The Making of Russian History

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Lviv and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Establishment Writers and Literary Politics on the Soviet Western Borderlands

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The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 led to a plethora of studies on the Soviet state's role in promoting an empire of nations, ones that employed the rhetoric and practices of the state to call for its dissolution. This article considers the Soviet western borderlands' contribution to its demise. Turning to the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, it suggests that late Soviet politics of empire integrated Western Ukrainians into one Soviet polity. In the late phases of Khrushchev's "Thaw," the literary journal of Lviv's Writers' Union, *Zhovten* (October), from 1964 to 1966 became a forum that accommodated local and national interests while adhering to an all-Soviet imperial canon. The dismissal of its editor, poet Rostyslav Bratun', did not completely end the journal's approach to literary expression. Writers like Bratun' remained very active in the public sphere. Drawing on studies of the Soviet Union and other empires, this article rejects binary oppositions between state and society and between imperial centers and colonial peripheries. It sees the power of imperial imaginations affecting regional and national identities.[1] It suggests instead that unresolved debates over issues like literature, language, and historical memory made these borderlands' integration very problematic. They provided the impetus for establishment intellectuals like Bratun' to mobilize support for national sovereignty movements in the late 1980s that contributed to the Soviet Union's breakup.

Borderland Identities and Lvivans' *Habitus*

As Peter Sahlins indicated in his pioneering study of the early modern Pyrenees, border regions have become crucial in shaping national identities. In the case of France and Spain, they affected early modern imperial policies.[2] A number of scholars have highlighted the Russian Empire's western border-

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[1] Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

[2] Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

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lands' impact on late tsarist and early Soviet nationalities policies.[3] The western borderlands acquired by the Soviet Union during World War II similarly transformed Soviet politics of empire. The Baltic republics, for instance, became for Russians a model of compromise between the capitalist West and Soviet socialism. At the end of the 1980s, national movements there had a direct impact on politics in Russia, encouraging Russia's separation from the Soviet Union.[4]

While this article will not assess the impact of Lviv on Soviet policies in Moscow, it sees that literary politics here had significant implications for relations between Lviv, the Soviet Ukrainian capital Kyiv, and Moscow. As with the Baltic republics, policy makers in Kyiv and Moscow had to deal with a region affected by Western "bourgeois" practices of nation-building. In the case of Lviv, this meant national movements that had emerged under Habsburg and then Polish rule. In the 19th century, the Habsburg province of Galicia, whose capital was Lviv, became the site of three major national projects, Polish, Ukrainian, and Zionist. Galicia's Ukrainian national movement was highly contested, as noted by Andriy Zayarnyuk in his study of Galician peasant reading clubs.[5] However, competition with Polish nation-building projects over time led to a sense of belonging to a Ukrainian national community in opposition to a Polish other, what Liah Greenfeld sees as a central aspect of modern nationalism.[6] This sense of belonging to a community united by a common history, territory, language, and ethnicity did not make violent confrontation between Polish and Ukrainian nationalisms inevitable, as Timothy Snyder has perceptively observed. However, Soviet and Nazi occupation

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[3] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1929* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996).

[4] Nils R. Muiznieks, "The Influence of the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process of Soviet Disintegration," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47: 1 (1995): 3–25; Dmitrii Smirnov, "Sovietization, Terror and Repression in the Baltic States in the 1940s and 1950s: The Perspective of Contemporary Russian Society," in *The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940–1956*, ed. Olaf Mertelsmann (Tartu: KLEIO, 2003), 55–57.

[5] John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987); Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Historical Memory and Regional Identity among Galicia's Ukrainians," in *Galicia: A Multicultured Land*, ed. Chris Hann and Paul Robert Magocsi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 185–209; Keely Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848–1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); and Andriy Zayarnyuk, "Framing the Ukrainian Peasantry in Habsburg Galicia: 1846–1914 (With Focus on the Sambir Area)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, 2003).

[6] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

policies during World War II sparked violent conflict between Poles and Ukrainians that led to the ethnic cleansing of the former Polish provinces of Volhynia and then Eastern Galicia in 1943 and 1944.[7] Similar to Kate Brown's Soviet Ukrainian province of Zhytomyr, this mixed borderland became an ethnic heartland populated almost exclusively by Ukrainians.[8]

In incorporating Eastern Galicia and other territories into what became known as Western Ukraine, Soviet policy makers contributed to its ethnic homogenization. However, their nationality policies assumed a different conception of nationhood than that perceived by Galician Ukrainian national activists. Interwar Soviet policy makers claimed elements of national belonging could be employed to build socialism among non-Russians of the former Russian Empire. On the eve of World War II, such aspects of nation building, known as indigenization or *korenizatsiia* in Russian, shifted in favor of Great Russians. While promoting national and ethnic particularism among non-Russians, Soviet policy makers stressed Great Russians' "progressive" role in leading the Soviet family of nations toward the communist future. These policies thus became at odds with Galician Ukrainians' understanding of what it meant to be Ukrainian. Their nation-building project did not require the leadership of Great Russians. To promote Great Russians' language and culture as more "progressive" suggested national discrimination.[9]

The Soviet occupation and reoccupation of Lviv thus produced a clash in nation-building projects where educated Galician Ukrainians were perceived as carriers of "bourgeois nationalism." In addition, Soviet expansion westward took on the features of a civilizing mission where "backwardness" became identified with the Western capitalist world. As Soviet policy makers expelled Poles from Lviv in 1944–47 and carried out resettlement and employment policies favoring ethnic Ukrainians, they compelled local Western Ukrainians to shed their "backwardness," breaking all ties with their "bourgeois nationalist" pasts.[10] This civilizing mission became especially aggressive as Soviet security forces fought underground nationalist partisans in Western Ukraine in the late 1940s. Soviet security organs called these partisans, members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), "Banderites," named after Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) leader in exile Stepan Bandera. They blurred distinctions between the two organizations to emphasize their connections to the OUN, whose members had collaborated with German occupation officials in the first months of the Nazi invasion. Fighting with the

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[7] Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

[8] Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

[9] Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 432–61.

[10] Tarik Youssef Cyril Amar, "The Making of Soviet Lviv, 1939–1963" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2006), 118–261.

"Banderites" was fierce. From February 1944 to May 1946, Soviet Party and state organs, along with Ministry of State Security (MVD) forces, killed a total of 110,825 "nationalist bandits" and arrested 250,676 people in Western Ukraine. UPA terror was no less significant. In the same period, such insurgent groups killed 11,725 people, injured 3,914 more, and presumably took 2,401 hostages. These victims were mostly Soviet collaborators, officials, and officers.[11]

This campaign against the nationalist underground acquired further impetus in 1946–48 due to the emerging Cold War. American intelligence services initially sought out UPA and OUN activists as potential sources of information for war against the Soviet Union.[12] Similarly the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, active in Galicia's Ukrainian national movement, became identified as a security threat, not just because of perceived ties to the nationalist underground (which church leaders nonetheless had condemned), but to the capitalist West, as the church hierarchy was subordinate to the Vatican. In 1946, Soviet leaders arranged the dissolution of this church, known also as the "Uniates." The Russian Orthodox Church absorbed its hierarchy, priests, and followers. Priests and bishops who refused to comply with the new church faced imprisonment and exile.[13]

Such attempts at ridding Western Ukrainians of their "backwardness" did not mean that Soviet policies lacked flexibility. After Stalin's death, Moscow and Kyiv promoted a Soviet Western Ukrainian identity that acknowledged the region's differences with Eastern Ukraine, that is, Soviet Ukraine prior to 1939. They promoted Lviv's surviving prewar Ukrainian intelligentsia as role models for younger Western Ukrainians. Histories of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and Lviv's semi-fictitious Soviet partisan movement incorporated what was "progressive" or amenable to Soviet myths about the October Revolution and World War II.[14] Besides this cooptation of the local, the nationalist underground struggle exhausted the local population. Of 11,725 assassinations known to have been carried out by Ukrainian nationalists against Soviet agents between February 1944 and December 1946, over half (6,250) were local Ukrainians, a figure that increased to two-thirds (6,980) when local recruits for the Soviet security forces' Destruc-

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[11] Jeffrey Burds, "AGENTURA: Soviet Informants' Networks and the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944–48," *East European Politics and Societies* 11: 1 (Winter 1997): 97, 113.

[12] Jeffrey Burds, "The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948," *Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 1505 (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2001).

[13] Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–50)* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996).

[14] Amar, "Soviet Lviv," 613–788.

tion Battalions were included.[15] Such partisan activity, which also affected the Baltic republics, constituted what Amir Weiner rightly calls a civil war on the western borderlands, one which pitted locals against one another as well as locals against Soviet power.[16] In this manner, Lviv's Western Ukrainians came to see Soviet power as the lesser of two evils. The removal of Poles from Lviv and the rest of Galicia and Volhynia and the remaking of Lviv into a Ukrainian city likewise neutralized nationalist agendas. Similar strategies worked in Lithuania, where the making of Vilnius into a Lithuanian city realized the aims of 19th-century Lithuanian romantic nationalists.[17]

The post-Stalin era moreover provided opportunities for greater local and national self-expression. In the western borderlands, these policy shifts by Moscow helped mitigate impressions that Soviet power was an alien outside force. In May and June of 1953, Soviet secret police chief Lavrentii Beria initiated amnesties to nationalist partisans and their sympathizers in prison and in exile. He sponsored reports highly critical of discrimination against locals in assigning Party and state leadership positions. In the case of Western Ukraine, such reports criticized local functionaries for failing to make use of the Ukrainian language. While Beria had questionable motives for these reforms, and while these reforms were discredited after his arrest and execution, the promotion of locals to Party and state leadership positions that had been carried out remained in place. Amnesties of those in prison and exile continued.[18]

Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin's cult of personality in 1956 and Stalinists in 1961 encouraged critics of Great Russian chauvinism. In the case of Ukraine, the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961 provoked Ukraine's Party chief, Nikolai Podgornyi, to accuse past Ukrainian Party chief Lazar' Kaganovich of being a "real sadist" who, in 1947, unjustly accused intellectuals and Party functionaries of engaging in "nationalism."[19] In Kyiv, however slowly, the Thaw encouraged the partial rehabilitation of cultural figures repressed in the Stalin era.[20] With the Thaw's end in the mid-1960s, the Brezhnev era wit-

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[15] Burds, "AGENTURA," 109.

