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Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?

STEPHEN VELYCHENKO

It is from men who either hold or are eligible for public life that nations take their character; where no such men exist, there can be no energy in any other class of community. No elevation of character can be expected among men . . . who in the civil line can hope for nothing beyond some petty judicial or revenue office in which they may by corrupt means make up for their slender salary.

—Sir Thomas Munroe

An artificial, hungry uncultivated class [tsarist bureaucrats] that sucked the people's blood with thousands of dirty bloody mouths.

—Alexander Herzen

During the Soviet period, Moscow and Russians ruled the USSR, while non-Russians administered their respective native territories. Was this a Bolshevik innovation or a continuation of tsarist practice? Recent scholarship on Western colonialism has shown that whatever the intentions of European overlords, their rule depended much on the actions of indigenous officials. Some prospered and had considerable authority as agents of the Europeans. “But their gains inevitably came at the expense of European colonizers in the form of revenues they were able to siphon off for their own uses, of their ability to frustrate European initiatives for political and social reforms, and of the influence they continued to wield over their subordinates and the colonized population that fell under their jurisdiction.”¹ In short, Western rule overseas was weaker and less oppressive than previously thought. How omnipotent and oppressive was tsarist rule? How many clerks, accountants and notables in the non-Russian regions were local men? Did they affect the implementation of policies? Did Petersburg prefer outsiders to natives and settlers for offices in non-

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¹M. Adas, “‘High’ Imperialism and the ‘New’ History,” in *Islamic and European Expansion*, ed. M. Adas (Philadelphia, 1993), 322.

Russian borderlands: Was there a relation between national movements in the empire and job opportunities for non-Russians in government? If there was exclusion on the basis of national origin, did it motivate those who felt cheated or frustrated in career ambitions to join or sympathize with national movements? Or, as in late nineteenth-century Ireland, where Catholics eagerly took advantage of opportunities to enter British service, did access to the tsarist bureaucracy dampen radical proclivities among locals? As an introduction to the issue of nationality and bureaucracy in Imperial Russia this paper attempts to identify by national origin bureaucrats in nineteenth-century Ukraine. It will examine how many of which nationality served at which level, and the role of national origins in selection and appointments.

By the seventeenth century in Russia proper, provinces were merely administrative entities. Nobles, faced with obligatory service where sent, high degrees of estate dispersal and parcellization, and possible arbitrary seizure of property by the state until the 1830s, lacked local roots and identities.² To prevent newly incorporated non-Russian lands from serving as foci for subimperial traditional loyalties, Petersburg redrew their borders and turned historical regions into zones of authority. Tsarist Ukraine was divided into ninety-six districts (*uezd*) and nine provinces (*guberniia*). Kiev, Chernihiv (Chernigov), Poltava and Katerynoslav (Ekaterinoslav) provinces were carved out of Cossack Ukraine in the early 1800s and made part of three nonhistorical entities, ruled for most of the century by governors-general with extensive powers: the South-Western Lands (1796–1914), Little Russia (1801–56) and New Russia (1796–1874). Chernihiv and Poltava provinces were under the Kievan Governor-General from 1856 to 1879, and the Kharkiv Temporary Governor-General from 1879 to 1889. Katerynoslav and Taurida provinces were under a Military Governor based in Mykolaiv (Nikolaev) from 1803 to 1828 and from 1879 to 1882 they were supervised by a Temporary Governor-General in Odessa. But although Cossack Ukrainian territory was divided into tsarist political units, “Little Russian” regional identity persisted. Most significantly, the elite remembered that an autonomous Hetmanate based on private property had existed between 1654 and 1782 and that it had claimed jurisdiction over adjacent lands to the west and south.³

In tsarist Russia central rule did not mean central control. The local gentry jealously guarded its autonomy from officialdom, frequently using its right of appeal to the Senate, while the administration was too fragmented to adequately perform its intended role as an agent of uniformity. Since Russia had a government of men, not of laws, policy depended greatly on personality, and interests could find expression within the nominally unified administrative system. For instance, “the crazy quilt distribution of power and authority in education operated to ensure a high degree

² M. Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia* (New York, 1966), 34–121; R. Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974), 172–81; T. M. Poulson, “The Provinces of Russia: Changing Patterns in the Regional Allocation of Authority, 1708–1962” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1963).

³ S. Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process* (Edmonton, 1993), 148–51, 165. Kharkiv (Kharkov) Province was formed from Sloboda Ukraine, which was never part of the Hetmanate but shared the same culture, as well as social, political and military structure. See D. Bahaly, *Istoriia slobodskoi Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1918). This analysis excludes Taurida Province. Historically, the territory belonged to the Nogai and Crimean Tatars; it was settled late by Ukrainians and in 1897 Ukrainians made up less than 50 percent of its population.

of autonomy at the local level for anyone who was smart enough to take advantage of the loopholes and opportunities provided by fragmentation and interministerial rivalry.” As a result, zemstvos controlled and ran rural schools formally under the Ministry of Education.⁴ Plagued by internal rivalry and open to external pressures, the bureaucracy both reflected and perpetuated the diversity of the empire. Autocracy could ensure that this diversity did not express itself as bureaucratic nationalism, but graft, corruption, bribery, venality, nepotism and red tape riddled the bureaucracy, and ignoring directives was so widespread that, in practice, self-rule was the rule.⁵ How did national/regional ties and interests relate to this situation, and did they affect central rule? Any attempt to answer these questions must consider the national composition of the bureaucracy.

Except for the Baltic Germans, the participation of non-Russians in the tsarist administration is almost unstudied.⁶ Rhinelander suspects Petersburg preferred Russians to natives in the borderlands but noted that this opinion was not expressed in documents.⁷ Mosse, discovering that in 1892 governors with the highest ranks presided over the ten central Russian provinces, suggested a relationship between nationality and high office.⁸ Robbins noted that the Department of General Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior had no system for selecting governors and vice-governors until the 1900s. There were no regulations expressly forbidding the appointment of governors and vice-governors in provinces where they held land or had served earlier, but the Interior Ministry was reluctant to make such appointments.⁹

PLEMIA AND SOZNIANIE

Despite romantic nationalist claims to the contrary, there is no direct relationship between language, identity and loyalty. Particularly in preindustrial societies, where state literary languages were usually different from all the vernaculars spoken in the realm, language use depended on pragmatic assessments of utility, and change was not tantamount to repudiation of heritage or the destruction of the soul. In the nineteenth century educated non-Russians became cultured to imperial Russian ways, most were bilingual, if not polyglots, and use of a native language did not imply a person was nationally conscious or that their primary loyalty was to the language group. For the literate and illiterate, imperial and regional identities coexisted for as long as Petersburg believed that the unity of the state should depend on loyalty to

⁴B. Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools* (Berkeley, 1990), 126. This is particularly significant for the Ukrainian provinces. In the 1890s, 47 percent of all primary schools and 78 percent of the pupils in Poltava, Chernihiv and Kharkiv provinces were under zemstva jurisdiction. See V. Borisenko, *Borotba demokratychnykh syl za narodnu osvitu na Ukraini v 60–90kh rokakh XIX st.* (Kiev, 1980), 33, 44.

⁵S. M. Seredonin, ed., *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta Ministrov*, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg, 1902), 319–21; B. Mironov, “Bureaucratic or Self-Government: The Early Nineteenth-Century Russian City,” *Slavic Review* 52 (Summer 1993): 233–55.

⁶P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.* (Moscow, 1978), 8, stated that the absence of data about the nationality of administrators does not matter because religious affiliation was given.

⁷A. L. Rhinelander, *Prince Michael Vorontsov, Viceroy to the Tsar* (Montreal, 1990), 171.

⁸W. E. Mosse, “Russian Provincial Governors at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” *Historical Journal*, no. 1 (1984): 229.

