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Taras Kuzio ^a

^a Honorary Research Fellow with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies ,
University of London ,

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The Crimea and European Security

TARAS KUZIO

Crimea is central to European security. Of the large variety of outstanding issues between Russia and Ukraine that have contributed to a Cold War between them no other factor is more likely to lead to a full-blown conflict than the Crimea and its strategic ports, such as Sevastopol. If a conflict over the Crimea were to drag in Russia and Ukraine it would destabilise Central and Eastern Europe, alarm three of the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) and Turkey (a member of NATO) and damage Ukraine's commitment to denuclearisation. It would also lead to the growth of domestic support in Russia and Ukraine of nationalist groups and thereby damage their reform programmes contributing to further centrifugal tendencies in both Russia and Ukraine.

Finally, such a conflict between two nuclear powers would force the West to take sides between Ukraine and Russia – something it has been unwilling to do since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union (FSU). In view of the West's support for Ukrainian territorial integrity since the signing of the Trilateral Agreement in January 1994 the West is more than likely to support Ukraine if such a conflict were to unfold. Consequently, such a conflict would also severely damage US-Russian relations.

The Crimea has many similarities to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the former Yugoslavia. These include a similar ethnic make-up divided between three groups (Russians, Ukrainians and Tatars) and a large Ukrainian and Russian military presence. But the Crimea also possesses some notable differences as well. Russian-Ukrainian relations are strained – but do not suffer from the same degree of historical hatred as the Serbian-Croatian relationship. A deep level of historical animosity does exist between the Russians and Tatars, as most visibly demonstrated by their support for President Dzhokar Dudayev of Chechnya in his confrontation with Russian-backed opposition forces.¹ President Yury Meshkov refused to attend commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the Tatar deportation saying sarcastically that, 'These people probably feel the same degree of shame as those Tatars who joined the Nazi battalions and took part in the slaughter of innocent people during the war.'² But Tatars only account for approximately 10 per cent of the

population and therefore do not constitute a visible or serious threat to the dominant Russian majority.

Second, the current Russian leadership (in contrast to the Serbian) is not pursuing a 'Greater Russia' by military means.³ Of course, this could change after 1996 if Boris Yeltsin is replaced by a new nationalistic president who would then be likely to follow the same policies as Serbia's Slobodan Milosovic. The current Ukrainian leadership (in contrast to former leaders of the Trans-Caucasian republics) is also only likely to use force against the Crimea as a last resort.⁴

This essay will not cover in a chronological manner the triangular dispute between Russia-Crimea-Ukraine since the late 1980s because this has been covered in sufficient detail elsewhere.⁵ Instead, it will discuss Ukrainian and Russian policy towards the Crimea and whether they have contributed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This study will argue that Russian policies have served to exacerbate the Crimean and Black Sea Fleet problems. The election of President Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine in July 1994 has improved relations with Russia and the Crimea but there are few indications that Ukrainian foreign and defence policies will fundamentally alter, particularly over threats towards its territorial integrity.

The article will also discuss Western policy towards Ukraine and Russia. Has it been helpful towards promoting European security in the FSU? Or, as this author argues, has merely appeased Russia by turning a blind eye to its empire building? The West, by supporting Russian demands to play the role of gendarme in the FSU and through its intervention in ethnic conflicts, heightened Ukrainian insecurity and made the likelihood of a conflict over the Crimea more, not less, likely. It is argued here that the West has relegated the entire FSU within the Russian sphere of influence with the exception of the three Baltic states, as most visibly demonstrated by the Western debate regarding Russia's opposition over Central European admittance into NATO (yet, Russia does not border Central Europe except in the small Kaliningrad enclave). Therefore, it is only possession of nuclear weapons and their use as a bargaining chip that have ensured Ukraine is treated by the West more akin to the Baltic states than Moldova.

The impact of the Crimean question and strained Ukrainian-Russian relations upon Central Europe and the Black Sea region will be discussed. Ukraine's relations with Poland and Turkey are key components ensuring stability and security in Central-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region. Any threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity in the Crimea or a deterioration in Ukrainian-Russian relations would sharpen

Polish and Turkish security fears with demands for the immediate entry of the former into NATO.

THE IMPACT OF HISTORY

History greatly influences the triangle of conflict between Russia-Crimea-Ukraine. Tartar-Russian relations are still strained by the Treaty of Kalinarjii of 1775 which transferred sovereignty over the Crimea from the Ottoman Turks to the Russian empire. Ukrainian and Tartar historians dispute Russian nationalist claims that the Crimea has been 'Russian land from time immemorial', pointing to Kievan Rus', Zaporozhian Cossack, Tartar and Ottoman influence prior to 1775. Turkey and Russia fought 13 wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁶ Central-Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea were never separate entities in the Russian empire but merely divided between 11 *gubernias*.

This legacy continues to influence contemporary Turkish-Russian relations; the Turkish chief of staff in June 1994 commented that, 'Russia has become a serious danger . . . Today, there is a Russia which behaves with a Tsarist motivation.'⁷ Turkish and Ukrainian apprehensions about Russian neo-imperialism has made them into strategic allies (see later).

The current dispute over the Black Sea Fleet has its own historical analogy after the disintegration of the Tsarist Russian empire in 1917. On 13 March 1918 the Ukrainian Hetmanate government adopted a law placing the Black Sea Fleet under Kiev's control. Over a month later the Fleet raised the Ukrainian flag. The bulk of the Fleet though was later scuppered by the Bolsheviks rather than let it fall into Ukrainian hands.

Between 1921 and 1954 the Crimea was included as a an autonomous republic within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The Tartars never constituted a majority of the Crimean population even during this period; they were finally all deported in May 1944 on charges of 'collaboration' with the Nazis. The Tatars began to return to the Crimea in the late Gorbachev era and blamed the Soviet-Russian authorities for the attempt at erasing their ethnic group through deportations and imprisonment.

In 1954 to celebrate the '300th anniversary of the reunification of Russia and Ukraine' then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, himself a Russian from Ukraine, arranged the transfer of the Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine. The transfer was adopted in law by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 26 April 1954. Ukrainian resentment stems from their subsidies to the Crimea over four decades (the Crimea has a budget deficit) and fear that loss of the Crimea would lead to a domino

effect over Russian claims to other regions of Ukraine. Ukraine points to other Soviet acts which transferred territory from Ukraine to Russia and asks rhetorically if these too should be annulled? Ukraine also backs the view of the bulk of European countries that post-Yalta borders should remain intact to prevent continent-wide instability if demands for border changes were acted upon, as in the former Yugoslavia.

Russian, Tatar and Ukrainian historians and commentators therefore approach the Crimean question from a variety of incompatible angles. Russia's attempts at inheriting the great power status of the FSU – but not the negative aspects of the Soviet past – is one of the factors contributing to damaging its relations with the former Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine. As one author has pointed out. 'The discontinuity between the Soviet past and the (Ukrainian) present is most apparent in Crimea . . . acceptance of Crimea's status as a part of Ukraine has been half-hearted at best and quite often implicitly challenged.'⁸ In the May 1994 Russian celebrations of the end of World War II the Russian military press suggested that because Sevastopol was liberated by them 50 years ago this entitled them to a voice in its future today. Likewise, even President Yeltsin described the city as, 'one of the national sacred places for all Russians'.⁹

UKRAINIAN POLICIES

Ukrainian policies towards the Crimea have remained cautious reflecting its overall positive approach towards national minority questions.¹⁰ The Ukrainian communist leadership, led by then chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, supported the drive towards restoring the Crimea's autonomy in a referendum supported by 81 per cent of the peninsula's population in January 1991.

At the time, democratic groups protested against the revival of an autonomous republic analogous to that which existed between 1944 and 1954 reflecting its new ethnic reality. Ukrainian democratic groups, in contrast to former President Kravchuk, have always voiced their support therefore for the Crimea to return to its pre-1944 status as a primarily Tatar autonomous republic, although within the confines of Ukraine.

After Ukraine's secession from the USSR in December 1991 the Ukrainian authorities continued their positive policies towards national minorities and Ukraine remained free of the ethnic violence which many other former Soviet republics suffered. A major plank in former President Kravchuk's appeasement of regional elites who could poten-

tially be a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity was to coopt them by striking a deal which exchanged their neutrality *vis-à-vis* independence while leaving them in power.

These policies helped maintain an artificial stability in Ukraine throughout 1992 but the consensus began to break down in 1993–94. First, the agreement led to stagnation of the newly independent state with little forward momentum in reform. Second, maintaining former Soviet elites at the local level in the Crimea and Donbas tied former President Kravchuk's hands *vis-à-vis* economic reform which remained largely absent. As the economy improved in Russia under the impact of economic reforms the local population in the Donbas and Crimea began to compare their lot in Ukraine to Russia in an unfavourable manner. Their revenge came in the January Crimean presidential and March 1994 Ukrainian parliamentary elections and referenda where they voted for leaders and political groups that advocated reintegration with Russia.¹¹

Ukraine's plans were severely upset by the Crimea's election of President Meshkov in January 1994. Kiev only allowed the presidential elections in the Crimea to take place because it expected that 'its favourite', Mykola Bagrov, would win. Bagrov has a similar pedigree to former President Kravchuk; both of them are former leading functionaries in the Communist Party of Ukraine. Bagrov was expected to follow the Kravchuk path; from chairman of parliament to president.

Kiev counted on Bagrov to keep the lid on the Crimean cauldron by granting him a wide array of powers and rights. In return Bagrov, as former chairman of the Crimean parliament, would not seek to harm Ukrainian territorial integrity or its security interests. But in assuming that Bagrov would follow the Kravchuk path from parliamentary chairman to president Kiev did not consider one vital factor. The Crimea, in terms of acute ethnic awareness and political activism, is more akin to Western Ukraine – the only region where Kravchuk came second to his nationalist rival, Viacheslav Chornovil, in the December 1991 presidential elections.¹² Ukraine, unlike the Baltic and Trans-Caucasian republics, does not possess a sufficiently strong national consciousness throughout the country which has prevented, and will continue to prevent, the emergence of a nationalist president in the foreseeable future.¹³

Could former President Kravchuk have relied on anybody else in the Crimea to maintain Ukrainian sovereignty other than post communists, such as Bagrov? This is unlikely because the only two serious power groups in the Crimea remain the former communist *nomenklatura*, grouped around Bagrov and the Party of Economic Revival of the

Crimea, on the one hand, and the Russian nationalist camp grouped around the Russia Bloc, on the other.