[16] Amir Weiner, "The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics," *Journal of Modern History* 78 (June 2006): 333–76.

[17] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 90–102; Theodore R. Weeks, "Population Politics in Vilnius 1944–1947: A Case Study of Socialist-Sponsored Ethnic Cleansing," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 23: 1 (2007): 76–95; idem, "A Multi-ethnic City in Transition: Vilnius's Stormy Decade, 1939–1949," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47: 2 (2006): 153–75.

[18] Weiner, "Empires Pay a Visit," 336–39.

[19] Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarianism to Post-Stalinist Society*, trans. Karen Forster and Ostwald Forster (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 235, 240.

[20] Hryhoriy Kas'ianov, *Nezhodni: Ukrains'ka intelihentsiia v rusi oporu 1960–80-kh rokiv* (Kyiv: Lybid', 1995), 12–13.

nessed the acceleration of postwar trends where ideological matters became increasingly devoid of content. As Alexei Yurchak has noted of late Soviet society, state and Party functionaries at all levels came to emphasize performance of literary conventions in official reports and meetings that had little to do with actual policies. Such formalization of Party and state discourses meant that the ideological struggle against "bourgeois nationalism" in the western borderlands, too, acquired an ambiguous, almost meaningless character.[21]

The post-Stalin era in Lviv thus allowed for tacit negotiations between institutions in Lviv, Kyiv, and Moscow and local intellectuals. Such negotiations allowed for the cooptation of individual, regional, and national forms of self-expression when it came to Lviv's literary scene. However, relations between the western borderlands and Moscow remained ambiguous. The legacy of nationalist underground resistance made these regions highly suspect for republic and all-Union leaders. During political unrest in Poland and Hungary in 1956, Soviet leaders in Moscow saw returned nationalist underground activists as contributing to "anti-Soviet" manifestations on the Western borderlands. Such suspicions led to greater restrictions on returning from prison and exile, more emphasis on communal policing of such "anti-Soviet" elements, and greater emphasis on the class struggle.[22]

Suspicions lingered despite such policy changes. A KGB report to the Ideological Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, dated May 8, 1964, strongly suggested this. In assessing nationalist manifestations throughout the Soviet Union, it linked the emergence of young nationalist underground groups in the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine to agitation conducted by returned national guerrillas and relatives with connections to the nationalist underground. It indicated that such former nationalist underground activists had changed tactics, urging young people to join the Komsomols and the Party to undermine the Soviet Union from within. The report similarly targeted Roman Catholic priests and underground "Uniate" clergy as sources of nationalist inspiration, a clear reference to Lithuania and Western Ukraine, where both groups respectively were active. Prewar and wartime nationalist literature circulating underground likewise fueled this new wave of nationalist activity.[23] As late as the fall of 1980, during the rise of Poland's Solidarity movement, disturbances in the Soviet bloc were linked to increased activity among "Uniates" and underground nationalist activists, as

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[21] Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[22] Weiner, "Empires Pay a Visit," 360–75.

[23] Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI) f. 5, op. 55, d. 71, ll. 33–47, in *The Departmental Records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1953–66*, Ideology Department, Reel 428.

seen with a November 14, 1980 report by the Lviv Regional Party committee to superiors in Kyiv.[24]

In addition to these upheavals in the Soviet bloc, shifting political fortunes after Khrushchev's Thaw made it difficult, though not impossible, for Lvivian writers to find accommodation with Party and state institutions. In Soviet Ukraine, conflicts between Party chief Petro Shelest and Moscow colleagues led to a "general pogrom" against the Ukrainian intelligentsia in 1972 and Shelest's subsequent ouster. The rest of the decade witnessed rigorous censorship of national self-expression. Valentyn Malanchuk, a former Lviv regional Party committee official and a protégé of Moscow's chief ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, carried out such censorship from 1972 until his removal in 1979 as republic Central Committee Party secretary for ideology.[25]

It was in these shifting political fortunes that Lvivians came to identify with the values and practices of one Soviet polity. They adopted a broad set of values and practices, or *habitus*, which made them loyal Soviet citizens, patriotic Ukrainians, and also proud Lvivians and Western Ukrainians.[26] For those involved in Lviv's literary thaw of the mid-1960s, this process of accommodation was far from easy. Born mostly between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s, such Western Ukrainian writers had experienced Polish rule, Nazi and Soviet occupations, and postwar guerrilla resistance. Poet Rostyslav Bratun' (1927–95), a native of Volhynia, was one such example. Bratun' came from a region where the KPZU rather than the OUN had actively resisted Polish rule. During World War II, Volnynia witnessed the growing influence of OUN activities. Tensions between Poles and Ukrainians, fueled by Nazi occupation policies, led to the ethnic cleansing of Volhynia's Poles by the recently-formed UPA in 1943. UPA guerrillas and ordinary Ukrainians killed between 40,000 and 60,000 Poles in the most brutal fashion, putting on display disemboweled, crucified, or dismembered bodies to compel Poles to flee.[27]

Bratun''s youth became ensnared in the violence that engulfed the Volhynia Region. He came from a family whose sympathies with Soviet power were quite strong, yet not without ambivalences. His father, Andriy Bratun', a teacher of peasant background, had been a member of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries Party when Volhynia was part of the Russian Empire. While he had fought for the Ukrainian People's Republic under Simon Petliura against the Bolsheviks, in interwar Poland he came to admire the Soviet

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[24] Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'iednan' Ukrainy (TsDAHOU) f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2048, ark. 99–100.

[25] Kas'ianov, *Nezhodni*, 133, 137–38, 144–45, 172; Vitalii Vrublevskii, *Vladimir Shcherbitskii: Pravda i vymysly* (Kyiv: "Dovira," 1993), 114–24.

[26] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977); idem, "Habitus," in *Habitus: A Sense of Place*, ed. Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002), 27–34.

[27] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 168–70.

Union and its indigenization policies that benefited Ukrainians. As a member of the Polish parliament, the Sejm, the elder Bratun′ was among those who organized the Selsoiuz (Peasants′ Union), a leftist group with sympathies for the Soviet Union, in 1924. This organization in turn created the Sil′-Rob (Ukrainian Peasant-Worker Union), a peasant political party accused of being a front for the KPZU, illegal in Poland since its existence in 1923. This communist-leaning political party was banned in the early 1930s. In Volhynia Bratun′ became head of the Ukrainian cultural organization Prosvita (Enlightenment), whose members later became accused of having "bourgeois nationalist" tendencies when Soviet power came to Volhynia and Galicia.[28] Rostyslav Bratun′′s aunt, Natalia Uzhviy, became a famous actress in Soviet Ukraine's capital, Kharkiv, in the late 1920s, and later a deputy in Ukraine's Supreme Soviet.[29] Under these circumstances the younger Bratun′, already inclined to active public service, embraced the new Soviet order in his early teens. As one of his friends, poet Mykola Petrenko, recalled, Bratun′ was "not only the first Scout" in Volhynia, a reference to the interwar Ukrainian Scouting organization Plast′, but also "the first Pioneer" and "the first Komsomol," always striving for "for first place only."[30]

Bratun′′s pre-adolescent and adolescent aspirations to become a leader, as well as other factors, drew him into Volhynia's emerging Ukrainian nationalist underground during World War II. According to a Writers′ Union Party meeting investigating his personal case on January 10, 1952, Bratun′ at age 15 (around 1942–43) briefly took part in a secret youth division of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), adopting the code name "Pavlo." While attending a gymnasium in the village of Horokhiv run by his father, Bratun′ and some of his classmates secretly joined it. Bratun′′s discussions with them about nationalist literature supposedly had attracted the interests of OUN recruiters. Such literature included the works of historian Mykhailo Hrushevs′kyi, condemned by 1952 by Party leaders in Kyiv and Moscow for allegedly inspiring people to advocate Ukraine's separation from the Soviet Union. Bratun′ then served as leader (*providnyk*) of District (*raion*) 435 in the Volhynia region with the code name "Ruslan," succeeding an OUN activist who joined the OUN's Security Service (SB).[31]

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[28] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 150; idem, *Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 137; Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1929*, trans. Alan Rutkowski (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 89.

[29] Mykola Il′nyts′kyi, *Drama bez katarsysu*, vol. 1, *Storinky literaturnoho zhyttia L′vova pershoi polovyny XX stolittia* (Lviv: "Misioner," 1999), 176.

[30] Mykola Petrenko, "Chy i my buly bohemoiu: Na charku z Bratunem," *Postup* (Lviv), 6 February 1999, p. 6.