⁹R. G. Robbins, *The Tsar's Viceroys* (Ithaca, 1987), 26, 38.

the tsar and not on uniformity of language and culture. In such a context, regional/national backgrounds provided a basis for “dual loyalty,” and faithful service to the tsar and “Rossiia” was not incompatible with concern for the native group and its territories. Russians living in non-Russian areas, or non-Russians who used the literary Russian of the day, were not necessarily Russian nationalists nor devoid of regional loyalty. Baltic Germans like the Gesses, for instance, were settled for generations in the Kiev region but their loyalties clearly lay with Petersburg. The German Volynian landowner Shteingel, conversely, was active in the Ukrainian national movement even though he never learned Ukrainian. There were undoubtedly more Russians in Ukraine like princes A. Kurakin, P. Rumiantsev and N. Repnin who represented regional concerns and placed estate above state interests. Prince M. Dolgorukov, Chernihiv gentry marshal in the 1890s, participated in the Ukrainian national movement and his successor, A. Mukhanov, supported the movement in the first Duma.¹⁰ Research might even reveal widespread regional loyalties among settled Russians and Germans and demonstrate that the Shteingels and Repnins were not an insignificant minority in the borderlands.

Not all members of an indigenous elite invariably used their positions in the interests of their region, but at times one identity or loyalty could be more influential than the other. To pinpoint such moments would be difficult but possible in some instances, and although generalizations about bureaucracy and nationality might be tenuous, they must be made if this aspect of the past is to be known. Research would require investigating the education, marriage and peer-group connections of individuals as well as their behavior in crisis, determining when there was advocacy of localism, and if such localism or administrative autarky ever coincided with a “national” orientation.

In the case of Ukraine, classification by nationality is complicated because statistics often grouped “Little Russians” together with Russians. After 1811, imperial censuses did not list national origin because of the cost and the irrelevance of the information for tax purposes. Similarly, polls did not normally enumerate bureaucrats and nobles because they did not pay tax. Until the 1897 census, nationality figured only in some published statistical studies, and to compensate for the lacuna, surnames and place of birth can be used to help determine identity.¹¹ These may be complemented by correspondence, memoir literature and autobiographies that refer to loyalties and attitudes of individuals.¹²

Among the literate and educated, nationalism began to displace the bonds of

¹⁰ S. Rusova, “Moi spomyny,” *Za sto let*, book 3 (1928): 177; O. Lototsky, *Storinky mynuloho*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1932–34), 16. On language and identity see J. Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity* (Oxford, 1985).

¹¹ V. M. Kabuzan, *Narodonaselenie Rossii* (Moscow, 1963), 98–99; V. M. Kabuzan, G. P. Makhnova, “Chislennost' i udel'nyi ves ukrainskogo naseleniia na territorii SSSR v 1795–1959 gg.,” *Istoriia SSSR*, 1965, no. 1:29. Government service records (*formularnye spiski*) indicate place of birth.

¹² The following were used to identify families: *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'*, 25 vols. (reprint ed., New York, 1962); *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, 33 vols to date (Warsaw-Krakow, 1935-); A. Lazarevsky, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1888, 1893); O. Ohloblyn, *Liudy staroi Ukrainy* (Munich, 1959); G. Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1978); *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, 41 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1890–1904).

estate, patrimony, kin and religion in the mid-nineteenth century. Men like A. Iuzefovich and A. Savenko, although “Little Russians” by birth, became Russian nationalists. Like Russians Ivan Aksakov or Mikhail Katkov, they warned about “Ukrainian separatism,” opposed efforts to create literary versions of non-Russian vernaculars, and urged the government to repress manifestations of non-Russian national identity. D. Pikhno, another Russian nationalist of “Little Russian” origin, as member of the State Council in 1912 moved that a new education law specifically exclude Ukrainian from schools.¹³ Whereas non-Russian nationalists often considered the government too nationalist, unofficial Russian nationalists would condemn policies for being insufficiently nationalist, orthodox and autocratic. In the last years of the regime the number of ministers who sympathized with, or were, Russian nationalists, increased. But until then the government distrusted all nationalisms, including the Russian variety, and decisions frequently depended on who had the ear of a given official.¹⁴ Arguably, up to 1914 most officials still identified with “Rossiia” and its dynasty and retained the premodern outlook wherein regional and imperial loyalties coexisted. Such traditionalist Russians and non-Russians could be scrupulously impartial or impartially arbitrary. They could shape decisions while implementing them to favor a region, or achieve the same by not implementing them at all.

Russians did not regard “Little Russians” as a separate nation or race, and outside Ukrainian territories “Little Russians” were seen as Russians, much like Scots outside Britain were seen as English. But Russians and “Little Russians,” just like Scots and English, could identify each other.¹⁵ Typical of the government’s perspective are observations on leaders of the Ukrainian national movement made by Minister of Education S. Uvarov in 1846:

Little Russia, faithful to the throne and unshakable in the faith, cultivates . . . an idea of the past; she, in her leisure time mourns over past independence . . . but one shouldn’t accuse the Ukrainian spirit for the criminal conspiracies of several lunatics [Shevchenko, Kostomarov and Kulish], with whom neither the higher class, nor even less the local clergy and the countless majority of peaceful and submissive denizens . . . have anything in common. The spirit of Little Russia is not part of any insidious conspiracy; if [it] prizes its past history, then it shares this feeling with all known tribes,

¹³ G. Shevelov, “The Language Question in Ukraine in the Twentieth Century,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, no. 1–2 (June 1986): 114.

¹⁴ H. Rogger and E. Weber, eds., *The European Right* (Berkeley, 1965), 443–500; R. Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Revolution* (New Brunswick, 1980), 86–105. On the impact of access and personality on policy related to Ukrainian culture see F. Savchenko, *Zaborona Ukrainstva 1876 roku* (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1930); and O. Doroshkevych, “Ukrainskyi rukh v otsyntsi pomishchyka 80kh rokov,” *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1924, no. 6:218–25. In the 1860s, A. S. Golovnin, the minister of education, strongly opposed the 1863 ban on the use of Ukrainian in print and supported the publication of a Ukrainian translation of the Bible. See M. Lemke, *Epokha tsenzurnykh reform 1859–1865 godov* (St. Petersburg, 1904), 305–6.

¹⁵ On elite images and identities see P. Bushkovitch, “The Ukraine in Russian Culture, 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals,” *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* 39 (1991): 339–63; and G. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Shevchenko* (Munich, 1971). In Russian popular literature Ukrainians were either heroic defenders of the southern borders or lovable simpletons. See J. Brooks, *When Russians Learned to Read* (Princeton, 1985), 228.

who in the course of events, assimilated with a strong tribe, lost their individual importance and were forced to acknowledge the sovereignty of another more mighty principle over themselves.¹⁶

Liberal zemstvo activist I. Petrunkevich, who was born in “Little Russia,” was also well aware of these differences, and after living in exile in Russia he was particularly struck by the sobriety of Ukrainian peasants. Although he expected modernization would make Ukrainians into Russians he vigorously defended local interests while a member of Chernihiv zemstvo and opposed persecuting the Ukrainian national movement on the grounds that repression would only make it separatist.¹⁷

Novelist Nikolai Leskov wrote that “Little Russian” noblemen belonged to a specific social group with a fierce local pride that was not, but should be, studied. He portrayed the typical descendant of the Cossack officers as someone who was loyal and abused his personal and official powers, but who believed “Muscovites” were as different from “Rus’ians” (Ukrainians) as was heaven from earth. These people, Leskov wrote, possessed an intuitive sense of what aristocracy really meant and mocked Russian nobles, whose ancestors had been beaten like peasants. For the “Little Russian” nobleman, St. Nicholas was the patron saint of Russia, but it was St. George who took care of “Little Russia.”¹⁸ In his memoirs, Polish nobleman T. Bobrowski described “Little Russian” students in the 1840s as gifted and descended from great families, yet lazy, coarse and insincere—unlike Russians. He continued, “fairness demands noting that these shortcomings in the Little Russian character developed unfortunately, from their position first under Polish and then Russian rule.”¹⁹

Foreigners and locals in non-Russian regions who identified with a political-legal historical entity such as the Cossack-Hetmanate, and who did not think in terms of territory defined culturally and linguistically, as did nationalists, could advocate or support two kinds of regionalism. Proposals by powerful “Little Russian” nobles in the mid-nineteenth century for railroads in their provinces are an example of regionalism based on geographical-economic considerations.²⁰ Count Kapnist, the October Duma delegate from Poltava and descendant of a famous Cossack family, provides an example of traditionalist cultural regionalism. In a 1914 speech against measures prohibiting public celebration of the centenary of Shevchenko’s birth, he distinguished between the dangerous separatism of the “so-called Ukrainian move-

¹⁶ Cited in D. Bahalyi, “Novi dzerela pro kyrylo metodiivske bratstvo,” *Nashe mynute*, 1918, no. 2:177.

