish in our field, dealing with religion and Slovene studies, émigrés and East European economics, publishing and politics, linguistics and the Russian revolution. Altogether nearly forty separate publications will stem from the Harrogate congress: more than twice as many as from any previous congress of its kind, and a rich and enduring record of its deliberations.

Most of these volumes will be published in the United Kingdom by Macmillan. It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge Macmillan's early interest in the scholarly output of the congress, and the swift and professional attention that has been given to all of these volumes since their inception. A full list of the Harrogate series appears in the Macmillan edition of this volume; it can give only an impression of the commitment and support I have enjoyed from Tim Farmiloe, Clare Wace and others at all stages of our proceedings. I should also take this opportunity to thank John Morison and his colleagues on the International Council for Soviet and East European Studies for entrusting me with this responsible task in the first place, and the various sponsors – the Erasmus Prize Fund of Amsterdam, the Ford Foundation in New York, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British Council, the Stefan Batory Trust and others – whose generous support helped to make the congress a reality.

The next congress will be held in 1995, and (it is hoped) at a location in Eastern Europe. Its proceedings can hardly hope to improve upon the vigour and imagination that is so abundantly displayed on the pages of these splendid volumes.

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1 The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831–47

Orest Pelech

Contemplating nineteenth-century Ukrainian history, one is struck by the importance of the Ukrainian triumvirate of Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), Panteleimon Kulish (1819–97) and Taras Shevchenko (1814–61) in the creation of a new body of knowledge around which all subsequent Ukrainian experience has been centred. Kostomarov created a new paradigm of Ukrainian history based on contemporary standards of scholarship.¹ Kulish played a key part in the codification of a Ukrainian prose canon; among his many accomplishments was a modern Ukrainian translation of the Bible.² Shevchenko is the national poet analogous to Pushkin for the Russians, Mickiewicz for the Poles, Dante for the Italians. However, for Ukrainians, his importance is not limited to his poetic genius or to his role in the codification of modern Ukrainian.³ In addition, his incarceration and exile between 1847 and 1859, followed by his premature death in 1861 served as a metonym of a suffering nation.

This triumvirate was not original in choosing to write Ukrainian poetry, prose and history: others had preceded them in all three activities. Rather, what is striking is their productivity, the authority of their work and their invincibility even under the most adverse conditions. Notwithstanding their lowly social origins,⁴ they somehow acquired a confidence that made possible their choice of vocation and accounts for their ability to fulfil their personal potential.

It is tempting to apply the word 'professional' to the triumvirate. After all, in the 1840s, they held responsible positions in the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment, and were generously rewarded for their scholarship and teaching.⁵ This is in contrast to their predecessors, individuals such as Ivan Kotliarevskiy (1769–1838), Petro Hulak-Artemovskiy (1790–1865), Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko (1778–1843), Mykola Markevych (1804–60), who pursued their Ukrainian

interests not as part of their service obligations. Whereas there is a spirit of experimentation and even dilettantism among the latter, the triumvirate, on the other hand, was thorough and single-minded in its development of Ukrainian *belles-lettres*, scholarship and consciousness. However, the word 'professional' also suggests a rational pursuit of material interests or even opportunism, whereas the triumvirate pursued their Ukrainian interests at an extraordinary cost to their careers.⁶

We will argue that the triumvirate's confidence and choice of vocation were acquired between 1835 and 1840. The turning points in these three young lives occurred as a result of their contact with participants in the cultural revolution that was started by the Russian Imperial state. This experience gave the triumvirate a new awareness and a sense of vocation so firm that neither punitive measures nor ridicule could weaken their resolve. The changes which had taken place in the internal politics of the Russian Imperial state in the reign of Nicholas I served as the background to this transformation. Examining these changes and their impact on the triumvirate is the major focus of this chapter.

Over the course of two centuries of Russian imperial history, the ideal of citizenship changed. The imperial model had given way to a nationalist one. Between the early eighteenth century and the 1820s, the Russian imperial model satisfied the traditional definitions of imperial citizenship: a subject needed to be loyal and efficient in his fulfilment of state service, but there was no need for him to convert to the religion of the national identity of the dominant ethnic.⁷ From Peter I to Alexander I, some of the highest servitors of the Imperial state were either foreigners or members of the non-Russian nationalities of the Empire.⁸ In the Imperial institutions of higher learning, first the Academy of Sciences, then the Academy of Arts, and later the universities, the majority of staff were foreigners, many of whom never learned Russian even after decades of service in St Petersburg and Moscow.⁹

It was only in the last years of the reign of Alexander I that the nationalist model of Imperial citizenship began to emerge. Emblematic of this change was the fall from grace in 1823 of Alexander's former favourite, the Polish Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, whose Vilna Educational District became an object of government concern and distrust.¹⁰ However, it was really Alexander's younger brother, Nicholas I, who began the lengthy, systematic and often traumatic process of changing the imperial model of citizenship to the national model.

Nicholas I himself was much less cosmopolitan than Alexander I or their grandmother, Catherine II. For example, unlike Alexander's, Nicholas's entourage of courtiers, ministers, generals and governors did not include foreigners, except for the incumbent Nesselrode (a German Catholic) as head of the Foreign Office. Especially after the failed Polish revolt of 1830–1, it became less acceptable to Nicholas to have the Imperial academies and universities staffed by foreigners. Under the brilliant leadership of his Minister of Popular Enlightenment, S. S. Uvarov, a post he held from 1833 to 1849, the secular educational system became an instrument not only of instruction, but also of Russification.¹¹ Certain sub-sets of the Empire's nobility were 'favoured' with greater attention than others. In the 1830s and 1840s, it was the Polish nobility of the nine Western provinces who were the primary target of Russification, whereas the tiny Baltic German nobility were spared until the 1880s.¹²

When Emperor Nicholas chose the strategy of Russification, he did not have a ready-made Russian 'high' culture to impose upon non-Russians, or indeed, upon the Russians themselves.¹³ The Russian language itself had only recently emerged as a standardised vehicle for formal communications such as *belles-lettres*. Modern Russian literature was just emerging as a vital tradition in the early 1830s.¹⁴ Russian historical scholarship was also in the early stages of development at both ends of the historiographical continuum: that is, archives needed to be put in order and textbooks had to be written.¹⁵ There was a chronic shortage of cadres in this effort: the Russian nobility was notoriously indifferent to the pursuit of higher education, and thus professors, teachers and students had to be found among marginal groups such as impecunious nobles and *raznochintsy*.

One needs to linger on these points because the spectacular successes in Russian literature and other arts, in scholarship and science in the last three Romanov reigns (1855–1917) overshadow the precarious and very modest status of the noetic enterprise in the reign of Nicholas I. Another systematic block in apprehending the cultural revolution of his reign is the extraordinarily bad press that Nicholas has received from almost all historians – Soviet, Imperial Russian and Western.¹⁶ Nicholas's was a failed *perestroika*: specifically, he throttled his own reforms in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1848 and thus his reign is usually viewed through the dark glass of his last seven years.¹⁷ Nevertheless, in the period 1831–48, the institutions of Russian literature and scholarship were either formed or consolidated. The indigenisation of science and arts became the

motive principle of cadre selection in the Imperial Academies and universities.¹⁸ Perhaps most importantly, the meta-institution of language – to use Jurgen Habermas’s term – became firmly entrenched: Contemporary Standard Russian became the exclusive language of formal and public discourse.

Pursuing the shift from the imperial to the nationalistic model of citizenship, Nicholas turned to a secular Russian culture that had been slowly forming among some of the Great Russian nobility since the mid-eighteenth century. Before Peter I, Russians had two cultures: the peasant and the ecclesiastical, each with its own language, literature and cultural code. After the upheaval of Peter’s reign, a small but growing number of Russian nobles became irreconcilably alienated from the Russian peasant and ecclesiastical cultures, and beginning in the 1760s, created a new secular culture with its own language, literature and cultural code that were fundamentally different from the former.

In the reigns of Catherine II, Paul I and Alexander I, the relationship between the Imperial Court and the new secular Russian culture was episodic and inconsistent. For example, a pioneer of the new culture such as Nikolai Novikov was alternately cosseted and persecuted by the Empress. Under Alexander I, a ‘pro-Russian’ lobby of Nikolai Karamzin and Nikolai Novosiltsev emerged to advance what they perceived as Russian national interests, especially in the western provinces acquired from Poland.¹⁹ However, the Russian rulers were themselves a cosmopolitan lot, with a preference for Western European languages, arts and tastes. It was Nicholas who began to promote the new secular Russian culture and use it as the focus of a new model for the organisation of the Empire, the Russian nation and even the Court itself.

Before developing my argument, it is necessary to consider what constitutes a culture, how it is communicated and what the salient characteristics of the modern Russian cultural codes are. These are important questions because the modern Russian cultural code profoundly changed the behaviour of Russians and those influenced by carriers of this code. The Ukrainian triumvirate, as discussed below, experienced a fundamental shift of attitudes in early adulthood because of contact with mentors who were missionaries of the modern Russian cultural code.

A culture is a shared memory of a self-defined group within a specific time and place.²⁰ Cultures are realised in human behaviour through cultural codes.

Cultural codes are systems of more or less conventional signs that a member of a given society must internalize in order to participate competently in that society's life. The possessor of such a cultural code is able to distinguish within the flow of raw experience those elements significant from the point of view of his culture, identify their value and react to them. Like any native language, the codes of social behavior are not consciously created or learned, they are acquired during the ordinary practice of social relations.²¹

Cultural codes are a meta-language that narrows the number of choices for an individual in any behavioural situation. Cultural codes define fundamental aspects of human values such as a sense of time, place, purpose, importance, beauty and virtue. They define the prestige and desirability of discrete forms of behaviour. For example, consider readership in Russia. Before 1750, prior to the gradual introduction of the modern Russian cultural code, reading among Russians was an exotic practice limited to a tiny number of devotees.²² However, as a result of the introduction of a new cultural code, Russians became ever more voracious readers, so that by 1913, notwithstanding a 72 per cent illiteracy rate, the Russian Empire published three times as many books as France.²³

Perhaps the most dominant feature of the new Russian cultural code was historicism, or a vision of the significance and purpose of the lives of groups such as nations and of its individuals, past present and future. For example, one of the artifacts of this new cultural code was the diary or the personal journal. This genre did not exist among Russians before the mid-eighteenth century;²⁴ afterwards, there is a growing stream of diaries and journals, and then memoirs and autobiographies. To a traditional nobleman, time slipped effortlessly by, day by day, in the pursuit of pleasure and gain. Keeping a record of each day would have been pointless. To the new secular culture, each day mattered, and it needed to be recorded rigorously for future examination and evaluation. Here was a sense of personal history, a completely new organisation of memory that was utterly unlike the memory of peasant, priest or traditional nobleman.²⁵

This militant *carpe diem* was focused on the pursuit of personal and collective improvement, which in turn, was premised on a new awareness of human suffering inherent in Russia's social order and of its backwardness *vis-à-vis* the West. Proponents of the new cultural code expressed this sensitivity and ameliorative teleology in a variety of ways. On the one hand, beginning with Alexander Radishchev (1749–

1802), there was a radical tradition which advanced a devastating critique of the social order and, eventually, revolution.²⁶ On the other hand, *engagé* intellectuals, such as men of the Arzamas circle,²⁷ pursued ameliorative strategies discreetly and within the framework of the existing political order.

In 1833, Nicholas chose one of the Arzamas alumni, S. S. Uvarov, to direct his transformation of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment into a tool for unifying the Empire into a nation-state. Among a multitude of problems facing the new incumbent was the Russian nobility's dependence upon foreign tutors, their occasional study in European universities and a systematic avoidance of the Ministry's schools. Uvarov was sufficiently wise to realise that simple police measures, such as restricting exit documents for Russian nobles and entry documents for foreign tutors were not enough.²⁸ Russian nobles had to be attached to the Imperial universities because they were equal to the best European universities. Alas, in 1833, this was far from the case, and so, Uvarov proceeded to overhaul completely the Empire's universities. He began by changing their purpose as stated in their charters (*ustavy*) from being outposts of general education to being centres of the 'research imperative' institutionalised so recently at the newly-founded University of Berlin.²⁹ Then, Uvarov carried out a systematic purge of his university faculties, and with remarkable skill, he identified promising young men to send abroad to complete their education and to return as Russia's first research professors. This is precisely how Uvarov touched the life of one of the Ukrainian triumvirate, Mykola Kostomarov.

Kostomarov entered Kharkiv University in 1833 when it, like other Imperial universities, was in a sad state of decline. One conspicuous source of corruption was the practice of students boarding in professors' houses. This supplemented the income of professors, but the practice also led to a mockery of academic standards because professors would not jeopardise this source of money by giving low grades to their own or to their colleagues' students. Kostomarov boarded with the Professor of History, Hulak-Artemovskiyi, one of the pioneers of modern Ukrainian literature. Nevertheless, it is curious that while living with Hulak-Artemovskiyi, Kostomarov did not develop any interest in Ukrainian, in history or even in serious study of any kind. Instead, Kostomarov pursued the usual frivolities of undergraduates: wine, women, song, brawling and 'cram' studying only before examinations.

However, in his third year at university, Kostomarov witnessed a profound change in the environment:

The year 1835 was remarkable in the history of Kharkiv University: some kind of rejuvenation was experienced. The various faculties received fresh, young forces, new people, returning from abroad, where they were sent by the minister [Uvarov] to finish their education. Our historico-philological faculty was renewed by the appearance of two talented and learned professors.³⁰

One of these was Alfons Walicki (1808–58), a major translator into Polish of Goethe, Hoffmann, Sophocles, Euripides and Aeschylus. The other was Mikhail Lunin (1806–44), Professor of Universal History, and newly returned from two years of study at the University of Berlin.³¹ Lunin's lectures, Kostomarov noted, 'made a tremendous impression on me and made a decisive turning point in my spiritual life: I fell in love with history more than with anything else, and from that time threw myself into studying history books.'³² This is a description of a religious conversion, a complete shift in values and behaviour.

Kostomarov's subsequent life was not easy. His populist approach to history was not welcome in his alma mater; his professorial career at St Vladimir University in Kiev was terminated abruptly in 1847 with a year's incarceration in the dreaded SS. Peter and Paul Fortress, and was followed by a decade of exile in Saratov province. After another brief period as a professor of history at St. Petersburg University from 1859 to 1862, Kostomarov was banned permanently from teaching. Throughout his professional setbacks and personal misfortunes, too numerous to mention here, Kostomarov was heroically faithful to the role of the scholar and by the end of his life, he published over 400 titles that remain at the core of both Ukrainian and Russian historiographies.

Another transformation followed Kostomarov's existential decision to be purposeful and serious, namely, his discovery in 1837 of the peasantry. Once again, this change was facilitated not by independent observation, not by exposure to Hulak-Artemovskiy or the Kharkiv Romantics, but by a close relationship with another of Uvarov's proteges, Izmail Sreznevskii (1812–80).³³ Kostomarov's discovery of the peasantry was remarkable because he was not some aristocrat whose ambience was limited to the salons of St Petersburg and the

spas of Central Europe, and worlds apart from the *narod* – the people. On the contrary, Kostomarov was the bastard son of a Russian landowner and a Ukrainian serf. After the senior Kostomarov's murder by disgruntled serfs, his cousins inflicted several weeks of servitude upon the eleven year old Mykola in order to extort successfully most of the deceased's estate from the young boy's mother.³⁴ Therefore, Kostomarov had first-hand experience with serfdom. He had direct contact with Ukrainian peasants because his mother was one, and they surrounded him in both the province and city of Kharkiv. Furthermore, Kostomarov could have been exposed to an enthusiasm for peasants and for Ukrainian folkways in the house of Hulak-Artemovskiy, who, after all, wrote in the language of the local peasants about peasant heroes. Instead, Kostomarov remained indifferent both to the class and nation of his mother.

It was only Sreznevskii who managed to open Kostomarov's eyes to the peasants around him, and this changed the direction of Kostomarov's new-found seriousness.³⁵ Rather than become a classicist and a universal historian like his mentor, Lunin, Kostomarov hurled himself headlong into a '*khozhdenie v narod*':

Little Russia became my *idée fixe* and this approached eccentricity. At times, I would see a university worker or some other *khokhol*, and begin questioning him, 'what does this word mean?' ... I was possessed by some kind of passion for everything Little Russian. I was beside myself that vulgarians, of whom there were many, spoke with contempt about the *khokhly*, and that any kind of Little Russian word provoked only laughter.³⁶

This transformation led Kostomarov to a rapidly growing corpus of ethnography, for example, Mykhailo Maksymovych's 1827 anthology of Ukrainian songs, as well as to ethnographic *belles-lettres*, such as Gogol's *Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka* and *Taras Bulba*. More importantly to posterity, Kostomarov chose to combine his two new passions, history and the folk. The result was a drastic shift of noetic territory from the customary 'kings, battles and dates' to 'kings, battles, dates *and peasants*', as a legitimate subject of historical inquiry. In our demotic times, there is nothing shocking, unusual or upsetting about such a noetic venue; however, in the late 1830s, this was an intellectually radical choice – and utterly unacceptable even to sympathisers with the folk such as Hulak-Artemovskiy.³⁷

To another member of the Ukrainian triumvirate, Panteleimon Kulish, the role of mentor in the values and ideas of the new Russian

cultural code was played by yet another of Uvarov's proteges, Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–74).³⁸ Maksymovych was the product of an impoverished Poltava gentry family who sought his fortune through higher education. He graduated from Moscow University in 1823 at the age of nineteen; two years later, he began to teach botany there. However, Russian nationalist politics attracted Maksymovych even more: in 1830, at a ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of Moscow University, the provincial Ukrainian read a fiery speech that called for an indigenous Russian educational establishment. Upon becoming Minister of Popular Enlightenment three years later, Uvarov remembered the young botanist-ideologue, fired his parasitic senior professor and elevated Maksymovych from lecturer to senior professor at the age of thirty. When Uvarov chose to relocate the plundered resources of the Polish Vilna University to Kiev in order to create a new Russian university, he also chose Maksymovych as the first rector.

It was Maksymovych who 'discovered' Kulish in 1839 when the obscure provincial *raznochinets* entered St Vladimir University. Notwithstanding Kulish's social status and his inability to pay tuition costs, Maksymovych recruited Kulish for various projects and roles in the effort to Russify the Polish gentry of the three southwestern provinces. So, Kulish was first exposed to his future metier of ethnography by one of its contemporary masters, Maksymovych. Maksymovych introduced Kulish to the world of scholarship and print by involving him in the publication of his journal *Kievlianin*. It was Maksymovych who introduced Kulish to the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott, which became the model of Kulish's most important contributions to Ukrainian literature. Maksymovych found employment for his protégé in one of the Ministry's *gymnasia* in Volyn province, and then in the city of Kiev itself, notwithstanding Kulish's lack of either a university or even a *gymnasium* diploma. Finally, Maksymovych passed Kulish on to the most generous and influential of Uvarov's protégés, the rector of St Petersburg University, tutor of the future Alexander II and Pushkin's most faithful friend, Petr Pletnev.³⁹

Pletnev never could accept Kulish's Ukrainian interests; however, he was civilised enough to agree to disagree on the issue of a distinct Ukrainian literature and identity. This disagreement did not interfere with Pletnev's extraordinary generosity to Kulish: until Kulish found his own quarters upon moving to St Petersburg, he lived with Pletnev. Pletnev found him employment as teacher of Russian both in the

University and a local *gymnasium*. Finally, it was Pletnev who recommended Kulish for one of the most prestigious prizes available to an Imperial scholar: a two-and-a-half year grant (from the Imperial Academy of Sciences) to travel to Slavic lands in order to become a professor of Slavic Studies upon return. This part of Kulish's ambitions was thwarted by his arrest in the SS Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood affair. However, even then, Pletnev did not reject his protégé, and indeed continued to help Kulish financially and through his influential connections when Kulish was in exile in Tula province.

Although Kulish could be an attractive and charming person, he was often difficult and imperious. During the course of his long life, he managed to alienate almost every supporter and friend, including eventually Kostomarov and Shevchenko.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the conditioning that Kulish received from Maksymovych in 1839 and 1840 in the virtues of hard work, in the role of the writer and scholar, in the importance of the Ukrainian language and folk – this conditioning served Kulish well in the many lonely years of either exile or self-inflicted isolation. Like his peers, and sometime friends, Kostomarov and Shevchenko, Kulish acquired in later adolescence from a carrier of the new Russian culture what the American sociologist, David Riesman, calls an 'internal gyroscope',⁴¹ that was not dislodged by the exigencies of a turbulent life.

In the period, 1835–40, Shevchenko's biography differs from that of Kostomarov and Kulish. Although Shevchenko was an employee of Uvarov's Ministry of Popular Enlightenment at the time of his arrest in 1847, Shevchenko's appointment to the Ministry came well after he found his mission as a poet and his subject for poetry in Ukrainian ethnography and history. Shevchenko did not leave any extensive memoirs or autobiographies, but it is clear from his police interrogation that he began to write in 1837.⁴² Also, there is general agreement among his biographers that the person who exposed Shevchenko to *belles-lettres* generally and to Ukrainian *belles-lettres* specifically was Ievhen Hrebinka (1812–48), himself a minor writer in both Russian and Ukrainian.⁴³

An alumnus of the Bezborodko Lycée, Hrebinka was three years younger than his eminent school mate Nicholai Gogol (1809–52). Like Gogol, Hrebinka chose to pursue a literary career in St. Petersburg while making a living in government service, specifically in Uvarov's Ministry of Popular Enlightenment.⁴⁴ Just as Lunin and Sreznevskii were crucial to Kostomarov, and Maksymovych to Kulish, so Hrebinka was crucial in his mentorship of Shevchenko. It was

Hrebinka who introduced Shevchenko to the power and beauty of contemporary Russian and Ukrainian poetry. It was Hrebinka who gave Shevchenko that early encouragement that is so crucial to the development of artistic identity.⁴⁵ It was Hrebinka who tried to exploit his own extensive literary connections in the capital to publish Shevchenko's outpouring of first-class verse, and he succeeded with Shevchenko's first edition of the famous *Kobzar* of 1840.

As Shevchenko's circle of acquaintances, friends and patrons widened, as his fame grew among both Russians and Ukrainians, Hrebinka faded quickly into the shadows of Shevchenko's life. Nevertheless, it is to Hrebinka that belongs the credit of discovering and channelling the immense verbal talents of the previously untutored peasant, Shevchenko. Shevchenko found his persona as a writer in St. Petersburg in the year of Pushkin's death. In his language and choice of subjects, he rapidly became the premier Ukrainian poet. However, in his confidence and in his vision of the writer as a secular-religious figure, Shevchenko was very much the Russian writer on the eve of the 'Magnificent Decade'.

To summarise, I offer the following model of the relationship between the Russian Imperial state and Ukrainian self-consciousness. In the beginning were the peasants. It was their language, their world of symbols, their historical experience that fed the language, the literature, the historiography of both secular Russian and Ukrainian cultures. This point may seem truistic, but, it needs to be made because all too many chauvinists of the Russian persuasion (and many are not even themselves Russian) believe that the Ukrainian language, literature and history were the 'artificial' product of some intellectuals' or even foreign agents' cabal.⁴⁶ However, not even the triumvirate's genius could have created a Ukrainian culture *ex nihilo*.

Secondly, as a result of the influx of foreign ideas and foreigners into the Russian Empire of the 18th century, a new Russian culture began to form among some Russian nobles in the 1760s. This culture was profoundly different from the traditional culture of the Russian peasant, priest and noble in such basic human categories as perceptions of time, place and purpose in life. It was a culture that was historicist: its members placed a high value on exploring the past, but they also had a vision of personal and social progress for the future.⁴⁷ Specialized forms of behaviour, such as reading *belles-lettres* and keeping diaries, became indicators of membership in this culture.

Thirdly, for reasons of state, the Emperor Nicholas in the period 1831 to 1849, especially through the institutions of the Ministry of

Popular Enlightenment, broadcast the language and behavioural norms of this new Russian culture to a far broader audience than could have been reached by isolated individuals. By placing one of the new Russian culture's heroes, Uvarov, at the head of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment, the Emperor pursued an agenda, not only of Russifying the Polish nobility in the nine western provinces, but also of the creation of a body of Russian national knowledge that included archeology, archeography, ethnography and history.

Fourthly, in the period 1835–40, a period of great intellectual ferment and expectations, three socially marginal Ukrainians were recruited into Uvarov's *Kulturkampf*. They found a personal sense of purpose, a sense of dedication to their work and to their nation, as well as to their role as artists and scholars at the hands of Uvarov's missionaries of the new Russian culture.

Fifthly, in the search for a 'usable Russian past' that was central to Uvarov's programme, the Ukrainian triumvirate found an alternative Eastern Slavic identity and history.

In considering the topic of 'The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831–47', I have chosen not to pursue certain *loci classici* of both Russian and Ukrainian historiography. I have not characterised the politics of the Nicholaevan state in exclusively negative terms, nor have I described the Ukrainian triumvirate as martyrs. I have not chosen to pursue Ukrainian-Russian intellectual communications in terms of 'legitimation by association' of Ukrainians with acceptable Russian radicals.⁴⁸ Nor have I attempted to engage in a traditional history of the transmission of ideas – a field that is far from exhausted for this time and place. Rather, I have chosen to focus on values and their transmission. On the individual, the micro-level, this entailed the examination of the period in late adolescence and early manhood when the Ukrainian triumvirate found their personae as artists and scholars. On the societal, the macro-level, this entailed the examination of a new Russian culture that was harnessed by the Emperor to change his country from a cosmopolitan empire to an empire that aspired to be a nation-state. It is a complicated history, but especially in our era of 'new thinking', a history that needs to be explored.

Notes

1. The best bibliography of Kostomarov's work is still N. I. Kostomarov, *Literaturnoe nasledie. Avtobiografiia – stikhotvoreniia – stsény istoricheskie*

- *otryvki – Malorusskaia narodnaia poeziia -poslednaia rabota* (St Petersburg, 1890), pp. 493–521.
2. See George Luckyj, *Panteleimon Kulish. A Sketch of Life and Times* (Boulder, Colorado, 1983), pp. 141–95. The most complete bibliography of Kulish's works remains P. Kyryliuk (ed.), 'Bibliohrafiia prats' P. O. Kulisha ta pysan' pro n'oho', *Vypusk 2. Ukrains'ka bibliohrafiia* (Kiev, 1929).
 3. For a discussion of Shevchenko's and Kulish's roles in the development of literary Ukrainian see George Y. Shevelov, 'Ukrainian', in Alexander M. Schenker and Edward Stankiewicz (ed.), *The Slavic Literary Languages: Formation and Development* (New Haven, 1980), pp. 143–63.
 4. Shevchenko was born a serf. Kostomarov was the bastard son of a Russian noble and a Ukrainian serf. Kulish was a son of a free peasant. For a discussion of the social background of the triumvirate, see my: 'Toward a Historical Sociology of the Ukrainian Ideologues in the Russian Empire of the 1830s and 1840s' (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1976) pp. 119–125.
 5. Between May 1845 and March 1847, Shevchenko was employed by the Kiev Archeographical Commission, and a few days before his arrest in March 1847 was appointed drawing instructor at St Vladimir University in Kiev. See Volodymyr Miiakovs'kyi, 'Kyrylo – Metodiivtsi v Arkheohrafichni komisii' in *Iubileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademyka Mykhaila Serhiievycha Hrushevs'koho*, vol. 1, *Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Ukrains'koi Akademii nauk*, vol. 76 (Kiev, 1928), pp. 312–23. Kostomarov taught at a gymnasium in Rivne, and a year prior to his arrest in March 1847 was appointed to lecture in history at same university. See his *curriculum vitae* in Ts.GIA, f. 733, d. 54, god 1885, pp. 10–17. Kulish taught in gymnasia in Luts'ke, Kiev and St Petersburg, and also at St. Petersburg University. In spring 1846 he received a sizeable grant from the Imperial Academy of Sciences to travel in Slavic lands as preparation for a professorship in Slavic studies. He was arrested in March 1847, in Warsaw, *en route* to Prague. See M. Chalyi, 'Iunye gody P. A. Kulisha,' *Kievskaia starina*, May 1897, pp. 290–99.
 6. Shevchenko's life was ruined by his imprisonment and exile 1847–59. Kostomarov was systematically denied permission to accept invitations to professorships in Kharkiv and St Vladimir Universities. Kulish never managed to resume his intended career as a professor of Slavic studies.
 7. See Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, 'Empires' in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5 (New York, 1968), pp. 41–9; and his *The Political Systems of Empires* (London, 1963), pp. 50–68.
 8. Names such as that of the Scottish Catholic Patrick Gordon (1635–99), the confidant of Peter I, and the Polish Catholic Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861), confidant and Foreign Minister (1804–6) of Alexander I, abound in this period. For a pioneering treatment of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire, see David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985). However, several recent analyses stress the stability and continuity of the Russian Imperial elite from late Muscovite times to 1917. See Brenda Meehan-Waters, *Autocracy and Aristocracy. The Russian Service Elite* (New

- Brunswick, 1982) and Dominic Lieven, *Russia's Rulers under the Old Regime* (New Haven, 1989).
9. The first sixteen members appointed to the Imperial Academy of Sciences in 1725 were all foreigners: thirteen Germans, two Swiss and one Frenchman. See Alexander Vucinich, *Science in Russian Culture*, vol. 1 (Stanford, 1963), pp. 75–125.
 10. See Daniel Beauvois, 'Lumières et Société en Europe de L'Est: L'Université de Vilna et les écoles polonaises de l'Empire Russe 1803–1832' (Doctoral dissertation, University of Paris, 1977) and Mark F. O'Connor, 'Cultures in Conflict: A Case Study in Russian-Polish Relations, the University of Wilno' (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1977).
 11. Remarkably, there is only one biography of S. S. Uvarov published since a lengthy obituary in 1855 by one of his protégés, P. A. Pletnev. See Cynthia Wittaker, *The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855* (DeKalb, 1984). See also P. A. Pletnev, 'Pamiati grafa S. S. Uvarova, prezidenta Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk', *Uchenye zapiski IAN*, vol. I, 1856, pp. liii–cxxv.
 12. For a Russian nationalist interpretation of Czartoryski's 'Trojan horse' in the Russian Empire and the problems it created for Uvarov, see Iu. F. Krachkovskii, *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti vilenskago uchebnago okru-ga za pervyi period ego sushchestvovaniia, 1803 g.–1832 g. Otdel pervyi, 1803 g.–1824 g.* (Vilna, 1905), pp. 532–64. On the Baltic Germans, see Michael H. Haltzel, 'The Baltic Germans' in Edward C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 111–206.
 13. A pioneering work on the relative novelty of modern Russian culture is by Marc Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia. The Eighteenth Century Nobility* (New York, 1966).
 14. See Alexander V. Issatschenko, 'Russian' in Schenker and Stankiewicz, ed. *The Slavic Literary Languages*, p. 119. See also Boris A. Uspenskij, 'The Language Program of N. M. Karamzin and Its Historical Antecedents,' in Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (eds), *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question. Volume II: East Slavic* (New Haven, 1984), pp. 235–96. For a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between a young language and a young literature in the age of Alexander Puskin, see William Mills Todd III, 'A Russian Ideology' in his *Fiction and Society in the Age of Pushkin. Ideology, Institutions and Narrative* (Cambridge, MA, 1986), pp. 10–44.
 15. For a history of the Russian Imperial archives see Vladimir Stepanovich Ikonnikov, *Opyt russkoi istoriografii. Tom pervyi, kniga pervaiia* (Kiev, 1891), pp. 100–577. The provision of textbooks, especially in Russian history, is dealt with in *Desiatiletie Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniia 1833–1843. (Zapiska predstavlennaia Imperatoru Nikolaiu Pavlovichu Ministrom Narodnago Prosveshcheniia nadpis'iu Ego Velichestva 'Chital s udovol'stviem')* (St Petersburg, 1864), pp. 115–88.
 16. Nicholas's negative image in Western Europe begins with the propaganda war waged against the Empire by various members of the 'Wielka Emigracja' (actually about 5000 men) that clustered in Paris, Brussels and London after the failed 1830–1 revolt. For their bibliography see

- Bibliografia Historii Polski XIX Wieku, II, 1832–1864. Czesc III, Wolumen I*, Wladyslaw Chojnacki (ed.), (Wroclaw, et al., 1974), pp. 3–286. The anti-Nicholaevan tradition was enhanced by subsequent texts such as the best-seller of Astolphe de Custine, *La Russie en 1839* and Alexander Herzen's *Byloe i Dumy*. After Nicholas's death, the uniformly negative interpretation of his reign was propagated by several generations of Russian historians, including M. I. Semevskii (1837–92), M. K. Lemke (1872–1923), A. E. Presniakov (1870–1929) and M. N. Pokrovskii (1868–1932).
17. For example, one of the champions of the anti-Nicholaevan historiography, M. K. Lemke, characterises the period 1848–55 as the 'epoch of censorship terror' in his *Ocherki po istorii russkoi tsenzury i zhurnalistiki xix stolietia* (St Petersburg, 1904). An extreme term such as 'terror' is contradicted by bibliometric data: Imperial book production went from 879 titles in 1848, down to 696 in 1850 and more than recovered to 1039 in 1852 and 1162 in 1854. See M. N. Kufaeu, *Istoriia russkoi knigi v xix veke* (Leningrad, 1927), p. 350.
 18. On Uvarov's efforts to make the Academy of Sciences and the Imperial universities Russian in personnel equal to the best Western European institutions, see Whittaker, *The Origins of Modern Russian Education*, pp. 152–88 and Pelech, 'Toward a Historical Sociology', pp. 70–118.
 19. On Novosiltsev (1762–1838) see Daniel L. Schaflly, 'Novosil'tsev, Nikolai Nikolaevich' in *Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, vol. 25, 1981, pp. 120–23. On Karamzin see Joseph L. Black, *Nicholas Karamzin and Russian Society in the Nineteenth Century. A Study in Russian Political and Historical Thought* (Toronto, 1975) and Iurii M. Lotman, *Sotvorenie Karamzina* (Moscow, 1987).
 20. Of course, there are many definitions of the word 'culture'. I draw mine from Iurii M. Lotman and Boris A. Uspenskii, 'Binary Models in the Dynamics of Russian Culture (to the End of the Eighteenth Century)' in Alexander D. and Alice S. Nakhimovsky (eds), *The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History* (Ithaca, 1985), p. 30. On the concept of shared memory, see Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 1–40.
 21. Boris Gasparov, 'Introduction' in Nakhimovsky and Nakhimovsky, *The Semiotics*, p. 16–17.
 22. The first book printed in Muscovy appeared in 1564 – eleven decades after Gutenberg's Bible. In the entire 17th century, Muscovy produced fewer than 500 titles. Peter's *dirigisme* had little effect on Russians' indifference to reading. For example, in the period 1725–54, the Empire produced fewer than 900 titles. Printing 'took off' in the reign of Catherine II, so that by the early 1790s, the Empire produced as many titles as France (approximately 370 titles annually). See Gary Marker, *Publishing, Printing, and the Origins of Intellectual Life in Russia, 1700–1800* (Princeton, 1985). On French bibliographic data see Robert Estivals, *La Statistique Bibliographique de la France sous La Monarchie au xviiiè siècle* (Paris, 1965), p. 415.
 23. On literacy in the Empire see A. G. Rashin, 'Gramotnost' i narodnoe obrazovanie v Rossii v xix i nachala xx veka', *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 37, 1951, p. 49. French bibliometric data are from Estivals, *La Statistique*,

- p. 415 and data for the Russian Empire are from M. V. Muratov, *Knizhnoe delo v Rossii v xix i xx vekakh* (Moscow–Leningrad, 1931), pp. 204–6. According to Estivals and Muratov, respectively, in 1913, France published 11560 titles, and the Russian Empire, 34 006.
24. The best bibliography on published Russian diaries, memoirs and autobiographies is P. A. Zaionchkovskii (ed.), *Istoriia dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii v dnevnikh i vospominaniakh. T. I : XV–XVIII veka* (Moscow, 1976). For a study based on this source, see Orest Pelech, 'Russia's Fall into Time', paper delivered to the international conference, 'Soviet Culture Today: Restructuring the Past or Inventing the Future?', Duke University, 29–31 March 1990. (To be published in Thomas Lahusen, ed. *Soviet Culture Today: Restructuring the Past or Inventing the Future?*, Duke University Press, 1991.) On some theoretical aspects of the genre of the diary see Felicity A. Nussbaum, 'Toward Conceptualizing Diary' in James B. Olney (ed.), *Studies in Autobiography* (New York–Oxford, 1988), pp. 128–40.
 25. Pelech, 'Russia's Fall into Time'.
 26. This tradition was ossified into a canon of intellectual history no later than the 1900s by masterful historian-propagandists such as R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik (1878–1946), D. M. Ovsianiko-Kulikovskii (1853–1920) and G. V. Plekhanov (1856–1918).
 27. Very little has been written about Arzamas, notwithstanding the fact that the group included a 'who's who' of noble-born Russian intellectuals in the period of its existence (1815–18). For a brief introduction see Lauren Leighton, 'Arzamas' in *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet Literature*, vol. 1 (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1977), pp. 229–33. For primary materials see M. S. Borovkova-Maikova (ed.), *Arzamas i arzamasskie protokoly* (Leningrad, 1933).
 28. Whittaker, *The Origins of Modern Russian Education*, pp. 135–7.
 29. See R. Steven Turner, 'The Prussian Universities and the Research Imperative' (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1973). Using the new university at Kiev, Uvarov wrote its charter first, and then copied it for the other Imperial universities with minor variants. See Pelech, 'Towards a Historical Sociology', pp. 114–17.
 30. Cited in Pelech, *ibid.*, p. 147.
 31. On Lunin see V. P. Buzeskul, *Isticheskie etudy* (St Petersburg, 1911), pp. 248–301.
 32. Cited in Pelech, 'Towards a Historical Sociology', p. 147.
 33. The best biography of Sreznevskii is still that written by his son. See V. I. Sreznevskii, 'Sreznevskii, Izmail Ivanovich' in *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'*, *Smelovskii-Suvorina* (St Petersburg, 1909), pp. 276–98.
 34. The surviving court documents on this case were published and analysed by G. Vashkevich, 'K biografii N. I. Kostomarov', *Kievskaja starina*, November 1898, pp. 207–17.
 35. N. I. Kostomarov, *Avtobiografiia N. I. Kostomarova* (ed.) V. Kotel'nikov (Moscow, 1922), p. 149 and N. I. Kostomarov, *Isticheskie proizvedeniia. Avtobiografiia* (ed.) V. A. Zamlinskii (Kiev, 1989), p. 447.
 36. N. I. Kostomarov, 'Avtobiografiia Nikolaia Ivanovicha Kostomarova (ed.) V. Semevskii, *Russkaia mysl'*, May 1885, p. 203.