[31] Derzhavnyi arkhiv l′vivs′koi oblasti (DALO), f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 1–13.

It is doubtful that Bratun′ joined the OUN youth organization to fight Soviet power. According to remarks by the Writers Union Party secretary handling Bratun′′s case in early 1952, Bratun′ claimed that he had joined the group "out of foolishness" (*po durosti*), hiding his membership from his own father, the gymnasium's director. He claimed that there were a lot of things that he misunderstood back then.[32] His own testimony stressed how complicated the situation was. He said that he had seen with his own eyes the "Banderites" burning homes in the Volhynia, a reference to UPA violence against Poles in 1943. Bratun′ speculated that the fact that these people had turned against the Germans had influenced his decision to join the OUN youth group. He also emphasized that once recruited into the OUN youth group, he could not leave or disobey orders for fear of being punished.[33] He stressed to fellow Party members that while in the nationalist underground, he helped hide and give aid to Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet partisans behind enemy lines, testimony other Party members cast doubt on.[34]

Such testimony at his Party hearing clearly aimed to mitigate his guilt of being a "bourgeois nationalist," just as fellow Party members' criticisms of Bratun′′s actions were the result of pressure by Party and state organs for them to show political vigilance. However, this hearing did suggest that the immediate circumstances of the war drew Bratun′ into the nationalist underground, if but for a moment. Growing conflicts between the OUN and the Germans in Volhynia no doubt encouraged young people like Bratun′ to join the cause. Following attempts by the OUN faction led by Stepan Bandera, OUN-B, to declare an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv in late June 1941, German occupation authorities cracked down on OUN-B, arresting leaders like Bandera and killing up to four-fifths of OUN-B's overall leadership in 1941–42. Germany's defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943 convinced OUN-B's younger, more inexperienced, and more radical surviving leaders to rise up against German occupation and cleanse Volhynia and Galicia of Poles.[35]

Other factors made it difficult for Bratun′ not to follow through with his commitment to the OUN. While Bratun′ tried to distance himself from the OUN, he justifiably feared retribution if he left it. OUN-B and members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) killed perhaps as many Ukrainians as Poles in 1943, the result of attempts to silence opponents and potential traitors.[36] While fellow writers at his 1952 Party hearing brushed off Bratun′′s claims that he had also helped out Soviet partisans and prisoners of war, negotiations did take place between nationalist and Soviet partisans in Volhynia in

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[32] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 2.

[33] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 2–3, 12.

[34] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 4, 5–6, 9, 11, 12.

[35] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 164, 166–67.

[36] Ibid., 164.

1942, before OUN-B came to dominate underground nationalist resistance in the region. Bratun′, who was then age 15, probably made few distinctions between the two, especially since he had been active in the Komsomols before German occupation.[37] Nonetheless, such ties with the OUN apparently left their mark on Bratun′ even after he had tried to distance himself from it. The secretary of the Writers′ Union Party organization claimed that someone from the "Banderite" underground wrote letters to Bratun′ after the latter had supposedly left the OUN, which suggested his ties to the OUN were far from accidental.[38]

With the war's end, Bratun′ did try to leave his OUN past behind. As with others in Soviet society in the Stalin period, he learned to dissimulate. He hid his involvement with the OUN when compiling his biography for entrance into the Komsomols, Lviv State University, the Writers′ Union, and the Party. As one of the first of Western Ukraine's new generation of Soviet-educated writers, he gained fame as a poet praising "Golden September," September 1939, when Soviet forces brought Volyn′ and other parts of what became Western Ukraine under one Soviet Ukrainian state.[39] It was only in late 1951, when talking with a journalist at the Russian-language regional newspaper *L′vovskaia Pravda* (L′vov Truth) that Bratun′ decided to come clean. On the advice of that journalist and that journalist's father, he decided to confess this part of his biography to the local KGB organs and to the Lviv Regional Party committee.[40] As they soundly condemned Bratun′'s act of deception and voted to expel him from the Party, fellow Writers′ Union Party members in early January 1952 insisted that Bratun′ should have been more forthcoming about his involvement, informing Party and state organs about those he had known in the OUN.[41] Only one recommended more lenient punishment, citing Bratun′'s youth (age 15!) and inexperience.[42] Others, though, cast doubt on his true political orientation, noting the discrepancy between his patriotic poems and his own private actions. As one fellow Party member put it, "We don't know who you are—an enemy hiding or a person who got confused."[43] Despite being expelled from the Party ranks, Bratun′ managed to

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[37] John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 143–46.

[38] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 12.

[39] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear Off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 270–78; Ivan Hushchak, "Rostyslav Bratun′," in *Pleiada zaboronena, pryzabuta* (Lviv: "Kobzar," 1998), 262–63.

[40] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 3–12.

[41] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 5–12.

[42] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 6.

[43] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 7.

redeem himself. While I did not have access to Bratun''s personal Party member file, an archival employee on condition of anonymity read me an appeal Bratun' had written to Stalin following his expulsion from the Party, in which he addressed Stalin as "my sun" (*sontsia moia*). His aunt, the famous Soviet Ukrainian theater and film actress Natalia Uzhviy, supposedly won over Party and state organs on Bratun''s behalf.[44]

It was in this context that Bratun' sought to cast aside his "Banderite" past and embrace the ideals of postwar Soviet socialism. He went on to write poems praising the Soviet state and the Party. He actively participated in public life, appearing on the radio nearly every day. Bratun' acquired such a notorious reputation for his civic engagement that a Russian colleague, Lviv poet Grigorii Glazov, supposedly penned the epigram, "Wherever you spit, there's Bratun'" (*Kuda ne pliun', vezde Bratun'*). In 1959, Bratun' published a pamphlet denouncing the followers of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" in the OUN, the UPA, and in the Ukrainian diaspora in the capitalist West. He vividly described in this pamphlet violence committed by the OUN and the UPA in places like his native Volhynia.[45]

One could argue that Bratun' was adopting a *habitus* that merely adhered on the surface to the ideals of Soviet power. A Lviv poet, recalling nights spent at Bratun''s home in the late 1950s, noted that Bratun'—"Under a veil of secrecy, of course," reports the poet—privately let him read literature marginalized or banned in the Soviet public sphere. At Bratun''s home, this poet read Polish translations of such modernist poets as Charles Baudelaire and Federico Garcia Lorca.[46] Reading such poets could not in itself be seen as an "anti-Soviet" act, as Bratun''s friend assumes, as Baudelaire could be viewed as a critic of 19th-century French society, and Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War, whom the Soviet government opposed, presumably had killed Lorca. Writers like Baudelaire and Lorca were published in the Soviet Union during the Thaw and after. However, Soviet publishers reproduced such works in Russian only in small quantities because of their potentially "apolitical" or "bourgeois" subtexts. This could be seen with the Moscow publisher Progress's recommendation to all-Union Central Committee functionaries on February 8, 1964 to limit the press run for the selected works of existentialist writer Franz Kafka.[47] More importantly, these private readings included a collection of poems by Ukrainian writer Ievhen Malaniuk. Malaniuk was a

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[44] Il'nyts'kyi, *Drama bez katarsysu*, 1: 176.

[45] Rostyslav Bratun', *Krapka bez i: Pamphlety* (Kyiv: Radians'kyi pysmennyk, 1959); Il'nyts'kyi, *Drama bez katarsysu*, 1: 177.

[46] Mykola Petrenko, "Chy i my buly bohemoiu: Na charku z Bratunem," *Postup* (Lviv) 6 February 1999, p. 6.

[47] Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), f. 5, op. 55, d. 100, ll. 1–2, in *The Departmental Records of the Central Committee: RGANI of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1953–1966*, Ideology Department, Reel 437.

Galician writer associated with wartime nationalist circles. He fled to the West and was banned as a "bourgeois nationalist" by Soviet censors, consequently making his book one that Bratun' had to keep a secret.[48] Bratun' thus came to adopt the practices of dissimulation prominent in Soviet society since the Stalin era, saying one thing in public while practicing another in private.

To some extent, this strategic engagement with Soviet practices and values could be seen when Bratun' became editor of *October*. In an oral interview, a writer in charge of the journal's literary criticism recalled that when he showed Bratun' the manuscript of an article comparing national motifs in the poetry of 19th-century Ukrainian and Hungarian poets, Bratun' said that it was a fine article, were the journal in Paris.[49] Bratun''s remark suggested he was well aware of the ideological pitfalls of comparing Ukrainian and Hungarian poets, which neglected the role of Great Russian literature. It also suggests he was leery of materials that focused exclusively on national motifs, which would have gotten the journal in trouble for "nationalism" because of neglecting the role class struggle played in these poets' works, as Soviet literary critics were expected to do. For Bratun', what mattered was not necessarily the ideological "purity" of an article, but whether or not his superiors would accept it.