¹⁷ A. A. Kizevetter, ed., “Iv. II. Petrunkevich. Iz zapisok obshchestvennogo deiatelia. Vospominaniia,” *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, 21 (1934): 32–34, 303–5. The only initiative Petrunkevich relates that he took on Ukrainian issues was in the 1870s, when he was a district judge. He refused to prosecute peasants charged by overzealous police for disturbing the peace because they sang folk songs.

¹⁸ N. S. Leskov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1958), 466–74. Leskov was fluent in Ukrainian, lived seven years in Kiev and counted among his friends leading persons in the Ukrainian national movement.

¹⁹ T. Bobrowski, *Pamiętnik mojego życia*, vol. 1, 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1979), 212. Bobrowski claimed he could never trust or like Ukrainians, yet on the preceding page reminisced about his fond friendship with the Ukrainian inspector of schools, M. Mohyliansky.

²⁰ P. Klepatsky, “Holos kapitalu z Ukrainy pershoi polovyny XIX st.,” *Ukraina* (December 1929): 71–81.

ment” and the “natural affinity of every Little Russian to his native country,” which, if repressed would constitute an insult to his patriotism.²¹ A. Afanasiev-Chuzbinsky, a “Little Russian” official who argued that modernization would succeed only if the central government utilized local tradition and knowledge, advocated both kinds of prenational regional interests.²²

Cultural and geographical-economic regionalism in Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv and Poltava provinces was stronger than in Ukrainian provinces west of the Dnieper not only because the former had an indigenous elite and a collective historical identity based on institutions distinctly different from Russian ones. The former also had slower rates of agricultural commercialization and urbanization. As a result these old Cossack lands retained their historical structure and identity longer. During the elections to the First Duma these were expressed politically in strong support for the Octobrists. Kiev, Podillia and Volyn provinces, where modernization was faster and economic competition with Poles and Jews was keen, became strongholds of Russian and Ukrainian nationalists. The nobility tended to support the former. The peasants, forced to compete with non-Ukrainians for seasonal work by land shortages even more acute than in eastern Ukraine, were accordingly more inclined than their eastern countrymen to listen to the nationalist message of Ukrainian socialist intellectuals.²³ The lingering persistence of “Little Russian” identity and loyalties east of the Dnieper was one reason why Ukrainian national identity was weaker and developed slower there than west of the Dnieper. Election returns from 1917 showed heavy support for Ukrainian parties in all Ukrainian provinces. But 77 percent of voters in the Right Bank provinces, as opposed to only 55 percent in the Left Bank provinces, voted for clearly Ukrainian parties.²⁴

STATISTIKA

There is no comprehensive statistical breakdown of the tsarist bureaucracy by year, region, rank and nationality. Volume 2 of the tsarist civil lists annually identified from three hundred to five hundred ranked officials by province who comprised 25–30 percent of all officials midcentury, and 8–10 percent of the total in 1897.²⁵ Non-

²¹ Cited in Lototsky, *Storinky* 3:127. Drahomanov pointed out that educated “Little Russians” were bilingual and eagerly bought the few Ukrainian publications that went beyond “ethnographic patriotism” and dealt with current issues. See O. Dei, O. Zasenko and O. Lysenko, eds., *Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov. Literaturno-publiistsychni pratsi u dvokh tomakh* (Kiev, 1970), 1:138, 308, 2:401–2.

²² C. B. Clay, “From Savage Ukrainian Steppe to Quiet Ukrainian Field: Ukrainian Ethnographers and Imperial Russia in the Reform Era,” in *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present*, ed. B. Krawchenko (New York, 1992), 27.

²³ Edelman, *Gentry Politics*, 10, 43, 50–52, 56. D. Beauvois, *La Bataille de la Terre en Ukraine, 1863–1914* (Lille, 1993), 106–20, 301–11; S. L. Gauthier, “The Roots of Popular Ukrainian Nationalism: A Demographic, Social and Political Study of the Ukrainian Nationality to 1917” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1990), 213–19, 225. The Octobrists stood for constitutional monarchy, extended local self-government and cultural rights for non-Russians. “Little Russian”-born Russian nationalist opponents of the Ukrainian movement tended to be from the Right-Bank provinces.

²⁴ Because only 36 percent of the population in Ukraine voted, with less turning out in the Right Bank provinces than the Left Bank, these returns have limited value as indicators of national consciousness. See O. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, 1950), appendix.

²⁵ *Adres-Kalendar' . Obshchaia rospis' nachal'stvuiushchikh i prochikh dolzhnostnykh lits po vsem upravleniiam v Rossiiskoi imperii*, vols. 1–2 (St. Petersburg, 1828–1914).

ranking scribes, copyists and clerks made up 36 percent of the bureaucracy in 1857 and 49 percent of “administrative and legal personnel” in 1897.²⁶ Volume 1 listed hundreds of functionaries in the provinces attached to central organizations whose subdivisions did not always correspond to provincial borders. These included military, educational, Synod, railway, justice, post, banking, and customs personnel. The 1897 census classified 31,432 “administrative, police and legal personnel” in the eight examined provinces by native language. This figure excluded teachers and railway and postal personnel, but included nonranking clerks, servants, police and firemen—21 percent, 9 percent and 42 percent, respectively, of this category at the imperial level. Besides state officials, in each province there were one thousand to two thousand zemstvo employees by the early 1900s.

To determine the national composition of the administration I examined the surnames and/or native languages of three groups of officials. The first, at the highest level, included 57 military governors and governors-general, 566 governors, vice-governors and gentry marshals, and 17 heads of the Kievan governor-general’s chancery.²⁷ The second group is a sample of pre-1861 middle-level incumbents in seventeen positions representing roughly 5 percent of the total number of administrators: specifically, 121 persons in 1828, and 133 in 1840.²⁸ The third sample, 236 and 260 incumbents of eleven middle-level positions in 1905 and 1911, respectively, represent roughly 10 percent of the total number of officials in those years.²⁹ Included in these two groups are staff from the Treasury, Audit, and State Lands Departments. I counted officials with nationally indeterminate names as “Little Russian”:

—Five of the military governors and governors-general (9 percent), and two of the powerful heads of the Kievan chancery (12 percent) had Ukrainian names.

Of 566 governors, vice-governors and gentry marshals, 321 (57 percent) were Russian, 73 (13 percent) were Baltic German, 54 (9 percent) were Polish, and 118 (21 percent) were “Little Russian.”

²⁶ Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat*, 68. Frederick Starr notes 1,807 officials in Chernihiv Province in 1857, excluding clerks and scribes (*Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia* [Princeton, 1972], 48). See also *Obshchyi svod po Imperii rezul'tatov razrabotki dannykh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1905), chart no. 20a. This calculation included men and women, but not 130,711 persons listed under the “administrative legal and police” category as foreign ambassadorial and court personnel, police, servants, and porters.

²⁷ The latter figures represent an estimated 90 percent and 75 percent, respectively, of the total. They do not include incumbents in Chernihiv, Poltava and Katerynoslav provinces, vice-governors in Kiev Province, or marshals in Kharkiv Province for the years 1802 to 1828. See *Istoricheskie dannye ob obrazovanii gubernii oblastei gradonachal'stvo i drugikh chastei vnutrennego upravleniia imperii . . . po 1 noiabria 1902 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1902); and E. Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation Russlands von der Peter dem Grossen bis 1917* (Leiden, 1966), 397–401. Lists of the Kievan Governor-General’s chancery staff from 1796 to 1827 were unavailable to me.

²⁸ The secretaries and senior advisers to the governor and vice-governor; secretary for treasury affairs; secretary for criminal affairs; head and secretary of the Criminal Court; chief, secretary, auditor, and treasurer of the Treasury Department; chief and secretary of the Civil Court; procurator; secretary of the Health and Welfare Department; secretary to the Provincial Gentry Assembly. These totals exclude scribes, copyists and clerks.

²⁹ The secretaries to the governor and vice-governor, adviser to the vice-governor, secretary of the Provincial Administrative Bureau, zemstvo liaison officer, treasurer, auditor and their assistants.