37. Kostomarov's dissertation, *Ob istoricheskom znachenii russkoi narodnoi poezii* (1843) was based almost exclusively on ethnographical material, and for that reason, was bitterly opposed by most of Kharkiv University's historians, including Hulak-Artemovskiy, but not Lunin. For Kostomarov's account of this episode see Kostomarov, 'Avtobiografiia', p. 206.
38. On Maksymovych see S. Ponomarev, 'Mikhail Aleksandrovich Maksimovich (Biograficheskii i istoriko-literaturnyi ocherk)' in *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnago prosveshcheniia*, October 1871, pp. 175-249 and D. F. Ostrianin, *Svitohliad M. O. Maksymovycha* (Kiev, 1960).
39. V. Shenrok, 'P.A. Kulish. Biograficheskii ocherk', *Kievskaiia starina*, February 1901, pp. 153-79.
40. Virtually every scholar of Kulish has expressed bafflement at the twists and turns of Kulish's moods and behaviour. For a dispassionate discussion of Kulish's personality, see Luckyj, *Panteleimon Kulish*, pp.194-5.
41. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd. A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, 1950), p. 25.
42. 'Voprosy predlozhennyye khudozhniku Shevchenko Aprel' 21 dnia 1847 g.', in *Taras Shevchenko, Dokumenty i materialy* (Kiev, 1963), pp. 41-8.
43. On the relationship between Shevchenko and Hrebinka, see P. Fylypovych, 'Shevchenko i Hrebinka', *Ukraina*, nos. 1-2, 1925, pp. 24-36.
44. See S. D. Zubkov, *Ievhen Pavlovych Hrebinka* (Kiev, 1962), pp. 20-2.
45. For an impecunious provincial, Hrebinka seems to have made a remarkable number of contacts in a brief time in the literary *beau monde* of 1830s St Petersburg. Much of this network he passed on to Shevchenko. Hrebinka's contacts helped in speeding *Kobzar* through the censorship: the censor of the epochal book was Professor P. Korsakov, a friend of Hrebinka's. See *ibid.*, pp. 28-9.
46. For a valuable compendium of this position, see N. I. Ul'ianov, *Proizkhohzhenie ukrainskago separatizma* (New York, 1966).
47. In pursuing the progress of the collective, members of the new Russian culture did not neglect their own intellectual development. For example, while he was Minister of Popular Enlightenment and President of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, Uvarov found the time to be tutored in Greek by Professor Grafe of St Petersburg University. After the end of his career in the Ministry and two years before his death, Uvarov defended a master's thesis on the origins of the Bulgarians! See Whittaker, *The Origins of Modern Russian Education*, pp. 240-1.
48. For example E. S. Shabliovskii, 'N. I. Kostomarov v gody revoliutsionnoi situatsii (1859-61)' in M. V. Nechkina (ed.), *Revolutsionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859-1861 gg.* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 101-23. By the end of the article by this eminent Soviet Ukrainian literary historian, the reader is left with the impression that Kostomarov's friendship with Chernyshevskii was the culmination of the historian's life.

2 From Savage Ukrainian Steppe to Quiet Russian Field: Ukrainian Ethnographers and Imperial Russia in the Reform Era

Catherine B. Clay

In the nineteenth century educated Ukrainians began to define the meaning of the Ukrainian nation for the Russian empire. In doing so, they turned to a study of the Ukrainian *narod* (people).¹ In 1855 two Ukrainian ethnographers joined this ongoing inquiry. Hitherto, educated people and state servitors had asked two kinds of questions about the common people: what was the *narod* (in order to know what it meant to be 'Russian,' or 'Ukrainian,' or 'Slavic'); and how could the *narod* be controlled as a resource for taxes and conscripts? Questions of romantic nationalism and imperial finance merged in this official and unofficial redefinition of *narodnost'*. A third and more pressing question for the empire emerged from this inquiry: how should the modern empire accommodate nation? Two Ukrainian ethnographers took advantage of the reform era, that brief moment of *glasnost'* and *perestroika* of the last century, to offer answers to that question.

In 1855, questions of imperial reform preoccupied the new Naval Minister, the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich. He envisioned an Empire that would accommodate nation, region and locality. He was convinced that the reforming Empire must rely on educated indigenous talent who must be given a free rein to investigate and disseminate their findings. His vision led to the Ethnographic Expedition of the Russian Imperial Naval Ministry and he commissioned ethnographers on *komandirovka*, or scholarly expeditions. He invited them to report their findings according to 'their own personal discretion',² especially concerning the regions' potential to offer the Navy and the Empire a

prosperous future. Two of the eight commissioned ethnographers, both Ukrainians, investigated the way of life in Ukraine, and wrote reports for the *Naval Collection* which gave a nuanced Ukrainian commentary on imperial reform.

G. P. Danilevskii and A. S. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii were born in 1829 and 1817 into Ukrainian landholding families of Poltava and Kharkiv respectively. After their university education, they wrote and served in the government. Their scholarly, journalistic and literary work of the 1840s and 1850s focused on local conditions and the lives of the common people. The Grand Duke believed that such work prepared them for their *komandirovka*. Furthermore, their service in the Imperial Russian bureaucracy showed loyalty to the empire.³ Their government experience meant they were familiar with the language and culture of the bureaucracy, and would know their intended audience well. Thus, in 1855, the Grand Duke and his Naval Ministry offered them ethnographic commissions.

The fact that the two Ukrainians were commissioned by the Imperial state illustrates the astonishing degree of change in the political climate represented by the reform era. The commission of the two Ukrainian ethnographers came only six years after the break-up of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. Danilevskii and Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii resumed the earlier efforts of Panteleimon Kulish, Mykhailo Maksymovych, Taras Shevchenko and others to study ethnicity and reformulate the relationship between south and the north in Imperial Russia.⁴ Such efforts had introduced Imperial Russia to a wider world of slavdom. Like many other Ukrainians in the empire, the two ethnographers, without being Ukrainian nationalists in the modern sense, expressed their Ukrainian identity in a new way.⁵

In their reports, the two Ukrainians stressed the authority of local ways against the centralising tendencies of the Imperial state, much like the 'federalist' or 'provincial ideologist' historians Afanasii Shchapov and Mykola Kostomarov had done in the 1850s and 1860s, and as did most of the other naval ethnographers of 1855.

Danilevskii investigated *chumaky* (in Russian, *chumaki*) or Ukrainian ox-cart drivers of the 'the Imperial southwest'. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii studied people living along the Dnieper.⁶ Both investigated the history and character of the people, their heroes, religiosity, workways and law. These aspects of life along the Dnieper served to organise Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii's policy directives: to prosper, Imperial Russia should accommodate Ukrainian history, law, knowledge and people in

its reforms. For Danilevskii, each of the aspects of *chumaky* life represented crucial elements of a culture that must be preserved if Ukraine were to survive.

Danilevskii and Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii combined ethnography with history in a new way. They asked how past mores differentiated one people from another. They argued that Ukraine had its own neglected history. Indirectly they were refuting Vissarion Belinskii, the influential culture broker and critic. Belinskii attacked the idea of Ukraine in a review of M. Markovych's *Istoriia Malorossii* published in Moscow in 1842–3. Advancing Russian statist arguments, Belinskii maintained that 'Little Russians' were 'only a tribe, never a people, even less a state'. The story of the tribe's past showed they were 'previously cut off [from civilisation] by the insurmountable obstacle of [their] semi-barbaric life-style'.⁷

Both 1855 ethnographers showed a different history and a different people. Danilevskii criticised prevailing historical representations and judgments which he argued were shaped by regional hatred. He reported that anecdotes circulating in Moscow about the 'slyness and laziness of *chumaki*...are adroit inventions'.⁸ For Danilevskii, the *chumaky*, infused with the traditional Ukrainian cossack spirit, represented the essence of the Ukrainian *narod*. Danilevskii noted that 'Little Russian' folk songs and tales treated *chumaky* as heroes. They had tamed the steppe, something the Russian empire should acknowledge. A romantic, Danilevskii maintained that life on the steppe was better before the imposition of Russian control. Imperial taming of the steppe through violence and the establishment of bureaucratic rule had reduced the Ukrainian people to complacency.

Danilevskii maintained that the memory of the 'Little Russian' or Ukrainian past was important. He wrote about Ukraine in terms of 'our history', 'our heroes', not within the context of tsars and Russians. 'Pathfinder Little Russian' leaders in a violent steppe world; society and law as it had developed in the region; the *sich* (Cossack commune) and *sud* (traditional court); these were the agents which held back the forces of disorder. He offered a special blend of cultural nationalism and a resigned, realistic assessment of the future being brought by Imperial progress and modernisation. 'The steppe, the savage Ukrainian steppe, is becoming simply a quiet Russian field,' he lamented.⁹

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii observed such 'quieting' of the Ukrainian *narod* with far less remorse than Danilevskii. He welcomed modern ways and did not fear their influence on the Ukrainian way of life. He

was, however, disquieted by the loss of concern for communal well-being, and believed this could be corrected by maintaining or revising certain traditions. He remained an advocate of modernisation and Ukrainian assimilation into Imperial Russia. Though something was lost in the process, he welcomed Tsarist Russian hegemony because of the order and security it seemed to ensure.

Like Danilevskii, Afanasev Chuzhbinskii argued that the Little Russian *narod* was entitled to an honest account of its distinct and glorious history. 'Several critics not so long ago inappropriately mocked the entire Little Russian tribe, I do not know to what purpose....' He criticised writers who considered Little Russians as 'slaves' or dismissed them as being most famous 'for the ability to play a role in some kind of comic story'. He asserted, 'The good hospitable Little Russia, before merging forever with Northern Rus', had its own history, eloquent pages which are worth both enlightened attention and warm interest.'¹⁰

Ukraine had a right to 'an unprejudiced history' since it had 'joined itself to the One Belief and One Tribe'.¹¹ Later he wrote, 'It is impossible not to be sad that the best episode from the life of Little Russia remains in the shadow and anyone who takes it into his head to reproach and mock it, is wrong.'¹² 'Imprints of tribal hatred' had sometimes distorted the work of Russian and Polish historians. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii aimed to redress that, and believed Ukrainian historians and ethnographers had a special duty 'to avoid wrath and artificial fervor... , be thoughtful about every fact and present each in such a light that things are called by their proper names'.¹³ This was the method he advocated in writing Ukrainian history. He felt that Danilevskii at times succumbed to 'artificial fervor'.

Both ethnographers believed Ukrainians must reconstitute their heroic history. Both responded to attacks or dismissals of the ethnic cultural heritage and history, in much the same way that Russian Slavophiles had responded to Piotr Chaadaev decades before.

Although Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii and Danilevskii wrote about 'sword and scythe' in their accounts of Ukraine's past and present, they differed in their evaluation of the heroes of this land. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii aimed to flesh out the image of the Little Russian character by showing 'the way of life of this tribe which, exchanging lance and sword for plough and scythe, peacefully occupy themselves with their work in locales where terrible bloody dramas were played out in the past centuries'. Peaceful productivity, that quintessential Ukrainian trait, would contribute significantly to a prosperous

imperial future. His cultural, social and religious analysis was framed by this point of view. He placed the highest value on a docile, hard-working *narod*, held together in quiet family lives, assimilated or integrated to support the imperial future.

Danilevskii's account of the quieting of the steppe was somewhat different. He emphasised the unity of 'sword and scythe' in the *chumak* traditions, drawing on Kostomarov's work on the origins of Little Russia.

Popular demand called Cossacks to action; and *chumaky* created Little Russia, its social needs and popular spirit. Little Russia ended its warlike vocation; a new era began. The sword was replaced by the scythe, the gun by the plough.

But the wild Ukrainian steppe maintained its imprint on the Ukrainian people.

Could the Little Russian *narod*, playing such a tragic role, forget it quickly? Nature loves gradual change. Thus, the Cossack gradually settled in little settlements and he became a *chumak* and barge-hauler. The *chumak*, though by occupation a muzhik [peasant], is by spirit a Cossack.¹⁴

For Danilevskii, the *chumak*, having taken up the scythe, had not forgotten the sword.

Danilevskii and Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii differed on whom they considered to be heroes of Ukrainian history. The romantic Danilevskii recalled that Shapka, the first otaman (ataman) trailblazer, had traversed the Ukrainian steppe when there were no roads, with caravans of salt for the Crimea, fish for the Don, grain for Zaporizhia and other goods for Ochakov. In the eyes of the settled Zaporozhian dwellers and nomadic people alike, Shapka was the essential *chumak*; 'a pathfinder of the Ukrainian wilderness', who had earned respect for his bravery and knowledge of the wilderness.¹⁵ Danilevskii told the story of a *chumak* in the naked steppe, tar-covered, a gun in hand – with a little bag around his neck holding an Imperial passport – facing plague, foul reptiles, and savage Nogai Tatars.

Imperial power stopped at the frontier. In the past, the power of the official note allowing passage, whether printed in Russian or Turkish, did not extend into the land of the nomadic steppe tribes. The *chumaky* 'crossed the frontier and bravely met their enemies'. Danilevskii

venerated the frontier experience of the *chumaky*. However, by 1855, 'Modern times changed the *chumaky*... Crimean and Nogai Tatars have been suppressed. In the steppe, wells have been dug everywhere and the population is booming. But the memory of the original *chumaky* has not disappeared.'¹⁶ *Chumak* families attempted valiantly to maintain their traditions in song, memory, language, work and religion.

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii opposed Danilevskii's romanticism.¹⁷ He emphasised the positive role of Imperial leaders such as Prince Potemkin, 'creator of New Russia', and founder of Kherson. However, Imperial power would be enhanced if educated Ukrainians were included in a new partnership.¹⁸

He argued that 'the Cossack way of life passed' with the 'destruction of savage neighbors and it would be absurd to pity the disappearance of coarse boldness based on physical force'. Cossack heroes deserved an honoured place in the historical record. However, the Imperial ethos required a balanced approach. 'We, their remote offspring, should not find all the activity of the [Cossacks] irreproachable.' This was 'pseudo-patriotism'. He granted that 'the very destruction of the Sich in 1775 [by the Imperial Government] was accomplished in a dishonorable way'. But, 'the Sich was already not only superfluous, but also onerous for the government'. It was an outmoded institution that barred the march of progress. Those who resisted Imperial Russia deserved to be overcome.

Imperial leaders, Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii argued, were agents of modernisation, whereas traditional leaders (in the Caucasus, he hastened to add) only excelled in military matters and despotism, qualities fostered by conditions of uncertainty. Ukraine and the Russian empire were ready for progressive, modern leadership. 'Look at the land of Don Cossacks. What a rich region! What material treasure it has!' However, the Empire needed the support of local elites for this potential to be realised. He contrasted modern settlements with the traditional kind. Potemkin constructed Kherson in a modern way, and it prospered. On the other hand, an ataman, a sword-carrying leader like Shapka, had founded Cherkask in the traditional manner. 'Cherkask itself, arising from the whim of one ataman, does not have water and cannot be praised for being well-constructed, although whole working regiments were in its service on a daily basis.'¹⁹

In the modern era, Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii argued, wise governance by modern-day heroes, and local enlightened people acting in partner-

ship with the reforming empire could bring effective economic modernisation. Prosperity depended on the degree of enlightenment of those at the top of the social hierarchy.²⁰ Modernity allowed man, through science and rationality, to make the best of natural resources to enrich and better the life of the empire.

The two ethnographers also examined Ukrainian religiosity, and their distinctive approaches were also reflected here. Danilevskii hoped to represent and preserve *chumak* religiosity in the Imperial *mentalité*. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii, by contrast, focussed on the development of a modern imperial religious policy.

Fascinated by the smallest details of the *chumak* way of life, Danilevskii noticed how their devotional experience was interwoven in the whole fabric of their life and work; formalised 'Orthodoxy' held no special meaning for the people.

Like Danilevskii, Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii also presented religiosity as part of the life of the Ukrainian people, so evident in their prayers about planting and harvesting crops, in their icon corner with 'iron case and icon adorned with flowers, mainly cornflowers and carnations'. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii found the veneration of nature to be widespread among the people.

He reported on the often uneasy co-existence of various religious communities, Orthodox Ukrainian, Old Ritual Great Russians, Jews, German Catholic and Mennonite colonies and Tatar settlements. He placed the highest value on religiosity that fostered economic productivity, social cohesion and integration into the imperial future.²¹

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii was pleased to observe that even erstwhile Old-Ritualists had found some use for the Orthodox institutions of parish church and music-loving priest.

The parish church is sometimes useful to them to render justice; it is not only well-decorated, but for a village, even luxurious.... The old priest, who fusses a lot around the adorned church, has organized a sizable and rather good choir from the schoolboys; they come together thus, under the spontaneity of his command, and because of this, other villages envy Kamenka, since in most other villages, there is only one decrepit reader in the choir who sings all the liturgies (usually in a lifeless voice).²²

Like others who wished for an Orthodox revival, he suggested that the Empire needed more such conscientious parish priests.²³ The church could offer a location for judicial proceedings and provide continuity

and much needed community services in a backward but rapidly changing society. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii believed this kind of church could contribute to imperial prosperity.

An Orthodox revival was important to Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii because he was concerned about religious obscurantism and alcoholism. Thus he favoured religiosity that unified and supported modernisation, temperance and enlightenment. He believed the empire should appreciate resourceful Ukrainian Orthodox parish priests who, by organising village choirs and adorning their churches, contributed to imperial cultural unity.

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii's and Danilevskii's investigation of Ukrainian workways showed most clearly their differences in defining Ukraine's place in the Empire.

Danilevskii focussed on recording for an Imperial audience and posterity the fast disappearing workways of a unique Ukrainian group. *Chumaky* were doomed to extinction. Railroads were destroying *chumak* work. The *chumaky* 'have maintained much that is original and distinctive [about the Ukrainian people]'.²⁴ He voiced his concern, and reported to the Ministry the anguish of many *chumaky* about the changing world around them.²⁵ Danilevskii offered no solutions to the dilemma. He merely took solace in the fact that 'the free untrammelled steppe' had left an impact on the people who lived there. 'There are still families . . . where grandfathers, fathers, sons, grandsons and great-grandsons live and work as *chumaky* and transfer legends and traditions about workways from . . . generation to generation, and maintain this memory in popular songs.'²⁶

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii, by contrast, studied workways to see how Ukraine could become integrated into the Imperial economic and social order. He investigated farming methods and offered advice on how to improve the Ukrainian village economy.²⁷ He paid particular attention to the practices of foreign colonists.²⁸ He discussed modern developments that fostered trade, such as railroads, steamships and canals. Unlike Danilevskii, he believed technology was the way of the future. He took seriously the original request of the Naval Minister to point out what would help bring the Navy and the Russian Empire prosperity.

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii saw the Ukrainian village as part of a developing imperial commercial economy, and noted that some adapted more effectively than others. He contrasted the stagnation of a traditional agrarian colony with the prosperity of the villages engaged in shipping and trade.²⁹ Vasylivka, an example of the former,

lacked wharfs or docks which would facilitate trade. Its inhabitants led a paltry existence by farming and breeding cattle. Mykolaiv, on the other hand, through wise governance, achieved prosperity and its people 'lived in clover'. A canal had changed the social and economic organisation of the town, making the people wealthy.

Trade, economic diversification, wharfs, canals and barges, built and operated by a productive peasantry and resourceful villagers working for enlightened upper classes in partnership with the new modernising imperial government: these were the ingredients for prosperity which Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii offered landholders, including the largest landholder, the Tsar and the state. Imperial policy should incorporate local people, their talents and strengths to develop and implement such policy, and then assist the population in adapting to the new era. Make the region prosperous, and the Empire will also prosper, he argued.

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii advocated a careful balancing of local tradition and knowledge with Imperial interest in the process of modernisation. He gave a specific instance where such a policy was urgently needed, namely, in the attempt to build a canal on the Dnieper to circumvent the four rapids. Building commissions had been short-sighted because they ignored history. He advised the engineering branch of the Naval Ministry to consider using the old Cossack trail. Furthermore, imperial bureaucrats would do well to study the past when they made maps too. Because 'official people' did not pay attention to Ukrainian names, they could not produce good maps.³⁰ Local knowledge and local enlightened people were essential if modernisation and prosperity were to be achieved.

In their examination of workways, both ethnographers believed that the state should restrain the tyranny and arbitrary rule of local landowners. The difference between the two lay in the fact that while Danilevskii entertained a romantic hope that traditional workways could be retained in the new scheme of things, Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii believed that an enlightened Imperial state, enlightened local proprietors and enterprising people should co-operate in forging a better future. However, the reports of both implied that any new Imperial ethos must find accommodation with the distinctive regional ethos.

The two Ukrainian ethnographers also studied Ukrainian customary law. They respected traditional ways of keeping order and shared an ambivalence towards Imperial law and conflict resolution. Even the imperialist Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii believed that the Imperial Russian order, hierarchical and authoritative as it was, was more violent, less

just and less effective than local customs. The two ethnographers characteristically differed on how to respond to the unjust and corrupt order. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii hoped to influence and aid the new reforming government, while Danilevskii seemed resigned to its unchanging character.

Danilevskii examined past ways of keeping order, and contrasted them with contemporary practice. 'When ... two Cossacks argued in the winter camp, or when crops were trampled by cattle, both [bought] fancy bread in the bazaar and [went] to the neighborhood court of the Cossack settlement ...'³¹ Having received the bread, the court listened to both sides, and the affair would end peacefully and honourably because the court understood the realities of a subsistence economy and compromise solutions would be found. Traditional law testified to the ingenuity and mildness of the people, and it maintained peace, honour and dignity.

Danilevskii contrasted this dignified procedure to the more recent patterns of resolving disputes. The same 'litigants' bought the same fancy bread, but by the end of the affair they would have had to purchase many more as the case moved from one hierarchy to another to another, until at the highest echelon, the offender was ignominiously thrown down and beaten with sticks by order of the chief ataman until he confessed and made the necessary pledges. The message was clear: with the advent of the so-called new justice, coercion and bureaucratic violence had replaced persuasion and communal resolution.

Proizvol or arbitrary rule was the main charge Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii levelled at authorities in the locales he investigated. Imperial governance must not tolerate *proizvol*, for it contradicted the very nature of Imperial expansion, whose historical role was to create order out of disorder. The arbitrary rule of some officials was the most serious obstacle to progress: 'The spirit of force and intolerance under the influence of arbitrary rule of bureaucrats' threatened the established order.³²

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii presented several instances of injustice. Inhabitants were not compensated as promised for carts taken during the Crimean war. 'Money was sent for distribution among the inhabitants, but it did not reach its destination.'³³ People were ill-informed about government decrees on free movement and free land, and they did not know about the abolition of these temporary freedoms. Some peasants packed up and moved to new land, only to be seized by a new landowner acting under the terms of a new cadastral survey. The landowners simply impounded movable goods

or stock. While the peasants' cases were pending, the landowners forced these aspiring free settlers to work for them. When courts were finally held to decide the land and serf ownership issues, justice was administered by other landholders or bureaucrats who sympathised with the local landowners.³⁴

When he presented another example of the way the people experienced *proizvol*, he provided an image of a lawsuit, a peasant Jarndyce and Jarndyce straight out of Dickens' *Bleak House*. In 1841, a merchant Agarkov wilfully took 75 head of cattle from Golubov, and 'in spite of all the evidence and eyewitnesses', the case 'dragged on' in the courts for seventeen years.³⁵ Reams of over-complicated documents were produced, however 'no action at all was taken by the judicial officials!'³⁶ 'This highly edifying case bears witness to the conditions of our justice, especially in the unknown and remote village communes,' he wrote.³⁷

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii advocated a liberal-imperialist conception of people 'under' the law, and where the law was 'above' the daily, ethnic realities.³⁸ He believed that enlightened law created enlightened society. A productive and adaptive Ukrainian people were a critical ingredient in his recipe for Imperial prosperity. While he believed that the empire steered Ukraine to progress and prosperity, current abuses in the Imperial order threatened progress when they alienated local people.

He understood that people became passive under abusive government. Fearful, humble slave-like servitude characterised the countryside's relation to the state. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii reported how he had to explain to the people along the Dnieper that bureaucrats and military officers did not have the right to live off the land nor demand anything without paying for it, even if the peasant had wealth beyond mere subsistence.³⁹

Danilevskii noted that under 'the new justice', the old mildness of the Ukrainian people was replaced by a distinctive kind of placidity or complacency. This was a new kind of alienation which both Danilevskii and Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii implied would bode ill for Ukraine and the Empire.

Like Danilevskii, Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii had little use for the ineffective, wasteful, conflict resolution procedures of the Imperial bureaucracy. However, he placed his hopes in the new enlightened Imperial Russian leadership of the reform era to initiate a just and effective law system in Ukraine. Danilevskii, however, expressed few such hopes.

When Danilevskii and Afanasev-Chuzhbinski discussed the question of law, or other issues, they upheld a new view of the place and future of Ukraine in the Empire. The predominant view, exemplified by 'Muscovites' like Belinskii, maintained that 'Little Russia' had no alternative but to submit to imperial domination, and had little or nothing of its own to offer to the empire and humanity. The two ethnographers, while partners in attempting to revise this opinion, foresaw different effects of Ukrainian assimilation into the modern Empire.

Danilevskii's work often implied that Ukraine's future in the Russian Empire was bleak. At other moments he seemed to believe that perhaps in the reform era Ukraine's salvation lay in the appreciation and preservation of traditional ways. He clearly did not consider the Imperial bureaucracy as an agent of modernity. The only question that interested him was whether the *chumaky* could resist modernity's degenerating influence by continuing to maintain their customs. He thought this was unlikely and the fate of the *chumaky* served as his index for the fate of Ukraine. His reports provided readers with fleeting glimpses of degeneration, erosion, taming – the process whereby the steppe became 'a quiet Russian field'.

By contrast, Ukrainian history and ethnography taught Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii that Ukraine was better off under an enlightened Imperial Russia. He judged harshly the steppe pirates and their displays of 'cruelty and savage mockery, and the uncurbed and beast-like arbitrariness that might come into their head'. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii's view was that Danilevskii's Shapka and *chumaky* had learned too much from the 'savage Nogai' on the 'naked steppe'.

For Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii, that which was indeed a 'glorious, independent history' before the eighteenth century naturally culminated in purposeful, pluralistic unity with the empire. Ukraine should continue on that path, offering the reforming empire several necessary ingredients for prosperity. He wrote that although once 'Little Russia' convulsively seized on the concept of independence, however, 'from the time of Peter I, she recovered, and with one heart realized that . . . there is not one tribe inhabiting our huge Empire that had more need to defend itself against unjust attacks'.⁴⁰ Any movement for political autonomy was unnatural, almost a convulsion. Imperial protection was critical for Ukraine. It joined the empire to defend itself more effectively. Once secure there, Ukraine would flow into 'the ocean of humanity'. While love of independence was a strong trait among the

'Little Russians'. in the future they must and would assimilate. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii argued.

Zaporozhe no longer exists; Little Russia has completely merged with Russia and is one of the best grain-producing provinces in the empire; our tribe works in all walks of life of the state; a multitude of households which share one life; finally the rays of civilization begin to smooth away the sharp differentiating features.⁴¹

The empire would civilise and modernise, and 'Little Russia' would prosper as part of a developing Imperial culture.

Both Danilevskii and Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii showed a concern for the region and its people in all their detail and singularity. The ethnographers gave identities to the people they investigated, so that they would no longer appear as faceless obstacles in the way of progress. They recorded the conversations, and the people working on the Dnieper thus came to the attention of educated Russians in the capital. Both stressed the authority of local ways and importance of local people against some centralising tendencies of the Imperial state.

The two ethnographers formulated essentially similar criticisms of imperial arbitrariness and faceless bureaucratic hierarchy. Both recognised modernity as a steamroller, riding roughshod over traditions, imposing uniformity and turning the Ukrainian people into a faceless mass. Both advocated retaining a persuasive, community-based method of conflict resolution rather than the existing hierarchical authoritarian system.

The image of Ukrainian history and people that arises from the combined reports testifies to the emerging sense of national differentiation in response to potential accommodation by the empire. Perhaps when writers under Nicholas I or Alexander III wrote about a historical 'Rus' not led by Moscow or Petersburg, the word had 'anti-government implications'.⁴² In the era of the Great Reforms, however, those who used such terms hoped to force acknowledgement of the Ukrainian nation from the reforming Imperial state and inject 'Ukrainianism' into 'official nationality'. The two ethnographers shared this goal. They felt the reform era offered an invitation to raise the new question of imperial accommodation of nation.

Clearly, they differed on several issues, especially on what the transition represented by the reform era meant for Ukraine, and what form the accommodation between nation and Empire might take.

Their differences originated in the something akin to the struggle between Slavophiles and Westerners. Danilevskii continued to be drawn to the earlier question of nation and traditional culture, while Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii was influenced by the questions of fiscal and military control.⁴³ Danilevskii suggested that Imperial servitors should be both attentive to and respectful of *narodnyi byt* (popular way of life) and regional memory. He valued local tradition, local memory and local order that were in tension with Imperial tradition and Imperial order. He was far more ambivalent about modernity and empire, seeing only a potential tragedy and loss of a 'nation' in the inevitable modernisation and alienation.

Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii advocated enlightened Imperial rule in Ukraine, free of arbitrariness, a rule of science and progress over steppe barbarism. He envisioned Ukraine participating in the great Imperial future with state-encouraged prosperity and education, one language, and one religion, if not one history. He served the empire as an educated Ukrainian in his ethnographic investigation and profited from involvement in a larger community.⁴⁴ He provided advice on how the Empire and Ukraine should accommodate each other, placing all his hopes in this dual process: while the enlightened modernising regime would turn to the best of local ways and local enlightened elites, Ukraine would adapt to the challenge of modernity to achieve prosperity.

Both nation and empire were affected by their work. The ethnographers, with their balance of ethos and empire, aimed to forge a 'self-defined nation' as Walker Connor wrote. 'While an ethnic group may be other defined, the nation *must* be self-defined.'⁴⁵ Thus the ethnographers, and others before and after them, created the Ukrainian nation from the material life and history of the Ukrainian *narod* around them.

The empire was also influenced by their work. The reports were read avidly by Naval Ministry readers, many of whom were part of a progressive faction of the Imperial government. Among these readers were key figures, such as the Grand Duke, who hoped to modernise government and people, and at the same time involve the educated public in the reforms. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii's work answered the progressive faction's need for a modern Imperial ethos. Such a new ethos provided a justification for expansion other than the traditional Great Russian, ill-informed, autocratic 'might makes right'. In the modern era, a polity was required to forsake exclusion and embrace inclusion of its people in the governing and reforming process. The

ethnographic reports expanded in various ways Uvarov's narrow Russian imperial formula of 'Autocracy, Orthodoxy and *Narodnost*'. Autocracy must not be arbitrary, and should consider regional traditions; the people had always defined itself, and would continue to do so. Thus the nationality question was changed for the empire as well. Cultural nationalism and imperial reform came together to argue for imperial accommodation of nation.

The mid-century ethnographic movement of which the two Ukrainians were a part worked to bring the ethos of the diverse peoples of the empire to the attention of Petersburg readers, in order to transform Uvarov's Great Russian *narodnost*' into a more realistic *narodnost*' based on diverse ethnic and regional groups, i.e. into a 'nation'. Few had brought imperial diversity, its meaning, opportunity and challenge, under such scrutiny before. Once these two Ukrainian ethnographers apprehended the dual force of ethos and empire, they could mediate between Imperial Russia and Ukraine, between educated people and the *narod*, and suggest how the reforming Empire and Ukraine might accommodate each other.

Notes

1. For an analysis of earlier Imperial Russian support of Slavic (and Ukrainian) studies to support S. Uvarov's 'official nationality' see O. Pelech, 'Towards a Historical Sociology of the Ukrainian Ideologies in the Russian Empire of the 1830s and 1840s' (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1976). See also C. B. Clay, 'Ethos and Empire: The Ethnographic Expedition of the Imperial Russian Naval Ministry, 1855-62' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1989); and W. Wilson, 'Herder, Folk and Romantic Nationalism', *Journal of Popular Culture*, no. 4, 1973, pp. 819-35.
2. S. V. Maksimov, 'Literaturnaia ekspeditsiia', *Russkaja mysl'*, vol. II, 1890, p. 23.
3. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii wrote soldiers' stories, collected Ukrainian folklore, and produced articles about society and religion in Poltava and Kherson. In 1855 he wrote on Ukrainian linguistics for the Academy of Science's Russian Language and Literature Section (ORIAS). He began an extended study of the Ukrainian peasant way of life with the Kiev Commission, even before the Ethnographic Expedition. Danilevskii collected 'Malorossiiskie' folk stories, and wrote about Cossacks and religious colonies in South Russia.
4. Afanasev-Chuzhbinskii held the military rank of Lieutenant and served in the Voronezh Provincial government. Danilevskii served in the Ministry of Education for seven years and in the Archives of the Southern Monasteries.
4. See G. S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko* (Munich, 1971).

