

The Archeology of Bolshevik Knowledge, Or the Birth of Stalinism from the Spirit of Grand Cultural Projects

SERHY YEKELCHYK

These days, only historians interested in early Soviet ideological interpretations would peruse the first edition of the *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, hereafter *BSE*) or the *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR* (History of the Civil War in the USSR, hereafter *IGV*). But when they search major research libraries for the *BSE*'s distinctive dark-green volumes with red spines or leaf through the pages of the large crimson volumes of the *IGV*, they will no longer see these books as mere repositories of Bolshevik texts. After reading Brian Kassof's article, a student of Soviet history is bound to pay attention to "paratext" or the non-textual features of a printed work. It is fascinating to read about how page layouts, headings, and editorial information reflected the changing nature of the encyclopedia project and the growing role of ideology in Soviet cultural production. Likewise, after perusing Elaine MacKinnon's paper, readers will find it difficult to see Soviet history books simply as texts, without imagining the astonishing mixture of belief and survival skills that motivated their authors. Knowing more about the personality of Isaak Izrailevich Mints, his passion for Pushkin and Shakespeare, and the ways that the Civil War formed him as an agitator allows one to see the imprint his generation of scholars left on the *IGV* project and other historical works of Stalin's time.

Attention to features other than the "facts" and interpretations found in the texts of these monumental Stalinist projects is only one trait uniting the excellent articles by MacKinnon and Kassof. In the pages that follow, I attempt to show that the many parallels between the two articles in fact mean that both authors, in different ways, are analyzing the same fundamental qualities of the emerging Stalinist culture.



The Bolsheviks' intensely ideological view of the world led to the proliferation of monumental historical and reference works in the USSR. History had

to be rewritten to emphasize its inner logic leading to the victory of socialism, but all other fields of knowledge needed reshaping too, so that they could conform to the materialist viewpoint. This familiar and seductively simple scheme of the Bolshevik remaking of learning is, of course, missing two important points. First, Bolshevik theory itself was unstable and constantly changing, especially during the decade immediately after the Revolution, but also during Stalin's tenure at the helm. Second, far from being independent judges standing above the cultural sphere, party ideologues were part of the Soviet "cultural ecosystem," which acted upon them just as they sought to reshape it.¹ These two corrections turn a static picture of Soviet cultural production into a dynamic one in which the line between the state and its cultural agents is no longer solid. They also imply that Bolshevik culture evolved—an evolution brought about by complex interactions in the cultural sphere among ideologues, cultural figures, and their audiences, rather than by the state's simple *Diktat*.²

Keeping this "dynamic" model of Soviet culture in mind, let us proceed to the first common feature of the articles by MacKinnon and Kassof. Both authors examine the difference between original designs, for the *IGV* and the *BSE*, and final products. The change, which occurred halfway through the *BSE* and early in the *IGV* project—but in both cases during the mid-to-late 1930s—was obviously related to the advent of Stalinism in culture. But what was the exact nature of this transformation?

To put things in better perspective, it helps to start with the encyclopedia project because it began during the 1920s. Kassof shows that the *BSE* grew out of an idealistic vision of an ideologically coherent Bolshevik encyclopedia that was to emphasize the natural and applied sciences. The dream of ideological coherence had to be abandoned early because of the shortage of reliable Marxist authors, but during the 1920s the party leadership did not worry about this. The party bosses, writes Kassof, "were not yet interested in inserting politically useful material in the *BSE*" (64); they just wanted to keep the first Soviet encyclopedia free of oppositionist ideas. The first major change came in 1931, during what is conventionally known as the Cultural Revolution. The *BSE*'s Presidium lost much of its influence to the Central Committee apparatus, but perhaps more important was the mass replacement of "old specialists" on the editorial board with Marxist scholars, many

¹ The notion of "cultural ecosystem" comes from Katerina Clark, *Petersburg: Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), ix–x, and has been used in such works on Soviet culture as Michael David-Fox, *Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918–1929* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and David L. Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity (1917–1941)* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

