

ARTICLES

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TSARIST CENSORSHIP AND UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY, 1828-1906

Introduction

The recent appearance of three major English language studies on tsarist Russian censorship, has opened a hitherto little known aspect of Russian Imperial history to a broader circle of readers.¹ However, all of these detailed and well-written surveys are limited to a study of censorship policy and the effect it had on Russian writings and intellectual life. They do not deal with, or mention only in passing, the effect of censorship on the non-Russian nationalities. More generally, they do not examine how the tsarist regime used censorship as an instrument of political and ideological control in the borderlands. To shed light on these two broader issues, this article will illustrate how tsarist censorship effected one particular body of writing—Ukrainian historiography. The article will list twelve censored Ukrainian historical works, try to explain why they were prohibited and, on the basis of these examples, attempt to determine the impact of tsarist censorship modern Ukrainian historiography. In a broader context, it also touches upon the question of how censorship impeded the evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The first historian to refer in print to censorship of Ukrainian historiography was Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov in his article

1. D. Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia, 1865-1905*. (Washington, D.C.: Univ. Press of America, 1979), M. T. Choldin, "A Fence Around the Empire: The Censorship of Foreign Books in Nineteenth Century Russia." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1979; C. Rudd, *Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804-1906* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1982). For one of the earliest discussions of the subjects in English, see B. Pares, *Russia and Reform* (London: Archibald Constable, 1907), pp. 260-305.

"Ukraina," published in *Kolokol* in 1860. He told readers that after the dissolution of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood in 1847, scholarly articles even written in Russian about "Little Russia" began to be controlled, and that the terms "Ukraine," "Little Russia" and "Het'manshchyna," came to be regarded as disloyal. In 1883 the critic and political thinker Mykhailo Drahomanov, in the introduction to his *Politychni pis'ni ukrains'koho narodu* [Political Songs of the Ukrainian People] published in Geneva, noted that Ukrainian historians were unable to deal with the deleterious consequences of tsarist rule in eighteenth-century Ukraine because of censorship, and that as a result, the history of Ukrainian social life and the attitudes of the nation towards the states in which they lived were not truthfully described. In the 1920s Bahalyi listed some censored works in his survey of Ukrainian historiography and claimed repression had led scholars to pay more attention to the national than to the social aspects of the Ukrainian past.² Dmytro Doroshenko also referred to this issue:

No prohibition was placed on studies of Ukrainian history as long as they were written in Russian and within the limits of general censorship rules. However, even more serious than the Tsarist ban [on Ukrainian language publications], was the reaction within Ukrainian society which set in as a result of the prohibitions and repressions. It restrained the development of the Ukrainian national movement, lowered the level of political thought, thus weakening national consciousness, and depriving the study of the past of any clear guiding idea.³

Drahomanov, Bahalyi, and Doroshenko, all claimed that the pre-1914 Ukrainian image of their past was seriously affected by censorship though none of them examined this subject in detail. However, solely on the basis of information available in secondary literature, it is possible both to qualify and elaborate upon their generalizations. A consideration of what is known to have been prohibited leads to the conclusion that the development and academic level of Ukrainian historiography was definitely less crippled by censorship than was Ukrainian language and liter-

2. D. Bahalyi, *Narys istorii Ukrainy na sotsialno-ekonomichnomu grunti* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1928), p. 89.

3. D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography* (New York: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1957), p. 248.

ature, and that, in general, censorship of Ukrainian historiography was guided by the same criteria as censorship of everything else in the Empire. That is, the government attempted to keep "dangerous ideas" away from the general reading public and the peasant masses, while at the same time permitting academics and small number of educated relative free access to such ideas.⁴

This is not to say that censorship was not harsh. By its very existence this practice is repressive. But, although undeniably an impediment on creativity and interpretation, the effects of censorship are very difficult to ascertain as by their nature they represent an indeterminable psychological relationship for which empirical evidence cannot be gathered. For this reason conclusions about the level of repressiveness can only be tentative and partial. To be sure some managed to avoid the morass of censorship altogether by an apolitical conservative attitude towards the established social and political order. Others simply knew which side of their bread was buttered and did not seem to be perturbed about making compromises. Dmytro Bantysh-Kamens'kyi, for example, when dealing with Vasyl' Kapnist, the author of "Oda na rabstvo" (1784?), in his *Slovar dostonamiatnykh liudei russkoi zemli* left out references to Kapnist's condemnation of Russian policy towards the Hetmanate. In a letter to his censor the historian wrote: ". . . and I paid no attention to the parts of his poem dealing with the enslavement of Little Russia."⁵ Still others could not be so blase, and they and their work suffered from the psychological intimidation created by censorship and the self-appointed watch-dogs of the regime. Kostomarov, for example, was hounded for his views

4. For a discussion of readership in Ukraine, see: P. Fylypovych, "Sotsialne oblychia ukrains'koho chytacha 30-40 rr. XIX viku," in *Pavlo Fylypovych. Literatura, statti, rozvidky, ohliady* (New York: Ukraiins'ka vil'na akademiia nauk u SShA, 1971), pp. 110-83. My article is based on secondary works; the sources for a detailed study of this subject do exist, however. The reports of nineteenth-century censors are today in the State Historical Library in Leningrad, and the Saltykov-Shchedrin Library has a collection of all the books and manuscripts prohibited in nineteenth-century Russia. In the Kiev State Historical Library are all the manuscripts denied permission for publication in *Kievskaiia starina*. In 1925 a commission was established under Serhyi Efremov to find and publish all censored Ukrainian literary manuscripts. The *Pidkomissiia dia vyhotovlennia do druku tsenzurnykh materialiv pro ukrains'ke pys'menstvo i teatr*, was disbanded in the 1930s.