Of 225 governors, 151 (67 percent) were Russian, 39 (17 percent) Baltic-German, and 29 (13 percent), "Little Russian."

Of 204 vice-governors, 119 (58 percent) were Russian, 29 (14 percent) were German, and 48 (24 percent), "Little Russian."

Of 137 gentry marshals, 51 (37 percent) were Russian, 5 (4 percent), German, and 41 (30 percent), "Little Russian."

The highest percentage of Ukrainian names in the three highest provincial offices was in Poltava province (40 percent) which also had the highest number of "Little Russian" marshals (70 percent). The fewest were in Volyn (8 percent). Russians in these three positions made up 50 percent or more of incumbents in all eight provinces. The highest number of Russians was in Kherson (74 percent) where they also dominated the post of marshal (79 percent). The most Baltic Germans were in Katerynoslav province (27 percent). Polish incumbents were limited to the three South-Western provinces and the highest number of Poles in these three positions were in Volyn (27 percent). The majority were marshals (19 of 26) and their number declined dramatically after 1831, when Poles were excluded from the posts of governor and vice-governor, and again after 1863, when they were forbidden to stand for marshal. Thirty percent of personnel in Chernihiv, Poltava and Kharkiv provinces, 13 percent in the Right-Bank provinces annexed from Poland, and 23 percent in the two steppe provinces had Ukrainian names. In all three regions Russians constituted 50 percent or more.

The "Little Russian" share of the three top provincial offices dropped from 50 percent in 1800, to 42 percent in 1828, to 21 percent in 1848 and to 13 percent in 1914. The percentage of Russians increased during these years as follows: 33, 25, 46, and 63. Twenty-five percent of the "Little Russian" incumbents, 53 percent of the Baltic German, and 47 percent of the Russian were governors.

In the 1828 sample of middle-level officials, 54 percent and 35 percent had Ukrainian and Russian surnames, respectively, with the former a majority in all but Kharkiv Province. In 1840 the figures were 47 percent and 39 percent, respectively, with Russians a majority in Podillia, Kherson, Kharkiv and Katerynoslav. In 1905, "Little Russians" declined to 36 percent and then rose in 1911 to 38 percent.

In absolute terms declared Russians clearly dominated the bureaucracy of the eight examined provinces. In the 1850s when Russians averaged 9 percent of the total population in the Ukrainian provinces—22 percent, 6 percent and .6 percent in New Russia, Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine, respectively—they were the majority of incumbents.³⁰ Similarly, the census of 1897 showed that the percentage of declared Russians holding posts in these eight provinces was grossly out of proportion to their share of the population. Germans constituted 2 percent and Russians 15 percent of the regional population—13 percent in Poltava, Kharkiv and Chernihiv provinces,

³⁰S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, "Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia Russkogo etnosa 1678–1917," *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, 1982, no. 4:9–25. In 1795 the respective figures were 19 percent, 5 percent and .1 percent. In the 1860s, 12.2 percent, 11.2 percent, and .1 percent of males in these regions were listed as Russian (A. Iakymenko, "Mihratsii selianstva iak faktor rozvytku mizhetnichnykh zviazkiv . . ." *Istoriychni doslidzhennia*, no. 16 [1990]: 30). See also M. Lebedkin, "O plemennom sostave narodnoselennia Zapadnago kraia Rossiiskago imperii," *Zapiski Russkago geograficheskago obshchestva*, 1861, no. 3:131–60.

4 percent in Volyn, Podillia and Kiev. Germans were 1 percent and Russians 34 percent of the urban population. Yet 47 percent of the nobles, 49 percent of the honorary citizens, and 29 percent of the merchants in the Ukrainian provinces were Russian. Declared Russians constituted 51 percent of the administrative, legal and police personnel (56 percent of urban and 35 percent of rural officials). Six-tenths of a percent of all Russians in our eight provinces were in this census category, and they represented 10 percent of all Russians in the empire in this category. In the 1890s, Russians and Baltic Germans together made up 88 percent of the governors, vice-governors and marshals in Ukraine.³¹

Seventy-five percent of the total population of the eight examined provinces in 1897 declared their native language Ukrainian, but only 40 percent of the administrative, legal and police personnel (49 percent of rural, 34 percent of urban officials) did so. That year two marshals and one vice-governor had Ukrainian names, and .08 percent of all who declared their native language Ukrainian were administrative legal and police personnel. Out of an imperial total of 18,359 in this category who gave their native language as Ukrainian, 12,728 (70 percent) held positions in the eight examined provinces. On the imperial level only 26 percent of “administrative legal and police personnel” were ranked officials. In provincial returns this category was not subdivided by native language.

Despite underrepresentation in absolute terms in the local bureaucracy, the number of Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russians” in 1897 corresponded favorably to the percentages of Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russians” in the groups most interested in and qualified for government jobs: 32 percent of urban dwellers, roughly 25 percent of nobles and 42 percent of honorary citizens. Also, 20 percent of males in all eight provinces with secondary or higher education, and 31 percent of those in Poltava, Chernihiv and Kharkiv provinces, declared Ukrainian their native language.³² That same year 36 percent of urban administrative legal and police personnel and 35 percent of urban males declared their native language Ukrainian, while 59 percent and 30 percent, respectively, declared themselves Russian. In Kharkiv, Poltava and Chernihiv provinces, Ukrainian speakers were the majority of administrative legal and police personnel and urban males—53 percent and 52 percent. Russians were 44 percent and 25 percent, respectively. Assuming that 26 percent of the 12,728 Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russian” administrative legal and police personnel were ranked officials, then on average, for every nine Ukrainian-speaking men with higher education, there was one ranking administrator (in absolute numbers 28,566 and 3,309, respectively). For Russians the ratio was twenty to one (81,286 and 4,134). This suggests that educated Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russians” tended to be less alienated from the tsarist state and more willing to take government jobs than their Russian counterparts.³³

Given negligence in the collection of data at county and district levels, officials

³¹ *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 goda* (St. Petersburg, 1897–1905), vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47; chart nos. 13, 22, 24; *Obshchyi svod po imperii 2*: chart no. 22.

³² *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, chart no. 15. Sixty-five percent of males and 38 percent of females literate in Russian gave Ukrainian as their native language.

³³ *Ibid.*, chart nos. 15, 21, 22.

who intimidated non-Russian underlings to declare their native language Russian, and the fact some non-Russians chose not to reveal their native language, the total number of Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russians” in the 1897 census must be regarded as a minimum.³⁴ Some idea of the reality may be gauged from figures indicating the province of birth of first-generation city dwellers. In the city of Kharkiv, for example, 25 percent of the total population gave their native language as Ukrainian, but 63 percent indicated a Ukrainian province as place of birth.³⁵ This suggests that almost two-thirds of those classified as Russians were probably “Little Russians” and that anywhere up to three-quarters of the city population, and presumably the provincial administration, could have been as well. In 1897, 81 percent of all first-generation urban dwellers in tsarist Ukraine were born in the same province as their city of residence.³⁶ Thus, a small minority of Russians dominated social life and predominated in higher offices by the second half of the nineteenth century. In middle-level government positions in the eight examined provinces between 1828 and 1911, however, probably many more than half were “Little Russians” and their decline in numbers at that level was less than it was at the highest levels.

GRAMOTNOST', POKROVITEL'STVO AND SLUZHBA

A preliminary sampling of officials in eight Ukrainian provinces indicates that “Little Russians” were a majority of incumbents holding the highest- and middle-level local positions during the first half of the nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century their share of the highest offices had shrunk dramatically, while at the middle level the decline was from roughly half to 40 percent. At the end of the century the number of Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russians” in middle-level offices in local urban administration did not seem excessively disproportional to the percentage of Ukrainian-speaking urban male dwellers and noblemen—the group most interested in government jobs. And as there were more “Little Russians” in reality than in the statistics, there must have been more in the imperial bureaucracy as well. Nevertheless, existing figures do pose the question of why there seemed to be so few “Little Russians” and declared Ukrainian-speakers in service in absolute terms and why there seemed to be such a high proportion of Russians. Was lack of education in literary versions of non-Russian vernaculars a reason? Did this limit the number of non-Russians that could complete schooling and enter the pool of job candidates?