² On this point, see my "Diktat and Dialogue in Stalinist Culture: Staging Patriotic Historical Opera in Soviet Ukraine, 1936–1954," *Slavic Review* 59, 3 (2000): 597–624.

of whom were freshly trained “red specialists.” Like Isaak Mints, who joined the *IGV* project at about the same time, many of these sons and daughters of the Revolution did not see party propaganda and scholarship as opposites. It was this generation of editors and authors that in the mid- to late 1930s ushered in the transition to “Stalinist epistemology.” Reflecting this transition was the 1938 change in the listing of editorial sections, with party history and Marxist theory moving ahead of natural sciences, for the former was officially instated as the basis of knowledge.

In her discussion of Mints and his *IGV* project, MacKinnon describes a parallel transformation from the original plans for a popular history, written by the masses and for the masses, to an authoritative single-voice narrative of events. The difference was that this project started in the early 1930s and its first volume (1936) already reflected the new model. What Maksim Gor’kii envisaged as a new type of history-writing in which historians and *littérateurs* would publish the inspirational testimonies of thousands of participants, turned into a conventional narrative glorifying Stalin and the Party. It, too, was penned by “red specialists.” Significantly, the format of the first volumes changed from collections of articles to a continual narrative put together by a group of professional historians. The new format was accompanied by a transformation of the *IGV*’s main story line, with the narrative of mass heroism becoming secondary to the glorification of Stalin and the demonization of his opponents. Yet, as MacKinnon astutely observes, the first two volumes of the *IGV* were published as mass historical literature. With numerous illustrations and a picturesque narrative style more characteristic of fiction, they were designed to attract readers in order to feed them the Stalinist version of the Revolution and the Civil War.

I do not mean to suggest that it was necessarily a force-feeding. Keeping in mind Evgeny Dobrenko’s argument that the emergence of official Stalinist Socialist Realism was in fact related to the popular taste of Soviet readers,³ one need only recall recent scholarship on the identity-shaping power of Soviet discourse⁴ to stop imagining the Stalinist model of history (or knowledge in general) as having been forcibly imposed on passive or even resisting readers.

³ Evgeny Dobrenko, *The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception of Soviet Literature*, trans. Jesse M. Savage (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); and Dobrenko, “The Disaster of Middlebrow Taste, Or, Who ‘Invented’ Socialist Realism?” in *Socialist Realism without Shores*, ed. Thomas Lahusen and Dobrenko (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 135–64.

⁴ See, for instance, Igal Halfin, *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Jochen Hellbeck, “Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931–1939),” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44, 3 (1996): 344–73; Hellbeck, “Working, Struggling, Becoming: Stalin-Era Autobiographical Texts,” *Russian Review* 60, 3 (2001): 340–59; and Anna Krylova, “The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies,” *Kritika* 1, 1 (2000): 119–46, repr. in *The*

Finally, so as better to illuminate the transformation of these two large Soviet projects, I would like to mention a third contemporary project, the *Istoriia fabrik i zavodov* (History of Plants and Factories, hereafter *IFZ*) book series. If the first two productions could be adapted to the Stalinist cultural milieu, the third did not survive the transition. The subject of Sergei Zhuravlev's excellent book,⁵ the *IFZ* was another of Gor'kii's pet projects. Like the *IGV*, it was meant to be a popular history written by the masses, and for the masses' further political mobilization. There were some similarities with the original design of the *BSE* as well. In particular, Gor'kii wanted to see the *IFZ* as "an encyclopedia capturing the dynamic of our construction."⁶ The format of the series reflected the idea of popular history taken to the extreme, as it was to consist of separate volumes on the history of major factories written by the workers themselves. Workers showed considerable enthusiasm for the project, but the enormous effort of collecting memoirs and preparing texts was abandoned in 1938, after the publication of only 12 volumes out of the 30 envisaged for the first series alone. As Zhuravlev puts it, by 1938 the USSR was a "different country," which no longer needed a workers' history of their factories.⁷ Aside from several collections of memoirs and interviews that were byproducts of the *IFZ* project, most books were actually singly authored. Some began with portraits of Stalin and celebrated his victory over opposition. A monumental project that was subsequently abandoned, the *IFZ* did not survive primarily because, unlike the *IGV* and the *BSE*, its continuation was not essential to maintaining such fundamental myths of Stalinism as the victory in the Civil War or the materialist approach to the world.