5. David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture* (Edmonton, 1985), pp. 238 ff.
6. See Clay, 'Ethos and Empire' for the detailed story of the expedition and an analysis of the work of the eight ethnographers.
7. Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact*, pp. 238–9.
8. G. P. Danilevskii, 'Nravy i obychai Ukrainskikh chumakov. Ocherki chetyrekh vremen goda v Malorossii. (Iz putevykh zametok 1856 goda)', *Biblioteka dlia chtenia*, vol. 143, May, 1857, p. 79.
9. *Ibid.*
10. A. S. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'Obshchii vzgliad na byt pridneprovskogo krestianina', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XXIV, no. 10, 1856, pp. 1–3.
11. *Ibid.*
12. A. S. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'VI. Liman i ego okrestnosti', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XLVIII, no.9, 1860, pp. 289–90.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
14. Danilevskii, 'Nravy i obychai', p. 76.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 68–9.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 74–5.
17. See his review, 'Iz Ukrainy. Skazki i povesti G. P. Danilevskago', *Osnova*, no.1, 1861, pp. 298–306.
18. A. S. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'IV. Kherson', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XLII, no.8, 1859, pp. 293–6.
19. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'VI. Liman', pp. 289–90.
20. A. S. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'Porogi', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XLI, no. 11, 1859, pp. 32; 22–3.
21. For example, A. S. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'Poezdka na Dnieprovskye Porogi i na Zaporozhe', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XXXI, no.9, 1857, p. 26. Many of his observations were marked by anti-Semitism.
22. A. S. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'V. Ot Kamenka do Aleshek', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XLIV, no. 11, 1859, p. 41.
23. The role of parish priests in the reform era is discussed by G. L. Freeze, *Parish Clergy in the Nineteenth Century, Crisis, Reform, Counter-reform* (Princeton, 1983).
24. Danilevskii, 'Nravy i obychai', p. 63.
25. G. P. Danilevskii, 'Chumaki' in *Iz Ukrainy. Skazki i povesti* (St Petersburg, 1860), 3 vols., vol. 3, pp. 87, 84, 114–16.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
27. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'Poezdka', pp. 18–19.
28. See Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'Porogi', p. 19, and 'Poezdka po Nizov'iam Dniepra. II. Ot Melovoi do Berislava', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XL, no. 4, 1859, pp. 268–73, 274–7, 279–82, 284–5; *ibid.*, 'III. Ot Berislava do Khersona', *Morskoi sbornik*, vol. XLII, no. 7, 1859, pp. 13, 16, 22–25.
29. He singled out for praise the villages of Baron Steiglitz, the reform administrator and activist. See *ibid.*, 'III. Ot Berislava', p. 34.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 7, 11, 27, 32.
31. Danilevskii, 'Nravy i obychai', pp. 77–9.
32. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'V. Ot Kamenki', p. 49.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 54–5.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 55–6.
38. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'Porogi', p. 21.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
40. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'Obshchii vzgliad', no. 8, 1856, pp. 2–3.
41. Afanas'ev-Chuzhbinskii, 'II. Ot Melovoi', pp. 260–2.
42. Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact*, pp. 7, 262.
43. M. Azadovskii, *Istoriia russkoi fol'kloristiki* (Moscow, 1963), vol. 2, p. 85.
44. E. M. Kravets, 'Iz istorii russko-ukrainskikh sviazei v oblasti etnografii v XIX veka', *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4, 1954, pp. 132–41.
45. Walker Conner, 'A Nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a . . .', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, no.4, 1978, p. 388.

3 A. N. Pypin's Defence of Ukraine: Sources and Motivation

Alexis E. Pogorelskin

In late April 1885 while writing a series on Ukrainian ethnography for the St Petersburg journal *Vestnik Evropy*, A. N. Pypin interrupted his work to travel to Ukraine and see the region for himself. His daughter later explained that her father went at the invitation of 'long time close friends' and that the trip 'fulfilled' a long held 'wish to see Ukraine'.¹

Pypin's interest in Ukraine therefore predated his compositions on the subject and in fact can be traced to experiences of almost three decades before. To understand Pypin's writing on Ukraine, one must examine his earlier associations with Ukrainian scholars. This chapter analyses Pypin's treatment of the Ukrainian question in relation to his friendship with M. I. Kostomarov and M. P. Drahomanov. Pypin's interpretations of Ukraine cannot be understood without reference to those two domineering figures in Ukrainian culture in the second half of the nineteenth century. Finally, we will argue that while incorporating a Ukrainian viewpoint, Pypin modified it to argue for Ukrainian cultural autonomy from a Russian perspective.

Pypin became acquainted with Kostomarov in Saratov. Kostomarov had been exiled there in 1847 after serving a year of imprisonment in the SS Peter and Paul Fortress. His crime had been membership in the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, a clandestine society that had included some of the brightest members of the Kievan intelligentsia.² Kostomarov, then a rising star at St Vladimir University, had been that society's 'chief ideologist' and written its programme which advocated autonomy for Ukraine within a federation of free and equal Slavic peoples.³ An informer betrayed the group, and Kostomarov was incarcerated, then banished from Ukraine.

Far from languishing in the provincial Volga town of Saratov, Kostomarov took up important work. He turned to a study of Stenka Razin and of Russian peasant life in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. The subsequent publication *The Revolt of Stenka Razin* (1858) and *Sketches of the Domestic Life and Morals of the Great Russian People in the XVI and XVII Centuries* (1860) led to his rehabilitation and the invitation to resume his academic career at the St Petersburg University, the premier university in the empire. The emperor himself insisted on reading Kostomarov's work on Razin before the appointment could be approved. He did so in the summer of 1859, in the end praising the author for turning a potentially dangerous topic into an acceptable yet exciting work.⁴

Pypin came to know Kostomarov precisely when he began to apply the methods and sensibilities of the Ukrainian scholar to problems of Russian history. Kostomarov's work in Saratov was an outgrowth of his previous research in Ukraine. He was steeped in the decades-old practice of Ukrainian ethnographic studies. He had learned the language of the *narod* and collected songs among the peasantry around Rivne.⁵ In Saratov he turned to the Russian peasantry whose songs praised the exploits of Stenka Razin.⁶

It was ironic that Kostomarov's treatment of a Don Cossack rebel should have been so important in his rehabilitation to respectability and academic prominence. Kostomarov would have been attracted to Stenka Razin for several reasons. Razin, a Ukrainian hero, had revolted against the Russian state sixteen years after it incorporated eastern Ukraine into its domains. For that reason Kostomarov might have found Razin sympathetic. Kostomarov used his own grievances against Russian state power. It had twice intervened in his life, once to ban his master's dissertation⁷ and again to exile him from his homeland. While hardly a rebel himself, Kostomarov harboured resentments and frustrations that found a constructive outlet in the study of a figure who was. In his seemingly new-found role as a Russian historian, Kostomarov incorporated his Ukrainian experiences. At the same time he continued work on Ukrainian history, producing a major study on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi while in Saratov. It was very much as a Ukrainian scholar that Kostomarov exerted his influence on both Pypin and Pypin's cousin N. G. Chernyshevskii.

Pypin's account of his relationship to Kostomarov was curious. Nowhere does he acknowledge the influence that Kostomarov must have had on him, at times even taking pains to obscure or deny it. Pypin admits that his cousin became close to Kostomarov in the early 1850s while both were living in Saratov: 'They saw each other constantly; they were people of the same scholarly level... N. G... rated Kostomarov's work very high and compared it to that of the

famous Thierry.⁸ Pypin implied that Chernyshevskii alone expressed such enthusiasm for Kostomarov. Yet at that time both Pypin and Chernyshevskii were consumed by the cause of Russian scholarship and saw their life's work as contributing to its advance.⁹ Kostomarov – brilliant, glib, already a scholar of accomplishment – must have moved Pypin as he did Chernyshevskii. Other information suggests that Kostomarov influenced a whole circle of people, Pypin included, and engaged them in scholarly research based on a new approach to history.¹⁰

Among those whom Kostomarov inspired were the future historian D. L. Mordovtsev and A. G. Tikhmenev. Both were students in the Saratov gymnasium during Kostomarov's period of exile. Mordovtsev, a close boyhood friend of Pypin, established 'a friendship with... Kostomarov' and at that time 'nourished an interest in the history of everyday peasant life'.¹¹ Mordovtsev subsequently saved the local Saratov archives from 'cleaning', that is, 'mass destruction', and used the material to compile a major study on peasant revolts along the Volga.¹² Kostomarov's imprint on those endeavours was unmistakable. Similarly, Tikhmenev published his work 'On the Importance of the Study of *Narodnost*' in General and in Saratov Province in Particular' in 1853, having just graduated from the local gymnasium where Chernyshevskii was an instructor.¹³

Chernyshevskii joined Kostomarov in the same activity. Pypin described their ethnographic collaboration circumspectly. 'During his stay in Saratov, Kostomarov, along with one other person, collected [peasant] songs...'¹⁴ At the time Pypin wrote, his cousin had been banished from public life and languished in Astrakhan after years of Siberian exile. The censorship forbade Chernyshevskii's name or work to appear in print. Pypin had none the less revealed that the local gymnasium instructor, like his pupils, had been caught up in Kostomarov's ethnographic enthusiasms.

Pypin was no exception, but the way in which he described his activity in Saratov in the early 1850s was peculiar. He gave two different versions of it. In the first version which appeared in works published in Kostomarov's lifetime or shortly after he died, Pypin acknowledged their closeness.¹⁵ The second one, in his autobiography, dictated sixteen years after Kostomarov's death, ignored their relationship.¹⁶ In his obituary of Kostomarov, Pypin noted that the two of them had conducted research together in the Saratov archives in the early 1850s,¹⁷ and he had then become enthusiastic about Ukrainian culture and 'peasant life'.¹⁸ In his autobiography Pypin

dates those enthusiasms to the same period but failed to mention Kostomarov. He wrote:

I was familiar with peasant life from childhood; now I saw only that. Meanwhile my father lived for a time... in the large village of Baland... populated almost entirely with Ukrainians. Ukrainian speech, costumes, practices were kept to the hilt and here for the first time... the physical and moral differences of the two branches of the Russian people struck me. I already understood that before me was [the phenomenon of] ethnographic diversity.¹⁹

Pypin's use of 'already' suggested independence and precocity. More likely he visited the village at Kostomarov's prompting or at least after Kostomarov had aroused his curiosity about the southern Slavs. Pypin's understanding of what he observed certainly came from Kostomarov. It was Kostomarov who enunciated the concept of the Russians and Ukrainians as two peoples who branched off from an original Slavic group.²⁰ The phenomenon of 'ethnographic diversity' was precisely the subject that Kostomarov urged his pupils to take up.

Pypin was similarly disingenuous in his autobiography about the identity of his first scholarly mentors. He omitted Kostomarov altogether and named I. I. Sreznevskii along with V. I. Grigorovich as the two to whom he was most 'obligated for his interest in Slavic studies [*slavianstvo*]...'²¹ On Sreznevskii, Kostomarov's former colleague at Kharkiv University, Pypin contradicted himself. In his autobiography he stated that at St Petersburg University in the 1840s, Sreznevskii was at his most enthusiastic over Slavic matters.²² In a portrait of Sreznevskii written a decade and a half earlier, Pypin explained that Sreznevskii's appointment to St Petersburg University in 1847 coincided with 'the recent sad outcome of romantic pan-Slavism in Kiev', that is, the suppression of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood.²³ As a result Sreznevskii cooled toward Slavic matters and lost his 'former enthusiasm' for 'Slavic scholarship and the contemporary Slavic movement'.²⁴ The first account suggests that Sreznevskii imparted his Slavic enthusiasms to Pypin. The second one, written when Kostomarov was still alive, revealed Sreznevskii as unlikely to have been the catalyst in Pypin's subsequent scholarly development.

Although Pypin's autobiography remained unfinished, ending with events from the late 1850s, the slight to Kostomarov was all the more

striking because the two remained close after both had left Saratov. In the mid-1850s they met frequently while conducting research in the St Petersburg Public Library.²⁵ As professors at St Petersburg University, Pypin and Kostomarov lived 'two steps' away from each other.²⁶ Both collaborated for years on *Vestnik Evropy*. If Kostomarov played the role of mentor in Pypin's scholarly career, particularly regarding Ukraine, the relationship could have continued well beyond the Saratov years.

One can only speculate as to why Pypin's accounts of Kostomarov were contradictory. He may have resented the inaccuracies in Kostomarov's autobiography. He and Chernyshevskii agreed Kostomarov's self revelations 'had sometimes been simple untruth'.²⁷ Chernyshevskii felt that Kostomarov had devalued their relationship and distorted his opinions.²⁸ Pypin may have chosen to diminish Kostomarov in his account for that reason. He may also have been uncomfortable acknowledging how profound Kostomarov's influence had been on him in his most formative years as a scholar. To name Sreznevskii and Grigorovich was to emerge self taught, devoid of intellectual debts.

Yet Pypin's subsequent career was a testament to Kostomarov's influence. His spirited defence of Ukraine grew out of Kostomarov's teaching imparted to his Saratov disciples in the early 1850s.²⁹ At that time Pypin accepted a concept that had underlain Kostomarov's programme for the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood and that permeated his historical writing (see especially his essays in *Osnova*), namely that Ukraine and Great Russia were equal partners in sharing a common Slavic heritage. Pypin also accepted another lesson taught by Kostomarov: Russian history was more than an account of Muscovite or Petrine state power. Kostomarov disdained the notion of *gosudarstvennost'* which dominated most contemporary historiography.³⁰ Pypin's own scholarship focused on social and cultural opinion and those who formed it. Pypin became a historian of Russian society in part because Kostomarov provided the example. Kostomarov's originality as a historian arose from his ethnographic research in Ukraine; Pypin could recognise his debt to the same source.

Because unpublished correspondence documents Pypin's relationship with Drahomanov, the ambiguity and manipulation discernible in the accounts of Kostomarov are absent. Pypin and Drahomanov were close at least through the 1870s. The origin of their friendship is unclear, but it apparently predated their collaboration on *Vestnik Evropy* which began in 1870 with Drahomanov's first contribution.³¹

Pypin had joined that journal three years earlier and was to devote his entire career to it.

More than professional commitments bound the two. In the early 1870s the families of both men had suffered a similar tragedy. In March 1872 Drahomanov's one-year-old daughter died.³² In May 1871 the Pypins also lost a daughter at a very young age.³³ Pypin's wife, travelling in Europe, met Drahomanov for the first time shortly after his loss. She wrote to her husband, '... we became quite friendly with... Drahomanov... He is a fine and simple person but overcome with anguish... which I... more than anything can share with him...'³⁴

Pypin subsequently turned to Drahomanov in what for him was also a family matter, namely the publication abroad by P. L. Lavrov and other Russian radicals of Chernyshevskii's Siberian novel *Prolog*.³⁵ Pypin regarded its publication as detrimental to his own reputation and to the well-being of his cousin still incarcerated in Siberia. He begged Drahomanov, who knew Lavrov, 'Do everything possible... the affair is bloody to me... your assistance will be a sign of your great friendship in which I do not doubt.'³⁶

But most sustaining of all for their friendship was their shared love of Ukrainian culture. Drahomanov wryly observed, 'despite the large number of 'brothers' in [Slavdom] in St Petersburg, it is difficult to find a human attitude to Kievan interests... [But] you, Alexander Nikolaievich, are very nearly the most *slavnyi* of such brother residents' of the capital.'³⁷

Writing from Kiev, Drahomanov regarded *Vestnik Evropy* as an important outlet. It not only added substantially to his income, but as one of the most important 'thick journals' in St Petersburg, it could provide a cachet for writing favourable to Ukraine when no other journal of its stature would publish such material.

The point was a sensitive one. The Ukrainian journal *Osnova* had not lasted even two years, and Stasiulevich had removed Kostomarov as his co-editor precisely for opening the pages of *Vestnik Evropy* to one of *Osnova's* founders, P. O. Kulish.³⁸ But the early 1870s witnessed a measure of tolerance for Ukrainian culture. In 1872 a branch of the Imperial Geographical Society was permitted to open in Kiev, and Stasiulevich readily accepted Drahomanov's work in *Vestnik Evropy*.³⁹

When the government reverted to the hostility shown Ukraine in the early 1860s, at the time of the Polish revolt,⁴⁰ Pypin became more a defender than an editor for Drahomanov. He sought to persuade M. M. Stasiulevich, the owner and publisher of *Vestnik Evropy*, of

Drahomanov's value as a contributor. Their correspondence revealed not only Pypin's deep commitment to Ukrainian issues, but also Stasiulevich's hostility to Drahomanov, even contempt for him and the cause he represented. The point was significant because it showed yet another level of censorship that Pypin had to surmount to replace Drahomanov as a defender of Ukraine on *Vestnik Evropy*.

By early 1876 Drahomanov could be certain that *Vestnik Evropy* had become a reluctant ally, if an ally at all. He told Pypin that Stasiulevich had been making unkept promises for two years to publish his essay entitled 'New Material on Ukrainian Ethnography'.⁴¹

In June of that year the situation for Ukraine worsened dramatically. Pypin wrote to Stasiulevich, then abroad, that although Drahomanov 'remained one of the wisest writers in current Russian literature... public circumstances' now made it unlikely that he could write even on innocent topics for *Vestnik Evropy*.⁴² Through his contacts with the Ukrainian circle in St Petersburg, Pypin had just learned of the contents of the Emperor's Ems decree, issued a month earlier and never made public.⁴³ He explained that one of Drahomanov's associates had brought him word that a special government commission had rendered the following prohibitions on Ukraine: (1) plays written in the Ukrainian language could no longer be performed; (2) only scholarly books in Ukrainian may be published and those 'must be presented to the censorship in St Petersburg'; (3) 'the Kiev section of the Geographical Society is closed'. The commission 'raised the question about personal persecution against certain writers, but it was voted down'.⁴⁴

On the last point Pypin's information was incorrect. Drahomanov subsequently wrote that he had been singled out for persecution. Although Drahomanov was already living in Geneva, gendarmes had come to his 'former apartment in Kiev... to drive [him] from the city with a prohibition to live in the southern provinces or any of the capitals... This order is equal to banishment and entails further consequences'.⁴⁵

Despite such official hostility, Pypin none the less persevered with Stasiulevich. He wrote him circumspectly that 'if it turned out that Ukrainian articles... are now inconvenient there remains the possibility of keeping [Drahomanov's] former connection with the journal... the time will come again for that task to which his heart is most drawn... for now he can do many other things useful for literature. I advised him to correspond with you' about writing for *Vestnik Evropy*.⁴⁶

For Pypin, Drahomanov's plight evoked the agony of his cousin who along with physical banishment experienced the additional punishment of exile from the Russian press. Pypin badgered Stasiulevich that Drahomanov's recent articles were 'removed from any of the latest national questions'.⁴⁷ But Stasiulevich would not accept Pypin's reassurances, telling him that 'even if I ask [Drahomanov] to write about pickled cucumbers... I am sure that he... will move to the Ukrainian question... people of such a mood cannot bear any contradiction; for them, he who is not for them is against them...'⁴⁸

Pypin's efforts had been futile. Stasiulevich had discerned months before word of the Ems decree leaked out that Ukraine had become a dangerous topic for Russian journalism. He had then warned Pypin, 'your article [on Ukraine]... presents... serious danger... cuts in it are necessary; but even with this, I will not guarantee its security.'⁴⁹ Pypin was able to satisfy Stasiulevich's anxiety; no article by him on Ukraine appeared in *Vestnik Evropy* in 1876.

He had to wait nearly a decade to write on that subject for Stasiulevich's journal. With minor exceptions nearly all of his Ukrainian essays dated from 1885 and 1886. In fact, starting in July 1885, Pypin had a major essay on Ukraine in every issue until April 1886, that is, ten essays in all.

They were remarkable in many respects, not the least of which was the fact that a polemical tone characterised each of them. Pypin challenged nearly every major policy directed against Ukraine in the reign of Alexander II. He defended the journal *Osnova*, printed in Russian and Ukrainian and closed in 1862 after less than two years existence. He deplored the closing of the southern branch of the Imperial Geographical Society in 1876 and the suppression of the Ukrainian language in the same year. He sought to defend the phenomenon of *ukrainofilstvo*. He had done so briefly during the 'Dictatorship of the Heart', noting that 'in recent years' there was 'no possibility to refute slanders [against it]'.⁵⁰ In the mid-1880s he took up a more extended defence. Finally, he symbolically returned Drahomanov and the ethnographer P. P. Chubynskyi from exile, praising their scholarly work as unique and deploring its absence as a loss for all of Russian scholarship. Chubynskyi along with Drahomanov had been declared *persona non grata* in the summer of 1876.

Pypin's essays could not have appeared in the reign of Alexander II, at least not after promulgation of the Ems decree. But technically Pypin did not challenge official policy. As he said of the closing of the Kiev branch of the Geographical Society: it had occurred 'for some

reason until now unexplained in our press'.⁵¹ The regime never formally proclaimed the Ems decree, although Pypin through his Ukrainian contacts had known of its contents within a month of its signing. In one of his Ukrainian essays he listed the prohibitions that it contained but gave no indication that either a law or a decree had launched them.⁵² Another factor in Pypin's favour may have been that the government of Alexander II, notoriously hostile to the Jewish population of Ukraine, seemingly possessed a measure of tolerance for the Slavic people of the region. In 1881 the Ukrainian theatre, still with a restricted repertoire, was allowed to renew performances.⁵³ Pypin was one of the few figures in Russian journalism willing to push the matter and take up actual defence of Ukraine.

Unbeknown to his editor or the censorship, he had been ably assisted by Drahomanov. Stasiulevich had already discerned a similarity in what Pypin and Drahomanov wrote. He admonished his editorial assistant that an article he had recently submitted 'presented serious danger' because it 'repeated everything... that made it impossible to finish printing... [one] by Drahomanov'.⁵⁴ Pypin's article like Drahomanov's did not appear. Drahomanov shortly thereafter went into exile; and Stasiulevich presumably dropped the matter of his relationship to Pypin.

A decade later, when Pypin again turned to the Ukrainian question for *Vestnik Evropy*, he produced a substantial series on Ukrainian ethnography. Those essays owed much to Drahomanov. He suggested that Pypin expand an earlier group of articles collectively titled 'Characteristics of Literary Opinion from the 1820s to the 1850s',⁵⁵ where he had discussed Slavophilism and the development of ethnographic studies in Russia. Drahomanov urged Pypin to expand those essays with a special chapter on similar developments in Kharkiv and Kiev between 1815 and 1863.⁵⁶ Drahomanov recommended that he include 'depiction of the masonic movement and the Decembrists... southern slavism and the study of *narodnost*'... Kostomarov, Kulish'.⁵⁷ The result was Pypin's five part series entitled 'Survey of Ukrainian Ethnography'⁵⁸ in which he assessed the work of all major Ukrainian ethnographers from the 1830s to the 1860s.

He followed Drahomanov's advice, devoting a chapter each to Kostomarov and Kulish. He discussed the Masonic movement in the south (Pypin had already written extensively on Masonry in Russia) and the emergence of southern slavism.⁵⁹ Pypin was well versed in all of these subjects, but the compendium that he produced was just what Drahomanov had recommended.

No doubt helpful to Pypin was Drahomanov's own essay entitled 'New Material on Ukrainian Ethnography', which had been sent to Stasiulevich in late 1875 or early 1876.⁶⁰ Pypin urged him to print it, but to no avail.⁶¹ It never appeared in *Vestnik Evropy* except, one can surmise, through the mediation of Pypin's work ten years later.

Drahomanov further advised Pypin that in writing on Ukraine, he distinguish carefully between 'Ukrainian Slavophilism' and 'the Moscow ones'.⁶² Pypin emphasised the distinction throughout his Ukrainian essays. He attacked 'the Moscow exclusiveness of the latest Slavophilism' and 'the backward idealism' of the old.⁶³ He said of Kostomarov that he 'had little in common with the [Moscow] Slavophiles' whose '*narodnyi* principle' was imbued with 'Moscow exclusiveness'.⁶⁴

Pypin wrote the essays on Polish-Ukrainian literary relations⁶⁵ in part from material supplied by Drahomanov. To treat that subject he needed Galician publications, that is, the literature of Ukrainians living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 'In St Petersburg,' he wrote to Drahomanov, 'it is difficult to have... the publications... of this literature.'⁶⁶ After going into exile abroad, Drahomanov acted as a middle man for Pypin in the complex world of trade in Slavic books. Among his prime concerns in that endeavour was to supply Pypin with Galician material. He wrote from Geneva:

Concerning Galician literature I have asked Lviv to send you 'M. Katkovskii and Galician Literature'... I am also sending you a brochure by Fed'kovich with an introduction by me... it would be useful to have full runs of *Pravda* and *Drug*. Ask Khomiakovskii to send to Il'inskii in Kiev for my offprints 'Society of Learning' and 'Galician Relations of the Slavic Committee' if you do not have them.⁶⁷

The same problem emerged two years later when Pypin attempted to expand his *History of Slavic Literatures*. He again discovered that he 'had insufficient... information namely on the Galician part'.⁶⁸ He wrote Drahomanov that he needed 'the latest information about personalities currently active in Galician literature... make me... a short synopsis [of]... the main trends... the main persons'.⁶⁹

Drahomanov's influence on Pypin's understanding of Gogol was even more significant. He caused Pypin to change his interpretation of the great writer. Drahomanov criticised Pypin's essay on Gogol included in the series 'Characteristics of Literary Opinion from the

1820s to the 1850s',⁷⁰ admonishing him for failing to take account of Gogol's identity as a Ukrainian. He explained that

if one does not value the contrast that exists in the soul of Gogol between the image of Taras Bulba, the Cossack songs, etc. and [the image of] St Petersburg, then one will not...comprehend the appearance of *The Inspector General* and other works...it seems that you ...did not perceive in Gogol the 'Ukrainian,' a type of Shevchenko, up to his very death.⁷¹

Pypin accepted Drahomanov's insight and offered an interpretation of Gogol in the first of his essays on Ukrainian ethnography which differed significantly from the previous essay on Gogol published in the early 1870s.

Echoing Drahomanov, Pypin observed that Gogol wrote such works as *The Inspector General* and *The Wedding* precisely when he devoted attention to Ukrainian songs and history. The coincidence was significant because, as he explained,

We will never understand...[how] an ill-educated provincial, a stranger to the results of leading European thought ...[could] become the awakener of critical self-consciousness in Russian society, if we ignore the connection of the appearance of *The Inspector General*...and Gogol's preoccupation with Ukrainian songs and history.⁷²

Pypin added that it was precisely the contrast between the 'grandiose images' of those songs and 'the pettiness and mediocrity which entangled our life' which gave Gogol the insight to depict Russian society as he did.

Pypin had extended Drahomanov's interpretation, arguing that Russian culture, through Gogol, owed a great debt to the songs of the Ukrainian peasantry because they had helped inspire a Ukrainian writer's insights into Russian life. Pypin's defence of Ukraine emerged from the tutelage of Kostomarov and Drahomanov, but the reasoning he employed to argue for Ukrainian cultural autonomy came from a purely Russian perspective. It is time to examine Pypin's essays on Ukraine in light of that judgment.

Pypin condemned the attacks against Ukraine in the Russian press. Just as destructive as government measures, those attacks focused on the phenomenon labelled *ukrainofil'stvo*. To the conservative publicist

M. N. Katkov the word meant nothing less than 'a Polish intrigue' to cause Ukraine to break away from Russia. Katkov had begun his denunciations against Ukraine at the time of the Polish insurrection of 1863;⁷³ but in the years following the Ems decree, the conservative Russian press stepped up the campaign and increasingly denounced Ukrainian separatism, labelling it *ukrainofil'stvo*.

Even before his major articles on Ukraine appeared, Pypin had discussed the subject in various essays so that his position was already clear.⁷⁴ As a result, a writer for Katkov's *Russkii vestnik* named de Pule, identified Kostomarov and Pypin as defenders in the Russian press.⁷⁵ Pypin defended himself briefly,⁷⁶ but addressed the issue at length only three years later with his first major piece on Ukraine, 'Volga and Kiev'.⁷⁷

He insisted that *ukrainofil'stvo* was a feeling to which the Ukrainians were perfectly entitled. *Ukrainofil'stvo*, 'an awkward, bookish term', was simply 'the healthy feeling of a people for their homeland'.⁷⁸ This 'simple feeling of attachment to one's homeland' was 'a natural human feeling' and 'constitutes the basis of *ukrainofil'stvo*'.⁷⁹ Far from being 'a pernicious tendency', Pypin argued that love for one's region is 'naturally joined to... love for the fatherland'.⁸⁰

He explained that inexcusable ignorance motivated the enmity towards the phenomenon. 'The main basis [for]... accusations against *ukrainofil'stvo*... consists of local gossip... as is known, talk has reached the point of mythopeic separatism...'⁸¹ Another source consisted of 'the self-professed patriots [who]... made the famous discovery that *ukrainofil'stvo*... was a weapon of 'Polish intrigues'... how could there occur this unbelievable discovery?... [when] all the heroes of Ukrainian poetry and history are the enemies of Poland'.⁸² Pypin, an acknowledged expert on Polish culture, called the accusations 'a vulgar absurdity'.⁸³

Finally, Pypin addressed 'the fear that *ukrainofil'stvo* can do damage to Russian literature'. Russian literature 'needed no police protection from the rudiments of local literature'.⁸⁴ On the contrary, southern Russian scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had contributed to Russian enlightenment and in the present, Ukrainian culture had given Gogol to Russian literature. Such a culture, for the sake of Russian literature itself, should 'not be constrained in its creativity'.⁸⁵

Pypin's defence of the journal *Osnova* grew out of his discussion of *ukrainofil'stvo*. 'Opponents of the Ukrainian literary movement consider... *Osnova* to be the first declaration' of that phenome-

non.⁸⁶ The essay on *Osnova* did more than defend a long suppressed casualty of tsarist censorship; it fulfilled Drahomanov's wish that Pypin 'talk in more detail about the Kostomarov circle'.⁸⁷ Those who founded *Osnova* in 1861, that is, the Kostomarov circle, Kulish, Shevchenko, and Kostomarov himself had formed the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood fifteen years earlier. But 'the circle had changed somewhat' since then. Their 'fantastic dreams had died of themselves'. By that Pypin meant their advocacy of federation that had provoked criminal charges. With *Osnova*, on the other hand, the group sought 'to study the Ukrainian past... and assist... the printed Ukrainian word'.⁸⁸ *Osnova* had appeared in both Russian and Ukrainian. Far from being a separatist plot that sought 'union with the "Polish right"', *Osnova* was 'only one of the manifestations of the social mood... and excitement that distinguished the first years of the last reign'.⁸⁹

Pypin's final argument in defence of *Osnova* was a purely Russian one. However well-justified and apolitical its contributors, they deserved the right to their own journal because they had done so much for Russian culture. The great collectors of Ukrainian poetry like Kostomarov, Kulish, Sreznevskii and Maksymovych had gathered 'numerous poetical works of unusual beauty that... had excited Pushkin and... inspired Gogol'.⁹⁰

Pypin used a similar argument in condemning the closing of the Kievan branch of the Imperial Geographical Society. He noted that 'local scientific strivings' and 'a lively intellectual movement' had encouraged its establishment in 1872.⁹¹ The Kiev section then sponsored many publications such as *The Historical Songs of the Ukrainian Peasantry* by Drahomanov and Antonovych, 'which became the point of departure for subsequent research' on the Ukrainian epic.⁹² Equally significant were the ethnographic studies of Chubynskyi 'whose work occupies first place in the history of... Ukrainian ethnography'.⁹³ With the closing of the society in 1876, its 'members... had to leave Kiev'. Drahomanov's work was never completed, and the loss of Chubynskyi's was 'a great loss for all Russian ethnographic science'.⁹⁴ Pypin seemed unable to explain why the society 'for some reason' had closed its doors and why such productive individuals should leave work unfinished. He could at least praise what they managed to accomplish.

The suppression of the Ukrainian language, Pypin argued, was the most harmful policy of all because of the profound debt that Russian culture owed that language in one form or another. He cited numerous

instances. For example, without 'ancient Kievan *pismennost'* ... Russian literature is unthinkable, both southern and northern'.⁹⁵ In the seventeenth century when Moscow needed scholarly forces for purifying the church, for the conduct of schools, for the decorum of the Tsar's court, scholars came from the Kievan Academy of Petro Mohyla.⁹⁶ Mohyla's classical philologists represented 'the first firmly grounded Russian scholarship' which was 'a fully southern Russian cause'.⁹⁷ Discovery and study of peasant culture came with the revival of Ukrainian literature at the end of the eighteenth century.⁹⁸ Pypin repeated the example of Gogol 'in whose person Ukraine again contributed to Russian poetry and enlightenment'.⁹⁹

Pypin also discussed at length the numerous scholarly debates concerning the relationship between Russian and Ukrainian.¹⁰⁰ He insisted that the resolution of linguistic differences occur 'on reasonable and calm scholarly soil', not, he implied, by the administrative prohibition of one language by another.¹⁰¹

One of the themes that underlay all of Pypin's Ukrainian essays was the conviction that the 'southern Russian people are [themselves] a Russian people'.¹⁰² And again, 'the southern Russian *narodnost'* is most Russian';¹⁰³ 'one common root of ethnicity' existed for both peoples.¹⁰⁴ Because of that fact, the fulfillment of Russian self-consciousness (*samosoznanie*) or self-knowledge, 'about which so much is said',¹⁰⁵ depended on knowledge of Ukrainian culture. 'The unfamiliarity of our great writers with Kiev and in general southern Russian life...closed for...Russian literature a whole side of... Russian nature and peasant life.' If we ignore them 'our so-called *samosoznanie* will remain an empty phrase'.¹⁰⁶ In even stronger terms Pypin reiterated that without knowledge of the people who 'populate the Russian land from Poland to the Caucasus, all talk about national distinctiveness will be empty nonsense'.¹⁰⁷

Pypin had come full circle from the teachings of Kostomarov in Saratov more than three decades earlier. Kostomarov had unified ethnography and history by applying the study of peasant life to the orderly exposition of history.¹⁰⁸ He had distinguished himself as a historian with such methods. Pypin, the Russian scholar, broadened Kostomarov's insight. To know themselves, Russians had to know more than the history of state politics; they needed to know the history of all the Russian peoples which also included those 'between Poland and the Caucasus'.

Pypin's courage and generosity in his treatment of Ukraine made him almost unique in Russian journalism in the mid-1880s. *Golos*

published a few pieces sympathetic to Ukraine, but it was closed in 1884. Kostomarov himself died in early 1885.