5. "Dmitrii Nikolaevich Bantysh-Kamenskii," *Russkaia starina*, 60 (Nov. 1888), pp. 525-26. ". . . no umolchil o volnykh stikhakh ego otnositelno poraboshcheniia Malorossii. . . ."

after his return from exile in the early 1860s.⁶ Volodymyr Antonovych in the 1880s, according to his student Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ". . . gave the impression of being a man stifled by this hounding . . . he increasingly distanced himself from history, and moved into spheres which in those days were 'more peaceful', archaeology, historical geography, and numismatics."⁷ Similarly, Dmytro Iavornyts'kyi was excessively cautious concerning Ukrainian matters according to one of his former students. At Moscow University where he taught, Iavornyts'kyi was afraid of giving a course of Ukrainian history, though this would have been possible in the years before 1914 had he titled it the history of the Cossacks.⁸

The Legal and Political Background

During the period under study two laws on censorship were enacted. Their purpose was to suppress the printing of anything that portrayed autocracy unfavorably, or revealed discontent with conditions or institutions. The statutes were also worded vaguely in order to allow broad applicability. The earlier code of 1828 was, under Russian conditions, ostensibly liberal, exempting the publications of Learned Societies and Academies. However, by secret decree of April that same year, censors were obliged to report to the secret police any works containing ". . . violation of the obligations of loyal subjects," while after the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, a series of administrative decrees were implemented ordering censors to forbid anything that could possibly be regarded as dangerous to the state. The second statute of 1865 allotted greater power to the courts but also gave censors extensive discretionary powers. Books over 160 pages long and journals published in Moscow and St. Petersburg were exempted from preliminary censorship, but fines and imprisonment were prescribed for anyone calling into question the "compulsory force of the laws," or "inciting one segment of the population of the state to animosity against another." In 1865 Valuev, the Minister of the Interior, introduced an undefined notion of "harmful tendency"

6. A. Gertsen, *Polnoe sobranie sochinennii* (Petrograd: Literaturno izdatel'skyi otdel' narodnoga komissariata po prosveshcheniiu, 1919-25), XVI, 301-02; F. Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva*, 2nd. ed. (Munich: Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, 1970), pp. 3, 192-204.

7. L. Vynar, ed., *Autobiohrafiiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho z 1926 roku* (New York-Munich-Toronto: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1981), p. 10.

8. V. Doroshenko, "Ukrains'ka students'ka hromada v Moskvi," *Pratsi ukrains'koho naukovoho instytutu*, 49 (1939), 147.

into censorship guidelines, which in practice had the effect of making authors liable to prosecution if the government found anything at all displeasing to it in their work.

Besides these two statutes there were also central administrative directives on censorship. In 1847, after the dissolution of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, Aleksei Orlov, Chief of the Third Section or secret police, explained in a memorandum to the tsar that ideas about the restoration of language and nationalities of the sort propounded by Kostomarov and Shevchenko could lead to Russia's subject peoples developing notions about the possibility of independent political existence. He, therefore, suggested that the Ministry of Education issue guidelines to ensure that writers and academics in the future not glorify "Ukraine" [sic], Poland, and other nations in their conclusions, but rather the Empire as a whole. Expression of love towards the native region or *rodina* was not to override love of the fatherland or *otechestvo*, and censors in Kiev and Kharkiv were to be warned to be especially careful not to allow in print any "ambiguities" that could lead "people of ill will" to think about the "independence and ancient liberties of nations subjected to Russia." Governors in the Ukrainian provinces were also to be instructed to watch those engaged in Ukrainian studies, and discreetly, without open persecution, "to stop abuses."⁹ In 1849, after the publication of an essay in *Sovremennik* on the Time of Troubles by Solov'ev, another important directive was issued setting down policy on the publication of historical articles dealing with popular riots and rebellions. In a note to the Petersburg censorship committee Uvarov, the Minister of Education, explained such events could be dealt with in specialist academic journals but not in magazines intended for a broad readership.¹⁰ The double standard explicit in this regulation can also be found in a list of criteria compiled by the Ministry of Popular Education for a competition for the writing of a textbook on Russian history. The book should not awaken class hatred, described in the conspect as "foreign" to the Russian nation, it had to be written in a spirit of patriotism, and it had to avoid ". . . all tendentious spurious and contentious

9. The memorandum is reprinted in full in D. Bahalyi, "Novi dzherela pro Kyrylo Metodivs'ke bratstvo," *Nashe mynule*, No. 2 (1918), pp. 171-79.

10. M. Lemke, *Ocherki po istorii Russkoi tsenzury i zhurnalistiki XIX stoletia* (St. Petersburg: Ki-vo N. Pirozhkova, 1904), p. 222.

conclusions found in recent historical literature."¹¹ Special regulations also existed forbidding certain already published books to be kept in the collections of free Public Libraries of which there were 141 in the Ukrainian provinces by 1897.¹²

Alongside the major laws and regulations there were special instructions dealing with censorship in the particular regions given to or issued by local officials in non-Russian provinces. In 1821, for example, local journals in Malorossiiia were forbidden to publish anything concerning peasants, after the Military Governor of Poltava province attributed a riot there to the appearance of an article in a local magazine comparing the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising with the Haidamak revolts.¹³ In 1835, the Minister of the Interior constructed the Governor of Kiev province and Right-Bank Ukraine that historical essays in the *Kievskaiia gazeta* ". . . must avoid anything which might awaken sympathy for old Poland and Lithuania, or a wish to restore the old order, and, on the contrary, they should demonstrate how this area was always Russian, and was the second cradle of the Russian monarchy."¹⁴

Censorship, however, involved more than laws and regulations. It was also influenced by factors such as the attitudes of officials towards "Little Russia" and its past, the prevailing official interpretation of Russian history, and also by governmental concern about social order and political stability.

Before the turn of the century official educated opinion about Ukraine and its history was not hostile. The tsarist administrative and academic elite as a rule tolerated "Little Russia," its culture and its past, if only for reasons of political expediency. During the middle of the nineteenth century, it will be remembered, Ukrainian historiography was sponsored by the government in order to cultivate an official anti-Polish "Little Russian patriotism." Exceptional, therefore, was a letter written in the 1840s by Prof. Kubarev, professor of classics in Moscow, to

11. "Obiavlenie ot uchenago komiteta ministerstva narodnago prosveshchenniia o konkurse na premii za 'Istorii Rossii dlia narodu'," *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnago prosveshchenniia*, No. 6 (July 1896), pt. I, pp. 37-39.

12. I. Kizchenko, *Kul'turno-osvitnyi riven' robitnychoho klasu Ukrainy naperedodni revoliutsii 1905-07 rr.* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1972), p. 102.

