Endgame in NATO's Enlargement

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The Baltic States and Ukraine

Yaroslav Bilinsky

PRAEGER

To my wife, Wira R. Bilinsky

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The Honorable Valeriy P. Kuchinsky, Minister Counsellor of the Em-

Introduction

At the meeting of Allied Heads of State in Madrid, which took place on July 8–9, 1997, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), offered full membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. That was commonly expected. Slovenia was also a serious candidate for inclusion in the first group, as was Romania. The final admission of the first three states, however, is not anticipated to occur before the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of NATO in April 1999, some two years later. In those two years there will be intensive negotiations on the coordination of weapons and similar technical matters, which will probably be used by the opponents of NATO's enlargement to both redefine and diminish the real commitments of the old partners to the new.[1]

The burden of this work is that in these unusually protracted negotiations over NATO's first enlargement into East Central Europe, the strategic endgame should not be lost from sight. The more desirable status quo is not that of August 22, 1939, just before the conclusion of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, but of December 8, 1991, which brought about the disestablishment of the Soviet Union, against which the original NATO had been set up. This strategic endgame calls for the simultaneous admission into NATO of the three Baltic states, the victims of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and of Ukraine, which is both a victim and a beneficiary of that pact. Such a move would leave Russia intact to pursue its democratic and market reforms, but would bar it from reconstituting a Great Russian Empire and/or Soviet Union, which would then be tempted to exert its hegemony first over all of the ex-Soviet republics, including Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and then over all the East Central European states that had once been members of the Warsaw Pact—

with the exception of East Germany, which is now reunited with West Germany. Before long, the stability in Central and Western Europe would be gone for good.

Less obviously, 1999 will be the sixtieth anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which helped set off World War II and led to the subjugation of East Central Europe. The second point of this volume is that by 1999, at the latest, a decision must be made in principle to foreclose another, similar adventure on the part of a strengthened, nuclear-armed Russia. The best way to do this would be to erase forever the fruits of Molotov and Ribbentrop by admitting the three relatively small Baltic states and populous Ukraine under the umbrella of NATO, at the first opportunity.

This volume will be organized as follows. In the first chapter I will briefly review some of the arguments contra and pro any kind of NATO's enlargement, while the second chapter will deal with the specific problems of the Baltics and the third with the specific problem of Ukraine. A fourth chapter will interpret the diplomatic events of May 1997 that bear on the Baltics and Ukraine, and a fifth chapter will bring the story up to date until mid-1998. At the end there will be a brief conclusion and an epilogue.

NOTE

1. In his column, Henry Kissinger has rightly voiced his misgivings about the apparently endless delays in finally admitting the first tranche of NATO applicants. In his words, ''The significance of NATO enlargement resides in guaranteeing the frontiers of new members, and should not wait for the resolution of every technical issue'' (Kissinger, ''NATO: Make It Stronger, Make It Larger,'' *Washington Post*, January 14, 1997, p. A15 [op-ed]). But the admission process does take time, and the significance of the 1999 anniversary has captured the imagination of such supporters of the enlargement as Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and President Bill Clinton. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, ''Geopolitical Pivot Points,'' *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), p. 210; and his classic ''A Plan for Europe,'' *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995), pp. 26–42. See President Clinton's electoral campaign speech in Detroit, Michigan, October 22, 1996: ''Remarks to the Community in Detroit, Michigan . . . ,'' *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 32, no. 43 (October 28, 1996), p. 2143.

Endgame in
NATO's Enlargement

Chapter 1

To Enlarge or Not to Enlarge?

In the West alone, there have been sharp critiques of NATO's eastward extension, literally from B to Z.[1] It may be that, as Daniel N. Nelson has said, the issue has already been decided in favor of some kind of an eastward expansion and that the debate on the utility of enlargement is purely academic,[2] or it may well be that the issue will still be defeated by objection A, the budgetary process in U.S. Congress.[3] Since, in my judgment, the latter is still a distinct possibility, we ought to consider some of the objections against growth in general and also an enlargement to include the first tranche (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary).

At the 1996 American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) national convention in Boston, Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstein of the University of Pennsylvania said the following in opposition to NATO's enlargement:

I do not believe that Russia is a military threat to Europe and to Eastern Europe. . . . Only the United States can deal with a nuclear Russia on the wide range of interests that are involved [including terrorism]. . . . Europe is at peace, and no power in Europe threatens war. . . . The U.S.-led NATO coalition that is the dominant military force on the continent of Europe faces no challenge in the immediate and foreseeable future. . . . [Speaking from the American perspective,] three times in this century the United States committed enormous forces and materiel to preventing Europe from being dominated by one power—twice against Germany, once the adversary was the Soviet Union. In the current strategic environment there is no threat. A status-quo NATO would succeed admirably in maintaining peace on the continent of Europe.

Professor Rubinstein also expressed his doubts about the long-term stability of the East Central European states from Finland to Bulgaria and his suspicion that West European governments, who, if anyone should have felt threatened by the developments in Eastern Europe, were deliberately maneuvering the United States into underwriting a very expensive and an inherently unstable process of NATO enlargement. The European Union (EU) should be deepened, not widened, and Germany in particular should remain bound to that Union, instead of striking out on its own with NATO's expansion.[4]

A majority of semiofficial and official Russian spokesmen have been even more critical of NATO's enlargement. In the felicitous phrase of former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, not an ardent advocate of NATO enlargement himself, the Russian reaction to NATO's expansion plans ''ranges between being unhappy to being very unhappy.''[5] To be sure, if you scratch the surface, some Russian officials and academics may welcome Russia's joining NATO for what is probably a variety of reasons, ranging from genuine willingness to cooperate with the United States on a number of security issues to controlling the admission process from East Central Europe. They are: Ivan Rybkin, the present secretary of the Russian Security Council; Yuri Baturin, the head of the Russian Defense Council; Andrei Kortunov, a leading Atlanticist among the foreign policy experts in Moscow; and last, but certainly not least, General Aleksandr [Alexander] M. Lebed, Rybkin's predecessor and a leading contender for the Russian presidency. U.S. Senator William W. Roth Jr., who is strongly in favor of NATO's enlargement, found Mr. Lebed ''much more flexible on the issue of NATO enlargement than some of his colleagues in Moscow.''[6] But the majority of Russian spokesmen have voiced their opposition, most bluntly perhaps Alexei K. Pushkov, foreign affairs director of Russian Public TV and board member of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policies, in his *New York Times* op-ed piece ''The Risk of Losing Russia: NATO Expansion Imperils Security.''[7]

We must, however, be very careful to determine what kind of NATO enlargement the Russians are objecting to and for what reasons. In a more extended article on the same subject, Pushkov wrote that NATO's ''Study on Enlargement,'' which was made public on September 28, 1995, ''did not exclude the stationing of nuclear weapons and the deployment of NATO forces in the newly accepted countries, dependent on unspecified circumstances. It raised questions in Moscow about whether this might apply not only to Poland or the Czech Republic *but in the future to the Baltic states as well*'' (emphasis added).[8] Now this is really a paradox: whereas some persons in Washington may want to restrict NATO's total enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the Russians are thinking ahead to NATO in Riga and in Kyiv [Kiev] too. In Pushkov's words: ''The entry of Ukraine could bring Russia and NATO

to the threshhold of a large-scale third level crisis.''[9] The British journalist Anatol Lieven has been as perceptive and much more explicit when he wrote,

If NATO expansion explicitly stops with Visegrad [i.e., Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary], then it is probable that Moscow will eventually accept this, albeit resentfully. The real problems for Moscow are twofold. The first is what appears to be the ''open-ended'' nature of NATO expansion, leading to the ultimate NATO membership for the Baltic states and, above all, Ukraine. The second connected factor is that NATO expansion is seen as part of a pattern of Western betrayal, motivated by ambition and hostility to Russia.[10]

When, in a public seminar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies on April 25, 1995, I broached the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO, an unnamed member of the audience referred to that as ''pie-in-the-sky'' thinking—but apparently the Russians have different ideas. In defense of this work, one could also say that Western policymakers should be aware that Moscow is ''hanging'' them, not only for the proverbial sheep but for the goats too, which may or may not be worthwhile from the perspective of NATO.

Briefly, what are the most important arguments for NATO's enlargement? First, if we hold that the countries in East Central Europe are legitimate, ''normal nation-states,'' a few of which (notably Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) have made a great deal of progress toward a functioning market economy at the expense of their peoples, the threat assessments of their leaders should be taken seriously. It is really impermissible to tell the democratically elected presidents of Poland (both Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski), the Czech Republic (Vaclav Havel) and Hungary (Arpad Goncz) that what their countries ''really need'' is not NATO, but a tomato—sold in Brussels, Paris or wherever else in the old European Union.[11]

Second, as put by Kissinger, ''Russia is in, but not of, Europe.''[12] All of the East Central European candidates for NATO admission, with the possible exception of Ukraine, are clearly ''of Europe.'' Politically and economically, Russia is less stable than most East European countries, but it seeks to find a Russian ''national identity'' or, really, multinational, imperial identity, by destabilizing the so-called ''illegitimate'' governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the former Soviet Union, today, and most of the former Warsaw Pact members tomorrow. Offered an E.U. tomato, the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Slovenians, Romanians, Balts and Ukrainians have wisely decided to apply to NATO first. As Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu of the University of Maryland politely put it at the 1996 AAASS Round Table, ''The legitimate security concerns of the Russian policymakers should be addressed,

but should not prevail over the sovereignty of legitimate East European states.''

Third, the serious nuclear issue must not be swept under the rug, nor will it be. In my judgment, the nuclear nexus is more apparent than real. Nuclear survival politics is *sui generis* and is best dealt with by a combination of deterrence by a viable arsenal of offensive missiles and an immediately deployed minimal arsenal of defensive missiles.[13] Russia's semiacknowledged aid to the military industry of Iran that is researching and developing long-range missiles tipped with nuclear and biological warheads is a destabilizing aspect of its foreign policy.[14] The tie with Iran, however, predates the NATO enlargement controversy. I also take it for granted that U.S. security agencies will watch out for nuclear terrorists with or without the wholehearted cooperation of their Russian counterparts. Given American parity, or perhaps even superiority, in nuclear weapons, NATO enlargement for defensive stabilization would be an irritant to Russian policymakers, but not enough to lead Russians either into disarmament—or, more likely, modernization and rearmament—actions that they would not have undertaken otherwise in the Russian interest of national survival.

Fourth, since two of the four major world powers are in Europe, and since both could become a danger to the United States if cut loose, the United States cannot but remain in Europe in more than token force for many years to come. A more realistic, enlarged NATO, not the NATO that ended at the Elbe and the Oder, with parallel security negotiations with the Russians when necessary, especially in the nuclear realm, would be an ideal and, over the long run, a relatively inexpensive instrument for American foreign policy.[15] On the contrary, the most costly strategy is one of sporadic engagement and disengagement: first participation in the final and decisive stage of World War I; then isolationism; then the secret war of 1939–1941, followed by full-scale engagement in World War II; then the attempted disengagement at Yalta in favor of the World's Four Policemen of the UN Security Council; then the tentative reengagement in soon-to-be West Germany (the Stuttgart speech of September 1946) and in Greece and Turkey (the Truman Doctrine of March 1947), leading to Stalin's inherently rational miscalculation on Berlin in 1948; and, in response, the full, institutional engagement via NATO, which was established in 1949. It utterly confuses friends and encourages enemies no end. In a way, the reaction of Senator Joseph R. Biden's constituent from Dagsboro, Delaware, who did not think it was such a great idea to extend our nuclear umbrella to Slovakia (by the way, why Slovakia, and not Poland?) has come up before.[16] In 1939, five out of seven Frenchmen did not want to ''die for Danzig.'' Before long, they realized that by not stopping Hitler in time, they had to die for Paris.

The opponents of NATO's enlargement, including the gentleman from

Dagsboro, Delaware, Professor Rubinstein and others are absolutely correct in that NATO enlargement should not be paid exclusively by U.S. taxpayers, while the Europeans will engage in better and more profitable concerns. A fair sharing of the financial burden is the crux of the issue. If the present military defense and political stabilization frontier of old NATO is shifted from the Oder to the San (the eastern boundary of Poland), or, even better, to the Donets (the eastern frontier of Ukraine), the immediate beneficiaries of that shift should pay their fair share of the increased costs. But what are the benefits and the disadvantages of going beyond the first tranche of NATO membership applicants? Why go from the San (the absolute minimum) as far as the Donets? Let us first look at NATO's enlargement into the Baltics, then the case of Ukraine.

NOTES

1. See the forceful but not altogether logical polemic by Michael E. Brown, ''The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion,'' *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34–52, who advocates rapid expansion if strategic circumstances should change; and the more logically consistent objection by Philip Zelikow, who worked on the staff of the U.S. Security Council under President Bush from 1989 to 1991 (Zelikow, ''The Masque of Institutions,'' *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1 [Spring 1996], pp. 6–18). In between in terms of the alphabet and particularly significant because they come from a country that, on balance, has been a strong supporter of NATO's enlargement (viz., Germany) come the critical articles by Karl-Heinz Kamp, an official of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (''The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion,'' *Foreign Policy*, no. 99 [Summer 1995], pp. 116–29) and by the Otto-Wolff Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn, Karl Kaiser (''Reforming NATO,'' *For. Policy*, vol. 103 [Summer 1996], pp. 128–43), the latter of which is a plea for the enlargement to the east of the European Union, not of NATO. Noteworthy also is the opposition by Edward N. Luttwak, ''Don't Offer the [NATO] Alliance to Those We Can't Protect,'' *Washington Post*, July 6, 1997, p. C3. At the Roundtable on ''NATO's Expansion: Pros and Cons,'' at the 28th Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) in Boston, MA, November 16, 1996, which I chaired and which henceforth will be referred to as ''1996 AAASS Round Table,'' Professor Hannes J. Adomeit, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, was, on balance, critical of rapid NATO enlargement, unless the legitimate security interests of Russia were addressed in parallel negotiations. The psychological state of the Russian elite he compared to that of the Germans after the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty: at bottom, NATO enlargement was for the Russians ''the aftershock of having lost superpower status.'' But like Professor Daniel N. Nelson, of Old Dominion University and President of Global Concepts, Inc., Professor Adomeit felt that the train for NATO enlargement had already left the station, for good or for ill.

2. Professor Daniel N. Nelson, at the 1996 AAASS Round Table. Initially,

Professor Nelson admitted to misgivings about choosing NATO as the designated instrument for increasing the security of East Central European states, but now the issue was becoming academic.

3. Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstein, of the University of Pennsylvania, at the 1996 AAASS Round Table, was most strongly opposed to the entire issue of NATO enlargement and most optimistic that the process could still be stopped in the U.S. Congress.

4. For an earlier, well-taken critique of NATO's enlargement (''There is near universal agreement in the Russian government that the enlargement of NATO, absent a solid foundation of cooperation between Russia and the West, would undermine Russian security *and make the reintegration of the CIS more difficult*'' [emphasis added]), see Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State* (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 304. See also Rubinstein, ''The Unheard Case Against NATO Enlargement,'' *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 44, no. 3 (May/June 1997), pp. 52–60.

5. Jim Hoagland, ''The Perry Proposition for NATO: His Proposal Gives Moscow Far More than Many in the U.S. Senate Will Want to Grant When They Are Asked to Ratify NATO Treaty Revisions,'' *Wash. Post*, January 9, 1997, p. A21 (op-ed). The words are Secretary Perry's, as cited by Hoagland.

6. See Ira Straus, U.S. Coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, for the first three names (''Russia as an Ally,'' *Wash. Post*, December 31, 1996, p. A17 [op-ed]). Also, on Lebed—Steven Erlanger, ''Lebed Admits A Bit of Envy For Transition Done in Peace,'' *N.Y. Times*, January 21, 1997, p. A15. Senator Roth—as quoted by Erlanger. Also, Rachel L. Swarns, ''Unlikely Meeting of Minds: Lebed Meets The Donald,'' *N.Y. Times*, January 23, 1997, p. A8.

7. *N.Y. Times*, January 21, 1997, p. A23 (op-ed). At a major seminar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, on January 22, 1997, Sergey Rogov, the director of the USA–Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, claimed that NATO's enlargement plans had united a strong opposition in Russia. Unwittingly, Dr. Rogov undercut his own case against enlargement by saying that the CIS boundaries were ''illegitimate.'' For an earlier thoughtful critique from the deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the Duma of the Russian Federation, see Alexei Arbatov, ''Eurasia Letter: A Russian–U.S. Security Agenda,'' *For. Policy*, no. 104 (Fall 1996), pp. 103–106 and passim.

8. Alexei K. Pushkov, ''Russia and NATO: On the Watershed,'' *Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 19. See the full text of the six chapters' and 82 items' *Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995* on NATO's *Web-Archive* (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm). The figure at the end refers to the contents page of the study; the individual chapters have figures from 9502 to 9507.

9. Pushkov, ''Russia and NATO,'' p. 27.

10. Anatol Lieven, ''Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion,'' *The World Today* (London), vol. 51, no. 10 (October 1995), p. 197.

11. The *New York Times* foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman wrote, ''NATO expansion is the bone E.U. [European Union] members throw the East Europeans instead of letting them into the European common market, *which is*

what the East Europeans really want and need. That's what would really bolster their democracies'' (emphasis added). Friedman, ''NATO or Tomato?'' *N.Y. Times*, January 22, 1997, p. A21 (op-ed). Many West Europeans may think so; the columnist is witty, the title even rhymes, but at bottom, the column is either plainly arrogant or designed to deliberately kill NATO enlargement with ridicule and is thus a prime submission for the Yeltsin Peace Prize.

12. Kissinger, ''NATO: Make It Stronger, Make It Larger,'' *Wash. Post*, January 14, 1997, p. A15 (op-ed).

13. Very good small, but relatively up-to-date pieces on the two sides of the nuclear balance are: R. Jeffrey Smith, ''U.S. Studies Further Cuts in Nuclear Warheads: Possible START III Treaty Could Be Leverage to Get Russia to Ratify 1993 Arms Reduction Pact [START II],'' *Wash. Post*, January 23, 1997, p. A4; and Edward L. Rowny, ''Build a Missile Defense System—Now,'' *N.Y. Times*, January 24, 1997, p. A31 (op-ed). Admittedly, there is now a complication, namely, the growing Franco–German cooperation in *nuclear* defense policy. See Craig R. Whitney, ''France and Germany to Discuss Joint Nuclear Deterrent: A shift for countries that have relied on the Americans,'' *N.Y. Times*, January 25, 1997, p. 3. There may also be more nuclear weapons in Russia than many Americans either realize or would like to admit. A French Defense Ministry report, publicized by Reuters and DPA on May 2, 1997, ''estimated that Russia has some 6,650 long-range nuclear weapons and between 18,000 and 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons, which is far larger than the U.S. tactical weapons stockpile.'' See ''French Report Says Russia Stockpiling Nukes,'' *RFE/RL [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty] Newsline on the Web*, May 5, 1997 (http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/05/050597.html). But I cannot agree too strongly with Harvey Sicherman, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, that the Russian Duma's refusal to ratify START II ''predates the NATO issue and has little to do with it.'' See his ''NATO–Russia Agreement,'' *Foreign Policy Research Institute Notes*, June 3, 1997, p. 2.

14. See both Thomas W. Lippman, ''U.S. Keeps After Russia to Halt Flow of Missile Technology to Iran,'' *Wash. Post*, January 18, 1998, p. A9; and Kenneth R. Timmerman, ''Missile Threat From Iran: Why Is Moscow Aiding the Strategic Weapons Program of a Nation Engaged in Terrorism?'' *Reader's Digest*, January 1998, pp. 87–91. Based on similar sources, the two articles nicely complement each other.

15. A similar argument was later eloquently made by William Odom, ''History Tells Us the [NATO] Alliance Should Grow,'' *Wash. Post*, July 6, 1997, p. C3. He concludes his article as follows:

No great strategic departure is without risks, and enlarging NATO has some, as its opponents abundantly point out. Likewise, *there are risks in not going forward, for that, too, is a strategic departure—backward from Europe.*

The reunification of Germany within NATO is the greatest strategic realignment in Europe's history without a major war, an achievement no pundit would have conceded beforehand to be possible. But that is only half of the task. Consolidating a community of liberal democracies in Central Europe and beyond is the more difficult half. *Failure would eventually affect America's own economy and security adversely*, not to mention the negative political and moral consequences. Is America worthy of its liberty and prosperity if it no longer dares to accept such challenges with energy and optimism? [emphasis added]

16. Friedman, ''NATO or Tomato?'' p. A21. Since 1997, Senator Biden has become the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His ''serious reservations'' about NATO expansion may be simply the reaction of a thoughtful senator or may constitute the new policy of the Clinton administration. In May 1997, however, Senator Biden's report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations showed him as a staunch, but realistic proponent of NATO's enlargement—and an advocate of the quick admission of Slovenia to boot. See U.S. Congress (105th Congress; 1st Session), U.S. Senate, *Meeting the Challenges of a Post–Cold War World: NATO Enlargement and U.S.–Russia Relations*; A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by Joseph R. Biden Jr., . . . May 1997 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 59 pages. Report supplied by the senator.

Chapter 2

NATO in the Baltics

The determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to seek full membership in NATO was reaffirmed by all three ambassadors on October 22, 1996,[1] the day President Clinton gave his campaign speech on NATO enlargement. The historical credentials of all three Baltic states are impeccable; they have a strong moral claim, and above all, with good reason, they feel much more threatened than the candidates for early admission, such as Poland, not to mention the Czech Republic.

All three countries are clearly ''of Europe'': Lithuania, like Poland, is a strong bastion of living Roman Catholic faith; Latvia is predominantly Protestant, and so is Estonia (Lutheran). Linguistically and culturally, Estonia is very close to Finland. All three countries had been democratic independent states between the two world wars, until they were assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence by the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939, and its Supplementary Protocol of September 28, 1939. In the summer of 1940, they were brutally incorporated into the USSR. Not only were they the first independent victims of Soviet imperialism of 1939–1940, but the savagery of the regime, the large-scale shootings and deportations, both in 1940–1941 and after the Soviet reconquest of 1944, the large-scale immigration of Slavic, mostly Russian, settlers into Latvia and Estonia, allegedly to fill vacancies in the rapidly developing economy, and the systematic persecution of the Baltic languages could lead to a plausible charge of both physical and cultural genocide. All three states resisted the Soviet policy of oppression: in Lithuania, guerrillas continued to fight the regime until the early 1950s, leading to further mass executions and mass deportations. Finally, under Brezhnev and his successors, all of the Balts moved into the forefront of

organized political opposition, and Lithuania declared independence as early as March 11, 1990, some twenty-one months before the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The three states have also been good citizens of the world community: ''Their ambassadors cited their countries' commitment to a strong defense, multiparty democracy and free market economies as qualifications for NATO.''[2]

Public opinion in all three Baltic states has also supported accession to NATO. In the spring of 1996, for instance, 41.1 percent of the respondents in a nationwide poll in Estonia said that their country should join NATO, whereas 21.1 percent were opposed;[3] in Latvia, 37.6 percent were for and 21.7 percent were opposed;[4] however, in Lithuania, the number of supporters was the highest, with 42.6 percent, and the number of opponents was the lowest, with 10.4 percent.[5] In May 1997, in a similar nationwide poll, the number of NATO supporters in Lithuania went down slightly to 41.0 percent, and that of opponents increased to 15.9 percent.[6] Was this a reaction to the bad news that Lithuania would not be admitted to NATO in the first round? The number of NATO suporters in Latvia, however, remained stable (37.6 percent), while that of the opponents increased slightly to 23.1 percent.[7] (The 1997 poll figures on Estonia were not available to me at the time of this writing.) But irrespective of any fluctuations of public opinion between 1996 and 1997, the elite in all three countries remain strongly committed to seek admission to NATO at the first opportunity, particularly the leaders in Lithuania, which does not have such a strong Russian ethnic minority as Estonia and Latvia. As Daniel Williams put it, ''Membership in NATO is the Holy Grail of all Lithuanian politicians.''[8] Why?

THE SURIKOV AND KARAGANOV REPORTS

All three countries feel genuinely threatened by Russia. In 1995–1996, two important semiofficial Russian security studies were conducted bearing on the Baltics and also Ukraine: one appeared relatively moderate; another definitely was not. The first, published on May 23, 1996, under the provocative title ''*Vozroditsya li soyuz? Budushchee postsovetskogo prostranstva*'' [Will the Soviet Union Be Reborn? The Future of the Post–Soviet Space], was sponsored by the prestigious Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow, which in turn was headed by Sergey Karaganov, a former Gorbachev and present Yeltsin advisor. It was signed by forty leading Russian academics, businesspeople and parliamentarians—for simplicity's sake, let's call it the Karaganov Report.[9] The second, called an ''alternative national security doctrine'' by one of its main authors, the military strategist at the U.S.–Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Anton Surikov, who may or may not be a colonel

in Russian military intelligence, was published only in excerpts in the Russian press, but had already gained notoriety in the international diplomatic community in the fall of 1995. Reportedly, the second report had been secretly commissioned by then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. Let's call the second hard-line report the Surikov Report.[10]

To take the earlier Surikov Report first, ''the document calls for stationing nuclear weapons in Belarus, *putting troops in the Baltics if they try to join NATO* and bombing oilfields in Azerbaijan if Moscow does not get a slice of the profits'' (emphasis added).[11] Surikov was also somewhat disrespectful of Yeltsin by hinting that he would lose the presidential election in 1996. The Karaganov Report, in the preparation of which participated some unnamed and unsigned Yeltsin officials, is seemingly much more restrained, but in its essentials it confirms rather than denies the Surikov theses. For instance, among Russia's vitally important interests (point 5.2)—''those the state must be ready to use all means, including force, to protect''—are points 5.2.2 and 5.2.3:

Preventing the dominance, especially military–political, of other powers on the territory of the former USSR.

Preventing the formation of coalitions hostile to Russia, including those in response to Russian actions in the former USSR.[12]

Translated into plain English, or Surikov's Russian, this would amount to military action against the Baltic states if they joined NATO.

In another section of the Karaganov Report, it is postulated that ''the resurrection of the [Soviet] union in the shape of a confederation is reasonably realistic,'' but the report is not very hopeful about reabsorbing the Baltic states. The exact wording is important:

• Latvia—[reintegration] improbable, but not completely impossible.
• Estonia and Lithuania—[reintegration] almost unfeasible [*pochti isklyucheno*].[13]
  [The text notes that one council member, A. G. Arbatov, the Deputy Chair of Russian Duma's Defense Committee, disagrees.]

In contrast to the three Baltic states, or, to be more exact, the one and two Baltic states, the reintegration of Ukraine—and Uzbekistan, Georgia and Moldova—is given considerable but not predominant probability in point 6.7, even though the reintegration of Ukraine has been assigned top priority, along with that of Belarus, Kazakhstan and especially oil-rich Azerbaijan, in points 6.9, 7.15 and 7.15.5.[14] But the Karaganov Report is quite mindful of the geopolitical advantage concerning the Baltics that Russia has gained through the near-integration of Belarus. According to the report, point 7.15.1, ''From the geopolitical point of view, Belarus, separating the Baltics and Ukraine, is a 'bridge' between Russia and the

West.'' For having helped Russia in geopolitics, Belarus should be paid ''a certain economic price.''[15]

YELTSIN'S LETTER AND CLINTON'S RESPONSE

So much for theory, either by Surikov or Karaganov and their associates. The harsh practice emerges from Jim Hoagland's column, ''Fight for the Baltics'':

. . . clear evidence of a new position [on NATO enlargement] has emerged from a crude propagandistic letter on the Baltics that President Boris Yeltsin sent to Clinton on June 20 [1996] and from subsequent conversations European diplomats have had with Russian Foreign Minister Yvegeny [*sic*] Primakov.[16]

The secret Yeltsin letter, which was timed to arrive on the eve of Clinton's June 25, 1996, meeting with the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, was ''reeking of bombastic, threatening rhetoric. In it, Yeltsin focuses on an old territorial dispute with Estonia and accuses that tiny neighboring state and Latvia of 'gross and massive human rights violations' against their Russian minorities.'' The Russian policy is well summarized by Hoagland. He wrote:

Russia is not moving militarily to reimpose its rule or to challenge Baltic sovereignty. The game here is far more subtle: *Moscow hopes to squeeze the three small republics into acknowledging Russian hegemony in economic, military and political matters*—and to achieve Western acquiescence in return for letting NATO expansion move ahead smoothly.[17] [emphasis added]

In August 1939, Stalin had an enticing offer for Hitler: in return for ''non-aggression'' and the opening to him of Western and Central Poland, the Baltic states would be assigned to the Soviet ''sphere of influence'' (essence of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact). According to Hoagland's August 4, 1996, column, President Clinton, as a democratically elected leader, justly rejected the price of Russian acquiescence in NATO's first round enlargement as being ''too high.'' Nonetheless, on September 27, 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry was reported as having stated ''that the Baltic States would not be among the first new members of NATO because their military forces are now unable to fulfill the responsibilities of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which include the ability to respond with force to an armed attack on a member country. The answer to the Baltic states' request for admittance . . . 'is not ''no;'' it is ''not yet.'' ' ''[18] Informed Balts have also complained that officials in the U.S. Department of State at one time appear to have accepted the exaggerated Russian argument that Lithuania could never be admitted into NATO as

long as the Lithuanian government did not fully control its territory, or as long as Russian troops had transit rights through Lithuania to Kaliningrad. In fact, the transit regime is under effective Lithuanian control.[19]

OTHER PROPOSALS

The danger to the Baltic states to be effectively left outside of NATO either until the negotiation of the second tranche or perhaps forever is well addressed in the comprehensive, nuanced, thoughtful article by Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick of the RAND Corporation, which may be the public summary of a still-confidential U.S. interagency ''Baltic Strategy'' paper that is mentioned in Hoagland's August 4, 1996, column. Asmus and Nurick warn: ''The Baltic states themselves would have to realise that any attempt to blackmail or shame the West into giving a security guarantee which it is not yet prepared to give will only backfire.''[20] They recommend that European Union and NATO membership for those states should come, if at all, as a package—which is, of course, the counsel of perfection and probably unattainable. A more realistic solution would be a quick extension of European Union membership to Estonia alone, at the same time Poland is admitted into NATO, on the reasoning that the Russians are interested in eventually gaining admission to the EU themselves, that they regard the Baltic states as a bridgehead into that economic and political organization and would not, therefore, block their intermediary for admission to the EU. On the other hand, Estonia is not as much of an economic competitor to Western European countries as is, for instance, Poland: it does not grow exportable tomatoes on a large scale. In this volume, it is impossible to do full justice to Asmus's and Nurick's insights and arguments. In essence, they point out that the Baltic states may have lost their battle for admission to NATO in the first round, not only because of Russian opposition on a range of issues that have been deliberately blown out of proportion (such as the relatively harsh, but deserved, treatment of the Russian minorities, who are substantial in Latvia and Estonia) but also because the Baltic states, unlike Poland, have not acquired the diplomatic patronage of Germany. Furthermore, the Nordic states in Europe, who have become the immediate geopolitical beneficiaries of the independence of the Baltic states, have not yet coordinated their own security policies. Little Denmark, a member of NATO, has been a staunch advocate of the early admission of the Baltic states; Norway, also a NATO member, has been reticent, while Sweden and Finland, who are more sympathetic to the Balts' concerns, are themselves in the delicate process of abandoning neutrality and joining the WEU and NATO in the foreseeable future.