Also noteworthy was that the essays, polemical in tone, should have appeared when they did. Pypin had to convince the cautious Stasiulevich to publish them. Stasiulevich had no particular sympathy for Ukrainians, all of whom he thought were like Drahomanov, imbued with fanaticism. The conservative government of Alexander III was hardly known for a liberal nationalities policy. Still, Pypin was able to criticise the Ukrainian policy of the previous monarch, and do it having already earned a reputation for strong pro-Ukrainian sentiments. Even before the ten major essays appeared, Pypin learned that 'in Ukraine they rendered' him 'godlike homage'.¹⁰⁹

As we have suggested in this essay, the influence of Kostomarov and Drahomanov permeated Pypin's writing on Ukraine. Yet it was curious that Pypin took pains to obscure or deny Kostomarov's contribution to his intellectual development. He may have harboured personal grievances against Kostomarov or sought to portray himself as independent and original. Both impulses may have motivated him. The fact of Drahomanov's influence can only be discerned from a correspondence that remains unpublished. Important sources for Pypin's essays have therefore gone unnoticed or unexamined.

Beyond the influence of such towering figures, Pypin found his own point of view, a thoroughly Russian perspective, from which to defend Ukraine. Russian culture owed an immense debt to Ukrainian culture. To constrain the latter harmed the potential for Russian creativity and the *samosoznanie*, so important to the very press that denounced the Ukrainians for *ukrainofil'stvo*.

Pypin's work on Ukraine also grew in part from the extensive research he had recently completed on the Polish question. In his essays entitled, 'The Polish Question in Russian Literature', he had argued that the constraints on the Polish language and its culture imposed by St Petersburg encouraged German influence to grow among the Poles. Polish literature had abandoned Warsaw and gravitated to Austrian and Prussian Poland.¹¹⁰ Pypin deplored the Russian mistreatment of fellow Slavs.

He employed similar arguments for the Galicians, that is, the Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary. The constraint imposed on the Ukrainian language in 1876 constituted 'a heavy blow, limiting the means of their national struggle against German-Polish and Hungarian pressure... their natural enemies had to be happy about the measures of 1876'.¹¹¹

Pypin argued a position that he and Drahomanov shared. Russia faced competition west and south from a growing German threat to the Slavs. The Russification policies in Poland in the 1860s and Ukraine in the 1870s undermined Russian credibility in areas where Germanic influence spread among the Slavs.

Pypin's expertise on the Polish question might have made him more sensitive to one aspect of the Ukrainian issue which he dismissed out of hand. He treated with contempt the notion that a link existed between *ukrainofil'stvo* and 'Polish intrigues'. Yet he scrupulously employed throughout his essays the adjective 'malorusskii' (Little Russian), and not the relatively new term 'ukrainskii' condemned in government decrees of the early 1860s.¹¹²

P. A. Valuev, Minister of Interior, had denounced 'the so-called Ukrainian language now being formed . . . by some Little Russians, and especially by Poles'.¹¹³ In fact the new language that Valuev condemned emerged from the ethnographic studies conducted by Kharkiv professors who formed a literary language from their own poetry and the dialects of the Left Bank.¹¹⁴ Lacking a credible vernacular of its own, the Ukrainian language was often at the mercy of ethnographers of Polish and Russian origin. The Kharkiv region in particular boasted a significant Polish population. It was where Kostomarov had learned Polish,¹¹⁵ and the adjective 'ukrainskii' to designate all of Little Russia was a Kharkiv term.¹¹⁶

But Pypin had assumed the role of advocate. He dismissed two centuries of Polish influence in Ukraine as an unfortunate interval. The Ukrainians and Russians were two branches of one people now reunited. The northerners possessed the talents to build a state while the southerners were the carriers of poetry and enlightenment.¹¹⁷ However simplified or exaggerated Pypin's arguments, they sought to mitigate a destructive cultural chauvinism. Taken as a whole, his Ukrainian essays mark a sad commentary on decades of Tsarist policy in Ukraine.

Notes

1. V. A. Pypina, 'Vospominaniia ob A. N. Pypine (1861–1904)', Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia biblioteka im. Saltykova-Shchedrina, St Petersburg, Otdel rukopisei (hereafter GPBor), *fond* 621, no. 1117, pp. 195–6.
2. *Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopedia* (ed.) V. Kubijovyc, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1963) p. 675.
3. *Ibid.*

4. N. I. Kostomarov, 'Avtobiografiia', *Russkaia mysl'*, vol. XXXIII, no. 5, 1885, p. 33.
5. A. N. Pypin, 'Obzor malorusskoi etnografii', *Vestnik Evropy* (hereafter *V.E.*), no. 10, 1885, p. 780.
6. L. V. Domanovskii, 'K saratovskim vzaimootnosheniim N. G. Chernyshevskogo i N. I. Kostomarova', *Chernyshevskii sbornik*, vol. VIII, p. 224.
7. On Kostomarov's first master's dissertation see James T. Flynn, 'The Affair of Kostomarov's Dissertation: A Case Study of Official Nationalism in Practice', *Slavonic and East European Review*, no. 127, 1974, pp. 188–96 and I. Aizenshtok, 'Persha disertatsiia Kostomarova', *Ukraina*, no. 3, 1925, pp. 21–6.
8. A. N. Pypin, *Moi zametki* (Moscow, 1910), p. 88.
9. See especially Chernyshevskii to Pypin; N. G. Chernyshevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 15-i tomakh* (hereafter *PSS*) (Moscow, 1939–53), vol. XIV.
10. My account differs from those in Domanovskii, 'K saratovskim vzaimootnosheniim', where it is argued that Chernyshevskii played the more dominant role and was Kostomarov's intellectual mentor. Similarly, cf. E. S. Shabliovskii, 'N. I. Kostomarov v gody revoliutsionnoi situatsii (1859–1861)' in M. V. Nechkina (ed.), *Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859–1861 gg.* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 101–23 where Chernyshevskii allegedly played the same role.
11. Pypin, *Moi zametki*, p. 11.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Domanovskii, 'K saratovskim vzaimootnosheniim', pp. 215–16.
14. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 10, 1885, p. 800.
15. See especially, A. N. Pypin, 'N. I. Kostomarov', *V.E.*, no. 5, 1885, pp. 419–22.
16. *Moi zametki* is not bereft of references to Kostomarov, but Pypin discusses his fellow historian only in terms of his relationship to others.
17. Pypin, 'Kostomarov', p. 419.
18. Pypin, *Moi zametki*, p. 44
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 44–5.
20. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 10, 1885, p. 799.
21. Pypin, *Moi zametki*, p. 39.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
23. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 9, 1885, pp. 342.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Pypin, *Moi zametki*, p. 99.
26. A. N. Pypin, 'Poslednie trudy N. I. Kostomarova', *V.E.*, no. 12, 1890, p. 798.
27. Chernyshevskii to Pypin, *PSS*, vol. XV, p. 555 (7 November 1885.)
28. *Ibid.*
29. Kostomarov's influence could be seen in the first of Pypin's Ukrainian essays for 1885 entitled 'Volga i Kiev'. Pypin urged scholars to study local peasant life precisely where Kostomarov had first done ethnographic research. Those regions became linked in Kostomarov's experience just when, having come from Kiev to Saratov via the fortress,

- Kostomarov became acquainted with Pypin. Unmentioned, Kostomarov remained the inspiration behind the essay.
30. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 10, 1885, pp. 798, 804.
 31. Drahomanov to Pypin, 12 June 1870, GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1.1.*
 32. Pypina, 'Vospominaniia', p. 87.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
 35. For a full discussion of this incident see my 'Pypin and Chernyshevskii: The Prolog Affair Reconsidered', *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, vol. XIV, 1981, pp. 107–20.
 36. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i isskustva (hereafter TsGALI), *fond 1065, opis' 4, ed.khr. 1, 1.21, 3 February 1877.*
 37. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1. 8 ob.*, 18 October 1871.
 38. See my 'Vestnik Evropy and the Polish Question in the Reign of Alexander II', *Slavic Review*, no. 1, 1987, p. 92.
 39. Drahomanov to Pypin, 24 June 1870, GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1.3.*
 40. *Ukraine*, vol. 1, p. 684.
 41. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1. 17 ob.*, 6 June 1876.
 42. Institut russkoi literatury (Pushkinskii dom) (hereafter ILRI), *fond 293, opis' 1, n.1188, 29 July 1876.*
 43. See *Ukraine*, vol. 1, p. 684 for an account of the Ems decree.
 44. IRLI, *fond 293, opis' 1, n. 1188, 29 July 1876.*
 45. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1. 21 ob.*, 15 September 1876.
 46. IRLI, *fond 293, opis' 1, n. 1188, 31 July 1876.*
 47. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1. 16, 10–22 August 1876.*
 48. *Ibid.*, 1. 15, 5–17 August 1876.
 49. *Ibid.*, 1. 3, 5 May 1876.
 50. A. N. Pypin, *V.E.*, no. 1, 1881, p. 410.
 51. A. N. Pypin, 'Malorusskaia etnografiia poslednaia dvadtsat'piat' let', *V.E.*, no. 1, 1886, p. 331.
 52. *Ibid.*
 53. *Ukraine*, vol. 1, p. 685.
 54. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1.3, 5 May 1876.*
 55. *Ibid.*, *ed. khr. 287, 1. 8 ob.*, 18 October 1871.
 56. *Ibid.*
 57. *Ibid.*
 58. A. N. Pypin, 'Obzor russkoi etnografii', *V.E.*, nos. 8–12, 1885.
 59. See especially, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 9, 1885, pp. 329–30.
 60. Drahomanov to Pypin, 6 June 1876; GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1. 19.*
 61. IRLI, *fond 293, opis' 1, n. 1188, 31 July 1876.*
 62. *Ibid.*, 1. 25, 10 December 1876.
 63. Pypin, 'Malorusskaia etnografiia', p. 337.
 64. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 10, 1885, p. 799.
 65. *Ibid.*, no. 11; 'Epizody iz literaturnykh otnoshenii malorussko – pol'skikh', *V.E.*, nos. 2–3, 1886.
 66. TsGALI, *fond 1065, opis' 4, ed. khr. 1, 1. 38, 20 April 1878.*
 67. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, 1. 25 ob.*, 10 December 1876.
 68. TsGALI, *fond 1065, opis' 4, ed. khr. 1, 1. 38, 20 April 1878.*

69. Ibid.
70. A. N. Pypin, 'Kharakteristiki literaturnykh mnenii ot dvadtsatykh do piatidesiatsykh godov', *V.E.*, no.9, 1871.
71. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, l. 8 ob.*, 18 October 1871.
72. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 8, 1885, p. 772.
73. *Ukraine*, vol. 1, p. 682.
74. See for example A. N. Pypin, 'Izuchenie russkoi narodnosti', *V.E.*, no. 8, 1882, p. 757 and *passim*.
75. A. N. Pypin, 'K sporam ob ukrainofil'stvo', *V.E.*, no. 5, 1882, p. 438.
76. Ibid., pp. 441–2.
77. A. N. Pypin, 'Volga i Kiev', *V.E.*, no.7, 1885.
78. Ibid., p. 213.
79. Ibid., p. 206.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p. 211.
82. Ibid., p. 210.
83. Ibid., p. 211.
84. Ibid., p. 213.
85. Ibid.
86. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 12, 1885, p. 804.
87. GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 287, l. 25*, 10 December 1876.
88. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 12, 1885, p. 805.
89. Ibid., p. 804.
90. Ibid., p. 805.
91. Pypin, 'Malorusskaia etnografiia', *V.E.*, no. 1, 1886, pp. 329–30.
92. Ibid., p. 315.
93. Ibid., p. 316.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p. 334.
96. Ibid., p. 336.
97. Ibid. See also 'Volga i Kiev', p. 204.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. A. N. Pypin, 'Spor mezhdou iuzhanami i severianami', *V.E.*, no. 4, 1886, pp. 745–76.
101. Ibid., p. 776.
102. Pypin, 'Malorusskaia etnografiia', p. 344.
103. Pypin, 'Volga i Kiev', p. 203.
104. Pypin, 'Malorusskaia etnografiia', p. 334.
105. Ibid., p. 349.
106. Pypin, 'Volga i Kiev', p. 215.
107. Pypin, 'Malorusskaia etnografiia', p. 334.
108. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 10, 1885, p. 804.
109. D. L. Mordovtsev to Pypin, 4 August 1884; GPBOR, *fond 621, ed. khr. 565, l. 27*.
110. Pogorelskin, 'The Polish Question', p. 101.
111. Pypin, 'Malorusskaia-Galitskie otnosheniia', *V.E.*, no. 1, 1881, pp. 408–9.
112. See *Ukraine*, vol. 1, p. 682.
113. Ibid.

114. Omeljan Pritsak, 'Prolegomena to the National Awakening of the Ukrainians during the Nineteenth Century' in Roland Sussex and J. C. Eade (eds), *Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Eastern Europe* (Columbus, 1985), p. 104.
115. Pypin, 'Obzor', *V.E.*, no. 10, 1885, p. 778.
116. Pritsak, 'Prolegomena', p. 104.
117. Pypin, 'Spor', p. 743.

4 Ukrainian Migration to Siberia before 1917: The Process and Problems of Losses and Survival Rates

Ihor Stebelsky

Ukrainian migration to Siberia was part of the great Siberian migration and colonisation of the frontier of Asiatic Russia. At its peak, between 1894 and 1914, some five million people from all regions of the Russian Empire crossed the Urals to the east. Of this total, nearly 1.5 million returned, but more than 3.5 million settled in Asiatic Russia.¹

The number of Ukrainian peasantry migrating to Siberia was very large, but their exact numbers are not known. Russian migration records did not differentiate the migrants according to their nationality or the language they spoke, but they did list the province of origin of each migrant and thus provided a basis for various estimates.²

The most comprehensive estimate of Ukrainians in Asiatic Russia was made by Volodymyr Kubijovyc.³ Using migration statistics for intercensal years, he calculated that about two million Ukrainians migrated east of the Urals between 1897 and 1926. Adding this influx to the 312 000 Ukrainian speakers present in Asiatic Russia in 1897, and pro-rating the natural increase in the population over time, he estimated that some three million Ukrainians resided east of the Urals in 1926. According to Kubijovyc, the fact that the 1926 census registered only two million Ukrainians could not have resulted from the rapid assimilation of nearly one-third of the Ukrainian settlers within one generation. Since there was no known large-scale return flow during the revolution, he suggested that the discrepancy could be accounted for by a bias or under-representation by the census-takers in 1926.

We intend to test an alternative explanation. It could be that Ukrainian migrants suffered high losses, and that as a result of

lower survival rates, fewer Ukrainians were registered in 1926. Both the Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia noted at the time that illnesses, epidemics and death were common amongst migrants because of the arduous journey and hard pioneering conditions. Ukrainians were particularly disadvantaged: their voyage was longer, wood and water were more scarce in the areas where they settled and Russian migrants and officials exhibited animosity towards them. We will review the conditions of migration and settlement, estimate the losses of migrants and the rates of survival beyond the Urals, and on this basis discuss an alternative assessment of Ukrainian migration to Siberia.

Before the Siberian Railway, travel was long and difficult. Migrants used their own horses and carts or ox-drawn wagons, travelling by dirt roads in long trains and traversing major rivers by barge. Distances were enormous: from Poltava, the epicentre of Ukrainian out-migration, it was about 1000 kilometres to the Volga River, followed by another 700 to 1000 kilometres to the Urals, and then, depending on the final destination, some 1000 to Omsk, over 2000 to the Yenisei River, or nearly 5000 kilometres to the Amur River valley in the Far East. A journey to Omsk could be accomplished in one season; migration to the Far East by cart would require a sustained effort of two summers, with winter spent in Siberia. The migrants had their carts or wagons loaded down with many objects of sentimental value, which only added to the burden of the journey. Along the way, they lacked night accommodation or protection from the weather, a healthy food supply, or proper hygiene and medical attention. Consequently, illness was common, often resulting in death. Sometimes entire families perished, or perhaps only a child or two might be left, fortunately adopted by fellow migrants. According to I. I. Popov, death rates reached 10 per cent among adults and 30 per cent among children.⁴

With the advent of trains and steamships it was possible to travel greater distances in shorter periods of time. Increasingly, more migrants chose to sell their equipment and animals at home, travel with food and personal belongings on a combination of train and steamer or barge, and then purchase a horse and wagon or a hand-pushed cart in Siberia to reach their final destination. Throughout the 1880s and until 1895, an increasingly larger proportion of the migrants chose this modern mode of travel to Siberia through Tiumen. Such a journey involved taking a special train which served migrants to a point of embarkation on the Volga River, travel by barge up to Perm

(since barge rates were cheaper than train fares), then again board the train to Tiumen and there, wait for a barge or steamer that plied the Ob-Irtysh river system.

Travel by rail or barge was arduous.⁵ Trains which served migrants consisted of freight cars which were crammed tightly with 40 to 60 settlers and their belongings. The box cars were often unheated and had neither toilet nor cooking facilities. Filth and vile odours accumulated quickly. Doors were open during the day to allow fresh air to circulate, but would be kept shut at night to keep sleeping people from rolling out. Barges and steamers were equally congested and uncomfortable. These cargo vessels, depending on size, held from several hundred to a thousand people and baggage. The migrants descended down ladders into dark cargo holds, where they were confined to squalor and filth for periods of 15 to 20 days until the next landing. Under such conditions of crowding, poor hygiene and paltry nutrition, illness and death were common. Corpses would be unloaded for burial at the next station with a cemetery; the sick would not receive medical attention for days on end.

Tiumen served both as a major transit point and the government registration centre for migrants to Siberia. By 1892, some 85 per cent of all migrants to Asiatic Russia went through Tiumen. Of the remaining migrants, the larger share took the trains through Syzran (a government registration centre on the Volga) to Orenburg, from where they continued by horse and cart or on foot to the Steppe Krai or Turkestan; the rest took trains on a new line from Samara (on the Volga) to Zlatoust (in the Urals), from where they ventured onto the Siberian trail. With a doubling of migrants in 1888 and re-doubling in 1891, the transit point at Tiumen became a severe bottleneck. Extreme crowding in shoddy housing, poor food supply and meagre medical facilities were aggravated by long delays in shipping caused by ice on the middle Ob in the spring. Often, migrants had to cart downstream to an alternate point of embarkation and wait until early summer when the water level of the Tura River dropped at Tiumen.⁶ Destitute, malnourished and sick, many of the migrants died in the 'death trap' at Tiumen. According to medical records, settlers who stayed in Tiumen for one month, experienced a death rate of 10 per cent; for those who had to stay a second month, the rate increased to 13 per cent.⁷

The next transit point, Tomsk, served as a launching point for overland travel to the Yenisei River in Eastern Siberia and the Amur River in the Far East. Conditions here were somewhat better, but the

rigours of travel and crowding on the vessels took their toll. According to medical records at Tomsk, the illness rate per 1000 migrants increased each year. On average, the migrant was seriously ill at least once. Among registered patients at Tomsk, the registered death rate was 9 per cent.⁸

Construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway facilitated migration to Siberia. Construction began in 1891 from both east (Vladivostok) and west (Zlatoust). From the west, the railway was routed through Cheliabinsk, the new gateway to Siberia, reaching the Irtysh at Omsk in 1894 and the Ob at Krivoshekovo in 1896. From Novonikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk) on the east side of the Ob, the railway reached the Angara near Irkustsk in 1899 and Lake Baikal in 1899. By-passing slow and difficult construction around Lake Baikal, a steamer linked travellers with its continuation on the other side, which reached Sretensk, the head of navigation for barges on the Shilka River, tributary of the Amur, in 1901. Meanwhile, from Vladivostok, the Ussuri line was completed to Khabarovsk on the Amur in 1897. Then, efforts from both ends went into the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria, which linked Vladivostok with the Trans-Baikal stretch of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1903. In the Russo-Japanese war (1905), however, the Chinese Eastern Railway was lost to the Japanese; the replacement route, along the north side of the Amur River, was not completed until 1916.

The Trans-Siberian Railway had eliminated arduous transfers to steamers or barges as far as Lake Baikal. Along the way, points were set up which provided migrants with hot soup, medical care, and loans. Such conveniences, together with the reduction of the price of tickets in 1898, doubled (1895) and redoubled (1898) the number of migrants to Siberia. Once again facilities became congested. A longer stay was needed in Cheliabinsk for registration and to find the baggage, which often got lost *en route*, or even thrown out of the train by some hostile migrants. Longer waits were also needed at points of disembarkation along the Trans-Siberian Railway, from where the settlers were to travel to their settlement. Delays at such points were phenomenal, taxing the supply of available food, water and housing; settlers had to use temporary shelters such as nomad huts, tents or lean-tos made of branches. Illness continued to be common. However, according to a report by A. Kulomzin, the administrator of the Siberian Railway Committee, the death rate was reduced at such migration points to less than 1 per cent.⁹

The delays were not simply associated with the increased numbers of migrants and the logistics of obtaining a horse and cart or barge transport to the point of destination. The Siberian Railway Committee, responsible for the survey and allocation of land for settlement until 1906, could not keep up with the demand. Officials in charge of the migration points would not allow migrants to depart unless they had permits for specific destinations where land was available to them. They would prevent the departure of such 'irregular' migrants by withholding assistance from them until land could be found to accommodate them. The 'irregular' migrants, therefore, often found themselves in insurmountable difficulty and, after much waiting and or futile attempts to settle, would return home, bearing financial and sometimes human losses.

Pioneering involved considerable outlays of capital. Funds were needed to purchase a wagon and horses or oxen, and to build or purchase a house. It would have been easier to join an existing community of established settlers, but enrolling in such a community was a daunting procedure. A newcomer had to formally enroll in a community. To do this, he had to send three years of taxes to his home community, and pay an admission fee to his prospective community ranging from 50 to 100 rubles (roughly the purchase price of a wagon or a horse). Finally, he had to send his certificate of admission to his home village and request, in return, a certificate of discharge. Frustrated by this bureaucratic red tape and expense, many settlers chose to carve a new settlement out of the wilderness. Occasionally, authorities were horrified to discover new settlements on lands that were designated out of bounds. Nevertheless, it was impracticable for them to force the settlers to return, and they were usually allowed to stay.

Building a wooden frame house, or spending a winter in a sod hut or a dug-out was a difficult task. There was a shortage of trees for building materials. Water supply was also a major problem. In 1896 Kulomzin found that epidemics had hit nearly all recently established settlers, and especially those with a poor water source.¹⁰

Ukrainian migrants were more disadvantaged than their Russian counterparts. First, Ukrainians had to deal with a distinct cultural barrier. They spoke a language not always understood by officialdom and the Russian migrants and railway crews were often hostile towards them. A. Omelchenko, who administered the Krivoshchekovo migration camp in 1896, observed the animosity which existed between Russians and Ukrainians. Derogatory name-calling and brawls were

common. If, by chance, a Ukrainian should end up in a box car of Russians, his belongings might be tossed out with no remorse. Omelchenko noted that Ukrainians were less collectivist in their behaviour. They would make individual requests for financial support, and never begged for assistance. Russians, by contrast, always spoke as a group, requested support for the group, and did not hesitate to get on their knees to maximise collective gain.¹¹

Secondly, Ukrainians tended to occupy marginal lands. The first settlers obtained the best lands, and those who followed were relegated to less favourable districts. Since, with time, Ukrainians formed an increasing share of the migrants to Siberia, exceeding 50 per cent of all the migrants in 1904–5 and 1910–11, a large number of them had to settle on marginal lands. In many instances these were the dry grasslands of the Steppe Krai, where trees and water were in poor supply. The largest concentration of Ukrainian settlers was to be found in the Steppe Krai and in the distant Far East.¹²

Finally, on average, Ukrainians had to travel greater distances than Russians. This was a particular problem for the areas which had to be traversed by horse and cart in Siberia and the complex transfers beyond Lake Baikal to the Amur and the Far East. These were the most backward areas with the fewest doctors and medical facilities.¹³

In measuring migrant losses and the survival rates of settlers, one is confronted by the fact that reports of epidemics and deaths among migrants and settlers were mostly anecdotal in nature. Estimates of death rates are fragmentary. Moreover, the data on epidemics or deaths do not distinguish migrants by nationality or origin. In view of this problem, aggregate migration and population data will be used to measure losses and survival rates in an indirect way. Specifically, we will use the February 1897 census and the December 1926 census as benchmarks for both population and end results of migration; migration data for the intervening years, natural population increase data from 1897 to 1913, and population estimates of the Central Statistical Committee for January 1911 and January 1913.

The procedure being proposed involves two steps: (1) to establish a general level of losses and survival rates for all migrants to Asiatic Russia, and (2) to do the same for the migrants from the nine Ukrainian provinces. The two sets of data can then be compared. By balancing the 1897 and the 1926 end results of migration survivors with migration statistics for the intervening years one can establish a general level of population loss and survival rates. The results of this approach are given in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Calculation of migration survivors for 1926 using a death rate of 2.3 per cent on migration survivors of 1897 and subsequent migrants

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Migrants or migrant survivors^(a)</i> | <i>Retention rate for each year up to 1926 assuming 2.3% Death Rate ^(b)</i> | <i>Migrants or migrant survivors retained by 1926 ^(c)</i> | <i>Discrepancy from benchmark</i> |
|-------------|--|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| | <i>(1000)</i> | <i>(%)</i> | <i>(1000)</i> | <i>(1000) (%)</i> |
| Pre-1897 | | | | |
| 1897 | 1400 | 31.0 | 434 | |
| 1897 | 70 | 33.3 | 23 | |
| 1898 | 176 | 35.6 | 63 | |
| 1899 | 192 | 37.9 | 73 | |
| 1900 | 177 | 40.2 | 71 | |
| 1901 | 94 | 42.5 | 40 | |
| 1902 | 88 | 44.8 | 39 | |
| 1903 | 105 | 47.1 | 50 | |
| 1904 | 39 | 49.4 | 19 | |
| 1905 | 39 | 51.7 | 20 | |
| 1906 | 195 | 54.0 | 105 | |
| 1907 | 513 | 56.3 | 289 | |
| 1908 | 702 | 58.6 | 411 | |
| 1909 | 642 | 60.9 | 390 | |
| 1910 | 320 | 63.2 | 202 | |
| 1911 | 196 | 65.5 | 128 | |
| 1912 | 244 | 67.8 | 165 | |
| 1913 | 317 | 70.1 | 222 | |
| 1914 | 242 | 72.4 | 175 | |
| 1915 | 28 | 74.7 | 21 | |
| 1916 | 11 | 77.0 | 9 | |
| 1917 | 6 | 79.3 | 5 | |
| 1918 | 64 | 81.6 | 52 | |
| 1919 | 0 | 83.9 | 0 | |
| 1920 | 85 | 86.2 | 73 | |
| 1921 | 71 | 88.5 | 63 | |
| 1922 | 7 | 90.8 | 6 | |
| 1923 | 3 | 93.1 | 3 | |
| 1924 | 13 | 95.4 | 12 | |
| 1925 | 94 | 97.7 | 92 | |
| 1926 | 81 | 100.0 | 81 | |
| Dec.-1926 | 3305 | | 3336 | 31 (0.9%) |

Notes overleaf

Notes to Table 4.1

(a) Pre-1897 are migrant survivors (residents of Asiatic Russia who were born in European Russia), according to the February 1897 census.¹⁴

1897 to 1913 are net migrants, adjusted on the basis that 47 per cent of those registered as returners actually returned.¹⁵

December 1926 are migrant survivors (residents of Asiatic Russian who were born in European Russia), according to the December 1926 census.¹⁶

(b) The retention rate is based on the assumption that 2.3 per cent of migrants died each year until 1926, and only the remaining migrants would be registered as migrant survivors in the 1926 census.

(c) Calculated by multiplying the net migrants of a given year (column 1) by the respective retention rate (column 2).

Data from the February 1897 census are used for the first year of the time series. In the light of this information, there were 1 400 000 residents in Asiatic Russia who were born in European Russia. By December 1926, the last year of the time series, there were 3 305 000 residents in the Asiatic USSR who were born in European USSR. By applying an appropriate death rate backwards from 1926 to each group of migrants who settled in Asiatic Russia in the intervening years, (including the migration survivors registered in the 1897 census, so that the resultant migrants and survivors of 1897 correspond to the survivors of the 1926 census), the death rate thus obtained should approximate the death rates experienced by the migrants over the period as a whole. After a number of iterations, a mean annual death rate of 2.3 per cent gives the closest approximation.

Next, an attempt was made to verify the results, including net migration figures and the death rate applied to migrants. Population growth in Asiatic Russia was simulated and compared to population estimates for 1911 and 1913. (See Table 4.2.) This was done by taking the February 1897 census data as a benchmark, and successively adding for each year from 1897 to 1913 net migration, and natural increase, less expected deaths at the 2.3 per cent mean annual death rate. The results thus obtained show a small overestimation of population, which clearly rules out the possibility that the suggested mean annual death rate is too high.

The second stage of the analysis involves balancing the 1897 and 1926 results of migration survivors from the nine Ukrainian provinces with migration statistics for intervening years for the same provinces. Using migration data for the provinces circumvents the problem of determining Ukrainian national identity and accounts for linguistic

Table 4.2 Simulated population growth in Asiatic Russia

| Year | Benchmark population ^(a) (1000) | Plus net migration ^(b) (1000) | Less death of migrants ^(c) (1000) | Plus natural increase ^(d) (1000) | Next year's expected population (1000) | Discrepancy from benchmark (1000) (%) |
|------|---|---|---|--|---|--|
| 1897 | 13 506.9 | 70 | 2 | 218 | | |
| 1898 | | 176 | 4 | 203 | 13 792.9 | |
| 1899 | | 192 | 4 | 216 | 14 167.9 | |
| 1900 | | 177 | 4 | 214 | 14 571.9 | |
| 1901 | | 94 | 2 | 247 | 14 958.9 | |
| 1902 | | 88 | 2 | 221 | 15 297.9 | |
| 1903 | | 105 | 2 | 265 | 15 604.9 | |
| 1904 | | 39 | 1 | 238 | 15 972.9 | |
| 1905 | | 39 | 1 | 221 | 16 248.9 | |
| 1906 | | 195 | 4 | 255 | 16 507.9 | |
| 1907 | | 513 | 12 | 259 | 16 923.9 | |
| 1908 | | 702 | 16 | 282 | 17 683.9 | |
| 1909 | | 642 | 15 | 301 | 18 651.9 | |
| 1910 | | 320 | 7 | 343 | 19 579.9 | |
| 1911 | 19 693.4 | 196 | 5 | 340 | 20 235.9 | 542.5 (2.8) |
| 1912 | | 244 | 6 | 340 | 20 766.9 | |
| 1913 | 20 745.8 | | | | 21 344.9 | 599.1 (2.9) |

(a) See note.¹⁷

(b) Taken from Table 4.1.

(c) Calculated as 2.3 per cent of the net migrants of each year.

(d) Combining Siberia and Central Asia.¹⁸

Table 4.3 Calculation of migration survivors from nine Ukrainian provinces for 1926 using a death rate of 2.3% on migration survivors of 1897 and subsequent migrations

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Migrants or migrant survivors (^a)</i> | <i>Retention rate for each year up to 1926 assuming 2.3% death rate</i> | <i>Migrants or migrant survivors retained by 1826</i> | <i>Discrepancy from benchmark</i> |
|-------------|---|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| | <i>(1000)</i> | <i>(%)</i> | <i>(1000)</i> | <i>(1000) (%)</i> |
| Pre-1897 | | | | |
| 1897 | 293.2 | 31.0 | 90.9 | |
| 1898 | 28.5 | 33.3 | 9.5 | |
| 1898 | 26.9 | 35.6 | 9.6 | |
| 1899 | 45.6 | 37.9 | 17.3 | |
| 1900 | 74.3 | 40.2 | 29.9 | |
| 1901 | 45.8 | 42.5 | 19.5 | |
| 1902 | 37.9 | 44.8 | 17.0 | |
| 1903 | 39.5 | 47.1 | 18.6 | |
| 1904 | 25.8 | 49.4 | 12.7 | |
| 1905 | 27.5 | 51.7 | 14.2 | |
| 1906 | 87.6 | 54.0 | 47.3 | |
| 1907 | 199.6 | 56.3 | 112.4 | |
| 1908 | 280.1 | 58.6 | 164.1 | |
| 1909 | 291.5 | 60.9 | 177.5 | |
| 1910 | 195.2 | 63.2 | 123.4 | |
| 1911 | 101.1 | 65.5 | 66.2 | |
| 1912 | 71.5 | 67.8 | 48.5 | |
| 1913 | 130.9 | 70.1 | 91.8 | |
| 1914 | 113.3 | 72.4 | 82.0 | |
| 1915 | 6.4 | 74.7 | 4.8 | |
| 1916 | 2.5 | 77.0 | 1.9 | |
| 1917 | 1.4 | 79.3 | 1.1 | |
| 1918 | 14.7 | 81.6 | 12.0 | |
| 1919 | 0.0 | 83.9 | 0. | |
| 1920 | 19.6 | 86.2 | 16.9 | |
| 1921 | 16.3 | 88.5 | 14.4 | |
| 1922 | 1.6 | 90.8 | 1.5 | |
| 1923 | 0.7 | 93.1 | 0.7 | |
| 1924 | 3.0 | 95.4 | 2.9 | |
| 1925 | 21.6 | 97.7 | 21.1 | |
| 1926 | 18.6 | 100.0 | 18.6 | |
| Dec. 1926 | 10044.0 | 1248.3 | + 204.3 | (19.6%) |

Notes to Table 4.3

(a) Pre-1897 migrant survivors are residents of Asiatic Russia who were born in the nine Ukrainian provinces, according to the February 1897 census.²⁰

Figures for 1897–1914 are net migrants from nine Ukrainian provinces, calculated on the basis of detailed sample migration data,²¹ and adjusted to the more complete data of Table 4.1, column 1.

Figures for 1915–26 are net migrants from nine Ukrainian provinces, calculated on the basis of a percentage of Ukrainian migrants for this time period,²² multiplied by the net migrants in Table 4.1, column 1.

December 1926 data are migrant survivors from nine Ukrainian provinces according to the December 1926 census. In conformity with pre-Soviet administrative areas, the numbers include a small part of the Ural region.²³

assimilation over time. The procedure is identical to that employed in Table 4.1 and is illustrated in Table 4.3.

The February 1897 census, the first year of the time series, indicated that 293 000 residents of Asiatic Russia were born in the nine Ukrainian provinces.¹⁹ By December 1926, the last year of the time series, 1 044 000 inhabitants of Asiatic USSR indicated a Ukrainian province as their place of birth. In Table 4.3, the same death rate of 2.3 per cent was applied backward in time for each year of migrants, including the migration survivors registered by the 1897 census, and the figure thus obtained compares with the actual survivors revealed by the 1926 census. Clearly, given the average annual death rate, the number of expected survivors in 1926 should have been almost 20 per cent higher than was the case. In order to provide a closer result, the simulation required a mean annual death rate of 2.8 per cent as shown in Table 4.4.

Finally, an attempt was made to compare these migration results to the growing numbers of Ukrainians in Asiatic Russia. The latter was estimated by S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan using language identification data of the 1897 census data and the preliminary census returns of 1917 which they collected in archives and other registries.²⁵ The same method as used in Table 4.2 and described in Table 4.5 was used to simulate results. The total number of Ukrainian speakers in Asiatic Russia was established using the February 1897 census results. Then the net migration from the nine Ukrainian provinces, plus the rate of natural increase (the same as for the general population in Asiatic Russia) were added for each year from 1897 to 1917, less expected deaths (at the 2.8 per cent mean annual death rate).