13. There was a total ban on discussion of the peasant question in print until 1858. C. Rudd, "Censorship and the Peasant Question," *California Slavic Studies*, 5 (1970), 143-67.

14. "Tsenzura v tsarstvovanie Imp. Nikolai I," *Russkaia starina*, No. 113 (March 1903), pp. 586-87.

the editors of the *Chteniia* of the Moscow Historical and Antiquities Society, condemning them for publishing a series of eighteenth-century Ukrainian chronicles and documents in their periodical. "What has become of the *Chteniia*," he asked. "It has become a den of social misfits and a depository of bohunk fairy tales. Anything worthwhile becomes lost in this manure."¹⁵

Generally speaking, Russians tended to see Ukraine and its past in a nostalgic, indulgent, and patronizing light, and since Ukrainian history as a rule was regarded as a part of "All-Russian" history, the government saw no reason why it should not be studied. "Little Russia" was merely a region that after centuries of oppression had returned to Moscow's fold. This spirit and approach is succinctly captured in a description of events at Nikolai Gogol's birthday party, written by the son of the Russian slavophile Ivan Aksakov:

The three bohunks [Gogol, Osyp Bodians'kyi and Maksymovych] were charming, they sang without notes, and Gogol read to me some of the dумы of the bohunk [khokhlatskii] Homer. Gogol recited and the other bohunks gesticulated and whooped . . . I, Khomiakov and Solov'ev enjoyed this expression of nationality, but without much sympathy. Solov'ev's smile betrayed contempt, Khomiakov's laughter . . . a kind hearted mockery, and I found it simply amusing to look at them as at some Chauvashes or Cheremises. . . .¹⁶

It should be noted that this sympathetic and condescending image of the Ukrainian past as an integral part of "All Russian" history was not purely Russian in origin. Though propagated in general histories of Russia, one of its major roots were the eighteenth-century "loyalist" cossack chronicles, which presented Ukrainian history as a great but quaint prelude to an even more glorious present and future under the rational rule of the tsars. These historians reflected the opinions of a successful assimilated elite without political claims against St. Petersburg whose image of "Little Russia" was not linked to any reformist

15. Cited in N. Vasilenko, "O. M. Bodianskii i ego zaslugi dlia izucheniia Malorossii," *Kievskaiia starina*, No. 83 (Dec. 1903), p. 726. ". . . bylei i nebylei khokhlatskikh. . . ."

16. V. Gippius ed., *N. V. Gogol', materialy i issledovaniia* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1936), I, 217.

demands. Their history was safely in the past, not invoked as a model for emulation in the present, and could be tolerated as a source of localist pride, not incompatible with All-Russian patriotism. Histories of Little Russia written by such men as Vasyl' Ruban, Mykhailo Antonovs'kyi, Opanas Shafons'kyi, Iakiv Markevych, and later Bantysh-Kamens'kyi, are representative of this historiography.

In the mid-nineteenth century, this "loyalist" interpretation of Ukrainian history was held by men like Aleksander Nikitenko (Nykytenko), chief censor for a time during the reign of Alexander II. Regarded as a liberal, he supported freedom of expression, as well as a project to translate the bible into Ukrainian, and he thought the Russian slavophile Mikhail Pogodin was a dangerous fanatic. At the same time, Nikitenko fully condoned the dissolution of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, believing it had been nothing more than a Austrian inspired plot against Russia, and he condemned the *Povest ob Ukrainskom narode*, written in 1846 by the populist historian Panteleimon Kulish, because it was too anti-Russian and could awaken "irresponsible fits of patriotism" in the reading public.¹⁷ Nikitenko's image of Ukrainian history emerges clearly in his comments on an unpublished history of Little Russia written between 1817 and 1822 by O. Martos. Made in 1839, they in fact summarize the official tsarist interpretation of Eastern Slavic history.

The author's major theme is in effect the central idea and fate of the Little Russian nation, namely, that this nation, because of its origins, spirit and religion, was always part of the Great Rossiia, and despite temporary separation returned to its natural orbit thanks to [this] natural affinity, to form together with Russia one soul and one power.¹⁸

This official interpretation of "Little Russia" and Eastern Slavic history was part of an imperial ideology shared by Ukrainian and Russian members of the tsarist elite which tolerated and even actively supported research into Ukrainian history. But during the second half of the century, when populist intellectuals

17. M. Lemke, ed., *Moia povest o samom sebe i otom "chemu svidetel' v zhyzhni byl"; zapiski i dnevniki 1804-1877* (St. Petersburg: 1904), I, 7, 19-20, 25, 318, 371.

18. F. Savchenko, "Novi vidomosti pro neopublikovanu istoriiu Ukrainy A. Martosa," *Zapysky istorychnoi septsii UAN*, No. 38 (1930), p. 13.

increasingly began to invoke the Ukrainian past as a model for the present and future, the tsarist authorities became more suspicious of Ukrainian history. In so far as this "new" history diminished rather than enhanced All-Russian patriotism the authorities began to treat it as a potential threat.

The dividing line between acceptable interpretation of Ukrainian history was not rigid, and an incident in 1843 surrounding the appearance in the Petersburg journal *Biblioteka dlia chteniia* of a review manifestly hostile to Ukrainians, provides an example of the kinds of debates that went on. The anonymous reviewer equated the cossack period with anarchy and barbarity which the Poles had been unable to control, but which the Russians finally tamed. He also criticized the sympathy many Ukrainian historians felt for this period as being "the most inscrutable thing in the world." After reading this, the Ukrainian historian Mykola Markevych complained to the Minister of the Interior that the article was anti-Ukrainian and pro-Polish, and he demanded the arrest of the censor who had passed the review. The matter was passed on to Uvarov, who mildly reprimanded the censor and noted the reviewer had the right to his opinion. He himself, meanwhile, expressed agreement with the gist of the review that claimed Ukraine never had political independence and had caused nothing but trouble for its neighbors until it was annexed by Russia. The incident even reached the tsar, who noted that if what was expressed in the review was untrue, then it should be demonstrated. Nikitenko, who related the entire affair in his diary, concluded this had been a superb judgment.¹⁹