The Ukrainians number, according to the last Soviet census of 1989, 25.75 per cent of the Crimean population. Together with the Tartar population they therefore make up over a third of the peninsula's population. Theoretically therefore, they could pose a potential danger to the Russian majority. But this is severely hampered by the russification of the Ukrainian population and their political apathy on behalf of their ethnic rights. In the referendum which accompanied the March 1994 parliamentary elections in the Crimea 78.4 per cent and 82.8 per cent voted respectively for greater autonomy and dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship (figures higher than the Russian ethnic population of the Crimea).

The Kiev authorities therefore were left with no choice but to do a deal with the former communist *nomenklatura* in the Crimea who, after all, were long-time acquaintances of the then Ukrainian president. Bagrov had ditched the Republican Movement of the Crimea (RDK), led by current Crimean President Meshkov, after he had obtained what he perceived to be the maximum he could obtain from Kiev short of full secession.¹⁴ The May 1992 vote by the Crimean parliament for secession was merely an attempt at pressuring Kiev to grant greater concessions to the Crimea in the negotiations then taking place over the division of powers between them.

Between summer 1992 and winter 1993 Bagrov came under attack from two camps. On the one hand, Russian nationalists accused him of having 'sold out' to Kiev and stepped back from secession. On the other, his former communist colleagues reestablished the communist party in the Crimea and attacked him for having 'betrayed' communist ideals and the aim of reconstituting the FSU.

Former President Kravchuk always respected power and influence, moving in that direction in order to be associated with the dominant trend. This was acutely seen during 1990–91 when he gradually moved towards the nationalist camp. In the Crimea he never therefore supported the Tartars because they are not a sufficiently large or influential group, which would have anyway antagonised the then Bagrov leadership. In a manner similar to Ukrainian nationalist groups, Tartars backed Bagrov and Kravchuk in the Crimean and Ukrainian presidential elections respectively as the 'lesser of two evils'.¹⁵ But after the election of Meshkov as Crimean president and the escalation of the crisis between Crimea and Kiev former President Kravchuk dropped any earlier reservations he held against openly supporting the Tartars.¹⁶ Former President Kravchuk stated for the first time on the 50th

anniversary of the Tartar deportation from the Crimea that they were entitled to strive for statehood.¹⁷

Whereas Tartar groups were already well organised and have remained highly politicised the Ukrainian minority, with a lot of prodding from unofficial and official quarters in Kiev, only began to organise politically in 1993. Ukrainian political parties are relatively weak in the Crimea, as they are throughout Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Newly organised Ukrainian civic groups and political parties, especially since the election of President Meshkov, have made a conscious effort to align the Ukrainian ethnic minority with the Tartars to try and prevent Russian-speaking Ukrainians from giving their support to Russian nationalists and separatism.

In March 1994 Ukrainian and Tartar civic organisations issued joint statements calling for cooperation and opposition towards President Meshkov. Ukrainian civic groups in Kiev and their deputies in parliament would, 'be even more uncompromising in defending the interests of the Crimean Tartars'. Whereas the Tartars, 'will support Ukrainian organisations on the issues of preserving Ukraine's territorial integrity and consolidating Ukrainian statehood on the territory of the Crimea'.¹⁸

On 28 November 1993 Ukrainian civic groups and political parties throughout the Crimea gathered to establish the Civic Congress of the Crimea.¹⁹ One of the first statements of the Civic Congress was a call to boycott the Crimean presidential elections which would be the, 'last step on the way towards tearing Crimea away from Ukraine'. From the outset therefore, the Ukrainian Civic Congress, the only all-Crimean representative Ukrainian body, came out (like the Tartars) against the institution of a presidency in the Crimea.²⁰

The Ukrainian Civic Congress describes itself as a 'shadow parliament' in opposition to the current Crimean leadership. In late May 1994, after the readoption of the 1992 separatist constitution by the Crimean parliament, it issued an appeal stating that, 'A totalitarian dictatorship is emerging in the Crimea, built on the basis of open Russian chauvinism'. It added 'The pro-Russian chauvinists and their media are trying to convince people that Kiev is responsible for all of Crimea's troubles . . . This campaign has already reached its goal: fear is common among Crimean residents and households are becoming involved in interethnic clashes'.

The demands of the Ukrainian Civic Congress are the same as those espoused by democratic and nationalist groups in Kiev and include:²¹

- dissolution of the Crimean parliament
- abolition of the Crimean presidency

- direct presidential rule by Kiev over the Crimea
- settlement of the Black Sea Fleet to include withdrawal of Russian ships from Ukrainian territory
- no leases of Ukrainian territory to foreign military bases
- recognition of the *Majlis* as the official representative of the Crimean Tartars²²

Additional demands to these by political parties and civic groups in Ukraine have included abolishing Crimean autonomy and returning it to its status between 1944 and 1990 of an *oblast* as well as introducing the institution of presidential representative in the Crimea.²³ Whether any, or all, of these demands are now realisable is doubtful.

The only demand which was acted upon by the Ukrainian leadership was that of introducing a presidential representative, Valery Gorbатов, in the Crimea in April 1994.²⁴ The law 'On Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Republic of Crimea' was adopted in January 1993²⁵ but was only acted upon after the defeat of Bagrov in the presidential elections. Even then the position only stood until 26 June 1994 when the newly elected local councils abolished presidential prefects altogether.

Similarly the Ukrainian authorities only objected to the presidential elections in the Crimea after the first round on 16 January 1994 gave Meshkov the highest vote of the two leading candidates (38.2 per cent to Bagrov's 17.6 per cent). Four days later the Ukrainian parliament amended the Soviet-era constitution in a panic to allow the president to nullify any acts by the Crimean republic that violated the constitution.²⁶ Nevertheless, Meshkov won the presidential elections in the second round on 30 January with three times as many votes as Bagrov.

Since the election of Meshkov as President of the Crimea relations between Ukraine and the Crimea have steadily deteriorated. Meshkov and his allies in the newly elected Crimean parliament have clouded their strategic aims by advocating at different times to remain within Ukraine, create a Crimean independent state or union with Russia. Their clear aim is to remain in Ukraine only on the basis of a treaty, similar to federal republics in the Russian Federation, thereby helping to federalise Ukraine itself and make it more digestible for reintegration with Russia. While, at the same time, replacing Ukrainian security and naval forces with Russian and reintegrating the Crimea piecemeal with Russia.

To the Ukrainian authorities these steps are anathema and they have followed a three-pronged approach – legal, economic and military – to attempt to forestall President Meshkov's aims towards the Crimea and

the city of Sevastopol, which has republican status and does not come under Crimean jurisdiction. First, they have declared numerous decrees by President Meshkov and laws of the Crimean parliament to be annulled, asserting the supremacy of Ukrainian over Crimean legislation. Second, economic sanctions have been threatened against the Crimean republic which runs a budget deficit and relies on Ukraine for fresh water, energy and foodstuffs. Third, while openly declaring the inadmissibility of the use of force Ukraine's security presence in the Crimea, which is already more than double that in the Soviet era, has been increased in terms of personnel, equipment and bases.

In February 1994 the Ukrainian parliament adopted the first of several legal resolutions dealing with the Crimea. The resolution rejected separate Crimean citizenship or dual citizenship (a demand also backed by Russia in the 'Near Abroad' but rejected even by its Central Asian allies), called for the introduction of a presidential prefect in the Crimea (which was later undertaken) and ruled out any changes in Ukraine's borders which were 'unitary, indivisible, inviolable and integral'. The resolution also demanded that the Crimea should, 'bring the constitution and other legislative acts of the Crimean republic into conformity with Ukraine's constitution and legislation'.²⁷

Former Ukrainian parliamentary speaker Ivan Pliushch said at the time that, 'We can no longer tolerate violations of the constitution by the Crimean authorities.'²⁸ But the deadline passed and was ignored by the Crimean authorities.

As soon as Meshkov was elected president he declared his support for a referendum on the future of the Crimea. The referendum, which asked Crimean citizens three questions on greater autonomy, dual citizenship and to give the Crimean president greater powers to rule by decree, was annulled by President Kravchuk but went ahead and received 78.4 per cent, 82.8 per cent and 77.9 per cent endorsement respectively. Initially the Crimean Central Electoral Commission also rejected the referendum but later backed down after a compromise was reached changing it to the status of an 'opinion poll' which had no legal ramifications.²⁹

Former Presidential adviser on domestic affairs Mykola Mykhailchenko said, 'We can no longer make concessions to separatists in the Crimea – their games could lead to an Abkhazian solution. It is better to stop the separatists now rather than having to restore order later by military means.'³⁰ But the Ukrainian authorities continued to make concessions and extend deadlines. In the words of Serhei Holovatiy, a leading deputy from the Reform parliamentary faction and president of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation, 'the President of Ukraine has shown

indecision with regard to the leadership of the autonomous republic. We are now in a state where Leonid Kravchuk is no longer able to do anything because he is three years late.³¹

The war over decrees between the Crimea and Ukraine continued through April and May 1994, particularly over the sensitive area of security policy. President Meshkov's attempts to gain control over the Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs and demand that Crimean conscripts undertake their military service in the autonomous republic all inflamed tension with Kiev. None of these areas concern economic policy, over which Kiev has given full control to the Crimea, and are, on the whole, even beyond the prerogative of the Tartar autonomous republic in the Russian Federation, which President Meshkov often likes to use as an example of how Crimea's relations should be established with Kiev.

Despite rumours of impending presidential rule³² the Ukrainian authorities only issued another ten-day ultimatum after the Crimean parliament voted on 19 May 1994 to reintroduce the May 1992 constitution adopted when the Crimea declared independence. Again former President Kravchuk threatened dire consequences if the Crimean parliament did not rescind their decision and return to the September 1992 Crimean constitution.³³ 'If the Crimean authorities violate the Ukrainian constitution, we have enough power to force respect', President Kravchuk warned.³⁴

The reintroduction of the May 1992 Crimean constitution also gave the go-ahead for dual citizenship and the basing of Crimean conscripts on the peninsula, something which Kiev regards as an attempt to create its own armed forces. Although the Security Service in the Crimea has remained loyal to Kiev another compromise had to be reached over the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Henceforth the Crimean Ministry of Internal Affairs would be divided between two loyalties; those directly subordinated to Kiev and those under President Meshkov's appointee, General Valery Kuznetsov.³⁵

The Ukrainian parliamentary resolution described the return to the May 1992 constitution as, 'a step towards Crimea leaving the composition of Ukraine'. It gave an ultimatum, which, like previous ultimatums, was allowed to pass and then was extended to allow time for negotiations.³⁶ This tactic had worked well in summer 1992 when Bagrov backed down and 'suspended' the declaration of independence. On this occasion this seemed less likely.