To cut through the Gordian knot of Asmus's and Nurick's veritable web of conterarguments, Lithuanian Ambassador Česlovas V. Stankev-

ičius, who headed the Lithuanian State Delegation in negotiations with Russia during the period 1991–1993, has forcefully proposed a strategic endgame, which would have immediately designated the Baltic states as full-fledged candidates for NATO admission, albeit at a later date. He says that a clear line should be drawn between Central and East European states, including the Balts and other Eastern Europeans. In his words,

Some of the Eastern European states—Belarus, Moldova and even Ukraine— have strong economic and political links with Russia through joint institutions of CIS. At the same time, there is a like-minded group of Central and Eastern European countries which are seeking to integrate into the European Union, NATO and other Western structures. This group of C & EE countries can be regarded as a unified region of Europe.[21]

While Russia and Ukraine are to be given enhanced relationships with NATO, full NATO membership should be extended to the unified region. ''In the first instance, all the C & EE states of the unified region that are candidates for NATO membership should be invited to begin direct discussions on membership. . . . From the outset of the negotiating process, all the countries of the C & EE unified region seeking membership should be considered in the same perspective of 'participating in negotiations.' ''[22]

   This is a very good argument that tries to forestall the danger of the Baltic states being negotiated out of any realistic admission to NATO, while the negotiations with Russia ostensibly deal only with the position of the *first tranche* states. (Neither Surikov, nor Karaganov, and certainly not Yeltsin–Primakov have given up effective hegemony over the relatively small Baltic states!) At the same time, as I will try to show later, Ambassador Stankievičius may have been too restrictive in leaving out Ukraine, which is different from the smaller Belarus and Moldova: Ukraine is increasingly showing its intentions of joining the European political and security structures and of gradually withdrawing from the CIS. Ukraine is a somewhat reluctant bride, to be sure, but in her dowry is a much larger military force than could ever be marshalled by the Baltic states.

   Finally, two brief arguments follow from two American advocates of rapid NATO enlargement who, to a different degree perhaps, are mindful of the interests of the Baltic states. First, Peter W. Rodman, a former White House and State Department official and at present the Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, like Dr. Kissinger and others, has been impatient with the delays in admitting the first candidates to NATO that lead to more discussions with the Russians, which tend to jeopardize the admission of the first

candidates and also tend to undercut the consolidation of the U.S. victory in the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1991. He offers an interesting suggestion for accelerating the admission process, if Moscow ''shoots the hostages'' or mistreats the states that are not admitted to NATO in the first round:

Moscow needs to understand that if it threatens the Balts or Ukrainians or others, the curtain will come down: NATO enlargement will *accelerate*; no restraints on NATO's military dispositions, nuclear or conventional, will apply; relations with the West (including economic) will go down the drain; and Russia's self-isolation will be complete. Countries not admitted into NATO in the first wave will not, by definition, have the Alliance's most solemn defense commitment, but NATO's declaratory policy *must* make clear to the Russians that their bullying of these states will be taken as an intention to destabilize Europe, and that the West will react accordingly.[23] [emphasis in the original]

These are strong sentiments that beg, however, the question of whether there is a united West or a United States strong enough to carry Germany, France and Great Britain with it on a well-thought-out and well-coordinated policy toward Russia.

Second, *New York Times* columnist William Safire, while acknowledging the worsening prospects for NATO enlargement in the United States (''isolationists now have strange bedfellows: many members of the Council on Foreign Relations and their media acolytes,'' who feel that the enlargement ''would be unduly humiliating to the new Russia''), nonetheless comes out for ''damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!'' Specifically, he suggests that ''as Germany sponsors Poland, France sponsors Romania, Italy sponsors Slovenia, *we can sponsor the Baltic three*—with ultimate membership determined by democratic stability, not by Russian threats'' (emphasis added).[24] Safire would explicitly have the the three Baltic states declared as NATO applicants at the crucial July 1997 meeting. This is an even bolder suggestion than that of Ambassador Stankievičius's, and it eliminates the cardinal weakness of the lack of a major sponsor that was pointed out by Asmus and Nurick. But Asmus and Nurick suggested a European sponsor, preferably Germany, which for a strange reason has not played an active role in the northern sector.

To conclude, the Balts have morally earned the support of the large European powers and of the United States, who did not recognize their incorporation from 1940 until 1991. But neither did the United States recognize Lithuania's independence in March 1990, when it counted most. Will the United States go against Russian interests in the Baltics in 1997 and 1998?

NOTES

1. ''NATO in the Baltics,'' *Washington Times*, October 23, 1996, p. A13. This determination is also the prime reason why on January 16, 1998, President Clinton signed with the three Baltic presidents ''A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania.'' On that, see Chapter 5.

2. Ibid.

3. To be more precise, in 1996 15.7 percent ''strongly agreed'' with the statement that Estonia should join NATO and 25.4 percent ''agreed somewhat,'' whereas 9.2 percent ''disagreed somewhat'' and 11.9 percent ''disagreed strongly.'' In addition, 25.4 percent ''neither agreed nor disagreed,'' and 18.8 percent made no statement at all, possibly because they did not know. If the 18.8 percent effective nonrespondents are excluded, the number of supporters will exceed the majority. The total number asked in face-to-face interviews was 2,018, between April 22 and May 16, 1996. The poll was conducted for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. These and similar poll data from the Baltic countries (notes 3 through 7) are used with permission of InterMedia (Global Audience and Market Research) of Washington, DC.

4. More precise 1996 poll data on joining NATO for Latvia were as follows: 18.7 percent ''strongly agreed'' and 18.9 percent ''agreed somewhat,'' whereas 9.4 percent ''disagreed somewhat'' and 12.3 percent ''disagreed strongly.'' Additionally, 16.6 percent ''neither agreed nor disagreed,'' and as many as 24.2 percent made no statement at all. The total number polled was 2,063 (April 21– May 16, 1996). Results have been weighted by sex, nationality, urban residence and education.

5. More precise 1996 poll data on joining NATO for Lithuania were: 19.8 percent ''strongly agreed'' and 22.8 percent ''agreed somewhat,'' whereas 5.7 percent ''disagreed somewhat'' and 4.7 percent ''strongly disagreed.'' Additionally, 25.0 percent ''neither agreed nor disagreed,'' and 21.9 percent gave no statement. The total number polled was 2,003 (April 28–May 19, 1996). Results have been weighted by age, sex, education and nationality.

6. More precise 1997 poll data on joining NATO for Lithuania were: 19.3 percent ''strongly agreed'' and 21.7 percent ''agreed somewhat,'' whereas 7.7 percent ''disagreed somewhat'' and 8.2 percent ''strongly disagreed.'' Additionally, 16.5 percent ''neither agreed nor disagreed,'' which is a sharp drop from the 25.0 percent in 1996, and 26.6 percent made no statement at all (May 1997).

7. More precise 1997 poll data on joining NATO for Latvia were: 19.2 percent ''strongly agreed'' and 18.4 percent ''agreed somewhat,'' whereas 10.2 percent ''disagreed somewhat'' and 12.9 percent ''strongly disagreed.'' Additionally, 16.2 percent ''neither agreed nor disagreed,'' and 23.1 percent gave no statement at all. The total number polled was 2,018, during May–June 1997.

8. Daniel Williams, ''Foreign Journal: Touring Lithuania's Hard Times Museum,'' *Wash. Post*, January 19, 1998, p. A27.

9. For the original, see *Nezavisimaya gazeta* [Independent Newspaper], Moscow, May 23, 1996; Appendix *NG-Stsenarii* [NG-Scenarios], pp. 4–5. Major excerpts were translated into English, with an introduction, in Scott Parrish, ''Will

the Soviet Union Be Reborn?'' *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 15 (July 26, 1996), pp. 32–35, 62. For a different, benign interpretation of the Karaganov Report, see Stephen Sestanovich, ''Geotherapy: Russia's Neuroses, and Ours,'' *National Interest*, no. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 8–9. Neither Richard Pipes nor Mikhail Alexseev, in their letters to the editor (*National Interest*, no. 46 [Winter 1996/1997], pp. 91–93) have agreed with that interpretation, nor do I. It is of piquant interest to students of American foreign policy making under President Clinton that despite some opposition by Baltic and non-Baltic groups in the United States, in November 1997 Dr. Sestanovich was appointed U.S. Ambassador to the ex-Soviet Newly Independent States (NIS).

10. ''Washington Whispers: Back in the USSR,'' *U.S. News & World Report*, November 13, 1995, pp. 37–38. See also the major article by Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, ''NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States,'' *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 137, and p. 141, note 19, which identifies the institutional sponsor of the Surikov Report as the Institute of Defense Studies in Moscow.

11. ''Washington Whispers,'' p. 37.

12. ''Will the Soviet Union Be Reborn?,'' pp. 5/33. First figure refers to Russian original, second to Parrish's translation, which has been used in the text. All decimal numbers and points from Russian original.

13. Ibid., pp. 5/34.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 5/35.

16. Jim Hoagland, ''Fight for the Baltics,'' *Wash. Post*, August 4, 1996, p. C7 (op-ed., ''Outlook Section'').

17. Ibid.

18. Saulius Girnius, ''Looking at Russia: Restraint and Resentment from the Baltic States,'' *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 23 (November 15, 1996), p. 19. After the Baltic Ministers of Defense objected to Secretary Perry's statement, he wrote them a letter, dated October 3, 1996, arguing that his remarks had been misinterpreted: ''The Balts are fully eligible for NATO membership, and . . . I look forward to the day when each country is a member. . . . In particular, I reject—and the U.S. rejects—any idea that the Baltic countries are excluded a priori, or that any non-NATO country has a veto over their aspirations—whether de jure or de facto.'' Secretary Perry, as quoted by Girnius, ''Looking at Russia.''

19. Comments on this paper made by Vytautas [Victor] V. Klemas, College of Marine Studies, University of Delaware.

20. Asmus & Nurick, ''NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States,'' p. 134.

21. Česlovas V. Stankevičius, ''NATO Enlargement and the Indivisibility of Security in Europe: A View from Lithuania,'' *NATO Review*, vol. 44, no. 5 (September 1996), pp. 21–22.

22. Ibid, p. 25.

23. Peter W. Rodman, ''NATO Looks East: How to Talk to the Russians about NATO Enlargement and Peace in Europe,'' *National Review*, vol. 48, no. 13 (July 15, 1996), p. 38.

24. William Safire, ''NATO: Bigger Is Better,'' *N.Y. Times*, December 16, 1996, p. A15 (op-ed).

Chapter 3

NATO in Ukraine

Two days after President Clinton's speech on NATO enlargement, the always-witty Jane Perlez published an exposé on Ukraine in which she quoted the Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko [Hryshchenko] to the effect that his country was pursuing both a special understanding between Ukraine and NATO and a solid relationship between Russia and NATO. Said Hryshchenko, ''We don't want to be in the middle of uncertainty. We don't want to be left at the borders of a NATO which might become an adversary of Russia.'' Perlez continued,

If being positioned between Russia and potential NATO countries makes for a tricky balancing act for Ukraine, Washington officials say they also have a difficult task in defining their relations with Ukraine.

On one hand, *Washington has made it clear that Ukrainian membership in NATO is out of the question, a State Department official said*. But on the other hand, the United States would like to make Ukraine feel as secure as possible while ''sitting nervously on the edge of a menacing Russia.''

The official said Washington understood Ukraine's desire for a ''warm and fuzzy'' relationship with NATO that would be close enough to ward off any Russian designs but not so close as to antagonize Moscow.[1] [emphasis added]

Now, if there is one thing that many students of Ukrainian affairs and some statesmen have learned, it is to avoid making absolute statements with respect to Ukraine. ''Ukrainian membership in NATO is out of the question'' does sound peremptorily categorical, but so did the dire warning by one American president on August 1, 1991, to not become independent. Less than three weeks later, with or without the tacit help of

Gorbachev, who, by the way, is a half-Ukrainian masquerading as a Russian, a group of conservatives tried to declare a state of emergency throughout the Soviet Union in order to stop it from unravelling. On August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament declared independence, and on December 26, 1991, the United States recognized it as being willy-nilly—so much for an independent Ukraine "being out of the question."

UKRAINIANS—WHO ARE THEY?

To paraphrase another cliché, Who *are* those Ukrainians and what *do* they want? Even native Ukrainians are frequently exasperated when they try to answer those two questions. The Ukrainians are an ancient people of at least 47 million worldwide, or as many as 59 million, if all of their descendants are counted. More to the point, in today's Ukraine, out of some 51.3 million total population (as of January 1, 1996), ethnic Ukrainians, according to the last Soviet population census of January 1989, number approximately 73 percent and Russians 22 percent, or 37 and 11 million, respectively. The census may have overstated the extent of linguistic and political assimilation, or it may not have. A new census should be held in Ukraine within two years.

The Ukrainians' period of historic glory was in the Middle Ages, when Kyiv [Kiev] was the capital of the Kievan Rus'. By the fourteenth century, the Ukrainians lost independent statehood, insofar as it is possible at all to speak of independent nation-states in the Middle Ages. For about two centuries, until 1569, Ukrainians enjoyed political autonomy in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had succeeded to parts of the Kievan Rus'. In the modern period, Ukrainian Cossacks and burghers enjoyed a measure of political autonomy, first under the Poles and then under the Russians, which ended at the close of the eighteenth century, when Eastern Ukraine became a province of Russia and Western Ukraine (more exactly, Eastern Galicia) became part of the Hapsburg Empire. Like the Poles, the Baltic states and Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainians tried to become independent after World War I. But unlike the Poles, the Lithuanians and others, they failed.

The interwar period is crucial for an understanding of modern Ukrainian nationhood. Under the Soviet regime, the majority of the Ukrainians was first given a measure of autonomy—very narrow in politics, but relatively broad in linguistic and cultural matters. Then, from 1930 through 1939, they were subjected to both physical and cultural genocide, which cost the lives of at least seven million Eastern Ukrainians and led to widespread linguistic assimilation among those that had been spared. Meanwhile, the Western Ukrainians under Poland, a minority of all of the Ukrainians, were predominantly treated as disloyal Polish cit-

izens who refused to assimilate. (A small but growing number, particularly among the youth, were not only disloyal but came under the influence of German secret agents, both under the Weimar Republic and under Hitler.) Interwar Poland being an essentially democratic country; Ukrainian nationalism, both moderate and radical, reached a high pitch. In an act of hubris, in August 1939, Stalin and Hitler not only partitioned the interwar Polish state, but Stalin annexed the highly nationalistic Galician Ukrainians to the seriously wounded and dispirited Eastern Ukrainians, thereby uniting and consolidating the modern Ukrainian nation. In 1991, it was this nation that brought about the disestablishment of the Soviet Union, after the Ukrainian independence referendum of December 1, 1991, when 90.3 percent voted for Ukrainian independence and 61.6 percent voted for the first Ukrainian president, Leonid M. Kravchuk, who was from Western Ukraine, though not from Galicia proper.

In June 1997, the usually pro-Yeltsin Russian weekly *Argumenty i Fakty* [Arguments and Facts] printed a very revealing interview on present Ukrainian–Russian relations with two Russian opinion makers, one of whom was Andranik Migranyan, a well-known member of Yeltsin's Presidential Council and a strong Russian patriot. An excerpt follows:

AiF: Why is it . . . that a former ''fraternal'' republic is fleeing away from us for dear life, like Satan at a whiff of frankincense [*kak chert ot ladana*]? Is it only because of our weakness?

Migranyan: West Ukraine occupies only 15 percent of the total territory of the country. But it dominates in the political elite, in the press. ''The Westerners'' ''don't give a hoot'' that the Lviv bus factory has been ''laid on its back.'' This is because for them the creation of a national state on an anti-Russian platform is more important than a thousand economic problems. And they will wait for another 100 years, *but will solve those problems sooner with the help of the West*, before they come to kowtow before us.

In Ukraine they have an idea what they want and with whom, whereas in Russia there is every man for himself [*razdray*].[2] [emphasis added]

Coming from a Russian Armenian, this is not a bad characteristic of Western Ukrainians, even though it may have been somewhat exaggerated for emphasis.

Furthermore, to complete the historical vignette and interpretation, immediately after World War II, West Ukrainian guerrillas, like the Lithuanians, had fought the new regime until the early 1950s. (This time, the radical nationalists in West Ukraine were, on a small scale, supported by Britain and the United States.) Beginning in the 1960s, Ukrainians engaged in determined political opposition to the Soviet regime, like the Balts. Similar to Lithuania, Western Ukrainians rallied around the un-

derground Catholic Church, which immediately guaranteed a popular
mass basis to the political opposition of the elite. (The formal dissolution
of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and its absorption by the Russian Or-
thodox Church was Stalin's second greatest blunder; Gorbachev undid
it in 1989—much too late.) In sum, however weak the Ukrainians had
been at the conclusion of World War I, they grew rapidly in national
consciousness and determination after World War II. Stalin both killed
and then united and consolidated a stronger Ukrainian nation: this is
what I mean by saying that they were both victims and beneficiaries of
the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (they lost the relatively powerless Polish
overlords and passed under the much harsher Soviet taskmasters, but
they did so together).[3]

To return to the problem of NATO: Is modern Ukraine ''of Europe''?
In a way, Ukraine never left Europe. No less a European statesman than
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said in September 1996: ''Kyiv [Kiev]
and Lviv are as European cities as are Warsaw, Berlin and Paris.'' [4] Kohl
said in the same speech:

To a future European order belong, in equal measure, stable, [universally] rec-
ognized frontiers and the comprehensive protection of minorities. In this order
nobody can now question the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
In this context I would like to add the following: No state can prescribe another
state whether the latter can or cannot join an alliance. Likewise, no state has the
right to treat another state as a kind of security glacis. Whoever does this, thinks
in the obsolete categories of a system of European powers [*eines vergangenen
europeaischen Maechtesystems*].[5]

The Chancellor's speech does not automatically imply Germany's un-
conditional support against strong Russian opposition, but it does show
Kohl's perception of Ukraine being ''of Europe,'' rather than ''in Eu-
rope.'' At the same time, the caution of both the Ukrainian people and
the elites not to burn all of their bridges with Russia before being for-
mally admitted to European political and security structures is a fact—
it is markedly in contrast to the single-minded determination of the Poles
and the Lithuanians to become an active member of NATO, the Euro-
pean Union and other structures. As I read Kohl's speech, it is a subtle
nudge for the Ukrainians to move West, where they really belong by
history and culture.

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ABOUT NATO

Public opinion polls conducted among the general population and
among the elite in Ukraine and Poland show a major contrast in atti-
tudes. In 1996, in Ukraine, about 24 percent of the people and 44 percent

of the elite were in favor of joining NATO now or in the near future, whereas 24 percent of the people and 41 percent of the elite were opposed.[6] In Poland, roughly corresponding figures were as follows: 71 percent of the general population was for admission to NATO, as was 92 percent of the elite. Only 4 percent of the general Polish population and 5 percent of the elite were opposed.[7] Does this mean that the Ukrainians are absolutely against Europe? Not necessarily. In 1995, 51 percent of the nationwide respondents and, in 1996, as many as 89 percent of the elite in Ukraine advocated rapid joining of the ''European community,'' while 4 percent of the people and 3 percent of the elite were opposed.[8] It is not clear, however, what exactly was meant by ''European community''—the very exclusive European Union or the more open Council of Europe, where Ukraine was accepted in November 1995, even before Russia? Comparable data from Poland were 72 percent of the nationwide sample in 1995 for, with 2 percent opposed; and 96 percent among the elite for, and 1 percent opposed.[9] The figures in Lithuania for entry into NATO were somewhat lower than those in Poland (Poland, allegedly, has been gripped by ''NATO-mania''),[10] but higher than those in Ukraine.

Some public opinion polls in Ukraine show that there is a growing acceptance of the idea of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. Those figures, while still much below comparable Polish ones, are approaching the level of pro-NATO sentiment in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. On May 6, 1997, on the eve of NATO Secretary–General Solana's one-day visit to Ukraine to open an official NATO Documentation and Information Center in Kyiv, the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN announced that 37 percent of the people in Ukraine were in favor of joining NATO, 28 percent were opposed and 34 percent were undecided.[11] Another poll, which had been conducted in December 1996, found that ''36 percent of Ukrainians [favored] NATO membership, with 15 percent saying as soon as possible and 21 percent favoring Ukraine's joining the alliance at a later date.'' At that time, 19 percent said that Ukraine should not become a member and as many as 45 percent were undecided. Younger Ukrainians, university graduates and supporters of private enterprise tended to be strongly in favor of NATO.[12]

The Ukrainian poll, which was publicized on May 6, 1997, and which may have been taken earlier, comes very close to the poll figures from the Czech Republic in March 1997. At that time, only 40 percent of the respondents favored admission to NATO, 29 percent were opposed and 31 percent did not know. Christine Spolar wrote, ''In fact, ambivalence about NATO in the Czech Republic is surprisingly deep.''[13] Comparable figures from Hungary, from a Gallup poll taken in the same month, showed 47 percent in favor of joining NATO, 27 percent opposed and 26 percent undecided. Those in Poland, from a poll taken by the Center

for Public Opinion Research, also in March 1997, were much higher than those in the other two prime-candidate states: 88 percent in favor, 3 percent opposed and 9 percent did not know.[14] Later public opinion polls in the Czech Republic, whose date was not given, however, show increasing support for NATO: 50 percent in favor and 26 percent opposed, as conducted by Factum poll.[15] If popular support for NATO was the main criterion for admission, the Ukrainians need not give up hope: as late as March 1997, Czech society was also deeply divided about NATO, yet the Czech Republic has remained a prime candidate.

To continue our survey of public opinion polls in Ukraine, in the first half of 1997, 26 percent of the respondents in a nationwide poll and as many as 57 percent in an elite poll said that Ukraine should join NATO, while 29 percent in the nationwide poll and 34 percent in the elite poll were opposed. Over one-third (35 percent) of the respondents in the nationwide poll did not give any statement. In rough terms, between 1996 and 1997, this constitutes a slight increase of NATO supporters in the nationwide poll (from 24 to 26 percent), but an even greater increase among the opponents in the nationwide poll (from 24 to 29 percent).

The relatively low figure of NATO supporters in the May–June 1997 nationwide poll, which was commissioned by InterMedia, was caused at least partly by a change in the wording of the question and the requested responses. Unlike the nationwide poll in 1995, which allowed for ''softer'' answers (join NATO ''now,'' ''in 5 years' time'' and ''in 10 years' time'') and then provided 28.4 percent in support, both the 1996 and 1997 polls called for ''harder'' responses to the statement ''Ukraine should join NATO,'' namely, ''Strongly agree'' and ''Agree somewhat.'' Partly as a result of the change in wording, the favorable nationwide responses were 24.3 percent in 1996 and 26 percent in 1997. In the nationwide poll, respondents, who did not answer quickly, had their hesitation coded by the interviewer as ''not stated.''[16] It should be noted, however, that support for joining the European Union in Ukraine was greater: in 1997, among the elite it was 94 percent, which compared favorably with 89 percent in 1996.

To realistically gauge the popular and elite strength for joining NATO and the European Union, Tables 3.1 through 3.6 will present detailed breakdowns according to region and nationality.

From Table 3.1 it appears that there are substantial differences among the various regions in the number of respondents in the nationwide poll who favor joining NATO. In Western Ukraine, in which the ethnic Ukrainians are particularly strong, the supporters' figures approach those in the Czech Republic (43 percent for, with 30 percent being strongly in favor of joining and 13 favoring accession to NATO somewhat). In Western Ukraine, only 14 percent in the nationwide poll were opposed (7 percent somewhat and 7 percent strongly). In the Crimea,

Table 3.1
Popular Support for NATO in Ukraine, 1997, by Region[a]

	Total	Central	Eastern	Southern	Crimea	Western
Number of Respondents (N)	2,134	811[b]	445	287	110	481
"Ukraine should join NATO":						
Strongly agree	16	15	8	11	7	30
Agree somewhat	10	10	7	14	5	13
Neither agree nor disagree	9	8	8	19	6	6
Disagree somewhat	7	8	4	10	14	7
Strongly disagree	22	20	40	19	38	7
Not stated or no answer	35	38	33	27	29	38

Notes: [a]All the figures in this and the following five tables—except for the absolute figures marked N—are in percentages.
[b]Weighted figures.
Source: The nationwide survey was commissioned by InterMedia and carried out by the International Institute of Sociology, Kyiv, between May 1 and June 18, 1997. Used with permission of InterMedia.

however, with its conservative Russian ethnic majority, only 12 percent were in favor of joining NATO (7 percent strongly and 5 percent somewhat), whereas as many as 52 percent were opposed (14 percent somewhat and 38 percent strongly). The most important region is the Central one, because it also includes the nation's capital, Kyiv. In the Central region, 25 percent were in favor of joining NATO (15 percent strongly and 10 percent somewhat), while 28 percent were opposed (8 percent somewhat and 20 percent strongly).

Behind the regional differences may lie ethnic differences, though the really decisive cause may be, as told to me by a high-ranking Ukrainian diplomat, not ethnic background as such, but membership in certain political parties. It so happens that nonethnic Ukrainian citizens are more strongly represented in some of the Leftist anti-NATO parties. In any case, detailed figures from Table 3.2 show that in the nationwide poll there is a sharp division between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Whereas 28 percent of the ethnic Ukrainians want Ukraine to join NATO (17 percent strongly and 11 percent somewhat), only 19 percent of the ethnic Russians want to do so (11 percent strongly and 8 percent somewhat). It is also interesting that of the Jewish respondents, as many as

Table 3.2
Popular Support for NATO in Ukraine, 1997, by Ethnic Background or Nationality

	Total	Ukrainian	Russian	Belarussian	Jewish	Other	Not Stated
N	2,134	1,618	402	18	11	79	6
"Ukraine should join NATO":							
Strongly agree	16	17	11	15	24	13	0
Agree somewhat	10	11	8	11	19	7	0
Neither agreee nor disagree	9	9	10	7	16	11	0
Disagree somewhat	7	7	9	5	0	12	0
Strongly disagree	22	19	33	32	24	22	43
Not stated	35	37	28	30	17	36	57

Source and Notes: As under Table 3.1. Used with permission of InterMedia.

43 percent, or a higher figure than among the ethnic Ukrainians, want to join NATO (24 percent strongly and 19 percent somewhat). On the other hand, among the NATO opponents ethnic Russians also stand out: whereas 26 percent opposed joining NATO among the ethnic Ukrainians (7 percent somewhat and 19 percent strongly), among the ethnic Russians the overall number of NATO's opponents was 42 percent (33 percent strongly and 9 percent somewhat). It should also be noted that among the Jewish respondents, the total percentage of NATO opponents (24 percent) was smaller than among the ethnic Ukrainians (26 percent), even though all of the Jewish repondents were strong in their opposition (there were no "disagree somewhat" responses among them).

The February 1997 elite poll on joining NATO also showed major differences among the regions (see Table 3.3). Western Ukrainian elite members were overwhelmingly in favor of joining NATO: 49 percent wanted to join now, 30 percent in 5 years' time and 5 percent in 10 years' time, or a total of 84 percent. Those figures are almost in the general Polish range of support. In the Southern region, however, which, in the elite poll, included the Crimea, only 54 percent were in favor (18 percent "now," 16 percent "in 5 years' time" and 20 percent in "10 years' time"). The Central region, which includes the Kyiv officialdom, had a total majority of 61 percent for joining NATO and 30 percent against.

Table 3.3
Elite Support for NATO in Ukraine, 1997, by Region

	Total	Western	Central	Southern	Central-Eastern
N[a]	400	43[b]	212	44	101
"When, if ever, do you think Ukraine should become a member of NATO? Should it become a member . . .":					
Now	28	49	29	18	20
In 5 years' time	20	30	23	16	13
In 10 years' time	9	5	9	20	6
Later	9	2	9	9	13
Never	34	14	30	36	49

Notes: [a]N stands for absolute number of respondents. All the other figures are in percentages.
[b]Weighted figures.
Source: The elite survey was commissioned by InterMedia and carried out by USM [Ukrainian Surveys and Market Research], Kyiv, between March 3 and April 19, 1997. Used with permission of InterMedia.

Finally, the most dramatic difference among the elite respondents is found in the breakdown by nationality (see Table 3.4): whereas 64 percent of the ethnic Ukrainian elite were in favor of joining NATO, only 40 percent of the ethnic Russian elite were. Resolutely opposed to NATO were 28 percent of the ethnic Ukrainian elite, but as many as 50 percent of the ethnic Russian elite in Ukraine. Jewish elite members were almost as pro-NATO (60 percent) as were ethnic Ukrainian elite members, and there were slightly fewer Jewish elite opposed to NATO compared to the ethnic Ukrainian elite (27 percent to 28 percent).

The next two tables (3.5 and 3.6) show that Ukraine's entry into the European Union is much less controversial among the elite than its possible entry into NATO. There also is the gratifying but surprising figure of as many as 97 percent of the elite in the Southern region wanting to join the European Union now. The explanation for the latter lies in the thinking in cosmopolitan and progressive Odessa, Ukraine's largest seaport.

To conclude our discussion of the polls, even in 1997 there was considerable opposition in Ukraine to joining NATO, particularly among the

Table 3.4
Elite Support for NATO in Ukraine, 1997, by Ethnic Background or Nationality

	Total	Ukrainian	Russian	Belarussian	Jewish	Other
N	400	253	118	3	15	11
"When, if ever, do you think Ukraine should become a member of NATO? Should it become a member . . .":						
Now	28	33	13	33	27	64
In 5 years' time	20	24	13	33	20	9
In 10 years' time	9	7	14	0	13	18
Later	9	8	11	0	13	9
Never	34	28	50	33	27	0

Source and Notes: As under Table 3.3. Used with permission of InterMedia.

people at large, as opposed to the elite, and most strongly among the residents of the Crimea and ethnic Russians in general. The opposition does not extend to the less controversial idea of joining the European Union.

INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS ABOUT NATO

The overall results of these polls, particularly the earlier ones, have been confirmed by interviews with three Ukrainian defense experts (one private, two associated with the official National Institute for Strategic Studies) in Kyiv in early September 1996,[17] as well as by cautious statements of two Ukrainian members of Parliament, made to me at the same time. The three defense experts, almost unanimously, concentrated on the difficulties of Ukraine abandoning the neutral, or "nonbloc" status that had been proclaimed to the world by then-Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) on July 16, 1990 (the so-called State Sovereignty or, de facto, political autonomy, Declaration, while the Soviet Union was still in existence). One of the experts told me how anxious former President Kravchuk had been during the first visit to Ukraine of the late NATO Secretary General Dr. Manfred Woerner. His staff inquired about whether this would not forever spoil Ukraine's relations with Russia. The problem was solved by giving relatively low publicity to that visit.

Table 3.5
Elite Support for the European Union in Ukraine, 1997, by Region

	Total	Western	Central	Southern	Central-Eastern
N	400	43	212	44	101
"When, if ever, do you think Ukraine should become a member of the European Union? Should it become a member . . .":					
Now	70	72	63	97	69
In 5 years' time	16	7	18	3	25
In 10 years' time	8	11	11	0	6
Later	3	2	5	0	1
Never	3	8	3	0	0

Source and Notes: As under Table 3.3. Used with permission of InterMedia.