A second factor influencing censorship of historical writing was the threat of sporadic peasant spilling over into mass revolt. Constantly haunting administrators, this spectre made them sensitive to the possible repercussion on the populace of written accounts of earlier peasant uprisings and revolts. Apprehensive officials monitored all reports of rural discontent to determine whether they stemmed from local socio-economic grievances, or whether they were related to politically organized movements. In some instances, it emerged that rumours about "cossack revenge" or "reformation" of haidamak bands had been nothing

19. Lemke, ed., *Moia povest*, I, 349-50. Petr Korsakov, the censor in question, was regarded as a liberal. Educated at the Hague and fluent in eight languages, a year earlier he had passed Markevych's *Istoriia Malorossii*.

more than outbursts of drunken peasants. In other instances, reports show historical ideas did play a role in the organization and justification of mass armed revolt. In 1806-07, for example, a brigade of Ukrainian peasants mobilized for military service came to the conclusion this had given them the right to remain soldiers and not return to serfdom. As reported by one of their officers, these men thought they would ". . . according to their old custom become cossacks." Initially, their owners and officers did nothing to dispel their illusion in order to placate them and avoid trouble. In the end, these peasants could not be dispersed until after a pitched battle between them and several divisions of regular troops and cossacks.²⁰ In another incident, in 1846-47, rumours about a call to arms and formation of haidamak bands were reported in Kiev province. Upon investigation it emerged that an article in the local press about the cossack and Haidamak revolts had been read and misinterpreted by half-literate priests and peasants ". . . who began to confuse the past with the present and the future." Nothing happened in the end, except that for a number of months before the issue was cleared up, officials had cause for consternation.²¹ Memories of past uprising did play a role in instigating revolts in Podillia province in 1853, and in the "Kyivs'ka kozachyna" of 1855.²²

Fear of possible mass unrest spilling over and affecting the army in the Ukrainian provinces just before and after the Emancipation decree of 1861, led to the infamous Valuev Decree of 1863—reinforced twelve years later by the Ems Ukaz.²³ These two acts supplemented already existing regulations isolating the peasantry from written history, with an unwritten law prohibiting the publication of anything except *belles lettres* in Ukrainian, and they thereby reinforced the existing barrier separating the mass of the nation from the Ukrainian populist intellectuals.

The fact that the majority of peasants were illiterate when these various regulations were enacted was not significant, and in any case illiteracy declined rather quickly considering

20. I. Trotskiy, "Do istorii revoliutsiinoho rukhu na Ukraini na pochatku XIX st.," *Prapor marksyzmu*, No. 1 (1930), pp. 161, 167-69.

21. N. Petrov, "Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia brozheniia v kievskoi gubernii v 1846 i 1847 godakh," *Istoricheskie vestnik*, No. 21 (1885), pp. 552-53.

22. G. I. Marakhov, *Sotsialno politicheskaia bor'ba na Ukraine v 50-60 roky XIX veke* (Kiev: Vyshcha shkola, 1981), p. 23; S. Shamrai, "Kyivs'ka kozachyna 1855 roku," *Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, No. 20 (1928), pp. 255-60.

23. Savchenko, "Novi vidomosti.," pp. 189-339.

Russian conditions. In the 1880s, for example, in Chernihiv Kharkiv and Poltava provinces, about 5 percent of the peasants could read, but by 1908 this figure had risen to about 24 percent. Among men the rate was even higher, as shown by figures based on surveys of army recruits. In the 1870s, 15 percent of the recruits from these three provinces could read. By 1904 this had swollen to almost 50 percent.²⁴

At the time most of the above mentioned laws and regulations were enacted, what was important for the government was the way in which illiterate or semi-literate people reacted to the printed word. Because in traditional, non-literate societies, the populace usually accepted as true anything in print, authorities had to ensure that anything published and intended for the mass of the nation be edifying and/or give moral lessons even if the item in question was to be read by no one except a village priest. Words on paper had a mystique and authority for the vast majority of the tsar's subjects. From this point of view regulations limiting and preventing the spread of printed knowledge were quite necessary even though the majority of the people were illiterate.²⁵

Official apprehension about the potential of certain historical ideas to cause popular disturbance in the Ukrainian provinces had some basis in reality. The cossack and Haidamak revolts held a central place in the Ukrainian oral folk tradition, and when stimulated by a combination of events and misinterpreted written history, such memories could serve as a spark turning local incidents into major riots or more. More problematical, however, was a third consideration that influenced the censorship of Ukrainian historiography—the threat of "Ukrainian separatism." Though historians now doubt whether such a thing existed as a realistic political force in nineteenth-century tsarist Ukraine, it is important for our purposes that especially during the second half of the century, tsarist officials thought such a threat existed. As noted above, Orlov linked Slavic studies to pol-

24. A. G. Rashin, "Gramotnost i narodnoe obrazovanie v Rossii v XIX i XX v.," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, No. 37 (1951), pp. 34, 37, 46, 48. E. Chykalenko notes that although peasants were taught Russian, they read Ukrainian much better. *Spohady* (New York: Ukrains'ka vil'na akademiia nauk u SShA, 1956), p. 278.

25. In one of the articles of the 1721 Statute of the Committee on church affairs we read: "The common people are not capable of telling right from wrong but cling firmly and stubbornly to what they see written in a book." *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (St. Petersburg: Tip. Imp. Akademii nauk, 1830-1916) series I, VI, 321.

itical separatism, and decided to take measures against all slavophiles in the Empire because he feared they could become anti-statist in their political orientations. Regarding Ukrainophilism as a particularly dangerous form of Slavophilism, Orlov ordered the members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood arrested, because, in the words of his deputy, Vasiliï Dubelt, their ideas: ". . . might have taken a direction dangerous to the stability of the state."²⁶ In a particularly revealing passage, Dubelt also summarized the historical views of the young Kulish and Kostomarov:

. . . but because all the members of the society were Ukrainian born, their Slavophilism turned into Ukrainophilism, and they arrived at the assumption that Little Russia should be restored as it existed before the Union to Russia. . . . In the published works of Kulish, and in some of Kostomarov's, the decisions of the Emperor Peter I and his successors were described as persecution and abolition of national rights; in contrast to this, they described enthusiastically the spirit of the ancient cossacks, and described the Haidamak raids as knightly deeds, they referred to the glory of the Hetmanate as international, and cited Ukrainian songs in which there is expression of love of liberty, remarking this spirit has not diminished, and still exists concealed within the Little Russian.²⁷