The Ukrainian parliamentary resolution was adopted by two thirds of the newly elected deputies. Although the parliament, which at the time had only two thirds of its deputies elected, has a left-wing majority many

from this camp also adopted a tough line on the Crimea. President Meshkov's anti-communism has allowed communists and socialists in both Ukraine and the Crimea to distance themselves from him. A leading member of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr Marchenko, stated that, 'Socialists will not agree to Crimea's secession from Ukraine. The territorial integrity of the state envisages Crimea within the composition of Ukraine. This is unequivocal.'³⁷

Former President Kravchuk pointed to the strategic course of the Crimean leadership which aims to secede the Crimea from Ukraine and return it to Russia. The second plank of this 'strategic course' is the 'restoration of the former Soviet Union', he claimed.³⁸ He dismissed any notion of a treaty relationship between the Crimea and Ukraine along the lines of Tartarstan because Ukraine is not a federal state. After all, even the Tartar-Russian Federation Treaty delegated all matters pertaining to military, Ministry of Internal Affairs and security to the central Russian authorities.³⁹

The Ukrainian authorities opted to forget about the deadline after extending it for three days to allow for negotiations to continue. Meanwhile, Kiev began to implement the second plank of its policy towards the Crimea, namely, to threaten and quietly implement economic sanctions as an additional form of pressure. Former President Kravchuk threatened to cut off electricity and water and added, 'Let's speak frankly, Crimea today is a region which is subsidised by Ukraine. We don't have to go into all the figures; there's energy, water, etc. As the Russian saying goes, don't try to wear clothes that don't fit.' A similar policy had been applied in 1918 by the Ukrainian Hetmanate state against the Crimea which brought it to heel within three days. The Crimea draws only 20 per cent of its water from within its territory; the remainder is taken from the Dnipro river in Ukraine via a canal that could be easily closed by the Ukrainian authorities.

Former acting premier, Yukhym Zvyahilskyy, himself from the Donbas, added his support to the idea of economic sanctions. The Crimea, he claimed, was in debt to Ukraine to the tune of 1,500 billion *karbovanets*. 'We must turn to sanctions like those used by Russia against Ukraine. We have enough levers such as the supply of water and electricity.' He refused to call it an 'ultimatum': 'This is a tougher approach to our relations.'⁴⁰ Former Crimean deputy premier, Yevgeniy Saburov, later accused Kiev of having imposed economic sanctions by scaring away tourists, who are a major source of income, curtailment of financial credits and halting construction of a water pipe to Sevastopol. Along the Southern Crimean coast tapwater is available for only one hour every two or three days, a problem that began in mid-1993.

The third plank in Kiev's policy towards the Crimea is that of ensuring and bolstering a security force presence on the ground. The Ukrainian authorities are unlikely to allow the resolution attached to the reintroduced May 1992 constitution which forbids the sending of Crimean draftees to serve outside the peninsula (it is proposed that they would serve either in military units based in the Crimea or in the Black Sea Fleet). The chief of the Crimean military commissariat, Aleksandr Volkov, rejected such a demand.⁴¹ But the deputy commander of the Fleet stated his readiness to take all Crimean conscripts and ensure Crimean security after a Ukrainian withdrawal.⁴² The chairman of the Crimean parliamentary commission on military and security issues has also called for the withdrawal of the Ukrainian National Guard and its replacement by a 'Crimean Republican Guard'. President Meshkov has also established a presidential service for security and interstate affairs headed by Colonel Vladimir Bortnikov from the former Russian KGB which has an initial staff of 39.

The tug of war over control of the security forces based in the Crimea is potentially the most dangerous aspect of the crisis. President Meshkov's appointment of Kuznetsov to head the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) means that he, 'is now in charge of a massive arsenal of weapons found on Crimean territory', according to the Ukrainian MVD as well as special forces of the militia, such as the red-bereted *Berkut* riot police and black-bereted *Spetsnaz* state protection militia. On 18 May 1994 the Ukrainian First Deputy Interior Minister, Colonel General Valentyn Nedryhailo, attempted to take control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs headquarters in Simferopol with 20 *Spetsnaz* police officers in order to place it directly under Kiev's jurisdiction.⁴³ The unresolved question of control over the Crimean MVD has led to an upsurge in organised crime on the peninsula which, 'is overrun by racketeering', according to Kuznetsov.⁴⁴ President Kuchma's campaign against organised crime will therefore face tough and armed resistance in the Crimea where it will antagonise local politicians, many of whom are invariably tied to organised crime.

The bulk of the rumours that were given wide circulation in the Russian media regarding Ukrainian military movements at the time have since proved to be false. According to Russian military sources the combined Ukrainian security presence in the Crimea increased from 18,000 to 51,000 personnel during the last three years (these figures have now been endorsed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence although the author was unable to obtain any official figures for personnel and bases in the Crimea from Kiev officials). Of these upwards of 15,000 are in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the remainder include Naval, Air Force,

Air Defence, the 32nd Army Corps, 2 *Spetsnaz* brigades, Border Troops and National Guard.⁴⁵ In the capital of the Crimea, Simferopol, the headquarters of a mechanised division, the military construction academy and Border Troops⁴⁶ are based. Ukraine's elite 1st Airmobile Division based at Bolgrad in Odessa *oblast*, which was used in the Odessa incident in April 1994, is also near the Crimea (see later).

The existence of 32nd Army Corps HQ in Simferopol provides Ukraine with command, control, communications, intelligence and logistical capability for its armed forces in the Crimea, which would allow it to rapidly build up their size. Ukrainian security planning in the Crimea also possesses the advantage of controlling Northern Crimea. This is where the bulk of the Ukrainian population is concentrated and could be easily detached from the coastline south of the peninsula cutting across the Crimea. Kiev also continues to control the eastern approaches of the Crimea at Kerch from where Russian reinforcements could possibly arrive in the event of a conflict.

A tank and anti-aircraft unit attached to the Black Sea Fleet were transferred to the Fleet's headquarters in Sevastopol on 21 May 1994 at the height of the Crimean constitutional conflict. A marine brigade was also brought to the 'military danger' state of increased readiness where personnel are issued with weapons, first aid kits and bulletproof vests while being combined to barracks. The Fleet's press office warned that, 'It is clear that whatever the development of the situation, the Black Sea Fleet cannot remain outside events unfolding around it.'⁴⁷ Fleet exercises were held between 19 and 22 May 1994 during which 'unidentified armed soldiers' were repulsed after attempting to take over a unit of the Ukrainian Air Defence in Sevastopol.

Kiev is unlikely to use force to bring to heel the Crimea except as a final last resort, although it is preparing for every contingency. With the MVD in the Crimea divided in its loyalties any conflict on the peninsula would be left to the National Guard and Border Troops to deal with, backed by the intelligence apparatus of military counter-intelligence and the Security Service. But if these forces were insufficient to deal with the conflict specialist units of the Ukrainian armed forces (airborne, marines and *Spetsnaz*) would be forced to intervene although domestic affairs are beyond the prerogative of the military. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian military are closely tied to the *raison d'être* of the Ukrainian state and its territorial integrity and public support for this action would exist. A typically strong response was given by former Defence Minister Vitaliy Radetsky: 'The toughest and most extreme measures will be taken against the violators of the state borders and Ukraine's territorial integrity. We are not going to bargain with anyone.'⁴⁸

The Ukrainian National Guard, which has been deployed in the Crimea since October 1992 and normally has a complement of 1,000 men, has been increased to 3,000 with an additional 29 APCs in their two main bases in Simferopol and Sevastopol. Assault rifles, light machine-guns, grenade launchers and other military equipment were transferred to the National Guard in the Crimea. Additional APCs were removed from storage near Yalta. National Guard units have been also moved to new bases in Kerch and Yevpatoriya.⁴⁹ A field hospital has been prepared to take casualties in the event of conflict.

Crimean official buildings are guarded by armed *Berkut* riot police in bulletproof vests with the help of Russian Cossack volunteers. 'Unarmed' members of the National Guard are patrolling the streets to 'combat crime' (on 15 May they were involved in a skirmish with the Militia in Simferopol while on 17 August they were involved in a fight with drunken Black Sea Fleet sailors near Sevastopol that led to the hospitalisation of a National Guard sergeant⁵⁰). Ukraine has since drafted into the Crimea *Spetsnaz* from the 21st Special Militia Detachment claiming that the *Berkut* riot police were spending too much time protecting Crimean leaders and buildings rather than combating crime.

Oleksander Skipalskiy, Chief of Military Counter Intelligence and a Ukrainian nationalist member of parliament, accused the Russian secret services of interference in the Crimea: 'such actions are a gross violation of the agreement concluded by the special services of Ukraine and Russia which specifies that subversive work against each other is inadmissible.'⁵¹ A group of commanding officers of the Security Service, led by the first deputy head, also arrived in Simferopol in May 1994.

If a Crimean conflict began to develop Russian Cossack, Ukrainian Cossack and nationalist paramilitaries have all expressed their willingness to join the fray on either side. The paramilitary arm of the Ukrainian National assembly, the Ukrainian People's Self-Defence Forces (UNSO), have already sent volunteers to the Crimea as 'active holiday-makers'.⁵² Russia's Don Cossacks (who had already begun delivering weapons to the Crimea as early as October 1993) have signed an agreement with the Crimean leadership to provide volunteers. The Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples, which are backed by the Tartars, would also intervene against Russia in the event of a Crimean conflict that would inflame Muslim-Russian relations throughout the FSU. Cooperation has already been established between Ukrainian paramilitaries and the Chechen leadership.