From 1804 private schools in the empire had to teach in the literary Russian of the time. Legislation made formal allowance for “local languages” in parish schools, yet that same year another regulation prohibited schools from using the Ukrainian vernacular.³⁷ In 1824 the new minister of education expressed his wish to see all

³⁴ Two sets of figures on the same two groups taken in 1897–98 in Volyn Province differed from each other by 18,984 in one instance, and 60,000 in the other. See L. Lichkov, “K voprosu o reforme ofitsial'noi statistiki,” *Kievskaiia starina* (January 1902): 1–34; and S. O. Iefremov, “Vne zakona,” *Russkoe bogatstvo*, 1905, no. 1:81.

³⁵ M. V. Kurman and I. V. Lebedinskii, *Naselenie bol'shogo sotsialisticheskogo goroda* (Moscow, 1968), 122.

³⁶ *Obshchyi svod po imperii; prilozhenie*, chart. no. 6.

³⁷ A. V. Ososkov, *Nachal'noe obrazovanie v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii (1861–1917)* (Moscow, 1982), 28; F. Walker, “Patriotic Rhetoric, Public Education and Language of Choice in the Russia of Tsar Alexander I,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, no. 2 (1985): 262.

education in Russian, and in 1835, Nicholas I agreed with a proposal by Uvarov that again formally interdicted vernacular Ukrainian from schools.³⁸ In 1864 the allowance for local language was deleted from the statute on primary education.³⁹

It is sometimes argued that since teaching had to be in literary Russian the monolingual Ukrainian-speaking peasant could not take advantage of the possibilities that education provided. There were few "Little Russians" in service after the 1860s, it would follow, because there were few who were literate and eligible. In practice, however, the Ukrainian vernacular had to be, and was, used because otherwise pupils would not have understood anything—thus some learning did occur.⁴⁰ Second, "Little Russian" noblemen and townsmen, the major social groups who did enter higher education and service, had long been educated in a second language anyway. Before and after 1800, the written literary and spoken languages in Ukrainian lands were different. The former, a russified imperial version of "Slaveno-Russian," had been the language of instruction at the Kiev Mohyla Academy from 1765, and children of the elite who had wanted to go to college had learned it at home even earlier.⁴¹ Accordingly, the administrative personnel of the Hetmanate had to be and were bilingual.⁴² In 1800, twenty years after the Hetmanate was abolished, natives constituted 50–55 percent of the top five ranks in service on the territory of the former Hetmanate and New Russia.⁴³ In the early 1800s, 56 percent of personnel in the lower and middle levels of the entire imperial bureaucracy were commoners.⁴⁴ As there is no reason to assume the figure was less in "Little Russia," it would follow that local commoners who wanted government jobs also learned imperial Slaveno-Russian and then got them. By midcentury the expanding imperial bureaucracy had three thousand vacancies annually, and to meet the demand restrictions were eased in 1855 to admit non-noble sons of lower officials to universities.⁴⁵ More commoners entered education and administration after Emancipation and the law of 1871 that guaranteed access to classrooms for all. Despite restrictions in the 1880s, the percentage of nobles in middle and lower service ranks declined while the numbers of commoners rose.⁴⁶

Third, research based primarily on Russian provinces indicates that, despite the use of literary Russian in schools and educational democratization during the end of

³⁸ W. H. Johnson, *Russia's Educational Heritage* (New York, 1969), 89; M. Hrytsenko, *Narysyz z istorii shkoly v Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1966), 13.

³⁹ Walker, "Patriotic Rhetoric," 268; S. Siropolko, *Istoriia osvity na Ukrainy* (Lviv, 1937), 107.

⁴⁰ S. Efremov, *Za rik 1912-yi* (1913; reprint ed., Kiev, 1993), 34–35.

⁴¹ B. Struminsky, "The Language Question in the Ukrainian Lands before the Nineteenth Century," in *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, vol. 2, ed. R. Picchio and H. Goldblatt (New Haven, 1984), 9–47; P. Pliushch, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi literaturnoi movy* (Kiev, 1971), 251–53; D. Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985), 41.

⁴² L. Okinshevych, *Znachne viiskove tovarystvo v Ukraini-Hetmanshchyni XVII–XVIII st.* (Munich, 1948), 76.

⁴³ I. Smolensky, "Biurokratychna verkhivka na Ukraini naprykintsi XVIII i na pochatku XIX st.," *Ukraina* (July–August 1930): 70–80.

⁴⁴ M. W. Pintner, "The Evolution of Civil Officialdom, 1755–1855," in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, ed. W. M. McKenzie Pintner and D. K. Rowney (Chapel Hill, 1980), 197.

⁴⁵ P. L. Alston, *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia* (Stanford, 1969), 44–45.

⁴⁶ A. I. Piskunov, ed., *Ocherki istorii shkoly i pedagogicheskoi mysli narodov SSSR*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1976), 546–60.

the century, “the degree of educational mobility remained very slight indeed in the countryside, for the actual number of peasant youth in secondary schools remained but an insignificant fraction of the rural population.”⁴⁷ The reason had less to do with the language of instruction than with peasant parents who wanted some education and minimal literacy for their children, but not too much of either, for fear they would leave the village, making life harder for those who remained. Since everyone in a given vicinity knew the vernacular anyway, there was little practical need to learn the literary standard taught in school. Literary Russian, moreover, was as different from the Russian peasant vernacular as it was from the Ukrainian until the end of the nineteenth century. Only in the wake of the economic boom of the 1890s did peasant families begin to see practical uses for schooling and start to ensure that their children attended classes and learned the literary standard.⁴⁸ In short, up to the early 1900s peasants were not much interested in literacy or social mobility, and the language of instruction mattered little to them or their fate. Until the turn of the century family considerations in a context of economic underdevelopment made formal instruction practically useless, even if free, and kept peasants in the village and out of the pool of government-job candidates. It should not be assumed that, before the 1890s, teaching in literary Russian was a greater impediment to mobility for Ukrainian than Russian peasants.

If absence of education in a literary version of their vernacular was not in itself an insurmountable barrier to social mobility for “Little Russians,” were there perhaps other barriers, besides conscious refusal to serve, that might explain why they accounted for only half of incumbents in office in their native provinces before the 1850s and fewer afterwards? Why, at the end of the century, were they particularly underrepresented at the highest levels? The process of appointment and promotion provides some insight into the problem.

Patronage, rather than competence, was the crucial criterion of advancement in the tsarist system. A law of 1809 made examinations necessary for promotion beyond the eighth rank—and noble status—in the civil service, but even after the 1830s, when the gentry grudgingly resigned themselves to the need for some schooling as the price of a government job, commoner access to higher positions did not become systematic and education never displaced the vital support that family and patrons provided for appointments. In 1856 all previous educational as well as social criteria of selection were actually annulled.⁴⁹ Thus, in the provinces men with higher education were rare, and someone like D. Bibikov, who could not write in any language except bad Russian, could become governor-general of South-Western Russia.⁵⁰ Even though proportionately fewer nobles served in the 1900s than in the mid-nineteenth century, the nobility monopolized higher service positions, particularly

⁴⁷ Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools*, 469.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 267, 282. In France it was only in the 1880s that peasant families began to see practical uses of schooling in French for their children and began to ensure they attended. See E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, 1976), 328.

⁴⁹ Alston, *Education and the State*, 26–27; E. Karnovich, *Russkie chinovniki* (St. Petersburg, 1897), 91.