Dubelt's summary of Taras Shevchenko's historical ideas is also significant: "Such verses could take root in Little Russia and lead to ideas about the alleged good old days of the Hetmanate, the good fortunes which would ensue if those times were brought back, and possibility of Ukraine [sic] existing as an independent state."²⁸

26. M. Lemke, *Nikolaevskie zhandarmy i literatura 1826-1855 gg.* (St. Petersburg: Iz. S. V. Bunina, 1909), pp. 218-20. In *Zaborona ukrainstva*, Savchenko argues that during the reigns of Aleksander II and III, "Ukrainian separatism" was the product of ukrainophobes' imagination. Some separatist sentiment appeared during Napoleon's invasion of Russia, but no political organizations to this end were formed. I. Rybakov, "Do kharakterystyky doby kryzy 'ancienne regime' na Ukraini," *Naukovyi zbirnyk Leningradskoho tovarystva doslidnykiv ukrains'koi istorii psy'menstva ta movy*, No. 2 (1929), pp. 47-63.

27. Lemke, *Nikolaevskie zhandarmy*, p. 218.

28. Full text is reproduced in V. S. Borodin, *T. H. Shevchenko i tsarska tsenzura* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1969), pp. 51, 90.

Officialdom's almost paranoid fear of political instability and "disorder" was kept alive by the Polish revolt of 1863, and the development of the Russian revolutionary movement. Accordingly, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, censorship of Ukrainian historiography could be easily justified on the grounds that it was a politically sensitive subject. Thus, unlike Russian historiography, Ukrainian historiography was censored not only if it discussed social history in a way the authorities disapproved of, but also if it stepped beyond the bounds of the officially defined "Little Russian" patriotism.

Examples of Censorship.

The first example of censorship I have found for the period under study dates from 1839, when Maksymovych's "Skazanie o koliivshchiny" was prohibited. This article demonstrated, for the first time, that the Haidamak revolts had left a positive image in the minds of the Ukrainian peasantry—a conclusion at odds with the prevailing view of the revolts as brigandage and banditry. Written the same year the Uniate Church was abolished in the Empire, and Kiev University was shut down after a nest of Polish conspirators had been discovered there, the article, according to Uvarov, would have reflected "badly in the memory of the old and common people."²⁹ Uvarov also refused to allow the distribution of Kostomarov's doctoral dissertation on the role of the church in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ukraine, claiming it was a controversial subject and could incite disturbances because it dealt with the recently abolished Uniate church.³⁰ One year later, Dubelt did not allow the publication of the eighteenth-century historical poem, "Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei," that argued Cossack Ukraine should exist as an autonomous entity under tsarist rule. In his opinion, "here there is insult to Russia as well as Little Russia; the first asks stupid questions while the second boasts like an old woman, and in the end her heart fails her because of our yoke."³¹

29. M. Markov, *M. O. Maksymovych vydatnyi istoryk Ukrainy XIX st.* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1972), pp. 218-19. Borodin, *Taras Shevchenko*, p. 24. The article was published for the first time in 1875 in *Russkii arkhiv*.

30. J. T. Flynn, "The Affair of Kostomarov's Dissertation. A Case of Official Nationalism in Practice," *Slavonic and East European Review*, 52, No. 127 (Apr. 1974), 158-96.

31. N. Petrov, ed., "Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei," *Kievskaiia starina*, No. 1 (Feb. 1882), pp. 314-15. The published version of the poem finished with reconciliation and it is unclear what Dubelt was referring to when he mentioned

In 1847, soon after its publication, Kulish's *Povest ob ukrain-skom narode* was withdrawn from bookshops. The liberal censor who had passed it was arrested, while Nikitenko condemned the book and approved of the punishment meted out to Kulish and the censor.³² According to Vissarion Belinskii, the prohibition of the *Povest* marked the beginning of more stringent censorship in general, and for this reason he vehemently condemned the book and the Ukrainian movement which it represented. Calling the leaders of the movement "Bohunk radicals" [khokhlatskie radikaly] he wrote: "And this is what this cattle does, mindless petty liberals. Oh these bohunks, sheep-playing at liberalism in the name of dumplings and pork fat."³³

The very next year, Kostomarov had another encounter with the censors when his history of the Slobodian cossacks was confiscated. As this work seems to have been lost it is impossible to determine why it was prohibited. In 1856, Kostomarov together with Mordovets completed a *Malorusskii literaturnyi sbornik* which was published but not before parts of it had been changed to comply with censorship. Eighteen historical poems by Mordovets had to be omitted because they "glorified the past" and mentioned the Ukrainian struggle against Russia, while two historical plays by Kostomarov were altered. A quote from Khmel'nyts'kyi's speech made to Polish commissioners in early 1649, where he calls himself "Rus' autocrat," was deleted on the grounds it reflected "local patriotism," while a section describing the oppressive nature of lord-serf relations was deleted on the grounds that it would "fan hatred."³⁴ That same year, Kostomarov again submitted his *Bogdan Khmelnitskii* to the censors. The work had already been completed in 1850, but according to Nikolai Chernyshevskii, censors' cuts had made such nonsense out of the work that Kostomarov, out of frustration, had simply put it away.³⁵ This time, as previously, it was rejected. But

"heart-failure" as a result of the Russian yoke. Petrov explained that the section the censors had singled out originally were badly transcribed and then wrongly interpreted.

32. Lemke, ed., *Moia povest*, I, 371.

33. V. G. Belinskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1956), XII, 447. His words were: "Odna skotina iz khokhlatskikh liberalov.