It was also mentioned that whereas in October 1991 Russia secretly re-solved not to integrate the republics that were already falling apart but concentrate on the building of a strong Russian nation-state, Ukraine "spoiled" relations with its big neighbor by making overtures to the West immediately after the overwhelming independence referendum of December 1991. Russia could have subjugated Ukraine by "legal and political means" by having its supporters organize and win the refer-endum on confidence in President Kravchuk in 1993, but accepted the cancellation of that referendum and waited until the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994, which resulted in a Leftist and poten-tially pro-Russian plurality in Parliament and the replacement of Presi-dent Kravchuk by President Leonid D. Kuchma, who in 1994 was considered pro-Russian. Two of the experts, while justly deploring the economic damage that accompanied independence, painted what to me was an excessively rosy scenario of gradual detachment from Russia over twenty years, a kind of "soft friendly divorce," which is really an oxy-moron. Another interesting idea that was expressed was that in any rap-prochement to European structures, Ukraine would face competition from southern-tier states such as Spain, Portugal and Italy, which do not want their old subsidies from the northern EU–NATO states to now be channelled to East Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland and

Table 3.6
**Elite Support for the European Union in Ukraine, 1997, by Ethnic
Background or Nationality**

	Total	Ukrainian	Russian	Belarussian	Jewish	Other
N	400	253	118	3	15	11
"When, if ever, do you think Ukraine should become a member of the European Union? Should it become a member . . .":						
Now	70	76	61	64	56	33
In 5 years' time	16	16	14	36	31	0
In 10 years' time	8	6	10	0	13	67
Later	3	2	5	0	0	0
Never	3	0	10	0	0	0

Source and Notes: As under Table 3.3. Used with permission of InterMedia.

Ukraine, of course. Above all, Ukraine should not frighten Russia before
Europe becomes ready to accept Ukraine.

In Andriy Sobolev's major article on Ukraine and NATO, some of the
traditional objections against Ukrainian membership in NATO are voiced
both comprehensively and forcefully. Ukraine is in a difficult, unstable
situation: in its defense policy its orientation is westward (Ukraine has
refused to enter the collective security pact of CIS), but its economic ties
are predominantly with Russia (40 percent of Russian exports go to
Ukraine, and 44 percent of the Ukrainian exports go to Russia). Any
tearing asunder of those economic ties would have catastrophic conse-
quences. In his words,

The decision to enlarge NATO eastward will become a catalyst for active geo-
political shifts, the consequences of which will not only return us to the "cold
war" from the 1960s to the 1980s, but will, possibly, lead to the use of military
force. As far as Ukraine's geostrategic position is concerned, its role in such a
development will become most unenviable, because Ukraine will find itself in
the center of two opposing sides and its territory will become a theater of their
military operations.[18]

By implication, Sobolev rejects the official Ukrainian policy of pursuing a neutral, nonbloc status in the friction between the United States and Russia. But if you cannot maintain perfect balance, which way do you tilt? In his words,

It is in the interests of Ukraine, despite its consistent pursuit of neutrality, to support Russia's initiative (as expressed by its President B[oris] Yeltsin during his trip to participate in the jubilee session of the UN in October [1995]) to transform, as a matter of [urgent] necessity, the North-Atlantic Alliance into a general European security structure.[19]

This new structure would be based on ''equal democratic partnership,'' and Ukraine would become its full-fledged member. With some reason, the article is critical of U.S. policy in Bosnia (in the late summer of 1995, we started bombing the Serbs in all seriousness, without informing the Russians beforehand, which mightily displeased Yeltsin, but eventually led the Serbs to the Dayton agreement). It reflects the thinking in some Ukrainian quarters and may have been representative of the official foreign policy of Ukraine in the second half of 1994, but no longer in 1998.

Two Ukrainian parliamentarians, both from Western Ukraine and both basically prointegration with Europe, in September 1996, were somewhat cautious when I raised the question of Ukraine's eventual membership in NATO. The question was premature, for Ukraine was not yet being threatened militarily. Ideally, Ukraine should be admitted to the European Union and to NATO at the same time. Entry into the EU was highly desired. But there were difficulties with the Europeans' reservations concerning trade, economic cooperation and investments: ''Goodness knows, to gain respect maybe we should try to get admitted to NATO first.'' Ukraine's admission to NATO would not take place before the year 2005, at the earliest. Meanwhile, Ukraine would collaborate with NATO on numerous military exercises and intensify its cooperation without openly declaring its desire to join the Alliance as a full member. Great hope was placed in the opening of a NATO information and documentation center in Kyiv.[20]

EVOLUTION IN THE VIEWS OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

The deputies' caution is understandable, not only because public and elite opinion in Ukraine is divided on the desirability of applying for full NATO membership soon but because the main foreign policymakers in Ukraine, President Kuchma, above all, have undergone an evolution from relative hostility to NATO enlargement in November 1994 to relative sympathy for the Baltic pro-NATO aspirations in May 1995.[21]

Rather significant is the evolution in the views of Borys Tarasyuk, former First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine and in 1996 Ukraine's ambassador to Belgium and NATO. In 1995, Tarasyuk gave a long interview to Monika Jung of the Open Media Research Institute (OMRI). His ideal then was an overarching European security system, which included the United States and, in Central and Eastern Europe, an ''arch of stability,'' stretching from Germany in the West to Ukraine in the East, with Poland in the middle. In his words,

a transatlantic system of security that would include all countries, without exception, under the axiom that security is indivisible. It is not possible to create a security system in which a country or a group of countries feel insecure—in such a case there will be no security. Central and Eastern Europe are crucial to an all-European system of security and stability. As long as we cannot forge stability in this part of Europe, there will be no stability for the whole of Europe—Yugoslavia unfortunately proves that. . . . If the continent is divided by an invisible line, the rich and the less rich parts of the continent will inevitably engage in conflict because there is tension.[22]

Miss Jung did not press Tarasyuk to relate his concept to that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); Tarasyuk himself did refer to the unsuccessful Ukrainian initiative of February 1993 to create a loosely organized zone of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe, which was partly taken up in the equally unsuccessful proposal by French Foreign Minister Balladur in April 1993. But Tarasyuk was asked several pointed questions about Ukraine's position toward NATO's enlargement and an eventual application of his country for full membership in that organization. He said, ''The later [the expansion], the better for Ukraine.'' One of the reasons for the desired delay, ''Not all the countries applying for NATO membership have settled their border disputes with Ukraine. [The apparent reference was to Romania.][23] It would not be acceptable to us if a country that has unsettled border problems with Ukraine were admitted to NATO.'' Officially, Ukraine was not applying to NATO because Ukraine ''is seeking a neutral and nonnuclear status and is not participating in military blocs'' (the old position from 1990). But Tarasyuk also discussed frankly the unofficial reasons.

Unofficially, in terms of internal policy, we are not yet ready for that step, nor is NATO ready to make such a decision [on Ukraine's membership]. . . . Seeking membership now would just devalue our position in Europe: the door is not opening, so why should we lose respect for ourselves and ask for membership? If we can be sure that the door will open, then we should think about [membership]. But that process will take time and we should meanwhile find a proper form of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. We are quite comfortable co-

operating with NATO through the existing mechanisms: the NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] and the Partnership for Peace Program.[24]

But in the same interview, Borys Tarasyuk left a loophole for Ukraine: if the security of that country deteriorated with unexpected suddenness, Ukraine reserved to itself the right to apply for NATO membership immediately. He correctly stated that the position of neutrality was taken when Ukraine was still trying to get out from under the Soviet Union, thus implying that the neutral stance was now obsolete.[25]

In a brief conversation with me at an international conference in Washington, DC, Ambassador Tarasyuk realistically sketched the three foremost obstacles to Ukraine being able to gain admission to NATO. First, it was necessary to overcome resistance from old NATO members. When I asked him whether political opposition to Ukraine's membership was strong in the Netherlands and Norway, he volunteered that, as he saw it, the greatest obstacle for now was France. Second, Ukraine had to overcome the determined opposition of Russia. Third, in Ukraine itself, the people had to be educated that NATO was not the enemy, as it had been presented for decades. The ambassador pinned great hopes on the work of the NATO Information Center in Kyiv, which, eventually, was established on May 7, 1997. But nowhere, neither in his brief conversation with me, nor in the extensive comments on papers delivered at the conference, did the ambassador refer to his central idea of 1995 that a restructured OSCE, perhaps a ''super-OSCE,'' was preferable to the enlargement of NATO.[26]

It would appear that since September 1995, Ukraine's official policy toward NATO is best visualized as a dual-track approach. The shorter, more visible track is to argue for a ''special relationship'' with NATO, somewhat akin to the special relationship enjoyed by Russia, albeit at a lower level (Russia, after all, remains a nuclear power, whereas Ukraine, for better or for worse, has given up its nuclear weapons). The second, longer and partly hidden track envisages an application for full NATO membership if Ukraine's geopolitical situation should deteriorate rapidly. Following the short, highly visible track, on September 14, 1995, the foreign minister of Ukraine, Hennadiy Udovenko, submitted in Brussels to NATO's secretary-general what Larrabee has aptly called ''an ambitious and far-reaching'' draft agreement on future cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. In essence, it called for ''joint co-operation in nonproliferation, arms control, defence economy, environment, and science and technology; . . . a special NATO Information Center in Kyiv, as well as establishing special joint working groups on a permanent basis; locating some permanent NATO bodies within the framework of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP [Partnership for Peace] in Kyiv, and holding occasional NACC/PfP sessions in Ukraine.''[27]

Soon after his visit, Minister of Foreign Affairs Udovenko presented his country's policy in a major article. In his words:

It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the appearance of an independent Ukrainian state with a population of 52 million proved to be one of the biggest geopolitical developments since Yalta and Potsdam. Therefore, the gradual and organic integration of Ukraine into the European and world communities as a natural and reliable democratic partner is one of the top priorities of our foreign policy.[28]

Not very concretely, Udovenko sketched a Euro-Atlantic collective security organization that would take into account the interests of Ukraine but also those of Russia. He also showed sympathy for the aspirations of Ukraine's Western neighbors to join NATO. What about Ukraine's own intentions? Here Udovenko was most diplomatic:

Ukraine, as is set out in its main legislative documents, still adheres to the policy of non-participation in military alliances and has not put the issue of NATO membership on the agenda *for the time being*.[29] [emphasis added]

Nicely, discreetly put, there is the dual-track approach again.

UKRAINE APPROACHING NATO

How far has Ukraine advanced on its short, visible track to a "special relationship" with NATO, without openly raising the question of admission? On the basis of both official documents and other, less official materials, I would say that by the end of 1996, Ukraine won largely symbolic concessions from NATO, while running into determined, real opposition from Russia. Ukraine's real position vis-à-vis NATO became somewhat less clouded, but still far from crystal clear, at the crucial NATO enlargement summit in Madrid on July 8–9, 1997. A preliminary agenda for the 1997 Madrid Summit was set at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Alliance Council, which was held at NATO headquarters on December 10, 1996. In Article 2, it called for "further developing an enhanced relationship with Ukraine." But it was perhaps more than counterbalanced by the immediately preceding commitment to Russia: "intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the Partnership for Peace by aiming at reaching an agreement at the earliest possible date on the development of a strong, stable and enduring security partnership."[30] Similarly, in Article 4, NATO is committed to "building a strong, stable and enduring security partnership with Russia; strengthening our relationship with Ukraine"—in that order.[31] Among unofficial observers, the common expectation was that a "special agree-

ment'' or even a ''Charter'' would be signed with Russia even before the Madrid Summit, which was borne out in the long, five-paragraph Article 10, with its list of particulars, which is addressed to Russia: ''Agreement might be expressed in a document or could take the form of a Charter. . . .''[32] Relations with Ukraine are dealt with in the three-paragraph Article 11, which apparently tries to strike a balance between the businesslike and the merely perfunctory, and does not quite succeed.[33] But however ambiguous, Article 11 of the Final Communique of December 10, 1996, is a vast improvement over the commentary by a high-ranking NATO official in early 1996. When Russia was making difficulties with its announced plans for participation in NATO programs, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Gebhard von Moltke, dedicated three long paragraphs to wooing Russia and one single sentence at the end to Ukraine and all of the other newly independent states. With hopefully unintended irony, the lead word to that ''also ran'' sentence was ''equally'': ''*Equally*, we want to develop further our relations with Ukraine and . . .''[34] By the time of the December 10, 1996, Ministerial Meeting, the climate for Ukraine at NATO had changed for the better: Russia was still given preference, as was its due, but no longer in such a lopsided, perfunctory, almost insulting, way as in the January 1996 article.

Even more revealing are the informal comments of a Ukrainian parliamentarian, who took part in the November 18–21, 1996, session of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), which is not an organ of NATO in the strict sense of the word but a periodic conference of parliamentarians from old NATO states and pro-NATO countries, from both members and ''members-in-waiting,'' so to speak. Ukraine is an associate member of the NAA, and one of the members of Parliament who attended the Paris meeting, the last before the crucial summit in Madrid, was the Deputy-Chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, Oleksandr Shandryuk, who shared his personal impressions with the readers of his party's newspaper. In Paris, Ukraine achieved two successes and suffered one setback. First, the special relations between NATO and Ukraine were to be written into a solemn treaty, which had greater moral and legal significance than a simple agreement. Second, the conditions for the opening of NATO's Information Center in Kyiv were made more precise. Ukraine, however, received a symbolic setback, when an obligatory invitation of Ukraine to the Madrid Summit, for which the Ukrainian delegation lobbied, was not written into the session's final protocol— allegedly the overwhelming majority of the attending delegations was in favor of Ukraine being invited to Madrid, but not to the extent of writing their support into the final protocol.[35] (Eventually, Ukraine did attend the Madrid Summit.)

Russia sent to the Assembly a very large delegation, which tried to

disrupt the agenda of the Assembly dedicated to NATO enlargement by offering endless amendments to the Final Resolution. All of the Russian ''killing amendments'' were ultimately defeated, but not before the final session of the Assembly was stretched to more than twelve hours. In an ingenious way, Russia tried to sabotage the direct negotiations between Ukraine and NATO by insisting that the new partnership be a triangular one: Brussels, Kyiv and Moscow, too. That attempt failed.

Shandryuk both praises and chides Anton Buteyko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the last Party Secretary (i.e., political control officer) of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991, a close foreign policy advisor of the first president, Kravchuk, and at the time of the North Atlantic Assembly, still a centrist deputy of the Ukrainian Parliament. Buteyko is praised because for the first time, officially speaking for Ukraine, he declared that under certain circumstances, following a deterioration of Ukraine's position, Ukraine could put the question of applying for full NATO membership on the agenda.[36] Buteyko, however, was simultaneously chided by his fellow parliamentarian for defending the Ukrainian government position that if NATO enlarges to include among its members former Warsaw Pact countries, no nuclear weapons should be stationed on their territories. This policy may have been designed to make Ukrainian nonnuclear policy more consistent, but it also helped the Russian position and would certainly undercut the Ukrainians in their standing in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. Would the Russians appreciate the nonnuclear variation of Kyiv? Hardly. But that policy did not sit well with the former president of the NAA, member of the German Bundestag, Karsten Voigt. Voigt asked Buteyko pointedly whether the Ukrainian position also envisaged the removal of Russian nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe behind the Urals, to which Buteyko was forced to reply that, on this, he did not have any official instructions.[37]

Even blunter than Shandryuk was the political columnist of a national democratic, patriotic newspaper of Ukraine in December 1996. In November 1996, he attended a briefing in the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which in semi-Delphic, but still understandable terms, Volodymyr Horbulin, the secretary of President Kuchma's National Security and Defense Council, intimated that Ukraine reserved the right to apply for NATO membership in the future.[38] At a later briefing in the Foreign Ministry in Kyiv, which was conducted by Dr. Ihor Kharchenko, director of the Ministry's Policy Analysis and Planning Department, the subject was Buteyko's special mission to Brussels, where he met with NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and with decision makers in the Belgian foreign office, and also to London, Bonn and the Hague, where in effect he presented the Ukrainian dual-track policy. Buteyko had some success. Ukraine's minimum demand, upon President Kuchma's instructions,

was to insist on a special relationship to NATO and on his country being invited to the 1997 Madrid–NATO Summit. But Kharchenko, in his briefing, also disclosed the second track: ''Ukraine does not exclude the possibility of submitting a declaration on admission to NATO.''[39]

Most important, however, the Ukrainian pro-NATO commentator points to several weaknesses in the developing Ukrainian dual-track, pro-NATO policy. First, both of those moves and NATO enlargement in general were opposed by then Socialist Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Oleksander Moroz, who was supported by the Communist and Socialist deputies. Those deputies have at least a plurality in the Parliament. Belatedly, to counter the NATO enlargement, which has become a historical fact at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, Moroz would like to convene in Kyiv a congress of all OSCE (''Helsinki Conference'') countries to set up a more perfect security organization. Moroz undoubtedly would get the support of Moscow, but may run into determined pro-NATO opposition in his own parliament in Kyiv, which could make his proposition stillborn.

More dangerous still, the columnist writes that ''in no way can President Kuchma rid himself of his ambivalence. He still continues to believe in his good and sincere friend and tsar, who will not harm Ukraine in any way.'' Without going into details, Omelchenko accuses President Kuchma of sending Buteyko to sound out the attitudes in some NATO capitals, while almost at the same time his new Minister of Defense, Oleksander Kuz'muk, is allowed to embrace his Russian counterpart and ''signs a military cooperation agreement'' with Russia. Omelchenko's column is called ''Chasing Two Hares,'' which is difficult to do, even for such an able statesman as President Kuchma. Surely the first precondition for any serious discussions of a ''special relationship'' with NATO—a relationship, moreover, that eventually could lead to full membership—would be a basic determination in Kyiv whether to look East or West.

RUSSIAN MOVES AGAINST UKRAINE

Over the years, the objectives of Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine, whether expressed in the Lukin Doctrine of January 1992,[40] the harsh Surikov Report of the fall of 1995 or the seemingly more moderate Karaganov Report of April 1996,[41] have become rather clear: to destabilize Ukraine by economic, political and diplomatic, but not necessarily military, means, and to force its government to virtually surrender Ukrainian independence to a Russian-dominated new CIS, which has already been accomplished in Belarus through Lukashenka. Larrabee wisely observed, ''Most Russians have difficulty accepting Ukraine as a truly independent country and assume that sooner or later Ukraine will

return to the Russian fold, either as a part of Russia or as part of a confederation with Belarus (and possibly Kazakhstan)."[42] The absolutely last thing Russia wants is Ukraine's effective entry into European political and security structures, such as the EU and NATO. The implementation of this policy of "integration" or, really, subjugation by hook or by crook, is sometimes rather obvious, sometimes much less so, thereby escaping the attention of the casual diplomatic observer abroad.

There is, of course, the by now somewhat repetitious story of Russian claims to Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimea, which in my view is but a wedge issue to help destroy Ukraine from the south. On October 23, 1996, the Russian State Duma, containing many opponents to President Yeltsin, by a vote of 334 to 1, declared that Sevastopol was a Russian city, and on December 5, 1996, the Russian Federation Council, which includes many of Yeltsin's friends, by a vote of 114 to 14, condemned "Ukraine's refusal to recognize Sevastopol's Russian status [*sic*]."[43] The basic treaty with Russia that was finally signed on May 31, 1997, may or may not be ratified by the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments, and it may or may not put all of those contentious issues to rest.[44]

Very ingenious, however, and not quite as obvious has been the partly successful Russian policy of blocking, or at least delaying, the building of a modern oil terminal near Odessa, to replace the old, unsafe terminal in the middle of Odessa's harbor. First there were the Russian "environmental tourists" that have been described by an unsympathetic former Odessa citizen as follows:

Russia's participation in the political intrigue around the terminal was pretty obvious. For example, groups of campers from Russia arrived at the site to live there in tents for many weeks during the summer. As they were basking in the sun, swimming and fishing at the beach, they also took turns to picket the administration offices, protesting against the terminal construction with Greenpeace signs and slogans.[45]

Not so well known was a determined and well-financed challenge in the 1994 Odessa mayoral election. Eduard Gurvits, who supported the terminal and who, by the way, is the best-known and strongest Ukrainian politician of Jewish descent, narrowly won the race against a certain Alexei Kostusev, who fought the construction tooth and nail. With a touch of Odessite humor, Peter Voitsekhovsky remarked, "Soon after he lost the race, Mr. Kostusev fled to Russia as a criminal investigation revealed his involvement in illegal money transactions."[46] But at bottom, work on the building of the new oil terminal near Odessa has been excruciatingly slow, and the terminal is not yet finished, three years after the Ukrainian Parliament in Kyiv had authorized its construction in January 1995.

Meanwhile, a competitive modern oil terminal in Russia, in the not-so-attractive port of Novorossiisk, has already been built, without any protests by ''environmentalists'' and well-contested city elections, though Novorossiisk is notorious for being quite exposed in stormy weather, which is a common occurrence in that part of the Black Sea. But the near-defeat and definite delay on the construction of the—for Ukraine—vitally needed Odessa oil terminal need not be exclusively blamed on Russian intrigues: the Ukrainian authorities who ran out of money on the project refused to let in foreign capital, which could have helped. In summary, it seems that a certain pattern has been established: declared and nondeclared Russian presidential candidates such as Aleksandr Rutskoy, Yeltsin's disgraced Vice President; Yuriy Luzhkov, a popular present mayor of Moscow; and even former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin all embrace the Russian status of Sevastopol and the Crimea, and unsuccessful politicians, such as Meshkov, the former pro-Russian president of the Crimea, and Kostusev, Gurvits's unsuccesful challenger for mayor of Odessa, promptly retire to Russia. Ukraine is quite an interesting country in which to live, which may, therefore, disqualify it for NATO membership in some timid eyes.

UKRAINE'S CASE FOR ADMISSION TO NATO

The case for Ukraine's admission to NATO in the near future—the next five to ten years—cannot be based on overwhelming general population and elite support at the present time: the public opinion polls right now show a division of attitudes. An auxiliary argument for admission is that the Russians expect an application for admission from Ukraine and the Baltic states anyhow.[47] Even if, to clear the air, certain groups in the U.S. government and certain European NATO powers would publicly promise that for allowing NATO's enlargement to reach only the first tranche (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) NATO would never admit the Baltic states and Ukraine, the Russians would still be skeptical of Western intentions. Had they not expected NATO to fade away with the Warsaw Pact? Had they not expected Western economic assistance on the scale of the Marshall Plan, which Stalin foolishly rejected in 1947? Now the negotiations on NATO enlargement are asymmetrical, because many in the West are focused on the minimum expansion, which, by right, should long have ''sailed past the Russians,'' whereas the Russians are thinking further ahead to the admission of the Balts and, possibly, Ukraine. The Western negotiators are already paying the price for Russian suspicion and farsightedness. Why not take a leaf from Russian diplomats and think-tank discussions and factor in the possible benefits from the admission of Ukraine?

In essence, Ukraine's case rests on the inherent weight that a truly

independent, medium-sized state carries in a traditionally unstable geographic region. It rests on its progress in democratic reform and its progress toward achieving a market economy. If there is any particular factor to be singled out, it is that Ukraine controls a major conventionally equipped army and air force, with the beginnings of a modern navy, and could thereby become a net contributor to the region's security structures. On June 28, 1996, Ukraine adopted a modern, presidential-type constitution after prolonged ''give-and-take'' debates in Parliament, which acted as a de facto Constitutional Convention, not in a ''take-it-or-leave-it'' popular referendum. The Ukrainian government's relations with the large Russian ethnic minority have been relatively harmonious, due to a very inclusive Ukrainian citizenship law and the Ukrainians' restraint in imposing the use of the Ukrainian state language on its non-ethnic Ukrainian fellow citizens.

In Ukraine, economic reforms have not advanced as far as, for instance, in Estonia. Partly it is a question of the bad structure of the economy, which the country inherited from the Soviet Union (overemphasis on extractive and producers' goods industries, too little consumer goods industry, no effort to economize on fuels, inefficient collectivized agriculture). Additionally, the slowness of economic market reforms is a political question. To the extent that the Ukrainian elites in business and in government, sometimes called the ''clans,'' as in Russia, feel that the country had been mismanaged under the old Soviet regime, and that they should now be given the opportunity to do better, both for the country and for themselves, their influence on the market is a powerful force for maintaining political independence. But to the extent that the Ukrainian ''clans'' act as rentiers rather than entrepreneurs, that they monopolize a certain niche in the export markets and, above all, that they do not share a reasonable portion of their profits with the general population, whose average living standard has fallen, slowness of the reforms will not help Ukraine in the long and intermediate run. Finally, to a lesser degree, the progress of economic reform is not accelerated by international discrimination, whether at the hands of the European Union[48] or competitors in the United States. An American coat manufacturer had barely established a small market for very well made but inexpensive women's coats sown in Kyiv than quotas were imposed to protect the nearly extinct coat factories in Maine. Ukrainians have been trying to sell steelplate in the United States, for which there is a very high demand that cannot be easily filled by American firms, only to be slapped with an ''anti-dumping'' action by Bethlehem Steel. Ukraine's present economy has not yet taken off at full speed, despite macro economic stabilization and the exchange of currency. But it is making genuine progress.

One of Ukraine's greatest successes has been the gradual and peaceful

transformation of the units of the Soviet Armed Forces, which in the summer of 1991 had been deployed in Ukraine into a national Ukrainian army, under command of the Ukrainian government. The transformation had been planned at least since mid-1990; in a more meaningful sense, it was a deliberate attempt to make up for the blunder of 1917 in Eastern Ukraine, when the Rada government neglected to create a force for national survival. When Ukraine became fully independent in December 1991, there were over 700,000 ex-Soviet troops on its soil. In 1996, despite the denuclearization, there were still approximately 400,000 officers and men in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, despite all of the pressures caused by the bad economy.[49] *The Military Balance 1996/97* estimated 400,800 as the total active military personnel in Ukraine: the terms of service in the army (187,800) and air force (124,000) were eighteen months: in the 16,000 strong navy, which is being created partly from scratch and partly by dividing the old Soviet Black Sea Fleet, it was two years. The reserves were some 1 million (personnel who had served within five years).[50] The same handbook furnished an interesting description of the weaknesses and strengths of the Ukrainian defense industry:

Ukraine's defence industry, which accounted for about one-fifth of the total Soviet defence industry, retains only a limited capacity for producing major systems, including main battle tanks (MBTs) and transport aircraft, but dependence on Russian contractors restricts the scope for reconstitution. Ukraine is actively promoting defence exports as a means of earning foreign currency, and in 1996 received orders for four An-32s [Antonov-32s] from Sri Lanka and for 320 T-80 MBTs from Pakistan—the latter order representing by far Ukraine's largest defence sale since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.[51]

In terms of numbers alone, quite apart from the nuclear dimension, Ukraine would not be a match for the armed forces of Russia, totalling in 1996 about 1,270,000,[52] hence the Ukrainian interest in joining NATO. But neither would the Ukrainian Armed Forces be limited to a mere trip wire, not to speak of a merely symbolic function.

Illuminating may be summary data from the same handbook on the total armed forces among Ukraine's Western neighbors, both hostile and friendly. In 1996, the total armed forces of Belarus, which has practically joined Russia, were 85,500 active personnel (terms of service eighteen months).[53] On the other hand, the total armed forces of Poland, which borders on both Belarus and Ukraine, and which has been friendly toward Ukraine, is 248,500 active personnel (147,100 conscripts, terms of service eighteen months), with 466,000 reserves. Most interestingly, the Poles have been engaged in numerous UN peacekeeping missions all over the world: in token numbers (approximately five observers each) in Angola, Croatia, Georgia, Iran/Kuwait, Korea, the former Yugoslav Re-

public of Macedonia, in Tajikistan and the Western Sahara; and in sub-
stantial numbers in Bosnia (in the NATO-commanded IFOR—660 men);
Lebanon (637 men); and Syria (355 men).[54] Compared to the Poles, the
Ukrainians are not so well travelled: they now have token representation
in Bosnia, where they had been in force before, in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and in Tajikistan, but are in substantial numbers
in Angola (215 men) and in Croatia (444 men).[55] As to the three Baltic
states, their military forces are relatively small, which may be linked to
their policy of building up their armies from scratch, not transforming
the available Soviet forces, but which may also reflect other priorities set
by their governments. In 1996, Estonia, the smallest of the three coun-
tries, had a total active military personnel of 3,450 (including 2,650 con-
scripts, the terms of service being twelve months), with some 6,000
reserves;[56] Latvia, the second largest state, had an active total of 8,000
(including 3,000 conscripts, Border Guard and 1,500 National Guard, the
term of service being eighteen months);[57] and Lithuania, the largest, had
an active military force of some 5,100 men (2,000 conscripts, terms of
service being twelve months).[58]

Ukraine's actual and potential contribution to any regional security
system has not escaped the attention of American scholars and foreign-
policy advisors: Richard L. Kugler of the RAND Corporation, has said
''[Ukraine's] survival is a vital interest to the West.''[59] Why? There is the
question of numbers. In a revealing table (see Table 3.7), Kugler has
found that even after the projected downsizing, in the years 2000 to 2010,
Ukraine will have thirteen ground ''division equivalents,'' which are de-
fined as mobilizable divisions, counting active and reserve units. Trans-
lated into a historic comparison, ''Ukraine will have enough divisions to
equal the U.S. ground forces that were deployed in each of three major
regional wars: Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf.''[60] In a preceding
table, Kugler assesses the combined contribution of the Baltic states as
three ''division equivalents.''[61] In the same decade, Russia will have a
total of 45 ground ''division equivalents.'' Belarus will have four ''divi-
sion equivalents.'' The most striking conclusion to emerge from our Ta-
ble 3.7 is the major contribution to regional security of Poland, with nine
ground division equivalents, compared to only eight ground division
equivalents for Germany, whose total population is twice the size of
Poland. Kugler also introduces a so-called ''combined index,'' which
takes into account the number of combat aircraft (see Table 3.7). This
would worsen somewhat the relative military standing of both Ukraine
and Poland vis-à-vis Russia and improve the military standing of Ger-
many. The comparisons of ground forces, however, are somewhat more
tangible. In essence, Kugler is posing the question of where to find a
permanent home for those thirteen Ukrainian division equivalents: in the

Table 3.7
Conventional Military Balance in East Central Europe, 2000–2010

Country	Population (millions)	Division Equivalents[b]	Combat Aircraft	Combined Index[c]
Russia	150			
Local Mobile Command		7	400	9
MRC Posture[a]		25	1,300	33
Total Posture		45	4,000	70
Belarus	10	4	172	5
Ukraine	52	13	500	16
Baltic States[d]	13	3	135	4[e]
Moldova	4	1	45	1
Poland	39	9	350	11
Czech Republic	10	4	172	5
Slovakia	5	1	90	2
Hungary	10	4	90	5
Romania	23	7	220	8
Germany	81	8	450	11

Notes: [a]MRC means major regional conflict.
[b]Mobilizable divisions, counting active and reserve units.
[c]The "combined index" is an amalgamation of ground and air forces, assuming that three air wings equal one division in total strength.
[d]Baltic states figures taken from a different table—see *Sources* below.
[e]*For Baltic states only*: Combat index assigns a score of 1.0 for each ground division and 162 combat aircraft.
Sources: Except for data on Baltic states, slightly adapted from Table 6.1 in Richard L. Kugler, with Marianna V. Kozintseva, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor* (Report no. MR-690-OSD; Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), p. 175. Baltic figures from Table 5.3, ibid., p. 154. Institutional author: National Defense Research Institute. "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited." Used with permission of RAND.

limbo of neutrality, within a reintegrated CIS, or—what increasingly constitutes the preference of Ukrainian decision makers—within NATO.[62]

NOTES

1. Jane Perlez, "Ukraine Walks Shaky Tightrope Between NATO and Russia," *New York Times*, October 24, 1996, p. A6.
2. Vitaliy Tseplyaev, interviewer, "Rossiya v kol'tse vragov?" [Has Russia

Been Placed into a Circle of Enemies?], *Argumenty i Fakty* [Arguments and Facts, Moscow], no. 25 (870) (June 1997), p. 9. [Subtitles are ''Nations; Private Opinions.'']

3. This vignette rests on my more than four decades of study of things Ukrainian. A good, recent interpretation is that by Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997). Anatol Lieven, ''Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia and the West,'' *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 55–77, comes to diametrically opposite conclusions. Lieven quotes with admiration a group of Ukrainian and Russian Ukrainian intellectuals of 1993: ''The contradictions and dynamics in Russian–Ukrainian relations are similar to those when you try to separate two Siamese twins''; denies that the terror-famine of 1932–1933 was an act of genocide against the Ukrainians from which Russians profited; counsels Ukrainians to appease Russians in the 1990s; and warns them that it will be the Ukrainians' fault if the Russians in Moscow elect a Nationalist-Kemalist dictator. This is quite a tall order indeed!