Table 4.4 Calculation of migration survivors from nine Ukrainian provinces from 1926 using a death rate of 2.8% on migration survivors of 1897 and subsequent migrants

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Migrants or migrant survivors^(a)</i> (1000) | <i>Retention rate for each year up to 1926 assuming 2.8% death rate</i> (%) | <i>Migrants or migrant survivors retained by 1926</i> (1000) | <i>Discrepancy from benchmark</i> (%) |
|-------------|--|--|---|--|
| Pre-1897 | | | | |
| 1897 | 293.2 | 16.0 | 46.9 | |
| 1897 | 28.5 | 18.8 | 5.4 | |
| 1898 | 26.9 | 21.6 | 5.8 | |
| 1899 | 45.6 | 24.4 | 11.1 | |
| 1900 | 74.3 | 27.2 | 20.2 | |
| 1901 | 45.8 | 30.0 | 13.7 | |
| 1902 | 37.9 | 32.8 | 12.4 | |
| 1903 | 39.5 | 35.6 | 14.1 | |
| 1904 | 25.8 | 38.4 | 9.9 | |
| 1905 | 27.5 | 41.2 | 11.3 | |
| 1906 | 87.6 | 44.0 | 38.5 | |
| 1907 | 199.6 | 46.8 | 93.4 | |
| 1908 | 280.1 | 49.6 | 138.9 | |
| 1909 | 291.5 | 52.4 | 152.7 | |
| 1910 | 195.2 | 55.2 | 107.8 | |
| 1911 | 101.1 | 58.0 | 58.6 | |
| 1912 | 71.5 | 60.8 | 43.5 | |
| 1913 | 130.9 | 63.6 | 83.3 | |
| 1914 | 113.3 | 66.4 | 75.2 | |
| 1915 | 6.4 | 69.2 | 4.4 | |
| 1916 | 2.5 | 72.0 | 1.8 | |
| 1917 | 1.4 | 74.8 | 1.0 | |
| 1918 | 14.7 | 77.6 | 11.4 | |
| 1919 | 0. | 80.4 | 0. | |
| 1920 | 19.6 | 83.2 | 16.3 | |
| 1921 | 16.3 | 86.0 | 14.0 | |
| 1922 | 1.6 | 88.8 | 1.4 | |
| 1923 | 0.7 | 91.6 | 0.6 | |
| 1924 | 3.0 | 94.4 | 2.8 | |
| 1925 | 21.6 | 97.2 | 21.0 | |
| 1926 | 18.6 | 100.0 | 18.6 | |
| Dec. 1926 | 1044.0 | | 1036.0 | -8.0 (-0.8%) |

(a) For sources, see Table 4.3.

Table 4.5 Comparison of growth of Ukrainian speakers in Asiatic Russia between 1897 and 1917, with simulated growth from migration and natural increase in the same period

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Benchmark population (a)</i> | <i>Plus net migration (b)</i> | <i>Less 2.8 death rate of (c)</i> | <i>Plus natural increase (d)</i> | <i>Next year's expected population</i> | <i>Discrepancy from benchmark</i> |
|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1897 | 325.5 | 28.5 | .8 | 5.2 | | |
| 1898 | | 26.9 | .8 | 5.4 | 358.4 | |
| 1899 | | 45.6 | 1.3 | 5.8 | 389.9 | |
| 1900 | | 74.3 | 2.1 | 6.6 | 440.0 | |
| 1901 | | 45.8 | 1.3 | 8.3 | 518.8 | |
| 1902 | | 37.9 | 1.1 | 8.0 | 571.6 | |
| 1903 | | 39.5 | 1.1 | 10.5 | 616.4 | |
| 1904 | | 25.8 | .7 | 10.0 | 665.3 | |
| 1905 | | 27.5 | .8 | 9.8 | 700.4 | |
| 1906 | | 87.6 | .2 | 11.1 | 736.9 | |
| 1907 | | 199.6 | 5.6 | 12.5 | 835.4 | |
| 1908 | | 280.1 | 7.8 | 16.7 | 1041.9 | |
| 1909 | | 291.5 | 8.2 | 21.3 | 1330.9 | |
| 1910 | | 195.2 | 5.5 | 29.4 | 1635.5 | |
| 1911 | | 101.1 | 2.8 | 31.5 | 1854.6 | |
| 1912 | | 71.5 | 2.0 | 31.8 | 1984.4 | |
| 1913 | | 130.9 | 3.7 | 31.3 | 2085.7 | |
| 1914 | | 113.3 | 3.2 | (33.7) | 2244.2 | |
| 1915 | | 6.4 | 0.2 | (33.4) | 2388.0 | |
| 1916 | | 2.5 | 0.1 | (34.0) | 2427.6 | |
| 1917 | 1700.0 | | | | 2464.0 | 763.2 (44.9%) |

(a) Source in note.²⁵

(b) As in Tables 4.3, 4.4.

(c) Calculated as 2.8%.

(d) Applying the same rate as obtained for each year in Table 2, column 4.

The simulated growth of the Ukrainian population in Asiatic Russia between 1897 and 1917 indicated an expected increase that exceeded the 1917 census returns by almost 45 per cent. This result suggests that even with a death rate of 2.8 per cent for the Ukrainian migrants, a far greater proportion of the settlers underwent linguistic assimilation or were simply not counted as Ukrainian speakers in the 1917 census.

In conclusion, the difficult migration conditions we described suggest sizeable losses of migrants and settlers which our indirect measurements confirm. For all migrants between 1897 and 1913, the

losses were equivalent to a mean annual death rate of 2.3 per cent. The hypothesis that Ukrainian migrants, for reasons of greater distances, social barriers, and more arduous conditions of settlement, had higher mortality was also substantiated. Migrant losses from the nine Ukrainian provinces was equal to a mean annual death rate of 2.8 per cent. Nevertheless, when Ukrainian population growth in Asiatic Russia was simulated, the losses of Ukrainian migrants could in no way compensate for the much lower registry of Ukrainian speakers in 1917 and, as Kubijovyc noted, in 1926. The very large difference can only be accounted for by linguistic assimilation or a census bias.

Notes

1. D. W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War* (Princeton, 1957), p. 34.
2. M. P. [sic], 'Emigratsiia z Ukrainy do Sybiru za chvert' viku', *Ekonomist*, no. 8, 1911, pp. 151-3; Ie. Golitsynskaia, 'Ukraina i ieiia kolonii', *Ukrainskaia zhizn'*, no. 1, 1914, pp. 17-30; A. P. Iakhaonov, *Pereselenie za predely Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1926); S. Korbut, *Siryi Klyn i ukrains'ka kolonizatsiina sprava* (Lviv, 1938)
3. W. Kubijowicz [V. Kubijovyc], 'Rozmieszczenie Ukraincow w Azji', *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukrainski*, no. 21, 1934, pp. 9-11; no. 22, pp. 3-4.
4. I. I. Popov, 'Pereselenie krest'ian i zemleustroistvo Sibiri' in *Velikaia reforma. Russkoe obshchestvo i krest'ianskii vopros v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, vol. VI (St Petersburg, 1911), p. 253.
5. D. M. Golovachev, 'Zametki o russkoi kolonizatsii Sibiri', *Zemleviedienie*, no. 5, 1895, pp. 51-2; M. Hekhter, 'Z ukrains'koho zhyttia. Pereseleniie', *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, no. 4, 1910, pp. 180-4.
6. Golovachev, 'Zametki', pp. 46-8.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
8. N. M. Iadrntsev, 'Iz nabliudeniia nad pereselentsami v Zapadnoi Sibiri letom 1892', *Zemleviedienie*, no. 5, 1895, pp. 78-9.
9. Cited in Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration*, p. 116.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 138-9.
11. A. Omel'chenko, 'V Sibir' za zemlei i schast'em', *Mir Bozhii*, no. 8, 1990, pp. 19-23.
12. See I. Stebelsky, 'Ukrainian Peasant Colonization East of the Urals, 1896-1914', *Soviet Geography*, no. 9, 1984, pp. 686, 688.
13. I. L. Iamzin, 'Vrachebnoe delo v Aziatskoi Rossii', *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1, *Liudi i poriadki za Uralom* (St Petersburg, 1919), pp. 270-94.
14. *Obshchii svod po Imperii rezul'tatov razrabotki dannykh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia*, 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1905), vol. 1, table VIIa.
15. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration*, p. 34; V. V. Obolenski, *Mezhdunarodnye i mezhkontinental'nye migratsii v dovoennoi Rossii i SSSR* (Moscow, 1928), pp. 127-8.

16. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926g.*, 56 vols. (Moscow, 1928–33) (hereafter *Perepis' 1926*), table 5 in vols 38, 40–3, 49, 50.
17. N. Turchaninov, 'Naselenie Aziatskoi Rossii. Statisticheskii ocherk', *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1, p. 92; *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossii 1913 g.*, 2 parts (St Petersburg, 1914), part 1, pp. 53–7.
18. R. I. Sifman, 'Dinamika chislennosti naseleniia Rossii za 1897–1914 gg.', *Brachnost', rozhdaemost', smertnost' v Rossii i v SSSR* (Moscow, 1977), p. 76.
19. The nine Ukrainian provinces are: Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kiev, Podillia, Poltava, Tavria and Volyn.
20. *Obshchii svod*, table Va, vol. 1.
21. N. Turchaninov, *Itogi pereselencheskago dvizheniia za vremia s 1896 po 1909 gg. (vkluchitel'no)* (St Petersburg, 1910) and N. Turchaninov and A. Domrachev, *Itogi pereselencheskago dvizheniia za vremia s 1910 po 1914 g.* (St Petersburg, 1916).
22. Kubijowicz, 'Rozmieszczenie', no. 21, p. 11.
23. V. Kubijovyc, *Atlas of Ukraine and Adjoining Countries* (Lviv, 1937), plate 21.
24. S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, 'Chislennost' i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa v XVIII–nachale XX v.', *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 5, 1981, pp. 15–31.
25. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Chislennost'', pp. 21, 24.

5 Ukrainian Nationalism and 'Soviet Power': Kharkiv, 1917

Rex A. Wade

The October Revolution in Petrograd ignited a complex struggle for power in Kharkiv which sheds light on both the process of the spread of 'Soviet power' in 1917 and the development of Ukrainian nationalism. The two were intrinsically intertwined in the events in Kharkiv between 26 October and 9 December 1917, when Bolsheviks took power by means of an armed seizure. This was the result of both a prolonged political struggle within the city, during which Ukrainian national assertiveness rose markedly, and the appearance of outside armed forces, both Ukrainian and 'Muscovite'. The successful establishment of Soviet-based power set the stage for the Bolsheviks' declaration of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic on 13 December, after the arrival in Kharkiv of Bolshevik leaders fleeing Kiev.

Response to the news of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd varied widely from place to place, depending on local political conditions. In some cities the Bolsheviks controlled the local soviet, held a preponderance of armed force, and immediately established Soviet power with little or no opposition. In other cities the process was more difficult, lasting several days and involving some fighting. In yet a third type of situation a protracted *political* struggle of one to two months ensued before the Soviet or Bolshevik forces prevailed. In these cases the Bolsheviks usually did not control the local soviet, or they were confronted with a strong alternative force. Kharkiv was such a place.

Kharkiv was a major industrial and financial hub, growing rapidly in the half century before 1917 from about 35 000 to 382 000 inhabitants. It had several large metalworking factories, some of which had been evacuated from Latvia. Kharkiv leaders felt it to be an important regional centre, the focus of 'Left-Bank Ukraine'. However, Ukrainian nationalism was much less developed here than in Kiev, and only a minority of the population of Kharkiv was

Ukrainian (the surrounding peasantry was another matter). Russians dominated both the officialdom of the city and the factories (a feature found in other large cities). Other nationality groups, especially Jews and, after 1914, Latvians and Poles, were significant in the city. Ukrainian nationalism developed slowly even after the February Revolution and appears not to have been a strong force until the autumn of 1917. It became much more important after the October Revolution posed anew the issue of political loyalties.¹

The February Revolution in Kharkiv developed quickly along the lines of events in Petrograd. By 2 March 1917 a Soviet and a Public Committee (which drew heavily on the professional classes and the city *duma*) had been formed. The Kharkiv Soviet was dominated by the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), as was the *duma* after the summer elections. Both the SR and Menshevik parties in Kharkiv were significantly to the left of their national organisations, especially by the autumn. The Bolsheviks gained some strength in the summer, but new elections in mid-August showed them still with only 30 per cent of votes in the Soviet, behind the SRs but ahead of the Mensheviks. Ukrainian socialist parties had yet smaller but growing representation. Despite the Bolsheviks' minority status, P. A. Kin, a Bolshevik who had been a champion of social democratic unity, was chosen as chairman of the Soviet in August (a fact which would have special significance in October). This election was the result of complex political manoeuvres, in which Ukrainian socialists as well as some Mensheviks and others gave their support to Kin. Indeed, at this time the Ukrainian socialist parties were able to play a balancing role in the Soviet, with their support sometimes deciding the outcome of disputes and votes.² It should be stressed that the Bolsheviks did not control the Kharkiv Soviet, either directly or through coalition, which would prove to be critical after 25 October.

When the first news of the October Revolution in Petrograd reached Kharkiv the morning of 26 October, Kin used his office to summon quickly the local Bolshevik leaders and proclaim Soviet power in the city. Red Guards and pro-Bolshevik troops occupied key points. However, later that day a joint meeting of the executive committees of three soviets – the Kharkiv Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Province (*guberniia*) Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, and the Regional (*oblast*) Soviet of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih basins – none of which were Bolshevik controlled, continued to survey the situation. They repudiated the Bolsheviks' actions and instead decided to create a broader revolutionary-democratic organ of power. This led

to formation of a 'Kharkiv Province Military Revolutionary Committee' (MRC) as the supreme authority in the area. The MRC in turn elected a nine-man executive bureau, popularly referred to as the *deviatka*.³ This action thus not only reversed the efforts by the Bolshevik to quickly proclaim support for events in Petrograd (about which they had only limited information), but also established a fundamentally new political authority in Kharkiv.

Turning to the Kharkiv MRC, it should be noted that it was established as a broad-based but distinctly leftist organisation, with an unprecedented Ukrainian representation. In discussions leading to its establishment, the Ukrainians had insisted on equal representation with the Russians (apparently meaning half the places). The allocation of membership gave five places each to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (the city soviet), to the City Duma, and to the Province Soviet of Peasants' Deputies (dominated by the Ukrainian SRs), three places to the Regional Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, two to the factory committees, and one each to thirteen political parties and eight public – mostly workers' – organisations, and *thirty* to 'Ukrainian organizations'. Party affiliations were not entirely clear, but approximately 16 out of some 56 members were Bolsheviks. The *deviatka* consisted of two Bolsheviks, two left SRs (Russian), one Menshevik-Internationalist, two Ukrainian social democrats, and two Ukrainian SRs. A. S. Severo-Odoevskii, a Ukrainian SR, was elected chairman of the MRC.⁴ The large Ukrainian representation on the MRC reflected an increasingly assertive Ukrainian sentiment, including the claim by these political groups of the exclusive right to speak for all Ukrainians.

The MRC's political position might be described as favouring 'soviet power', that is, a socialist government based on the soviets, but it did not equate this with Bolshevik domination. The MRC supported some of the steps being taken by the new revolutionary government in Petrograd, but rejected others. This posture reflected both the influence of a strong non-Bolshevik left and the attitude of the Ukrainians. It represented the kind of broad socialist coalition government which the left of the SR and Menshevik parties in Petrograd were advocating. It also indicated that the Kharkiv SRs were significantly to the left of their national leadership and that the local Mensheviks were predominantly from the Internationalist wing. The presence of a growing Ukrainian political movement, socialist in orientation and supporting the Central Rada, facilitated this broad coalition. Initially, the Ukrainians and the non-Bolshevik socialists

had a mutual interest in banding together to defend the idea of a politically inclusive strategy represented by the MRC, against the Bolsheviks.

The role of the Ukrainian groups requires special attention. Ukrainian nationalism had not played an important role in Kharkiv until the autumn of 1917, when rising nationalist sentiment led to support for the Central Rada in Kiev. This added a new source of tension in the city. By October the Rada and the Provisional Government were in such conflict that the Ukrainians easily supported the ousting of the Provisional Government. However, it was less clear which government they would back. Some Ukrainians argued that the Central Rada was in fact soviet power in Ukraine, a reference to the Rada's generally socialist composition and to the fact that *rada* was the Ukrainian language equivalent of the Russian *soviet*. To further confuse matters, some Bolsheviks suggested that a 'rada' would indeed play a role, but only one elected by an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. After the October Revolution the Central Rada asserted itself even more, complicating the problem of defining the relationship. The Central Rada's Third Universal on 7 November 1917 provided for a stronger Ukrainian government and gave a focus for Ukrainian political aspirations. Yet, it did not declare a completely independent Ukraine, providing rather for the Central Rada to be the government in Ukraine within some larger federation (whose capital would probably be Petrograd). Moreover, the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks in Kiev were thus far working together against the supporters of the old Provisional Government and other perceived 'counter-revolutionary' movements. Indeed, in Kharkiv the Soviet applauded the Third Universal.⁵ It took some time, and growing hostility between the Central Rada and the Petrograd Government, to clarify the extent to which a socialist Ukrainian government (the Rada) and the Bolsheviks could or could not co-operate, whether in Kharkiv or in Kiev and Ukraine as a whole.

After the formation of the MRC the *deviatka* moved quickly to assert its authority. On 27 November it announced that political authority rested with the MRC and the *deviatka*, its executive organ. Claiming as its basis 'the union of all the revolutionary-democratic forces', the MRC also announced its intent to suppress all counter-revolutionary activities. Interestingly, perhaps as a reflection of the Ukrainian influence, it stated that it represented the will of the Central Rada as well as that of the soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies and other revolutionary organisations.⁶ The assertions of the

deviatka seem to reveal both a commitment to the principle of a broad socialist government and an appeasement of Ukrainian sentiments. It also had the virtue of delaying a decision on whether or not the Bolshevik seizure of power should be accepted, and it gave an illusion of responding to news from Petrograd, while in fact awaiting the outcome of developments.

However, the Kharkiv Bolsheviks quickly began a sustained campaign to gain support for Lenin's government in Petrograd and recognition of Bolshevik power as the only valid expression of Soviet rule. This vigorous political struggle lasted throughout November and into early December. The Bolsheviks' drive to establish Soviet power and recognition of the Council of People's Commissars confronted Ukrainian assertiveness and their demand for support of the Central Rada. That these two positions were not seen by all as necessarily mutually exclusive confused, but did not lessen, the rivalry. In this period the Bolsheviks had not yet developed a clear position on the nature of their relationship to the Central Rada.

The Kharkiv Soviet resolution of 10 November, which some cite as signalling the establishment of Bolshevik soviet power in the city, in reality demonstrates the prevailing confusion. A motion was introduced reorganising the Kharkiv Soviet, along with calls for the Soviet to be the supreme authority in Kharkiv. This provoked bitter debate. S. Petrenko, a leader of Ukrainian social democrats, charged that the motion represented an attempt by the Bolsheviks to seize power 'on the sly' and he threatened bloodshed if they persisted. Artem (F. A. Sergeev), the Bolshevik leader, argued that power must rest with a Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, to which the Central Rada must subordinate itself. A. S. Severo-Odoevskii (a Ukrainian SR) responded that the Rada was the sole and supreme authority. Other party spokesmen appealed for a unified 'revolutionary-democratic authority' and some SRs reminded everyone that the Constituent Assembly was in fact the ultimate authority.⁷

The 10 November resolution has been the source of considerable controversy over the years. Soviet collections of documents used by most Soviet historians omit an important passage from the resolution. (Alternatively, the other versions of the resolution had a passage added to the original.) The first part of the resolution welcomed the overthrow of the Provisional Government, supported the resolutions of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets (proclaiming peace and land), and recognised the authority of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars as the 'All-Russian' (*obshche-*

rossiiskoe) government. It then called for the country to be organised on a federative basis and welcomed the initiative of the Ukrainian Central Rada in proclaiming the Ukrainian People's (*Narodna*) Republic. Having thus praised both Petrograd and Kiev, the resolution read, 'We recognize that in Ukraine, as in all the rest of Russia, all authority both locally and centrally must belong to the Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies *of the Ukrainian republic* and to the *Central Rada and General Secretariat* chosen by it, and we will do our utmost to convene in the shortest possible time a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.'⁸ The disputed passage is given in italics.

The resolution raises many interesting questions. Without the passage it suggests that the Soviet in effect recognised the authority of both the Central Rada and the Council of People's Commissars. This has been the generally accepted reading, and the compromise wording is consistent with the balance of forces in Kharkiv at the time. If the passage is included, then the interpretation has to be adjusted in two respects. First, the resolution no longer implies a clear recognition of the Rada as a sovereign body, but rather views it as an organ subordinate to a Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (and presumably to be elected by it). However, it also alters the degree of recognition of the government in Petrograd. While accepting it in the first part of the resolution, the latter part points to the authority of a future Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, and even of a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, as the governmental authority for Ukraine within a broader federation of republics. Indeed, the idea of a federal state, probably very decentralised, expressed in the Third Universal had extensive support at the time, including Kharkiv. It also fits within the then unclear definitions of *rada* and *soviet* and their relationship(s) referred to above. Which version and interpretation was intended remains unclear, as does the reason for the difference.⁹

The resolution in any case did not change political power relationships, and the political struggle continued, ever more bitter, throughout November. The respective authority of the Central Rada and of soviet institutions was the subject of debate in various forums and meetings throughout the city. It was the main issue at the 17, 19 and 24 November meetings of the Soviet. On 24 November the Bolsheviks finally won passage of a resolution on relations with the Rada. This is also the date often given for the establishment of soviet power in Kharkiv. In reality, the 24 November resolution was as ambiguous as the 10 November motion.

The resolution denounced the Central Rada for claiming to be the government of Ukraine. It recognised 'only one authority – the authority (*vlast*) of the soviets'. This, however, was defined as an authority to be established by the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Indeed, to further confuse matters, it designated a 'Rada' to be elected by this Congress as the supreme authority of Ukraine. The Rada was explicitly identified as the equivalent of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. Moreover, this Rada was to convene a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. The Council of People's Commissars in Petrograd was recognised, in a final sentence which seems almost an afterthought, to be the lawful government of a federal state.¹⁰

In other respects, the 24 November meeting did represent a major step toward Bolshevik control and Soviet power in Kharkiv. The results of the re-election of deputies to the Soviet, which the Bolsheviks had pressed for throughout November, were confirmed at this meeting and were reflected in the election of a new executive committee of the Soviet. There was a major increase of Bolshevik support even though an absolute majority still eluded them. They received 19 out of 41 seats on the new executive committee, and the more hard-line Bolshevik, Artem, was elected chairman.¹¹ The Ukrainian socialists held four seats in the new Executive Committee.¹²

After 24 November, however, the focus of the struggle for power now began to shift to preparation for armed confrontations. The relative military strength at the disposal of the two sides at this time is unclear. This was because party lines were not neatly drawn. Nor was it certain who should be included in 'soviet' power. Finally, Ukrainian armed forces in the city were just beginning to take shape.

Examining the military situation in Kharkiv, it appears that the city garrison had between 30 000 and 40 000 men, many of whom, perhaps a third, were convalescents. By the end of November the active garrison may have been reduced to some 10 000 men. While the idea of 'soviet power' had strong support in the garrison, whether this would be translated into backing for the Bolsheviks was doubtful. The most important units were the 28th, 30th, and 232nd infantry regiments, the 1st Sapper Regiment, and the 29th Armoured Car Regiment. The 30th was the most actively pro-Bolshevik, and later Bolshevik memoir accounts refer almost exclusively to it when speaking of troops playing an active role in the events of late November and early December. Although Soviet historians always refer to the

232nd and the 1st Sapper regiments as pro-Soviet, the paucity of references to them during these days suggests that as units they gave little if any support for the Bolsheviks. The 29th Armoured Car Regiment was a special case. It had come to the city only recently and supported the revolution in the broad sense, but did not back the Bolshevik version of Soviet power and, if anything, had an SR orientation. The Bolsheviks were very worried about what it would do in a confrontation.

Ukrainian strength was concentrated in the 28th Regiment, which at this time began to reorganise itself into the 2nd Ukrainian Regiment. (We will refer to it as the 2nd Regiment.) Efforts to 'Ukrainise' it were among the sources of tension in early December. At the beginning of December steps were taken to remove non-Ukrainian elements from the regiment, a move which may have originated either with the garrison commander, Chebotarev, or with the Central Rada. As early as 1 December about one hundred officers protested a decision by the regiment to send to the front all officers failing to swear support for the Central Rada, and a list of non-Ukrainian officers was drawn up.¹³ In a series of stormy meetings between 1-4 December the issue of Ukrainisation was debated, with the participation of speakers from all political parties, including the Bolsheviks. On 4 December the regiment resolved to recognise only the Rada as the supreme power in Kharkiv, to support the Third Universal, and to expel from the regiment and out of the territory of the Ukrainian republic all (including ethnic Ukrainians) those who did not recognise the Rada. They also asked to be renamed the 'Kharkiv Cossack Regiment'.¹⁴ However, some of the troops present at the meeting declared support for the Soviet.¹⁵

At the same time, rumours abounded of the arrival of other Ukrainian troops. Indeed, this became a staple of the newspapers in early December. For example, *Izvestiia iuga* on 2 December spoke of small groups of Ukrainian soldiers arriving daily, and *Iuzhnyi krai* on 5 December reported that 'several hundred' Ukrainian cossacks with officers had arrived the day before. Apparently, some soldiers from the Ukrainian Chyhyrnskyi and Pereiaslavskyi regiments did enter the city in early December. These reports tended to be vague about the size of the regiments in question and whether the soldiers stayed in the city or were merely in transit. There were also reports of Ukrainian troop movements toward or around Kharkiv. Many of these accounts were published in the Ukrainian language section of *Izvestiia iuga*. What all of this added up to is not entirely clear. The

press reports created the impression that a huge Ukrainian force was already in Kharkiv or converging on it. As we discuss below, this was not the case, but it does explain the reluctance of the Kharkiv Bolshevik leaders to force a confrontation. The fact that Bolshevik memoirs constantly refer to Ukrainians having a preponderance of force in the city would indicate that Bolsheviks took the threat seriously.

In addition to the soldiers, both sides also drew upon other armed forces. Here the Bolsheviks clearly had the upper hand. By early December the Red Guard which had formed at industrial enterprises had become a significant force. Not only had it grown in number – about 3500 by the beginning of December – but some of the units had been hardened in military action outside the city in November, most importantly in clashes in the neighbouring Russian city of Belgorod. The Red Guard were the most aggressive of the armed forces and were staunch supporters of soviet power in its most radical, that is, Bolshevik meaning.¹⁶ On the Ukrainian side some volunteer 'free cossack' units were being formed. Little is known about the size or level of organisation of these units. Apparently, most came from the area around Kharkiv rather than the city itself. On 8 December the 'General Staff of the Free Cossacks' issued a call for 'all the Ukrainian toiling population to organize units of free cossacks' to defend their freedom and the Central Rada, and announced a general assembly of free cossacks of the Kharkiv region to be held 10 December.¹⁷ The appearance of free cossacks caused considerable apprehension in Soviet circles, but as events turned out, unlike the Red Guards, they did not play a role in the political-military conflict of 8–9 December 1917.

Although figures on the overall relative strength of the two sides are imprecise, it appears that the Bolsheviks had the upper hand, although it was not one they could play with any degree of confidence. On the Ukrainian side, estimates range from approximately 2000 'Ukrainized' soldiers, mostly from the 2nd Regiment, to about 8000, comprising most of the 2nd Regiment (whose total strength was about 3500 men), free cossacks, as well as smaller groups of Ukrainian soldiers who came to the city in late November and early December.¹⁸ The figure of 2000 probably reflects the force that could actually be called upon to participate in action, whereas the larger number was indicative of potential support. Bolshevik support in the Kharkiv garrison, both real and potential, was probably equal in size. A. F. Ignatov writes that some 9000 soldiers were of a

'revolutionary mood'.¹⁹ Although this is probably correct, it is doubtful that anywhere near that number were willing to go beyond 'mood' to use arms in support of the Bolshevik vision of power in early December. The Bolsheviks would have been hard pressed to summon more than 2000 soldiers. (The pro-Bolshevik 30th Regiment was by then reduced to several hundred troops, far below regular regiment strength.) It was, however, the Red Guard which gave Bolsheviks a clear edge. Comparatively large and politically committed, the Red Guard could play a decisive role in a situation where determination was more important than formal military training and where actual shooting would be minimal.

An important advantage the Bolsheviks had over their Ukrainian rivals was control of the Kharkiv Soviet. Since the February Revolution, the soviet was the strongest political authority in the city, and by December it had reasserted some of the dominance it had lost to the Military Revolutionary Committee after October. In part this was a reflection of the weakness of the MRC as a long-term political force: it was an unstable coalition of parties and its vision of a broad socialist coalition government had lost credibility nationally. However, it was also in part due to the ability of the Soviet to reassert its traditional role as the focus of worker and soldier loyalty, reinforced by the successes the Bolsheviks had in the November factory re-elections of deputies. In contrast, the Ukrainians did not have a comparably strong city political leadership. The main institution was the Kharkiv Free Ukrainian Rada led by S. Petrenko, which backed the Central Rada as the all-Ukrainian government and considered itself the Rada's local representative. The Kharkiv Rada had only recently emerged and had not yet developed a strong popular base or an experienced unifying leadership. Whether it could have emerged as the dominant political force is uncertain given that Ukrainians were a minority of Kharkiv's population and that there was a division amongst Ukrainians between supporters of the Rada and those favouring Soviet rule. In any case, the armed seizure of power on 8–9 December 1917 precluded the possibility.

The political atmosphere in Kharkiv was charged with nervous anticipation by the end of the first week of December. During that week there were numerous reports of the arrival of Ukrainian soldiers, of fighting in nearby cities, and of the possible arrival of Bolshevik troops from the north. Tensions were heightened by the bitter exchange between the Soviet government and the Central Rada which occurred 4–6 December 1917. The Bolsheviks issued a series of

demands, including that the Rada stop disarming Soviet troops and Red Guards and that they facilitate the passage of Soviet troops south (probably through Kharkiv), and threatened war if the demands were not immediately met. The Rada responded by ridiculing the 'sad experiment' in the Muscovite territories and promised to defend itself with arms. Within Kharkiv various groups issued increasingly strident declarations, and in some instances engaged in hostile actions. On 6 December a city-wide meeting of Red Guards gave stormy approval to a statement by M. L. Rukhimovich, a prominent Bolshevik, that the Red Guards would 'not surrender a single shell,' in response to a proposal to disarm them.²⁰ On 7 December the garrison commander Chebotarev, a Rada supporter, ordered them to disarm within 24 hours. *Nova hromada* on 8 December issued a stirring call to Ukrainians to prepare for the 'decisive battle' for Ukrainian freedom: 'Russia appears – in its relations to Ukraine – in the role of a landowner who does not wish to renounce his property voluntarily. And none will renounce it, neither Kadets nor Bolsheviks... For Ukrainian democracy one road remains, the road of firm, resolute struggle with the Muscovite drones.'²¹ Meanwhile, both sides had taken some aggressive measures. For example, the Red Guard carried out a number of raids and searches for 'counter-revolutionaries' at hotels and other places.²² *Izvestiia iuga* described the tension in the city: 'In Kharkiv machine guns stand ready and whole regiments have been sitting alert in their barracks for some nights, without sleep, in armed preparedness, as if at any moment artillery fire might begin to roar.'

The crisis came to a head in the morning of 8 December with the arrival in Kharkiv of a Bolshevik expeditionary force commanded by Rudolf Sivers. This included about 1500 soldiers, 300 Baltic Fleet sailors and an unspecified number of Petrograd Red Guards. Taking a much more aggressive stand than the Kharkiv Bolsheviks had been willing to do, they provoked a confrontation. In an effort to resolve the situation without an armed clash, a meeting of all political groups was held in the evening of 9 December. The focus of the gathering was how to reconcile the conflicting Bolshevik and Ukrainian positions. The Bolshevik demands centred on (1) guarantees of free passage for Soviet troops south to combat anti-Bolshevik forces on the Don; (2) guarantees of the movement of food and goods north; (3) stopping the disarming of Russian troops and Red Guards and the 'Ukrainization' of military units. Ukrainian spokesmen, while presenting several different viewpoints, generally insisted (1) on a

recognition of the authority of the Central Rada and that the political future of Ukraine must be decided by the people of Ukraine; (2) that the newly arrived Bolshevik troops (or others allowed to pass through) not interfere in Kharkiv politics; (3) on a territorial principle for military formations (that is, Ukrainisation). The Ukrainian representatives tended to agree to allow Soviet troops to move through the city to the south, but only with the permission of the local officials.²³

During the negotiations the Bolsheviks laid plans for aggressive military action. The first step was for some of Sivers's troops and Kharkiv Red Guards to disarm the armoured car unit. The local Bolsheviks, fearful of the outcome, insisted that Sivers not take any hostile actions against the Ukrainians, to which he agreed. Around 1.00 a.m., as the political negotiations were coming to an end for the night with the makings of a compromise, the Bolsheviks opened fire on the armoured car barracks. Before a hastily organised delegation from the conference could arrive to stop the firing, the armored car unit surrendered. With this success behind them, about 4.00 a.m, Bolshevik militants – Sivers and the Kharkiv Red Guard commanders in the lead – moved to surround the building of the staff of the Ukrainian Military Council. After a short scuffle they easily overwhelmed the guard and arrested the staff and whatever soldiers and free cossacks were there. There was some brief shooting at the barracks of the 2nd Regiment, but apparently the Ukrainian troops simply stayed in their barracks (they were not disarmed until the end of the month). The Bolshevik forces now controlled the city, having carried out a successful armed seizure of power.²⁴

The coup was consolidated politically the next day, 10 December, when a new MRC was elected by a joint meeting of the executive committees of the soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies. It had only 15 members, including five Bolsheviks, seven Left SRs, one Menshevik-Internationalist, one Ukrainian Social Democrat and one Ukrainian SR. Thus the Ukrainian element was vastly reduced. A Bolshevik militant, Rukhimovich, was elected chairman.²⁵ In fact the Bolsheviks now dominated the city politically as well as militarily, playing a major role in the MRC and, even more important, controlling the Kharkiv Soviet. This allowed the Kiev Bolsheviks, following their unsuccessful attempt in Kiev to proclaim Soviet power for the entire Ukraine, to turn to Kharkiv as the place to organise the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Commenting on the events of 8–9 December 1917, *Izvestiia iuga* lamented that 'to this time Kharkiv was

a happy island in a stormy sea of bloody conflict in Moscow, Belgorod and on the Don'.²⁶ The editors could not have imagined the bloodshed and suffering that lay ahead for their city.