The Crimean crisis has predictably strained relations with Russia. The Crimean leadership would like to drag in Moscow on its side in its dispute with Kiev. Igor Yeroshkin, a member of President Meshkov's

RDK said, 'It is now certain we have Yeltsin's support and it is our duty to be clear that we demand reunion with Russia.' Accreditations were removed from three Russian journalists in Ukraine after former President Kravchuk criticised the Russian leadership for interference in its domestic affairs and the Russian media for spreading 'rabid and dishonest' information.

It is clear from developments in the Crimean crisis during the last two years that although, on the one hand, the Ukrainian authorities have increased their security presence on the peninsula they, nevertheless, have been reluctant to utilise force to bring the Crimea to heel. Reasons exist for this reluctance to use force (although it cannot be ruled out as an ultimate last resort if legal and economic sanctions fail to halt the Crimean slide to separation).

First, attempts at suppressing minorities in other post Soviet states have ended disastrously. In Moldova it led to the creation of a secessionist republic backed by the Russian 14th Army. In Azerbaijan the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh led to constant *coup d'états* and changes in the presidential leadership of that country. Most dramatically, in Georgia the failure of its conflict over Abkhazia led to a *coup d'état*, civil war and loss of state sovereignty after President Edvard Shevardnadze agreed to his country's reentry into the CIS and the reestablishment of three Russian military bases.

The Ukrainian leadership believes that the 'Abkhazian' syndrome was perhaps a dry run for the Crimea, as discussed in the Ukrainian and Russian press⁵³. If the Ukrainian authorities stormed into the Crimean parliament, in the manner of the Georgian National Guard at Sukhumi, Russia would inevitably be drawn into the conflict either officially or through the use of surrogate forces that could then be denied official recognition by the Russian leadership. The Russian authorities have often decreed the right, without Western criticism, to intervene in the 'Near Abroad' in defence of Russians or 'Russian speakers' and they could not therefore stay passive towards the Crimea if it was involved in violent conflict with Ukraine. It is no coincidence that Ukraine has been a strong opponent of Russia acquiring a mandate to undertake 'peace-keeping' missions throughout the FSU because such a mandate, along the lines of Moldova and Georgia, would lead Russian 'blue helmets' into the Crimea who would then be reluctant to depart.⁵⁴

A second factor which discourages the Ukrainian authorities from utilising military force against the Crimea is the impact it would potentially have upon the delicate ethnic balance within southern and eastern Ukraine itself. Eastern-Southern Ukraine voted against the nationalist candidate, Kravchuk, in the July 1994 second round of the

presidential elections in favour of the more 'pro-Russian' Kuchma. Russians do not constitute a majority in any Ukrainian administrative region other than the Crimea. Nevertheless, Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians form large constituencies in regions such as Odessa and the Donbas which have latent secessionist or autonomous tendencies. These would be accentuated in a Ukrainian-Crimean conflict and would inevitably be exploited by Russia.⁵⁵

In Ukraine there is a strong pro-Russian lobby which is primarily based in eastern and southern Ukraine; a lobby reflected in opinion polls that give one third of Ukrainians in favour of unity with Russia in a single state (only 7 per cent less than Belarussians).⁵⁶ During the parliamentary elections in spring-summer 1994 large areas of eastern Ukraine elected communists who now have the largest single faction within parliament. The election programme of the Luhansk *oblast* Communist Party of Ukraine called for, 'the restoration of the USSR . . . and the recognition of the illegality of the Belovezhsky agreement as the first step toward the reunion of the peoples of Ukraine and Russia'.⁵⁷

The Dniester Republican leadership in Moldova has not hidden its strategic objective of uniting with pro-Russian secessionist regions of southern-eastern Ukraine (so-called *Novorossiya*, or New Russia, the Tsarist term for the region) into a new state that would link up with Russia and the Crimea and cut the truncated Ukraine off from the Black Sea. Chairman of the Dniester Republican Supreme Soviet, Grigorii Marakutsa, described his region as, 'an inalienable part of the Russian state's southern region, which also includes Crimea, Odessa *oblast* and a number of other (Ukrainian) *oblasts* and is known as *Novorossia*'.⁵⁸ Dniester Republican officers, trainers and weapons were used in Abkhazia and are now making their way to the Crimea. Weapons and ammunition (which are Russian property from 14th Army) are being presumably delivered to Kuznetsov's MVD and the Crimean presidential republican guard.⁵⁹

The attempts to reach a compromise on the Crimea within the 10–13 days deadline in May–June 1994 led to the sixth round of negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet. Failure to reach a negotiated settlement during 1992–94 rests not over the Fleet's division but the status of its on-shore infrastructure and bases. Russia has continued to insist that Sevastopol be leased or given to the Russian Black Sea Fleet for a 99-year term lease while the Ukrainian Navy either vacates the Crimea completely or moves to Balaklava. Sergey Lavrov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, insisted that the Black Sea Fleet, 'with all the

infrastructure in Crimea, is used by Russia and receives Russian markings'.⁶⁰ President Yeltsin refused to consider signing an inter-state treaty with Ukraine (the stumbling block being recognition of current borders) until the Black Sea Fleet question is resolved.

If the question of the Black Sea Fleet were resolved, according to former Defence Minister Radetskiy, it would defuse the Crimean crisis by half. Ukraine's successful policies of nationalisation of the former Soviet conventional and nuclear armed forces on its territory were prevented with regard to the Black Sea Fleet by its then commander Admiral Igor Kasatanov (who was rewarded for his actions with the post of First Deputy Commander of the Russian Navy). The Ukrainian position has constantly shifted from initially demanding only a section of the Fleet, to all ships on Ukrainian territory and then for a compromise 50:50 split. As the Crimean crisis escalated, support for separatism grew while Russian policy towards the 'Near Abroad' became more assertive making finding a resolution to the Black Sea Fleet more difficult. President Yeltsin's spokesman, Viacheslav Kostikov, pointed out that, 'The Ukrainian side refuses to deal with realities and is becoming more and more inconsistent and unpredictable in its actions and announcements.'⁶¹ At issue is less a claim towards possession of the ships, which have little strategic value, but bases, such as Sevastopol, and the Crimea.

Between 1992 and 1994 the Black Sea Fleet was the subject of five failed attempts to reach a compromise, one of which brought down former Defence Minister Konstantyn Morozov who accused President Kravchuk and former premier Leonid Kuchma of a 'sell-out' to Moscow at the Massandra summit in September 1993. The fifth round of talks in April 1994 collapsed over Russian Defence Minister General Pavel Grachev's demands for Ukraine's naval withdrawal from the Crimea.⁶² Grachev has openly demanded (not proposed) that, 'Sevastopol should be the main base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. We consider that as well as Sevastopol, the fleet should also be based in Balaklava, Feodosiya, Kerch and Donuzalev where the main forces of Russia's Black Sea Fleet are deployed and also where units and formations are stationed. It is clear that we have the right to, and we will not, undermine the combat readiness of the Black Sea Fleet, a battleworthy and full-blooded formation of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. . . .'⁶³

Although the Ukrainian authorities have agreed to sell or transfer 30 per cent of their 50 per cent share to Russia in return for energy debts since September 1993, Russia has progressively adopted a more strident position. This has included a 99-year lease of the city of Sevastopol (and not just the port), division of coastal infrastructure (as well as vessels)

and removal of all Ukrainian naval forces from the Crimea (a demand backed by the Crimean president).⁶⁴ Russian naval plans included basing 70 per cent of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, 10 per cent in Donuzlav, 5 per cent in Balaklava and 7 per cent each in Feodosiya and Kerch. For a foreign power (Russia) to demand that the host country (Ukraine) depart from territory internationally recognised as falling under Ukrainian jurisdiction (Crimea) seems to have been lost on the West which has been reluctant to become involved in the dispute or condemn Russian policies.

Russia has local support for its insistence that Sevastopol city and port be leased to Russia indefinitely. On the same day as presidential elections on 26 June 1994 Sevastopol held an opinion poll 'on the status of Sevastopol as a Russian town' with the question: 'Are you in favour of the status of Sevastopol city as the main base of the Russian Federation's Black Sea Fleet, in accordance with the Russian-Ukrainian protocol of 3 September 1993?'⁶⁵ Sevastopol city council, supported by a 89 per cent endorsement in the referendum, therefore back Russian demands that the Ukrainian Navy and the National Guard completely vacate the city's naval base.⁶⁶

The election of President Kuchma was supported by nearly 90 per cent of the Crimean electorate and, in the words of President Meshkov, Kuchma's lack of 'nationalist hang-ups' and support for economic reform meant that relations between Kiev and Simferopol would improve. President Meshkov regarded the election of Kuchma as leading to the renewal of closer ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, in particular in, 'as strong a union with Russia as possible'.⁶⁷

But both President Kuchma and the Crimean leadership regarded the high vote for Kuchma in different ways. President Kuchma regarded it as a vote for the Crimea to remain within Ukraine. The Crimean leadership, on the other hand, regarded it as the first step of its unification with Russia followed by Ukraine. The deputy speaker of the Crimean parliament, Aleksey Melnikov, predicted that the Crimea would be independent by the end of the year and the moratorium on a referendum for independence would be lifted in October-November when local elections were held.⁶⁸ President Meshkov warned that Kuchma was failing to pay off the political advance made by the Crimean electorate which would lead to relevant measures being taken in the future.

Conflict between Kiev and the Crimea has therefore continued, although without the threat of military sanctions used by former President Kravchuk. The visit to the Crimea by Sergei Baburin, a

Russian nationalist deputy, on 29 July 1994 where he stated that the peninsula is viewed as part of Russia was followed with a vote by the city's council by 36 out of 42 deputies to confirm the city as the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Russian legal status on 23 August (based on the earlier June referendum). It also called for the removal of Ukrainian naval forces and the National Guard from Sevastopol. On 8 September the Crimean parliament voted to support the decision of the Sevastopol council on providing it with a Russian legal status.⁶⁹

A polite condemnation came immediately from President Kuchma, whose reaction was described as 'the most acceptable one' by the chairman of Sevastopol city council, as well as more strongly worded statements from the Sevastopol Procurator and the Ministry of Justice. The latter accused the Sevastopol council of violating the Ukrainian constitution because it is under republican jurisdiction and thus can be altered only by parliament.⁷⁰ The Ukrainian parliament re-convened from its summer recess on 15 September 1994 and one of the first items on the agenda was the Sevastopol city council vote. The Crimean leadership again miscalculated the mood of the newly elected parliament which voted 303:5 in favour of rescinding the Sevastopol vote.