4. September 3, 1996, in Kohl's speech at the Taras Shevchenko University in Kyiv, after accepting an honorary doctorate from that university. See ''Offizieller Besuch des Bundeskanzlers in der Ukraine am 3. und 4. September 1996'' [Official (state) visit of the Federal Chancellor (Kohl) in Ukraine, September 3–4, 1996], *Bulletin*, no. 73 (Bonn, September 17, 1996), p. 786.

5. Ibid., p. 786.

6. The question was: ''When, if ever, do you think Ukraine should become a member of NATO? Should it become a member? . . .'' The answers, from a nationwide sample in 1996, were: 13.5 percent ''strongly agreed'' and 10.8 percent ''agreed somewhat,'' giving a total for joining of 24.3 percent. Of the elite sample in 1996, 22.7 percent wanted Ukraine to join NATO ''now,'' 18.0 percent ''in 5 years' time,'' and 3.5 percent ''in 10 years' time,'' an exact total of 44.2 percent. Of the same nationwide sample, 7.3 percent ''disagreed somewhat'' and 16.7 percent ''strongly disagreed,'' giving a negative total of 24.0 percent. Among the elite sample, 41.1 percent gave the answer ''never.'' Of the elite sample, 11.2 percent also wanted Ukraine to join NATO ''later,'' which might be interpreted either as lukewarm support or polite rejection. I have omitted this figure here and in comparative Polish data. The nationwide poll in Ukraine, consisting of 1999 face-to-face interviews, was conducted by the Kyiv International Sociological Institute from May 1 to July 4, 1996. An elite survey in 1996 (face-to-face interviews with 401 respondents) was conducted by the Ukrainian Surveys Market Research from January 9 to February 12, 1996. All of the poll data are used with permission of InterMedia (Global Audience and Market Research), Washington, DC (formerly, Audience and Opinion Research Department of the Open Media Research Institute [OMRI]).

7. The question was: ''When, if ever, do you think Poland should become a member of NATO? Should it become a member? . . .'' Of the 1995 nationwide sample in Poland, 36.4 percent answered ''now,'' 29.1 percent ''in 5 years' time,'' and 5.0 percent ''in 10 years' time,'' giving a total of 70.5 percent for admission to NATO in the near future. Of the 1996 elite sample, 38.0 percent answered ''now,'' 43.4 percent ''in 5 years' time,'' and 10.1 percent ''in 10 years' time,'' a

corresponding total of 91.5 percent for admission. Among the nationwide sample, only 3.6 percent answered ''never''; and among the elite, only 5.3 percent answered ''never.'' See Nationwide Polish Audience and Opinion Research Spring Survey 1995, conducted by C.E.M. (Market and Public Opinion Research Institute), Cracow, March 25 to April 13, 1995, raw sample size 1961, unweighted. Polish AOR Elites Survey, conducted by C.E.M., Warsaw, January 10 to February 10, 1996, face-to-face interviews with a total of 376 respondents. Used with permission of InterMedia.

8. The question was: ''When, if ever, do you think Ukraine should become a member of the European community? Should it become a member? . . .'' Of the 1995 nationwide sample, 37.9 percent answered ''now,'' 10.0 percent ''in 5 years' time,'' and 2.6 percent in ''10 years' time,'' a positive total of 50.5 percent. (By the way, the same question was not asked in the nationwide poll of 1996.) The elite, in 1996, answered, 60.8 percent ''now,'' 18.2 percent ''in 5 years' time,'' and 9.5 percent ''in 10 years' time,'' a positive total of 88.5 percent. In the nationwide sample of 1995, 3.9 percent answered ''never.'' Among the 1996 elite, 3.2 percent answered ''never.'' Used with permission.

9. The question was: ''When, if ever, do you think Poland should become a member of the European community? Should it become a member? . . .'' The nationwide sample answered as follows: 35.0 percent ''now,'' 31.7 percent ''in 5 years' time,'' and 5.4 percent ''in 10 years' time,'' a positive total of 72.1 percent. Among the elite, the answers in 1996 were: 18.6 percent ''now,'' 61.7 percent ''in 5 years' time,'' and 15.4 percent ''in 10 years' time,'' a positive total of as many as 95.2 percent. The negatives were very small: 2.3 percent of the nationwide sample ''never'' wanted to join the European community. Among the elite, the corresponding figure was 1.1 percent. Used with permisssion.

10. Daniel N. Nelson, at the 1996 AAASS Roundtable, commenting on press coverage in Poland. Figures on Lithuania in Chapter 2.

11. ''Newsbriefs: [Foreign Minister] Udovenko: Society Divided over NATO,'' *Ukrainian Weekly* [Jersey City, NJ], vol. 65, no. 19 (Sunday, May 11, 1997), p. 2. Source is Reuters.

12. The poll was conducted by Socis–Gallup and the Democratic Initiatives Fund. See Volodymyr Pedchenko, ''Ukraine's Delicate Balancing Act,'' *Transitions: Changes in Post-Communist Societies*, vol. 4, no. 1 (June 1997), p. 75, also for citation. Article is informative, although calling the declaration of July 16, 1990, one of independence is both inaccurate and puzzling.

13. The poll was conducted by the Factum polling agency—see box in Christine Spolar, ''As Changes Loom, Debate by Public Plays Minor Role,'' *Wash. Post*, June 18, 1997, p. A23; citation on same page. This is the second of three front-page articles on NATO's enlargement.

14. Spolar, ''As Changes Loom,'' p. A23, box.

15. Peter A. Rafaeli, ''Letter to the Editor: Czech NATO Aspirations [against Spolar's article],'' *Wash. Post*, July 4, 1997, p. A20 (ed).

16. In the 1997 InterMedia nationwide poll in Ukraine, the question about joining NATO was asked last among nineteen statements. In the Russian-language version of the questionnaire, it was ''*Ukraina dolzhna prisoedinitsya k NATO*'' [Ukraine should join NATO]. The five possible answers for the respondents were: ''*Polnostyu soglasen*'' [''Strongly agree'']; ''*Skoree soglasen*'' [''Agree

somewhat''']; ''*Ni soglasen, ni ne soglasen*'' [''Neither agree, nor disagree''']; ''*Skoree nesoglasen*'' [''Disagree somewhat''']; and ''*Polnostyu nesoglasen*'' [''Strongly disagree''']. It was Jaroslaw Martyniuk of InterMedia who drew my attention to the importance of changes in the wording of the question.

17. Oleksander Levchenko, vice president of a private defense consulting firm; and Dr. (Military Science) and Colonel (Reserve) Alexander Manachinsky and Andrei Sobolev, the latter two senior consultants of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, September 3, 1996.

18. Andriy Sobolev, ''Ukraina i NATO: do problemy rozshyrennya NATO na skhid'' [Ukraine and NATO: The Problem of NATO's Eastward Expansion], *Narodna armiya* [People's Army, Kyiv], December 5, 1996, p. 3. Copy courtesy of the paper's editor.

19. Ibid.

20. Interviews on September 4, 1996, in Kyiv, with Members of Parliament, or ''People's Deputies,'' Ihor Ostash, Secretary [Deputy-Chair] of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Dr. Ihor R. Yukhnovsky, former Head of the Centrist ''Statehood'' [*Derzhavnist'*] Inter-Party Group in the Parliament, elected in 1994 and former head of the People's Council in the 1990–1994 Parliament and right-of-center, pro-Rukh presidential candidate in 1991.

21. F. Stephen Larrabee, ''Ukraine's Balancing Act,'' *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 146–47; Bilinsky, ''Ukraine, Russia and the West: An Insecure Security Triangle,'' *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 44, no. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 31, 33.

22. Boris [Borys] Tarasyuk, ''A New Concept of European Security,'' *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 13 (July 28, 1995), p. 19.

23. Incidentally, after long and protracted negotiations, a basic treaty between Ukraine and Romania was signed by President Kuchma and President Constantinescu in Constantsa, Romania, on June 2, 1997. It stipulates that the countries' existing borders ''are inviolable.'' See Ukrainian Ambassador [to the U.S. Dr. Yury] Shcherbak, ''A New Period in the Ukrainian–Russian Relations: Remarks at the National Press Club, June 9, 1997,'' *Embassy of Ukraine Newsletter*, vol. 1.4 (June 1997), p. 4. See also ''Ukraine, Romania Sign Basic Treaty'' and ''Reactions to Ukrainian–Romanian Treaty'' in *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, June 3, 1997, pp. 6–7.

24. Tarasyuk, ''A New Concept of European Security,'' p. 19.

25. Ibid., pp. 19–20.

26. On December 12, 1996, at the two-and-a-half-day conference on ''Ukraine in the World,'' which met at George Washington University in Washington, DC, and was jointly cosponsored by the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, the Ukrainian Program of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, and the Embassy of Ukraine to the United States. In a 1992 article, Johan Jorgen Holst, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, criticized enlargement: ''Such an extension could weaken the process of reconciliation [with Russia].'' See his ''Pursuing a Durable Peace in the Aftermath of the Cold War,'' *NATO Review*, vol. 40, no. 4 (August 1992), p. 10. In 1996, Frits Bolkestein, member of Parliament and leader of the Liberal Party (VVD) in the Netherlands, was even more critical of enlargement. Concessions to the Russian point of view had to be made. ''Hence, in my view, there would be no

serious early prospect of membership for the Baltic States or Ukraine.'' Bolkestein, ''NATO: Deepening and Broadening?,'' *NATO Review*, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1996), p. 23.

27. Larrabee, ''Ukraine's Balancing Act,'' p. 148; individual agenda points as paraphrased by Larrabee.

28. Hennadiy Udovenko, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, ''European Stability and NATO Enlargement: Ukraine's Perspective,'' *NATO Review*, vol. 43, no. 6 (November 1995), p. 15.

29. Ibid., p. 17. See also the somewhat brief and noncommittal ''NATO–Ukraine Joint Press Statement,'' ibid., p. 17. It is noteworthy that as late as December 6, 1997, in New York City, in his speech at the dinner given in his honor as president of the United Nations Assembly by Ukrainian-American organizations, Foreign Minister Udovenko did not address the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO. In a brief after-dinner conversation with this author, the foreign minister said that Ukraine would not be allowed into NATO, strongly implying that the opposition came not only from Russia.

30. NATO, ''Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10 December 1995 [*sic*]: Final Communique'' [Press Communique M-NAC-1 (96) 165], p. 2.

31. Ibid., p. 3.

32. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

33. For the record, here follows the full text of Article 11, from pp. 6–7:

We continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation and a market economy. The maintenance of Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe.

Ukraine's development of a strong, enduring relationship with NATO is an important aspect of the emerging European security architecture. We greatly value the active participation of Ukraine in the Partnership for Peace and look forward to next year's exercise near Lviv. We also value Ukraine's cooperation with European institutions such as the EU and the WEU. Ukraine has made an important contribution to IFOR and UNTAES, and we welcome its commitment to contribute to a follow-on operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We welcome the continued development of our broad cooperation beyond PfP. We note with satisfaction the recent meeting between the Alliance and Ukraine on issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. *We welcome the progress made towards establishing a NATO information office in Kyiv, and look forward to its opening in the near future.* We welcome Ukraine's active interest in further enhancing its relations with the Alliance. We are committed to the development in coming months, through high level and other consultations, of a distinctive and effective NATO–Ukraine relationship, *which could be formalised, possibly by the time of the Summit, building on the document on enhanced NATO–Ukraine relations agreed in September 1995, and taking into account recent Ukrainian proposals.* [emphases added]

Incidentally, the NATO communique has been reprinted in the appendix to Senator Biden's report, *Meeting the Challenges of a Post–Cold War World: NATO Enlargement and U.S.–Russia Relations*, pp. 39–50. Article 11 on Ukraine is on p. 45.

34. Gebhard von Moltke, NATO's Assistant secretary-general for Political Affairs, ''NATO Moves Towards Enlargement,'' *NATO Review*, vol. 44, no. 1 (January 1996), p. 5.

35. Oleksandr Shandryuk, ''Konya kuyut', a zhaba i sobi pidstavlyaye nohu: U partnerstvo mizh NATO ta Ukrainoyu znov namahayet'sya vtrutytysya Rosiya'' [While the horse is being shod, the frog, too, offers its foot; Into the Partnership between NATO and Ukraine Russia tried to interfere again], *Samostiyna Ukraina* [Independent Ukraine, Kyiv], no. 33 (220) (December 1996), pp. 5–6.

36. Ibid., p. 6. Speaking with greater restraint (''Ukraine's new constitution of June 28, 1996, does not forbid us to enter into military alliances''), Anton Buteyko dropped a hint to the same effect in a brief conversation with this writer at the December 1996 Washington conference on ''Ukraine in the World,'' December 13, 1996. A diplomatic subordinate of Buteyko's was later much more outspoken.

37. Ibid., p. 6.

38. Vladyslav Omelchenko, political observer of *Ukrains'ka hazeta*, ''Pohonya za dvoma zaytsyamy: Z pryvodu masshtabnoi poizdky spetsial'noho predstavnyka Prezydenta Ukrainy Antona BUTEYKA po krainakh-chlenakh NATO'' [Chasing Two Hares: (commentary) on the Major Journey of the Special Emissary of the President of Ukraine Anton BUTEYKO to Member Countries of NATO], *Ukrains'ka hazeta* [Ukrainian Newspaper, Kyiv], no. 22 (114), December 19, 1996. To journalists' questions about whether Ukraine would apply to NATO, Horbulin replied, ''It is difficult to foresee the future, anything may happen.''

39. Ibid. At the December 12–14, 1996, Washington conference, a high-ranking member of the Ukrainian embassy to the United States confirmed the essence of First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Buteyko's visit to NATO capitals.

40. Bilinsky, ''Ukraine, Russia and the West,'' p. 29.

41. See Chapter 2.

42. Larrabee, ''Ukraine's Balancing Act,'' pp. 149–50.

43. For an official Ukrainian position, see the statement made by Dr. Yury Shcherbak, ambassador of Ukraine, at the round table discussion on ''The National and Legal Status of the Ukrainian City of Sevastopol and Problems of the Black Sea Fleet Division,'' at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, December 10, 1996: ''For the Record: Shcherbak on the Status of Sevastopol,'' *Ukr. Weekly*, vol. 64, no. 51 (Sunday, December 22, 1996), pp. 2, 11–12.

44. See Chapter 4.

45. Peter Voitsekhovsky, ''The Odessa [Odesa] Oil Terminal: Construction Goes On and On,'' *Ukr. Weekly*, vol. 64, no. 48 (December 1, 1996), p. 2.

46. Ibid., p. 19.

47. Clearest on this is former Soviet Military Intelligence Colonel Stanislav Lunev, ''Future Changes in Russian Military Policy,'' *The Jamestown Foundation Prism* (February 9, 1996). See also the interview of the pro-Yeltsin *Argumenty i Fakty*, no. 17 (April 1996), p. 3 with then British Prime Minister John Major.

48. See the op-ed piece by Swedish-born Anders Aslund, ''Give Ukraine a Break,'' *N.Y. Times*, August 8, 1996, p. A27, particularly in comparison with his earlier article, ''Eurasia Letter: Ukraine's Turnaround,'' *Foreign Policy*, no. 100 (Fall 1995), pp. 125–43. Dr. Aslund has been an economic advisor both to the Russian and later to the Ukrainian government, under President Kuchma. In an interview with me on September 4, 1996, a right-of-center member of Parliament complained that Ukraine was today overrun with wheeler-dealers. It was high time for serious representatives of the European Union to come together with

their Ukrainian counterparts to discuss areas of mutually advantageous economic cooperation for the long haul. Ukraine, in his view, held a comparative advantage in agriculture, in the extraction of high-quality materials for the construction industry (granites, kaolins, sands for making glass, cement), and in metallurgy.

49. One of my defense consultants spoke about a disproportionate number of officers ''and enough soldiers to guard the weapons'' in September 1996. He expected the total number to fall from 400,000 to 350,000 in half a year. A second consultant said that as of September 1996, the number was 380,000, and added, ''It must not be reduced any further.''

50. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1996/97* (London: Oxford University Press for the I.I.S.S., 1996), pp. 101–2.

51. Ibid., p. 43. Without going into details, one Parliamentary deputy stated that the problem of unfinished products had been solved in the Ukrainian armaments industry.

52. Ibid., p. 113.

53. Ibid., p. 80.

54. Ibid., pp. 94–95.

55. Ibid., p. 102.

56. Ibid., p. 86.

57. Ibid., p. 91.

58. Ibid., p. 92.

59. Richard L. Kugler, with Marianna V. Kozintseva, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), p. 214.

60. Ibid., p. 176.

61. Ibid., table 5.3, p. 154.

62. Ibid., pp. 214–20; and especially his Executive Summary on p. xxii.

Chapter 4

The Meaning of May 1997

In the latter half of May 1997, ''in ten days that 'shook down' the world,''[1] several major diplomatic initiatives took place which, on balance, only reinforce the argument for a rapid admission into NATO of the three Baltic states and Ukraine. On May 23, 1997, a close union was established between Belarus and Russia. According to a public opinion poll, which was taken in Russia in May by the ''respected Public Opinion Foundation, 75 percent of Russians view the Russia–Belarus union as the first step toward the restoration of the USSR,'' and 64 percent of the 1,500 respondents also named Ukraine as the former Soviet republic which they would like to accede to that union, while Latvia and Lithuania received a similar endorsement by only 5 percent of the respondents and Estonia by only 3 percent.[2]

On May 27, 1997, at a special NATO summit conference in Paris, the sixteen current NATO members signed the ''Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.''[3] Two days later, on May 29, at the regularly scheduled spring meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko initialled ''The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine.''[4] Finally, on May 31, President Kuchma and President Yeltsin signed in Kyiv the long-awaited ''Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation,'' following on the heels of an agreement on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, which was signed by then Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, only as late as May

28.[5] Surely there is a connection among all of those diplomatic moves of those ''ten days in May''?

THE FOUNDING ACT BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA

A full analysis of the Founding Act of May 27, 1997, is beyond the purview of this work. Suffice it to say that there have been trenchant critiques, notably by the German parliamentarian Friedbert Pflueger[6] and, above all, by Dr. Kissinger.[7] There also have been spirited official and nonofficial defenders of the Act, such as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Robert E. Hunter[8] and, jointly, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake.[9] Somewhat restrained and basically leaning toward the critics has been Harvey Sicherman, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.[10] It appears to me that, first, in concluding the long-debated Founding Act, Russia has definitely ensured its right to have a major voice in NATO's deliberations immediately, along with the development of a NATO-like institutional mechanism, in the form of the multilevel Permanent Joint Council. Second, the effective integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary may have been delayed. Third, and most to the point, there is the question of the proper interpretation of Yeltsin's statement made after initialling but before the formal signing of the Act that ''NATO must take Russia's views into account and that Moscow *will revise its relations with the alliance if it expands to include former Soviet republics*,''[11] that is, the Baltic states and Ukraine. [Emphasis added.]

President Yeltsin made that warning during a meeting with leaders of both chambers of Parliament and the leaders of all Duma factions. There may be a strong temptation to dismiss his words as a political gesture, without any diplomatic consequences. This is not so. The so-called ''preparatory works'' or issues raised during negotiations by one party are important for the interpretation of the final document, as are the reactions of other parties. Already, on May 15, 1997, or two days after the initialling of the Founding Act, the following became known:

During six rounds of intensive negotiations, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov constantly reminded NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana of what Moscow considers its bottom line: no encroachment on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Solana, however, stuck by NATO's uncompromising position: that every nation must be free to choose its own alliance.[12]

While on paper everything is as it should be, and while Russia did sign the Act, including Article 17, saying, among other things, that the Act's provisions ''cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states,''[13] the argument can be made that both Primakov and Yel-

tsin put everybody on notice that Russia has always had serious reservations about Article 17 applying to the eventual NATO membership for the Baltic states and Ukraine. Such an ''off the record'' or ''off treaty'' reservation is apt to be invoked sooner rather than later, unless the other states voice their counterreservations immediately and vigorously.

At the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Sintra on May 29, 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright somewhat indirectly challenged Yeltsin's and Primakov's preemptive exclusion of ''former Soviet republics.'' In what was interpreted as a reference to the Baltic states, she said, ''We must pledge that the first members will not be the last and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.''[14] A correspondent of the leading German conservative paper, however, called the situation of the Baltic states, with respect to NATO admission, ''precarious.'' At Sintra, German Foreign Minister Kinkel evaded a direct question on the admissibility of the Balts, but he suggested that at the forthcoming summit meeting in Madrid, all of the heads of state should issue a joint declaration that the policy of NATO should be to support free peoples, including the Baltic states.[15] (Eventually, possibly under American pressure, on July 8, 1997, the Baltic states were mentioned at Madrid as being ''aspiring members'' to NATO in the fourth paragraph of the very long Article 8 of the ''Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation,'' after Romania and Slovenia were mentioned by name ''as aspiring members'' whose case was to be reviewed at the 1999 summit in paragraph three. The exact wording of the reference to the Balts is important. After recognizing the need ''to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries of southeast Europe . . . ,'' the heads of state and government continued, ''At the same time, we recognize the progress achieved toward greater stability and cooperation by the *states in the Baltic which are also aspiring members*'' (emphasis added).[16] It also is significant that the German correspondent did not mention Ukraine at all, even as a non-viable candidate, though it was at Sintra that ''The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine'' was initialled by NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Udovenko, which Charter was signed and immediately made public at the Madrid Summit conference by Solana and President Kuchma.[17]

THE NATO–UKRAINE CHARTER

The NATO–Ukraine Charter is more ''low key'' and less elaborate than the voluminous, detailed NATO–Russia Founding Act. It has only nineteen clauses to the over 29 in the Act, and runs only seven pages compared to eleven pages. The Charter does not provide for a high-level

Permanent Joint Council. Consultation and cooperation will be implemented through ''NATO–Ukraine meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council at intervals to be mutually agreed'' (Art. 11). As a rule, ''not less than twice a year'' the North Atlantic Council (NATO's main decision-making authority) ''will periodically meet with Ukraine as the NATO–Ukraine Commission'' (Art. 12). Similar meetings will take place with appropriate NATO committees and with NATO chiefs of defense. The Charter is a more open-ended arrangement, which is best expressed in the introductory sentence to Article 12, ''NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an evolving, dynamic process.''

Ukraine is promised consultation and cooperation, among other areas, ''on science and technology issues'' and ''aerospace research and development'' (Art. 7). The security assurances of December 1994 that were given by the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and, independently, France, for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons, are praised in Article 16 and thus incorporated into the more solemn Charter. Ukraine, in turn, promises ''to carry forward its defense reforms, to strengthen democratic and civilian control of the armed forces and to increase their interoperability with the forces of NATO and Partner countries'' (Art. 3).

Article 18 is a bow toward Russian security interests: Ukraine welcomes the promise that nuclear weapons will not be deployed in new NATO members (''no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy''). But there also are some anti-Russian nuances in the Charter. Article 1, the preamble, is much more favorable toward NATO's enlargement process than the Founding Act[18] and Article 2 contains a transparent critique of Russia's efforts to establish its hegemony over the former USSR and East Central European states.[19] Also interesting is another paragraph of Article 2, which along with the key Article 12 on the ''evolving, dynamic process,'' may be interpreted as constituting Ukraine's reservation of its right to apply for full NATO membership (the famous second track of Ukraine's Western policy). The paragraph reads as follows:

[NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to:] the inherent right of all states to choose and to implement freely their own security arrangements, and to be free to choose or change their security arrangements, *including treaties of alliance, as they evolve*. [emphasis added]

On the face of it, the paragraph would not rule out military cooperation with Russia, but its real meaning, in my judgment, is to keep the door open to full NATO membership, if only a crack wide.

The diplomatic protocol and atmosphere factors also are worth noting: in the long run, they weigh in Ukraine's favor. Both the NATO–Russia Founding Act and the NATO–Ukraine Charter mention the establish-

ment of a NATO Information and Documentation Center in the two national capitals, except that the Center in Kyiv was already established on May 7, 1997. Additionally, the signing of the Charter took place on the second less important day of the Madrid Summit, after the formal invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were extended, and after Romania and Slovenia and ''the states in the Baltic region'' were designated as ''aspiring members'' on the first day. The signature of the Charter, however, preceded the meeting of the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the policy-making organ of the Partnership for Peace. Thus Ukraine was treated as not quite an immediate candidate for admission to full NATO membership, but was placed ahead of those who were only Partners for Peace. Above all, President Kuchma attended the Madrid Summit in person, as did the presidents of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and Estonia and Latvia. Before the signature, President Kuchma made a gracious, brief speech, as did NATO Secretary-General Solana, who appeared genuinely pleased over the opening of the NATO Documentation and Information Center in Kyiv.[20] President Yeltsin, however, the star of the Paris summit of May 27, did not come, even though he had been invited by King Juan Carlos of Spain himself, but took a ''diplomatic vacation'' in Karelia. His absence from Madrid may or may not have propitiated public opinion in Russia, but clearly signalled to both old and prospective NATO members in Madrid that, at bottom, the Russian government continues to view NATO as an adversary, the ringing preamble of the Founding Act notwithstanding.[21] At Madrid, the Russian viewpoint was voiced in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council by a relatively low-ranking official of Belarus, who, at great length, argued against NATO's enlargement at the enlargement summit.[22]

UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY AND THE BLACK SEA FLEET

The signature on May 31, 1997, of the Ukrainian–Russian ''Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership'' was rather overdue, proceeded under somewhat dramatic circumstances, and was definitely linked to the NATO–Ukraine Charter that had been initialled in Sintra only two days earlier. To take the last point first, in late May 1997, the Kievan journalist, Batih, commented on the announced visit of President Yeltsin as follows:

Its political constellation [*von ihrer inneren Verfassung her*] does not allow Ukraine to enter NATO as yet. But Ukraine has carried off a good bluff. That Yeltsin, after years of delay, is finally coming to Kyiv to sign the basic treaty is

most closely linked to Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO—*even though that process is more verbal than real*.[23] [emphasis added]

Batih may underestimate the actual content of the rapprochement, but he is right that it led to Yeltsin's visit in May 1997.

The signature of the comprehensive Ukraine–Russia friendship treaty was overdue, if only because the negotiations had already begun under President Kravchuk in early 1992 and also because most of the details had been ironed out by March 1995. Six times President Yeltsin had promised to visit Ukraine to sign the treaty, until he finally did on May 31, 1997. Sergey Kisilev of Moscow's *Literaturnaya gazeta* [Literary Gazette], in a front-page article, called the five years' delay a strategic loss for Russia: what would have been warmly welcomed in Kyiv in 1992 was met with considerable skepticism in 1997.[24] Still more interesting, as late as May 30, 1997, literally a few hours before Yeltsin's touchdown in Kyiv, the Kyiv correspondent of the traditionally pro-Yeltsin *Izvestiya* reported that the Ukrainian government did not know whether Yeltsin and Kuchma would actually proceed with the signing of the treaty. In case Yeltsin, whose arrival finally appeared more or less assured, refused to do so, the Ukrainians and Russians had prepared a joint declaration ''containing mutual assurances of all things beautiful, good and rosy [*svetlom*]'' that would be initialled by the two presidents in Kyiv. But if Yeltsin signed the treaty itself, the grandiloquent and empty declaration would simply be forgotten.[25] Do the Russians always conduct diplomacy according to the ''perils of Pauline'' principle?

What was so controversial about the general friendship treaty? Or was it not so much the comprehensive treaty itself that was so objectionable to Yeltsin's opponents as were some of the immediately preceding supplementary accords on the division of the Black Sea Fleet? A perusal of the complete text of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty[26] and an analysis of some of the supplementary agreements show that there is something ambiguous, inchoate, nay, half-baked about all of those agreements, despite their having been in preparation for almost five years.

The Treaty's preamble is relatively businesslike: it does not overemphasize the traditional ''friendship'' between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, as would have been the case before 1991. It refers to the treaty between the old Ukrainian SSR and the Russian SFSR of November 19, 1990, which is being replaced by the present Treaty, and to the essentially abortive Ukrainian–Russian agreement at Dagomys, of June 23, 1992. An interesting if somewhat pious wish in the preamble is that the High Contracting Parties are ''firmly resolved to ensure the irreversible nature and progressive character of the democratic processes in both of their countries.''[27]

Even though the treaty itself has forty-one articles, it is not self-

contained: most of the articles either implicitly or explicitly call for sup-plementary agreements. Article 1 speaks of Ukraine and Russia being friendly sovereign countries enjoying equal rights.[28] Articles 2 and 3 both call for mutual respect for territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing frontiers, with Article 3 going even further in prescribing the peaceful settlement of disputes, foreswearing the use of violence, threats of violence and economic pressures.[29] On first sight, it appears a diplo-matic victory for Ukraine, as it implies the recognition by Russia of the status quo in Crimea and Sevastopol in particular and a respite from repeated Russian threats to turn off the flow of Siberian natural gas im-mediately, unless the Ukrainian paid their energy debts quickly. On the other hand, the important follow-up agreement that had been prepared by the Ukrainian–Russian experts ''on the work in the direction of for-malizing the Ukrainian–Russian state frontier through legal agreements'' has not been signed by either of the two prime ministers (then Pavlo Lazarenko and Viktor Chernomyrdin, nor by the two presidents (Kuchma and Yeltsin). Ukrainians are reported to have been particularly concerned about the exact delimitation of the frontier in the area of the Sea of Azov, but were not successful in obtaining Russian cooperation on this point. Inviolability of the present frontiers thus rests on ''mutual assurances,''[30] not explicit and detailed diplomatic acts. In equal sus-pense has been left the exact status of the city of Sevastopol: that it be-longs to Ukraine is *implied* in Articles 2 and 3.

There is more to the issue of recognition of Ukraine's territorial integ-rity than meets the eye. As explained to me by a high Ukrainian diplo-mat, before the signing of the May 31, 1997 treaty, the governing provision was Article 6 of the treaty between the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian SFSR of November 19, 1990, which reads, ''The High Contract-ing Parties recognize and respect the territorial integrity of the RSFSR and the UkrSSR *within the presently existing boundaries of the USSR* [Soviet Union].'' (emphasis added).[31] For years, expansionist-minded policymak-ers in Moscow interpreted this in a restrictive, historic sense: since the USSR ceased to exist on December 25, 1991, the boundaries had to be reestablished and even renegotiated. Diplomats in Kyiv, on the contrary, emphasized that the article should be properly interpreted as a geo-graphical description of the existing boundaries as of November 19, 1990, which interpretation was accepted by the UN Security Council in 1993, when the Russian Supreme Soviet laid claim to Sevastopol as a Russian city. By accepting Article 2 of the May 31, 1997, Friendship Treaty, Russia apparently agreed, before the entire world, to the less restrictive Ukrain-ian interpretation.

Ukrainian critics of the May 31 treaty, however, have a rejoinder to this: As long as the boundaries have not yet been precisely delimited and established, especially the boundaries in the sea, the territorial status

quo is not quite as firm as it seems, because all that Article 2 guarantees is ''the inviolability of the *existing* boundaries'' (emphasis added). The critics even claim that the text of Article 2 of one of the supplementary agreements connotes ''that *the naval base in Sevastopol does not belong to Ukraine, and that its territory is not being regarded as the territory of Ukraine*'' (emphasis in the original).[32] In my judgment, this goes too far, but I agree with the critics that a more explicit reference to the leased character of the base would have been prudent.