34. P. Lobas, "Ukrains'kyi literaturnyi zbirnyk," *Arkhivy ukraïny*, No. 2 (1968), pp. 74-80.

35. N. G. Chernyshevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1949), XIV, 221.

Kostomarov now persisted and after a personal appeal to Dubelt, the decision was changed and publication was allowed under a number of conditions. The Chief of Police instructed censors to go through the manuscript again to ensure it contained no "disloyal tendencies" or descriptions of events that could have "harmful effects" on readers, and he specified the work could appear only in article form, but in parts of no less than three chapters. Dubelt perhaps felt that if chapters appeared separately, peasants could have misinterpreted them. Kostomarov also had to revise forty-eight pages of his manuscript which described how enraged peasants took revenge on their previous masters.³⁶

Primary sources were also censored. In 1853-54, for example, a number of sentences and pages were omitted and/or changed in the published version of the eighteenth-century *Hrabiianka Chronicle*. Censors, taking exceptions to what they regarded as excessive pro-Ukrainian sentiment in the editor's introduction, and to clearly anti-Russian statements in the chronicle itself, decided to change and delete the offensive passages. They justified their decision by reference to the Education Ministry's circular of 1847 on "local patriotism," as well as to a severe reprimand that had been given to a censor for having allowed the Chernihiv guberniia *Vedomosti* to publish some Ukrainian historical rhymes and popular sayings which, it was claimed, could have provoked hostility between Ukrainians and Russians.³⁷ Forty-one years later Lazarevs'kyi was able to publish the deleted sections of the chronicle, and we discover it consisted of a speech purportedly given by Petro Doroshenko to his rival Briukovets'kyi, where the latter's pro-Russian policy and the presence of Russian military governors in the Hetmanate is condemned. In this speech, Doroshenko explained that not even the Poles had infringed so wantonly upon Ukrainian rights as the Russians, and he called upon Ukrainians to leave the tsar and kill all Russian officials in the country.³⁸

Returning now to examples of censorship of secondary literature, the next work that can be listed is a biography of Hetman

36. I. Butych, "M. I. Kostomarov i tsars'ka tsenzura," *Arkhivy ukraïny*, No. 6 (1967), pp. 64-66. ". . . chtoby . . . ne bylo kokogo libo ne blagonamerennogo napravleniia ili sochitaniia takikh i opisanie kotorye mogli by proizvesti vrednoe na chitatelei vliianie."

37. "Tsenzura v tsarstvovanie Imp. Nikolaia I," *Russkaia starina*, No. 117 (Feb. 1904), pp. 441-42.

38. A. L[azarevs'kyi], "Opushchennaia v pechati stranitsia iz letopisi Grabianki," *Kievskaa starina*, No. 47 (Nov. 1894), pp. 297-300.

Doroshenko written in 1862. Though the manuscript seems to have been lost, the censors report provides valuable insight into its contents and interpretation.

The author of this work examined by me had set himself the difficult task of giving a popular account of a man whose historical activities centered on hostility to Russia and an attempt to tear Little Russia away from it. . . Obviously, the author did not realize the difficulty of his task, he doesn't attempt to conceal his sympathy for Doroshenko's ideas, and arranged his facts so the book could be seen as a protest denying the legal nature of the Russian take-over of Little Russia. Especially noteworthy is the claim that Russia lost the right to rule Little Russia after the Andrusovo treaty which nullified the Pereiaslav treaty. The author is so imbued with this idea that nowhere in his work did he call Russia his fatherland, nor did he ever write our ruler or our government, but throughout he used the terms Muscovite ruler, Muscovite government, or just Muscovy. . . .³⁹

In 1884 the censor gave a similar report on a historical novel about the Sich Otaman Ivan Sirko, which was one among a number of items removed from an almanack edited by the writer Mykola Staryts'kyi.

The author, praising the exploits of the fearless Sirko, who sought an independent Ukraine, does not conceal his antipathy towards Russia . . . the author writes: "Anyone with brains saw Moscow betrayed Ukraine and had laughed at its promise made to Khmel'nyts'kyi, and that Briukhovets'kyi, by siding with Moscow, did not save but lost his fatherland" . . . The author's ill will towards Russia emerges even more strongly when he deals with [Petro] Doroshenko's attempts to free Ukraine from the Muscovites, and its striving for freedom and liberty. In short, the entire story is imbued with hatred of Russia.⁴⁰

39. V. Miiakovs'kyi, "Dvi rukopysy 60kh rokiv," *Ukraina*, No. 3-4 (1917), pp. 86-88.

40. O. Tulub, "Mykhailo Staryts'kyi v borot'bi z tsenzuruiu 1880-kh rokiv," *Zapysky istorychnoi septsii UAN*, No. 30 (1929), p. 193.

Finally, an article on the progressive diminution of cossack Ukraine rights after 1654, written by Iakiv Shul'hyn, was denied permission for publication in *Kievskaiia starina* in 1886.

Russian tsarist censorship was repressive, yet in so far as it was an arm of a paternalistic autocracy that did not see itself either as an oppressor or an "agent of modernization," but rather as a tutor to sometimes misguided children, censorship was less harsh than might be expected. Besides this paternalistic approach, which mollified the worst aspects of thought control in tsarist Russia, such variables as changes in political climate, simple bureaucratic bungling and corruption, and the fact tsarist society was not totalitarian, but an entity in which personal loyalties could still override ideological or political conviction, also played their role. For all these reasons, despite censorship, works that did appear in print either could have been or indeed subsequently were considered seditious by some.

Among the anomalies of censorship produced by such an environment it is possible to include Maksymovych's "Skazanie" which, though prohibited when written, was passed some fifty years later. A second instance of this kind of anomaly is provided by the permission given for publications of the previously censored sections of the *Hrabianka Chronicle*. A third case of censorship by-passed is provided by the history of Mykola Sumtsov's dissertation on the seventeenth-century prelate Lazar Baranovych. Initially, Sumtsov had not been allowed to defend his thesis because of its negative references to seventeenth-century Russian rule in the Hetmanate. Yet, a short time later, in 1885, the work appeared in book form complete with sections such as this:

Beating was the most common occurrence in the Muscovite state. Everyone beat and almost everyone was beaten. The Patriarch beat, the Voievoda beat, the soldiers beat with anything handy, canes shields or bare knuckles. Beating became a necessity. Without the knout nothing could be done. . . . This is a characteristic feature of the Russian nation.⁴¹

41. D. Bahalyi, *Narys ukrains'koi istoriografii* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1923), I, 33; N. Sumtsov, *Lazar Baranovich* (Kharkov: Pechatnoe delo, 1885), p. 193.