Such strategic maneuverings between public and private spheres were nothing greatly unusual for Soviet society in the Stalin era or after. In the case of Western Ukrainians, this meant maneuvering between their private sympathies for "bourgeois nationalists" and their public commitments to a Soviet family of nations that overcame the dark "bourgeois" past. A colleague of Bratun''s, poet Ivan Hushchak, also shared such strategies. A native of Galicia who grew up in the Lviv's Region's district of Zhovkva, Hushchak was slightly younger than Bratun', born in 1930. Before becoming an editor for the Lviv publisher Kameniar, he had a post in the local Party leadership in Luts'k, Volhynia's capital. In 1964, *October* portrayed Hushchak as the son of a Communist activist killed in Auschwitz and said that the younger Hushchak took up arms to defend his collective farm during German occupation.[50] Despite his Party connections and spotless biography, Hushchak, like Bratun', had a checkered past. In a collection of memoirs and essays on other Lviv writers, Hushchak mentions that he had relatives and friends in the UPA and other nationalist organizations. It is very likely that the village defense force he took part in might have had sympathies for the UPA as the war came to a close. At any rate, Hushchak ran into problems with fellow Party members at work because he sometimes spoke too highly of the UPA in informal conversations.

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[48] Petrenko, "Chy i my buly bohemoiu," *Postup* (Lviv), 6 February 1999, p. 6.

[49] Liubomyr Senyk, Lviv, interview with the author, taped recording, 5 November 1998, Institute of Historical Research, Lviv National University.

[50] Taras Myhal', "Velyka rozmova," *Zhovten'* (Lviv), no. 4 (April 1964): 9.

Like Bratun', Hushchak privately read works of banned "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist" writers he had collected during German occupation, when he was a student at a workers' school in Zhovkva.[51]

While these young Western Ukrainians learned to hide their personal sympathies and attitudes toward official policies, the divisions between the public and the private were quite translucent, as seen in other studies on late Soviet society.[52] Bratun''s turning away from his OUN past was about constructing a new identity, one that broke with the violence and terror the OUN had committed in Volhynia. Soviet ideals of social and national liberation appealed to young writers after the war. Another Lviv writer close in age, poet Dmytro Pavlychko, born in 1928 in the Galician region of Ivano-Frankivs'k, had also flirted with the nationalist underground in his teens. In 1945, he was briefly arrested for belonging to a youth movement connected this time not with the OUN, but with the UPA. As he admitted years later in a published interview, he came to embrace the ideals of social and national liberation professed by Marx and Lenin. For many years, he associated Soviet Ukraine's problems with Russification with local and republic bureaucrats, not with policy makers in Moscow.[53] Bratun' apparently went through a similar evolution. It was no coincidence that he attributed his OUN activities in 1952 to the foolishness of youth. Such remarks reflected Bratun''s own changing world view, where improving Ukrainians' lives within a Soviet family of nations, not separation from the Soviet Union through armed force, was the only viable path Western Ukrainians could take. It was in this context that Bratun' contributed to Lviv's literary thaw in the early 1960s.

Rostyslav Bratun' and the Literary Thaw

Already before becoming editor of *October*, Bratun' was among Lviv's writers demanding greater expression for Ukrainian literature during the Thaw. He emphasized such demands at a Lviv Writers' Union meeting on January 25, 1962, not long after Khrushchev sharpened his criticism of Stalinists at the 1961 Twenty-Second Party Congress. Bratun' emphasized that Ukrainian writers needed to win back their readers' trust with works that were more "sincere, bold, and truthful" than works that Stalin's cult of personality had encouraged.[54] To inspire such new works, he promoted young literary talents as head of the Lviv Writers' Union's Office of the Young Writer. This included holding Sunday poetry readings in front of the Lenin Monument downtown. These poetry readings became known as the Young Writers' Square and later

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[51] Hushchak, *Pleiada zaboronena,* 5–6, 253–54.

[52] Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*.

[53] Mykola Mushynka, "Ukraina – tse ne vorota do Rosii, a velyka zemlia…': Interv'iu z Dmytrom Pavlychkom naperedodni ioho 70-richchhia," *Dzvin* (Lviv), no. 10–12 (October–December 1999): 130–31.

[54] DALO f. R-2009, op. 1, spr. 119, ark. 3.

the Young Artists' Square, where young poets, literary critics, and prose writers performed their works before the public. Artists, actors, and musicians took part.[55] Bratun' similarly advised and defended the Club of Artistic Youth, a Komsomol-sponsored organization promoting Lviv's Ukrainian cultural renaissance in the early 1960s.[56]

Bratun' continued this literary thaw when he became editor of *October* in the fall of 1963. As with central journals like Aleksandr Tvardovskii's *Novy mir* in Moscow, *October* under Bratun' negotiated with the public sphere rather than subverted it. Issues from 1964 and 1965, products of Bratun''s editorial policies, suggest a literary thaw that eroded Stalin-era stereotypes about Ukrainians' language, history, and literature. It was a thaw that promoted greater engagement with the capitalist West. It affirmed Moscow's calls for greater Soviet democracy, a restoration of socialist legality, and the construction of a communist society by a Soviet family of nations by 1980.

Such issues of *October* thus featured poems and essays on the Party, Lenin, and Soviet patriotism on the journal's front pages. They honored official holidays like the October Revolution, the anniversary of the Soviet army's liberation of Lviv in 1944, and the 25th anniversary of Western Ukraine's joining Soviet Ukraine. Drawing on recent Party decisions as calls for true Soviet democracy, essayists criticized Stalin-era stereotypes in scholarship and art. One writer, active in the local Club of Artistic Youth's Ukrainian national renaissance, took to task a scholar for dismissing the role national forms of self-expression had in works by such Ukrainian 19th-century literary classics as Ivan Franko. Turning to Franko's own words, he affirmed that all art is national as well as international.[57] Editions marking the sesquicentennial of the birth of Taras Shevchenko, the most noted of Ukraine's 19th-century national awakeners, and the anniversary of his death (in March and May 1964, respectively) contained materials affirming the values of Soviet patriotism, but also devotion to a Soviet Ukrainian homeland.

October regularly featured works by or about victims of Stalinist repressions (Myroslav Irchan, Hnat Khotkevych, Ostap Vyshnia) or those who had allegedly compromised themselves during Lviv's wartime German occupation (Iuriy Shkrumeliak, Taras Myhal'). In 1965 it ran in serial form the Stalinist gulag experiences of writer Volodymyr Hzhyts'kyi, a Galician native who had immigrated to Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s. Another formerly suppressed writer, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych from Kyiv, published a series of arti-

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[55] Iuriy Zaitsev, "Antyrezhymnyi rukh (1956–1991)," in *Lviv: Istorychni narysy*, Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Kryp'iakevycha, NAN Ukrainy (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Kryp'iakevycha, NAN Ukrainy, 1996), 564.

[56] Volodymyr Kvitnevyi, "Na shliakhu borot'by za ukrains'ke vidrodzhennia (iz spohadiv pro 'shistdesiatnykiv')," *Zhyvotoky* (Lviv) 1: 6 (January–March 1994): 12.

[57] Mykhailo Kosiv, "Perehuk heniiv – chy perekruchennia faktiv?" *Zhovten'* (Lviv), no. 3 (March 1965): 154–57.

cles on the proper use of the Ukrainian language. Antonenko-Davydovych, who had fought against Soviet power in Ukraine's national revolution of 1917–20, became a role model for Ukrainian intellectuals and dissidents until his death in 1984. In one of his 1965 articles on the Ukrainian language, he stressed the need to treat all languages of the world equally, including Ukrainian.[58]

The 1964–65 editions of *October* widened channels of individual and national self-expression. They featured writers whose poetry and prose were about intimate, personal themes having almost nothing to do with politics (Iuriy Koval', Oleksandr Lizen, Volodymyr Luchuk, Arkadiy Pastushchenko, and Iuriy Shcherbak). Some short stories were by writers in Kyiv later known for their modernist prose and science fiction, literary genres that broke with Soviet Ukrainian literature's emphasis on village folk themes (Oles' Berdnyk and Valeriy Shevchuk). Kyiv writers later blacklisted by republic Central Committee ideologue Valentyn Malanchuk during Ukraine's "general pogrom" of the 1970s appeared in these issues of *October* (Oles' Berdnyk, Ivan Drach, Vasyl' Holoborod'ko, and Ievhen Hutsalo).[59] Lvivians and other Ukrainians who later became political prisoners had contributed to poetry, essays, and short stories in *October* in 1964–65 (Ihor Kalynets' and Sviatoslav Karavans'kyi). Unlike previous editions, these paid striking attention to visual design, utilizing far more black-and-white graphics images by such young Lviv artists as Ievhen Beznisko and Sofiia Karaffa-Korbut.

In addition, *October*, like other institutions in late Soviet society, engaged with the wider world, namely the capitalist West. As sociologist Alexei Yurchak notes, this practice of engagement reflected policy makers' attempts to highlight late Soviet socialism's mission to enlighten and liberate humanity.[60] Issues of *October* in 1964–65 thus featured Ukrainian-language translations of works by writers from England (C. P. Snow), Spain (Federico Garcia Lorca), and the United States (Walt Whitman). To a certain extent this engagement with the capitalist West took place indirectly, through Soviet bloc countries and the "Soviet Abroad" of the Baltic republics, where censorship of literature was relatively more liberal than in Soviet Ukraine. In this manner *October* published translations of contemporary works by Latvian, Polish, Slovak, and Hungarian writers. The literary thaw of *October* was not just about reviving Ukrainians' national literature, but about providing individuals with opportunities for self-realization and greater access to the wider world, a central

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[58] Antonenko Davydovych, review of A. Matviienko, *Zhyve slovo* (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo dytiachoi literatury AN URSR, n.d.), *Zhovten'* (Lviv), no. 4 (April 1965): 138–40; Borys Tymoshenko, ed., *BAHATTIA: Borys Antonenko-Davydovych ochyma suchasnykiv* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1999).