⁵⁰ W. Pintner, “Civil Officialdom and the Nobility in the 1850s,” in *Russian Officialdom*, 245–47; Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat*, 146.

in the provinces, thereby keeping the educated expert subordinated to the privileged and landed right up to 1917.⁵¹

The tsarist administration was not bureaucratic in Weber's sense. It was an erratic system, pervaded by hierarchies of family and patronage networks, through which daily administration had to proceed. In order to get necessary work done, officials had to disrupt the rules they were supposed to uphold. A Ukrainian who in 1913 took up a post in the provincial capital Chernihiv, near Kiev, wrote that when he arrived he was devastated by the profoundly patriarchal character of the city.⁵² Policy was implemented slowly and with difficulty in the provinces, where instructions would lie in offices up to ten years, and where records would "disappear" in the face of persistent inquiry or inspections.⁵³ The tsars frequently violated their own decrees, while reformers either ignored laws, or issued new orders annulling old ones, thereby upsetting any regularity formed in practice. Coordination was minimal, rivalry rife. Whereas the Ministry of Finance sponsored policies intended to generate revenues, the Ministry of the Interior obstructed anything that could threaten order. Governors could not issue orders to gentry assemblies, and until the 1880s they were not obliged to inform the local police about their secrets or lists of potential subversives; nor were the police obliged to reveal their information to governors.⁵⁴ To implement decisions the government could either work through the established hierarchies, respecting their ways, or try to break them. Periodic purges, done in the name of efficiency and under guise of legal bureaucratic procedure, did put new men in offices, but the informal family-patronage system remained because replacing local with central appointees merely substituted one patron-family group for another. Strong newcomers could usurp the places of established leaders, but this did not create a system that could operate by a set of formal regulations—merely a new hierarchy with a new leader.⁵⁵

Informal networks influenced appointments thanks to decentralized departmental control over entry. Between 1803 and 1846, every three years, anyone wanting to enter service could register in their province and specify their desired place of work. Lists of the selected would then be forwarded to the Heraldry Office, and candidates would be presented to the Senate as openings occurred.⁵⁶ Formally, until midcentury, the Senate filled lower posts on recommendation of ministers. In reality, acceptance to most provincial positions depended on local chiefs, particularly gentry marshals, and there were no stipulations about formal qualifications for promotion

⁵¹ D. K. Rowney, *Transition to Technocracy* (Ithaca, 1989), 186–93.

⁵² M. Halahan, *Z moikh spomyniv*, pt. 1 (Lviv, 1930), 196. Like most activist intellectuals who took bold stands, Halahan had little respect for people who joined organizations to obtain status and income rather than to make political statements.

⁵³ I. A. Blinov, *Otnosheniia Senata k mestnym uchrezhdeniiam v XIX veke* (St. Petersburg, 1911), 77, 92, 202.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 58; P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Krizis samoderzhavii na rubezhe 1870–1880kh godov* (Moscow, 1964), 176.

⁵⁵ G. Yaney, "Law, Society and the Domestic Regime in Russia," *American Political Science Review* (June 1965): 387. See also D. Ransel, "Bureaucracy and Patronage: The View from an Eighteenth-Century Russian Letter Writer," in *The Rich, The Wellborn, the Powerful*, ed. F. C. Jaker (Secaucus, 1975), 161–77.

⁵⁶ Blinov, *Otnosheniia Senata*, 22–23.

to the eighth rank, which also was decided at provincial level. The tsar appointed governors and heads of provincial departments, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs appointed vice-governors. There were no appointment boards, and the average tenure of governors and vice-governors was five to six years, and twelve years for gentry marshals.⁵⁷ In our sample of 566 incumbents, only 67 (12 percent) had more than one term in office, while only three had more than three terms, and these in different provinces. In such circumstances, local postings, particularly lower ones, must be studied in relation to the high turnover in the three highest provincial positions as well as to the favoritism, nepotism and chance that permeated the entire administration. Accordingly, fluctuations in the number of “Little Russians” in local administration can be ascribed more to protection and family-patron systems than to lack of education in the vernacular.

Soviet historians claimed that the regime consciously excluded “Little Russians” from office in the examined provinces, but they provided no evidence.⁵⁸ In 1795, Petersburg questioned the legality of Ukrainian Cossack titles and eligibility of officers for *dvorianstvo* status. The final decision, made in 1835, granted noble status to all but two or three thousand in the lowest Cossack officer rank. It is unlikely that these men were excluded intentionally to weaken established hierarchies.⁵⁹ N. Repnin, governor-general of Little Russia in the early 1800s, may have attempted to break local hierarchies in Cossack Ukraine. In 1816 he complained to the tsar that its administration was controlled by family networks that had to be broken in the interests of efficiency. Within a year he admitted his efforts had failed but said he would persevere.⁶⁰ In fact, Repnin ended up representing regional interests to Petersburg and thereby gave his rivals a good pretext to have him dismissed. Whether other governors and governors-general attempted to break “Little Russian” patron-client networks systematically is unknown, but such efforts would provide an explanation for the dramatic decline in “Little Russians” among the top three positions in the Ukrainian provinces.

As far as we know, the “Little Russian” *dvorianstvo* was loyal and was perceived as such, particularly after 1835. Nationality may have become an issue in personnel selection under Nicholas I, who reinforced central supervision of appointments. Presumably as part of his reaction to the Revolutions of 1830, the Polish Revolt, and then the Petrashevsky and Cyril and Methodius Society affairs, the tsar gave the First Section of the Imperial Chancery control over all civil appointments in 1836, and in 1846 added to it an Inspectorate Department that oversaw this function until 1858, when the previous system was reinstated.⁶¹ Moreover, “official nationality” policy

⁵⁷ Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat*, 60; D. Lieven, “Russian Senior Officialdom under Nicholas II: Careers and Mentalities,” *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* 32 (1984): 203–4; Robbins, *Tsar's Viceroys*, 94–95; Mosse, “Russian Provincial Governors,” 234, notes that lack of criteria led to bad choices and many complaints about governors.

⁵⁸ B. M. Babyi et al., *Istoriia gosudarstva i prava Ukrainkoi SSR*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Kiev, 1987), 192.

⁵⁹ Z. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy* (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 249–57. The last available listing of this rank made in 1763 included 722 men (Okinshevych, *Znachne viiskove tovarystvo*, 94).

⁶⁰ N. M., “Iz semeinikh arkhivov,” *Kievskaiia starina*, 1893, no. 7:97–99.

⁶¹ N. V. Stroeve, *Stoletie sobstvennoi e. i. v. kantseliarii* (St. Petersburg, 1912), 182–84; *Polnoe sobranie*

was introduced during these decades and there was a Russian nationalist backlash in reaction to the Polish revolt of 1863 that identified the Ukrainian national movement with Polish separatism and radical socialism. Officials influenced by Russian nationalists consequently may have been more suspicious of “Little Russian” as well as Ukrainian candidates for government jobs, scrutinized their applications more closely and purposely sent an unknown number to other provinces.⁶²

The issue of “ethnic discrimination” has not been studied, however, and to date I have found only two examples where it applies. First, the Synod from midcentury appointed Russians to posts in central and Right-Bank Ukraine, and either restricted access of “Little Russians” and Ukrainians to higher positions there, or posted them to Russian provinces.⁶³ Second, in 1875 a commission established to draw up a list of measures against the Ukrainian national movement recommended that it “would be useful as a general rule” if the Ministry of Education appointed predominantly Russians as teachers to all eight Ukrainian provinces, and “Little Russians” [sic] to Russian provinces.⁶⁴ The Ministry of Education also required those who studied at state expense at Dorpat University to serve subsequently for ten years wherever they were sent. It is unknown whether this was also the case with graduates from universities in Ukrainian lands.

The government did take ruthless measures against the Polish nobility in Volyn, Podillia, and Kiev provinces after the 1831 revolt. By 1853, 340,547 of 410,547 gentry were reduced to the peasantry, while in 1852 Polish nobles in these three provinces were forced to serve in “Great Russian” provinces.⁶⁵ Secret decrees of 1835 and 1856 stipulated that local officials west of the Dnieper had to be “Russian”—which included “Little Russians”—and that natives from those three provinces had to have served ten years in the army and then in a Russian province before being eligible for posting in their home provinces.⁶⁶ In 1850 higher officials were empowered to remove subordinates at will without explanation, while the Senate was forbidden to accept complaints about dismissals.⁶⁷ After the 1863 revolt the tsar took over from the minister of the interior appointment of gentry marshals in the nine western provinces (present-day Belarus, Lithuania and Right-Bank Ukraine).⁶⁸ In 1832, 1839 and 1869, “Russian” administrators in this region were allotted extra pay and benefits as en-

zakonov rossiiskoi imperii (PSZ), series 2, vol. 21 (St. Petersburg, 1833), no. 20401. In 1895 appointments to the upper seven ranks were placed again under chancery control. Ministries and provincial officials still controlled the lower seven ranks (*PSZ*, series 3, vol. 25, no. 11919).