A fourth instance of censorship avoided is provided by the history of Iavornyt'skyi's classic study *Zaporozhe v ostatkakh stariny i predaniakh naroda* (1888). In the 1880s the historian was not in favor with the authorities, and all the schools in the Empire had been instructed not to hire him as a teacher. According to Delanov, the Minister of Education, his works contained a tendentious antipathy towards the government and Russian history, and at the same time, ". . . a passion for Ukrainian history." When the book in question was submitted to the censors it was stopped on the grounds that it would encourage Ukrainophilism. The readers also took exception to aspects of Ukrainian irreligiosity expressed in some of the popular stories reprinted in the book, and to the fact that contrary to the decree of 1876, these stories were printed in Ukrainian.⁴² The decision was reversed thanks to a relative of Vasyl' Tarnov's'kyi, a wealthy Ukrainian landowner, patron of the Ukrainian movement and friend of Iavornyt'skyi. The relation in question was none other than Mikhail Iuzefovich, a member of the Central Committee on Publications, vehement opponent of the Ukrainian movement, and the *spiritus movens* behind the Ems Ukaz. Also, it is possible that Hrushevs'kyi's *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* was facilitated on its way through the censorship by the intervention of Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii. A personal friend of the historian, the Prince was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1904. It may also have been thanks to his support that Hrushevs'kyi's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* was allowed into the Empire.⁴³

Besides the considerations referred to above, the policy of *quod licet jovi non licet bovi* also contributed to making tsarist censorship less rigid than it may have been otherwise. The government was prepared to grant limited concessions to the literary and academic elite and thereby showed it was less concerned, in this case, about control over Ukrainian historiography as a purely academic discipline, than it was in controlling and, if possible, preventing the dissemination of conclusions of which it disapproved. This can explain why, even during the height of the period of reaction under Nicholas I, anthologies of documents could be published from which those interested could learn what the censors were supposed to prohibit from general histories and

42. M. M. Shubravska, *D. I. Iavornyts'kyi* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1972), pp. 45, 55-56.

43. I am grateful to Tom Prymak, Hrushevs'kyi's biographer, for this information.

literature. More specifically, in the 1840s and '50s, eighteenth-century cossack chronicles that presented an "autonomist" interpretation of Ukrainian history, were published. In these works, unlike in those belonging to the "loyalist" interpretation, readers could find evidence of how Moscow systematically infringed upon Ukrainian rights after 1654. In 1846 the anonymous *Istoriia Rusov* was passed by censors, though in parts it was a decidedly anti-Russian work. In 1889 a comparative study of the texts of the Pereiaslav treaty by Shafranov was allowed to appear in *Kievskaia starina*. He claimed that what until then was regarded as the text of the Treaty, was in fact a version imposed upon the cossack officers by the Russians in 1659 that put more restrictions on Ukrainian autonomy than had the original accords. Finally, in 1895, Umanets was able to publish his scholarly biography of Mazepa, the first biography of the Hetman to appear in the Empire that defended rather than condemned his policies.

Conclusion

Tsarist censorship sought to prohibit from publications on Ukrainian history the ideas which Orlov, Uvarov and Dubelt had singled out in their reports on the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. These were overt anti-Russianism and glorification of the cossacks and the cossack period. Censors also looked out for arguments which in any way could either justify political separatism, or threaten to provoke social unrest or dissatisfaction. However, policy was directed more at control over dissemination of knowledge than at control over academic research, and for this reason there was limited tolerance of "dangerous ideas" among scholars. Yet corruption, inefficiency, personal relationships, as well as changes in political climate, often led to the publication of books or articles that either cast doubt upon or directly challenged aspects of the official interpretation of "Little Russian" and Eastern Slavic history.

The government considered it especially important to ensure that its image of the past remained unchallenged in the minds of the peasantry—at least to the degree this image managed to displace the popular folk-historical memory—although it was not as successful in this endeavor as it might have wished to be. The Ukrainian landowner and patron of the Ukrainian movement, Evhen Chykalenko, noted in his memoirs how a literate middle-aged peasant in Chernihiv province in the early 1900s had read Iavornyts'kyi's three-volume history of the Zaporozhians, and

had taken to heart the logic of Doroshenko's anti-Russian pro-Turkish policies. Quoting the man in question Chykalenko wrote:

And Iavornyts'kyi told the truth, Doroshenko understood that when Ukraine joins Muscovy it will lose its independence because of its religious and ethnic affinity. Great prophetic words! . . . While reading this book I marked the place with a pencil: Let all who read it stop and think at this place.⁴⁴

This example of the impact which a history book could have on popular consciousness, however, seems to be an exceptional one. Probably more representative of the general level of historical and political consciousness of the Ukrainian peasantry, is the following statement by Fedir Malyi, recorded by an ethnographer in the 1860s. The son of the cook to the last Hetman of the Sich, Malyi explained the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt and later events as follows:

Once this land belonged to the Poles. . . . but when the Zaporozhians signed a treaty with the Tatars and attacked Fort Kodak . . . all the lands as far as the Sluch River became the free territory of the Zaporizhzhia—ah!, and God knows where this Sluch River is.⁴⁵

Such simplistic, unsophisticated, and unpolitical conceptions of the past, passed down in oral literature from generation to generation, survived in the popular mind for longer than otherwise might have been the case thanks to tsarist censorship. And eight years of relative freedom in publishing between 1906 and 1914 were not enough to enable a small number of Ukrainian historians to overcome the primitive pre-literate popular image of the national past, nor the "All Russian" conceptions of Eastern Slavic history which censorship imposed upon all the tsar's subjects.

44. Chykalenko, *Spohady*, pp. 274-79. The statement was recorded in 1902 and the relevant passage is found on p. 370 in volume 2 of Iavornyts'kyi's book.

45. I. Karelin, "Materialy dlia istorii Zaporizhzhia i Nokopolia," *Zapiski Odesskago obshchestva istorii i drevnosti*, No. 6 (1867), p. 525. See also M. Dragomanov ed., *Malorusskiiia narodnyia predaniia i razkazy* (Kiev: Tip. M. P. Fritsa, 1876), pp. 206-08 for an example of how Peter's imprisonment of Hetman Polubotok as described in the *Istoriia Rusov* was understood and passed down in peasant oral tradition.

A detailed examination of the effect of tsarist censorship in the borderlands would involve determining what popular national and historical consciousness might have been, had its development not been subject to repression. This in turn could permit a relatively precise estimation of the effect of censorship on the evolution of national consciousness, as well as intellectual life in general. However, such a study lies beyond the scope of this article, which will only note that in 1918 the historian Aleksandra Efimenko blamed tsarist policy for the low level of Ukrainian national consciousness. Her words suggest censorship played a key role.