Notes

1. On general characteristics of the city see M. V. Kurman and I. V. Lebedinskii, *Naselenie bol'shogo sotsialisticheskogo goroda* (Moscow, 1966) and *Istoriia gorodov i sel Ukrainskoi SSR. Khar'kovskaia oblast'* (Kiev, 1976).
2. Surik, 'Oktiabr'skie dni v Khar'kove,' *Gornorabochii*, no. 10–11, 1921, p. 8; D. Erde, *Gody buri i natsiki. Kn. 1. Na Levoberezh'e* (Kharkiv, 1923), p. 159.
3. *Izvestiia iuga*, 3 November 1917; *Iuzhnyi krai*, 3 November 1917; *Zemlia i volia*, 4 November 1917; P. A. Kin, 'Vospominaniia ob Oktiabr'skikh dniakh v Khar'kove,' *Piat' let. Sbornik statei i vospominanii* (Kharkiv, 1922), pp. 63–4; A. F. Ignatov, 'Kharkivs'ka rada u dni peremohy Velykoho Zhovtnia', *Pytannia istorii SRSR*, vyp. 22 (Kharkiv, 1977), pp. 22–3; A. I. Smolinchuk, *Bol'sheviki Ukrainy v bor'be za Sovety* (Lviv, 1969), pp. 174–5; *Khar'kov i khar'kovskaia guberniia v Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii. Dokumenty i materialy* (Kharkiv, 1957), p. 23.
4. The list of organisations represented – or with the right to be represented – is as given in *Zemlia i volia*, 4 November 1917. There is some discrepancy on numbers. Both contemporary and later references mention either 56 or 60 as the size of the MRC. 60 probably reflects simply doubling the Ukrainian allocation of 30, since the agreement provided for them to have half of the positions. However, if all of the organisations named sent representatives, that would provide for as many as 71 members. Some representatives may never have materialised. It would appear that 56 was the actual size. The number of Bolsheviks – 16 – is the calculation of Ignatov, 'Kharkivs'ka rada', p. 12.
5. N. Popov, 'Ocherki revoliutsionnykh sobytii v Khar'kove', *Letopis' revoliutsii*, no. 1, 1922, p. 21.
6. *Izvestiia iuga*, 3 November 1917; *Iuzhnyi krai*, 3 November 1917.
7. *Izvestiia iuga*, 12 and 14 November 1917; *Iuzhnyi krai*, 12 November 1917.
8. The resolution with the disputed passage is in *Iuzhnyi krai*, 12 November 1917, and without it (and other minor variations) in *Izvestiia iuga*, 12 November 1917. The short version used by Soviet historians over the years, with yet some other minor differences from both the above and drawn from a non-Kharkiv newspaper is found in *Bol'shevistskii organizatsii ukrainy v period ustanovleniia i ukrepeniia sovet'skoi vlasti (noiabr' 1917 – april' 1918). Sbornik dokumentov* (Kiev, 1962), p. 150.
9. There is no certain explanation for the existence of the variations. It was not commented on by memoirists who wrote shortly afterwards. Newspaper accounts show that the meeting was chaotic, and imply that it finally voted a motion with the understanding that it would be cleaned up

- by a rewrite commission (a not uncommon procedure in 1917), which would be one explanation for two variants.
10. Resolution in *Pobeda Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii na Ukraine. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 257–8.
 11. *Izvestiia iuga*, 28 November 1917; V. I. Astakhov and Iu. Iu. Kondufor, *Proletariat Khar'kova v bor'be za pobedu Oktiabria* (Kharkiv, 1957), p. 161; *Khar'kov i Khar'kovskaia guberniia*, pp. 263–4, 304–5. 12. *Izvestiia iuga*, 28 November 1917.
 13. *Iuzhnyi krai*, 2 December 1917.
 14. *Iuzhnyi krai*, 6 December 1917.
 15. *Izvestiia iuga*, 3 December 1917.
 16. On the Kharkiv Red Guards see Rex A. Wade, *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution* (Stanford, 1984), pp. 239–74.
 17. *Nova hromada*, 8–21 December 1917.
 18. A. F. Ignatov, 'Bor'ba Bol'shevikov Khar'kova za uprochenie v gorode Sovetskoi vlasti v 1917 g.', *Voprosy istorii SSSR*, vyp. 34 (Kharkiv, 1989), p. 13; P. I. Garchev, *Chervona hvardiia Ukrainy u Zhovtnevii revoliutsii* (Kharkiv, 1969), p. 186.
 19. Ignatov, 'Bor'ba', p. 13.
 20. *Donetskii proletarii*, 9 December 1917.
 21. *Nova hromada*, 8–21 December 1917.
 22. Erde, *Gody*, p. 107.
 23. Account of meeting in *Zemlia i volia*, 9 December 1917.
 24. The major sources for the events of the night of 8–9 December 1917 are S. Pokko, 'Organizatsiia i bor'ba Krasnoi gvardii v Khar'kove', *Letopis' revoliutsii*, no. 1, 1922, pp. 44–8; P. I. Garchev, 'Pytannia istorii Ukrainy. Chernova hvardiia Kharkiva v bort'bi za peremohu radians'koi vlady', *Visnyk Kharkivs'koho universytetu. Istorychna seriia*, vyp. 2, (Kharkiv, 1967), pp. 11–12; and V. A. Antonov-Ovseienko, *Zapiski o grazhdanskoj voine* (Moscow, 1924), vol. 1, pp. 55–6 (he received his account on arrival two days later from one of Sivers' staff members).
 25. Ignatov, 'Bor'ba', p. 19.
 26. *Izvestiia iuga*, 10 December 1917.

6 Population Loss in Ukraine in the 1930s and 1940s

Serhii Pirozhkov

During the twentieth century Ukraine experienced far-reaching changes in the development of its population. This was in part due to the demographic transition from high levels of fertility and mortality, typical of underdeveloped societies, to conditions of low parameters of population reproduction. Ukraine also endured major catastrophes – the First World War, the civil war, the epidemics and famine of the early 1920s which followed in its wake, the man-made famine of 1932–3, the mass repressions of the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s, the Second World War, the deportations of the 1940s, and the famine of 1947 – all of which disturbed the normal process of the natural movement of the population.

The period from the end of the twentieth century to the middle of the 1920s was studied in detail by Ukrainian statistical organisations and demographers who worked in the Institute of Demography of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (1919–38), the first of its kind in Europe. However, the study of the 1930s was a forbidden area for Ukrainian demography. From the end of the 1920s to the mid-1950s, reliable data on the natural movement of the population and its size were not available, and certain officially published summary demographic indices were falsified. The materials of the 1937 population census were suppressed and its organisers punished as ‘enemies of the people’.¹

In the absence of reliable statistical materials on the natural movement of the population for the 1930s and 1940s, many historians and writers on social and political affairs, particularly in the West, developed their own estimates of population loss in the USSR and Ukraine which have little scientific basis. The total number of population losses due to the famine of 1933 and mass repressions was often overstated. It should be noted that many Western studies simply did not take into account the experience of long-term population projections carried out in the 1930s by authoritative Soviet

demographers such as S. A. Novoselskii and V. V. Paievskii, or the Ukrainian scholars M. V. Ptukha and A. P. Khomenko.² The work of the above prompted us to carry out our own computations with the aim of trying to provide credible data on the scope of population losses during this tragic period in the history of Ukraine.

We will not dwell on a detailed analysis of the estimates of population loss for the 1930s given by other authors and the methodology used to obtain them.³ We should only note that much of the research was based solely on a direct computation of the number of deaths and births. Most of these calculations related to the losses of the 1930s, and to a lesser extent, to that of the 1940s, even though population losses in the latter period were particularly high. Advocates of the direct computation technique claimed that one could obtain a reasonably accurate picture of the population dynamics for the 1926–39 intercensal period. Comparing the population size reconstructed in this way with the 1939 census published data, permitted researchers to draw inferences regarding population loss.

The problem with this method of computing population loss is that it requires an initial reliable data base on the natural movement of the population. Such a base was locked away in the closed sections of the archives and was not available until recently. The difficult task of reconstructing the initial statistical data on the population of the USSR was, to our knowledge, accomplished only by the Department of Demography of the Research Institute of Statistics of the State Committee for Statistics of the USSR.⁴ Other computations are, in our view, simply unreliable. Our calculations are based on this new information and use the age-specific rate method of demographic projection.

Basing our calculations on the initial age structure, we obtained a hypothetical age structure formed on the basis of the normal natural movement of population unaffected by crisis factors. Starting with the age structures given in the 1926 and 1939 censuses, we shifted the age distribution step by step up to 1939 and 1959, when the successive actual age structures can be derived from the All-Union censuses. We thus carried out a comparative analysis between the computed hypothetical age structure and the real one which allows for deviations to be assessed within each of the age groups. These deviations characterise the scope of the demographic crises caused by the upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s, and their age distribution gives us an idea of the structure of losses, whose effects can be seen in the age-structure of subsequent generations.

It should be noted that our findings are preliminary since some demographers have called into question the reliability of the 1926 and 1939 population censuses which we use as the initial data base. A more accurate assessment of the census materials (through an analysis of the archival documents) will permit the scope of the demographic catastrophes of the 1930s and 1940s to be defined more precisely. Moreover, we did not take into account population migration which undoubtedly influenced the actual age structure. However, population decrease caused by migration can also be considered a consequence of the traumas of the 1930s and 1940s.

Taking into account that the results of our calculations are of particular significance in estimating Ukraine's population losses, we consider it necessary to dwell on some of the issues bound up with both the techniques used in the computation and with the fertility and mortality hypotheses that we take as a basis. Our estimates of population losses in the 1930s will also be compared with the population projections (based on the 1926 census) carried out by Ptukha and Khomenko.

The gradational shift in the age-structure of the population of the Ukrainian SSR for 1926-39 was carried out in two stages:

1. The sex-age structure according to the 1926 census was corrected for data on the natural movement of the population for 1 January 1927; the age-specific birth rates for 1926-7, and the life table for 1926-7 served as initial data. Based on them, by performing a gradational five-year shift, the population structure of 1932 was obtained.
2. The population sex-age structure for 1929, obtained as the linear combination of the age structures for 1927 and 1932, served as the basis for the principal computation. Then, a five-year shift with two steps for 1934 and 1939 was accomplished. Here the age-specific birth rates were reconstructed for the entire period of the population projection using the Coale-Truesdell model which best describes the distribution of the new-borns by the mother's age in Ukraine (the method of spline-function was also used for comparison).⁵

The age probabilities of death were at our disposal only from the life tables for 1926-7 and 1933-9. For the remaining periods, the linear interpolation of the life expectancy index for males and females was carried out. According to this index, the age-specific probabilities of

death from the Coale-Demeny tables (model 'West', level 11) were selected. As a result, the following data on fertility and mortality were posited:

| <i>Years</i> | <i>Total fertility rate</i> | <i>Life expectancy (year old)</i> | |
|--------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| | | <i>Males</i> | <i>Females</i> |
| 1928-9 | 4.24 | 45.0 | 48.4 |
| 1933-4 | 3.97 | 48.4 | 51.4 |
| 1938-9 | 3.87 | 49.8 | 54.2 |

On the basis of such initial hypotheses, the population sex-age structure for 1939 was computed and compared with the age structure according to the 1939 census (see Table 6.1). The results of comparative analysis are presented in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1.

Table 6.1 Hypothetical sex-age structure of Ukraine's population compared with the 1939 census results (*)


| <i>Age group</i> | <i>Both sexes (1000s)</i> | | <i>Males (1000s)</i> | | <i>Females (1000s)</i> | |
|------------------|----------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | |
| | | | | | | |
| 0-4 | 3757 | 4988 | 1908 | 2516 | 1849 | 2472 |
| 5-9 | 2539 | 4452 | 1259 | 2240 | 1280 | 2212 |
| 10-14 | 3909 | 4200 | 1936 | 2117 | 1973 | 2083 |
| 15-19 | 2962 | 3431 | 1436 | 1724 | 1526 | 1707 |
| 20-24 | 2764 | 3124 | 1376 | 1553 | 1388 | 1571 |
| 25-29 | 3235 | 3248 | 1548 | 1593 | 1687 | 1655 |
| 30-34 | 2705 | 2940 | 1328 | 1416 | 1377 | 1524 |
| 35-39 | 2258 | 2422 | 1047 | 1146 | 1211 | 1276 |
| 40-44 | 1708 | 1951 | 799 | 912 | 909 | 1038 |
| 45-49 | 1329 | 1562 | 606 | 732 | 723 | 830 |
| 50-54 | 1086 | 1258 | 491 | 594 | 595 | 664 |
| 55-59 | 903 | 999 | 348 | 468 | 555 | 531 |
| 60-64 | 702 | 774 | 279 | 352 | 423 | 422 |
| 65-69 | 505 | 581 | 188 | 253 | 317 | 328 |
| 70-74 | 302 | 409 | 110 | 172 | 192 | 236 |
| 75-79 | 168 | 238 | 59 | 99 | 109 | 139 |
| 80+ | 114 | 133 | 36 | 54 | 78 | 79 |
| Total | 30946 | 36710 | 14754 | 17941 | 16192 | 18767 |

(a) Hypothetical, meaning the sex-age structure which would have existed in 1939 had the tragic events of the 1930s not taken place.

Table 6.2 Hypothetical sex-age structure of Ukraine's population compared with the 1939 census results

| Age group | Both sexes | | Males | | Females | |
|-----------|----------------------------|------|---------|------|---------|------|
| | (1000s) | (%) | (1000s) | (%) | (1000s) | (%) |
| | (-, decrease; +, increase) | | | | | |
| 0-4 | -1231 | 32.8 | -608 | 31.9 | -623 | 33.7 |
| 5-9 | -1913 | 75.3 | -981 | 77.9 | -932 | 72.8 |
| 10-14 | -291 | 7.4 | -181 | 9.3 | -110 | 5.6 |
| 15-19 | -469 | 15.8 | -288 | 20.1 | -181 | 11.9 |
| 20-24 | -360 | 13.0 | -177 | 12.9 | -183 | 13.2 |
| 25-29 | -13 | 0.4 | -45 | 2.9 | +32 | 1.9 |
| 30-34 | -235 | 8.7 | -88 | 6.6 | -147 | 10.7 |
| 35-39 | -164 | 7.3 | -99 | 9.4 | -65 | 5.4 |
| 40-44 | -243 | 14.2 | -113 | 14.1 | -129 | 14.2 |
| 45-49 | -233 | 17.5 | -126 | 20.8 | -107 | 14.8 |
| 50-54 | -172 | 15.8 | -103 | 21.0 | -69 | 11.6 |
| 55-59 | -96 | 10.6 | -120 | 34.5 | +29 | 4.3 |
| 60-64 | -72 | 10.3 | -73 | 26.2 | +1 | 0.2 |
| 65-69 | -76 | 15.0 | -65 | 34.6 | -11 | 3.5 |
| 70-74 | -107 | 35.4 | -62 | 56.4 | -44 | 22.9 |
| 75-79 | -70 | 41.7 | -40 | 67.8 | -30 | 27.5 |
| 80+ | -19 | 16.7 | -18 | 50.0 | -1 | 1.3 |
| Total | -5764 | 18.6 | -3187 | 21.6 | -2575 | 15.9 |

Figure 6.1 Ukraine: population loss by age-group, 1929-39



Proceeding from data reported in Table 6.2, we have good grounds to state that Ukraine's population losses both direct and indirect during the 1930s constituted about 5.8 million people. It should be noted that in the ten-year period from 1929 to 1939 children's age groups suffered most with the unborn and dead children accounting for 54.5 per cent of total losses (that is, the potential demographic losses of children was approximately 3.1 million people) and the direct losses of children and youths aged under 25 represented 13 per cent, or 760 000 people.

The total population loss figure derived by us differs from estimates provided by various recent sources. Some authors do not engage in any real analysis of demographic materials, but rather supply figures based on eye-witness testimony. In this category belongs the often quoted figure of eight million people, which allegedly represents Ukraine's rural population loss during the 1930s famine, recently reported in the Declaration of the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party.⁶ In the West, the figure of seven million appears to be widespread. In Ukraine, P. Vasilevskyi has provided a similar figure based on the personal reminiscences of A. M. Kiselov, head of the secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars in the 1930s.⁷

Other estimates have been provided by scholars, mainly historians, who have used archival documents and data on the natural population changes to reconstruct missing information. Although these figures are closer to the reality, they too cannot be considered as reliable since, as we have mentioned above, the real statistics of the natural movement of the population are missing and attempts to reconstruct them without the use of modern techniques of demographic simulation cannot yield satisfactory results. Robert Conquest, who claims that Ukraine lost five million people in the 1932–3 famine, is a case in point.⁸ Similarly, the Kiev historian S. V. Kulchytskyi has claimed that the figure is 3.5 million people.⁹ Yet an analysis of monthly data kept in the archives reveals that the average number of deaths in the period from September 1932 to February 1934 in Ukraine amounted to four million, with the urban areas accounting for 0.6 million and the rural areas 3.4 million – that is, 15 and 85 per cent of the total respectively.¹⁰

Finally, a third group has approached the study of population loss based on a simulation of demographic transition and gradational shift in age structure, supplemented with estimates based on the data of population censuses and those on changes in the natural movement of the population. In our view, the latter source can provide a reliable estimate of demographic catastrophes. S. Maksudov is a Western

scholar whose work falls into this category. He gives a population loss figure of 4.5 million people for the 1927–38 period.¹¹

Returning to our analysis of shifts in age-structure, it should be stressed that the population loss figure we obtained – 5.8 million – includes both indirect (the unborn) and direct losses (the physical loss of the living). The number of births and deaths which took place in the course of demographic transition, that is, the normal natural movement of population, has been excluded.

Analysing the age structure according to the 1939 census, one can see the emergence of a new dip in the children's age groups under 10 which is conditioned by the indirect losses. In terms of the number of losses, this dip is more significant than that which was observed in the same age groups in the 1926 census, caused by the First World War, civil war and 1921–3 famine. We can thus conclude that the cataclysms of the 1930s had more devastating impact on Ukraine's population than the above mentioned upheavals.

Studying the demographic development of Ukraine over the intercensal period 1926–39, attention should be paid to the population projections by Ptukha. In 1931 his long-range projections for the period from 1927 to 1960 were published in French.¹² In comparing his result with our calculations, carried out some 60 years later with the benefit of historical hindsight, we had to process Ptukha's data in a preliminary way since he published the sex-age structure of Ukraine's population for 1 January 1940, but not for 1939. The two sets of data are presented in Table 6.3.

Ptukha's projections exceeded the results of the 1939 census by 4451 000 people, that is 14.4 per cent. Interestingly, the shape of the age structure distribution in Ptukha's work corresponds to the deviations obtained by us. In this connection it should be noted that in the 1960s the well-known Ukrainian demographer, Iu. A. Korchak-Chepurkivskiyi, commented on divergences in the 10–15 year-old age cohorts. In his view, these were due mainly to the fact that Ptukha failed to correct the underenumeration of young children in the 1926 census.¹³ Ptukha himself strongly objected to such a correction. He believed the 1926 census in Ukraine was of such high quality that there was no reason to correct for the underenumeration of the population. Korachak-Chepurkivskiyi's point is not well taken since he did not even allow for the possibility that the discrepancies could be accounted for by the 1932–3 famine.

Comparing Ptukha's results with our own, we note that our figures diverge by 1 313 000 people. Elucidating this difference, we examined

Table 6.3 Ptukha's projections of the sex-age structure of Ukraine's population compared with the 1939 census results

| Age group | Both sexes | | Males | | Females | |
|--------------|----------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| | (1000s) | (%) | (1000s) | (%) | (1000) | (%) |
| | (-, decrease; +, increase) | | | | | |
| 0-4 | -1053.2 | 28.0 | -523.4 | 27.4 | 529.7 | 28.6 |
| 5-9 | -1754.3 | 69.1 | -905.7 | 71.9 | -848.5 | 66.3 |
| 10-14 | -141.3 | 3.6 | -109.8 | 5.7 | -31.4 | 1.6 |
| 15-19 | -346.6 | 11.7 | -230.0 | 16.0 | -116.6 | 7.6 |
| 20-24 | -248.5 | 9.0 | -124.8 | 9.1 | -123.7 | 8.9 |
| 25-29 | +102.9 | 3.2 | +8.5 | 0.5 | +94.4 | 5.6 |
| 30-34 | -129.9 | 4.8 | -40.4 | 3.0 | -89.5 | 6.5 |
| 35-39 | -77.3 | 3.4 | -60.5 | 5.8 | -16.9 | 1.4 |
| 40-44 | -172.2 | 10.1 | -82.3 | 10.3 | -89.8 | 9.9 |
| 45-49 | -177.1 | 13.3 | -101.4 | 16.7 | -75.7 | 10.5 |
| 50-54 | -127.0 | 11.7 | -83.0 | 16.9 | -43.9 | 7.4 |
| 55-59 | -60.2 | 6.7 | -104.3 | 30.0 | +44.0 | 7.9 |
| 60-64 | -44.2 | 6.3 | -61.2 | 21.9 | +16.9 | 4.0 |
| 65-69 | -55.1 | 10.9 | -56.5 | 30.0 | +1.4 | 0.4 |
| 70-74 | -91.3 | 30.2 | -56.2 | 51.1 | -35.1 | 18.3 |
| 75-79 | -61.4 | 36.6 | -36.7 | 62.2 | -24.7 | 22.7 |
| 80+ | -14.2 | 12.4 | -16.2 | 44.9 | +2.0 | 2.5 |
| Total | -4451 | 14.4 | -2584 | 17.5 | -1867 | 11.5 |

the results of the two population forecasts for every year for the period analyzed. (See Table 6.4.) Examining the data it can be seen that marked discrepancies in population size begin in 1929, after which time they increase smoothly, reaching 1 313 000 people by 1939. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that Ptukha assumed an invariable mortality and fertility rate which, in the long run, leads to a reduction in the size of the population owing to high population loss, in particular in children's age groups. On the other hand, in our population forecast the initial size of the population taken as the basis for the series exceeds the size of population obtained by Ptukha's forecast for 1929 by 374 000 people, which also contributed to the discrepancy. If Ptukha had accepted the hypothesis of reduced fertility and mortality levels, which had in fact occurred, his population projections would have revealed even more significant discrepancies in the size of the separate age groups as compared with the 1939 census data.

This point is corroborated by the population projection for 1937 carried out by Khomenko. He was first in the USSR to accept the hypothesis of reduced mortality in his long range projections and produced a figure of 35 617 000 as Ukraine's population for 1937.¹⁴ This exceeded Ptukha's estimates of population size for this period by 1 284 000, and the 1937 census results by 7 229 000. It should be pointed out, however, that the 1937 population census materials, first published by the USSR State Statistical Committee, gave Ukraine's total population as 28 388 800.¹⁵ However, the census archival documents which were used contain information only on the civilian population of Ukraine since the 1937 census of military personnel, and the personnel of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs was taken separately. The latter were evidently not included in the final estimate of Ukraine's population total; hence, the 1937 and 1939 census population figures must be defined more precisely.

Table 6.4 Ukraine: population projections, 1927-39 (1000)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Population (1 January)</i> | | <i>Births</i> | | <i>Deaths</i> | | <i>Natural increase</i> | |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|----------|---------------|----------|---------------|----------|-------------------------|----------|
| | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> |
| 1927 | 29037 | 29037 | 1155 | 1184 | 536 | 585 | 619 | 601 |
| 1928 | 29624 | 29638 | 1154 | 1139 | 536 | 586 | 618 | 553 |
| 1929 | 30565 | 30191 | 1093 | 1040 | 529 | 579 | 564 | 461 |
| 1930 | 31075 | 30652 | 1108 | 1068 | 529 | 583 | 579 | 485 |
| 1931 | 31641 | 31137 | 1120 | 1096 | 529 | 592 | 591 | 504 |
| 1932 | 32242 | 31641 | 1129 | 1120 | 527 | 604 | 602 | 516 |
| 1933 | 32867 | 32157 | 1135 | 1146 | 525 | 614 | 610 | 532 |
| 1934 | 33488 | 32689 | 1136 | 1174 | 522 | 628 | 614 | 546 |
| 1935 | 34121 | 33235 | 1134 | 1192 | 518 | 641 | 616 | 551 |
| 1936 | 34779 | 33786 | 1129 | 1198 | 514 | 651 | 615 | 547 |
| 1937 | 35443 | 34333 | 1120 | 1195 | 508 | 660 | 612 | 535 |
| 1938 | 36093 | 34868 | 1107 | 1198 | 502 | 669 | 605 | 529 |
| 1939 | 36710 | 35397 | 1090 | 1206 | 496 | 678 | 594 | 528 |

A = our projections; B = projections by M. V. Ptukha

Ptukha's and Khomenko's population projects have more than historical interest. They contribute towards an assessment of the demographic consequences of the tragedies which interfered with the normal reproduction of Ukraine's population.

During the 1940s and early 1950s Ukraine also experienced serious population loss which has yet to be studied. Using the age structure data for the period from 1939 to 1959 we computed the hypothetical age distribution (corrected for territorial changes after 1939). (It should be noted that the Transcarpathian region was incorporated into the USSR only in 1946.) The hypothetical age distribution was compared with the census results. Deviations of the real age structure from the hypothetical one give an idea about the scope of the population losses during this period. Our hypothesis for fertility and mortality for the series are as follows:

| <i>Years</i> | <i>Total fertility rate</i> | <i>Life expectancy (year old)</i> | |
|--------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| | | <i>Males</i> | <i>Females</i> |
| 1939 | 3.87 | 49.9 | 54.2 |
| 1944 | 2.77 | 52.4 | 58.4 |
| 1949 | 2.42 | 54.8 | 62.6 |
| 1954 | 2.30 | 61.8 | 67.6 |
| 1959 | 2.30 | 66.1 | 72.6 |

From the above data it is evident that the demographic transition in Ukraine was in progress during the post-Second World War period. We included this factor in our simulation of Ukraine's hypothetical demographic development, that is, the situation which would have existed had the tragedies of the 1940s and 1950s not occurred. The hypothetical sex-age distribution of the population of Ukraine for 1959 (see Table 6.5) was compared with the age distribution data presented in the 1959 census. The two are compared in Table 6.6.

As can be seen from Table 6.6, according to the normal population reproduction regime in Ukraine between 1939 and 1959, the country would have had 9 737 000 people more than was recorded in the census (excluding Transcarpathia, 8 818 700). The heavy loss of life during the Second World War, some 4.6 million,¹⁶ the 1947 famine, deportations, repressions and mass migrations took their toll. Indirect losses account for 3 955 000 people (or 40.6 per cent of the total), and direct losses, 5 782 000 people (or 59.4 per cent of the total figure). Sex-age demographic data are presented in Figure 6.2.

Our calculations of the hypothetical age structures indicate that the catastrophes of the 1930s and 1940s, ignoring the natural movement of the population, resulted in demographic loss of about 14.6 million people over a 30-year period (1929–59). This is roughly equivalent to

Table 6.5 Hypothetical sex-age structure of Ukraine's population compared with 1959 census results (*)

| <i>Age group</i> | <i>Both sexes (1000s)</i> | | <i>Males (1000s)</i> | | <i>Females (1000s)</i> | |
|------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | <i>Hypothetical census</i> | <i>Hypothetical census</i> |
| 0-4 | 3987 | 4424 | 2040 | 2242 | 1947 | 2182 |
| 5-9 | 3904 | 4327 | 1990 | 2175 | 1914 | 2152 |
| 10-14 | 2979 | 4426 | 1512 | 2210 | 1467 | 2216 |
| 15-19 | 3511 | 5159 | 1742 | 2578 | 1769 | 2581 |
| 20-24 | 4107 | 4368 | 2012 | 2196 | 2095 | 2172 |
| 25-29 | 3351 | 3320 | 1612 | 1641 | 1739 | 1680 |
| 30-34 | 3829 | 4730 | 1680 | 2330 | 2149 | 2400 |
| 35-39 | 2588 | 3646 | 1001 | 1765 | 1587 | 1881 |
| 40-44 | 2168 | 3179 | 813 | 1553 | 1355 | 1625 |
| 45-49 | 2757 | 3764 | 1045 | 1775 | 1712 | 1989 |
| 50-54 | 2352 | 3088 | 917 | 1477 | 1435 | 1610 |
| 55-59 | 1947 | 2461 | 682 | 1101 | 1265 | 1360 |
| 60-64 | 1502 | 1737 | 549 | 767 | 953 | 970 |
| 65-69 | 1167 | 1232 | 414 | 515 | 753 | 716 |
| 70-74 | 875 | 854 | 299 | 344 | 576 | 509 |
| 75-79 | 485 | 535 | 163 | 183 | 322 | 353 |
| 80+ | 360 | 356 | 104 | 115 | 256 | 240 |
| Total | 41869 | 51606 | 18575 | 24967 | 23294 | 26636 |

(*) The hypothetical sex-age structure is for 1959 and is computed on the basis of the 1939 census. The reproduction regime is unaffected by the crisis events of the 1940s.


35 per cent of the population total given by the 1959 census. The losses during the 1930s, which we have estimated as 5.8 million, can be defined more precisely if one obtains reliable age distribution data for the 1939 census. The 1939 census, as the reconstruction of the data for the USSR as a whole has demonstrated, overstated the total population by 2.1 million or by 1.2 per cent.

Our analysis of population loss shows that children and youth age cohorts suffered most. The loss of those under 20 years of age amounted to about 7.9 million people, or more than half the total losses. In our view, the figures we produced offer a reliable assessment of the demographic consequences of the tragedies of the 1930s and 1940s.

Table 6.6 Hypothetical sex-age structure of Ukraine's population compared with the 1959 census results

| Age group | Both sexes | | Males | | Females | |
|-----------|----------------------------|------|---------|------|---------|------|
| | (1000s) | (%) | (1000s) | (%) | (1000) | (%) |
| | (-, decrease; +, increase) | | | | | |
| 0-4 | -437 | 11.0 | -202 | 9.9 | -235 | 12.1 |
| 5-9 | -423 | 10.8 | -185 | 9.3 | -238 | 12.4 |
| 10-14 | -1447 | 48.6 | -698 | 46.3 | -749 | 51.1 |
| 15-19 | -1648 | 46.9 | -836 | 48.0 | -812 | 45.9 |
| 20-24 | -261 | 6.3 | -184 | 9.1 | -77 | 3.7 |
| 25-29 | +31 | 0.9 | -29 | 1.8 | +60 | 3.4 |
| 30-34 | -901 | 23.5 | -650 | 38.7 | -251 | 11.7 |
| 35-39 | -1058 | 40.9 | -764 | 76.3 | -294 | 18.5 |
| 40-44 | -1011 | 46.6 | -740 | 91.0 | -271 | 20.0 |
| 43-49 | -1007 | 36.5 | -730 | 69.8 | -277 | 16.2 |
| 50-54 | -736 | 31.3 | -560 | 61.1 | -176 | 12.3 |
| 55-59 | -514 | 26.4 | -419 | 61.4 | -95 | 7.5 |
| 60-64 | -235 | 15.6 | -218 | 39.7 | -17 | 1.8 |
| 65-69 | -65 | 5.6 | -101 | 24.4 | +36 | 4.8 |
| 70-74 | +21 | 2.4 | -45 | 15.0 | +66 | 11.5 |
| 75-79 | -50 | 10.3 | -20 | 12.3 | -30 | 9.3 |
| 80+ | +4 | 1.1 | -11 | 10.6 | +15 | 5.9 |
| Total | -9737 | 23.2 | -6392 | 34.4 | -3345 | 14.4 |

Figure 6.2 Ukraine: population loss by age-group, 1939-59



Notes

1. For an assessment of the 1937 census see E. Andreev, L. Darskii and T. Khar'kova, 'Opyt otsenki chislennosti naseleniia SSSR 1925–1941 gg. (Kratkie rezul'taty issledovaniia)', *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 7, 1990, pp. 34–46.
2. S. A. Novosel'skii and V. V. Paevskii, 'O svodnykh kharakteristikakh vosproizvodstva i perspektivnykh ischisleniiakh naseleniia' in V. V. Paievskii. *Voprosy demograficheskoi i meditsinskoi statistiki. Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 76–112; M. V. Ptukha, 'Naselenie Ukrainy do 1960 g.', *Sovetskaia demografiia za 70 let. Iz istorii nauki* (Moscow, 1987), pp. 46–64; A. P. Khomenko, *Sem'ia i vosproizvodstvo naseleniia. Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1980).
3. See A. L. Perkov'syi and S. I. Pirozhkov, 'Demografichni vtraty narodonaselennia Ukrain'skoi RSR u 40–kh rr.', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2, 1990, pp. 15–25; M. Tol'ts, 'Repressirovanannia perepis', *Rodina*, no. 11, 1989, pp. 56–61; V. V. Tsaplin, 'Statistika zhertv stalinizma v 30–e gody', *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4, 1989, pp. 175–81. R. Konkvest [Conquest], 'Zhatva skorbi', *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4, 1990, pp. 83–100.
4. Andreev, *et al.*, 'Opyt otsenki'.
5. W. Lutz, S. Pirozhkov and S. Scherbov, 'Modelling Ukrainian Fertility since 1925', WP-90-25, IIASA (Laxenburg), June 1990.
6. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 5 July 1990.
7. P. Vasylev'skyi, 'Alhebra henotsydu', *Dzvin*, no. 5, 1990, pp. 77–80.
8. Konkvest, 'Zhatva', p. 89.
9. S. V. Kul'chyt'skii, 'Demograficheskie posledstviia goloda 1933 g. na Ukraine', *Filosofskaia i sotsiologicheskaia mysl'*, no. 6, 1989, pp. 35–41.
10. Andreev, *et al.*, 'Opyt otsenki', p. 41.
11. S. Maksudov, *Poteri naseleniia SSSR* (Benson, VA, 1989), p. 165.
12. M. Ptoukha, 'La population de l'Ukraine jusqu'en 1960', *Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique*, tome XXV, 1931, pp. 59–88.
13. Iu. A. Korchak-Chepurkovskii, *Izbrannye demograficheskie issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1970), p. 305.
14. Khomenko, *Sem'ia*, p. 161.
15. *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 7, 1990, p. 67.
16. Perkhov'skyi and Pirozhkov, 'Demografichni vtraty', p. 16.

7 Between Two Leviathans: Ukraine during the Second World War

Taras Hunczak

Ukrainians found themselves in a most difficult position when the Second World War broke out. They were divided among states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, forming different communities who called themselves Ukrainians, or in some cases, by the archaic name Rusyny. These communities differed in terms of their level of national consciousness and by degree of political commitment to national emancipation or, to put it simply, to the idea of Ukrainian statehood. The most politically developed community was that of Galicia which, despite rather hard Polish rule, managed to develop an entire social, cultural and economic infrastructure, factors which translated into political power, or at least into a significant power base.

The situation of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union was much different. Collectivisation, the 1932–3 famine and mass repressions had devastated Ukrainian society. The population was reduced to a state of atomisation and political inertia. During the 1930s Ukraine ceased to a significant political factor in Moscow's political calculations. The republic was merely an administrative unit of a supra-national state run from Moscow.

In view of these political realities, it should be obvious that Soviet Ukrainians were incapable of becoming an independent factor during the Second World War. That role was to be played by the politically articulate West Ukrainians, who, building on an existing infrastructure, developed a nationalist movement which gave birth to the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists.¹ It was this organisation, armed with the exclusivist ideology of integral nationalism, that was to play a leading role, even trying to act independently, as the representative of the national interests of the Ukrainian people.