[59] For names on such black lists, see Vrublevskii, *Vladimir Shcherbytski*, 121.

[60] Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*, 162–65.

goal of many nationalist theories.[61] This literary thaw nonetheless placed Lvivians and other Ukrainians within a Soviet family of nations, one that was building a more progressive civilization in the Cold War era. Such efforts at accommodation with state and Party institutions brought much popularity to *October*. As a republic Writers' Union report to the republic Central Committee on June 14, 1965 noted, the journal's subscribers had grown to include every region of Soviet Ukraine, with subscriptions increasing from 11–12,000 when Bratun' became editor to as many as 18,000.[62]

Such efforts at accommodation came under fire after Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964. Claiming a number of ideological "shortcomings" committed by its editors, the Lviv Regional Party committee in May 1965 decided to remove Bratun' as editor of *October*. While the republic Writers' Union in Kyiv defended Bratun' and won time for his case, on May 6, 1966, the Secretariat of the republic's Central Committee finally approved the decision to fire him.[63] Bratun''s dismissal became part of a Soviet-wide trend of increasing censorship of literary journals that had advocated a more liberal line during the Thaw. In Moscow, such censorship of the journal *Novyi mir* led to the resignation of its editor, Aleksandr Tvardovskii, in early 1970.[64]

In the case of *October*, this curbing of the Thaw epitomized not just this wider political trend, but personal and institutional conflicts that played on unresolved tensions over nationhood on the Soviet western borderlands. In becoming editor, Bratun' provoked conflicts among Lviv writers themselves, with Eastern Ukrainians who had come to Western Ukraine after World War II taking the lead in attacking him. Bratun' had outmaneuvered prose writer Petro Inhul's'kyi for control over the journal in late 1963. Inhul's'kyi, who had expected to become editor, sided with state and Party organs in undermining *October*. According to one writer, Inhul's'kyi zealously helped the censor for the Regional Administration of Literature (Obllit) search for errors on the journal's pages, identifying the most innocent materials as ideologically suspect.[65] Bratun''s own June 1965 appeal to the republic Central Committee suggested the excessive censorship going on. He said that the regional Party committee brought up accusations such as "Why do you oppose using the word *miropryiemstvo*?" They objected to a Ukrainian word (presumably *zakhody*, or

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[61] Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), 21.

[62] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, spr. 6001, ark. 64.

[63] DALO f. P-3, op. 9, spr. 45, ark. 16–18 (regional Party committee); Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv-muzei literatury ta mystetstva Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAMLMU), f. 590, op. 1, spr. 601, ark. 6–12 (Writers' Union); TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 8, spr. 3258, ark. 30.

[64] Vladimir Lakshin, *Solzhenitsyn, Tvardovsky, and Novy Mir*, trans. Michael Glenny (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1980).

[65] Roman Ivanychuk, *Blahoslovy, duzhe moia, Hospoda… Shchodennykovi zapysy, spohady i rozdumy* (Lviv: "Prosvita," 1993), 118–19.

"event") being used instead of what was closer to the Russian equivalent, *meropriiatie*.[66] A report by the republic Writers' Union to the republic Central Committee noted that for 1964 alone, state censors intervened in *October* publications over 40 times, with 15 various materials removed altogether and some issues completely revised.[67] Besides underscoring the degree to which Bratun' had to make compromises with censors over what *October* could publish, Inhul's'kyi's ready cooperation with censors highlighted the role rivalries among writers played in undermining Bratun's leadership of the journal.

Similarly, poet Tymish Odud'ko joined in the regional Party leadership's campaign against Bratun'. Despite being on the editorial board of *October* and head of the Lviv Regional Committee on the Press, Odud'ko took aim at the journal's leadership for ideological mistakes, both at a regional Party conference and in one of Lviv's local Party newspapers. A republic Central Committee report, dated May 6, 1966, saw Odud'ko's behavior as unconstructive and irresponsible.[68] Odud'ko's remarks were not accidental. They reflected Odud'ko's own antagonisms with Bratun'. Some years earlier, in March 1956, while on a trip to Lutsk in Volhynia, Odud'ko had provoked Bratun' to talk about his "Banderite" past during a drinking bout in their hotel. In all likelihood, both the alcohol and Bratun''s return to the region of his youth sparked such stories. Odud'ko then informed the Writers' Union Party bureau that Bratun' had made several "anti-Soviet" remarks.[69] Personal animosities and Bratun''s own compromised past thus provoked two Lviv writers from Eastern Ukraine (Inhul's'kyi being a native of the Vinnytsia Region and Odud'ko being from the Khmel'nyts'kyi Region) to help the regional Party committee attack *October*.

Conflicts with a third state actor, Valentyn Malanchuk of the Lviv Regional Party committee, crucially decided Bratun''s fate. Like Inhul's'kyi and Odud'ko, Malanchuk was from Eastern Ukraine. While a generation younger than Inhul's'kyi and Odud'ko (both born in 1912), Malanchuk, born in 1928 in the Khmel'nyts'kyi Region, shared their antipathies toward Western Ukraine's "Banderite" nationalist underground. Such nationalist guerrillas killed his father when the latter served as a district Party secretary in Western Ukraine. According to a former republic Central Committee functionary, this incident fueled Malanchuk's later obsession with "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" as a Party leader. Fighting this phantom also became his trademark as he sought to advance his career in the Party apparatus.[70]

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[66] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, spr. 6001, ark. 75.

[67] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, spr. 6001, ark. 68.

[68] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 8, spr. 3290, ark. 171.

[69] DALO f. P-3808, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 1–4.

[70] Vrublevskii, *Vladimir Shcherbitskii*, 114.

Malanchuk indeed advanced far up the Party hierarchy because of his involvement in the nationalities question. Appointed ideological secretary for the Lviv Regional Party committee in 1963, he published widely on this issue. His articles got him into trouble with republic Party leader Petro Shelest, as they suggested that Ukrainian Communists had done badly fighting "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." He was then transferred to Kyiv in 1967. However, Malanchuk had attracted the protection of Mikhail Suslov in Moscow. Suslov, the Soviet Union's leading ideological authority, himself saw Shelest, a fellow member of Brezhnev's Politburo, as a threat by the end of the 1960s.[71] Shelest's fall from power in 1972, due to these conflicts with the Politburo, allowed Malanchuk not only to survive politically, but also become ideological secretary for the republic's Central Committee that year. Until Shelest's successor, Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi, removed him in 1979, Malanchuk censored any and all forms of national expression, often based on whether or not someone was to his personal liking.[72]

As a regional ideological secretary eager to show his political "vigilance," Malanchuk easily collided with Bratun' after the latter's appointment as editor of *October*. Personal conflicts here also played a role. According to one of Bratun''s friends, these tensions went back to their school days at Lviv State University, when both vied for the hand of a woman who later became Malanchuk's wife.[73] According to Bratun''s written appeal to the republic's Central Committee, dated June 3, 1965, Malanchuk had objected to his appointment from the very beginning. Instead of giving any kind of helpful advice, he accused Bratun' of being an "abstractionist" and a "formalist."[74] Malanchuk, too, played on Bratun''s "Banderite" past. Speaking before the regional Party committee bureau reviewing *October* on May 14, 1965, he reminded his audience that Bratun' had been punished by the Party in 1952 for belonging to the OUN and had made "anti-Soviet" remarks in 1956, ones Odud'ko had informed Party members of. He added that republic Central Committee Party secretary Andriy Skaba had warned Bratun' that he would lose his job if he made the slightest mistake.[75] Thus personal conflicts fatally collided with the aspirations of regional Party functionaries, helping convince republic Party leaders to remove Bratun' as editor. The republic Central Committee's Department of Science and Culture, in its May 6, 1966 report recommending Bratun''s dismissal, concurred with the regional Party committee's claim that Bratun' had failed to live up to the promise he had made in 1952—following

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[71] Petro Shelest, "Partiynyi natsionalist (1969–1972)," in *Petro Shelest: "Spravzhniy sud istorii shche poperedu": Spohady, shchodennyky, dokumenty, materialy*, ed. Iuriy Shapoval (Kyiv: "Heneza," 2003), 298–372.

[72] Vrublevskii, *Vladimir Shcherbitskii*, 114–24.

[73] Petrenko, "Chy i my buly bohemoiu," 6.

[74] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, spr. 6001, ark. 81–83.