It is worth looking more closely at what kind of *Weltanschauung* the surviving projects promoted. MacKinnon notes both the general blurring of the line between history and politics and more specific ingredients of the new historical mythology. In the prospectuses prepared for the first volumes of the *IGV*, Stalin, Voroshilov, and Budennyi emerge as larger-than-life historical heroes, while both Trotskii's role in the creation of the Red Army and his triumph in the Civil War are suppressed. In fact, instead of dealing with the Civil War as such, the first two volumes covered only the February and October revolutions, no doubt because the top leadership realized that this period was to provide

Resistance Debate in Russian and Soviet Studies, ed. Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Marshall Poe (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2003), 168–207.

⁵ S. V. Zhuravlev, *Fenomen "Istorii fabrik i zavodov": Gor'kovskoe nachinanie v kontekste epokhi 1930-kh godov* (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1997). MacKinnon refers to this book in her article; she also interviewed Zhuravlev during her research on Mints.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 70.

the foundational myth of early Stalinism—namely, that the Revolution had two leaders, Lenin and Stalin. A new narrative of the Revolution was also needed to complete the demonization of former opposition leaders. (As MacKinnon tells us, Stalin reportedly made some 700 corrections to the manuscript of the first volume alone. Examining the copy with his alterations should provide enough material for an interesting article.)⁸

Some of the interpretations first tested in the *IGV* soon became orthodox because of their inclusion in *A Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)*, the less massive but more influential Stalinist historical project of the 1930s.⁹ MacKinnon rightly says that Mints “helped lay the foundations for Stalinist historiography” (5) through his work on the *IGV* project, and later in the article when she speaks about his complicity in the “distortion” of history, it is her voice that we hear, not Mints’s. To suppose otherwise would require showing that Mints had previously held some “objective” concept of the Revolution and the Civil War—which is difficult to expect from a former Red Cavalry commissar and person who, as MacKinnon says, could not imagine history and the Communist Party as two separate concepts. But I return to the discussion of Mints’s views in the last part of this article.

Kassof also shows that the changes introduced in the *BSE* during the 1930s heralded the advent of Stalinism on the knowledge front. The most obvious manifestation of this process included the structure of the 1930 entry on the “All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik),” which highlighted the oppositionists’ past disagreements with Lenin, and the inversion of the standard formula “the Great October Socialist Revolution” in order to place the relevant entry in the O volume and reprint there the text from the recently published *Short Course*. But Kassof digs deeper, finding signs of a more general change in the Bolshevik vision of the world. He argues that the 1930s saw the invention of “Stalinist epistemology,” which supplanted Marxist materialism with the notion that great leaders such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin possessed the ultimate ability to interpret the world—and therefore the study of their works, rather than the independent examination of nature and societies, was the only path to true knowledge. The obligatory quotations from “patristic texts” by the four greats appeared in the *BSE* entries, just as they did in all other Soviet publications. I was particularly impressed by Kassof’s suggestion that Stalinist epistemology “eliminated the need to develop complex, fixed definitions of abstract concepts relating to Marxism-Leninism” (93). Indeed, whereas in the late 1920s the *BSE* editors struggled with the difficulty of preparing Marxist

⁸ Some of Stalin’s corrections to the text of the first volume are described in David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 254.

⁹ David Brandenberger is currently working on a book-length study of the *Short Course*.

definitions of such terms as “Dialectical Materialism,” “Imperialism,” and so on, during the 1930s they found an easy solution by replacing definitions with more or less relevant quotations from the four patriarchs. In Stalinist epistemology, citations were preferable to definitions because “their specific application to a given situation was subject to ideological interpretation, which was a transrational process, not liable to definition” (ibid.)