⁶² In Chernihiv Province during the sixties one official sympathetic to the movement allowed activist employees to disseminate their ideas during field trips. See N. A. Ship, *Intelligentsiia na Ukraine* (Kiev, 1991), 144.

⁶³ Lototsky, *Storinky* 1:207–9. Graduates of seminaries from Russia could go only to Tomsk, Warsaw or Dorpat universities. See D. Doroshenko, *Moi Spomyny pro davne mynule 1901–1914* (Winnipeg, 1949), 9.

⁶⁴ Savchenko, *Zaborona Ukrainstva*, 382–83.

⁶⁵ D. Beauvois, *Polacy na Ukraine 1831–1863* (Paris, 1987), 139, 270. The 1852 decision reversed an 1841 ruling that forbade remaining nobles from entering service (*ibid.*, 132).

⁶⁶ Seredonin, *Istoričeskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta Ministrov* 3:161–64.

⁶⁷ A. V. Nikitenko, *Dnevnik*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1955), 38. The decree is not listed in the published laws. See *Istoriia pravitel'stviushchago senata za dvesti let*, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1911), 562.

⁶⁸ A. P. Korelin, *Dvorianstvo poreformnoi Rossii 1861–1904 gg.* (Moscow, 1979), 220–25.

couragement to service.⁶⁹ In 1886 the western provinces appear again, alongside the Caucasian and eastern Siberian, as hardship posts with higher pay and benefits. Local-born men who served there did not qualify for the extra pay unless they had worked outside the territory the preceding ten years or had higher education.⁷⁰

Our sample statistics indicate that the number of outsiders holding office in Ukrainian provinces increased after the 1840s and we have suggested that absence of education in the literary Ukrainian was an unlikely reason for this. The tradition of bilingualism among the literate and educated, and the fact that the percentages of “Little Russian” administrators corresponded relatively closely to the percentage of urban dwellers and noblemen with Ukrainian surnames or who declared their native language Ukrainian, suggests that nationality was not a factor in appointments. Evidence to the contrary is slim, while the official “ethnic favoritism” that existed in Right-Bank Ukraine was not directed against “Little Russians.”

Three things probably determined the national composition of the bureaucracy in the Ukrainian provinces. One was the centrally directed “purge” motivated by considerations of control and bureaucratic efficiency. The second was the high turnover of governors, vice-governors and gentry marshals, which brought in its wake new men throughout the hierarchy. New appointees belonging to outside family patronage systems inevitably extended them into their new appanages, appointing favorites and clients to vacant posts. If the majority of local officials before the 1840s had used established procedure and networks to place local men, by the 1860s newly arrived Russians and Germans were using the same mechanism to place nonlocal men. Finally, the sizable share of posts held by outsiders might also have resulted from a shortage of local men. In 1897 there were 5,631 Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russians” serving outside the eight examined provinces, and 16,129 Baltic Germans and Russians serving in those provinces as “administrative legal and police personnel.” If someone had miraculously replaced all of the latter with the former, then Ukrainian lands would have ended up with 10,498 unfilled positions.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the number of “Little Russians” in local middle-level positions increased slightly. If it had been policy to exclude “Little Russians” from office in the Ukrainian provinces earlier, perhaps abolition of the Inspectorate Department and laxer screening of candidates might have explained the increase. Alternatively, perhaps modernization and urbanization led to more “Little Russian” commoners finishing school and entering the pool of government job applicants. Since the shortage of qualified persons in the undergoverned but expanding tsarist bureaucracy was so acute, perhaps even after patrons had placed all their clients, positions for unsponsored “Little Russians” to occupy still remained.⁷¹

CONCLUSION

The findings of this paper have implications for our understanding of the Ukrainian national movement as well as the administration of Russia’s borderlands. With re-

⁶⁹ PSZ, series 2, vol. 7 (1833), nos. 5293, 5473, 5495, vol. 39 (1864), no. 40656, vol. 44 (1873), no. 47700; Beauvois, *Polacy*, 156–57.

⁷⁰ PSZ, series 3, vol. 6 (1888), no. 3817. O. Ohienko, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi kul'tury* (Kiev, 1918), 212, incorrectly claimed that these laws gave extra pay only to Russians in the ten western provinces and had been directed against “Ukraine.”

⁷¹ Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government*, 44–49.

spect to the former, the likelihood that roughly half, if not more, of middle-level administrators in Ukrainian provinces were “Little Russians” throughout the nineteenth century suggests the absence of an important element in the formation of a nationalist intelligentsia—collective resentment of the educated, born of perceived exclusion from posts because of national identity. There is little evidence to suggest that the government systematically excluded “Little Russians” or nationally conscious Ukrainians from office in their provinces, and the sharp fall in the number of “Little Russian” governors, vice-governors and gentry marshals during the century is most likely related to the workings of the patronage system. In the Ukrainian provinces a considerable number of Russians and Baltic Germans held office, particularly as governors and vice-governors. Ostensibly the number of “Little Russian” officials in the eight Ukrainian provinces was small. But in 1897 their proportion relative to the percentage of Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russian” educated urban males and noblemen was sizable. The tsarist government never adopted proposals for devolution and deconcentration of power, and there was no corresponding nativization in non-Russian regions.⁷² Nonetheless, the total number of “Little Russians” serving in their native provinces seems to rise at the turn of the century. Not all Ukrainian-speaking “Little Russians” were nationally conscious, but this should not exclude them, nor Russian-speaking “Little Russians,” nor local Russians in the local administration, from being studied as agents of regional interest. Even the embezzling, collusion, pilfering, bribe-taking and underreporting done by these men can be examined as alternative means of “interest articulation” that softened and/or frustrated the demands of the center. Public quiescence does not mean there was no clandestine manipulation or defiance.

Although the empire was supposed to be composed of uniform units subordinated to the Ministry of Interior, there were significant differences between provinces. One stemmed from the lack of a consistent personnel selection policy as well as a single borderland administrative policy. During the same decades that Petersburg was excluding Polish gentry from office in South-Western Russia, it was appointing native Caucasians in the turbulent southeast, with the hope this would facilitate the region’s integration into the empire and cost less than importing Russians.⁷³ In Central Asia, Petersburg preferred that natives staff as many local positions as possible since it lacked the funds and personnel to assume the responsibilities of administration there. The preserved native institutions were more corrupt and inefficient than their Russian counterparts. But whether the traditionalist incumbents ended up serving the long-term interests of their peoples better or worse than a semi-assimilated, western-educated native administrative elite might have is open to debate.⁷⁴

⁷² Ibid., 51–291; M. Raëff, ed., *Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia* (Princeton, 1966), 30–31, 104, 112–13, 116, 135. British policy, by contrast, sponsored nativization of administration in Ireland and India. See J. Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation-State* (London, 1987), 262; and B. B. Misra, *The Administrative History of India* (Oxford, 1970), 227.

⁷³ Rhinelander, *Prince Michael Vorontsov*, 170. Vorontsov, influenced by his knowledge of English imperial administration, convinced Nicholas to do this in 1846.

⁷⁴ R. A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917* (Berkeley, 1960), 64–91; S. Becker, “Russia’s Central Asian Empire, 1885–1917,” in *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*, ed. M. Rywkin (New York, 1988), 235–55.

APPENDIX 1

Governors, Vice-Governors and Gentry Marshals, 1794 to 1914

Provinces	KIEV	VOL	POD	CHER	POL	KHAR	KAT	KHER	TOTAL	%
Governors										
Total	25	43	38	18	21	31	23	26	225	
Ukrainian	4	5	3	3	3	3	2	6	29	13
Polish	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	3
Baltic-German	3	7	9	1	1	7	10	1	39	17
Russian	18	27	24	14	17	21	11	19	151	67
Vice-governors										
Total	22	29	24	25	24	31	23	26	204	
Ukrainian	7	3	4	6	8	7	7	6	48	24
Polish	0	3	5	0	0	0	0	0	8	4
Baltic German	4	7	3	2	4	3	5	1	29	14
Russian	11	16	12	17	12	21	11	19	119	58
Gentry Marshals										
Total	14	26	21	13	23	13	13	14	137	
Ukrainian	2	0	2	9	16	4	5	3	41	30
Polish	9	19	12	0	0	0	0	0	40	29
Baltic German	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	5	4
Russian	3	7	6	4	5	8	7	11	51	37
Total										
Total	61	98	83	56	68	75	59	66	566	
Ukrainian	13	8	9	18	27	14	14	15	118	21
Polish	9	26	19	0	0	0	0	0	54	9
Baltic German	7	14	13	3	7	11	16	2	73	13
Russian	32	50	42	35	34	50	29	49	321	57
Percentage:										
Ukrainian	21	8	11	32	40	19	24	23		
Polish	15	27	23	0	0	0	0	0		
Baltic German	12	14	15	5	10	15	27	3		
Russian	52	51	51	63	50	66	49	74		

Key to Provinces: KIEV = Kiev; VOL = Volyn; POD = Podillia; CHER = Chernihiv; POL = Poltava; KHAR = Kharkiv; KAT = Katerynoslav; KHER = Kherson.