The overwhelming vote by the Ukrainian parliament coupled with the emotions stirred up by the Crimean threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity (the debate included calls for the abolishing of Crimean autonomy and a scuffle between Pavlo Movchan, head of the Ukrainian Language Society, with a Crimean deputy) are factors that President Kuchma, on the one hand, and the Russian leadership, on the other, will have to take into account. The Union of Ukrainian Officers, Rukh and Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, all of whom are represented in parliament, issued appeals to dissolve the Sevastopol city council. The Union of Ukrainian Officers added that the Ukrainian parliament should also vote for a nuclear status for Ukraine. The military council of the Ukrainian Navy also lodged a strong protest at the Sevastopol city council's vote.⁷¹

The warm political temperature between Kiev and the Crimea has also continued after numerous complaints from Ukrainian organisations in the Crimea and Sevastopol, which received widespread prominence in the Ukrainian press, of continued, 'attacks by extremists upon representatives of civic organisations who defend Ukrainian interests, citizens who speak the Ukrainian mother tongue or are loyal to the Ukrainian state'.⁷² The establishment of new branches of Rukh in the Crimea was also described as, 'a path towards kindling nationalism, confrontation and antagonism' by *Krasnaya Zvezda* (18 August 1994).

The confrontation between the Crimean parliament and president throughout September 1994 could also have led to civil disorder which could then have been exploited by outside political forces, warned the Procurator-General, MVD and Security Service in a joint statement.⁷³

— After the April 1994 Odesa (Odessa) incident⁷⁴ former President Kravchuk (but not then Defence Minister Radetskiy⁷⁵) accepted that locating both Russian and Ukrainian navies in Sevastopol after the division of the Black Sea Fleet would be to invite future conflict. Former President Kravchuk therefore agreed to relocate the Ukrainian Navy to other Crimean ports, such as Balaklava and Donuzalev. But, the sticking points remained former President Kravchuk's insistence that, 'the base for the Russian fleet will not be leased in perpetuity, but for a specified period' (former Defence Minister Radetskiy talked of only a five-year lease while Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyi, Ukrainian naval commander, discussed 15–20 years 'until Russia sets up a base on its own territory on the Krasnodar coast'⁷⁶). Second, Sevastopol would continue to be a base for Ukrainian military and national guard units to ensure Ukrainian sovereignty. Finally, only the Sevastopol base would be leased to Russia – not the city itself.⁷⁷

Both former President Kravchuk and former Defence Minister Radetsky bitterly complained that whereas the Ukrainian side took into account Russian interests the opposite was not the case with Moscow.⁷⁸ 'We take into consideration Russia's interests, but Russia does not admit ours and exercises unilateral pressure', Radetskiy complained.⁷⁹ Former President Kravchuk acknowledged the strength of feeling when he said, 'It is a very sensitive subject for Russia. Especially the question of Sevastopol. It is painful for historical reasons for the Russian mentality, for the Russian government.'⁸⁰

The Russian side also purposefully dragged out the negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet to await the outcome of the Ukrainian presidential elections on 26 June and 10 July 1994. The two leading candidates were Kravchuk and Kuchma. Moscow did not hide its preference for Kuchma in Ukraine (and Viacheslav Kebich in Belarus) to win the presidential elections because they would support a close alliance with Russia that would, in their view, de facto solve the Crimean and Black Sea Fleet questions.⁸¹ The head of the Russian Duma CIS Committee, Konstantin Zatulin, openly supported Kuchma because with Kravchuk, 'in the past there has been outright anti-Russian hysteria, bordering on an outright clash'.⁸² Ostankino television, which broadcasts throughout the FSU and has a greater number of viewers in eastern-southern Ukraine than Ukrainian television, also backed Kuchma.⁸³

After the presidential elections the Black Sea Fleet negotiations

continued but the Ukrainian position, although devoid of the ideological baggage of the Kravchuk era, nevertheless maintained the position outlined by Radetskiy in April 1994 in his meeting with Grachev. The negotiations since April have not been helped by Russian heavyhandedness and undiplomatic behaviour. Russian Defence Minister Grachev recommended that the new Ukrainian Minister of Defence undertake a reshuffle in his Ministry which would lead to a breakthrough in the Black Sea Fleet negotiations. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence issued a sharply worded response that condemned Grachev's interference into the personnel matters of a neighbouring country.⁸⁴ In Ukrainian eyes this was another example how Russia was unable to treat Ukraine as an independent, 'foreign' country. Similarly, Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, has continued to argue that the Fleet question can only be resolved, 'by means of unity and convergence between the two Slavonic nations in the economic, political and military spheres'.⁸⁵ In other words, Sevastopol and the Fleet would be used as tools to reintegrate Ukraine and Russia in a similar manner to Russian forward bases in Belarus, Georgia and elsewhere in the FSU.

The Black Sea Fleet negotiations have therefore remained tense. Ukraine's position is essentially unchanged since April 1994 and the failure to reach an agreement floundered on the question of Crimean bases and division of the Fleet's infrastructure. The division of ships 669:164 in Russia's favour had long ago been agreed by both sides, although compensation to Ukraine for its share transferred to Russia was still unresolved.⁸⁶ Ukraine will only agree to leasing for a maximum of 25-year term of some bays in Sevastopol – not the entire city or for 99 years, as Russia continued to insist (Ukraine originally insisted that only Donuzlav would be leased to Russia). Ukraine may continue to use Sevastopol as well, a demand strongly backed by the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, but its navy would be mainly based in Balaklava, Kerch, Feodosiya and Donuzlav.

Russia misjudged the Ukrainian election results working in its favour over the question of bases in the Crimea: 'The point is undoubtedly about Russia not encroaching on Ukraine's territorial integrity . . .', Oleksandr Moroz, Ukrainian parliamentary speaker, told Ukrainian naval personnel. In addition, in the words of Volodymyr Mukhin, chairman of the parliamentary committee on Defence and State Security, 'The stance of the Russian delegation at the talks has remained, as before, brutal and unchanged. The representatives of the Russian delegation did not display any compromises or concessions.' Deputy Defence Minister Bizhan noted that the Russian position had remained that adopted two years ago.⁸⁷ The Ukrainian leadership has also

continued to oppose dual citizenship for Russian naval officers living in Ukraine.

Ukrainian frustration at the unreasonable demands made by the Russian side have led to hints that they may change tactics and demand that the Russian Fleet, or the entire Black Sea Fleet, vacate the Crimea and other Ukrainian ports completely. Russian naval units in Ukraine therefore would be little different to foreign forces based without the host's consent in Moldova. If Ukraine were to adopt this position it would appeal to the UN Security Council to treat Russian naval forces in Sevastopol and elsewhere in Ukraine on the same level as Russian armed forces formerly in the Baltic republics. The West would be then forced to act as an intermediary to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian naval forces within a deadline.⁸⁸

The agreement on the Black Sea Fleet is to be an appendix on the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty under negotiation. The newly appointed Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Hennadiy Udoenko, a seasoned and professional diplomat, did call for the 'normalisation' of Ukrainian-Russian relations, but this could only be undertaken, he added, on the basis of partnership, 'rather than the relations of a senior with a junior' (a reoccurring Ukrainian demand during the last four years) and not at the expense of Ukrainian statehood and sovereignty (a reference to the Crimea). Zatulin, head of the Russian Duma CIS committee, has called for a 'strategic partnership' and 'special relations' between Russia and Ukraine that would recognise the two countries' interdependence.⁸⁹

The 'normalisation' of relations refers primarily, in Udoenko's view, to removing ideological tension and resuming bilateral economic ties. Normalisation of relations between Russia and Ukraine includes instituting an active political dialogue and developing foreign policy co-operation in a more dynamic manner, especially within the CIS, OSCE and in peacemaking operations. The normalisation of relations though primarily rests on completing a treaty between both states that has been in limbo since winter 1992. The negotiations have been kept secret although 80 per cent of the treaty was ready by the end of September 1994. The difficulties in the treaty rest over the remaining 20 per cent. According to Oleksandr Chaliy, Head of the Contractual and Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreement was reached on articles dealing with the legal status of minorities and Russia no longer insists on the inviolability of Ukraine's territorial integrity only within the CIS. The 20 per cent remaining areas in dispute included dual citizenship and recognition of territorial integrity.⁹⁰

At the same time, President Kuchma has been careful to rule out any confederation with Russia or other CIS states which would be strongly opposed domestically.⁹¹ The Ukrainian leadership has also to take into account the protests and warnings which have flowed from many political parties, nationalist groups and the Writers Union about various articles in the Russian-Ukrainian treaty.⁹² At the CIS summit in Moscow on 9 September 1994 the cautious Kuchma line was again in evidence. Ukraine opposed any return to supranational structures, which it regards as the resurrection of the FSU and rejected CIS political-military integration, especially a military union, joint military or peacekeeping action. Ukraine under newly elected President Kuchma has therefore remained an associate member of the Economic Union and the newly established CIS Interstate Economic Committee.⁹³

RUSSIAN POLICY

Russian policy towards the Crimea and Ukraine cannot be divorced from overall Russian security policy towards the FSU and has evolved remarkably since 1992. Between 1990 and 1992 Russian policy-makers and political parties could be divided into three clear groups with regard to accepting the disintegration of the FSU into independent states, with the majority of the Russian leadership rejecting empire or military intervention in the FSU.

But by 1994, in the aftermath of the Russian parliamentary elections in December 1993, the views of democrats and (national democratic) conservatives had become blurred with regard to security policy towards the 'Near Abroad'.⁹⁴ The liberal camp had disappeared from Russian security policy leaving only two camps remaining – the extreme left and right, who demanded the reestablishment of the FSU or Russian empire by force, and the centre-right national democrats who were in power and had evolved to take into account the new nationalist mood of the electorate.