Article 8 of the Treaty, dealing with mutual cooperation in security questions,[33] may ultimately turn out to be a victory for Russia, depending on its implementation over time. The *cause célèbre* in the application of Article 8 of the Treaty was surely the problem of the division of the Black Sea Fleet, which has flared up time and time again since 1992, without leading, however, to any bloodshed. Two days prior to Yeltsin's arrival in Kyiv, his prime minister signed with his Ukrainian counterpart (then Lazarenko) on May 28 as many as ''11 inter-state, inter-governmental and inter-agency agreements and protocols.''[34] Those eleven agreements did not include such important documents as ''On the compensation of Ukraine for the tactical nuclear arms and munitions that had been removed from Ukraine,'' ''On the pay-off of the debt for the 2.6 million tons of oil that had been supplied to Ukraine from the Russian Federation in 1993–1994'' and ''On the cooperation in the field of the fuel and energy complex,'' not to speak of the agreement on the formal settlement of the boundary issues that has already been mentioned.[35] But they did include what Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Yury Shcherbak, has called the most important, among them on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, namely:

1. ''Agreement on [the] Status and Conditions of [the] Stationing of the Black Sea Fleet of [the] Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine'';
2. ''Agreement on [the] Parameters of the Black Sea Fleet Division''; and
3. ''Agreement on Mutual Payments Connected with the Division of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine.''[36] [numbers added]

As of 1998, the jury is still out about whether the May 31, 1997, treaty in general and the preceding Black Sea Fleet agreements in particular were a net victory or a defeat for Ukraine. Interpreting it as a basic victory for Ukraine are, besides Ambassador Shcherbak,[37] former state department official and now Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty executive Paul Goble in Washington[38] and Gerhard Gnauck in Frankfurt, Germany.[39] On the other hand, Peter Rutland, a contributing editor of *Transitions*, sees it more as a victory for Russia. By obtaining in Sevastopol and elsewhere in the Crimea a 20-year lease, Russia has gained a tactical

advantage that in the event of another diplomatic crisis "could outweigh the value of legal recognition" of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity. Rutland concludes his brief analysis of both the NATO–Russia Founding Act of May 27, 1997 and the May 31, 1997, treaty by observing, quite astutely: "The deal allowing payments for the lease of the port to be taken out of Ukraine's energy debts looks similar to the *'zero option' Moscow struck with Belarus* to win basing rights there—*an uncomfortable parallel to say the least*" (emphasis added).[40] Pro-Russian British journalist Anatol Lieven approves of the May 31 treaty, but even he writes that the treaty "was made possible only by the resolution *or rather suspension* of the dispute over the [BSF] and the control of the fleet's base at Sevastopol" (emphasis added).[41] Russian and French commentators see it more as a draw, with neither Ukraine nor Russia having carried off a clear-cut diplomatic victory.[42] I would be inclined to side with the French and Russian commentators, going even so far as to hold that unless the Ukrainian government remains vigilant to the end, the May 31, 1997, general treaty, with the three main agreements of May 28, 1997, may turn out to be a Trojan horse against genuine Ukrainian independence.

Granted, the Black Sea Fleet has had a really inglorious history (it was defeated twice), its battleworthiness is now approaching zero, and Ukraine refused to yield to the maximum demands of such centrist politicians as Vladimir Lukin to yield to Russia the traditional shipbuilding facilities on the Ukrainian mainland in Mykolayiv and Kerch. Of the total of 525 combatants, auxiliary and support ships of the BSF, Russia, however, got as many as 388 (271 ships, or 525 *roughly* divided by 2, *plus* 117 ships—or 32 percent from the old BSF grand total—from the Ukrainian share being sold to Russia in return for cutting down the energy debt to Russia by $521 million).[43] More important for the future, while Ukraine was successful in its insistence that the splendid natural port of Sevastopol, with its total coastline of 126 kilometres (about 76 miles), be shared between the Russian contingent of the old BSF and its new fledgling Ukrainian navy, the Russians got the better bays: the Sevastopol Bay, which is the largest, the Southern Bay, which actually is an arm of the Sevastopol Bay, and the Quarantine Bay. The young Ukrainian navy will have to do with a single bay, the *Strilets'ka*, or Sharpshooters' Bay, which, according to *Izvestiya*, is not very useful from a military point of view. (Initially, Ukraine wanted to keep exclusive control over the *Strilets'ka* and Balaklava bays and also wanted a part of the Quarantine Bay.) Moreover, the beginning lease for the Russian BSF will run for as many as 20 years, for which Russia will pay $97.75 million a year, reportedly much less than the figure that was initially demanded by Ukraine. The lease payments will not be in cash but will be used to reduce Ukraine energy debt. For the duration of the lease, the total number of Russian naval officers and ratings and their supporting ground troops will be limited

to 25,000 (the total for the old, undivided BSF had been given as 48,000). Furthermore, according to the 1997 agreements, a subtotal of 1987 would be established as the maximum for Russian land-based personnel of naval infantry and aviation, and no nuclear weapons would be allowed in the BSF and its related ground troops.

The treaty itself, without the accompanying BSF division agreements, was ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament on January 14, 1998, by a vote of 317 to 27. A majority of the Rada rejected the opponents' efforts to link discussion of the treaty with the accompanying BSF agreements.[44] Ratification could be more of a problem in the Russian Duma, whose predecessor has gone on record in 1992 that the 1954 incorporation of the Crimea into the Ukrainian SSR had been unconstitutional, and in 1993 that Sevastopol was a Russian city. That Sevastopol was a Russian city was reaffirmed by both the present Duma and the present Council of the Russian Federation in October and December 1996.

Most obviously, the 1997 agreements on the BSF have been designed to stop and, if possible, reverse Ukraine's growing rapprochement with NATO, both in the short and long run. On May 30, 1997, on the very eve of the signature of the Big Treaty, Yeltsin's spokesman, Sergei Yastrzembskii, said in Moscow that Russia remained opposed to the NATO-led ''Sea Breeze'' exercises that had already been scheduled for August 1997 off the coast of Crimea.[45] In the long run, the entrenchment of up to 25,000 Russian navy officers and ratings in the Crimea is obviously designed to produce a ''super-Kaliningrad effect'': if timid souls already will not allow Lithuania into NATO because of the transit provisions, through Lithuanian territory, for Russian troops stationed at the Russian naval base of Kaliningrad, the more they will be aghast at dangers from Russian troops moving from the Crimea through mainland Ukraine to Russia. Overland transit might perhaps be averted by having the Russians move by sea or by air to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. Furthermore, Article 6 of the Ukraine–Russia Treaty is almost tailor-made for the Russians to argue that by signing the treaty the Ukrainians have given up the right to join NATO, permanently.[46] Being aware of this danger, the secretary of the Ukrainian Security and Defense Council, Volodymyr Horbulin, who, by the way, is of Russian ethnic origin, gently rejected the grandiloquent promise made by President Yeltsin on May 30, 1997, which promise Yeltsin repeated in Kyiv, at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on the same day, that under the agreements the two countries ''would participate together to defend Ukraine'' if it became necessary, and would help each other ''in extreme situations.'' Horbulin gently commented on what was in effect an invitation to join Russia in a really existential defense pact as follows: ''I think President Yeltsin was guided by his best intentions, but there were no [such] requests from the Ukrainian side.''[47] A Russian correspondent also noted that originally

Yeltsin's negotiators wanted to persuade Kuchma's diplomats to cosign an anti-NATO declaration on May 31, 1997, namely, Russia and Ukraine were concerned about NATO's expansion. Kuchma's men were able to turn the criticism into mild support: the two presidents signed a declaration that they were satisfied with the relationship between Russia and NATO, and between Ukraine and NATO.[48] Finally, the NATO exercise "Sea Breeze '97," which may have carried Yeltsin to Kyiv in May 1997, did take place as scheduled, even though its impact was softened by the holding of a Ukrainian–Russian naval maneuver, "Channel of Peace '97" in early November 1997.[49]

Hosting two competing maneuvers within three months is an effective but rather expensive way to signal to the world that Ukraine wants to join NATO without setting fire to all of its military bridges to Moscow. Quite informative on present military cooperation with Russia was Dr. Hryhorii Perepelytsia, chief analyst at the Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, who in late 1997 spoke at a conference in Canada, which was entitled "Ukraine between NATO and Russia." Dr. Perepelytsia said that in 1996, "ten joint programs were planned with the Russian military, of which four were carried out."[50] But within the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace Program, which began in 1995, Ukraine took part in over 200 exercises and programs. In Perepelytsia's own words, "If Ukraine were able to establish close cooperation with NATO structures, we would break our association with the [Russian-dominated] Tashkent Pact."[51]

On the other hand, Perepelytsia sketched Ukrainian–Russian cooperation in military infrastructure, such as "an extensive anti-ballistic missile defense system, an early warning network, and elements of the former space program." It is especially instructive to note the difference between the Baltic states and Ukraine in approaching this sensitive issue. As paraphrased by the correspondent, Dr. Perepelytsia, a high naval officer, said at the 1997 York University conference,

When Ukraine inherited these facilities [of the old Soviet military infrastructure], it faced the question [of] what to do with them. *The Baltic countries simply destroyed them.* Kazakstan leased them to Russia, but Ukraine decided to incorporate them into its defense infrastructure . . . [so that they] would be used to generate revenue. To this day, these installations are used to produce data, train personnel and manufacture materiel for Russian programs, but Russia pays its own way.[52] [emphasis added]

The Russians may be paying their own way, but judging from the BSF agreements, they can be tough and skillful bargainers. And at a certain point, effective independence may become compromised.

Opponents of the BSF division, who were in a small minority in the

1997–1998 Ukrainian Parliament, have asserted, ''De facto, Ukraine has entered a military alliance with Russia. From this it would follow that Ukraine cannot pretend to achieve either neutrality *nor accession to NATO*. The only possibility to join the North Atlantic Alliance is together with Russia or by renouncing any claims to the Crimean peninsula.''[53] [Emphasis added.] This is too harsh of a judgment. But there are high costs associated with seemingly financially profitable arrangements in military and military-industrial cooperation with Russia. Moreover, at bottom, for Ukraine the BSF agreements are also a bad financial deal.

What about the nonmilitary provisions of the Friendship Treaty? A possible, but not probable, gain for Ukraine lay in the conclusion of Article 12 on the reciprocal protection of the linguistic and cultural rights of the Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine, and that of the Ukrainian ethnic minority in Russia. As late as May 30, 1997, Yastrzembskii had said that President Yeltsin was concerned about the discrimination against the Russian language and culture in Ukraine.[54] The two presidents are said to have discussed that concern, but not to have come to any legal agreement. That is not surprising, because the real situation is asymmetrically in favor of Russia, not Ukraine: most ethnic Russians attend state-funded Russian-language secondary schools in Ukraine and so do a majority of college students of all nationalities, whereas in the Russian Federation, the millions of ethnic Ukrainians receive no public funds whatsoever to learn their native language but must rely on private Saturday schools. For good measure, the two Russian leaders visiting Kyiv snubbed Ukrainian culture twice. President Yeltsin refused to abide by the previously agreed upon diplomatic protocol by not addressing the honor guard in Ukrainian, while two days before, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin refused to pay respect at the traditional monument of honor, that to Ukrainian language poet and advocate of Ukrainian independence, Taras Shevchenko, but hurried to lay down flowers at the new monument of Yaroslav the Wise, a medieval prince allegedly shared by both the Ukrainians and Russians.

If, by concluding Article 12 on the equal treatment of ethnic minorities, the Ukrainians had hoped to persuade the Russians to break with Stalin's superassimilationist policies of the 1930s, they were overly optimistic, whereas to the Russians the article merely served to support their extreme nationalistic demands and fueled their bogus campaign against ''discrimination of Russian speakers in Ukraine.'' On the other hand, Article 10 on the equal treatment of citizens by implication—and by implication only—was a Ukrainian success in that it rejected old Russian demands for double citizenship for the up to 22 percent ethnic Russians in Ukraine, which would have been an administrative nightmare and a political disaster.

CONCLUSION

With French wit, Sophie Shihab of *Le Monde* compared the BSF sharing provisions to the old Soviet *komunalkas* (several families having to live in one apartment).[55] This was not quite impossible, but stressful at the very least. Like that of Yeltsin's Founding Act with NATO, the proof of success of the Ukrainian–Russian Treaty that was signed four days later will be in its implementation over time, perhaps over the next 20 years, if everything goes well. Part of the stress can be traced back to the somewhat cavalier attempts by Russia to restore its hegemony over the former Soviet Union in general and Ukraine in particular. Despite all of the protestations of friendship and mutual respect for ''sovereignty'' in the treaty of May 31, Russia's operative policy toward Ukraine remains that of the semiofficial Surikov and Karaganov reports of 1995–1996. If anyone, the Ukrainians should be particularly sensitive to the meaning of the term *sovereignty*: under the Soviet Union, its connotation was one of limited political autonomy. The ''Declaration of State Sovereignty'' of July 16, 1990, is emphatically different from the ''Final Act of Independence'' of August 24, 1991. For all of those reasons, the technical incompleteness of the May 31, 1997, treaty and its parallel documents is not a major defect from the Russian point of view. From the viewpoint of the Ukrainians, however, who want to escape that hegemony—ideally, with the help of NATO—all of those lacunae are quite dangerous.

NOTES

1. Stanislav Kondrashev, ''Desyat' dney, kotorye utryasli mir'' [Ten days that ''shook down'' the world], *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1997, p. 2.

2. ''Poll on Russia–Belarus Union,'' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, June 27, 1997, p. 4.

3. ''Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, May 27, 1997,'' from Internet, eleven pages. (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm). Articles in this otherwise complete version are, however, not numbered. For numbering, see extensive excerpts in ''L'Acte fondateur OTAN-Russie . . . ,'' *Le Monde*, May 28, 1997, p. 22.

4. ''Speaking Notes by the [NATO] Secretary General at the Initialling Ceremony of the NATO-Ukraine Charter,'' ''Address by H. E. Hennadiy Udovenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs [of Ukraine],'' and ''Statement by H. E. Anton Buteyko, First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,'' via Internet.

5. See below for citations.

6. Friedbert Pflueger [a Christian Democrat, member of the foreign affairs committee in the German Parliament], ''NATO's Bad Bargain: We Went Too Far Appeasing Russia,'' *N.Y. Times*, May 16, 1997, p. A33 (op-ed). ''NATO–Russia council could be a backdoor way of allowing Russia to become part of the alli-

ance. . . . Negotiations over deployment of nuclear arms were limited to new NATO states. Why not ask Russia to make similar concessions in areas like Kaliningrad, which lies between Poland and the Baltics? . . . NATO did not address the enormous Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons.''

7. Henry Kissinger, ''The Dilution of NATO,'' *Wash. Post*, Sunday, June 8, 1997, p. C9 (op-ed). [''Outlook'' section.] ''In practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. . . . Russia is approaching de facto NATO membership.''

8. Robert E. Hunter, [U.S. ambassador to NATO], ''Fear Not for NATO: Taking Exception,'' *Wash. Post*, June 27, 1997, p. A25 (op-ed). ''Before it even began negotiating the Founding Act with the Russians, NATO decided on its own—and declared unilaterally—that it had 'no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.' . . . NATO has made its choices, while 'keeping its powder dry.' ''

9. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake, ''For a New World, a New NATO: As Expansion Nears, We Should Count the Blessings,'' *N.Y. Times*, June 30, 1997, p. A19 (op-ed). ''Russia does get a perch in the alliance's antechambers, but it is not seated in the North Atlantic Council, NATO's chief policy making organ. . . . The agreement makes it clear that NATO would first formulate its own position before consultations with Russia.''

10. Harvey Sicherman [president, Foreign Policy Research Institute], ''The NATO–Russia Agreement,'' *FPRI Notes*, June 3, 1997, 3 pages. ''At least one prominent Russian analyst—Sergey Rogov of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada—describes the [Permanent Joint] Council as an 'effective veto for Russia.' . . . We could see a repeat of the debate over the League of Nations in 1919, when most Senators actually favored some sort of League but also wanted assurances about American freedom of action. . . . A strange alliance between the internationalists and the isolationists . . . killed the League.''

11. ''Yeltsin Warns NATO, Reassures Parliamentary Leaders,'' lead item, *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, May 20, 1997. Cited words are a paraphrase of Russian media reports by RFE/RL.

12. William Drozdiak, ''Alliance to Face Major Changes: News Analysis,'' *Wash. Post*, May 15, 1997, p. A30. To the same effect, Steven Lee Meyers, ''U.S. Now at Odds with NATO Allies on New Members: A Difference on Growth: Washington Wants to Limit Expansion to 3 Countries While Most Favor 5,'' *N.Y. Times*, May 30, 1997, p. A9.

13. Article 17 of the Founding Act reads in full: ''Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.''

14. Michael Dobbs, ''U.S. Indicates Preference for Just 3 New States: . . . ; Albright Says They Will Not Be the Last,'' *Wash. Post*, May 30, 1997, p. A30.

15. Fy, ''Beratungen ueber Nato-Beitrittskandidaten; Aussenministertreffen in Sintra/ Vermittlung zwischen 'kleiner' und 'grosser' Erweiterung'' [Deliberations about candidates for NATO membership; Foreign ministers meeting at Sintra/ Mediation (proposals) for 'little'' and 'big' enlargement], *Frankfurter Allgemeine*

Zeitung [Frankfurt General Newspaper; henceforth, *FAZ*], May 30, 1997, pp. 1–2, citation from p. 2.

16. Press Release M-1(97)81: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 8 July 1997: ''Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government.'' Off the Internet (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/pr97–081e.htm).

17. ''Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,'' Madrid, 9 July 1997. Off the Internet (http: www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchart.htm).

18. [''NATO and Ukraine,] . . . sharing the view that the opening of the Alliance to new members, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, is directed at enhancing the stability of Europe, and the security of all countries in Europe without recreating dividing lines; are committed . . .''

19. ''[NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to:] the recognition that security of all states in the OSCE area is indivisible, that no state should pursue its security at the expense of that of another state, and that no state can regard any part of the OSCE region *as its sphere of influence*.'' [Emphasis added; this is the lead paragraph in Article 2.]

20. ''Opening Statement by the President of Ukraine, H. E. [Leonid] Kuchma, at the Signing Ceremony of the NATO–Ukraine Charter, Madrid, 9 July 1997,'' off the Internet (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709i.htm). ''Secretary General's Remarks, at the Signing Ceremony of the NATO–Ukraine Charter, Madrid, 9 July 1997,'' off the Internet (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709a.htm).

21. The long Article 2, in the preamble of the Founding Act, begins, ''NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries.''

22. ''Statement by Mr. Victor Sheiman, Official Representative of President A. Lukashenko, State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus, Meeting of the EAPC, Madrid, 9 July 1997,'' 5 pages, off the Internet (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709j.htm).

23. As cited verbatim, but without an exact date, in Gerhard Gnauck, ''Vorabfruechte der Nato-Erweiterung: Ein Feuerwerk der Versoehnungen erleuchtet den immer weniger geteilten Himmel ueber Europa'' [Preliminary fruits of NATO's enlargement: a firework of reconciliations lights up the less and less divided sky over Europe], *FAZ*, May 28, 1997, p. 16. See also his analysis of the treaty, ''Toechterchen Russland, achte deine Mutter, die Ukraine: Der Besuch Jelzins ist eine Kroenung einer erfolgreichen Aussenpolitik Kiews'' [Little Russian daughter, do respect your mother, Ukraine; Yeltsin's visit is the crowning of Kyiv's successful foreign policy], *FAZ*, May 31, 1997, p. 7.

24. Sergey Kisilev, correspondent for Ukraine, ''Kto dirizhiroval v Kieve?: 'Ya shchastliv—chesno govoryu'—skazal Kuchma i trizhdy potseloval Yeltsina'' [Who called the shots in Kyiv?: 'I am happy—I say so honestly,' said Kuchma and kissed Yeltsin three times], *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 4, 1997, p. 1. On early negotiations, as related by the former president of Ukraine, Leonid M. Kravchuk, see Yanina Sokolovskaya, ''Borshch ili lapshu gotovit Kiev prezidentu Rossii? Korrespondentu 'Izvestiy' Yanine Sokolovskoy staly izvestny podrobnosti protokola vstrechi s Borisom Yel'tsynym'' [Is Kyiv preparing a feast (*borshch*) or a humble pie (*lapsha*, noodles) for the president of Russia? (Kyiv—Y. B.) corre-

spondent of *Izvestiya* Yanina Sokolovskaya has learned the details of the protocol of the reception of Boris Yeltsin], *Izvestiya*, May 28, 1997, p. 2.

25. Sokolovskaya, ''V Kieve gotovy k neozhidannostyam: Na sluchay nepod-pisaniya dogovora Ukrainy s Rossiey podgotovlen zapasnoy variant'' [In Kyiv, one is ready for the unexpected: In case the treaty of Ukraine with Russia is not signed, a substitute version has been prepared], *Izvestiya*, May 31, 1997, p. 1.

26. ''Dohovir pro druzhbu, spivrobitnytstvo i partnerstvo mizh Ukrainoyu i Rosiys'koyu Federatsiyeyu'' [Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation], eight pages, as supplied by the embassy of Ukraine in Washington, DC (courtesy of Mr. Valeriy P. Kuchinsky, Minister Counsellor, and Mr. Oleksandr Vashchenko, First Secretary). Henceforth cited as ''Dohovir . . . ,'' May 31, 1997.

27. ''Dohovir . . . ,'' May 31, 1997, p. 2.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp. 2–3.

30. Sokolovskaya, ''Bol'shoy dogovor ostavil bol'shie neyasnosti'' [The big treaty left big areas of lack of clarity], *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1997, p. 2. Also, Sophie Shihab, Moscow correspondent, ''Le traité entre la Russie et l'Ukraine met fin à cinq ans de frictions: À l'occasion de sa visite à Kiev, Boris Eltsine signéra samedi 31 mai, avec son homologue Léonid Koutchma, ce texte par lequel les deux Etats s'entendent sur le partage de la flotte de la mer Noire'' [The treaty between Russia and Ukraine puts an end to five years of frictions: on his visit to Kyiv, Boris Yeltsin is going to sign, on Saturday, May 31, with his counterpart Leonid Kuchma, the text whereby the two states agree to divide the Black Sea Fleet], *Le Monde*, May 31, 1997, p. 4.

31. As cited in Serhiy Kudryashov, Serhiy Odarych and Yuriy Orobets', *Karta Sevastopolya: triumf prezydentiv, trahediya Ukrainy (prodovzhennya)* [The Sevastopol card: triumph of the presidents and tragedy for Ukraine (continuation)] (Kyiv: ''Ukrains'ka perspektyva'' [Ukrainian perspective], June 25, 1997), p. 3. Kudryashov is a deputy of the Kyiv City Council, Odarych the president of the Ukrainian Perspective Fund, and Orobets' a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Council (Parliament).

32. The original Article 2 of the supplementary agreement on the parameters of dividing the Black Sea Fleet reads: ''The main base of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation is located *in* the city of Sevastopol'' (emphasis added). See ''Uhoda mizh Ukrainoyu i Rosiyskoyu Federatsiyeyu pro parametry podilu Chornomors'koho flotu'' [Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Parameters of the Black Sea Fleet Division], as reproduced in full in Kudryashov, et al. *Karta Sevastopolya . . .* , pp. 22–25, citation on p. 22. It is good, in my view, that the agreement stipulates the existence of the Russian naval base *in* the city of Sevastopol, as opposed to Sevastopol being the main Russian naval base. Kudryashov, Odarych and Orobets' would have been more explicit and prudent in writing, as Article 2 of the agreement, ''The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation utilizes on the basis of a lease the military base of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the city of Sevastopol.'' See *Karta Sevastopolya . . .* , p. 3.

33. Article 8 reads, in full, ''The High Contracting Parties develop their relations in the military and military-industrial spheres, in providing national security, as well as in their collaboration in frontier and customs matters, in export

and immigration controls, on the basis of separate agreements.'' ''Dohovir . . . ,'' May 31, 1997, p. 3.

34. Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, Dr. Yury Shcherbak, ''A New Period in the Ukrainian–Russian Relations, . . .'' *Embassy of Ukraine Newsletter*, vol. 1.4 (June 1997), p. 4 [direct quote]. The titles of all eleven documents are given in Kudryashov, et al., *Karta Sevastopolya . . .* , pp. 13–14. They are, in English translation by the author,

1. ''Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Status and Conditions of the Stationing of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF] on the Territory of Ukraine'' [original printed in *Karta Sevastopolya . . .* , pp. 15–22];

2. ''Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Mutual Payments Connected with the Division of the BSF and the Stationing of the BSF of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine'' [printed ibid. on pp. 28–30];

3. ''Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Parameters of the BSF Division (including 6 annexes)'' [full text of agreement and excerpts from annexes nos. 2 and 3 printed on pp. 22–27];

4. ''Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Sphere of Information Sciences'';

5. ''Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Sphere of Reprocessing of Waste Products Containing Mercury'';

6. ''Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Observing Tax Laws'';

7. ''Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Implementing Agreed-upon Structural Economic Policies'';

8. ''Protocol on Tax Measures Connected with the Implementation of the Agreements about the BSF, of May 28, 1997'';

9. ''Protocol of the 2nd Meeting of the Mixed Ukrainian-Russian Cooperation Commission'';

10. ''Protocol between the Customs Service of Ukraine and the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation on Regulations Concerning the Transportation across the Ukrainian–Russian State Frontier of Alcohol and Tobacco Products''; and, lastly,

11. ''Basic Directions of Long-Term Economic and Scientific-Engineering Cooperation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation for the Years 1997–2000 and the period until 2005.''

35. Sokolovskaya, ''V Kieve gotovy k neozhidannostyam,'' *Izvestiya*, May 31, 1997, p. 1.

36. Ambassador Dr. Yury Shcherbak, ''A New Period in the Ukrainian–Russian Relations . . . ,'' *Embassy of Ukraine Newsletter*, June 1997, p. 4.

37. Ibid., p. 5.

38. Paul Goble, ''A Victory for Ukraine,'' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, June 3, 1997, pp. 12–14.

39. Gnauck, ''Toechterchen Russland, achte deine Mutter, die Ukraine . . . ,'' *FAZ*, May 31, 1997, p. 7.

40. Peter Rutland, ''A Tale of Two Treaties,'' *Transitions: Changes in Post–Communist Societies*, vol. 4, no. 2 (July 1997), p. 5 [box].

41. Anatol Lieven, ''Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia and the West,'' *Wash. Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 55–56.

42. Shihab, ''Le traité entre la Russie et l'Ukraine . . . ,'' *Le Monde*, May 31, 1997, p. 4; and Sokolovskaya, ''Bol'shoy dogovor ostavil bol'shie neyasnosti,'' *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1997, p. 2. Also, Kisilev, ''Kto dirizhiroval v Kieve? . . . ,'' *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 4, 1997, p. 1.

43. Figures from Kudryashov, et al., *Karta Sevastopolya . . .* , pp. 4–5, 7. They are derived from Annex 4 to the Parameters of the BSF Division Agreement, which lists every ship. That annex was *not* printed in their book. For precision's sake, it should be mentioned that between 1992 and 1996, 263 additional BSF ships and auxiliary vessels had been written off as obsolete. Ukraine got 50 percent of the proceeds, increasing the write-off of the debt to Russia by another $5.5 million, a grand total of $526.5 million to be applied for the reduction of the debt, not $521 million. Ibid., pp. 5, 8, 28.

44. Pavlo Politiuk, ''Verkhovna Rada Ratifies Treaty with Russia, Setting the Stage for a New Relationship,'' *Ukr. Weekly*, vol. 66, no. 3 (January 18, 1998), pp. 1, 16.

45. ''Security Aspects of Russian–Ukrainian Treaty,'' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, June 2, 1997, p. 7.

46. Article 6 reads in full: ''Either High Contracting Party abstains from participation in or the support of any actions whatsoever which are directed against the other High Contracting Party, and obligates itself *not to conclude with third countries any treaties whatsover which are directed against the other Party*. Neither Party will also allow that its territory be used to the detriment of the security of the other Party'' (emphasis added).

47. ''Kyiv Rejects Yeltsin's Offer of Defense 'in Extreme Situations,' '' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, June 2, 1997, p. 7. See also Woronowycz, ''Ukraine–Russia Sign Long-Awaited Bilateral Treaty,'' *Ukr. Weekly*, vol. 65, no. 23 (June 8, 1997), pp. 1, 4 (on p. 4).

48. Sokolovskaya, ''Bol'shoy dogovor ostavil bol'shie neyasnosti,'' *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1997, p. 2.

49. For further details on the Ukrainian–NATO ''Sea Breeze '97'' maneuvers, including the units involved, from the Russian point of view, see Victor Yadukha, ''NATO Is Now in Crimea,'' *Sevodnya*, August 27, 1997, p. 4 [condensed translation in *Current Digest of Post–Soviet Press* (*CDPSP*), vol. 49, no. 34 (1997). pp. 18–19]. Best from the American point of view is Christian Caryl, ''NATO and Ukraine Are Getting Cozy: And the Russians Are Not Amused,'' *U.S. News and World Report*, vol. 123, no. 10 (September 15, 1997), pp. 52–53. On the post–''Sea Breeze'' Ukrainian–Russian naval maneuvers, see Mikhail Urusov, ''Joint Defense Zone,'' *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 44, November 2–9, 1997, p. 12, or *CDPSP*, vol. 49, no. 44 (1997), pp. 20–21, for a condensed translation.

50. Andrij Kudla Wynnyckyj, ''York University Conference examines Ukraine between NATO and Russia,'' *Ukr. Weekly*, vol. 65, no. 51 (December 21, 1997), p. 12 [paraphrase by Wynnyckyj].

51. As cited in ibid.

52. Ibid. On Ukrainian–Russian cooperation in air defense, see also Bilinsky,

''Ukraine, Russia and the West . . . ,'' *Problems of Post–Communism*, vol. 44, no. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 31–32.

53. Kudryashov, et al., *Karta Sevastopolya . . .* , p. 10.

54. ''Ukrainian, Russian Presidents Sign Political Treaty,'' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, June 2, 1997, pp. 6–7, on p. 7.

55. Shihab, ''Le traité entre la Russie et l'Ukraine . . . ,'' *Le Monde*, May 31, 1997, p. 4.

A Year after the Madrid Summit: The Overall Situation in Mid-1998

By mid-1998, roughly a year after the NATO summit in Madrid and some nine months before the expected formal accessions to NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary on the fiftieth anniversary of the original Washington Treaty in April 1999, the situation in both domestic and foreign policy, in Washington as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, has become only slightly less murky than it had been in mid-1997. In the spring of 1998, the U.S. Senate approved the amendment to the Washington Treaty in favor of NATO enlargement with a strong margin. But a seemingly failed amendment served to indicate the limits of U.S. support for NATO's enlargement beyond the first three candidates. A month before the vote in the U.S. Senate, the German Bundestag had overwhelmingly endorsed NATO's enlargement to include the first three and, in subsequent accessions, the Baltic states, but not Ukraine. The Czech Republic, one of the three states chosen to be admitted in the first round, unexpectedly ran into a small rough spot on its path to accession, which was, however, smoothed over by the strong advocacy of President Vaclav Havel in Prague and President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Korbel Albright in Washington. Hungary's popular enthusiasm for admission to NATO has also remained somewhat shallow, but less controversial, than the opinion polls in the Czech Republic. Popular and elite support for NATO in Poland, however, remained more robust than in mid-1996, after the victory of the democratic right in the parliamentary elections of September 1997.

The Balts remained as eager to join NATO as they had been in 1995–1996, despite their partial rebuff at Madrid and despite all of the offers of security guarantees by Russia after Madrid. In mid-January 1998, the

three Baltic presidents were offered a Charter of Partnership by the United States, not the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which included the promise to help the Baltic states be admitted to NATO. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could not but accept that Charter.