In light of this fascinating theory, it is instructive to check the *BSE* entries for the greatest contemporary leader and the worst enemy in Stalinist cosmology. One quickly discovers that the entry on “Stalin” contains no definition of who he is. Looking for Molotov’s name, for example, the reader would learn that he is “the chairman of the C[ouncil of] P[eople’s] Commissars. One of the most prominent leaders of the A[ll-Union] C[ommunist] P[arty] (B[olshevik]), member of the Politburo of the C[entral] C[ommittee],” and so on.¹⁰ In contrast, the entry on Stalin begins as a biographical narrative of his life, with no introductory definition. Nor is the greatest evildoer defined, as the *BSE* contains no entry on Trotskii, only one on Trotskyism, which begins with a quotation from Stalin proclaiming that Trotskyism “is not a political movement of the working class but an unprincipled gang of wreckers, saboteurs, spies, and killers devoid of ideas; a gang of sworn enemies of the working class who are on the payroll of foreign intelligence agencies.”¹¹ Indeed, it appears that by the time the later volumes of the *BSE* were published, definitions had become ideologically inappropriate.

There are aspects of Stalinism’s “ideological face” that neither MacKinnon nor Kassof discusses in their contributions to this issue, although the history of the *BSE*’s preparation and the life and work of Mints undoubtedly provide some interesting clues to these changes. I refer primarily to the Soviet state’s increased promotion of ethnic-based patriotism and the restoration to the official discourse of Russian national heroes—the subject of David Brandenberger’s 2002 monograph.¹² Other aspects could include the idea of the state’s “gift” to the people, requiring their permanent gratitude, as suggested by Jeffrey Brooks, and the Bolsheviks’ modernizing program of “acculturating the masses,” as described by David L. Hoffmann.¹³ But one cannot, of course, blame the two authors for not discussing all aspects of Stalinist culture in their articles; my aim here is simply to point out to the reader related components of the ideological transformation in question.

One final component no historian can miss is the Great Terror, which sent contradictory impulses throughout the Stalinist cultural domain. According

¹⁰ G. Tikhomirnov, “Molotov,” *Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 1st ed., vol. 38, 721–26.

¹¹ “Trotskizm,” ibid., vol. 55, 42.

¹² Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism*.

¹³ Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values*.

to Kassof, at the *BSE* headquarters mass arrests of editorial staff led to the disappearance of editorial listings during 1937 and 1938, but these years of fear were more productive than any other two-year period, with 11 volumes being published, even though most longer articles were unsigned. While looking at the *BSE* set at the Vernadsky Central Scholarly Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, it occurred to me that in some macabre way the Terror empowered librarians and readers, who were expected to “update” encyclopedias with fountain pens and scissors. For instance, in the 1930 entry on the “All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik),” which Kassof discusses in detail, I found two portraits of the members elected to the Central Committee at the Third Congress clipped out. But the unknown librarian did not bother to eliminate all references to these people in the text, and several pages later one still sees Rykov listed among the Central Committee members at the Third Congress.¹⁴ Even more intriguing is a page displaying portraits of the nine Politburo members after the 15th Party Congress. Four photographs have been cut out and the names under them blacked out with ink and later restored in pencil—Bukharin, Tomskii, Rykov, and Rudzutak. In fact, they were never deleted from the full list of the Central Committee members on the next page.¹⁵ Why did this librarian of the late 1930s not delete all mentions of these “enemies of the people”? Was it a reader or another librarian who restored the names, and was it done during Stalin’s lifetime or after his death? While there are no answers to these tantalizing questions, the encyclopedia project clearly involved the reader in the reshaping of the Stalinist historical canon.