Anguish at the loss of empire can be gauged by the regular calls for the reestablishment of the FSU and East Slavic Union.⁹⁵ No fewer than 57 per cent of Muscovites regret the collapse of the FSU while 17 per cent believe that former Soviet republics will soon form a new Union⁹⁶ (six months later by mid-1994 this had doubled to one third of Russians⁹⁷). In June 1994 the lower house of the Russian parliament voted to convene a meeting of the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian parliaments to debate the creation of an East Slavic Union. Yevgenny Yevtushenko, the well-known liberal Russian poet told an American audience that, 'The Soviet Union, in my opinion, will be resurrected

under a new name, without the dictate of Moscow, without the rule of the communist party.' Former President Kravchuk repeatedly warned though that any attempt to recreate the FSU or East Slavic Union, in a manner also backed by Mikhail Gorbachev,⁹⁸ would lead to widespread bloodshed and the growth of ethnic nationalism.⁹⁹

What has largely escaped Western policy-makers when discussing this growing demand for the reestablishment of a union (or empire) is that support for these policies within Russia are no longer confined to the extreme right and left. The current Russian leadership is espousing the security policies *vis-à-vis* the 'Near Abroad' originally formulated by the centre-right Civic Union in autumn-winter 1992, then led by Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi.¹⁰⁰ Calls for a new Union or confederation are made regularly by national democrats such as Vladimir Shumeiko, Federation Council speaker and head of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy and member of the presidential council¹⁰¹ and Sergei Stankevych, former presidential adviser. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, also by no means on the extreme right of Russian politics, describes Russia's borders with Ukraine and Kazakhstan as 'Leninist folly' which should be redrawn.¹⁰² 'The tearing off of Belarus and Ukraine from us is just the same as the division of Germany after the war . . . Historically, it must not endure', Solzhenitsyn argued.¹⁰³

Zatulin, Chairman of the Russian Duma's CIS committee, openly admitted to being 'an admirer of empire if this means imperial peace . . . and a tool for peacekeeping. A policy based on "spheres of influence . . . is unrelated to whether one is a democrat or not . . . Policy toward the CIS is Russia's internal policy.'¹⁰⁴ Zatulin congratulated the Foreign Ministry led by Andrei Kozyrev which, 'has sharply changed its position, and our positions are now practically the same'.

Russia's 'new imperialism'¹⁰⁵ towards the 'Near Abroad' by the current leadership, in the words of Yuri Afanasyev, has followed four paths. First, economic union is a prelude to political and military union of the FSU (with the possible exception of the three Baltic republics) under Russian control and influence in a new Union or confederation. As part of this policy, Russia will support separatism in the non-Russian republics (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine) in order that they be granted autonomy and the host states become federalist. The Russian leadership has linked the withdrawal of its forces from Moldova within 3-4 years (not by 1994-95 as initially demanded by the Moldovans) to the granting of a political status to the Dniester Republic (i.e., the federalisation of Moldova¹⁰⁶).

The special status of these regions would then be guaranteed by

Russia (bilateral treaties, peacemaking forces¹⁰⁷ or military bases). In the Ukrainian case, this referred to the Donbas and Crimea. The Russian-Georgian treaty and Russian military bases in Belarus¹⁰⁸ are the examples upon which Moscow would like Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan to agree a similar relationship with Russia.¹⁰⁹ Russian commentators have often pointed out that separatists in the republics of the FSU are its 'natural allies', such as in Moldova and Ukraine. The introduction of Russian peacemaking forces would 'freeze the front lines into de facto borders' which could then be later changed by plebiscite.¹¹⁰

Such bilateral treaties with Moscow and federalist state structures would reduce the power of the central authorities and make the republics more manageable and ultimately digestible. This would be particularly the case if the host country also agreed to dual citizenship. Former President Kravchuk resisted such Russian pressure because it would water down sovereignty and turn their states into de facto Russian satellites. President Kuchma has also rejected dual citizenship for Ukraine and the Crimea.

The Russian Federation and its borders have no historical legitimacy (Russia never existed as a nation state, only as an empire) and therefore its policies towards the 'Near Abroad' are to recreate these states in its own image (federalist with borders that are open and increasingly lose their relevance). Russian expansionism is also an attempt to preclude the possible disintegration of the artificial Russian Federation state, itself an empire, by applying the 'Kozyrev/Karaganov doctrine' where previously the FSU applied the 'Brezhnev doctrine' in Central Europe to prevent the collapse of the Soviet empire.¹¹¹

The creation of malleable satellites and the watering down of the non-Russian republics sovereignty is also reflected in Russian attitudes towards interstate frontiers in the FSU. No Russian-Ukrainian interstate treaty has been signed.¹¹² If Ukraine were to withdraw from the CIS, Russian policy towards Ukraine and the Crimea would then become more assertive and interventionist, as in the Trans-Caucasus and Moldova.¹¹³ When Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan turned their backs on the CIS, Moscow intervened through proxy forces, coups and economic pressure to ensure they ceased opposing the CIS and returned on Moscow's terms.

The third plank of Russian security policy towards the 'Near Abroad' is support for the large Russian diaspora. The West has not challenged Russia's demand that it has a 'right' to intervene and protect the Russian diaspora, a demand that is inconsistent with international law and has potentially devastating security ramifications, as reflected in former

Yugoslavia. This plank of Russian policy also refuses to recognise its neighbours in the 'Near Abroad' as fully fledged states, but only as satellites where Moscow can exert pressure and dictate its will. The new Russian military doctrine adopted in late 1993 outlines the responsibility of the armed forces to intervene outside the Russian Federation.¹¹⁴

In Ukraine, Russian inability to accept its eternal 'loss' has ensured that relations have remained tense. Moscow has only presented two choices to Ukraine – either to snuggle up to Mother Russia as an unequal 'younger brother' or accept the price of a truncated state if Kiev decides to turn its back on the CIS and Russia. Ukraine has constantly complained that its third option (equal relations of two fully fledged independent states) has not been accepted by Moscow. While not accepting the other post-Soviet states as equal in its eyes, the Russian leadership have played to the domestic nationalist audience by appealing to Russia's 'great power status' by demanding an equal voice to the West in the UN, NATO and G7. 'If the West wants peace in the Balkans it must understand and accept the position of Russia: it must be seen as a great power and an equal partner', *Krasnaya Zvezda* (19 February 1994), the Russian military newspaper, argued.

As Ukraine includes nearly half of the Russian diaspora and a large Russian enclave (Crimea), which the majority of Russians of even democratic persuasion do not accept as 'Ukrainian', the potential for conflict is large.¹¹⁵ Solzhenitsyn does not want the FSU recreated but cannot accept that areas with large Russian minorities, such as the Donbas, Crimea and Northern Kazakhstan be left outside the Russian Federation. Not surprisingly therefore, Ukraine has been a constant critic of Russia's Monroe Doctrine, rejecting its demand for Western sponsorship for peacemaking efforts in the FSU (which could potentially include the Donbas and Crimea).¹¹⁶

The fourth plank of Russia's neo-imperialism towards the FSU is the demand for 30 forward military bases. In the draft Russian-Ukrainian treaty proposed by Russia in August 1992 there were already calls for a 'single regional military-strategic space' and CIS/Russian military bases in Ukraine. President Yeltsin originally proposed the concept of forward bases to an Armed Forces Conference in June 1993 'identical to the American principle of basing'.¹¹⁷ Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov said that Moscow expected to establish 30 bases in the FSU.¹¹⁸ This was then backed by presidential decree two months later.¹¹⁹ Foreign Minister Kozyrev (after initially denying all knowledge of the decree)¹²⁰ and the Russian 'demo-patriotic' camp. Kozyrev has backed the call for bases by stating that Sevastopol had always been a 'Russian base' – and would always remain so.

Russia has already established military bases in Central Asia, Belarus, Armenia and Georgia. Russian armed forces will maintain the Skrunda Radar base in Latvia having pulled out their forces in August 1994 and are pressuring the Azeri leadership to agree to the return of Russian bases. In Moldova, where the West has been less insistent on the removal of unwelcome Russian troops than from the Baltic republics, Moscow originally demanded basing rights for its 14th Army.

In Ukraine demands for basing rights are, at the moment, confined to the Russian portion of the Black Sea Fleet and, in particular, Sevastopol. Moscow is also insisting on maintaining the Izmail naval base on the lower Danube in Odessa *oblast*, an area which could act as a forward military base into the Balkans in a manner envisaged for bases in Moldova.¹²¹ In addition, Moscow has strenuously pushed for the return of cooperation of Border Troops along the Western frontiers of the FSU or joint patrol of CIS borders. Despite the election of President Kuchma Ukraine has continued to oppose the formulation of the external borders of the CIS, believing that each countries borders are for itself to protect (particularly because acceptance by Ukraine of this formulation would lead to CIS/Russian Border Troops in the Crimea, a border region). The commander of Russia's Border Troops, Andrey Nikolayev, had other views: 'the border between Ukraine and Russia is the border between one nation and two states.'¹²²

If we bear in mind Russian policy towards the FSU in general we can now gauge how it affects, and has been applied to, the Crimea. There are no 'doves' and 'hawks' within the Russian leadership on the Crimea. Andranik Migranyan, Russian presidential adviser, has pointed out that, 'The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation correctly asserted the existence of the Crimean problem. This question has not disappeared with the disappearance of the Russian Supreme Soviet. There is absolutely no divergence of views in Russian political circles regarding Crimea. Absolutely none.'¹²³

On three separate occasions during 1992-93 the former Russian parliament questioned the status of the Crimea and Sevastopol within Ukraine. The Crimean question was initially placed on the parliamentary agenda by democrats, such as Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to the US, and only later picked up the nationalist right. The July 1993 Russian parliamentary assertion of sovereignty over Sevastopol was backed by every deputy who was present (only one abstained).¹²⁴ On no occasion did President Yeltsin distance himself from these actions except when the UN Security Council condemned the July 1993 resolution.

Since the election of President Meshkov relations between Ukraine and Russia initially deteriorated over the latter's interference in the dispute. Former President Kravchuk warned the Crimean leadership that they were damaging Ukrainian-Russian relations. 'The leaders of the Crimean republic say they want to be a bridge between Ukraine and Russia, but in fact they are laying a mine under this bridge', he added.¹²⁵ Rukh meanwhile believed that the, 'irresponsible helmsmen of Crimea are encouraged by deputies to the State Duma of the Russian Federation with the president of Russia being aware of this'.¹²⁶

One senior Western source was quoted as saying, 'Russian actions that have not yet become public knowledge, however, include "some pretty nasty stuff"'. What we see troubles us greatly'.¹²⁷ Both Zatulin and Migranyan participated in sessions of the Crimean Supreme Soviet where they raised the issue of the Crimea's entry as an entity separate to Ukraine into the CIS and in the CIS collective security forces. Their proposals are remarkably similar to those advanced during the Gorbachev era for separatist regions to join the USSR Union Treaty as units separate to their host republics.