The Ukrainians survived the challenge from the Leftist anti-NATO forces in the parliamentary election of March 1998, but already in mid-November 1997 the first director of NATO's Documentation and Information Center in Kyiv was killed in an automobile accident. Paradoxically, the only firm element in the diplomatic and political constellation in mid-1998 has been Russia's unremitting hostility against NATO's enlargement, particularly into the Baltics and Ukraine.

THE U.S. SENATE AND THE DESIGNATED ''NATO FIRST THREE''

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its hearings on the pros and cons of NATO enlargement on October 7, 1997, after the basic decision to offer admission to the first three states had already been made and signed in Madrid in mid-July 1997. This was a deliberate strategy developed by the Clinton administration to put political pressure on some of the less enthusiastic or even hostile U.S. senators. The hearings, not being fully covered by the press, were almost anticlimactic and rather ''low key.'' By the end of 1997, the Clinton administration also finessed the extension of the stay of American troops in Bosnia beyond the once-threatened date of withdrawal in June 1998: proponents of NATO enlargement, such as Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., were afraid that a full debate on the extension of service in Bosnia and NATO enlargement could have shipwrecked both policies.

The most notable proponents of enlargement were, besides Senator Biden, who is the ranking minority member on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright; Senator William V. Roth Jr., also of Delaware; Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski; and Dr. Henry Kissinger. Even more than Secretary of State Albright, Senator Roth stressed the general contribution of NATO's enlargement to international stability. In his memorable phrase, ''NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of instability that now exists in Europe.''[1] The anti-Russian implications of the first wave of NATO's enlargement were deliberately toned down by Dr. Albright and Dr. Brzezinski, but not so much by Dr. Kissinger, who repeated his previously voiced criticism that the new Permanent Joint Council gave Russia unofficial but effective veto power over the deliberations of NATO's councils.[2]

For our purpose, the most interesting insights from the hearings in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee are those on American attitudes toward the admission of the Baltic states and Ukraine to NATO in the

subsequent rounds. When Democratic Senator Charles S. Robb, of Virginia, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, inquired about ''the prospect for the ultimate accession of, say, the Baltic states,'' Secretary Albright gave a long answer about the United States ''taking a number of steps in order to ensure that the Baltic states are more and more enveloped in European institutions.'' She even furnished concrete examples. But on the controversial point of the Balts' entering NATO, Dr. Albright was diplomatically evasive. She said: ''NATO is open to all democracies that meet those guidelines that we have been talking about. It is not closed to anyone and there is a process in train, *but I am not going to predict specifically what the next group of countries will be*'' (emphasis added).[3] Dr. Brzezinski did not touch on the admission of the next waves of NATO aspirants. Most interesting was also the opinion of Dr. Kissinger. When challenged by Republican Senator Gordon H. Smith, of Oregon, ''There is no more reason then to keep the Baltics out than to keep Poland out,'' Dr. Kissinger replied,

The problem with *the Baltics or, say, Ukraine*, is that when you move former republics of the Soviet Union into NATO and an integrated military structure, then you have, especially with Ukraine, *a major challenge to Russian self-consciousness*. On the other hand, we have to find a way of conveying that a threat to the independence of the Baltics and Ukraine would be inimical to any friendly relationship with the United States, and that is something we would look at with the greatest gravity.[4] [emphasis added]

Implicitly, Dr. Kissinger is advocating some kind of security assurances for the Baltic states and Ukraine, short of their admission to NATO. But those security assurances are widely distrusted by all Baltic and a growing section of Ukrainian statesmen. There is some kind of illogic: if the Russian leaders cannot be trusted in not penetrating and subverting mighty NATO through the Permanent Joint Council, can they be trusted to keep their hands off of the Baltic states and Ukraine? If true Russian democrats will not oppose true independence of the Baltic states and Ukraine, why humor Russian protoimperialists? The resurrection of the Soviet Russian Union of 1939–1940 is surely not in the interest of either Western and Central Europe, nor of the United States? Or is it?

On March 3, 1998, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by a vote of 16 to 2, endorsed NATO's enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The two negative votes were by liberal Democratic Senator Paul D. Wellstone of Minnesota, and conservative Republican Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri. Senator Wellstone, whose father had been born in pre-Soviet Ukraine, was worried that NATO's enlargement would harm the democratic development of Russia. Senator Ashcroft felt that NATO's functions were being redefined and over-

extended.[5] The journalists predicted that the number of opposing sena-
tors was too small to prevent the first wave of expansion from being
endorsed by the full Senate. But both the opponents and the lukewarm
supporters devised the more imaginative technique of ''apausement'' or
''appausement,'' namely, accession of the three first NATO aspirants was
acceptable, but there should be a ''pause'' of several years (say, three)
before the next wave would be voted on, a ''pause'' that could effectively
kill the accession of the Baltic states and Ukraine.[6] The debate and vote
in the full Senate was also postponed from late March 1998.

Eventually, the ''apausement'' amendment was defeated by a vote of
59 to 41, and on April 30, 1998, the U.S. Senate voted to admit Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary immediately and to consider the other
aspiring states later. The vote was a strong 80 senators for, 19 against
and 1 absent. Senator Jesse Helms, who headed the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Commitee, initially had expressed some reservations about the
role of Russia in the Permanent Joint Council, but he guided the hearings
to a successful conclusion and also voted yea in the final vote on the
Senate floor. Of particular importance in our context, however, is the fact
that Republican Senator John W. Warner's ''apausement'' amendment
was defeated by only 59 votes, not two-thirds of the membership, or 68.[7]
This means that, unless Russian foreign policy turns much worse, there
will not be enough votes in the U.S. Senate, as presently constituted, to
endorse NATO's enlargement to the Baltic states and Ukraine. The
German Parliament (Bundestag) already voted on NATO's enlargement
on March 26, 1998, with 555 out of 622 members voting yea, 37 nay and
30 abstaining. Only the old Communist Party in East Germany, now the
PDS, opposed the measure as a bloc, as did a number of ''Alliance 90/
The Greens.'' There was no clear-cut opposition to further enlargement
as far as and including the Baltic states, as there was later in the U.S.
Senate.[8]

Meanwhile, already in December 1997, the Czech Republic had suf-
fered a political and an economic shock: Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus,
the leader of the Civic Democratic Party and well-known market re-
former, who had headed a coalition government since 1992, was forced
to resign over the combined issue of corruption and style of political
leadership within the Civic Democratic Party. President Vaclav Havel
did not waste any time in denouncing Klaus's economic policies, political
leadership and relative neglect of building up popular support for join-
ing NATO. In Havel's words, ''It is all the more unfortunate that we
have so far seemed unable to convey this message [on the importance
of joining NATO] to our citizens convincingly enough. . . . Maybe this
was also due to the unfortunate emphasis on pure economy.''[9]

President Havel is probably the strongest advocate of his country join-
ing both NATO and the European Union, and there was a good reason

for him to voice his concern. As late as November 1997, some four months after the Madrid NATO Summit, only 43 percent of the Czech respondents in a public opinion poll favored entry into NATO, and as many as 28 percent were undecided. In December 1997, in a more recent poll that was made public on December 23, the number of Czechs in favor of joining NATO increased to 53 percent, with 20 percent still remaining undecided. With the help of a vigorous public relations campaign in favor of joining NATO, but without holding a popular referendum, the latest pro-NATO public opinion figures rose to 57 percent in the spring of 1998.[10] The issue was solved not by holding a referendum, but by having the two chambers of the Czech Parliament endorse accession to NATO in April 1998.[11]

A popular referendum on joining NATO, however, with some advertising by the government, was held in Hungary on November 16, 1997. An overwhelming majority of the respondents (85.3 percent) indeed favored joining NATO. But there was a rub: the turnout for the referendum was 51 percent. In Hungary, accession to NATO was supported, so to speak, by a strong majority within a popular near-minority.[12]

Only the Poles, both the elite and the people as a whole, remained strongly committed to join NATO at the very first opportunity in 1999. As a bonus, in the Polish parliamentary elections of September 1997, the Communists and their allies lost to the democratic right, including representatives of the old Solidarity. Some advocates of NATO's enlargement breathed a sigh of relief in that it would make cooperation between NATO and Polish intelligence services that much easier. While it was appreciated in the West that Polish Communists such as President Kwasniewski supported Poland's accession to NATO, there was still some distrust left toward professional intelligence agents who had once worked for the Warsaw Pact and in 1998 still remained Communists. Removal of the leader of the group after the elections helped clear the air.[13]

THE EAGER BALTS

In the winter of 1997–1998, and especially in the spring of 1998, the Baltic countries moved closer toward integration into the European Union rather than NATO, without excluding the latter in principle, however. On January 4, 1998, a 71-year-old Lithuanian American, Dr. Valdas Adamkus, a retired regional administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the Midwest, narrowly won the Lithuanian presidential election against the indigenous candidate Arturas Paulauskas, who, critics said, represented the old Communist *nomenklatura*. President-elect Adamkus declared that he was serene about the delay in the admission to NATO. He said in an interview with the Baltic News Ser-

vice [BNS] on January 7, 1998, that he ''welcomed the current govern-
ment's efforts into integration into Western structures but warned that
membership in NATO may not be achieved until 2005.'' He also said,
''We will grow stronger during that period and will be accepted with
greater pleasure, compared to what our striving would look like today.''
Nonetheless, Russia was not pleased with the Lithuanian presidential
election going to a former U.S. citizen and federal official.[14]

In March 1998, negotiations were formally opened for the admission
of the first tranche of Eastern European members into the European Un-
ion. But of the Baltic states it was not Lithuania that was invited to
participate, but the smaller, economically stronger Estonia. Lithuania and
Latvia were relegated to the second-round negotiations. Of the formerly
Communist states, besides Estonia, it was Poland, the Czech Republic
and Hungary (the ''NATO First Three'') that were invited as first-tranche
candidates for full membership in the European Union, as was Slovenia,
the most prosperous and militarily successful part of former Yugoslavia.
Slovenia had also been seriously considered as a first-tranche candidate
for admission to NATO. To round up the ex-Communist ''First Five,''
Cyprus was added as a sixth first-tranche candidate for admission to the
European Union, whereas the application for full membership in the
European Union by Turkey, which had been an early member of NATO,
was relegated to the Greek kalends. Opposition to the Turkish entry into
the European Union stemmed not only from Greece but also from Ger-
many, which at one time had welcomed Turkish ''guest workers'' with
open arms. Greece championed, of course, the accelerated admission of
still-divided Cyprus. But the painful Turkish aspect is a separate story.[15]

More important for our work is that literally, within a week of the
Madrid Summit on NATO enlargement (July 8–9, 1997), on July 16, 1997,
the president of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, presented to
the European Parliament in Strasbourg a massive ''Agenda 2000,'' which,
among other things, covered plans for the enlargement of the European
Union.[16] Friedman was wrong to present the EU tomato as an alternative
to the admission to NATO: the two are linked intimately.

Initially in the European Union there had been pressure to restrict the
first-tranche invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (the
''First NATO Three'') and to Cyprus. The admission process to the EU
was also to be more protracted: if the negotiations with the first-round
states would begin in early 1998, they would not actually be able to join
the EU until 2002 or 2003, a process of four or five years. (In contrast,
the admission to NATO of the first-tranche candidates was to take place
within two years, from July 1997 until April 1999.) But it was reported
that Denmark, Finland and Sweden pressed for accession negotiations
to begin also with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia.
Estonia, apparently, was also included among the Scandinavian coun-

tries' protégés, and earlier there had been an American RAND Corporation study recommendation that Estonia should be offered EU membership first among the Baltic states. Agenda 2000 admitted that in 1997 none of the applicant countries met the EU admission criteria that had been established in 1993, but a political decision was made that the chosen first-tranche countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus) were the ones that came closest to meeting those criteria.[17]

From our point of view, the decision of the EU to start negotiating with the three prime NATO candidates—and also with Estonia and Slovenia, which were not to be admitted to NATO in the first round—only shows that the laborious process of admission to the EU is influenced by primary decisions made in NATO. Second, while the rapid EU negotiations with Estonia are to be welcomed, they have come at the price of Baltic solidarity. To break that Baltic solidarity has been one of the main objectives of Russian foreign policy, which—unwittingly, perhaps—has also been incorporated into the American RAND Corporation study. When the EU Agenda 2000 on enlargement was formally adopted on December 13, 1997, Latvian Prime Minister Guntar Krasts, representing a second-tranche country, could not but agree for the record. He said, ''We accept the approach and we are grateful. . . . It's a crucial decision to include all countries in the process, and it's an additional motivation.'' Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, speaking for a first-tranche EU candidate country, was incautious enough to undercut the international support for Slovenian admission into NATO by saying, ''Seventy percent of our trade is with EU countries. . . . NATO remains an objective, but the first and most vital objective for Slovenia is EU membership.''[18]

Evidently to counteract the dangerous impression that, for all of the sympathy they enjoyed in the West, the three Baltic states would first be split up and then still left out in the cold in their quest for accession to NATO, on January 16, 1998, President Bill Clinton and Presidents Lennart Meri of Estonia, Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia and the outgoing Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania signed a Charter of Partnership, which solemnly committed the United States to help defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the three states and also promised that the United States would do everything in its power to get them ready to join NATO and supported their efforts to do so.[19]

The three key sentences from the Charter, which has been reproduced in full in the Appendix, are:

The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to

assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO deter-
mines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the
strategic interests of the Alliance. . . . No non-NATO country has a veto over
Alliance decisions.[20]

In the exchange of speeches that preceded the signing of the Charter,
U.S. President Clinton hedged somewhat on the issue of the Baltic ac-
cession to NATO. He said, "Of course, there can be no guarantees of
admission to the alliance. Only NATO's leaders, operating by consensus,
can offer membership to an aspiring state. But America's security is tied
to Europe, and Europe will never be fully secure if Baltic security is in
doubt."[21] Possibly as an unintended consolation prize for not having
been given a firm date for admission to NATO, the United States formed
a new partnership commission with the Baltic states, to be headed by
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the real architect of President
Clinton's policy toward the former Soviet Union. That commission may
be patterned on the successful Gore–Chernomyrdin (U.S.–Russia) and
Gore–Kuchma (U.S.–Ukraine) commissions.

   While President Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia did not explicitly mention
NATO in his brief remarks, Algirdas Brazauskas, the outgoing president
of Lithuania, and President Lennart Meri of Estonia did. Said President
Brazauskas, "The U.S.–Baltic Charter confirms repeatedly that Lithuania
is a serious candidate for accession to NATO. . . . We appreciate and are
supportive of President Clinton's and the U.S. role of leadership in open-
ing up to Central European democracies the doors to history's most suc-
cessful alliance."[22] Said President Meri,

An important element in our [Estonia's] security strategy is eventual full mem-
bership in NATO. We believe that NATO continues to be the sole guarantor of
security and stability in Europe. . . . We believe that the question of Baltic mem-
bership in NATO will become the real test of post–Madrid security thinking—
that is, that countries shall be able to choose their security arrangements regard-
less of geography.[23]

Clearly, Presidents Brazauskas and Meri were speaking for the historical
record. So was President Clinton.

   On balance, the signing of the Baltic Charter was a welcome move
insofar as, from the very beginning, Russia had tried repeatedly to rule
out the Balts' accession to NATO and had persistently attempted to ob-
tain the United States' agreement to that principle. On January 16, 1998,
the United States went on record as endorsing an eventual Baltic acces-
sion to NATO, even against Russian opposition. Even before the signing,

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has told Foreign Minister Yevgeny M.
Primakov of Russia that Washington and Moscow should simply agree to dis-

agree on the possibility of future Baltic membership in NATO and work together instead on regional economic and environmental cooperation.

Albright's deputy, Mr. Strobe Talbott, in September 1997, even said, ''Quite bluntly, Russians need to get over their neuralgia on this subject. . . . They need to stop looking at the Baltic region as a pathway for foreign armies or as a buffer zone.''[24]

But there is a serious drawback to the Quadripartite Charter of Partnership, even when compared to the much looser NATO–Ukraine Charter of July 9, 1997. The Quadripartite Charter has not been concluded with NATO as a whole and does not automatically commit other members of NATO apart from the United States. The *New York Times* editorial staff was wise to put in the preview of the signing of the Charter a cautionary subtitle: ''Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will join NATO *when the allies are ready*. The U.S. *will help*'' (emphasis added).[25]

While the Russian reaction to the Charter was muted at first, anonymous NATO members have been quite candid in registering to the *New York Times* correspondent their reservations against the accession of the three Baltic states to NATO. Wrote Steven Erlanger,

America's NATO allies insisted that the charter make clear, as it now does in its final version, that any Baltic membership of NATO will depend not only on each country's readiness to join, but also on NATO's determination that including any Baltic country would serve the overall strategic interests of the alliance.

A senior diplomat from a NATO country said, Membership must not be just in the interest of the Baltic states. It must be in NATO's interests. Had Washington pushed Baltic membership now, he said, it would have seriously worsened larger European strategic interests.

While NATO countries have different views, the diplomat said, membership will depend in large part on how well the Baltic countries themselves improve their relations with Russia. That, he predicted, will take a decade or longer.[26]

The last precondition (that before Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can be admitted to NATO they have to improve their relations with Russia themselves) is not only logical nonsense (the reason the Balts want to join NATO is precisely because of Russian hegemonial strategy and rather heavy-handed pressure tactics) but is also the proverbial insult added to the injury of the genocide of the period 1940–1991, and the continued delay in keeping them out of NATO.

Sure enough, on March 3, 1998, there erupted a ''mini-crisis'' over the Latvian police forcibly dispersing but not injuring a few thousand Russian-speaking residents of Riga, Latvia, who insisted that the Latvian government recognize their Soviet-era passports and who kept the traffic tied up for several hours. The incident, which may have been staged, was then blown out of proportion by Russian Foreign Minister Prima-

kov, who decried Latvia's flagrant violation of basic human rights. Surprisingly, French President Chirac and German Chancellor Kohl, who visited President Yeltsin in the last week of March 1998, sided with the Russians against the Latvians.[27] Even more surprisingly, President Clinton, who had signed the Baltic Charter only in January 1998, did not speak out on the issue at all. Critics of the Clinton administration suspect that the ''White House wants to have it both ways'': credit for its solemn promise to sponsor Baltic accession to NATO eventually and credit for not ruffling too much the feathers of Russia and its anonymous friends in NATO. This would mean accession in 2005–2008 at the earliest, if ever. The Quadripartite Charter of Partnership is definitely not the whole loaf that the Baltic leaders and their peoples have aspired to, but under the circumstances, the quarter loaf may be better than nothing.

THE PREOCCUPIED UKRAINIANS

Throughout the fall of 1997, until March 29, 1998, Ukrainians were in the throes of campaigning for a new Parliament: the first under the Constitution of 1996 and the first under a mixed electoral law. According to detailed preliminary results—the counting of the paper ballots appears to take much time, as do challenges by unsuccessful candidates—the anti-NATO Communist Party did increase its representation, but not to the extent that it and its Leftist allies would have a strong majority. Altogether, the Communist Party obtained a plurality of seats (123 out of a total of 450, or 27.3 percent). The next largest group in Parliament appears to be the 114 (25.3 percent) Independents, who have not formally joined a party. The anti-NATO Socialists and Agrarians have won 32 seats (7.1 percent), and the more vociferous Progressive Socialist Party won 16 more (3.6 percent), giving the Communists a potential anti-NATO coalition of 171, or 38 percent, which falls short of the majority of 226.[28] Conversely, there is no strong pro-NATO majority in the 1998 Ukrainian Parliament either, the NATO supporters being able to count on about 179 deputies.[29] This places additional responsibility on the president, who is, however, up for reelection himself in October 1999.

As late as September 1997, one of the negotiators of the NATO–Ukraine Charter, Dr. Ihor Kharchenko, then director of Policy Analysis and Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, while saying that ''the development of a strong partnership with NATO is one of the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy, which is working towards gradual integration into existing European and Euro-Atlantic structures,'' was forced to admit that ''for the time being'' Ukraine is staying out of NATO. In his more nuanced words, ''Another distinguishing feature of Ukraine's security posture is that, while sharing many of the same points of view on security as a number of other Central and Eastern European

countries, Ukraine has not chosen to seek NATO membership, *at least for the time being*'' (emphasis added).[30] It is the old Ukrainian double-track approach again.

In November 1997, the cause of Ukraine's accession to NATO suffered a setback through the untimely death, in an automobile accident, of Mr. Roman Lishchynski, who had been appointed director of NATO's Information and Documentation Center in Kyiv only half a year before, on May 7, 1997.[31] According to a senior Ukrainian diplomat, the opening of that center on May 7 on the premises of the prestigious Institute for International Relations of the Shevchenko National Kyiv University, which is located in the former Higher Party School Building, was a very festive occasion, with NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and some 1,000 Ukrainian dignitaries and university students in attendance. Secretary-General Solana had personally taken an interest in the opening of that center, the first in a country that is not yet a member of NATO, and he was quite pleased with the turnout. Mr. Lishchynski's death *may* have been a genuine accident. In any case, no permanent replacement was found for him as of April 1998.

CONSTANT RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Paradoxically, the only stable element in mid-1998 is Russian foreign policy. Despite some statements by President Yeltsin himself, who toward the end of 1997 became decidedly unwell, Russia definitely wants to remain a world power. One of its instruments is the restoration of effective hegemony over the former Soviet Union—including first and foremost Ukraine—but definitely not excluding the three Baltic states. Russia's Baltic ambition does not play well in Washington, not to speak of Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm. But the decision makers in Moscow primarily listen to the reaction in Moscow and tend to disregard any hostile reaction abroad, especially after the West accepted the bloody 21-month war in Chechnya. There is a seeming change from the days of Stalin and Brezhnev: Russia no longer insists on formal subjection and incorporation, only on the real power of decision making. This ''soft,'' insidious restoration of the Soviet Union can then be used as a means of reestablishing hegemony over as many members of the former Warsaw Pact as will listen to Moscow, including even seemingly deaf Poland.

As the year 1997 closed, Dr. Paul A. Goble, director of the communications division of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and publisher of the *RFE/RL Newsline*, noted that while President Yeltsin himself in his New Year's message was relatively friendly toward the West, Foreign Minister Primakov in his December 30, 1997, press conference was not. (Primakov, incidentally, survived Yeltsin's dismissal of the ''entire'' Cab-

inet on March 23, 1998.) For our purposes, the following observation by
Dr. Goble is most pertinent:

Primakov went on to say that Russia not only *remained opposed to any eastward
expansion of NATO* but was actively considering the extension of Russian security
guarantees to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe not offered mem-
bership in the Western alliance.[32] [emphasis added]

Was the public disagreement between President Yeltsin and his well-
established Foreign Minister Primakov merely a clever ploy, of Yeltsin
playing the ''good cop'' and Primakov ''the bad cop'' in the eyes of the
West, an interpretation favored by Goble?[33] I would agree with this in-
terpretation: Yeltsin and Primakov are two sides of the same coin. Both
stand for a strong Russia at the expense of its neighbors and internal
Russian democracy.

   On April 5, 1998, Fred Hiatt, of the *Washington Post*'s editorial page
staff, issued a thoughtful and vigorous warning against accepting Rus-
sian offensive measures in both Latvia and Ukraine. He wrote,

This kind of appeasement does Russia's democrats no favor. Every country, no
matter how small, has the right to plot its own course. If Primakov and Luzhkov
can make gains in the West by threatening Russia's weaker neighbors, they will
only do it more. Russians who favor civilized, equitable relations will be weak-
ened.

Of particular significance is Hiatt's reference to a warning by Natan (An-
atoly) Sharansky. An ethnic Jew born in Ukraine, the mathematician and
computer programmer Sharansky played a unique role in the Soviet dis-
sident movement. He provided a liaison among the movement's Jewish,
Ukrainian and all-Soviet branches, and also worked as an English trans-
lator for the group around Academician Sakharov. Sentenced to harsh
imprisonment and then released, Sharansky emigrated to Israel and in
1996 was appointed as its Minister of Industry and Trade. In Hiatt's
words,

Natan Sharansky . . . cautioned during a recent visit here . . . that many Russians
still view the former Soviet Union as theirs. *They look hopefully at Ukraine*, he said,
because they see it has problems, and they see the West is not in a hurry to help.
   *The moment they will succeed with Ukraine, he added, that moment they will be able
to succeed with the whole [former] Soviet Union.*[34] [emphasis added]

Sharansky has hit the nail on the head: no wonder the Balts and Ukrain-
ians have approached NATO.

NOTES

1. ''Statement of Honorable William V. Roth Jr., [U.S.] Senator from Delaware, Chairman, Senate NATO Observer Group, and President, North Atlantic Treaty Assembly,'' in U.S. Congress (105th Congress: 1st Session), Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Debate on NATO Enlargement*; Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate . . . (October 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 and November 5, 1997) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 43. Henceforth cited as *U.S. Debate on NATO Enlargement*. Book courtesy of Senator Biden.

2. Said U.S. Secretary of State Albright on Russia: ''We want Russian democracy to endure. We are optimistic that it will, but one should not dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. *By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.*'' *U.S. Debate on NATO Enlargement*, pp. 8 and 13 [slightly different]. [Emphasis added.] Said Dr. Brzezinski: ''[NATO's enlargement] is about Russia's relationship to Europe, whether NATO's enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing to it the revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations regarding Central Europe.'' He added: ''For me, the central stake in NATO's expansion is the long-term, historic, and strategic relationship between America and Europe.'' Ibid., p. 46. For Dr. Kissinger's oral testimony and prepared written statement see ibid., pp. 183–89.

3. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

4. Ibid., p. 196.

5. Steven Erlanger, ''Key Senate Panel Passes Resolution to Expand NATO; Vote is Overwhelming; Measure Adding 3 Countries to Alliance is Now Expected to Win Senate Backing,'' *N.Y. Times*, March 4, 1998, pp. A1, A4.

6. The expression is by Senator Roth. See William Safire, ''The Real NATO Issue: Stop the Push for 'Apausement,' '' *N.Y. Times*, March 16, 1998, p. A 39.

7. Eric Schmitt, ''Senate Approves a NATO Expansion by a Vote of 80–19,'' *N.Y. Times*, May 1, 1998, pp. A1, A10.

8. Fy, ''Grosse Mehrheit im Bundestag fuer die Osterweiterung der NATO . . .'' [Large majority in the Bundestag for the eastern expansion of NATO . . .], *Frankfurter Allg. Zeitung*, March 27, 1998, pp. 1–2.

9. Jane Perlez, ''Havel's Silver Tongue Lashes Out at Czech Political Scandals,'' *N.Y. Times*, December 12, 1997, p. A17. The words are Havel's, as cited by Perlez.

10. Latest figure by Professor Peter Steiner of the University of Pennsylvania at round table on ''European Reactions to NATO's Enlargement,'' Annual Meeting of Mid-Atlantic Slavic Conference, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, March 21, 1998. For December 1997 polls and the pro-NATO publicity campaign, see (1) F. S., ''Czechs Increasingly in Favor of NATO Membership,'' in *RFE/RL [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty] Newsline on the Web* (http://www.rferl.org/newsline/fulltext.html), December 30, 1997, p. 10; and (2) Laura Belin (of RFERL), ''Pro-NATO Advertising Campaign,'' being item #2 on David Johnson's Russia List #2006 of 8 January 1998. (david Johnson@erols.com). Last reference courtesy

of Dr. Jaroslaw Martyniuk, senior researcher of InterMedia, Inc. The total number of Czechs polled in December 1997 by the state statistical office IVVM was 1,118.

11. The vote in the Czech lower chamber was 154 to 38 on April 15, 1998; in the upper chamber it was 64 to 3 on April 30, 1998. ''World Roundup,'' *The [Wilmington] News Journal*, April 15, 1998, p. 2; and ''World in Brief,'' *Wash. Post*, May 1, 1998, p. A28.

12. *Facts on File*, November 20, 1997, p. 857.

13. Jane Perlez, ''Touchy Issue of Bigger NATO: Spy Agencies,'' *N.Y. Times*, January 5, 1998, p. A3. Two additional subtitles are ''Old-timers Stayed on in Poland and Hungary after Communism's Fall. Can the Intelligence Services of Old Foes Be Trusted?''

14. On the election, see P. G., ''Adamkus Wins Lithuanian Presidency Vote,'' in *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, January 5, 1998, p. 8. For Adamkus's interview, see J. C., ''Adamkus Says no 'Drastic Changes' in Foreign, Domestic Policy,'' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, January 8, 1998, p. 7. The first citation is a paraphrase by the correspondent, the indented citation is a verbatim comment by Adamkus. On Russian displeasure, see Steven Erlanger, ''U.S. to Back Baltic Membership in NATO, but Not Anytime Soon,'' *N.Y. Times*, January 12, 1998, p. A10. See also Egidijus Vareikis, ''Inside Scene: A New Incumbent in the Presidential Palace,'' *Lithuania in the World* [Vilnius], vol. 6, no. 1 (1998), pp. 10–13. According to the final count, Dr. Adamkus received 50.37 percent of the votes cast, defeated Paulauskas by a margin of 14,256 votes, or 0.74 percent (Vareikis, p. 11). Last source courtesy of Mission of Lithuania to NATO.

15. Anne Swardson, ''Ex-Communist Nations Receive Nod from EU: 6 Countries to Start Membership Talks in March,'' *Wash. Post*, December 14, 1997, p. A28.

16. ''European Union: Presentation of Agenda 2000,'' *Keesing's Record of World Events*, July 1997, p. 41745. This was a package of documents totaling 1,300 pages.

17. Ibid., p. 41745.

18. As quoted in Swardson, ''Ex-Communist Nations Receive Nod from EU . . . ,'' *Wash. Post*, December 14, 1997, p. A28.

19. Steven Erlanger, ''U.S. to Back Baltic Membership in NATO . . . ,'' *N.Y. Times*, January 12, 1998, p. A1.

20. ''A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania, January 16, 1998,'' in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), vol. 34, no. 4 (January 26, 1998), p. 89.

21. ''Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Baltic Nations–United States Charter of Partnership, January 16, 1998,'' ibid., p. 85.

22. Ibid., p. 86.

23. Ibid., p. 87.

24. Erlanger, ''U.S. to Back Baltic Membership in NATO . . . ,'' p. A10, for both citations.

25. Ibid., p. A10.

26. Ibid.

27. Fred Hiatt, ''No Place for Appeasement,'' *Wash. Post*, April 5, 1998, p. C7 (op-ed). Also see the restrained but disturbing article by Paul A. Goble, '' 'Blank Spots' and 'Gray Zones,' '' in *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, March 30, 1998. Later in March 1998, a very tense month, the Latvian government committed a blunder

by allowing some high officials to participate in a commemoration of the anniversary of the Latvian Waffen SS.

28. ''Preliminarni rezul'taty vyboriv do Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy'' [Preliminary results of the elections to Ukraine's Supreme Council], *Svoboda* [Freedom, Parsippany, NJ, and New York], vol. 105, no. 65 (April 4, 1998), p. 1. Percentages added by the author. Also, Svitlana Svetova, coordinator for Russia–Ukraine Activities, NAA [North Atlantic Assembly], ''Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine,'' Document AR 146, GEN (98) 39 [April 10, 1998]. Used with author's permission. KBUV [Kyiv Bureau of *Ukrains'ki Visti*], ''Pryyshly do parlyamentu'' [Arrived at Parliament], *Ukrains'ki Visti* [Ukrainian News, Edmonton], vol. 71, no. 8 (April 22–May 5, 1998), pp. 2, 4 (contains long but incomplete lists of deputies approved as of April 17, 1998); and ''Communists to Have Largest Parliamentary Faction, [125 members],'' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, May 7, 1998.