[75] DALO f. P-3, op. 9, spr. 51, ark. 151.

revelations about his involvement in the OUN—to win back the Party's trust and demonstrate political reliability.[76]

In attacking Bratun''s political reliability, local Party leaders and fellow writers exploited unresolved tensions over nationhood in Western Ukraine. In its 1965 resolution calling for Bratun''s dismissal, the regional Party committee leadership cast doubt on *October*'s more liberal interpretation of literary and national politics. It claimed that the journal's junior literary critics "impose subjective views" and "defend formalist exercises of some artists and writers."[77] In an earlier report sent to the republic Central Committee on March 4, 1964, Malanchuk claimed that, among "essential" ideological errors for the March issue of *October*, honoring the sesquicentennial of Shevchenko's birth, several poems by Ivan Drach equated the tsarist oppression of Ukrainians of Shevchenko's time with practices of the current Soviet regime. *October* wound up not publishing these poems by Drach, a young poet active in Kyiv's Ukrainian national renaissance.[78] In appealing to the republic's Central Committee in June 1965, Bratun' claimed Malanchuk had unfairly criticized him and other journal editors for supposedly devoting an "excessive" amount of space to discussing writers of the past, "exaggerating their significance and place in Ukrainian literature" and trying to "tone down their ideological deviations."[79]

Among those writers *October* rehabilitated was the "forgotten" Ukrainian poet from interwar Lviv, Bohdan-Ihor Antonych (1909–37). Antonych, a poet from the Lemko Region of present-day Poland, became a literary sensation in Lviv in the 1930s, publishing several collections of poems noted for their lyricism, mysticism, and use of Lemko folk motifs.[80] While institutions like *October* incorporated elements of interwar Galicia's culture to create a useable Soviet Western Ukrainian past, Antonych's biography contained elements that greatly upset important Soviet historical myths. In criticizing Bratun''s rehabilitation of Antonych, the regional Party committee emphasized that Antonych in 1936 won a prize from the Ukrainian Catholic Union, headed by Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Metropolitan Andriy Sheptyts'kyi. Following the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church's dissolution in 1946, Soviet media portrayed Sheptyts'kyi and other members of the Greek Catholic, or "Uniate," church hierarchy as hirelings of German wartime occupiers, spiritual godfathers of "Banderites," and agents of intelligence services from the capitalist West. Thus regional Party committee functionaries saw Antonych's poems in

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[76] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 8, spr. 3290, ark. 172.

[77] DALO f. P-3, op. 9, spr. 34, ark. 17.

[78] DALO f. P-2941, op. 1, spr. 159, ark. 37.

[79] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, spr. 6001, ark. 68.

[80] Volodymyr Kubijovyč, ed., *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 1: 1065.

October as not merely apolitical, but deliberately marked by "a lack of politics," "pessimism," and "mysticism."[81]

Later criticism of a 1967 collection of Antonych's poems published in Kyiv by former Lviv poet Dmytro Pavlychko claimed that Antonych, on the eve of his death, praised victories by General Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Such remarks thus made Antonych a clear admirer of fascism.[82] The poem that supposedly linked Antonych to sympathy for fascism, "A Word about Alcazar," hardly seemed like an encomium to Franco's victories in the Spanish Civil War. Written in October 1936, the poem portrayed Franco's nationalist forces defending this strategic military fortress. However, it emphasized more the shock and awe caused by civil war. Not a word explicitly glorified General Franco and his cause.[83] One semi-fictional account of Antonych's life suggests that a sense of apocalyptic doom from watching a Lviv movie theater newsreel inspired the poem.[84] Regional Party functionaries nonetheless overlooked such ambiguities. The fact that Communist writer Stepan Havryliuk in the 1930s publicly claimed Antonych disoriented readers and allied with the bourgeoisie only played in their favor.[85]

Bratun' and his colleagues at October thus had to reckon with these problems as they published as many as 44 poems and ballads by Antonych in the second issue of the journal for 1964, as well as an article by Lviv critic Stepan Trofymuk on Antonych's art.[86] Both Trofymuk and Bratun' highlighted Antonych's positive social message, selectively omitting references to these supposed associations with "fascism" and "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." Trofymuk's article stressed the role reactionary forces in Galicia played in causing Antonych to avoid political themes. It emphasized Antonych's portrayal of positive village folk themes, his criticism of the realities of interwar bourgeois Galician society, and his adoration of the natural world as opposed to otherworldly matters like God and the church. The article omitted any mention of Antonych's connections to Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi or the Spanish Civil War.[87]

In his June 1965 appeal to the republic Central Committee, Bratun', while acknowledging the ideological weaknesses of poems Antonych had written in

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[81] DALO f. P-3, op. 9, spr. 34, ark. 16-17.

[82] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 25, spr. 217, ark. 3-4.

[83] Bohdan-Ihor Antonych, "Slovo pro Al'kazar," in *Tvory*, ed. M. N. Moskalenko (Kyiv: "Dnipro," 1998), 155–56.

[84] Iuriy Andrukhovych, *Dvanadtsiat' obruchiv* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004), 139–42.

[85] Dmytro Pavlychko, "Pisnia pro neznyshchennist' materii," in Bohdan-Ihor Antonych, *Pisnia pro neznyshchennist' materii: Poezii* (Kyiv: Radians'kyi pys'mennyk, 1967), 43.

[86] "Poet vesnianoho pokhmillia: Poeziia Bohdana Ihora Antonycha," *Zhovten'* (Lviv), no. 2 (February 1964): 100–09; Stepan Trofymuk, "Poet vesnianoho pokhmilllia: Slovo pro Bohdana Ihora Antonycha," *Zhovten'* (Lviv), no. 2 (February 1964): 134–45.

[87] Trofymuk, "Poet vesnianoho pokhmillia."

the last years of his life, drew attention to the fact that Antonych's poems celebrated life and depicted nature realistically. Like Trofymuk, Bratun' stressed the poet's devotion to the struggles of ordinary Ukrainian peasants. He claimed that Antonych portrayed Oleksiy Dovbush, an 18th-century Ukrainian Carpathian Mountain folk hero similar to Robin Hood, "as a fighter against social injustice." He noted that one of the republic's leading book publishers, *Radians'kyi pys'mennyk*, was about to publish a book of Antonych's poems (realized in 1967 by Pavlychko, as noted above), and that Antonych's poems were being published in Russian, Belorussian, Polish, Slovak, and other languages. In addition, Bratun' invoked the name of one of Soviet Ukraine's senior literary authorities, the poet Maksym Ryl's'kyi, who had died the previous year. He said that the late Ryl's'kyi told him personally that *October* deserved the greatest respect for resurrecting Antonych's poetry.[88]

The writers and editors of *October* thus placed Antonych squarely within a Soviet Ukrainian literary canon. Antonych was not the poet of mysticism and pessimism, but one of optimism. By making reference to his poems about Dovbush and ordinary peasants, they tied Antonych to both national and Soviet paradigms. Antonych defended ordinary Ukrainian peasants oppressed by Poles, feudal classes, and the bourgeoisie. His retreat from interwar reactionary political circles symbolized the bankruptcy of that period of Western Ukrainians' history. In that sense Antonych's retreat from politics foretold the coming of better times, the Soviet incorporation of Galicia and other Western Ukrainian lands.

The rehabilitation of Antonych's legacy was not to pass without controversy and objections from local Party functionaries. After Bratun''s colleague, Pavlychko, published a collection of Antonych's poems in Kyiv in 1967 and provided his own commentary on Antonych's life and works, a former Lviv Regional Party secretary working in the republic Central Committee apparatus denounced the move to Ukraine's Party chief, Petro Shelest. In a late 1968 report to Shelest that stressed ideological "deviations" committed by Pavlychko, secretary of the republic Writers' Union, Ivan Hrushets'kyi claimed that Pavlychko had consciously rehabilitated an adherent of fascism and "Uniate" reactionary circles.[89] While Pavlychko recalls Shelest summoning him in January 1969 and angrily telling him to stop making constant criticisms about Russification in Ukraine and think about his refusal to approve of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, he said nothing about Antonych. Furthermore, Shelest in his diary entry of January 3–15, 1969, reflecting on Hrushets'kyi's report, dismissed the latter as a malicious, unscrupulous intriguer who behaved like a merciless Gestapo agent toward Pavlychko. A former advisor of Shelest's successor Shcherbyts'kyi claims that Malanchuk,

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[88] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, spr. 6001, ark. 78–79.

[89] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 25, spr. 217, ark. 3–5.

one of Shelest's archenemies, was a Hrushets'kyi protégé, suggesting further Shelest's lack of respect for Hrushets'kyi and his political "revelations."[90]

In the Lviv Region, local officials, responding to republic and Soviet-wide campaigns against "revisionism" and "bourgeois nationalism" in the early 1970s, took steps to ban works on people like Antonych altogether. A March 26, 1971 regional Party committee bureau resolution considered barring research and publication of figures from Western Ukraine's history deemed politically unreliable. The dead poet Bohdan-Ihor Antonych figured on the list of those whose activities were to be investigated for political reliability.[91] This measure, which came on the eve of Ukraine's "general pogrom," signaled a retreat from incorporating people like Antonych into a useable Soviet Western Ukrainian past. However, the Party's local campaign against Antonych was ephemeral. A 1984 history of Lviv, compiled by Lviv historians and local Party functionaries and published in Kyiv, mentioned Antonych as a Ukrainian poet active in the city's 1930s literary life. The chapter on interwar Lviv's cultural life marginalized Antonych and other writers. It described at great length the accomplishments of writers affiliated with the local Communist Party, the KPZU. However, Antonych was not banned from the Soviet Ukrainian literary canon. Bratun' and other establishment writers had succeeded in restoring Antonych's good name.[92]

Likewise, the firing of Bratun' did not signal a complete end of Lviv's literary thaw. Bratun''s successor, a veteran KGB officer named Mykola Romanchenko, was well known for his overbearing demeanor at the journal, questioning even the arrangements of colors in poems, suspecting that they had political meaning.[93] Even in Romanchenko's brief period as editor, from 1966 to 1967, *October* continued to publish works by victims of the Stalin era (Vasyl' Bobyns'kyi) and writers repressed in Stalinist times (Ivan Hnatiuk). It published poems by writers whose works by 1971 faced discrimination due to suspicions over political reliability (Iaroslava Pavlychko and Hryhoriy Chubai). *October* did not feature ambitious translations of Western works (such as the translation of T. S. Eliot's "The Wasteland" under Bratun' in 1966). However, it did engage indirectly in it through the Baltic republics, as seen in translations of works by Lithuanian and Latvian poets.