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was created in 1929 and, in the course of ten years of active struggle against Poland,

became a serious factor in the life of Western Ukrainians. During those years the organisation articulated its programme and built its infrastructure, appealing particularly to youth, who sought a radical solution to the Ukrainian problem, rejecting the possibility of a parliamentary solution which seemed to have been leading nowhere. The OUN, as all other clandestine authoritarian movements of its kind, was subjected to various internal and external pressures in which the personalities of the leading individuals played a significant role. The split in the ranks of the OUN which occurred in April 1941, was only the last phase of a longer brewing problem. Henceforth, the two factions of the OUN were to be represented by their respective leaders, Andrii Melnyk and Stepan Bandera, reflecting their approach to the central idea of the OUN – the liberation of Ukraine from foreign domination. Each faction felt that it alone had the proper solution.²

What options, one might ask, were really open to Ukrainians during the Second World War? The Soviet Union presented no viable alternative for Ukrainians. The mass terror which accompanied the imposition of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine once again reminded Ukrainians of their colonial subjugation.³ The Germans, on the other hand, with whom OUN maintained contacts throughout the 1930s, were seen as the lesser evil.⁴ Some Ukrainians were particularly encouraged by the writings of Alfred Rosenberg, who assigned Ukraine a rather prominent role in Eastern Europe within the reconstructed new Europe.⁵

Obviously those Ukrainian leaders who were favourable to the idea of German–Ukrainian co-operation were unaware, or perhaps did not want to know, that many highly placed German officials and politicians viewed their dealings with Ukraine only in terms of a master–slave relationship. These officials of the Third Reich viewed Ukraine's role as *Lebensraum*, 'a colonial land for [German] settlement and exploitation'.⁶

The idea of colonial exploitation was promoted by Hitler himself. In his 12 September 1936 speech, he portrayed *Lebensraum* as a horn of plenty. Giving vent to his imagination he said, 'If we had at our disposal the incalculable wealth and stores of the Urals mountains and the unending fertile plains of Ukraine to be exploited under National-Socialist leadership, then...our German people would swim in plenty.'⁷

While favourably disposed toward Germany, the OUN leadership became increasingly uneasy about Germany's non-committal position

concerning the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, which was the central tenet of the ideology of OUN. It was probably this uncertainty or doubt about the German objectives that drove the nationalists, particularly the Bandera faction of the OUN, known as OUN(B), to espouse a policy of accomplished fact. The first effort in this direction was the 30 June 1941 proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state by Iaroslav Stetsko, Bandera's deputy.⁸ By this act, the leadership of the Bandera faction forced the German authorities to reveal their true intentions. German hints that Ukrainian political aspirations would be satisfied in the distant future were confronted with an unexpected political reality.⁹

The German authorities were taken by complete surprise by the audacious act of the Bandera wing of the OUN. The Germans moved quickly to intimidate the OUN with the aim of forcing them to liquidate the newly created government. The OUN refused to accede to their demands and this confrontation set the stage for German–OUN(B) relations for the duration of the war.

Bandera explained the OUN's position during his interrogation on 3 July 1941. He said that in the absence of any other political force, the OUN(B) acted on behalf of the Ukrainian nation in proclaiming the establishment of a Ukrainian state. Undersecretary Ernst Kundt countered by saying that only Hitler had the authority to decide the political status of the territories conquered by the Germany army. Bandera rejected that argument, maintaining that this right properly belonged to the Ukrainian people.¹⁰

The lines were thus clearly drawn – the positions of both parties were irreconcilable. German plans for Eastern Europe precluded the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, while the OUN could not compromise on this issue without losing the very purpose for its existence.¹¹ The OUN(B) thus crossed its Rubicon in the very first days of the German–Soviet war, placing it in an adversarial position *vis-à-vis* the Germans.

The German response was quick. They arrested Bandera and Stetsko, sending them on 15 September 1941 to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.¹² Arrests of rank-and-file OUN members quickly followed suit, and reached large-scale proportions in 1942–3.¹³ Most of those arrested were sent to concentration camps, while others were executed.¹⁴

From that point it became obvious to the leadership of the OUN(B) that it had to pursue a policy independently and in opposition to the German authorities in order to achieve their

political objectives. The new position was clearly articulated during the Second Conference of the OUN(B), held in April 1942. The resolutions adopted by the conference spoke about a policy based on an independent effort of Ukrainian revolutionary and military forces and on mobilising the entire nation for a national liberation struggle when the appropriate moment arrived. Referring to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as imperialistic states, the conference proposed its own vision of an international order based on the principle of sovereign national states united under the banner 'freedom of nations and individuals'.¹⁵

The Third Conference of the OUN(B), held 17–21 February 1943, reaffirmed its previous stand on the imperialist nature of the war between Germany and the USSR, the goal of which, the resolution stated, 'was to turn entire countries and nations into an object of colonial exploitation...'¹⁶ Thus 'Ukraine found herself between the hammer and the anvil of two hostile imperialists – Moscow and Berlin – both of whom treat her as a colonial object.'¹⁷ The conference delegates felt that the two principal combatants – Nazi Germany and the USSR – would exhaust themselves in the war, providing Ukrainians with an opportunity to rid themselves of foreign occupation. Therefore, they condemned any collaboration with the German occupation authorities not only because it was wrong from the point of view of Ukrainian national interests, but also because it would play into the hands of the Communists, who would exploit it in their propagandist efforts designed to tarnish the Ukrainian struggle for independence as an instrument of German imperialism.¹⁸ This position was re-affirmed by the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the OUN(B) held in August 1943.¹⁹

The OUN faction led by Andrii Melnyk, on the other hand, prevaricated on the question of condemning German colonial ambitions in Ukraine. Even when the Germans demonstrated their disregard for the political ambitions of the Ukrainian people, Melnyk still believed, or rather hoped, that they would change their policy. He persisted in this attitude even after the Germans executed, in Babyn Yar in February 1942, leading members of his organisation, among them outstanding individuals such as Olena and Mykhailo Teliha, Ivan Rohach and Iaroslav Chemerynskyi. Melnyk's failure to take an openly anti-German stand prevented his faction from playing a major political role.

The Bandera faction of the OUN, by its immediate stand against the Germans, presented quite a contrast to the Melnyk group. At a 10 July

1941 meeting the Bandera leadership decided to reorganise OUN(B) in order to prepare the population for armed struggle against Nazi Germany.²⁰ (With the arrest of Bandera and Stetsko, Mykola Lebed assumed the de facto leadership of OUN(B) – a position he held until May 1943.)

The reorganised OUN(B), as well as the Melnyk faction, continued to implement their programmes, which often called for great self-sacrifice. Certainly one of the most ambitious programmes undertaken by both factions of the OUN was to organise and send, on the heels of the Germany army, expeditionary groups (*pokhidni hrupy*) into Eastern Ukraine, whose task was to raise the level of national consciousness, help revive civil life, open schools, publish newspapers, and, if possible, organise cells of the OUN underground organisation.²¹ Despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles, these 8000 young men and women reached their destinations for the most part and achieved the objectives expected of them. Many paid with their lives for their activity. Among those who perished were leading OUN(B) members Dmytro Myron-Orlyk and Mykola Lemyk.²²

German authorities viewed with alarm the OUN campaign. From the Nazi archives we know that German security authorities carefully noted the OUN propaganda efforts.²³ German intelligence reports quoted extensively from OUN underground publications. For example, one report cited an OUN brochure which stated, 'Germany pretends to be an ally and liberator, but really does not wish to see Ukraine united and independent; does not want a Ukrainian state to exist, and wants to turn Ukraine into her colony and the Ukrainian people into . . . slaves.'²⁴ Another report quoted an OUN(B) 'Bulletin' article which maintained that Communism and Fascism were similar in their basic objectives, but differed only in the tactics they employed.²⁵

Analysing the OUN(B) propaganda, a German intelligence report of 27 November 1942 concluded that the leaflets of the Bandera faction were inflammatory, calling for the assassination of Germans, particularly of the security police.²⁶ The German perception of OUN(B) intentions was correct, for by November 1942, the OUN(B) had already organised its first units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), one of whose tasks was to resist the brutal Nazi administration.²⁷ The Germans themselves created the conditions which favoured the development of armed resistance. Mass executions, imprisonment and deportations to Germany led many young people to flee into the forests, creating a ready reserve for the Ukrainian national resistance

movement. These run-aways served as the basis for the first Ukrainian partisan groups which were organised near Sarny in Volhynia by Taras Borovets (alias 'Bulba'), a political activist not affiliated with the OUN.²⁸ Bulba's and similar groups protected the civilian population against the arbitrariness of German authorities, as well as against the requisitions and other abuses by the Soviet partisans.

The UPA as a unified force with a clearly defined ideology emerged in the winter of 1942 and received a significant boost in March 1943 when thousands of Ukrainians serving in the German auxiliary police deserted *en masse* and joined the UPA, bringing with them weapons and ammunition.²⁹ From that time on, the UPA was clearly on the offensive, increasing its control over most of the rural areas of Polissia and Volhynia.³⁰ The Germans controlled only the larger towns and cities which became strongholds from which they conducted their punitive operations.

Besides the Germans, the UPA also fought the Soviet partisans, whose primary focus of activity was to wrest control of the Polissia-Volhynia region from the UPA. Soviet partisans would masquerade as UPA units and engage in actions specifically designed to provoke the Nazis to take bloody reprisals.³¹ All too often their tactics succeeded and the Nazis would carry out mass executions of the Ukrainian civilian population.³²

In 1943 the UPA published its platform entitled 'What is the UPA Fighting For?' This was an important programmatic statement, which elaborated upon the nature of Russian and German imperialism, and proposed a programme for the unity of action of oppressed peoples.³³ Support for the principle of national self-determination brought into the ranks of the UPA an ever increasing number of units made up of Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Uzbeks and other Central Asians. To encourage the anti-Soviet resistance movement among the various non-Russian nations of the USSR, the UPA called for a conference of 'captive nations', which was held on 21-22 November 1943. The resolutions of the 'First Conference of Captive Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia' stated that only 'a new international order, based on the respect of the political rights of every nation, would provide each nation with the means for its complete cultural and economic development'.³⁴

The Ukrainian revolutionary movement, as represented by the OUN, made significant strides during 1943. By the end of the year the territorial and internal structure of the UPA had become quite comprehensive. The UPA continued to defend the Ukrainian popula-

tion against German military and police units, as well as against Soviet partisans. The battles fought by the UPA in this period showed considerable operational dexterity.³⁵

Having emerged as a national military force of some consequence, the UPA leadership felt that it had to create a political centre which would direct the Ukrainian revolutionary struggle at home and represent the movement abroad.³⁶ With that end in mind, representatives from all parts of Ukraine attended a meeting in the Carpathian mountains on 11–15 July 1944, and declared themselves the provisional parliament of Ukraine. The Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada – UHVR) elected a revolutionary government and adopted a democratic political platform.³⁷

The emergence of the UHVR as a revolutionary government with a democratic programme constituted the zenith of Ukrainian nationalist political activity during the Second World War. In its *universal* (appeal) to the Ukrainian people, the UHVR explained that it was 'the largest and sole guiding body of the Ukrainian nation for the duration of its revolutionary struggle, until the creation of the government of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state'.³⁸

The OUN(B) and the leadership of UPA were criticised after the war by their opponents for bringing reprisals upon the civilian population by their use of armed force against the Germans and the Soviets. There is, of course, some merit to the argument. It can, however, be argued that Ukrainians had no other options if they wanted to try to become a factor in the international arena, as well as assert their right to an independent political life. The only other alternative was to pursue a policy of survival, with the understanding that nothing could alter Ukraine's colonial exploitation by the two super-powers. Most Ukrainians were indeed passive and accepted such a position, making the task of colonial domination by the two Leviathans much easier.

The Germans' occupational apparatus was able to create a basic administrative infrastructure which helped it run vast areas with the assistance of the conquered people. To be sure, this was nothing unique, for the Germans were even more successful in finding people who would co-operate with them in Western Europe. Yet the point must be made that thousands of Ukrainians served freely in the German administration,³⁹ in the indigenous police and the Galician Volunteer Division.⁴⁰ On a less voluntary basis, Ukrainians also served in the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UVV), which was formed from the prisoners-of-war of the Soviet army.⁴¹

On a much larger scale, Ukrainians served in the Soviet state apparatus, in the Red Army, and in the Soviet partisans. Unlike those who served in the German administration or the army, a significant number of those serving in Soviet formations were dedicated communists who were willing and ready to fight and, if necessary, die for the cause which they frequently identified with Joseph Stalin. Their story is complex and has yet to be told in all of its dimensions. Certainly, many believed that things would change after the war, still others preferred the devil they knew to one who was unknown.

Ukrainians who were members of the nationalist or communist partisan movements, or who fought in the ranks of the Red Army or in German formations, or those who tried to remain uninvolved, paid dearly for finding themselves in the midst of this epic struggle. Some 22 000 villages and over 700 towns were destroyed. The population loss was over 10 000 000 – the largest of any country.⁴²

In the final analysis, Ukrainians were powerless, hapless victims. Their attempt to play an independent political role was doomed to failure, an assessment that many OUN and UPA members would have shared. Yet, as many members of the nationalist underground admitted, they fought to earn a place in history. In that respect, they did not fight in vain.

Notes

1. See *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta insykyh dokumentiv z borotby 1929–1955* (n.p., 1955).
2. See Petro Mirchuk, *Narys istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrain'skykh Natsionalistiv, 1920–1939* (Munich, 1968); Zynovii Knysch, ed., *Nepohasnyi ohon' viry* (Paris, 1974).
3. German archives are a rich source of information on the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine from 1939–41. For example, a 16 July 1941 report states that about 20 000 Ukrainians disappeared from Lviv during Soviet rule. At least 80 per cent of them were members of the intelligentsia. The number of those murdered was estimated at between 3000 to 4000. For details see Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Berlin, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, nr. 24, Bundesarchiv, R58/214, p. 10.
4. For details of OUN-German relations in the 1930s see 'Tagebuch des Generals Lahousen', Bundesarchiv and H. Grossewith, *Tagebucher eines Abwehrofficiers 1938–1940* (Stuttgart, 1970).
5. See Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (London, 1957) and Ihor Kamanetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies* (New York, 1961).

6. Rolf-Dieter Mueller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht: Die Bedeutung der Sowjetunion fuer die deutsche Wirtschaft und Ruestungspolitik zwischen den Weltkriegen* (Boppard am Rhein, 1984).
7. Cited in Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, vol.2 (London, 1949).
8. 'Akt proholoshennia Ukrain's'koi Derzhavy' in *Samostiina Ukraina* (Stanyslaviv), 10 July 1941; Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv URSR, L'viv, fond n. 201, opys nr. 1, od. zb., no. 125.
9. The German security police noted that the 'leadership of Bandera tries to present the German authorities with accomplished facts' and cited the 'proclamation of a Ukrainian republic' and 'the organisation of militia' as examples. See Bundesarchiv, R/58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, nr. 11, p. 58.
10. NSDAP nr. 51, 'Niederschift über die Rucksprache mit Mitgliedern des Ukrainischen Nationalkomitees und Stepan Bandera rom 3, 7. 1941'.
11. This was clearly stated in the memorandum of OUN(B) to the German authorities. See The National Archives, Washington, DC, T120/2532.
12. See Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, no. 11, pp. 3-4.
13. For a partial record of OUN(B) members arrested during the 1941-3 period see Bundesarchiv, R58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzen Ostgebieten, nr. 41; The National Archives, T175/279; T175/146.
14. The Archive of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, New York, has several 'Bekantmachugen' which provide full information about members of OUN or UPA who were executed.
15. See *OUN v svitli potanov*, pp. 61-74.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-103.
20. See Roman Ihnytzkyi, *Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934-1945*, vol. II (Munich, 1956), pp. 192-4.
21. See the comprehensive study by Lev Shankov's'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN* (Munich, 1958).
22. Bundesarchiv, R58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzen Ostgebieten, nr. 37, p.64.
23. *Ibid.*, nr. 14, p. 83; nr. 17, pp. 174-5; nr. 18, pp. 193-5.
24. *Ibid.*, nr. 37, p. 64.
25. The National Archives, T175/17/2520098-2520105.
26. *Ibid.*, T175/279/5490778.
27. See Mykola Lebed', *UPA: Ukrain's'ka Povstans'ka Armiia*, 2nd edition (New York, 1987).
28. See Taras Bul'ba Borovets', *Armiia bez derzhavy* (Winnipeg, 1981), pp. 121-74.
29. Lebed, *UPA*, p. 22.
30. 'UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotsi' in *Litopys Ukrain's'koi Povstans'koi Armii*, vol. II (Toronto, 1976), pp. 23-4.
31. See D. Medvedev, *Silnye dukhom* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 397, 403 ff.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 284-5.
33. See *Litopys Ukrain's'koi Povstans'koi Armii*, vol. I, pp. 121-30.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 205–36.
35. Some of the battles are described in *UPA v svitli dokumentiv z borot'by za Ukrain's'ku samostiinu sobornu derzhavu 1942–1950 rr.*, vol. II (Munich, 1960), pp. 5–97; *Povstanets'*, November 1944, pp. 12–15; January 1945, pp. 13–14; April–May 1945, pp.15–17.
36. Taras Chuprynka, 'Do genezy Ukrain's'koi Holovnoi Vyzvol'noi Rady' in *Biuro informatsii Ukrain's'koi Holovnoi Vyzvol'noi Rady*, vol. 1, no. 2 (August, 1948), pp. 2–6.
37. See *Litopys Ukrain's'koi Povstans'koi Armii*, vol. VIII (Toronto, 1980), pp. 27–38.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
39. Kost' Pankivs'kyi, *Roky nimets'koi okupatsii* (New York, 1965); Volodymyr Kubiiovych, *Meni 85* (Munich,1985).
40. See Wolf-Dietrich Heinke, *Sie Wollten die Freiheit. Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division 1943–1945* (Dorheim, 1973).
41. M. Nebeliuk, *Pid chuzhymy praporamy* (Paris, 1947) and Jurgen Thorwald, *The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in Hitler's Armies* (New York, 1975).
42. See Taras Hunczak, 'The Ukrainian Losses during World War II' in Michael Berenbaum (ed.), *A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis* (New York, 1990).

8 Restructuring from Below: Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev, 1985–89

Taras Kuzio

For fifteen years Ukraine had been ruled by Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). Widespread repression of all forms of dissent, an all-embracing campaign of Russification and subservience to Moscow authorities had characterised his tenure of office.¹ While the Western media speculated on Shcherbytskyi's demise after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in April 1985,² the arch-conservative boss of Ukraine remained in control. *Perestroika* in Ukraine was undoubtedly sacrificed in the interests of maintaining centralised control. As the former political prisoner Iuri Badzio noted, 'Gorbachev wanted to maintain political stability in Ukraine at the expense of democracy.'³

Under the circumstances informal groups emerged as the engine of change. As Leonid Kravchuk later admitted, 'I agree that if it had not been for Rukh [Popular Movement of Ukraine in Support of Restructuring] and other democratic currents we would not have come so far so fast.'⁴ This chapter examines the evolution of informal or independent groups from small circles to serious competitors for political power.

The story of the first stage of the birth of civil society in Ukraine is linked to the amnesty of prisoners of conscience who provided dissent with its organising cadres. The majority of political prisoners were released in the first half of 1987 and they breathed new life into a society which had stagnated under the party's grip.

The most important independent group to be formed at this time was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU). Officially founded in March 1988, the UHU viewed itself as a continuation of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the

Helsinki Accords which had been established in November 1976 and whose membership had been decimated by arrests.⁵ Unlike the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Ukrainian Public Group had never disbanded. The membership of the revived Ukrainian Helsinki Union read like a who's who of Ukrainian dissent of the 1960s and 1970s. In another link with the past, Viacheslav Chornovil relaunched the *samvydav* (*samizdat*) *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald) in 1987 as issue number 7, fifteen years after it had been closed down by the authorities. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* became the official organ of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.⁶

Levko Lukianenko, who had spent 26 years in prisons, was elected head of the UHU. In the winter of 1988, while still in exile, he wrote an essay entitled 'What Next?' which was the group's first programmatic statement. In Lukianenko's view, *perestroika* was a 'life or death' issue for Ukraine. 'The continuation of pre-*perestroika* policies would have meant the total assimilation and destruction of our nation.' He argued that the UHU should reach out to the masses and encourage their participation in political life. The population had to be assisted in overcoming its fear and atomisation. Although Lukianenko did not disguise his view that independence 'was the most favorable condition' for Ukraine, nevertheless the priority was 'to defend the rights of citizens and to raise language and cultural issues'.⁷

In the summer of 1988 the Ukrainian Helsinki Group released its 'Declaration of Principles' written by Chornovil, Mykhailo Horyn and Bohdan Horyn.⁸ The document represented a tactical compromise designed to win broad endorsement from a public still reluctant to support radical demands. The Declaration defined the UHU not as a political opposition party but as, 'an organization which activates the masses in order to encourage participation in the government of the country'. It was a 'federative union of self-governing human rights groups and organizations'. In short, the UHU regarded itself as an unofficial popular front with the intention of uniting a broad range of people around a basic programme.

The Declaration dealt with political, economic, constitutional, educational and cultural reform. It advocated the transformation of the USSR 'into a confederation of independent states' with each state having the right to independent diplomatic representation. It called for a transfer of power from the Communist party to elected soviets, public control over law enforcement agencies, the legalisation of banned religious denominations and an end to nuclear power. In the

economic sphere, the Declaration advocated market reform. It should be noted that the 'Declaration of Principles' was conceived as a 'minimum' programme which could serve as a common platform for the nascent informal groups.

One of the first initiatives of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was an attempt to break the regime's monopoly on culture. In his August 1987 'Open Letter to Gorbachev' Chornovil announced the Union's intention 'to form our own creative circles independent of the official ones'.⁹ This was a reference to the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia (UANTI) which was launched in October 1987. UANTI was to serve as an alternative because official creative unions 'developed only a pseudo-culture, modelled upon socialist realism'.¹⁰ UANTI promised to publish literary periodicals and almanacs and hold art exhibits. The signatories of the UANTI declaration included seven honorary members of the International Pen Club: Ihor Kalynets, Mykhailo Osadchyi, Mykola Rudenko, Ievhen Sverstiuk, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Iryna Senyk and Viacheslav Chornovil.

UANTI's first campaign was around the demand for the re-burial in Ukraine 'of the bodies of the talented poets and public figures – Vasyl Stus, Oleksa Tykhyi and Iuri Lytvyn – murdered during the period of stagnation'. UANTI called on the Ministry of Culture to officially honour the fiftieth anniversary of Stus' birth, publish a selection of his work, and obtain from the KGB works which they had confiscated from Stus in the camps.¹¹

UANTI's first congress, held in Lviv, in January 1989, fifteen months after it was founded, was attended by twenty-six participants from all regions of Ukraine. Congress reports noted that association members had succeeded in establishing the following periodicals: *Kafedra* (Lviv, edited by M. Osadchyi), *Ievzhan zillia* (Lviv, edited by Iryna Kalynets), *Karby hir* (Kolomyia, edited by Danylo Hrynkiv), *Snip* (Kharkiv, edited by Valerii Bondar) and *Porohy* (Dnipropetrovsk, edited by Ivan Sokulskyi).¹²

The Kiev-based Ukrainian Culture and Ecology Club (known as the Culturological Club) also deserves mention as a pioneer of the drive for democracy in Ukraine. Founded in August 1987 by several former political prisoners, it set as its mission the politicisation of the population of Ukraine's capital. Led by Serhii Naboka, Leonid Miliavskyi, Oles Shevchenko and Olha Matuskevych, the group campaigned for the release of all remaining prisoners of conscience and for a widening of the discussion around the so-called 'blank spots'

of Ukraine's history, the man-made famine of 1932-3 in particular. It organised commemorative meetings to honour figures such as Vasyl Stus and Taras Shevchenko and discussions of nuclear power, the environment and other pressing issues.

The Culturological Club was the first to organise sizeable demonstrations in the capital. On 26 April 1988, on the second anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, it held a demonstration in central Kiev. Authorities used loudspeakers to drown out speeches and arrested seventeen people, among them Oles Shevchenko. This former political prisoner was sentenced to fifteen days imprisonment.

As one of the most active informal groups in Kiev, the Culturological Club soon became the focus of a concerted press campaign orchestrated by Communist officialdom. Articles such as those which appeared in *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 19-21 May 1988, far from arousing popular hostility, in fact generated public interest in the club's activity. The Kiev example spurred the formation of similar culture and ecology clubs in other cities, including the eastern industrial city of Kharkiv.¹³

The radicalisation of the opposition and the public at large led to a decline in the activities of the Culturological Club towards the end of 1988. Many felt that the club was an inadequate form of organisation and moved to other groups such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union or the movement to legalise the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

The above mentioned groups were led by former political prisoners. Hromada, the Kiev University student organisation which was formed in the spring of 1988 at the initiative of students from the physics faculty, reflected the politicisation of a new generation. The student group began to publish a journal and a bulletin. One of its first activities was to hold a meeting on the fate of the Kievan Mohyla Academy, a seventeenth century institution whose premises were occupied by a military school. Echoing the position of the Culturological Club, the students demanded the immediate removal of the military from this major historical site.

In September 1988 members of Hromada travelled to Armenia to express solidarity with Armenian demands over Nagorno-Karabakh. Hromada was also the principal organiser of the November 1988 demonstration in Kiev attended by some 10000 in support of the formation of a Ukrainian popular front and in opposition to nuclear power. The students also called for the removal of Shcherbytskyi. In the autumn of 1988 the group organised a successful boycott of

military instruction classes at Kiev University. Hromada's journal, *Dzvin*, was among the first to discuss the question of the formation of Ukraine's own army. Other issues it raised were the abolition of party privileges, an end to new nuclear plant construction, economic sovereignty and the need to introduce Ukrainisation policies to overcome the legacy of decades of Russification.¹⁴

The impact of Hromada can best be gauged by the hostile official reaction to it. The Kiev University official organ published numerous attacks on the students throughout 1988, accusing them of being 'overcome by dogmatic nationalistic slogans'. Initially, the authorities insisted, they were not hostile to Hromada, but the group had become too politicised. When in November 1988 Hromada organised a meeting at the university to discuss the Ukrainian Helsinki Union's 'Declaration of Principles' this was the last straw for authorities who began to expel student activists.¹⁵

In this first period of the rebirth of Ukrainian society, a number of other groups and movements deserve special mention. One which had a sizeable following was the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, headed by the former political prisoner Ivan Hel. Despite being outlawed, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, based in Western Ukraine, had continued to function in the underground. The 'Church of the Catacombs', as it was known, emerged in the summer of 1987 with scores of bishops and hundreds of priests, monks and nuns. The Committee spearheaded the campaign for the church's legalisation. It published periodicals and organised mass protests.¹⁶

Perhaps the most important unofficial youth organisation to be established in this period was *Tovarystvo Lev* (the Lion Society, which took its name from the lion in Lviv's coat of arms). Founded in the spring of 1987, the society heralded the arrival of Galician youth on the political arena. The first leaflet issued by the group declared that the cultural, economic, environmental and moral crisis facing Ukraine could only be overcome 'if a large section of conscious people, in the first instance, young people' moved into action. The group announced that it would focus on 'concrete deeds'.¹⁷

Indeed, characteristic of *Tovarystvo Lev*'s activities was the concentration on specific projects such as the clean-up of the Lychakivskiy cemetery in Lviv, the renovation of churches, the opening of a school to teach long forgotten crafts, the revival of national traditions such as performances of the *vertep* (New Year's plays) and *hahilky* (spring) dances. The young people developed an ambitious cultural pro-

gramme sponsoring rock music concerts and theatres. The ecological expedition which they organised, 'Dniester 88', focused public awareness on the terrible pollution of the river. *Tovarystvo Lev* also initiated mass visits of Eastern Ukraine by Galician youth in an attempt to raise the national consciousness of this Russified region of Ukraine.¹⁸

It took two years of struggle before authorities agreed to formally register the student group, even though it functioned under the auspices of the Lviv University Komsomol and received limited financial support from the Ministry of Culture.¹⁹ Indicative of the group's dynamism was its launching of *Postup* in April 1989, 'the first unofficial youth newspaper in Ukraine' with a circulation of 20 000. *Tovarystvo Lev* served as a major training ground for a new generation of Galician leaders. The older generation of dissidents, it should be noted, were not without influence in this new milieu since UHU members such as Iryna Kalynets served as key advisers to the student group.

The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in April 1986 was the catalyst for the formation of many informal groups because it clearly demonstrated Ukraine's powerlessness in the face of central control. *Zelenyi svit* (Green World) emerged as a direct response to Ukraine's environmental emergency. The republic's largest informal ecological group came into being in the autumn of 1987 and it focused on a campaign against the cover-up of the full effects of the Chernobyl tragedy. In time, *Zelenyi svit* moved to tackle a wide range of environmental issues, from ecological education to safety of food supply.

Kiev's first large demonstration on 13 November 1988 served to increase the influence of *Zelenyi svit*. Some 10 000 demonstrators stood in the rain for three hours while speakers, among them spokesmen for *Zelenyi svit*, described the ecological crisis in Ukraine and criticised authorities for their inaction.²⁰

The informal groups that have been mentioned so far were among the most significant actors in the first phase of the development of autonomous political life in Ukraine. This period, which lasted from 1987 to late 1988, was characterised by an attempt by amnestied political prisoners to deepen and broaden the definition of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Small unofficial groups were launched. Although some could claim sizeable public support, none could be called mass organisations. While student circles had been drawn into dissent, the social basis of the informal groups was still very narrow. The movement of national awakening was focused in Western Ukraine and Kiev

and the new groups had little presence in the other regions of the republic.

In the autumn of 1988 autonomous political life in Ukraine moved to a new stage of development as existing groups realised that they had to build alliances and forge a more broadly-based movement. It is to this second stage that we now turn.

The example of Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics demonstrated the potential power of popular fronts. In Ukraine, the first attempt to establish such a broadly-based coalition occurred in Lviv. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, *Tovarystvo Lev* and the *Ridna mova* Society (Native Language Society, the precursor of the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society) joined together to form the Democratic Front in Support of Perestroika. The citizens of Lviv, the most politicised in Ukraine, had grown impatient at the slow pace of change in Ukraine. Throughout the summer of 1988 mass meetings were held in the city which regularly attracted some 20 000 to 50 000 people, many of whom held pictures of Gorbachev.²¹ The Democratic Front was a direct product of this popular mobilisation. The Front pledged to stand in elections and ensure the continuation of the democratisation process. Local authorities reacted to this new assertive mood by bringing out the OMON, the Special Purpose Militia Detachments and invoking special legislation against unsanctioned meetings. With increasing use of the OMON, the mass meetings in Lviv dwindled to 3000 to 4000 and the prospects of the emergence of a powerful popular front looked bleak.²² However, events took a different turn because of initiatives that were taken in Kiev.

The first Kiev-based attempt to form a popular front came in June 1988 when some 500 people from a number of informal groups met in the Philharmonic Hall. The meeting resolved to launch a Popular Union in Support of Restructuring with Oleksandr Sheikin as the head of the Initiative Committee. In early July the Popular Union met in a theatre in Kiev where a prominent speaker was Leonid Miliavskiy from the Culturological Union. Both the name of the Popular Union (*Narodnyi soiuz*) and the name of its publication, *Narodnaia volia* were in Russian, indicating that the impetus for the organisation had come from Russians outside the structures of the main Ukrainian dissident circles.²³ This attempt to launch a popular front did not succeed.

The origins of the organisation which came to be known as Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine in Support of Restructuring) were

somewhat different and are bound up with developments within the non-dissident Ukrainian intelligentsia. That intelligentsia, especially its writers and scholars, while becoming increasingly bold in voicing their views, had not yet taken organisational initiatives as a group. The intelligentsia was organised around unions and academic establishments and had newspapers and journals under their control. They were the soldiers of the 'ideological front', as party leaders often reminded them. If they and the institutions under their control were to become centrally involved in launching an independent organisation, this could seriously threaten the party's grip on civic life.

The story of Rukh is one of the defection of the intelligentsia from the party to the forces of the democratic movement. The previous work of the dissent circles had prepared the ground. It should be noted that the division between the dissident and non-dissident sectors of the intelligentsia was not always clearly defined. Both had often worked in the same institutions and they tended to move in the same social milieus. The dissident intelligentsia merely stiffened the others' backbone.

The original idea of a popular front was proposed by two writers, Pavlo Movchan and Viktor Teren, at a 1 November 1988 meeting of the Party organisation of the Kiev branch of the Writers' Union of Ukraine.²⁴ Shortly after the Kiev demonstration on 13 November 1988, the Kiev Branch of the Writers' Union of Ukraine and the Institute of Literature joined forces to form an initiative committee to launch a Ukrainian Popular Front. The move gained support and the joint plenum of cultural unions which met in mid-November resolved to draft a programme and struck a working group consisting of twenty writers and literary scholars headed by Ivan Drach.²⁵ The December 1989 plenum of the Writers' Union endorsed this proposal and instructed the initiative group to work on 'a draft of a program for a Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Restructuring'.²⁶

As a result of this development, leading cultural and literary figures came to the fore, supplanting dissident groups who would help in the background with organisational matters. On 4 December 1989 supporters of a popular front met with representatives from UHU, Zelenyi svit and others. On 31 January 1989 the initiative group presented a draft programme to the plenum of the Writers' Union.

Communist authorities were at first disoriented by the turn of events. Leonid Kravchuk, a secretary in the ideological department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine tried to derail the drive towards the formation of a popular front, claiming that

it was unnecessary since the Party itself was undertaking *perestroika*. Kravchuk attacked the programme as 'anti-constitutional' and CPU members were advised not to join the front.²⁷ Another approach taken by party officials was to demand that the programme have a clause supporting the 'leading role' of the Communist Party.

Having written a draft programme, Rukh now confronted the problem of bringing it to the public's attention. There was a concerted campaign to prevent the publication of the draft programme in the newspapers and it looked as if the programme would have to appear in limited circulation in samizdat. In the face of these obstacles, Ivan Drach and a group of writers travelled to Moscow on 13 February 1989 to appeal directly to Gorbachev. Gorbachev was forced to make an unscheduled visit to Ukraine on 19 February to deal with the rift. That day the organ of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, *Literaturna Ukraina*, printed the programme. Gorbachev's visit itself was a disappointment, since he used the occasion to attack Ukrainian nationalism. The CPU felt that its stance was vindicated and proceeded to launch an all-out campaign against Rukh.²⁸

The draft programme, the subject of such controversy, called for a front of independent groups and the reformist wing of the CPU in opposition to the leadership of the party. The leadership of Rukh included many party members who hoped to establish a working relationship between Rukh and the liberal wing of the party, something which the popular fronts of the Baltic republics had done with such success.

The draft programme described Rukh as a 'demonstration of support for revolutionary restructuring set into motion by the party. It represents a new coalition of Communist and non-party members united in a new struggle for fundamental social renewal of all spheres of public, government and economic life in the Ukrainian SSR.' As a programme it exhibited a left-liberal profile emphasising 'humanity, peace and progress'. Rukh 'recognised the leading role of the party in a socialist society', since without this phrase, the organisation could not hope to become officially registered. The document stated that the movement is a unifying link between the programme of restructuring proposed by the party and the initiative of the broad masses of the people. Rukh would assist the CPU in broadening democratisation. It promised to expose all attempts at slowing down democratisation, improve the environment, fight to increase living standards, ensure the establishment of the rule of law and campaign for the sovereignty of the republic.²⁹

The controversy over the publication of Rukh's programme and CPU-orchestrated campaign against it served to stimulate public interest. The editor of *Vechirnyi Kyiv* noted that by the summer his newspaper had received thousands of letters dealing with the draft programme, two thirds of which supported it.³⁰ *Literaturna Ukraina* received 3000 letters which expressed overwhelming support for Rukh's positions.³¹

The party's attack on Rukh continued for months on end. The party mobilised loyal writers and academics to join the chorus of denunciation. Boris Oliinyk, for example, wrote that the programme was marked by 'spontaneity and dilettantism'. It was clearly 'worked out without the participation of specialists' and was marred by 'confrontational positions'.³² High ranking members of the Academy of Sciences wrote that popular fronts in the Baltic republics 'could not boast of a real contribution to practical achievements in restructuring. But the division along national lines, mutual suspicions and distrust, on the other hand run quite deep'. They attacked Rukh for 'by-passing the party organization of the republic', and considered the call to Ukrainise the educational system a violation of the rights of 'twenty million Russian-language speakers' living in Ukraine.³³

The question of dual membership in the party and Rukh became a thorny one. Rukh leaders were criticised for remaining in the CPU and their actions were labelled a breach of party discipline: 'They have to remember that ideological and organizational unity are an inviolable law in our party's life and that any manifestation of factionalism and grouping is incompatible with adherence to the Marxist-Leninist party.'³⁴ Kravchuk asked, how could Rukh leaders remain members of the CPU when they regularly criticised it?³⁵ The leadership of the Union of Journalists added, 'One cannot help but see that around the initiative group of the Popular Movement for Restructuring are unconstructive, anti-socialist, nationalist inclined groups who are pushing on a course to de-stabilize and dislocate the party and people from the restructuring process.'³⁶

The writers, poets and academics who had taken the initiative to form Rukh were caught off guard by the vicious media campaign against them. They were accused of fomenting civil war, nationalism and separatism.³⁷ Whatever hope the intelligentsia had that Moscow and Gorbachev would support Rukh was dispelled when *Pravda* and other central newspapers joined the chorus of attacks.³⁸

The CPU claimed that Rukh had become a vehicle for groups such as the UHU which had 'no mass following', who through Rukh had

expanded their influence. Special concern was expressed about Western Ukraine where the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was said to be the dominant force.³⁹ The party's fears were well-grounded since Rukh was rapidly becoming a mass organisation. At the July 1989 Kiev oblast branch conference of Rukh, Ivan Drach claimed that the popular front had 200 local groups with 200 000 members despite the fact that the 'ideological apparatus has launched an offensive against it'.⁴⁰

The rise of Rukh marked a new phase in the development of autonomous associations. An important factor in Rukh's growth was the expansion of the social basis of informal groups. A number of important developments have to be dealt with in this respect.