In any case, at the present moment Ukrainian studies are an absolute necessity in light of the spiritual hunger of Ukrainian life. In such a program of Ukrainian studies Ukrainian history occupies a foremost place. . . . The truth must be admitted without embarrassment, that the subjects of a newly emerging state do not know their history. They don't even know it in anecdotal form, neither the masses nor the intellectuals. All the higher social groups of the Ukrainian nation were educated in Russian schools. Ukrainian history was found [only] in Russian history textbooks carefully filtered by learned committees of the Ministry of Popular Education. In these textbooks, pupils found Ukrainian history either summarized in a few lines, or at length—on a few pages. . . . And on such a skimpy foundation the need has suddenly arisen to form within the population a general familiarity with its own history.⁴⁶

Thus, the policy of isolating by censorship the mass of the population from what the government thought was inappropriate historical writing seems to have been basically successful. This policy did not prevent Ukrainian historians who wanted to learn about such issues as the deleterious consequences of tsarist rule in Ukraine after 1654, nor did it succeed in isolating all the peasantry, or all potential readers from "dangerous" historical ideas that could have stimulated "regional sentiment." None the less, in the final analysis, tsarist censorship was a major impediment to the early development of Ukrainian na-

46. cited in Bahalyi's introduction to the 1922 Ukrainian edition of Efimenko's *History of Ukraine*.

tional consciousness. Although censorship was inefficient and elastic, it seems to have succeeded in isolating most of the Ukrainian peasantry and the general reading public from the historically and nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals.

Turning now to the impact of censorship on the methodology and evolution of nineteenth-century Ukrainian historiography, it will be remembered that Doroshenko and Bahalyi claimed repression had a decisive influence. Bahalyi specifically wrote that censorship was responsible for making the nation the sole object or category of analysis, and limiting work in socio-economic studies which had to ignore state and ethnic boundaries. Although his observation is basically true, the degree to which such development can be blamed on censorship is open to doubt.

The issue concerns intellectual and philosophical currents which define methodologies, as well as the conscious and unconscious strategies employed by nineteenth-century intellectuals representing oppressed nationalities in struggles with central authorities. Drahomanov in 1891 also criticized Ukrainian scholars in terms similar to Bahalyi. He pointed out to them the need to employ new West European models of analysis, and examine Ukrainian history in a comparative context. He urged Ukrainian historians to break away from their narrow provincial populism, part of an ideology that disappeared in Western Europe after 1848, but he blamed the Ukrainians themselves for their conceptual narrow-mindedness and not tsarist censorship.⁴⁷ Was this observation true, or did Ukrainian historians perhaps fear that the non-national focus of the newer sociological-economic historiography would impede their efforts to build a national movement within the limits they had to work?

It has been shown that Polish historians at the turn of the century, though familiar with latest developments in methodology, eschewed them as novelties unsuitable for their purposes. Polish intellectuals, who like their Ukrainian counterparts, represented a nation without a state, used history to build national consciousness among their countrymen, and they feared that exper-

47. M. Drahomanov, *Chudats'ki dumky pro ukrains'ku natsionalnu spravu* (Geneva: Hromada, 1891), pp. 256-60. In her thesis, Choldin noted that although control over foreign historiographical philosophical and sociological literature was severe—Compte, for example, was considered more dangerous than Marx—tsarist scholars were able to obtain this literature sooner or later. This would indicate that censorship only delayed and did not prevent familiarity with the latest Western methodologies.

iments in social-economic or cultural history would detract from their efforts to bolster and develop Polish patriotism. For this reason, positivism never became a dominant or popular tendency in Polish historiography. At the beginning of the twentieth century social utility played an important role in determining the neo-Romantic direction of Polish historiography and the relative unpopularity of neo-positivism, "integral history" and Marxism.⁴⁸ Whatever the situation in Ukraine may have been,⁴⁹ it is evident from Drahomanov's observations and the Polish example that any shortcomings in methodological approach found in late nineteenth-century Ukrainian historiography should not be automatically attributed to censorship.

Did tsarist prohibitions result in or lead to bad scholarship? To be sure, internal as well as external censorship forced Ukrainian historians to avoid certain issues and either to omit references to pride in the national past, or to be extremely circumspect when doing so if they wanted to publish their work. But the absence of detailed treatment of certain topics or pride in the past does not detract from the scholarly quality of most of what was published. Certainly, more would have been written about a greater variety of subjects if the Ukrainian movement had not been subjected to administrative repression. It is also likely that much of this work would have contained what for the time was normal expression of nationalist historical pride—of the kind that may be found in nineteenth-century Russian historiography which was unfettered by censorship in this respect. In short, the academic standard of published nineteenth-century Ukrainian historiography does not seem to have been adversely affected by censorship. As anyone who has studied pre-nineteenth-century Ukrainian history knows, nineteenth-century monographs and

48. J. Maternicki, "Polska refleksja teoretyczna i metodologiczna w dziedzinie historii w okresie neoromantyzmu i modernizmu," *Przegląd Humanistyczny*, No. 7 (1979), pp. 313-56; "O nowy kształt historii," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, No. 1 (1980), pp. 119-72. No similar comparative study of methodologies exists for Ukrainian historiography. An unsatisfactory attempt was made by O. Ia. Lysenko, "Z istorii rozvytku idei sotsial'noho prohresu na Ukraini v druhyi polovyni XIX st., (70-80 rr.)," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 6 (1967), pp. 83-91.

49. The study of this problem could begin with an examination of the published correspondence of nineteenth-century Ukrainian intellectuals. See, for example, the letters of Pavlo Hrabovsk'kyi to Borys Hrinchenko. *Pavlo Hrabovsk'kyi. Zibrannia tvoriv u tr'okh tomakh* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnystvo khudozhnoi literatury, 1960), III, 288-309.

articles are indispensable and today many of them are still the basic works on their respective subjects.⁵⁰

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50. I summarize and classify the main corpus of nineteenth-century Ukrainian historiography in part III of my forthcoming book: "Interpretations of Ukrainian History: A Survey of the Interpretation of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Thought."