Thanks to MacKinnon’s research, we know more about the contradictory impact of the Great Terror on the work of Isaak Mints. The first edition of the *IGV*’s first volume (1936) had to be recalled and replaced with a sanitized second edition (1938) because so many heroes of the Revolution and the Civil War (not to mention authors and editors of the project) had fallen victim to the purges. Mints was criticized both from above, for harboring no fewer than 14 enemies in his editorial group, and from below, for taking credit for others’ work and hoarding library books. But being skilled in Bolshevik rituals of criticism and self-criticism, Mints always managed to extricate himself from problems, while never fully denying his responsibility for the errors. He continued serving as “responsible editor” of the *IGV* project. Moreover, MacKinnon shows that he used denunciatory meetings to tighten his control over his subordinates by cracking down on the practice of taking home archival materials and making non-essential phone calls from work.

All in all, just as the Great Terror was destructive because it played havoc with the existing Soviet canon and removed people who were working on the

¹⁴ A. S. Bubnov, “VKP(b),” *Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 1st ed., vol. 11, between columns 288 and 289, 307.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, between 520 and 521, 521–22.

project, it was also creative in its own ghastly, Stalinist way. It helped establish Stalinist orthodoxy, hastened the publication of the *BSE*, and reined in Mints's employees on the *IGV* project. In other words, the Terror completed both the "cultural face" of Stalinism and the political face of the regime.



For all the similarity of the main points that Kassof and MacKinnon make about Stalinist culture, the two scholars have their particular takes on the grand projects of the time. Kassof introduces the notion of paratext as an innovative way to penetrate the essence of cultural change, while MacKinnon offers a sophisticated picture of one scholar's role in the emergence of Stalinist historiography.

Although some would consider the linguistic and non-textual "turns" in historical studies as characteristic of postmodernist scholarship, Kassof shows that "[t]he Bolsheviks were intense readers of signs of all types, including paratextual cues" (59). Two or three non-textual features that he finds in the *BSE* are particularly significant because they mirror major ideological changes. The most striking are the layout of the entry on "Lenin and Leninism," with the text starting on a fresh page, as if it were a separate letter of the alphabet, and the customized guide words on the spine of the volume containing the entry on "Stalin": Consciousness to Strategy. Together with the 1938 reversal in the listing of editorial sections, when party history and Leninism were given priority over the natural sciences, these paratextual cues reflect the ascendance of the new Stalinist epistemology, in which knowledge was based on the lives of Bolshevik saints and a set of patristic texts. It is not coincidental that the entry on "Bolshevism," originally assigned to Lev Kamenev, was not included after his removal from the top leadership—he had lost his interpretive authority.

Other paratextual elements mentioned elsewhere in the article are interesting as well, but they reflect pragmatic decisions taken under the pressure of circumstances. Thus, certain idiosyncrasies in layout were caused by the hurried preparation or rewriting of entries touching on contemporary events, such as the completion of Dneprostroi and the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland. Yet one can see a deeper significance in these seemingly pragmatic changes, for they reflected the new attitude to the encyclopedia as a propaganda tool.

One can take the analysis of paratext in the *BSE* one step further by looking at the volumes' format and binding. Similar in dimensions to today's hardcover historical monographs, the *BSE* volumes are in fact the same size as the earlier most authoritative Russian encyclopedia, the Brokgauz and Efron. The Brokgauz and Efron volumes had a spine with excessive gold-on-black ornamentation without any particular message, however, while the *BSE* sports a red spine with modest gold ornamentation featuring the star, gear wheel, and an ear of wheat—all symbolizing socialism. The physical dimensions of the volumes changed starting with the second edition, which matched the

size of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. It is intriguing that the second edition of the first volume of the *IGV* (1938) had the same format and was much larger than the original 1936 edition. The well-known postwar series of one-volume selected works of major Russian writers also used the same format. What can we make of the fact that Stalinist culture seemed to have adopted the coffee-table book as an ideal size in designing important editions that were to fulfill certain symbolic functions?