Russian double standards with regard to establishing direct ties with separatist regions in republics of the FSU, while not allowing this to be undertaken with regions of the Russian Federation, prompted the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry to protest against the signing of the Russo-Crimean cooperation agreement on 13 May 1994. 'What the Ukrainian side is concerned about is the very procedure of signing this agreement, since Russia had previously stated to all countries and international organisations that entities within the Russian Federation signing foreign trade agreements must coordinate their actions with the federal authorities', it claimed. Ukraine adhered to this demand when it signed trade agreements with Tartarstan and Sakha.¹²⁸

Russian policy aims to loosen Ukraine's grip over the Crimea by bringing it directly into the CIS and within Russia's economic, political and military sphere of influence. Zatulin called the area Russia's 'sphere of special interests' from which it could not simply walk away. While Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, a democrat, welcomed the Russo-Crimean trade agreement with the words, 'Crimea has always been inseparable from Russia, it is poured generously with Russian blood. Crimea and Russia are an integral whole'.¹²⁹

The Russian leadership's inability to recognise the Crimea as a purely internal Ukrainian matter was reflected in President Yeltsin who described the Crimea as a 'sovereign republic' which has, 'the right to make its own decisions and that is its business . . . The main thing is that neither we, nor Ukraine, meddle (in those decisions)'. But former

President Kravchuk replied that, 'A president can only issue warnings to his own government bodies and ministers and not to the president of other countries. This is at variance with accepted norms and undemocratic.'¹³⁰ A Ukrainian presidential and governmental statement also accused 'senior Russian bureaucrats' of encouraging Crimean separatism 'and even going so far as overt threats to Ukraine'.

The Russian political elite are therefore unanimous over their unwillingness and inability to accept Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea and Sevastopol. The only difference between the 'enlightened imperialists' now in power and the nationalist right remains their methods and time table. But the overall strategic objective remains the same. If the nationalist right were to come to power in Russia in 1996, a distinct possibility, then the Russian Federation would move to annex regions, such as the Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Narva and the Dniester Republic. 'Kuwait is to Iraq as Crimea is to Russia. Both should be back where they belong', Vladimir Zhirinovskiy believes.¹³¹

WESTERN POLICY

No discussion of the central place of the Crimea in European security can be undertaken without a reference to Western policy, or the lack of such a policy, towards the Crimea and Ukrainian-Russian relations. In mid-December 1992 Kozyrev made a speech to the Stockholm CSCE conference warning them what Russia's policies would consist of if 'hardliners' came to power. Less than two years later the 'hardline' policies outlined then by Kozyrev are now current security policy of the Yeltsin leadership towards the 'Near Abroad'.¹³² Even President Yeltsin has shown a growing willingness to play to the nationalist gallery.¹³³

The evolution of Russian security policy towards a more integrationist and neo-imperial role since 1993 has been largely ignored by the West. The West has shown little interest in challenging Moscow in its attempts at reestablishing an empire. After the January 1994 Moscow Summit Russian presidential advisers claimed that President Bill Clinton, 'had confirmed Russia's special role in maintaining stability in the post-Soviet space'. Kozyrev added that this required maintaining a forward military presence in the other states of the FSU.¹³⁴

The strategic importance of Ukraine has only been recognised slowly and reluctantly in the US and most other Western countries and institutions¹³⁵. Indeed, 'many people in the West themselves have a Russo-centric bias in their thinking. Such thinking leads them to view Russian hegemony not only as the natural course of development in the region but also as a development that may not warrant any particular

scrutiny or critical analysis'.¹³⁶ The West's failure to condemn Russian neo-imperialism has brought on charges of Western 'appeasement' by many commentators.¹³⁷

The West has only challenged Russia over the three Baltic states, which the current Russian leadership regards as being outside its integrationist policies in the CIS. Russia accepts that the three Baltic republics are 'special' and has withdrawn its armed forces, unlike from Moldova which the West has largely ignored. Even so the West pressured the Latvians to accept a continued Russian presence at the Skrunda radar base. The Baltic republics have a high regard for 'Ukrainian activities aimed at strengthening peace and stability in Europe'. Algirdas Brazauskas, President of Lithuania, went out of his way to praise former President Kravchuk.¹³⁸ The Baltic republics regard Ukraine as the front line between them and a fully reconstituted Soviet empire.

In the case of Ukraine, Western policy would have no doubt resembled that towards Moldova and Belarus if Kiev had not had a trump card up its sleeve – nuclear weapons. In view of the Western and Russian policies towards the FSU outlined in this essay, it would have therefore been illogical for Ukrainian leaders not to have used nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to extract security assurances from the West. The only exclusion made by the West from the Russian sphere of influence within the former USSR are the three Baltic states. The West's view of Ukraine is confused and lacks clarity, assigning it to a 'no man's land' lying neither within (like Moldova or Georgia) – nor outside (like the Baltic republics) – the Russian sphere of influence because of its possession of nuclear weapons and use of them as a bargaining chip.

The US has now approved Russian peacekeeping in the FSU, something long opposed by Ukraine because of its security ramifications in the Crimea. Madeleine Albright, US Ambassador to the UN, believed that Russian peacekeeping forces in Georgia had become a 'neutral force' and people in the FSU were 'grateful' for Russian peacekeepers. The introduction of Russian forces into Georgia in this role, after initially backing Abkhazia's separation, was supported by the UN Security Council in a quid pro quo to obtain Russian backing for a possible US invasion of Haiti in a 'our backyard, your backyard' deal.¹³⁹ Such deals merely confirms widespread suspicions in Kiev that a deal would be struck behind their back between Washington and Moscow over the Crimea if a conflict began.

The Crimea is central to Ukrainian security fears and the driving force behind Ukrainian demands for security guarantees in exchange for

nuclear disarmament. If the Crimea is lost to Russia, Moscow will find itself with a nuclear neighbour hostile towards it, a situation rather resembling the relationship between India and Pakistan. First Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasiuk, has placed on the record that, 'any Russian attempts to benefit from the situation that occurred in the Crimea will threaten to break the agreement on Ukrainian nuclear missile withdrawal to Russia . . .'¹⁴⁰ Rukh and other nationalistic political parties have already demanded the suspension of Ukraine's denuclearisation in response to Russian interference in the Crimea¹⁴¹ and Mikhailchenko, former presidential adviser on domestic affairs, warned that, 'It is time to remind world public opinion that Ukraine possesses nuclear weapons' during the May 1994 Crimean crisis.¹⁴²

It is little coincidence therefore, that the West has supported Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea since the Trilateral Agreement and ratification of START 1 in early 1994 (in contrast to the West's silence in 1992-93). Ukraine and the Crimea will be, 'the key foreign policy question on which Moscow's readiness for a security association with the West is being tested.'¹⁴³ In June 1994 the Ukrainian parliament voted to place the question of the suspension of the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine on its agenda in response to Russian policy towards the Crimea, although this was later dropped.¹⁴⁴

The Crimea and Ukrainian territorial integrity will remain central to European security and pivotal to US-Russian relations. The West has largely appeased Russian neo-imperialism in the FSU which has only served to heighten Ukrainian security fears and swell its nuclear lobby. Both the newly elected parliament and president are critical of the delivery of US aid, only \$3 million out of \$350 million of which had arrived by August 1994 when 300 warheads (or nearly 20 per cent) of the total had already been transferred from Ukraine to Russia.

Canada, USA, UK, Turkey, Iran, China and Australia have all voiced their support for Ukrainian territorial integrity. Poland, Romania and Hungary voiced their concerns at the implications for European security of the Crimean conflict and added their support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. 'A sovereign Ukraine is in the strategic interests of Poland', the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, Ivo Bychewski, has argued, and Ukraine is a 'strategic partner' of Poland whose security would be damaged by conflict over the Crimea.¹⁴⁵

Turkey has visible national and security interests in the Crimea and the Black Sea region. On the eve of a visit by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel to Ukraine and Moldova in late May-early June 1994 the Turkish Chief of the General Staff Dogan Güres called Russia

a 'very serious threat to Turkey' by its expansionist policies in Ukraine, Crimea and the Trans-Caucasus. He accused Russia of wanting to annex the Crimea. Political *rapprochement* with Ukraine and Moldova is regarded as a 'long-term political investment in Turkish security'.

Turkey has therefore strongly supported Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, encouraged Tartar (or 'Crimean Turks') backing for Kiev, formulated common approaches to conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus (including supporting the inviolability of borders) and backed Ukraine's opposition to Russian peacekeeping and bases in the FSU.¹⁴⁶ Turkey also supports a plan for a pipeline from Iran through Turkey to transport oil to Ukraine to lessen Kiev's dependency on Russia and its ability therefore to apply pressure. The visit of former Defence Minister Radetskiy to Turkey in July 1994 led to the signing of a military training, technical and scientific cooperation agreement.¹⁴⁷

The CSCE and EU have also voiced their concern and support for a peaceful resolution of the Crimean question. Turkey and Ukraine have similar views about the role of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Agreement (BSECA) on security questions as an alternative to the Russian-dominated CIS. Former President Kravchuk called upon the BSECA to ban the use of Black Sea navies for offensive actions, establish treaties of nonaggression in the region and sign declarations on the inviolability of Black Sea states borders.¹⁴⁸ The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has also requested that the UN supported Ukraine's actions to ensure its territorial integrity when, 'a threat is thereby being created to peace and stability in the region and in Europe as a whole.'¹⁴⁹

Two factors could upset the current lack of a Western policy over the Crimea and Ukrainian territorial integrity. First, will the West continue to support Ukrainian territorial integrity as strongly after Ukraine removes all its nuclear weapons to Russia and will a democratic Russia then remain as restrained in its neo-imperialistic policies towards Ukraine? Second, what will the Western response be to the emergence of a nationalist president in post-Yeltsin Russia in the light of its failed policies towards Bosnia and inability to stem Serbian aggression? The advent of a Russian nationalist president would inevitably target Ukraine and the Crimea for reincorporation into a new empire.¹⁵⁰

CONCLUSIONS

Ukrainian policies are likely to continue as a mixture of appeasing and rejecting the demands of the Crimean leadership while drawing the line at secession through legal means and economic pressure. Newly elected

President Kuchma is unlikely to use the third option from the policy arsenal of his predecessor, military pressure, but Kuchma, like his defeated rival Kravchuk, will not be in a position, as head of state and guarantor of Ukraine's territorial integrity, to allow the Crimea to secede from Ukraine. At least two thirds of the Ukrainian parliament's deputies will always vote to annul any threats to its territorial integrity regardless of their disagreements about domestic political and economic questions.