Among the most significant was the revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The Initiative Committee in Support of the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was launched in Kiev in February 1989 with the support of Rukh and the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. The Autocephalous Church threatened one of the central institutions of Soviet rule in Ukraine – the Russian Orthodox Church. Ukraine was the 'jewel in the crown' of the Russian church. In 1988, for example, out of 6893 functioning parishes in the USSR, 4000 were located in Ukraine, 2000 of which were centred in the Western region of the republic. By contrast, the RSFSR boasted only 2000 churches. A church schism in Ukraine was therefore a 'mortal danger' to the Russian Church, and a threat to the central state institution which backed it.⁴¹

Throughout 1989, the Autocephalous Church revival was focused primarily in Western Ukraine. In August of that year, the parish priest of the Church of SS Peter and Paul in Lviv seceded from the Russian church and became the first Autocephalous parish in Ukraine. This was the beginning of a process which led to the collapse of the Russian church in Western Ukraine. It also created tensions with the Ukrainian Catholics. Parish priests in Western Ukraine were confronted with a choice – either to join the Ukrainian Catholic Church or the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. A sizeable number of priests joined the Autocephalous Church, not wishing to break with Orthodoxy, something which could not help but lead to friction over the allocation of buildings. However, what was significant was that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church received a base in Western Ukraine from which it would expand to the central and eastern regions. Autocephalous church communities in central and eastern Ukraine became closely linked with informal groups and with Rukh in particular,

and they provided the popular front with support amongst workers and peasants.

The March 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies served as the first lesson in electoral campaigning. These were the first semi-free elections in the USSR since the Bolshevik revolution. Although groups such as the UHU called for a boycott of the elections because the procedures were so patently unfair, none the less, once a number of popular candidates were nominated, informal groups swung to support them as a way of deepening the politicisation of the population.

The vast majority of candidates in the election were members of the CPSU. A third of them ran unopposed. Yet the CPU was shocked by the election results. In Lviv, 36 000 ballot cards were defaced or left blank, primarily in protest against candidates running unopposed. In Drohobych, near Lviv, the oblast first secretary Ia. Pohrebniak ran unopposed and received less than 12 per cent of the vote.⁴² Despite dirty tricks, a number of opposition candidates were elected, among them Iury Shcherbak, head of Zelenyi svit, Mykola Riabchenko, Dmytro Pavlychko, Rostyslav Bratun and V. Martyrosian. The opposition gained a new platform. The 1989 elections served as a dress rehearsal for the March 1990 electoral campaign.

Another important event was the launching of the Ukrainian Historical-Educational Society Memorial in March 1989 with the support of various informal groups and the Cinematographers', Theatre Workers' and Architects' Union and Ukrainian Cultural Fund. The inaugural congress took place in the midst of the election campaign and on the anniversary of Stalin's death. The spotlight was also on Ukraine's Katyn, a mass grave of over 200 000 bodies near Bykovnia which the authorities for years had attributed to Nazi atrocities, but which turned out to be the work of Stalin's repressive forces.⁴³ The congress attracted 500 delegates from 40 cities. The rally next day stressed that 'Although Stalin is dead, his followers are still among us.' The congress resolved to research and publicise Stalin's crimes in Ukraine, investigate and ensure the prosecution of officials involved in repression under Brezhnev, and secure access to KGB and MVD files. The congress also voted to support Rukh.⁴⁴

Another important group founded at this time was the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society. The Language Society grew out of the Ridna mova Society (Native Language Society) organised in Western Ukraine the year before and which had some 10 000 members. The inaugural congress of the Ukrainian Language Society was sponsored

by the Writers' Union, the Institute of Language and the Institute of Literature. It was attended by 500 delegates representing informal groups, government departments and creative unions. Ie. Ielchenko, head of the ideological department of the Central Committee, who addressed the congress, attempted to drive a wedge between the Language Society – whose goals were praised – and Rukh, which was condemned. When the Ukrainian Language Society voted to support Rukh, Ielchenko walked out in defeat.⁴⁵

Membership in the Ukrainian Language Society was often an intermediary step to full involvement in Rukh. Seemingly more innocuous than Rukh, the Society soon established branches in government offices, factories, schools and collective farms. By mid-1989 the Society had 70 000 members.⁴⁶

The inaugural congress of Rukh held in Kiev on 8–10 September 1989 could be considered the final chapter of the second phase in the development of autonomous movements in Ukraine. Attended by over 1000 delegates representing almost 300 000 people, the congress elected Ivan Drach as chairman, Serhii Koniev, a Russian from Dniprodzherzhinsk as his deputy, and Mykhailo Horyn, a leading member of the UHU as head of the secretariat. The draft programme was adopted after long discussion and many amendments. It was announced that Rukh would put forward candidates in elections, propose new legislation, and mobilise public opinion to ensure political democratisation, economic reform and real political sovereignty. The revival of the Ukrainian language and culture and defence of the rights of national minorities were also stressed.⁴⁷ With the first congress of Rukh, the political map of Ukraine was re-drawn.

Between 1985 and 1989 the opposition movement in Ukraine passed through two distinct stages. It began with the release of prisoners of conscience who provided the values, courage and organisational skills needed to establish autonomous groups. The founding of a wide spectrum of associations – ecological, religious and cultural – marked a genuine re-birth of civil society. The growth of informal associations soon posed the need for co-ordination and pooling of resources to ensure the development of an effective opposition movement. The defection of the main-stream intelligentsia to the side of the opposition gave autonomous movements cadres and access to resources of the society hitherto denied them. With the launching of Rukh, the democratic movement in Ukraine moved to a higher plane of activity. It was now poised to enter the contest for political power.

Notes

1. See Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), *Ukraine After Shelest* (Edmonton, 1983).
2. See Roman Solchanyk, 'The Perils of Prognostication', *Soviet Analyst*, 5 March 1986 and his 'Shcherbitsky Leaves the Political Arena: The End of an Era?' *Report on the USSR*, no. 40, 1989, pp. 1-3.
3. Cited in K. Mihailisko, 'Ukrainian Party Takes Stock After Election Defeat in Republic', *Report on the USSR*, no. 25, 1989, pp. 15-18.
4. B. Nahaylo and K. Mihailisko, 'Interview With Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk', *Report on the USSR*, no. 48, 1990, pp. 14-16.
5. For a review of the literature about the Helsinki Public Group and analysis of its activities see V. Haynes, 'Postmortem of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, no.15, 1983, pp. 102-13.
6. Between 1970 and 1972 six issues of *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* appeared under the editorship of Viacheslav Chornovil. After the arrest of Chornovil in 1972, number 7-8 appeared edited by Maksym Sahaidak, the pseudonym of Stepan Khmara, which reflected a more nationalistic position. Relaunching the journal in 1987 with issue 7, Chornovil chose to distance himself from Khmara's position.
7. L. Lukianenko, *What Next?* (London, 1990), pp. 4-5, 35, 41-3.
8. 'Declaration of Principles' in Taras Kuzio (ed.), *Dissent in Ukraine under Gorbachev: A Collection of Samizdat Documents* (London, 1989), pp. 24-34.
9. Viacheslav Chornovil, 'Open Letter to Gorbachev' in *ibid.*, pp. 6.
10. *Shliakh peremohy*, 12 March 1989.
11. Ukrainian Press Agency release nos 32, 33, 1987.
12. See Taras Kuzio, 'Unofficial and Semi-Official Groups and Samizdat Publications in Ukraine' in Romana M. Bahry (ed.), *Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto, 1990), pp. 73-4.
13. For a discussion of the club's activities see: B. Nahaylo, 'Informal Ukrainian Culturological Club Helps to Break New Ground for Glasnost', *Radio Liberty Research*, 8 February 1988 and his "'Informal" Ukrainian Culturological Club Under Attack', *Radio Liberty Research*, 23 November 1987; R. Solchanyk, 'Soviet Press Reports on Antinuclear Demonstration in Kiev', *Radio Liberty Research*, 8 June 1988. See also *USSR News Brief*, no. 19-20, 1987 and *The Independent*, 11 June 1988, Ukrainian Press Agency, press releases no. 29, 74, 1987; nos 25-6, 1988. On the development of similar clubs in other cities see *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 29 May 1988.
14. See D. Marples, 'Mass Demonstration in Kiev Focusses on Ecological Issues and Political Situation in Ukraine', *Radio Liberty Research*, 5 December 1988; K. Mihailisko, 'Report from Kiev University on Future of Students Military Obligations', *Report on the USSR*, no. 4, 1989, pp. 3-5; *Vechirni Kyiv*, 2 September 1989.
15. Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 17, 1989; *Kyiv'skyi Universytet*, 15 and 22 April, 27 May, 23 September, 2 and 9 December 1988.
16. See Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 18, 1987; *The Daily Telegraph*, 23 December 1987; L.J. Wollemborg, 'John Paul II and

- Ukrainian Catholics', *Freedom at Issue*, May–June 1988, pp. 28–30; Ukrainian Press Service (Rome), March 1988 release.
17. *Nove zhyttia*, 15 April 1988.
 18. *Sotsialistychna kul'tura*, no. 6, 1988, p. 11; *Molod' Ukrainy*, 6 March 1988; Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 56, 1988; M. Drohobycky, 'The Lion Society: Profile of a Ukrainian Patriotic "Informal" Group', *Radio Liberty Research*, 18 July 1988.
 19. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 12 June 1988.
 20. For a good account of Zelenyi svit see Chapter 5 in David R. Marples, *Ukraine under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt* (Edmonton, 1991).
 21. T. Kuzio, 'Nationalist Ferment in Western Ukraine', *Soviet Analyst*, 3 August 1988; R. Solchanyk, 'Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika Formed in Ukraine', *Radio Liberty Research*, 17 July 1988.
 22. Ukrainian Press Agency, press release no. 156, 1988; R. Solchanyk, 'Lvov Authorities Begin Criminal Proceedings Against Ukrainian Activists', *Radio Liberty Research*, 26 July 1988.
 23. *USSR News Brief*, nos. 12 and 13, 1988; *Radians'ka osvita*, 30 September 1988 and *Robitnycha hazeta*, 4 October 1988.
 24. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 17 November 1988.
 25. *Vechirni Kyiv*, 1 December 1988.
 26. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 15 December 1988.
 27. David Marples, 'Current Events in the Ukraine', *Soviet Analyst*, 28 June 1989.
 28. See T. Lekhyj, 'On the Current Situation in Ukraine', *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, no. 2, 1989, pp. 17–22.
 29. An English translation of the draft programme is found in *Soviet Ukrainian Affairs*, no.4, 1988, pp. 20–23.
 30. D. Marples, 'Interview with Editor of *Vechirnij Kiev*. The Voice of Perestroika in Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, no. 31, 1989, pp. 25–7.
 31. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 9 March 1989.
 32. B. Nahaylo, 'Confrontation over Creation of Ukrainian Popular Front', *Report on the USSR*, no. 9, 1989, pp. 13–17 and his 'Draft Program of Ukraine Baltic-Style Popular Movement under Strong Attack', *Report on the USSR*, no. 9, 1989, pp. 27–8.
 33. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 18 February 1989.
 34. *Ibid.*, 18 March 1989.
 35. *Sovetskaia kultura*, 28 September 1989.
 36. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 18 March 1989.
 37. R. Solchanyk, 'Party and Writers at Loggerheads Over Popular Front', *Report on the USSR*, no. 21, 1989, pp. 21–3.
 38. *Pravda*, 21 May 1989.
 39. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 5 July 1989.
 40. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 13 July 1989.
 41. J.B. Dunlop, 'The Russian Orthodox Church and Nationalism After 1988', *Religion in Communist Lands*, no. 4, 1990, pp. 292–306.
 42. *The Financial Times*, 3 March 1989; *The Independent*, 28 March 1989; K. Mihailisko, 'Alla Yaroshinskaya: Crusading Journalist from Zhitomir Becomes Peoples Deputy', *Report on the USSR*, no. 22, 1989, pp. 17–19.

43. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 5 March 1989; *The Independent*, 6 March 1989; *Pamiatky Ukrainy*, no. 2, 1989, pp. 63-4.
44. Ibid.
45. B. Nahaylo, 'Inaugural Congress of Ukrainian Language Society Turns Into Major Political Demonstration', *Report on the USSR*, no. 9, 1989, pp. 20-1; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 12 February 1989.
46. D. Marples, 'The Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society: An Interview with Dmytro Pavlychko', *Report on the USSR*, no. 30, 1989, pp. 35-7.
47. Rukh congress materials are reproduced in a special issue of *Suchasnist*, no.12, December 1989.

9 The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine

Peter J. Potichnyj

The March 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet in Ukraine were a significant step in the democratisation of political life. This chapter will analyse the electoral campaign and the final results, which represented a watershed in the history of the republic.

In preparation for the 4 March 1990 elections three laws had to be adopted.¹ Work on them began in August 1988 when the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet established two working groups mandated to prepare draft laws which could be submitted for public discussion and eventually considered for adoption by parliament. The public discussion of the draft laws occurred over a two-and-a-half month period and involved some 15 million people. According to a report by V. S. Shevchenko, Chairman of the Presidium, the Commission on Legislative Proposals of the Supreme Soviet received over 235 000 amendments and propositions from citizens (of which 150 000 were very concrete), and more importantly, nine alternative drafts, of which one – prepared by six People's Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet – was published in the press as an 'alternative draft'.² Important suggestions proposed by the alternative draft, as well as by various opposition groups, primarily Rukh circles, were selectively incorporated in the law adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.³ These laws differed from the provisions of the USSR constitution in a number of key respects.

An important issue was how to enhance the authority of the republican Supreme Soviet. Ukraine, unlike the All-Union structure, chose to do away with the Congress of People's Deputies and retained the (uni-cameral) Supreme Soviet as the highest organ of state power. Ukraine also rejected the election of deputies on the basis of quotas allocated to the Communist party and party dominated social organisations. This too differed from the practice at the USSR level.⁴ The size of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet was reduced from 650 to 450 deputies. Candidates could be nominated by a majority vote at a meeting where 200 or more electors were present.

In preparation for the election, 450 electoral districts were established, each with approximately 82200 voters. A Central Electoral Commission (CEC) composed of 31 members, and 450 District Electoral Commissions (DEC), were formed.⁵

From the very beginning of the nomination process, 3 November 1989, there were plenty of indications that the DECs were not operating within the spirit of the newly adopted electoral law. One of the reasons may have been that the right to create these commissions, according to the Electoral Law, was given to the Oblast Executive Committees (*oblyvkonkoms*), and the Executive Committees of the lower soviets, the majority of which were in the hands of arch-conservative elements.⁶ In many localities it was especially difficult for some social organisations or even voters' meetings to nominate their candidates without encountering numerous objections and harassment from the DECs. The laws were interpreted in such a way as to prevent the newly established so-called 'informal organisations' from nominating their candidates.⁷

The nomination process was unusually cumbersome. It gave local communist officials many opportunities to frustrate the nomination initiatives of their democratic opponents. Nominating meetings had to be approved by the Executive Committee of the local Soviets and the DEC or else they were declared invalid. Permission had to be given in writing, and obtaining this piece of paper from the local Executive Committees was not an easy task. Mustering the required 200 voters' quorum was relatively easy. However, the fact that all voters attending the meeting had to register and offer proof of residence and age created difficulties.⁸

Given that communists dominated the membership of the District Electoral Commissions, and given their hostility towards informal organisations, it is not surprising that there were numerous infractions of the electoral law. Thus, for example, the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, although an officially registered organisation as of 20 May 1989, was prevented on many occasions from fielding its candidates. The Society, a leading oppositional force, proved powerless in the face of bureaucratic arbitrariness. District Electoral Commissions claimed that they could not register the Society's candidates because the Central Electoral Commission had not certified the Society's status as a legal organisation. However, V. F. Boiko, Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, asserted that because the Society was officially registered there was no need to notify the DECs on this score. Yet this did not prevent many DECs from

refusing to register the Shevchenko Language Society candidates. In fact, in Kharkiv, Ternopil, Rivne and Mykolaiv, the DEC's did not reverse their negative decision even though they were ordered to do so by the Central Electoral Commission.⁹

Communist officials used various underhanded means to ensure control of the nomination process. Nomination meetings would be held at an inconvenient time; or a meeting would be scheduled in the evening and then held four hours earlier but only 'reliable' people were notified of the change of time or place.¹⁰ Permission to hold meetings was often denied for totally trivial reasons, and to ensure that there would be no appeal, the decision would not be given in writing. In this manner, in Kiev, eight candidates of the ecological movement *Zelenyi svit* (Green World) were refused registration.¹¹

The most blatant example of interference in the electoral process was the refusal of authorities to register *Rukh*, which had the best chances of winning a substantial number of seats in the Supreme Soviet. *Rukh* (the People's Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring), the largest and most authoritative democratic organisation in Ukraine, was refused registration until February 1990, that is, only after the deadline for the nomination of candidates to the 4 March 1990 elections had past, thus preventing it from fielding candidates.¹²

The actual registration of candidates took place between 4 January and 4 February 1990. It did not pass without controversy. Boiko, the Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, defended district commission decisions to refuse the registration of candidates from various informal groups.¹³ M. O. Lytvyn, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission, admitted that hundreds of voters had protested violations of the Electoral Law.¹⁴ The public was clearly dissatisfied with the work of the electoral commissions and continued to pressure for a more equitable treatment of oppositional groups. However, the Central Electoral Commission refused to review most complaints. When asked whether the 'District Electoral Commissions are placing artificial obstacles' to prevent the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, the ecological association *Zelenyi svit* and other informal associations from running candidates in the election, Boiko dismissed these accusations as 'groundless attempts to discredit democratically elected electoral organisations'. He would only admit that the CEC received 120 appeals of DEC decisions, 68 of which were reviewed; the ruling of the DEC's was upheld in 42 cases, and reversed in another 16 cases, including four involving the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society and *Zelenyi svit*.¹⁵

It is interesting to examine some of the tactics used to block opposition participation in the elections. In Kharkiv, for instance, a candidate was refused registration on the grounds that a member of the DEC was not present at the nominating meeting, even though such a presence was not required by the Electoral Law.¹⁶ In Bila Tserkva, the militia harassed those attending the nominating meeting called by the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, and eventually the meeting had to be held in the corridor of the local cultural centre since all other rooms were denied.¹⁷ In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, the DEC declared that the Novomoskovsk Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society had no legal right to nominate candidates, even though the Society's right to do so was recognised by the Central Electoral Commission.¹⁸ In Rivne, the secretary of the Kuznetsivsk city party committee travelled to Kiev and stole a form from the central office of the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society used to register local chapters of the organisation, and signed it in the name of the Kuznetsivsk Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society. He used this as proof that anyone can form a local chapter of the society hence its candidate should be refused registration!¹⁹

This widespread violation of registration procedures was protested by two deputies of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, both of whom headed the organisations most affected. Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society and Yuri Shcherbak, chairman of Zelenyi svit asked the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to use its constitutional powers to investigate infractions of the Electoral Law and the work of the electoral commissions.²⁰ A large rally held in Kiev on 11 February 1990 also addressed the registration issue.²¹ The protests did not reverse the decisions of electoral commissions. The irregularities, however, served to discredit the party apparatus in the eyes of growing democratic public opinion.

The electoral campaign itself played an important role in the politicisation of the population. In preparations for the elections, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) published its platform and an appeal to voters. Both documents emphasised that only the party could 'guarantee restructuring', express 'the interests of all classes and social groups' and guarantee social stability. The appeal attacked 'extreme elements' in society who were using the 'elections for their narrow egotistical goals... to push people into political adventurism'. These forces were stirring up 'national enmity' which could lead to a 'fratricidal civil war'.²² For the party the main enemy was Rukh.

It should be noted that at this time, the party had unleashed a campaign designed to heighten inter-ethnic tensions. Ukraine was swept by rumours of imminent anti-Jewish pogroms. Provocateurs, disguised as Rukh members, were spreading anti-semitic propaganda.²³ On 17 February 1990, the communist controlled Supreme Soviet issued a proclamation appealing for calm and support for the government.²⁴

This campaign, designed to convince voters that the Communist Party was the last refuge of law and order, back-fired because it was so obvious who was generating the tension. The government and the KGB had to admit that it was a false alarm. The electoral ploy worked against the party, and helped speed up the internal decay and disintegration within party ranks.²⁵

Party control of the mass media was widely abused during the electoral campaign. The CPU platform received wide publicity, while the positions of others were passed over largely in silence. The party press publicised the only the names of CPU-backed candidates.²⁶

Party-dominated mass organisations were also used to bolster the CPU campaign. On 2 December 1989 Ukraine's trade union organisation adopted a programme which largely aped the party position.²⁷ The same could be said of the platform of the Women's Councils of the republic.²⁸ A significant exception to this rule were the electoral campaigns of candidates from the Komsomol. They represented an important breach in communist monolithism.

The electoral platform of the Komsomol organisation of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute was an interesting example of the growing diversity of opinion. It called for the 'transfer of real power from the party to the soviets; adoption of democratic laws regulating strikes, meetings, demonstrations and the press'; constitutional guarantees for the developing social movements and organisations; a review of the union treaty; a rebirth of the national consciousness, history and cultures of all nations living in Ukraine; the return of land to the peasants and factories to the workers; the introduction of cost accounting in all sectors of the economy; the encouragement of co-operatives (private ownership); and finally, measures to improve the living conditions of youth and especially students.²⁹

Even more iconoclastic was the 'Proclamation to the People of Ukraine' issued in the name of 'young candidates' – a loose inter-regional grouping. The candidates claimed that since they 'were not weighed down by bureaucratic chains, stereotypes and ambitions' it would be easier for them 'to bring about reforms that would

fundamentally change political and economic relations in the republic'. Signed by 37 candidates, the proclamation highlighted the fact that out of 3653 nominated candidates, only 216 represented young people.³⁰

In a document entitled 'Position', issued by the same group of young candidates, they advocated genuine political and economic sovereignty for Ukraine and called for a renegotiation of the terms of the union treaty. They also supported improved social programmes and a more equitable distribution of the national income.³¹

Similar in content and in tone were the proclamations and resolutions of the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Komсомol. The Komсомol leaders were much bolder than their parent party organisation in raising the national question and identifying the economic and political measures that had to be taken to resolve it. The Plenum passed resolutions calling for 'real sovereignty' and demanded a new union treaty. The position on sovereignty was in fact similar to Rukh's. The Komсомol also tackled a highly charged symbolic issue by defending the use of the blue-and-yellow flag by public groups.³² (The blue-and-yellow flag was banned in Soviet Ukraine since it was identified with the national movement which fought for Ukraine's independence during the 1917 revolution.)

It should be pointed out that the party platform did not reflect the views of all party members. In fact, so many party members and party-affiliated organisations took exception to the party platform, that one journalist asked, 'How many parties are there actually within the Party?'³³

If one examines proposals from individual communists or those from some local party organisations, one can appreciate the correctness of the above question. For example, Academician K. M. Sytnyk, a Central Committee member, wrote that 'many people do not believe our assurances, promises, slogans and declarations'. He condemned 'conservatives' in the party who instead of confronting the economic problems facing the country preoccupied themselves with 'blackening Rukh members'. In his view, Rukh was essential in the battle against conservatives and 'good Rukh candidates' should be supported.³⁴

Some groups within the party were indeed quite radical in their call for reform and renewal. The preamble to the platform adopted by 1124 delegates to the party conference of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute stated, 'The transition from a totalitarian system with a monopoly of power in the hands of the party apparatus to a democratic political system demands a truly democratic party, which builds its relationship with other organisations and movements on the basis of

equal partnership, intellectual and moral authority.' The conference rejected the party's monopoly of power and 'dogmatic Marxism-Leninism', and called for an early congress to revamp the party rules and programmes. It called for close co-operation with Rukh.³⁵

Even more critical were the suggestions outlined by the Kiev party committee of the Ukrainian Writers' Union. The writers said Ukraine was confronted with a 'crisis of ideas, degradation of economic structures and lack of faith in the future'. Radical reform was needed and this entailed re-shaping the USSR into a 'voluntary union of republics – sovereign states' and the CPSU had to become a 'voluntary union of communist parties'. Political power should rest with the soviets, and the party apparatus should be placed under the democratic control of the party membership.³⁶ The position of the group reflected many of the ideas of Rukh, which was not surprising since some of the signatories, among them S. Plachynda, Iu. Mushketyk and I. Drach, were prominent members of Rukh.

The main opposition to the party in the elections was provided by Rukh, a coalition of Ukraine's democratic forces. Rukh's constituent congress was held in the autumn of 1989 and the 1158 delegates in attendance represented some 280 000 people. To prevent Rukh from contesting the election, authorities delayed the organisation's registration to February 1990, until the deadline for the nomination of candidates had passed. This action, coupled with the vicious campaign that was unleashed against Rukh, was probably beneficial for the organisation because it helped keep it united. Without this pressure from the outside, Rukh could have broken up into a number of political groups, each pursuing its own specific political goals.

It should also be added that many of the constituent organisations of Rukh were officially registered and despite great difficulties were able to field their candidates. (This was especially true of Memorial and the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society.) While the component organisations issued their own electoral platforms and appeals, the most important and authoritative programmatic statement was issued by the Rukh congress and it became the electoral platform of the vast majority of opposition candidates. Rukh called for the political and economic sovereignty of Ukraine within a renewed USSR. It upheld the national, cultural and religious development of all nationalities inhabiting Ukraine. It called for political democratisation and market-oriented economic reform.³⁷

When the election date was closer, and the attacks on opposition members multiplied, it was deemed necessary to face the elections in a

co-ordinated fashion. The experience of the Baltic republics was studied and in many cases adopted to the local situation. Mykhailo Horyn, chairman of the Rukh secretariat, admitted as much in a newspaper interview when he said that he was working on establishing 'pre-electoral coordinating councils and preparing a list of 500-600 candidates for nomination'.³⁸ On 18 November 1989, under Rukh auspices, some 43 different organisations came together in Kiev to form a Democratic Bloc, hoping in this manner to present the electorate with a clearer, identifiable alternative to party nominees, who quite often tried to camouflage their affiliations.³⁹

The Democratic Bloc group of candidates issued their own 'Electoral Manifesto', in which they condemned the slow process of 'restructuring' in Ukraine, and proposed to bring about 'real political and economic sovereignty for Ukraine, political pluralism and a multiparty system based on equal forms of ownership (state, cooperative, private, corporate, individual and mixed), a new constitution for Ukraine with strong guarantees of individual human rights and freedoms, national revival of the Ukrainian people and the free development of the cultures and languages of minorities in Ukraine, real freedom of worship, and the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church'.⁴⁰

In addition to the collective platform, each of the candidates had one of his own. Some candidates had the good fortune of being interviewed by a newspaper or radio correspondent, and their views were actually published. Each candidate also had a limited number of leaflets issued. Noteworthy in the campaign to bring the views of oppositional candidates to the public was the role of the newspaper of the writers' union, *Literaturna Ukraina*. It can be said to have acted as the organ of the candidates of the Democratic Bloc. The role of a number of Komsomol publications and Radio Kiev was also significant in this respect.

Unfortunately we have little survey data to be able to gauge public opinion on the eve of the elections. However, there is much evidence to suggest that the party was losing the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of the electorate. In secret instructions issued to party candidates, Ia. Pohrebniak, the First Secretary of the Lviv CPU oblast committee, admitted 'sociological studies showed' that party and Soviet candidates were supported primarily by 'members of the Communist Party, white-collar staff, soldiers, Russians, non-Ukrainians generally and pensioners'. The opposition, on the other hand, was 'supported by young Ukrainian workers in large industrial enterprises'.⁴¹

The Ukrainian Branch of the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion conducted a survey of the attitudes of young people which asked questions directly relating to the election. Of those surveyed, not a single respondent thought the party was functioning better than it had in the past. Some 45 per cent preferred their candidate not to be a party member; 55 per cent preferred them to be economists, lawyers or sociologists.⁴²

The first round of the election was held on 4 March 1990. According to the Central Electoral Commission there were 2999 candidates running for 450 seats in the Supreme Soviet. Only in four electoral districts were there single candidates; 34 districts had two candidates; 130 had from three to four; 211 had from five to nine; 64 had from ten to 19 and seven electoral districts had 20 or more candidates. Only 112 deputies, or 25 per cent of the total, succeeded in obtaining the absolute majority needed to be declared a winner on the first round. Voter turn-out was high – 84.6 per cent of 37.2 million eligible voters.⁴³

The most remarkable fact of the elections was the strong showing of candidates of the oppositional Democratic Bloc. They won 43 seats, primarily in Western Ukraine, on the first round. The winners included former political prisoners Viacheslav Chornovil, Mykhailo Horyn, Bohdan Horyn, Stepan Khmara, Iryna Kalynets, Levko Lukianenko and Bohdan Rebyk. Rukh leaders Ivan Drach and Volodymyr Iavorivskyi and won in Lviv and Kirovohrad oblast respectively. In addition, some 124 Democratic Bloc candidates placed either first or second (and in some cases both), and were to participate in the run-off elections in 112 electoral districts.⁴⁴

By contrast, some prominent party leaders were forced into the second round. This was the case with Volodymyr Ivashko, First Secretary of the CPU. Prime Minister V. Masol, Central Committee secretaries S. Hurenko, L. Kravchuk, were among the party notables who were elected (largely because they had chosen to run in rural districts).

Although the Electoral Law specified that the run-off elections had to take place not later than two weeks after the first round, the decision when to schedule the contest was left in the hands of the District Electoral Commissions. As a consequence, the second round occurred between 10 and 18 March, depending on the oblast. Contesting the elections in the second round were 664 candidates, and 330 were declared winners. Voter turn-out ranged from 60 to 80 per cent.⁴⁵

During the March elections 442 out of 450 deputies were elected. In six electoral districts new contests were scheduled for 22 April, and in

two districts recounts were ordered. According to nationality, 331 of those elected were Ukrainian, 99 Russian, 5 Belorussian, 4 Jewish, 1 Armenian, 1 Bulgarian and 1 German. Party functionaries at all levels captured 97 seats, among them 22 oblast committee secretaries. High functionaries of the state apparatus gained 54 seats. The single largest group was accounted for by the intelligentsia (science, education, health and culture) who had 104 deputies. There were 73 enterprise directors and 33 collective or state farm chairmen. The military had 16 deputies and the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior, 13 seats. Only 23 deputies were workers and not a single collective farm worker was elected. Interestingly, nine of the elected gave unemployed as their occupation – seven of whom were former political prisoners and leading members of the opposition.⁴⁶

Democratic Bloc candidates swept Lviv oblast winning all 24 ridings. In Ivano-Frankivsk oblast they won 11 out of 12 seats and in Ternopil, 8 out of 10. Opposition candidates also did well in Volyn, capturing 6 of the 9 ridings. In Kiev, the capital, the Democratic Bloc won 18 out of 22 electoral districts, and in Kharkiv oblast one third of the seats went to them. In eastern and southern Ukraine, Democratic Bloc candidates did poorly, winning approximate 20 out of 148 seats.⁴⁷

Throughout Ukraine, 117 Democratic Bloc candidates were elected. (In time, other deputies joined the ranks of the Democratic Bloc, increasing the parliamentary representation of the opposition to 124.) The Democratic Bloc deputies represented a new force which transformed the political scene in Ukraine.

Notes

1. The laws in question were: (1) The Law on Changes and Amendments to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Ukrainian SSR; (2) The Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR; (3) The Law on Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and (4) The Decree of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on Amendments to the Criminal Code. See *Radians'ka Ukraina* (hereafter cited as *RU*), 31 October, 1 November and 2 November 1989; 13 February 1990.
2. *RU*, 14 September, 15 and 25 October 1989.
3. *Vil'ne slovo*, no. 4, 1989; no. 7, 1990; *Holos*, no. 9, 1989.
4. *Pravda Ukrainy* (hereafter cited as *RU*), 15 November 1989; Radio Kiev-3, 18 December 1989.
5. *PU*, 25 November 1989.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Literaturna Ukraina* (hereafter cited as *LU*), 14 December 1989.

8. *RU*, 3 December 1989.
9. *LU*, 13, 21 December 1989; *Kul'tura i zhyttia*, 11 Decemebr 1989.
10. *Molod' Ukrainy* (hereafter cited as *MU*), 16 December 1989; *Radians'ka osvita* (hereafter cited as *RO*), 19 December 1989.
11. *RO*, 19 December 1989 and *MU*, 1 February 1990.
12. *MU*, 15 February 1990.
13. *PU*, 20 January 1990.
14. *PU*, 21 January 1990.
15. *PU*, 4 February 1990.
16. *Kul'tura i zhyttia*, 28 January 1990.
17. *RO*, 30 January 1990.
18. *LU*, 1 February 1990.
19. *LU*, 8 January 1990.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *MU*, 13 February 1990.
22. *RU*, 3 December 1989.
23. *LU*, 3 February 1990; *MU*, 22 February 1990; *Visti z Ukrainy*, no. 6 (February) 1990.
24. *Raboचाia gazeta*, 20 February 1990.
25. See Radio Kiev-2, 12 December 1989; *RU*, 10 December 1989; *Kommunist Ukrainy*, no. 12, 1989, pp. 66ff.
26. *RU*, 3, 23 and 26 December 1989; *MU*, 30 January 1990.
27. *RU*, 9 December 1989.
28. *PU*, 17 December 1989.
29. *Kyivs'kyi politekhnik*, 5 October 1989.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *MU*, 12 January 1990; Radio Kiev-3, 30 January 1990.
32. *MU*, 22 January 1990.
33. *RU*, 13 January 1990.
34. *Ukraina*, no. 1 (January) 1990.
35. *Kyivs'kyi politekhnik*, 25 January 1990.
36. *LU*, 8 February 1990.
37. Rukh documents are contained in the special issue of *Suchastnist'*, no. 12, 1989.
38. *Viche*, no. 8 (October) 1989.
39. *Ukrainian Media Digest*, 2 March 1990.
40. *Vil'ne slovo*, no. 7 (January) 1990.
41. *Ukrainian Media Digest*, 2 March 1990.
42. Radio Kiev-2, 30 January 1990.
43. *PU*, 13 March 1990.
44. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 18 March 1990.
45. Radio Kiev, 17-18 March 1990.
46. *PU*, 4, 13 and 24 March 1990.
47. *Ibid.*

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