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[90] Dmytro Pavlychko, "Petro Shelest," *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kyiv), 6 October 2005, p. 7; Iuriy Shapoval, ed., *Petro Shelest: 'Spravzhniy sud istorii shche poperedu': Spohady, shchodennyky, dokumenty, materialy* (Kyiv: "Heneza," 2003), 298–99; Vrublevskii, *Vladimir Shcherbitskii*, 114–15.

[91] DALO f. P-3, op. 19, spr. 49, ark. 4.

[92] V. V. Sekretariuk et al., eds., *Istoriia L'vova* (Kyiv: "Naukova Dumka," 1984), 220.

[93] Mykola Il'nyts'kyi, *Drama bez katarsysu*, vol. 2, *Storinky literaturnoho zhyttia L'vova druhoi polovyny XX stolittia* (Lviv: Instytut Ukrainoznavstva im. I. Kryp'iakevycha NAN Ukrainy, 2003), 76.

More importantly, Romanchenko's successor, Roman Fedoriv, continued to articulate a sense of national and regional identity despite more rigorous censorship in the 1970s. Fedoriv served as editor of *October* from 1968 until 1988, when the journal was renamed *Dzvin' (The Bell)*, and he remained editor of *The Bell* until his death in 2001.[94] During Ukraine's "general pogrom" of the 1970s, the journal faced particularly difficult times. One of Fedoriv's fellow editors recalled the regional Party committee secretary, Volodymyr Podol'chak, regularly attending editorial staff meetings and searching galley proofs for any compromising materials. One member of the regional Party committee bureau, a high-ranking military officer, even suggested sending troops to the journal to "establish order," though his suggestion was immediately dismissed by everyone at the bureau meeting discussing the journal's work. Conditions at work only improved with Podol'chak's removal from the regional Party committee in the late 1970s, allowing the publication of manuscripts held up for years.[95]

Amid such censorship, the journal continued to promote a useable past for Western Ukrainians. Issues from 1970 to 1973 featured late 19th- and early 20th-century Galician Ukrainian writers who led Galician Ukrainians' national movement. For instance, *October* published archival materials on Vasyl' Stefanyk and Volodymyr Hnatiuk from the late 1920s, research on Ivan Franko, memoirs by Galician writer Volodymyr Hzyts'kyi on literary life in 1920s Soviet Ukraine, and research on late 19th-century poet Syl'vestr Iarychevs'kyi. *October* in those years featured articles on the history of Ukraine and especially the history of Galicia. Issues explored the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks, Lviv's medieval and early modern schools, and schools sponsored by Galician Rus' princes. The journal in 1971 publicized efforts to preserve and restore Galician and Western Ukrainian medieval wooden architecture in Lviv's open-air museum, Shevchenko Meadow (Shevchenkivs'kyi Hai).[96] Such materials carefully adhered to Soviet narratives that glorified the lives of the lower classes and treated Ukrainian history as part of a history of an Eastern Slavic family of nations. Nonetheless, such materials helped *October* become a reliable journal for instilling a sense of Ukrainian patriotism among educated Western Ukrainian intellectuals, as one Western Ukrainian poet who debuted in *October* in the early 1980s recalled.[97] As with the Bratun' years, *October* continued engaging the wider world, publishing in

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[94] Ivanychuk, *Blahoslovy*, 127.

[95] Il'nyts'kyi, *Drama bez katarsysu*, 2: 88, 192–94.

[96] Arkhyp Danyliuk, "Vid vikiv i na viky," *Zhovten'* (Lviv), no. 9 (September 1971): 109–13.

[97] Oleksandr Irvanets', interview with the author, tape recording, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, MA, 9 March 2006.

1971, for instance, an article on Ukrainian motifs in the poetry of late 19th- and early 20th-century German writer Rainer Maria Rilke.[98]

To this extent, then, the literary thaw Bratun′ initiated at *October* symbolized a shift in Lviv's literary politics, allowing for greater expression of regional and national identities that engaged the wider world. His removal as editor signaled the limits to such a thaw. Nonetheless, regional, republic, and all-Union Party and state institutions thus tolerated, if not promoted, a sense of being Western Ukrainian connected to political and cultural events in Central Europe. Antonych, a modernist poet with ambivalent attitudes toward politics, became an acceptable part of the Soviet Ukrainian literary canon, endorsed by one of its senior members in Kyiv, Maksym Ryl's′kyi, before his death.

Nonetheless, Western Ukrainians′ connection to past "bourgeois nationalist" movements made such a literary thaw politically suspect. Its leader at *October* had flirted with the nationalist underground as a teen, and writers and Party functionaries knew this well and exploited it when they deemed Bratun′ unfit to be editor. Long after Bratun′ had left *October*, anonymous denunciations to the regional Party committee and presumably higher Party organs played on Western Ukrainians′ compromised pasts. An anonymous writer named Grigorii Serokvasha (translated roughly as "Gregory Rough Acid") wrote a furious letter to the Central Committee in Moscow. The letter, dated January 3, 1968, expressed outrage at Bratun′, by then head of the Writers′ Union, and others who had briefly appointed a junior writer with no editorial experience as acting editor of *October*. The letter reflected uncertainty over who would lead the journal before Fedoriv was appointed as permanent editor. The writer suggested that Western Ukrainians, among them Bratun′, had appointed this junior poet so that they, a "nationalist group," could seize control of a Soviet publication for their weaponry.[99] Another anonymous letter, written around the same time by a group of Lviv writers, alleged that this group had appointed this poet so that they could detour the influence of "Easterners," those who came to the region from Eastern Ukraine after World War II.[100]

Fedoriv's appointment ended this conflict, yet resentment against Bratun′ continued. In February 1971, an anonymous letter to the Lviv Regional Party committee, presumably by a Lviv writer, evoked Bratun′'s "Banderite" past. It commented on a photo of Bratun′ and a beaming collective farm worker, Ekaterina Tverdokhlebova. The photo appeared on the pages of *Literaturna Ukraina*, the republic's leading literary newspaper, on November 20, 1970. Musing over Bratun′'s "lowered eyelashes," the letter's author suggested that

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[98] Dmytro Nalyvaiko, "Ukrains′ki motyvy v poezii Ril′ke," *Zhovten′* (Lviv), no. 10 (October 1971): 135–47.

[99] DALO f. P-3, op. 9, spr. 75, ark. 94–97.

[100] DALO f. P-3, op. 9, spr. 75, ark. 99.

Bratun′ had a bad conscience. Bratun′ was musing over the fact that he, a member of the "Banderite" underground in his youth, had tried to kill such people as Tverdokhlebova. Tverdokhlebova, like many others, had come to the Lviv Region after the war to help new collective farms raise sugar beets.[101]

While Bratun′ and other Western Ukrainians had come to embrace the new Soviet order and its messages of national and social liberation, they still remained a "bourgeois nationalist" other in some respects. Like Antonych, whose past contained connections to the outlawed "Uniate" church and Franco's nationalist soldiers, these postwar writers remained not completely integrated into one Soviet polity. The post-Stalin era literary thaw at *October* represented a very successful compromise with Party and state institutions. It was a success story for late Soviet politics of empire. Nonetheless, unresolved tensions over Western Ukraine's recent past, like other parts of the Soviet western borderlands, simmered below the surface.

Literary Politics, the Western Borderlands, and the Soviet Collapse

Antonych's entry into Lviv's cultural mainstream, notwithstanding its surrounding controversies, epitomized the success of Soviet politics of empire on the western borderlands. While other historical and cultural figures, institutions, and political parties remained forbidden topics, elements of Galicia's past, read in a certain ideological manner, became accepted parts of Soviet Western Ukrainians' identity. A similar process took place in the Baltic republics after World War II. In Latvia, poet Jānis Rainis (1865–1929), a member of independent Latvia's Parliament and onetime Minister of Education, became a central figure in Soviet Latvia's national movement, with the centenary of his birth in 1965 marked by special celebrations in Latvian theaters and the completion of a large monument to him in central Riga.[102] Soviet-era guidebooks portrayed Rainis as a national revolutionary heavily influenced by Marxism in the 1880s and 1890s. His poetry addressed the working classes and opposed "bourgeois nationalism." One 1982 guidebook highlighted Rainis's translations of classic Russian writers into Latvian. It noted that Rainis eagerly followed events in the Soviet Union and, in the year of his death, founded and led a society promoting cultural ties between independent Latvia and the Soviet Union.[103]

While Rainis became central to the Soviet Latvian literary canon from the very beginning of postwar Soviet rule, in Soviet Lithuania, 19th-century composer and artist Mikalojus Čiurlionis (1875–1911) had been branded a "formalist" corrupted by the "bourgeois" past. The Thaw provided establishment

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[101] DALO f. P-3, op. 19, spr. 206, ark. 39.

[102] Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940–1990*, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 176–77.