29. Consisting, as of May 6, 1998, of the pro-Presidential Popular Democratic Party (77 deputies), Rukh (51), Hromada (41), three deputies from the Reform and Order Party, two each from the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Republican Party (four in all), and one each from the Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian–Democratic Party (three altogether).

30. Ihor Kharchenko [director, Policy Analysis and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine], ''The New Ukraine–NATO Partnership,'' *NATO Review*, vol. 45, no. 5 (September–October 1997), pp. 27–29. Web edition (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9705–09.htm).

31. [Javier Solana,] ''Statement by NATO Secretary General Following the Death of Mr. Roman Lishchynski, Information Officer, Kyiv,'' *NATO Press Release* (97)139 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97–139e.htm).

32. Paul Goble, ''One Country, Two Foreign Policies,'' *RFE/RL Newsline on the Web*, January 5, 1998, p. 16 (http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/01/050198.html).

33. Ibid., p. 17.

34. Hiatt, ''No Place for Appeasement,'' *Wash. Post*, April 5, 1998, p. C7 (op-ed).

Chapter 6

Conclusion

It would seem that during the period 1997–1998, the realities of international politics have thrown the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and Ukraine together, just as history threw them together with the conclusion of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. Neither the three Baltic states nor Ukraine are among the first tranche of East Central European states to which NATO membership has been offered at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997. Former Secretary of Defense Perry was excessively blunt toward the Balts, as was the anonymous Washington official in the conversation with Ms. Perlez concerning the Ukrainians. In both instances, the foremost reason for the delay appears to be opposition from Russia, though critics of the extension of NATO to the Baltic littoral and into Ukraine will be able to give a dozen different reasons, some of which have been adduced here as well. What can be done about it by both the Balts and the Ukrainians? Or should, on the contrary, the Balts and the Ukrainians go their separate ways, because their claims to membership are somewhat different? Above all, has the situation not drastically changed in July 1997, when the Balts were officially promised eventual entry into NATO, while the Ukrainians, like the Russians, have been sidetracked into NATO's antechamber—the Permanent Joint Council for Russia, and the nonpermanent, ad hoc NATO–Ukraine Commission for Ukraine? Furthermore, what business do the Ukrainians have of even dreaming of NATO after concluding a package of agreements with Russia on and before May 31, 1997?

   My analysis in Chapter 4, however, shows that things are not quite what they seem. At Madrid, the unnamed Balts were listed as ''aspiring members'' at the bottom of the list, after Romania and Slovenia. This is

far from a binding commitment, especially in view of Russia's often-announced threats that they will revise their just-signed Founding Act if any former Soviet republics are admitted to NATO. True, in January 1998, in the Baltic Partnership Charter, U.S. President Clinton has promised to help the three Baltic states become ready for admission to NATO, but it is a promise without a firm date. The 1998 Baltic Charter is essentially an IOU, payable by a future American administration. It is also contingent on the unanimous approval of at least eighteen other states: the fifteen old NATO members as of mid-1998, exclusive of the United States, plus the three new members (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). Unofficially, it may also be contingent on the approval of Russia, despite American assurances that Russia will have a vote, but not a veto in the Permanent Joint Council.

As to Ukraine, the May 31, 1997, treaty is obviously an attempt by Russia to keep its southern neighbor out of NATO. Less obviously, the treaty is a continuation of the Surikov–Karaganov policy of destabilizing the country and integrating it into a Russian-dominated CIS, which is but a new version of the old Russian empire. Many Ukrainians, led by President Kuchma, Foreign Minister Udovenko and Security Council Secretary Horbulin have recognized this. For that reason, Ukraine has insisted on obtaining from NATO the NATO–Ukraine Charter, which is flexible enough to permit integration into the regular NATO institutions, such as the NATO Council, and eventual application for full membership. But if the independence-minded Ukrainians do not play their cards right, the NATO–Ukraine Charter can still turn out to be a nicely decorated permanent antechamber literally in the middle of nowhere: not in the NATO Council itself and no longer in the overcrowded Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

My interpretation of the politics before and in Madrid is that the process of NATO's enlargement has turned out to be very contentious. The attempt by France to already have Romania admitted in 1997 and a similar effort by Italy, on behalf of Slovenia, were justified as strengthening the stability in southeastern Europe. Neither Romania nor Slovenia were opposed by Russia, so another, less charitable interpretation of the Franco-Italian initiative is that the two countries and their European friends wanted to get the process of enlargement over with in one big deal—and to permanently preempt the admission to NATO of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine. Because the enlargement process has become so nerve wracking, there will be tremendous political and diplomatic pressures to close the admission process effectively by 1999, by designating in that year, if not before, certain countries as being bona fide candidates and telling others that they will remain outside of the line forever—in other words, following the advice of Ambassador Stankievičius, though several years late.

All of those pressures pose a particularly difficult problem for Ukraine with its dual-track Western policy. A good argument can be made that this policy has already reached the point of diminishing returns, after the summit of Madrid. I agree with the conclusion of Volodymyr Zviglyanich, ''that non-bloc status now, after NATO enlargement, is detrimental to Ukraine's national security. Therefore, [the Ukrainian political establishment] should openly declare its desire to revoke this status and to become a full-fledged NATO member.''[1] Admittedly, the internal political constellation in Ukraine has not been very favorable toward seeking accession to NATO in 1997, and it has become even less favorable after the parliamentary elections of 1998. But quietly—*in pectore*—the Ukrainian leadership must have decided a long time ago whether to look west or east. Now is the time to educate the Ukrainian people. For the majority of Ukrainians and for an even stronger majority of Balts, membership in NATO is the most effective guarantee of national independence. Granted, it may be humiliating for a large country to be told ''No, not yet,'' but it is even more humiliating—and dangerous—to be perceived as being ''cute,'' *simpatico*, but not ''serious.'' Despite the small size of their states and populations, the Balts are ''serious'' about remaining independent, which is another reason for the Ukrainians to emulate the Balts and to ''stick to them,'' and for the West to encourage a Baltic–Black Sea Alliance.

I strongly support both Ambassador Stankievičius and Dr. Kugler that it is incumbent upon the policymakers in Washington and Brussels to think through the strategic endgame, though in actual politics the temptation is strong to ''slice problems tranche by tranche, to act pragmatically.'' The enlargement of NATO to the first three candidates will probably take place. It will be useful up to a point, shoring up the stability of Germany and to a lesser extent increasing the stability in those East European states who will be newly admitted. At the same time, the newly admitted states will be exposed to instability in two ways: through direct actions by Russia and indirectly through Russian efforts to thoroughly destabilize the Baltic states and Ukraine. A really bold strategy would have shifted the border of European security structures further east, which is wholly compatible with the development of a democratic Russian nation-state, as opposed to a protoempire in CIS II, which in turn will lead to a true empire within a generation. This is a bold strategy but not impossible, if, in the end, but only the very end, Russia is offered a role in both expanded NATO and in the European Union commensurate with its legitimate interests as a large nation-state holding nuclear weapons.[2] (In mid-1997, however, Russia was both installed in the Permanent Joint Council with NATO and was invited to become a 95 percent member of the old Group of Seven. Prematurely?)

In my view, the Balts and Ukrainians should cooperate, because their

positions are complementary rather than competitive: their strengths add up, and their weaknesses tend to cancel each other out. First there is the political and diplomatic legitimacy factor. All of the Baltic states had been independent during the interwar period. Providentially, the United States had not recognized their subjugation by the Soviet Union, but neither did the United States immediately recognize Lithuania's declaration of independence on March 11, 1990, when it really would have counted. (The Clinton administration improved on that of President Bush by effectively helping the Balts get the Russian troops removed by the fall of 1994.) To compare the Baltic states with Ukraine, with every single year Ukraine remains independent, its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community will increase.

Second, neither the Balts nor the Ukrainians obtained independence for free: genocide cost the Ukrainian people at least seven million dead, and a combination of genocide and small, natural population growth nearly ''pushed the Balts into the Baltic.'' Under Stalin's successors, the Balts and the Ukrainians got to know each other—and, for the most part, even like each other—while filling up the labor camps in the Urals, or wherever.

The Balts could teach the average Ukrainian a lesson or two about wholehearted commitment to independence and resoluteness in trying to break down the door to European economic and security structures; wisely, they refused from the very beginning the so-called ''soft divorce'' through the CIS, which turned out to be anything but soft. The Estonians in particular could teach the Ukrainians a lesson about creating a viable market economy.

Assuming, however, that the Ukrainian economy will improve; that the Ukrainian government will abandon its diplomatic balancing act and will opt, once and for all, for Europe; that the integrity of the Ukrainian armed forces will not be compromised through an excessive cooperation with those of Russia; and, above all, that the armed forces of Ukraine will be maintained in reasonable strength—ideally on a conscription and thus on a nation-building basis—the Ukrainians can offer the Balts ''critical mass'' and additional leverage in persuading both the United States and the leading West Europeans to adopt the bold strategy of consolidating the status quo of December 8, 1991, and not falling back on what, in the long run, will turn out to be halfway measures.

There is, however, an irony of history being played out on the world's stage: while the Balts and the Ukrainians, not to speak of the Poles, the Czechs and the Hungarians, would like to join the old NATO, which was primarily a defensive alliance against Russia, a new NATO collective security system may be emerging under American auspices, which relies heavily on Russia. According to a Washington critic of NATO's enlarge-

ment, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright ''recently said in Brussels that NATO would evolve into 'a force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa.' ''[3] To me, this is an ambitious notion of a new global NATO, which would constitute an effective armed forces for the United Nations and, above all, relieve the peace-keeping operations of the United States. European foreign ministers were critical of such an expansion of NATO's functions. Dr. Albright's deputy, Strobe Talbott, was even more ambitious in suggesting to some surprised European ambassadors in Washington that President Clinton had already privately communicated to President Yeltsin the idea that as an emerging democracy Russia would not be excluded from eventual admission to NATO as a full member. In Hoagland's words, this is ''an idea that divides NATO governments and which the administration has not highlighted for the Senate.''[4]

Possibly exasperated with the swings in Washington's thinking, which had already been a problem in the old NATO before 1989, a new Franco-German inner alliance is now emerging in the new, evolving NATO. There will be a Franco-German rapid reaction force, and plans are afoot to cooperate with each other in researching, designing, manufacturing and deploying nuclear weapons independently of the United States. France and Germany are of course also the two main pillars of the European currency union, which will be implemented beginning January 1, 1999. According to Hoagland, a decision may already have been made between Bonn and Paris to oppose the accession to NATO of the Baltic states and Ukraine. The inclusion of Poland, however, is strongly supported in Bonn and not rejected in Paris.[5]

But perhaps we should not despair. The old NATO of 1949–1997 has not yet been completely supplanted by the new global NATO of 2000. Realpolitik is alive and well in Washington. The United States is still a superpower, which calls for leadership, and global leadership requires exceptionally clear thinking. Writing for the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Dr. Kugler has aptly summarized the challenge from Russia as follows: ''In Eurasia, Russia is pursuing the reintegration of the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Belarus and Ukraine. In East Central Europe, it is opposing any Western enlargement that would exclude it, especially that of NATO. In essence, *it is aspiring to fashion a Eurasia under its influence and a East Central Europe that remains a neutral zone not belonging to the West*'' (emphasis added).[6] Additionally, Kugler has wisely included both Belarus and Ukraine in East Central Europe, though admittedly both are also part of Eurasia, which he defines as the CIS.[7]

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has been President Carter's national security advisor and who knows East Central Europe intimately, in a 1996 interview has added a note of prudent optimism:

Russia is viable as a nation-state. I don't think, however, that it has much of a future as an empire—I don't think the Russians can reestablish their empire. If they are stupid enough to try, they'll get themselves into conflicts that will make Chechnya and Afghanistan look like a picnic.

I *think* Ukraine is viable; I *think* Ukraine will survive. In 10 years from now, it may be in better shape than Russia. It has a better mix of the number of people to territory, to natural resources, and to access to world markets. And it has fewer hangups about being a great power, no lingering imperial aspirations. It doesn't have a frontier with 300 million potentially hostile Muslims and 1.2 billion energetic Chinese.[8] [emphasis added]

At least one influential Russian has explicitly rejected Dr. Brzezinski's recommendation to stick to the ''nation-state'': in Sergey Rogov's view, the Russian identity that is now being formed calls for a supranational ideology, and the Russian frontiers before Peter the Great are too confining.[9]

I did not pretend that enlargement of NATO, to include all three Baltic states and Ukraine, is an easy proposition: it is a bold, high-risk move for very high gains. Once accomplished, however, it will extend the reach of the West into a strategic territory formerly incorporated into the Soviet Union and will permanently forestall the reemergence of an authoritarian Russian empire. As a bonus, it will bring the West 65 million additional people, with their stout hearts and sixteen ground divisions.

NOTES

1. Volodymyr Zviglyanich, ''Russia, NATO and Ukraine: A United, or Disunited Europe?,'' *Ukr. Weekly*, vol. 65, no. 24 (June 15, 1997), p. 12.

2. Kugler, *Enlarging NATO*, p. 220, discusses both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for what he calls ''open end enlargement.''

3. Jim Hoagland, ''Foreign Policy by Impulse,'' *Wash. Post*, March 19, 1998, p. A21 (op-ed).

4. Ibid.

5. Jim Hoagland, ''[NATO] . . . and the Gatsby Syndrome,'' *Wash. Post*, July 6, 1997, p. C7 (op-ed). Here are the key sentences: ''If they were to speak candidly in public, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl would disclose two significant differences with the Clintonite dream of NATO expansion: *Both believe it should stop at the frontiers of the former Soviet Union, effectively excluding the Baltic States and Ukraine from future NATO membership.* [Emphasis added.] 'Do not humiliate the Russians,' Chirac keeps telling Clinton on this point. Chirac favors special NATO links to the Baltics and a charter agreement on security with Ukraine similar to one NATO has signed with Russia. Clinton says everybody is eventually welcome in NATO. . . . In private comments to American interlocutors during a visit to Washington last month, Kohl made clear that for him NATO expansion is about one country: Poland. Admitting Poland expiates German guilt. It removes Warsaw as the object of the

historic Berlin–Moscow competition in Central Europe. It is a political and psychological act for Kohl.''

6. Kugler, *Enlarging NATO*, p. xv.

7. Ibid., p. 13, note 8.

8. Zbigniew Brzezinski, '' 'An Airliner Gathering Speed—Without a Pilot': Interview Given to Steve Kettle,'' *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 23 (November 15, 1996), p. 33.

9. Sergey Rogov, director of the USA–Canada Institute, at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, January 22, 1997.

Chapter 7

Epilogue

On April 15, 1998, I talked about the prospects for NATO accession of the Baltic states and Ukraine with a German military officer in Bonn. On April 20, 1998, I explored the second subject during a day's conversations in Brussels, at the Mission of Ukraine to NATO, while on April 21, 1998, I was granted an interview by His Excellency, the Ambassador of Lithuania, at the Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to NATO and followed it up with a conversation with his defense attaché. Barring an unforeseen crisis in Eastern Central Europe, the admission to NATO of the three Baltic states and Ukraine does not appear imminent, but neither has it been ruled out from the outset, despite some reservations to such an admission that still exist in Central Europe.

The German officer, who has officially travelled to the Baltic states and Ukraine, and who had also served as an advisor to the Free Democratic Party caucus in the German Parliament (Bundestag), drew a line between the accession to NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which he regarded as being overdue, and the admission of the Baltic states and Ukraine, against which he had reservations. Admission of the first three had already been finally and rationally decided upon by the German political elites; they had already ''completed the process in their heads'' (*im Kopfe vollzogen*). It was designed to bring to a closure the downfall of Communist power in East Central Europe, to send a clear signal to all states that the Cold War had ended, and to fulfill the aspirations of those three peoples of East Central Europe in ''concrete, massive terms.''

Germany also felt a debt of gratitude toward what the Polish Solidarity Union had done to help reunify Germany, as it did toward Hungary for

accelerating the process in 1989 by opening its frontiers to many East Germans, so that they could cross into Czechoslovakia, and to the Czechs for receiving them. My interlocutor did not dwell on the importance for German security of moving the NATO frontier from the Oder to the San, that is, from the eastern frontier of Germany to the eastern frontier of Poland, because it was obvious. A military colleague of his later commented that Chancellor Helmut Kohl personally had strongly engaged himself in the task of bringing about a permanent reconciliation with Poland in the east, to parallel the historic reconciliation between Germany and France in the west.

As to the Baltic states, my German interlocutor readily granted that the feeling of being threatened was the greatest in them, as compared to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. At the same time, he had been shocked to discover that the three states pursued three independent foreign and security policies, which was later confirmed by his colleague. Since threats of an imminent military takeover by Russia in any of them were small, he himself was not in favor of admitting the Balts into NATO in the very near future, so as not to immediately place excessive demands (*zu ueberfordern*) on Russian general staff officers, who should really have been more concerned with threats arising from the unstable Islamic South, but who remained exceedingly sensitive to any changes in the Baltic Northwest.

A fortiori, the same reasoning applied to an early admission into NATO of Ukraine, which he personally did not favor. He had been pleasantly surprised that Ukraine had survived the stresses of the breakup of the Soviet Union as an independent state. When he had visited Ukraine, he noted in particular that ethnic Russians were developing a loyalty to the Ukrainian state. At the same time, he understood that the Russian military wanted to keep Ukraine as a *glacis* of its own (i.e., a strategic subarea adjoining the main strategic area, a *strategisches Vorfeld*, in which Russia's opponents would be denied strategic influence of their own). But there had already been many military and civilian contacts having military implications on the part of several NATO members in Ukraine, notably the United States. The holding of the ''Sea Breeze '97'' naval exercises within two months of the signing of the NATO–Ukraine Charter he found excessively provocative. The Charter itself, however, was a good document that had been designed to help the Ukrainians gain time, but ''Sea Breeze '97,'' by implication, was pushing the Russians too hard, too fast.

At the Mission of Ukraine to NATO, on the contrary, everybody liked ''Sea Breeze '97.'' Most interestingly, ''Sea Breeze '98'' had already been officially scheduled, this time with Russian military participation. (In 1997, Russia had first tried to wreck NATO-led ''Sea Breeze'' exercises altogether, then successfully insisted on compensatory Russo-Ukrainian

naval maneuvers. In 1998, the Russian Black Sea Fleet would join both the Ukrainian Fleet and NATO naval and military units in joint exercises. Ukraine's and NATO's determination to go ahead with the Sea Breeze exercises in 1997 had perhaps been the right move.) In the absence of His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk, the head of the Mission, who had been recalled to Kyiv and on April 17, 1998, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to replace Hennadiy Udovenko, who had just been elected to Parliament, the conversation in Brussels was held with H. E. Kostiantyn Morozov, the Acting Head of Ukraine's Mission, and with members of the Mission's political and military staff. (From September 1991 until October 1993, Colonel General Morozov had served as Ukraine's first minister of defense.) The highlights of the numerous conversations follow.

Ukraine is very much in favor of the NATO–Ukraine Charter on a ''Distinctive'' Partnership, regarding the Partnership as a ''special'' one: the development of cooperation with NATO opens up new possibilities, including the possibility of entering NATO as a full member. I was unable, however, to obtain a clear, on-the-record indication about exactly when Ukraine would apply for full membership. But if anyone in the Ukrainian foreign policy elite has been pro-West and pro-NATO, it is Borys Tarasyuk, and now Tarasyuk has been made foreign minister. General Morozov has also been in favor of entry into NATO since at least 1994. Incidentally, not too much should be made of the fact that the English and French texts of the NATO–Ukraine Charter have avoided the word ''special.'' A commission of philologists, whose conclusion was accepted by NATO, found that the English ''distinctive'' and the French *spécifique* should in Ukrainian be rendered by the word ''osoblyve.'' Osoblyve, however, can also be translated as ''special.''

The Ukrainians are particularly pleased that in the preamble of the Charter, Ukraine has been recognized as an ''inseparable part'' of ''Central and Eastern Europe.'' To implement that finding, Ukraine has suggested that representatives of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary be immediately invited to participate in the Ukraine–NATO Commission on the ambassadorial level, without waiting for their formal admission in the spring of 1999. NATO authorities, however, have refused to do so.

In any case, the Mission of Ukraine to NATO was formally established in October 1997. It consists of a Head, Deputy Head, and five professional diplomats in its political section, and of three officers, one a lieutenant general, in the military section. One function of the Mission is to prepare for the meetings of the NATO–Ukraine Commission, of which three have been held through April 1998: two on the ambassadorial level (October 10, 1997, and March 26, 1998), and one on the ministerial level (December 16, 1997), with another ministerial-level meeting being sched-

uled for May 29, 1998, in Luxembourg. The first ministerial-level meeting produced NATO–Ukraine agreements on the handling of emergencies and on overcoming the results of Chernobyl, which were signed by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and the Ukrainian Minister for Emergency Situations, Valeriy Kalchenko.

Another function of the Mission, which is even more important, is to help supervise the many NATO-authorized activities, either in its Partnership for Peace Program or in the spirit of that program. NATO offers a plethora of activities, in which no Partner for Peace can participate fully because there are too many of them. As selected by Ukraine and NATO, a printout of the currently planned activities from 1998 to 2000 is 1.5 centimeters, or almost half an inch thick. Alas, I was not able to read the individual items: they are restricted for use by officials of Partners for Peace countries, not outside scholars. There is no telling, therefore, how many of the activities are really important and how many may be ''busy work.'' The following details provide at least a partial answer. In 1997, eighteen out of over 200 accomplished activities consisted of maneuvers, including the famous ''Sea Breeze '97.'' In 1998, about 2,000 Ukrainian personnel, not all military, are engaged in approximately 300 NATO-related activities. More than half of the activities in 1998 are of a purely military nature.

Finally, there are at least two military reasons for the Ukraine joining NATO, as told to me by Lieutenant General Vitaliy S. Kuksenko. Should Ukraine choose to remain neutral, it would cost it dearly from the viewpoint of modern armaments. In NATO, which relies on multinational units, it is no longer necessary for a single country to provide for fully integrated armed forces. For instance, in NATO, a British armored brigade (unlike its Soviet-type counterpart in Ukraine) needs no British backup aircraft and no helicopters, for the latter are provided by other NATO members (possibly Germany). Second, a graduate of Ukrainian peacekeeping operations under the UN in former Yugoslavia, General Kuksenko was very pleased about how a detachment of 1,200 NATO military observers, including some 500 U.S. troops, had stabilized the situation in inherently unstable Macedonia. Serbia has not crossed the frontier as of yet. Russia would also have to think twice, if NATO military observers were, for instance, placed in the Crimea.

His Excellency, Linas Linkevičius, the Ambassador of the Lithuanian Republic to NATO, received me the next day for fifty minutes, though he and his staff had their hands full with the forthcoming state visit to NATO of Lithuania's new president, Dr. Valdas Adamkus. Ambassador Linkevičius had, like General Morozov, been defense minister of his country for three years. The ambassador was pleased with the signing of the Baltic–U.S. Charter, and he declined to specify, on record, which European states had reservations about Lithuania's accession to NATO.

Temporary absence of a military threat from Russia should not outweigh Lithuania's moral and legal right to choose its long-term security partners by joining the only effective organization, namely, NATO. Lithuania's risk was instability in the entire region and in Russia in particular. Lithuania has done its share by not humiliating the Russians, by saving their dignity. Younger Russian businessmen in particular were now interested in the economic development of the Kaliningrad enclave and were not obsessed with the alleged dangers coming from NATO's enlargement, whereas for some older Russian generals, NATO would remain an enemy to the end of their lives. Lithuanians were flexible on Russian transit rights to Kaliningrad, but they were tough in calling for long-term security guarantees and the right to enter NATO as a full member. Lithuania already cooperated with NATO in the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat), which was being coordinated by Denmark, in the Baltic [Naval] Squadron (Baltron, coordinated by Germany), and in the expensive Baltic airspace management regime (BaltNet), coordinated by Norway and sponsored by the United States. Ambassador Linkevičius expressed his country's hope that with the formal accession of the first three candidates in the spring of 1999, NATO would soon revise its strategic concept of 1991, which had been adopted while the USSR was still in existence and which was now obsolete, and that NATO would issue a declaration, reaffirming the open-door policy for admission, which had been first laid down in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty of 1949, and which was also effectively restated in the Baltic–U.S. Charter of January 16, 1998. Any delay, any break in the admission process, would contribute to instability in the area, for the security of a country depended on the security of its neighbor. Above all, any retreat from the open-door policy would send the wrong signal to the policymakers in Russia. It would weaken the Russian democrats, who were basically not opposed to NATO's enlargement, and would only strengthen the nationalist and antidemocratic forces, who would then be encouraged to take chances against NATO's interests.

The Lithuanian Mission had printed an attractive two-page fact sheet on ''Preparing for NATO.'' Among the points made were: during 1997, the annual inflation rate in Lithuania stood at 8.4 percent, while the GDP growth rose to 6.4 percent and foreign direct investment reached almost US Dol. 1 billion, showing real economic growth. In 1998, defense expenditures would reach 1.5 percent of the GDP, by the year 2005, they would be increased up to 2.5 percent of the GDP. Lithuania was keen on meeting the interoperability requirements of NATO in the following areas: English language training (30 percent of officers and civilians have completed NATO level 3333 training); introduction of NATO C3 procedures, which currently were being implemented force-wide; and, third, the acquisition of NATO compatible communications equipment, com-

munications equipment for one infantry battalion having been recently purchased. Lithuania also offered stable democratic civilian control (a nonmilitary minister of defense, two presidential elections since reestablishing independence, three parliamentary elections and a functioning multiparty system). Lithuania also stressed that it had neither territorial nor ethnic conflicts with neighboring countries, and had signed border demarcation treaties with all of its neighbors, including Russia. This was presented under the heading "A Good Neighborhord [sic] Policy Ensures Stability in Europe." Lithuania had also contributed to European security and stability by serving with UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces in Croatia from August 1994 through February 1996, and with the IFOR/SFOR NATO-led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia–Herzegovina from February 1996 to date.

The Lithuanian Defense Attaché made three interesting points. First, the entire country should prepare itself for admission to NATO. For that reason, he preferred the Slovenian and Ukrainian approaches, which brought into cooperation with NATO's Partners for Peace and related programs a substantial number of activities associated with other than defense ministries, whereas the Lithuanian and Polish approaches were focused almost exclusively on military cooperation. Second, the Lithuanian military representation at NATO headquarters was kept deliberately small because the Lithuanians wanted to expose their military officers to the experience of working at other NATO commands at other levels and in other countries. Third, in April 1998, Lithuania did not have a Defense Attaché in Germany.

Finally, I was left to ponder the significance of the fact that though the Lithuanian Mission to NATO, consisting as it did of the Ambassador, the Defense Attaché, the Counsellor, a First Secretary, and an Attaché, was smaller than the Ukrainian Mission, it occupied in the same building eight relatively spacious rooms by European standards, compared to only five functional rather than spacious rooms that had been assigned to the Mission of Ukraine, on the floor below. The two Missions are in the same building, however, which to me is a hopeful sign that, despite all of the obstacles, the endgame in NATO's enlargement will include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but also Ukraine.

Appendix I

A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and Republic of Lithuania, January 16, 1998

Preamble

The United States of America, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania, hereafter referred to as Partners.

Sharing a common vision of a peaceful and increasingly integrated Europe, free of divisions, dedicated to democracy, the rule of law, free markets, and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people;

Recognizing the historic opportunity to build a new Europe, in which each state is secure in its internationally-recognized borders and respects the independence and territorial integrity of all members of the transatlantic community;

Determined to strengthen their bilateral relations as a contribution to building this new Europe, and to enhance the security of all states through the adaptation and enlargement of European and transatlantic institutions;

Committed to the full development of human potential within just and inclusive societies attentive to the promotion of harmonious and equitable relations among individuals belonging to diverse ethnic and religious groups;

Avowing a common interest in developing cooperative, mutually respectful relations with all other states in the region;

Recalling the friendly relations that have been continuously maintained between the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania since 1922;

Further recalling that the United States of America never recognized the forcible incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR in 1940 but rather regards their statehood as uninterrupted since the establishment of their independence, a policy which the United States has restated continuously for five decades;

Celebrating the rich contributions that immigrants from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made to the multi-ethnic culture of the United States of America, as well as the European heritage enjoyed by the United States as a beneficiary of the contributions of intellectuals, artists, and Hanseatic traders from the Baltic states to the development of Europe; praising the contributions of U.S. citizens to the liberation and rebuilding of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Affirm as a political commitment declared at the highest level, the following principles and procedures to guide their individual and joint efforts to achieve the goals of this Charter.

Principles of Partnership

The United States of America has a real, profound and enduring interest in the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The United States of America warmly welcomes the success of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in regaining their freedom and resuming their rightful places in the community of nations.

The United States of America respects the sacrifices and hardships undertaken by the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to re-establish their independence. It encourages efforts by these states to continue to expand their political, economic, security, and social ties with other nations as full members of the transatlantic community.

The Partners affirm their commitment to the rule of law as a foundation for a transatlantic community of free and democratic nations, and to the responsibility of all just societies to protect and respect the human rights and civil liberties of all individuals residing within their territories.

The Partners underscore their shared commitment to the principles and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter.

The Partners reaffirm their shared commitment to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

The Partners will observe in good faith their commitments to promote and respect the standards for human rights embodied in the above-mentioned Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. They will implement their legislation protecting such human rights fully and equitably.

The United States of America commends the measures taken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to advance the integration of Europe by establishing close cooperative relations among themselves and with their neighbors, as well as their promotion of regional cooperation through their participation in fora such as the Baltic Assembly, Baltic Council of Ministers, and the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Viewing good neighborly relations as fundamental to overall security and stability in the transatlantic community, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reaffirm their determination to further enhance bilateral relations between themselves and with other neighboring states.

The Partners will intensify their efforts to promote the security, prosperity, and stability of the region. The Partners will draw on the points noted below in focusing their efforts to deepen the integration of the Baltic states into transatlantic and European institutions, promote cooperation in security and defense, and develop the economies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

A Commitment to Integration

As part of a common vision of a Europe whole and free, the Partners declare that their shared goal is the full integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense institutions. Europe will not be

fully secure unless Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each are secure.

The Partners reaffirm their commitment to the principle, established in the Helsinki Final Act, repeated in the Budapest and Lisbon OSCE summit declarations, and also contained in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible.

The Partners further share a commitment to the core principle, also articulated in the OSCE Code of Conduct and reiterated in subsequent OSCE summit declarations, that each state has the inherent right to individual and collective self-defense as well as the right freely to choose its own security arrangements, including treaties of alliance.

The Partners support the vital role being played by a number of complementary institutions and bodies—including the OSCE, the European Union (EU), the West European Union (WEU) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Council of Europe (COE), and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)—in achieving the partners' shared goal of an integrated, secure, and undivided Europe.

They believe that, irrespective of factors related to history or geography, such institutions should be open to all European democracies willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities and obligations of membership, as determined by those institutions.

The Partners welcome a strong and vibrant OSCE dedicated to promoting democratic institutions, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. They strongly support the OSCE's role as a mechanism to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and crises.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each reaffirm their goal to become full members of all European and transatlantic institutions, including the European Union and NATO.

The United States of America recalls its longstanding support for the enlargement of the EU, affirming it as a core institution in the new Europe and declaring that a stronger, larger, and outward-looking European Union will further security and prosperity for all of Europe.

The Partners believe that the enlargement of NATO will enhance the security of the United States, Canada, and all the countries in Europe, including those states not immediately invited to membership or not currently interested in membership.

The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance.

The United States of America reiterates its view that the enlargement of NATO is an on-going process. It looks forward to future enlargements, and remains convinced that not only will NATO's door remain open to new members, but that the first countries invited to membership will not be the last. No non-NATO country has a veto over Alliance decisions. The United States notes the Alliance is prepared to strengthen its consultations with aspirant countries on the full range of issues related to possible NATO membership.