One aspect of Kassof's article that I would like to see developed further is the author's concept of the Cultural Revolution. He seems to understand it, following Sheila Fitzpatrick, as a chronologically bounded "class war" in culture that lasted from 1928 to 1931 but emphasizes the existence of the Cultural Revolution's second phase, "which saw the establishment of a hierarchical system of cultural production controlled directly by the Central Committee" (68). The stress on this second phase, beginning in 1931–32, is obviously a reflection of Kassof's thinking about the advent of Stalinism in Soviet culture, but this connection is never expressed clearly. One wonders, as well, whether a long-term project such as the *BSE* might serve as a testing-ground for a less restrictive and less sociological vision of cultural revolution. For example, Michael David-Fox has argued recently that the concept of cultural revolution was intertwined with the Bolshevik project from its very beginning, although in 1928–29 its application was intensified, with the balance of emphasis shifting toward ideological purge over enlightenment.¹⁶ Indeed, why can we not see the first plans for the *BSE* in the early 1920s as a manifestation of a Bolshevik Cultural Revolution—one that was cosmological rather than sociological? Why can we not interpret the emergence of the Lenin cult in 1924 as the cornerstone of what Kassof calls "Stalinist epistemology"?

In contrast, I would like to see MacKinnon become more "sociological." In particular, it would have been interesting to situate Mints historically in the debates between the supporters and opponents of "class history" during the 1940s. Since he was a graduate of the Institute of Red Professors (IKP), one would expect him to have joined fellow *ikapist* Anna Pankratova in her spirited defense of the class approach against "old specialists" like Evgenii Tarle and Boris Grekov. Yet Mints's speech at the 1944 Agitprop conference of historians is an astute effort to find the middle ground between those who attempted to rehabilitate tsarist state-building and those who wanted to preserve Marxist class analysis.¹⁷ It would be too easy to dismiss Mints as a time-server who had betrayed Marxist ideals. What if he personified the birth of Stalinist historiography from an uneasy symbiosis between class concepts and statist patriotism?

¹⁶ Michael David-Fox, "What Is Cultural Revolution?" *Russian Review* 58, 2 (1999): 181–201.

¹⁷ See "Stenogramma soveshchaniia po voprosam istorii SSSR v TsK VKP(b) v 1944 godu," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 3 (1996): 105–10.

At first glance, MacKinnon contradicts herself when she talks about Mints's "uncanny survival skills," "maneuvers," and "cop[ing] with professional compromises," while recognizing elsewhere in her article that he had internalized the Bolshevik language, cherished his acquaintance with Stalin, and fully accepted his task to use history to shape consciousness. There appears to be a disagreement between the images of Mints the willing architect of Stalinist history-writing and Mints the survivor looking for ways to cope with the system. But this apparent contradiction is really only a reflection of the long intellectual tradition that viewed the Soviet people as either resisting liberal subjects or fully indoctrinated Communists.¹⁸ The worldview of Soviet citizens was not necessarily coherent or one-dimensional; their identities could be better described as hybrid. Although this is only an educated guess, I think the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens were probably somewhere between the poles of resistance and full identification with the Stalinist project, and so was the "loyal" Mints. MacKinnon is right on the mark in seeing his personality as having been shaped by a "complex mixture of popular idealism, personal opportunism, and fear" (6).

Both authors in some form suggest that the *BSE* and the *IGV* ultimately failed as large ideological projects. The advent of Stalinism in the 1930s meant that the early 20 or so volumes of the *BSE* were not fit to be used as a reference tool, and work on the second edition started as soon as the first was completed in 1947. Although MacKinnon is less explicit on this point, one cannot help noticing that in Stalin's lifetime the *IGV* did not advance beyond the first two volumes covering the Revolution. (These failures were strikingly similar to the fates of large historical and artistic projects in Ukraine, such as the two-volume *Istoriia Ukrainy 'koi RSR* [History of the Ukrainian SSR] and the opera *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'ky*).¹⁹ This brings me to the final question, one of many prompted by the two thought-provoking articles under discussion. What if the significance of the Stalinist grand cultural projects lay not in their (non-)completion or their failure but in the fact that in the process of their construction a Stalinist culture was developed?

Dept. of History/Dept. of Germanic and Russian Studies
University of Victoria
PO Box 3045
Victoria, BC V8W 3P4
Canada
serhy@uvic.ca

¹⁸ See Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject."

¹⁹ See my *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).