[103] Maria Debrer, *Riga: Reiseführer* (Moscow: Verlag Progress, 1982), 59–60; A. Lauks, ed., *Riga i rizhskoe vzmore: Kratkii putevoditel′*, 3rd ed. (Riga: Latgosizdat, 1954), 25–26.

intellectuals opportunities to rehabilitate Čiurlionis by studying and publishing his works. Vytautas Landsbergis, who led Lithuania's independence movement at the end of the 1980s, was one such establishment intellectual who promoted Čiurlionis's art. Čiurlionis, officially rehabilitated in 1961, became a central part of Soviet Lithuania's cultural heritage. Landsbergis in his memoirs noted with irony that by the mid-1970s, even Party functionaries had adopted Čiurlionis as one of their own.[104] Like the Baltic republics, Soviet Western Ukraine and its capital, Lviv, became embedded in larger Soviet imperial narratives that allowed national heroes honor next to those of the Great Russians. Poets like the Latvian Rainis and the Ukrainian Antonych, as well as the Lithuanian composer Čiurlionis took second place to Russian poets like Pushkin and Russian composers like Tchaikovskii. They nonetheless became part of what Yuri Slezkine has called non-Russians' "Great Traditions" that were not questioned by Party leaders.[105] Nationalities of the Baltic republics, due to sharp linguistic differences with the Great Russians, faced relatively less rigorous censorship.[106] In that sense the cultural wars fought by Lviv's *October* against local and republic Party chiefs became that much more significant, compelling important compromises over Western Ukraine's literary heritage and recent history.

Despite these successes in accommodating local and national identities at the western borderlands, popular readings of cultural productions by institutions like *October* showed their fragility. Thus regional Party committee leaders and local Party activists expressed great concern at the growing popularity of *October* among Lviv's readers in the early 1960s. As Malanchuk compiled compromising evidence against Bratun' in 1964, he noted in a report to republic superiors that the chancellor at Lviv State University cited *October* as the source of problems with ideological work at the university's philological faculty. According to Malanchuk, the chancellor, Mykola Maksymovych, complained that, among some members of the local intelligentsia, "there has spread the opinion that Lviv finally has received a free Ukrainian journal."[107] The regional Party committee's campaign against Bratun' gained the sympathy of those perceived to have grievances against Soviet policies toward Ukrainians. A 1965 underground publication by Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification*, identified this campaign with republic-wide discrimination

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[104] Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 100; Vytautas Landsbergis, *Lithuania Independent Again: The Autobiography of Vytautas Landsbergis*, prepared for an English-speaking audience by Anthony Packer and Eimutis Šova (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), 67–77; Misiunas and Taagepera, *The Baltic States*, 153–54.

[105] Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53: 2 (Summer 1994): 448.

[106] Misiunas and Taagepera, *The Baltic States*, 179.

[107] DALO f. P-2941, op. 1, spr. 159, ark. 38.

against Ukrainians' language and culture[108] A June 1966 republic Central Committee report that recommended Bratun''s dismissal noted that conflicts between the regional Party committee and Bratun' had led to speculation and rumors by "philistine" elements in Lviv and "bourgeois nationalist" circles abroad. In Lviv, the report noted, certain elements greeted with joy any instance where Bratun' failed to obey the regional Party committee and treated Bratun' like a hero whenever they heard about regional censors' interference.[109]

Such reports from Lviv and Kyiv did not clearly indicate who these suspicious fans of *October* were. They could have been people who had experienced Stalinist terror in the postwar years. Such people may have had relatives or friends in the nationalist underground. Nonetheless, these reports hinted at private murmurings where Lvivians viewed regional Party and state officials with hostility or at least derision. They alluded to private spheres of friends and fellow thinkers. In such private spheres, official pronouncements on historical memory, literary and artistic expression, and political discussions about the Ukrainian nation could not be so easily controlled. In a similar manner, rehabilitation of Antonych in the public sphere came on the heels of Antonych's circulation in the cultural underground. Antonych's poetry from the 1930s circulated freely underground. Poet Ihor Kalynets', who later went to prison in 1972 for political dissent, recalled first reading Antonych in his fifth year at Lviv State University at the beginning of the 1960s, when a friend lent him the 1936 collection *Knyha Leva (*The Book of the Lion). Antonych became one of Kalynets's leading sources of artistic inspiration, as seen in a poem he dedicated to Antonych in Kalynets's only collection of poems published in the Soviet Union in 1966.[110]

In 1964, a few months after Bratun' had published some of Antonych's poems in *October*, young writers, artists, musicians, and scholars like Kalynets' honored Antonych's memory. They did so officially as members of Lviv's Club of Artistic Youth, organizing a literary evening for Antonych, inviting older writers who knew him to attend. Later one Saturday, members of the club unofficially sought out Antonych's grave in Ianiv Cemetery, posing as Polish tourists to avoid trouble from the KGB. Finding the abandoned gravesite, bereft of a gravestone, they cleaned it up, placed a wooden cross on it, and paid homage to Antonych. His gravesite thus became the site of informal pilgrimages by Lviv's young Ukrainian intellectuals.[111] Efforts by *October* to incorporate Antonych into the Soviet Ukrainian canon thus competed with private readings and commemorations of Antonych, where it be-

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[108] Ivan Dziuba, *Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia* (Kyiv: "KM Academia," 1998), 140.

[109] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 8, spr. 3290, ark. 170.

[110] Petro Shkrab'iuk, *Popid zoloti vorota: Shist' elehii pro rodynu Kalyntsiv* (Lviv: Instytut Ukrainoznavstva im. I. Kryp'iakevycha, NAN Ukrainy, 1997), 40–41, 420.

[111] Ibid., 43–45.

came possible to view Antonych as a poet who spoke to young Galician Ukrainians, a poet whose ties with the "Uniates" did not necessarily spark disapproval. Such private readings of Antonych sometimes resurfaced in the public sphere, sparking public controversy. A young Lviv sculptor who made a bust of Antonych for a Lviv Komsomol art exhibit thus provoked criticism, including critical remarks made at a December 2, 1971 meeting of the republic Party's Poliburo on improving the character of young writers and artists.[112]

Admiration for Antonych did not necessarily mean antipathy for the Soviet Union. After all, despite political charges raised sometimes in Lviv and Kyiv in the 1970s, Antonych had become an accepted part of the Soviet Ukrainian literary canon. However, later circumstances in Lviv and other parts of the Soviet western borderlands helped transform such cultural figures as Antonych into symbols of opposition to the existing order. Calls for greater democracy and openness by Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, the 1986 Chernobyl' nuclear accident, the failure of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and emerging unrest in Poland and other parts of the Soviet bloc transformed the western borderlands' political atmosphere.

These contingent events revived unresolved debates about the role of non-Russian languages in public life, historical memory, and national and individual self-expression. In Lithuania, Landsbergis's memoirs suggest that his work promoting Čiurlionis as a national cultural figure thus easily helped him turn to political activities on behalf of Lithuanian national rights at the end of the 1980s.[113] Just as the establishment scholar Landsbergis easily moved from cultural activities to political action, so the establishment writer Bratun' turned to cultural activities that became political in the late 1980s. In late 1987, Bratun' became one of the senior sponsors of the Lion Society, named after Antonych's collection of poems, *The Book of the Lion*, which had received a prize from the Ukrainian Catholic Union in 1936. This society, working with the Komsomols, was made up of young scholars, writers, artists, and other professionals, as well as students. It revived national traditions and raised themes in Ukrainian history and culture that the population had grown too afraid to discuss. As Gorbachev's programs of democratization led to multi-candidate elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow in 1989, the Lion Society sponsored Bratun' as a candidate. This congress came to be known for directly challenging the Communist Party establishment throughout the Soviet Union, subjecting it to public criticism on national television for the very first time. For these elections, local Party leaders and the Party-controlled media resorted to the tactics of Malanchuk and his allies in the mid-1960s, claiming that Bratun' in his youth had cooperated with the OUN and thus was a fascist agent during World War II. Yet Bratun' won the elections on a platform dedicated to Ukraine's economic independence and

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[112] TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 10, spr. 941, ark. 52.

[113] Landsbergis, *Lithuania*, 77.

political sovereignty.[114] At the Congress of People's Deputies, Bratun' acquired notoriety in Ukraine's political circles when he defended Ukrainians' blue-and-yellow national flag, a symbol of Ukraine's 1917–20 wars for independence. No longer was it a symbol of "bandits" and "bourgeois nationalists," but a symbol of the nation.[115]

Establishment intellectuals like Bratun' thus symbolized the complex, shifting, not entirely stable Soviet politics of empire on the western borderlands. While ridding themselves of their "backward" and "bourgeois nationalist" pasts, Western Ukrainians and others came to accommodate themselves to the new postwar realities. Despite resorting to censorship and threats, Party and state institutions in Lviv, Kyiv, and Moscow obliged. They cooperated with locals in creating a sense of belonging to a region that was integrated into one Soviet politic. Nonetheless, that integration remained incomplete. Bratun' and the readers of *October* could not be fully trusted. Writers, Party activists, and ambitious local functionaries took advantage of such doubts, claming that the specter of "Banderite" nationalism was very much alive, though in veiled form. Such accusations may or may not have been unfounded. Nonetheless, in treating people of the western borderlands as a more "bourgeois nationalist" other, Party and state institutions kept alive old issues like historical memory, national and regional identity, and language use. Practices of empire at the borderlands thus created opportunities for advancing regional and national interests, yet like other imperial relationships, they were asymmetric ones. Foreign and domestic political developments in the 1980s brought these asymmetric relations to the surface. Thus by the end of the decade, in the Soviet West, the Soviet family of nations had become a very unattractive prison house of nations.

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[114] Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 123–30.

[115] Il'nyts'kyi, *Drama bez katarsysu*, 2: 110; Ivanychuk, *Blahoslovy*, 118.