The Partners welcome the results of the Madrid Summit. They support the Alliance's commitment to an open door policy and welcome the Alliance's recognition of the Baltic states as aspiring members of NATO. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pledge to deepen their close relations with the Alliance through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the intensified dialogue process.

The Partners underscore their interest in Russia's democratic and stable development and support a strengthened NATO-Russia relationship as a core element of their shared vision of a new and peaceful Europe. They welcome the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter, both of which further improve European security.

Security Cooperation

The Partners will consult together, as well as with other countries, in the event that a Partner perceives that its territorial integrity,

independence, or security is threatened or at risk. The Partners will use bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for such consultations.

The United States welcomes and appreciates the contributions that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have already made to European security through the peaceful restoration of independence and their active participation in the Partnership for Peace. The United States also welcomes their contributions to IFOR, SFOR, and other international peacekeeping missions.

Building on the existing cooperation among their respective ministries of defense and armed forces, the United States of America supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to provide for their legitimate defense needs, including development of appropriate and interoperable military forces.

The Partners welcome the establishment of the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) as an effective body for international coordination of security assistance to Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's defense forces.

The Partners will cooperate further in the development and expansion of defense initiatives such as the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat), the Baltic Squadron (Baltron), and the Baltic airspace management regime (BaltNet), which provide a tangible demonstration of practical cooperation enhancing the common security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the transatlantic community.

The Partners intend to continue mutually beneficial military cooperation and will maintain regular consultations, using the established Bilateral Working Group on Defense and Military Relations.

Economic Cooperation

The Partners affirm their commitment to free market mechanisms as the best means to meet the material needs of their people.

The United States of America commends the substantial progress its Baltic Partners have made to implement economic reform and development and their transition to free market economies.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emphasize their intention to deepen their economic integration with Europe and the global econ-

omy, based on the principles of free movement of people, goods, capital and services.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania underscore their commitment to continue market-oriented economic reforms and to express their resolve to achieve full integration into global economic bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) while creating conditions for smoothly acceding to the European Union.

Noting this objective, the United States of America will work to facilitate the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the world economy and appropriate international economic organizations, in particular the WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on appropriate commercial terms.

The Partners will work individually and together to develop legal and financial conditions in their countries conducive to international investment. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania welcome U.S. investment in their economies.

The Partners will continue to strive for mutually advantageous economic relations building on the principles of equality and non-discrimination to create the conditions necessary for such cooperation.

The Partners will commence regular consultations to further cooperation and provide for regular assessment of progress in the areas of economic development, trade, investment, and related fields. These consultations will be chaired at the appropriately high level.

Recognizing that combating international organized crime requires a multilateral effort, the partners agree to cooperate fully in the fight against this threat to the world economy and political stability. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain committed to developing sound legislation in this field and to enhance the implementation of this legislation through the strengthening of a fair and well-functioning judicial system.

The U.S.-Baltic Relationship

In all of these spheres of common endeavor, the Partners, building on their shared history of friendship and cooperation, solemnly

reaffirm their commitment to a rich and dynamic Baltic-American partnership for the 21st century.

The Partners view their partnership in the areas of political, economic, security, defense, cultural, and environmental affairs as contributing to closer ties between their people and facilitating the full integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into European and transatlantic structures.

In order to further strengthen these ties, the Partners will establish a Partnership Commission chaired at the appropriately high level to evaluate common efforts. This Commission will meet once a year or as needed to take stock of the Partnership, assess results of bilateral consultations on economic, military and other areas, and review progress achieved towards meeting the goals of this Charter.

In order to better reflect changes in the European and transatlantic political and security environment, signing Partners are committed regularly at the highest level to review this agreement.

<div align="center">

William J. Clinton
President
United States of America

Lennart Meri
President
Republic of Estonia

Guntis Ulmanis
President
Republic of Latvia

Algirdas Brazauskas
President
Republic of Lithuania

</div>

Washington D.C.,
January 16, 1998

NOTE: An original was not available for verification of the content of this agreement. This item was not received in time for publication in the appropriate issue.

Author's Note: In comparing the agreement printed above with an original copy supplied by e-mail by The Honorable Darius Semaska, Counsellor (Political) of the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in Washington, the following discrepancies were noticed:

Page 101, Preamble, first paragraph: hereinafter [instead of hereafter];

Page 101, third paragraph: internationally recognized [no hyphen];

Page 102, Section "A Commitment to Integration," first paragraph: security, and defense institutions [comma];

Page 104, Section "Economic Cooperation," last paragraph: and to enhancing the implementation [instead of enhance]; and

Page 105, Section "U.S. Baltic Relationship," second paragraph: Latvia, and Lithuania [comma].

Sources: *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 34, no. 4 (January 26, 1998), pp. 87–91 and copy furnished by the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania to the United States.

Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, Madrid, 9 July 1997

I. BUILDING AN ENHANCED NATO–UKRAINE RELATIONSHIP

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member States and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Ukraine,

- building on a political commitment at the highest level;
- recognizing the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe which have inseparably linked the security of every state to that of all the others;
- determined to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation in order to enhance security and stability, and to cooperate in building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe;
- stressing the profound transformation undertaken by NATO since the end of the Cold War and its continued adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, including its support, on a case-by-case basis, of new missions of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE;[1]
- welcoming the progress achieved by Ukraine and looking forward to further steps to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, and to deepen the process of integration with the full range of European and Euro-Atlantic structures;
- noting NATO's positive role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe and in promoting greater confidence and transparency in the Euro-Atlantic area, and its openness for cooperation with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, an inseparable part of which is Ukraine;

- convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole;

- mindful of the importance of a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine and recognizing the solid progress made, across a broad range of activities, to develop an enhanced and strengthened relationship between NATO and Ukraine on the foundations created by the Joint Press Statement of 14 September 1995;

- determined to further expand and intensify their cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, including the enhanced Partnership for Peace Program;

- welcoming their practical cooperation within IFOR/SFOR[2] and other peace-keeping operations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia;

- sharing the view that the opening of the Alliance to new members, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, is directed at enhancing the stability of Europe, and the security of all countries in Europe without recreating dividing lines;

are committed, on the basis of this Charter, to further broaden and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and effective partnership, which will promote further stability and common democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.

II. PRINCIPLES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO–UKRAINE RELATIONS

2. NATO and Ukraine will base their relationships on the principles, obligations and commitments under international law and international instruments, including the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents. Accordingly, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to:

- the recognition that security of all states in the OSCE area is indivisible, that no state should pursue its security at the expense of that of another state, and that no state can regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence;

- refrain from the threat or use of force against any state in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter or Helsinki Final Act principles guiding participating States;

- the inherent right of all states to choose and to implement freely their own security arrangements, and to be free to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve;

- respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states, for the inviolability of frontiers, and the development of good-neighbourly relations;

- the rule of law, the fostering of democracy, political pluralism, and a market economy;
- human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;
- the prevention of conflicts and settlements of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles.

3. Ukraine reaffirms its determination to carry forward its defence reforms, to strengthen democratic and civilian control of the armed forces, and to increase their interoperability with the forces of NATO and Partner countries. NATO reaffirms its support for Ukraine's efforts in these areas.

4. Ukraine welcomes NATO's continuing and active adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, and its role, in cooperation with other international organizations such as the OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union in promoting Euro-Atlantic security and fostering a general climate of trust and confidence in Europe.

III. AREAS FOR CONSULTATION AND/OR COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE

5. Reaffirming the common goal of implementation of a broad range of issues for consultation and cooperation, NATO and Ukraine commit themselves to develop and strengthen their consultation and/or cooperation in the areas described below. In this regard, NATO and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to the full development of the EAPC[3] and the enhanced PfP.[4] This includes Ukrainian participation in operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council, or the responsibility of the OSCE, and, if CJFT[5] are used in such cases, Ukrainian participation in them at an early stage on a case-by-case basis, subject to decisions by the North Atlantic Council on specific operations.

6. Consultations between NATO and Ukraine will cover issues of common concern, such as:

- political and security related subjects, in particular the development of Euro-Atlantic security and stability, including the security of Ukraine;
- conflict prevention, crisis management, peace support, conflict resolution and humanitarian operations, taking into account the roles of the United Nations and the OSCE in this field;
- the political and defence aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation;
- disarmament and arms control issues, including those related to the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty and confidence and security building measures in the 1994 Vienna Document;

• arms exports and related technology transfers;

• combating drug-trafficking and terrorism.

7. Areas for consultation and cooperation, in particular through joint seminars, joint working groups, and other cooperative programmes, will cover a broad range of topics, such as:

• civil emergency planning, and disaster preparedness;

• civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, and Ukrainian defence reform;

• defence planning, budgeting, policy, strategy and national security concepts;

• defence conversion;

• NATO-Ukraine military cooperation and interoperability;

• economic aspects of security;

• science and technology issues;

• environmental security issues, including nuclear safety;

• aerospace research and development, through AGARD;[6]

• civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control.

8. In addition, NATO and Ukraine will explore to the broadest possible degree the following areas for cooperation:

• armaments cooperation (beyond the existing CNAD[7] dialogue);

• military training, including PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory and NATO support for the Polish–Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion;

• promotion of defence cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbours.

9. Other areas for consultation and cooperation may be added, by mutual agreement, on the basis of experience gained.

10. Given the importance of information activities to improve reciprocal knowledge and understanding, NATO has established an Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv. The Ukrainian side will provide its full support to the operation of the Centre in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and the Government of Ukraine signed at Kyiv on 7 May 1997.

IV. PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND UKRAINE

11. Consultation and cooperation as set out in this Charter will be implemented through:

- NATO–Ukraine meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council at intervals to be mutually agreed;
- NATO–Ukraine meetings with appropriate NATO Committees as mutually agreed;
- reciprocal high level visits;
- mechanisms for military cooperation, including periodic meetings with NATO Chiefs of Defence and activities within the framework of the enhanced Partnership for Peace programme;
- a military liaison mission of Ukraine will be established as part of a Ukrainian mission to NATO in Brussels. NATO retains the right reciprocally to establish a NATO military liaison mission in Kyiv.

Meetings will normally take place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Under exceptional circumstances, they may be convened elsewhere, including in Ukraine, as mutually agreed. Meetings, as a rule, will take place on the basis of an agreed calendar.

12. NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an evolving, dynamic process. To ensure that they are developing their relationship and implementing the provisions of this Charter to the fullest extent possible, the North Atlantic Council will periodically meet with Ukraine as the NATO–Ukraine Commission, as a rule no less than twice a year. The NATO–Ukraine Commission will not duplicate the functions of other mechanisms described in this Charter, but instead would meet to assess broadly the implementation of the relationship, survey planning for the future, and suggest ways to improve or further develop cooperation between NATO and Ukraine.

13. NATO and Ukraine will encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Verkhovna Rada.

V. COOPERATION FOR A MORE SECURE EUROPE

14. NATO Allies will continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole.

15. NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult together whenever Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

16. NATO welcomes and supports the fact that Ukraine received security assurances from all five nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, and recalls the commitments undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom, together with Russia, and by France unilaterally, which took the historic decision in Budapest in 1994 to provide Ukraine with security assurances as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

Ukraine's landmark decision to renounce nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state greatly contributed to the strengthening of security and stability in Europe and has earned Ukraine special status in the world community. NATO welcomes Ukraine's decision to support the indefinite extension of the NPT and its contribution to the withdrawal and dismantlement of nuclear weapons which were based on its territory.

Ukraine's strengthened cooperation with NATO will enhance and deepen the political dialogue between Ukraine and the members of the Alliance on a broad range of security matters, including on nuclear issues. This will contribute to the improvement of the overall security environment in Europe.

17. NATO and Ukraine note the entry into force of the CFE Flank Document on 15 May 1997. NATO and Ukraine will continue to cooperate on issues of mutual interest such as CFE adaptation. NATO and Ukraine intend to improve the operation of the CFE treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the security of each state party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a political-military alliance. They share the view that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a participating state must be in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent of the host state or a relevant decision of the United Nations Security Council.

18. Ukraine welcomes the statement by NATO members that ''enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture and, therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.''

19. NATO member States and Ukraine will continue fully to implement all agreements on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and confidence-building measures they are part of.

The present Charter takes effect upon its signature.

The present Charter is established in two originals in the English, French and Ukrainian languages, all three texts having equal validity.

NOTES

1. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; replaced in December 1994 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
2. NATO-led [Dayton Agreement] Implementation Force/Stabilization Force.
3. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
4. Partnership for Peace.
5. Combined Joint Task Force.
6. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (established in 1952, since 1966 an agency of NATO's Military Committee).
7. Conference of National Armaments Directors.

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SIGNED IN MADRID ON 9 JULY 1997
SIGNÉ A MADRID, LE 9 JUILLET 1997

За Україну
For Ukraine
Pour l'Ukraine

За Організацію Північно-Атлантичного Договору
For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Pour l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord

Президент України
THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
LE PRÉSIDENT DE L'UKRAINE

Генеральний секретар НАТО
THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DE L'OTAN

Королівство Бельгія
the Kingdom of Belgium
le Royaume de Belgique

Канада
Canada
le Canada

Королівство Данія
the Kingdom of Denmark
le Royaume du Danemark

Французька Республіка
the French Republic
la République française

Федеративна Республіка Німеччина
the Federal Republic of Germany
la République fédérale d'Allemagne

Грецька Республіка
the Hellenic Republic
la République hellénique

Республіка Ісландія
the Republic of Iceland
la République d'Islande

Італійська Республіка
the Italian Republic
la République italienne

Велике Герцогство Люксембург
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
le Grand-Duché du Luxembourg

Королівство Нідерланди
the Kingdom of the Netherlands
le Royaume des Pays-Bas

Королівство Норвегія
the Kingdom of Norway
le Royaume de Norvège

Португальська Республіка
the Portuguese Republic
la République portugaise

Королівство Іспанія
the Kingdom of Spain
le Royaume d'Espagne

Турецька Республіка
the Republic of Turkey
la République turque

Сполучене Королівство
Великої Британії і Північної Ірландії
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord

Сполучені Штати Америки
the United States of America
les Etats-Unis d'Amérique

Sources: NATO Basic Texts: NATO–Ukraine Charter, Madrid, July 9, 1997, off the Internet (http://nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm). At the heading is: "NATO: Summit-Sommet Madrid, 8–9. VII. 1997." Signature page supplied by Ms. Nadia Tsok, Member, Mission of Ukraine to NATO, Brussels.

Appendix III

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation

Ukraine and the Russian Federation, henceforth ''The High Contracting Parties,''

- Proceeding from [*spyrayuchys' na*] the close ties established in history and the relations of friendship and cooperation that have grown up between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia;
- Acknowledging that the Treaty between the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian SFSR of November 19, 1990,[1] has furthered the development of good neighborly relations between the two states;
- Confirming their [mutual] obligations, which are derived from the articles of the Treaty between Ukraine and Russia on the Further Development of Inter-state Relations that was signed at Dagomys, June 23, 1992;[2]
- Considering that the strengthening of friendly relations, of good neighborliness and mutually advantageous cooperation corresponds to the age-long interests of their peoples, and serves the cause of peace and international security;
- Desiring to impart to those relations a new quality and to strengthen their legal foundation;
- Being firmly resolved to ensure the irreversible nature and progressive character of the democratic processes in both countries;
- Taking into account any agreements made within the framework of the Community of Independent States;
- Confirming their benevolent acceptance of (*prykhyl'nist' do*) the norms of international law and, above all, of the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as fulfilling the obligations incurred within the framework of the Organization for Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe [OSCE];

have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties, as friendly sovereign states that enjoy equal rights, base their relations on mutual respect and trust, on a strategic partnership and cooperation.

ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations arising under the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, respect the territorial integrity of each other and reaffirm the inviolability of the boundaries existing between them.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties establish their relations with each other on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers, the peaceful settlement of disputes, on refraining from the use of force or threats of force, including economic and other means of pressure, the right of peoples to freely determine their destiny, noninterference in internal affairs, the observance of human rights and basic freedoms, cooperation between states, the conscientious carrying out of international obligations, as well as other universally recognized norms of international law.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties proceed from [the assumption] that good neighborly relations and cooperation between them are important factors to increase stability and security in Europe and in the entire world. They are realizing [between themselves] close cooperation, with the goal of strengthening international peace and security. They use all necessary efforts to advance the process of universal disarmament, the creation and the strengthening of a system of collective security in Europe, as well as strengthening the peace-providing role of the UN and an increase in the effectiveness of regional security mechanisms.

The Parties will make efforts to solve all conflictual issues [between them] exclusively by peaceful means and will cooperate in obviating and settling conflicts and positions which affect their interests.

ARTICLE 5

The High Contracting Parties hold regular consultations with the objective of ensuring the further deepening of their bilateral relations and [bringing about] an exchange of ideas concerning multilateral problems, which constitute a mutual interest. When absolutely necessary, they will coordinate their positions for the carrying out of actions that had been [previously] agreed upon.

With those objectives in mind, with the agreement of the Parties, regular meetings are held at the highest level. The Foreign Ministers of the Parties meet at least twice a year.

Working meetings between representatives of other ministries and offices of the two Parties, for the purpose of discussing questions of mutual interest, are held as needed.

The Parties may create either permanent or ad-hoc commissions to decide questions in different fields.

ARTICLE 6

Either of the High Contracting Parties abstains from participation in or the support of any actions whatsoever which are directed against the other High Contracting Party, and obligates itself not to conclude with third countries any treaties whatsoever that are directed against the other Party. Neither Party will also allow that its territory be used to the detriment of the security of the other Party.

ARTICLE 7

Should a situation develop, which, in the opinion of one of the High Contracting Parties, creates a threat to peace, disturbs the peace or affects the interests of its national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, it can turn to the other High Contracting Party with a proposition to conduct appropriate consultation without delay. The Parties will exchange the appropriate information and, if necessary, will use agreed upon or joint measures to overcome that situation.

ARTICLE 8

The High Contracting Parties develop their relations in the military and military-industrial spheres providing national security, as well as in their collaboration in frontier and customs matters, export and immigration controls, on the basis of separate agreements.

ARTICLE 9

The High Contracting Parties, affirming their resolute will to proceed on the road of reduction of military forces and armaments, will advance the process of disarmament and will cooperate in undeviatingly implementing the agreements on the reduction of military forces and armaments, including nuclear forces.

ARTICLE 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties guarantees to the citizens of the other Party rights and freedoms on the same basis and to the same extent as it does to its own citizens, except in cases provided by the national legislation of the Parties or by their international agreements.

Each of the Parties protects, according to an established order, the rights of its citizens who reside on the territory of the other Party, in accordance with the obligations [contained] in the documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other generally recognized principles and norms of international law, as well as agreements made in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States to which they have adhered.

ARTICLE 11

The High Contracting Parties undertake in their territories all necessary efforts, including the passage of appropriate legislative acts, to prevent and suppress any actions whatsoever, which constitute incitement to violence or [actual] violence against individuals or groups of citizens, which [violence] is based on national, racial, ethnic or religious intolerance.

ARTICLE 12

The High Contracting Parties ensure and protect [*zapezpechuyut' zakhyst*] the ethnic, cultural and religious selfhood [*samobutnosti*] of the ethnic minorities in their territory and create conditions for the encouragement of that selfhood.

Each of the High Contracting Parties guarantees the right to persons who belong to ethnic minorities to either individually or together with other persons who belong to ethnic minorities freely express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious selfhood and to support and develop its culture, without being subjected to any attempts whatsoever at involuntary assimilation.

The High Contracting Parties will promote the creation of various pos-

sibilities and conditions for the study of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Federation and of the Russian language in Ukraine, the education of teaching personnel for conducting instruction in those languages in various schools, and will provide equivalent government aid for that purpose.

The High Contracting Parties conclude agreements on cooperation in this field.

ARTICLE 13

The High Contracting Parties develop equal and mutually advantageous cooperation in economic affairs and refrain from taking actions which can cause economic damage to each other. To this end, recognizing the necessity of a gradual formation and development of a common economic space through the means of creating conditions for free transit of goods, service, capital and labor, the Parties use effective means for coordinating a strategy for the realization of economic reforms, the deepening of economic integration on the basis of mutual interests and the harmonization of economic legislation.

The High Contracting Parties will ensure a high degree of exchange of economic information and the access to it of enterprises, entrepreneurs and scientists of both Parties.

The Parties will also aspire to the coordination of their financial, currency, credit, budgetary, foreign currency, investment, pricing, taxing, commercial-economic and customs policies, to the creation of equal opportunities and guarantees for economic actors [*hospodaryuyuchykh sub'' yektiv*]; will promote the formation and development of direct economic and commercial relations at all levels, of the specialization and cooperation of enterprises that are linked by technology, of enterprises, associations, corporations, banks, of [industrial] producers and consumers.

The High Contracting Parties will promote, on a mutually advantageous basis, the safeguarding and development of cooperation in production and in research and development between industrial enterprises in the development and production of goods, which require a high input of scientific know-how, including production for purposes of defense.

ARTICLE 14

The High Contracting Parties will ensure favorable conditions for direct commercial and other economic relations and for collaboration at the level of administrative-territorial units, according to existing national legislation, paying special attention to the development of economic relations in the frontier regions.

ARTICLE 15

The High Contracting Parties ensure favorable economic, financial and legal conditions for the entrepreneurial and other economic activity of the enterprises and organizations of the other Party, including the stimulation and mutual protection of their investments. The Parties will encourage all kinds of cooperation and direct ties between the economic actors [*hospodaryuyuchymy sub"yektamy*] of both countries, irrespective of the property regimes involved.

ARTICLE 16

The High Contracting Parties cooperate in the United Nations and other international organizations, including economic and financial organizations; they give support to each other in seeking entry to international organizations and in the accession to treaties and conventions, of which one of the Parties is not yet a member.

ARTICLE 17

The High Contracting Parties extend their cooperation into the sphere of transportation, ensure the free transit of people, loads and means of transportation through their respective territories, according to well recognized forms of international law.

The transportation of goods and passengers by rail, air, sea or river, or by car between the two Parties, and via transit through their respective territories, including operations through sea, river and air ports, rail and automobile networks, as well as operations via lines of communication, through pipelines and power grids, which are located on the territory of the other Party, are carried out in the order and according to the conditions that are spelled out in separate agreements.

ARTICLE 18

The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in carrying out searches and emergency salvage operations, also in the investigation of extraordinary events in transportation.

ARTICLE 19

The High Contracting Parties ensure the observance of the legal status of state property, the property of juridical persons and that of the citizens of one of the High Contracting Party, which is located in the territory of

the other High Contracting Party, according to the laws of that Party, unless otherwise not provided for by agreement between the Parties.

The Parties proceed from the assumption that questions concerning the property relations, which affect the interests of the Parties, are subject to regulation on the basis of separate agreements.

ARTICLE 20

The High Contracting Parties devote special attention to the development of cooperation in ensuring the functioning of the national fuel and energy complexes, systems of transportation, and systems of communications and information management, so as to promote the safeguarding, the rational utilization and the development of system complexes and individual systems, which had arisen in those spheres of the economy.

ARTICLE 21

The High Contracting Parties, on the basis of separate agreements, cooperate in the exploration and utilization of outer space, in the joint production and further development of space rocket technology, on the basis of equal rights, mutual interests and in accordance with international law. The High Contracting Parties promote the keeping and development of cooperative ties, which have become established between enterprises in the area of space rocketry.

ARTICLE 22

The High Contracting Parties will act jointly to liquidate accidents that have arisen as a result of extraordinary situations in lines of communication, oil and natural gas pipelines, road and rail transportation lines, and other objects which constitute a mutual interest.

The order of joint actions in emergency and salvage operations is regulated by special agreements.

ARTICLE 23

The High Contracting Parties cooperate in the fields of education, science and technology, in the development of research activity, by encouraging direct contacts among their scientific and research organizations and the carrying out of joint programs and developments, especially in the area of leading technologies. Questions of putting to use the results of joint research projects will be settled in each individual case by the conclusion of special agreements.

The Parties will cooperate in the sphere of educating scientific and technical personnel, will encourage the exchange of experts, scholars, graduate students and of personnel sent to acquire on the job experience, and of students; they will mutually recognize the equivalency of educational transcripts, scholarly diplomas and academic degrees, and will conclude a special agreement in this matter.

The Parties provide an exchange of scholarly and technical information, and cooperate in defending authors' and similar rights and other kinds of intellectual property, in accordance with national laws and the international obligations of their countries in this field.

ARTICLE 24

The High Contracting Parties develop their cooperation in the fields of culture, literature, fine arts, means of mass information, tourism and sports.

The Parties cooperate with each other in the field of preserving, restoring and utilizing their historical-cultural heritage.

The Parties promote in all possible ways the strengthening and expansion of creative exchanges and cooperation among groups of artists, organizations and associations of men of letters and arts, of mass media, tourism and sports.

In all possible ways, the Parties encourage the strengthening and expansion of creative exchanges and collaboration among collectives, organizations and associations of men of letters and arts, cinematographers, book publishers, archivists; they celebrate the traditional days of national cultures, [organize] artistic festivals and exhibitions, [arrange] for guest performances of creative ensembles and soloists; exchange delegations of cultural figures and experts on the state, regional and local levels; [promote] the organization of national-cultural centers on the territory of their states.

The Parties give state support for the development and realization of joint programs of renaissance and development of the tourist industry, in the establishment of new promising recreation zones, in the preservation, restoration and effective use of cultural-historical and religious monuments and objects. In all possible ways, there will be encouragement for the strengthening of contacts between sport organizations and clubs and for the joint holding of international sport events.

The Parties jointly work on and realize mutually advantageous programs for the development of a financial and technological foundation for television and radio, including audio programs transmitted by satellite; ensure, on the basis of parity, the establishment of television and radio programs in Russian in Ukraine and in Ukrainian in Russia.

The Parties promote the development of contacts between individuals,

political parties and public movements, trade unions, religious organizations and associations, as well as associations and unions oriented toward health issues, sports, tourism, and other [similar] objectives.

The entire complex of questions that are raised in this article will become the subject of separate agreements.

ARTICLE 25

The High Contracting Parties realize their cooperation in the area of protecting and improving the state of the environment, the prevention of pollution from across the frontiers, a rational and resource-saving use of the natural environment, the liquidation of the consequences of extraordinary situations, whether arising from a natural disaster or a technological [breakdown], they work together to coordinate actions in this area, on both the regional and global levels, aspiring as they do to create an all-encompassing system of international ecological security.

The Parties proceed from the assumption that questions of protecting the environment and providing ecological security, including questions of the protection and utilization of the ecological systems and resources of the river Dnieper, and other waterflows that cross state frontiers, and of actions in the framework of extraordinary ecological situations call for regulation on the basis of separate agreements.

ARTICLE 26

The High Contracting Parties collaborate in the liquidation of the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station and will conclude a separate agreement on this.

ARTICLE 27

The High Contracting Parties are developing their cooperation in the area of social services, including the social welfare of their citizens. They will conclude special agreements with the objective of resolving questions of labor relations, finding work, social welfare, compensation for crippling and similar medical injuries caused by accidents at the place of work, social benefits of the citizens of one Party, who are presently working or have worked in the past in the territory of the other Party, and other questions in this field, which call for decisions that have to be mutually agreed.

The Parties will ensure free and timely transmission of pensions, financial aid, alimony payments, compensation for damages for crippling and similar medical injuries, and other socially significant [i.e., substan-

tial] transfer payments to citizens of one of the Parties, who are either permanent or temporary residents on the territory of the other Party.

ARTICLE 28

The High Contracting Parties will work together in questions relative to the restoration of the rights of deported peoples, in accordance with either bilateral or multilateral agreements made in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

ARTICLE 29

As Black Sea countries, the High Contracting Parties are ready to develop all-around cooperation in the saving and the preservation of the environment of the Azov-Black Sea basin, the conduct of sea and climatological studies, the use of recreational opportunities and of the natural resources of the Black and Azov Seas, the development of shipbuilding and the exploitation of sea communications, ports and installations.

ARTICLE 30

The High Contracting Parties are conscious of the importance of preserving a technologically uniform system for Ukraine and the Russian Federation of collecting, evaluating and disseminating hydrometeorological information and data on the state of the environment, in order to safeguard the interests of the population and the national economy and will, in all possible ways, promote the development of cooperation in the sphere of hydrometeorology and the monitoring of the surrounding environment.

ARTICLE 31

The High Contracting Parties are especially conscious of the importance of developing mutually advantageous cooperation in the area of the protection of health and the improvement in the fields of sanitation and epidemiology, in the production of pharmaceuticals, in medical technology, and in the training of highly qualified personnel for the hospitals of both Parties.

ARTICLE 32

The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in deciding questions about the regulation of migratory processes, including measures to pre-

vent and foreclose illegal migration from third countries, in which area they will conclude a separate agreement.

ARTICLE 33

The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in combating crime, organized crime in particular; [against] terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including criminal acts directed against the safety of martitime commerce, civil aviation and other forms of transportation; [against] the illegal spread of radioactive materials, of arms, narcotics and mind-altering drugs; [against] smuggling, including the illegal movement across frontiers of objects which are of cultural, historical and artistic value.

ARTICLE 34

The High Contracting Parties will collaborate in legal matters, on the basis of separate agreements.

ARTICLE 35

The High Contracting Parties will promote the development of contacts and the cooperation between the legislatures and the legislators of both states.

ARTICLE 36

This Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties which are derived from other international agreements to which they are parties.

ARTICLE 37

Disputes about the interpretation and the application of the provisions of this Treaty are subject to settlement and regulation by means of consultations and negotiations between the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 38

The High Contracting Parties will conclude between themselves other agreements that are necessary for the implementation of the propositions contained in this Treaty as well as [new] agreements in areas which constitute a mutual interest.

ARTICLE 39

This Treaty is subject to ratification and becomes valid on the day when the ratifications are exchanged.

On the day that this Treaty will enter into force, the Treaty between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of November 19, 1990, will lose its validity.

ARTICLE 40

This Treaty is concluded for the duration of ten years. Its force will automatically be renewed for subsequent ten-year periods, unless either of the High Contracting Parties does not declare to the other High Contracting Party its willingness to cancel it by means of a written notice to that effect, which must be given no later than six months before the end of the ten-year period.

ARTICLE 41

This Treaty is subject to registration in the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter.

Done in the city of Kyiv, May 31, 1997, in two original copies, in the Ukrainian and the Russian languages, with both of the texts being authentic.

For Ukraine _____ For the Russian Federation _____

Source: Embassy of Ukraine to the United States. Ukrainian original faxed to the author by First Secretary Oleksandr Vashchenko by authority of Minister Counsellor Valeriy P. Kuchinsky. Translation by the author.

NOTES

1. The full text of the ''Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Russian SFSR and the Ukrainian SSR'' of November 19, 1990 was published in *Radyans'ka Ukraina* [Soviet Ukraine, Kyiv], November 21, 1990, p. 1f. In essence, in a disintegrating Soviet Union, an autonomous Russia under Yeltsin recognized the autonomy and territorial integrity of Ukraine under Kravchuk.

2. In essence, at Dagomys, on June 23, 1992, Ukrainian President Kravchuk and Russian President Yeltsin established the principle ''to create a Russian Navy and a Ukrainian Navy in the Black Sea on the basis of the [Soviet] Black Sea Fleet.'' See John W. R. Lepingwell, ''The Black Sea Fleet Agreement: Progress or Empty Promises?'' *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 28 (July 9, 1993), p. 50.

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About the Author

YAROSLAV BILINSKY is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. He is the author of *The Second Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (1964) as well as monographs, numerous articles, and contributions to books on Soviet and post-Soviet political topics.