Source: See footnotes 25, 27.

APPENDIX 2

"Little-Russian" Governors, Vice-Governors and Gentry Marshals, 1794 to 1914

Abaza, A. S.	Gov—KHER
Afondik, I. K.	VG—VOL
Andreevskii, N. E.	VG—KHAR
Bantysh, F. A.	Gov—KHER
Baranovich, N. I.	VG—KAT
Belukha-Kokhanovskii, D. P.	GM—POL
Bezkorovainy, I. V.	VG—KHAR
Bogdanovich, A. V.	VG—POL
Bogdanovich, E. A.	VG—KHER
Borozdna, M. P.	GM—CHER
Brazol, S. E.	GM—POL
Charnysh	GM—POL
Charnysh	GM—POL
Charnysh	GM—POL
Cherba, P. F.	GM—KHER
Danilevskii	GM—POL
Daragan, M. P.	Gov—CHER
Dashkovich	VG—KHER
Donets-Zakharzhevskii, D. A.	Gov—KAT
Dunin-Borkovskii, Io. Ia.	VG—KAT
Dunin-Borkovskii	GM—CHER
Dunin-Borkovskii, Io.	Gov—VOL
Dunin-Borkovskii, V. D.	Gov—KAT
Gladky	Gov—KHER
Gribovskii, M. K.	Gov—KHAR
Gudim-Levkovich, S. N.	Gov—KIEV
Gudim-Levkovich, S. N.	Gov—POD
Gudim-Levkovich, S. N.	Gov—KIEV

APPENDIX 2 (continued)

Iankovskii, E. O.		Gov—POL
Iankovskii, E. O.		Gov—VOL
Iurkevich, K. N.		VG—KAT
Iurkevich, N. I.		VG—POL
Iuzefovich, A. E.		Gov—POD
Iuzefovich, A. E.		VG—POD
Kanivalskii, M. D.		GM—KHER
Kapnist, I. V.		GM—POL
Kapnist		GM—POL
Kapnist, V. A.		GM—KHAR
Karnovich, D. G.		VG—KHER
Katerinich, M. K.		VG—POL
Katerinich, M. K.		Gov—KHAR
Katerinich, V. S.		Gov—KIEV
Katerinich, V. S.		VG—KIEV
Kochubei, G. M.		GM—POL
Kochubei, L. V.		GM—POL
Kochubei		VG—KIEV
Kochubei, M. V.		GM—POD
Koropchevskii	(Malorus)	VG—CHER
Kovalevskii, M. M.		GM—KHAR
Kovalevskii, M. S.		GM—CHER
Kovalevskii, N. E.		GM—KHAR
Kovanko, S. N.		GM—POL
Kozlovskii, V.		GM—KIEV
Kozachkovskii, A. F.		Gov—POL
Ladomirskii, V. N.		GM—CHER
Lesevich, Io. F.		VG—POL
Levenets		GM—POL
Lutskii, V. K.		VG—KAT
Malashevich, N. S.		VG—POD
Mamchich, E. A.		VG—KAT
Mandrika, A. Ia.		VG—POL
Miklashevskii, M. P.		Gov—VOL
Miklashevskii	(Malorus)	Gov—POL
Miklashevskii, A. M.		GM—KAT
Miklashevskii, M. I.		GM—KAT
Milodarovich, G. A.		GM—CHER
Milodarovich, L. A.		GM—KAT
Milodarovich, L. A.		Gov—POD
Milodarovich, L. A.		VG—KIEV
Morkovich		GM—CHER
Nechai, V. S.		VG—POD
Nechai, V.		VG—VOL
Neverovskii	(Novorus)	VG—KAT
Olenich-Gnenenko, K. A.		Gov—KHER
Olenich-Gnenenko		GM—KHER
Pasenko		VG—POL
Pasenko		VG—KIEV
Pashchenko, K. I.		VG—KHER
Pashkovskii, E. A.		VG—CHER
Pashkovskii, E. A.		VG—VOL
Paskevich, S. F.		VG—KHAR
Poddgorichani-Petrovich, Iu. N.		Gov—VOL
Politkovskii, N. R.		VG—CHER
Posudevskii		GM—CHER
Rachinskii, A. K.		GM—CHER
Rakovich, I. V.		GM—POD
Roslavets, V. I.		Gov—KHER
Roslavets, V. I.		Gov—KHER
Runovskii	(Malorus)	VG—CHER
Runovskii		VG—KIEV
Safonovich, I. F.		VG—POD
Savvich, P. S.		Gov—KIEV
Seletskii	(Novorus)	VG—KHAR
Seletskii, M. V.		VG—POL
Seletskii, P. D.		GM—KIEV
Seletskii, P. D.		VG—KIEV
Shabelskii, K. P.		GM—KAT
Shabelskii, K. P.		GM—KAT
Shabelskii, K.		Gov—CHER

APPENDIX 2 (continued)

Shidlovskii	(SlobUkr)	VG—KHAR
Shidlovskii, A. R.		GM—KHAR
Shirai, S. M.		GM—CHER
Shostak, A. L.		Gov—CHER
Shulzhenko		VG—KHER
Skoropadskii, I. M.		GM—POL
Sosnovskii, V. O.		VG—KHAR
Sosnovskii, V. O.		VG—POL
Staritskii, A. I.		VG—KAT
Sudienko, Io. M.		VG—CHER
Timonovich		VG—KHER
Tomara, L. P.		Gov—VOL
Tomara, L. V.		Gov—KIEV
Tomara, L. V.		VG—KHAR
Troshchinskii		GM—POL
Ustimovich, A. P.		Gov—KHAR
Ustimovich		GM—POL
Zolotnitskii		VG—CHER

Key to Provinces: KIEV = Kiev; VOL = Volyn; POD = Podillia; CHER = Chernihiv; POL = Poltava; KHAR = Kharkiv; KAT = Katerynoslav; KHER = Kherson.

Source: See footnotes 25, 27.

APPENDIX 3

Administrative Legal Personnel and Police by Nationality, 1897

Provinces	KIEV	VOL	POD	CHER	POL	KHAR	KAT	KHER	TOTAL	%
Ukrainian										
Total	2568	1002	1537	1613	2197	1723	822	1246	12,728	40
urban	1552	476	812	1115	1798	1263	490	844	7,860	
% urban	61	47	53	69	82	73	60	68	66	
rural	1016	546	725	498	399	460	332	402	4,046	
Polish										
Total	173	346	205	105	62	109	96	455	1,551	5
urban	92	187	110	81	57	22	73	419	1,041	
rural	81	159	95	24	5	87	23	36	510	
German										
Total	34	22	6	9	12	33	21	92	229	1
urban	19	8	4	4	8	25	9	67	144	
rural	15	14	2	5	4	8	12	25	85	
Russian										
Total	2601	2106	1669	1421	779	1965	1459	3900	15,900	51
urban	2176	1483	1092	1052	685	1708	1086	3722	13,004	
% urban	84	70	65	74	88	87	74	94	82	
rural	425	623	577	369	94	257	373	228	2,896	
Subtotal:	5376	3496	3417	3148	3050	3830	2398	5693	30,408	
Others:									1,024	3
TOTAL:									31,432	

Key to Provinces: KIEV = Kiev; VOL = Volyn; POD = Podillia; CHER = Chernihiv; POL = Poltava; KHAR = Kharkiv; KAT = Katerynoslav; KHER = Kherson.

Source: *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, charts xxi, xxii. Figures include men and women.