The newly elected Ukrainian president, with only a 6–7 per cent majority over his defeated rival Kravchuk, will adopt pragmatic policies and concentrate on economic questions. President Kuchma does not have a public mandate to alter Ukraine's geopolitical orientation radically. Ukraine's foreign and defence policies therefore have not changed, although presented in a less ideological and more diplomatic manner. The 'normalisation' of Ukrainian-Russian relations rests on an agreement finally reached over the Black Sea Fleet (especially naval bases) coupled with the signing of an interstate Russian-Ukrainian treaty on friendship and cooperation, both of which eluded former President Kravchuk. If President Kuchma is successful where his predecessor failed this would also lead to the 'normalisation' of relations between Ukraine and the Crimea.

Russian policy towards the FSU has evolved in the direction of neo-imperialism. There is no longer a liberal influence upon Russian security policy, unlike in 1990–92, which rejected empire in favour of Russian statehood. Current Russian security policy is the neo-imperialism first espoused by the centre-right national democrats during late 1992 under Rutskoi in the Civic Union and then increasingly taken on board during 1993–94 by President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev. The Russian leadership and policy-makers misjudged Ukrainian domestic politics, as so often in the past, believing that a Kuchma victory would lead to Ukraine's full reintegration into the CIS. The integration of the Crimea and long-term lease of bases on its territories by Russia will continue as items on its strategic agenda throughout the geopolitical space of the FSU.

Western policy towards Russia has largely been one of appeasement, as reflected in US support at the UN for Russian peacekeeping in the FSU. Although there is a greater awareness of Ukraine's strategic importance to European security since the beginning of 1994 in the US this has come only about after Ukraine used nuclear weapons to ensure that it was not relegated to the Russian sphere of influence and largely forgotten, like Moldova or Georgia. Although the US and Western Europe profess an interest in Ukraine's security concerns Western

policies towards Russia, such as those relating to peacekeeping, military doctrine and forward bases, often have the unintentional result of sharpening Kiev's security fears.

A major crisis in the West's policies towards Russia and Ukraine will arise if a Crimean conflict forces them to choose which side to support. A crisis in Ukrainian-Russian relations over the Crimea would have security ramifications for Poland and Turkey, both of whom have 'strategic partnerships' with Ukraine. Poland and Turkey are strong and vocal supporters of Ukrainian territorial integrity and harbour similar security fears about Russian neo-imperialism.

The Crimea will therefore remain crucial to European security and the stability of Central-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region. Russian-Ukrainian conflict over the Crimea, and other disputed Ukrainian territories such as the Donbas, would have security ramifications for Central Europe, Germany, Turkey and Kazakhstan (whose northern region, dominated by Russian-speakers, would be the next to erupt). The failure of Western policy towards the Yugoslav Civil War points to the need to take preventative action before (and not after) the crisis evolves into a full-blown conflict. For this to occur the West needs a coherent and all-embracing policy towards Ukraine which is willing to challenge Russian neo-imperialism, something it has been unwilling to undertake until now.¹⁵¹

NOTES

1. Interfax, 14 Sept. 1994.
2. Associated Press [hereafter AP] 18 May 1994.
3. The current Russian leadership is following a policy of reestablishing its influence and control over the FSU primarily by non-military means, except through support for secessionist movements and against the Tajik anti-communist opposition. On this see Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, *Back in the USSR: Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project* (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Govt. Harvard Univ., Jan. 1994).
4. See Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Reasserts its Strategic Agenda,' *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/50 (17 Dec. 1993).
5. See Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation Over the Crimea,' *RFE/RL Research Report* 1/7 (21 Feb. 1992), idem, 'The Crimean Imbroglia: Kiev and Simferopol', *ibid.* 1/33 (21 Aug. 1992), idem, 'The Crimean Imbroglia: Kiev and Moscow', *ibid.*, 1/40 (9 Oct. 1992), Ian Bremmer, 'Ethnic Issues in Crimea,' *ibid.*, 2/18 (30 April 1993), S. Crow, 'Russian Parliament Asserts Control Over Sevastopol,' *ibid.* 2/31 (30 July 1993), Andrew Wilson, 'Crimea's Political Cauldron,' *ibid.* 2/45 (12 Nov. 1993) and 'The Elections in Crimea,' *ibid.* 3/25 (24 June 1994). For a more detailed study see Taras Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine. Triangle of Conflict: Conflict Studies* 267 (London: Res. Inst. for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994).

6. AP, 19 June 1994.
7. See note 4.
8. John W.R. Lepingwell, 'The Soviet Legacy and Russian Foreign Policy', *RFE/RL Research Report 3/23* (10 June 1994), p.3.
9. *ibid.*, p.4.
10. See Susan Stewart, 'Ukraine's Policy toward its Ethnic Minorities', *RFE/RL Research Report 2/36* (10 Sept. 1993). The CSCE has often commended Ukraine for its positive ethnic minority policies. The CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities told his Ukrainian hosts that their policy should serve as the standard for other countries to follow (*Holos Ukrainy*, 7 June 1994).
11. See T. Kuzio, 'Ukrainian Election Results Point to Growing Regionalism', *Jane's Intelligence Review Pointer*, No.6 (April 1994), R. Solchanyk, 'Crimea's Presidential Election' and Ustina Markus, 'Crimea Restores 1992 Constitution', *RFE/RL Research Report 3/11* and 23 (18 March and 10 June 1994).
12. The Galician region of Western Ukraine and the Crimea gave the highest and lowest support respectively for Ukrainian independence in the Dec. 1991 referendum (nearly 100 per cent and 54 per cent). They therefore represent the two polar extremes in Ukraine that were reflected in the June–July 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections. Whereas Kuchma obtained 82.5 per cent Kravchuk obtained only 7 per cent in the Crimea. In Western Ukraine, on the other hand, the voting pattern was reversed and Kravchuk polled 70–90 per cent of the vote (*UPI*, 27 June 1994). In the city of Sambir, L'viv [Lvov] *oblast*, Kravchuk obtained an astounding 99 per cent of the vote.
13. In the 26 June 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine, unlike the Crimea or Russia, no nationalist candidate even stood. Of the seven candidates only one, Volodymyr Lanavoi, was from the democratic camp (in contrast to four in Dec. 1991). Nationalist hopes were pinned instead on Kravchuk as the 'lesser of two evils' against the other frontrunner, Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma stood for, 'a rejection of self-isolation, and a restoration of all mutually advantageous economic, spiritual and cultural links with the former republics of the Soviet Union, above all with Russia' (*UNIA news agency* (Kiev), 20 June 1994). Meanwhile, Ukrainian authors accused the Kuchma government of helping to fan the flames of 'anti-Ukrainian tendencies' in the Crimea (*Vechirnyi Kiev* (Kiev), 9 Feb. 1994).
14. During the Crimean presidential elections Bagrov stated that, 'Crimea's secession from Ukraine is out of the question, Meshkov's policy of promising people to take them into Russia's arms is a road to nowhere'. He referred to the Helsinki agreement, Russian-Ukrainian agreement and the Trilateral Agreement on nuclear weapons as three documents which ruled out border changes (*Radio Ukraine* (Kiev), 23 Jan. 1994).
15. The Tartars preferred Bagrov and Kravchuk in a choice pitting them against Meshkov and Kuchma respectively, who are both pro-Russian in their strategic orientations. The leader of the Tartar 'parliament' (*Majlis*), Mustafa Dzhemilev, said that the Crimean Tartars would, 'definitely be against Leonid Kuchma' because they viewed the Tartar question as purely a 'Crimean ethnic minority' question (*UNIAN news agency* (Kiev), 29 April 1994). On Tartar support for Kravchuk see *Molod Ukrainy*, 17 June 1994.
16. See the commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tartars attended by former President Kravchuk (*Holos Ukrainy*, 21 April, 17 May 1994 and *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 18 May 1994).
17. *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 May 1994.
18. *Radio Ukraine*, 29 March 1994.
19. On the congress see *Post Postup* (L'viv), no.44 (2–8 Dec. 1993). On the extraordinary congress of the Civic Congress see *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 Jan. 1994.
20. The law 'On the President of the Crimean Republic' was adopted by the Crimean parliament in 1993 under Bagrov in the hope that he would be its first beneficiary.

While former President Kravchuk believed this to be the case he did not oppose the institution of presidency in the Crimea. The appeal by the Civic Congress demanded that former President Kravchuk condemn the attempt of the 'communist party *nomenklatura*' (i.e., Bagrov) to install a presidency in the Crimea (*Narodna Hazeta* [Kiev], No.50, Dec. 1993).

21. See the statement on obtaining international diplomatic support to solve the Crimean crisis by the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (*Vechirnyi Kiev*, 2 June 1994).
22. *Radio Ukraine*, 31 May 1994. The deputy chairman of the Crimean parliament, Viktor Mezhak, ridiculed the shadow parliament as not possessing the authority to speak on behalf of Crimeans (*ITAR-TASS news agency* [Moscow], 1 June 1994).
23. *Samostiyna Ukraina* (Kiev), No.18 (15–18 May 1994). See also the statement of the Democratic Coalition Ukraine electoral bloc (*Holos Ukrainy*, 9 Feb. 1994) and by Rukh chairman, Chornovil (*Vechirnyi Kiev*, 18 May 1994). Chornovil demanded that steps be taken, 'to rebuff foreign intervention into the affairs of our state, to prevent armed conflict in the centre of Europe . . .' The Ukrainian National Assembly added stronger demands such as the introduction of martial law in the Crimea, arrest of Crimean leaders, introduction of further security forces and its administration by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (*UNIAR news agency*, 20 May 1994).
24. *Reuters*, 2 April 1994. See the hostile Crimean response and Ukrainian reply in *Holos Ukrainy*, 12 April 1994.
25. *Holos Ukrainy*, 27 Jan. 1993.
26. *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 Jan. 1994. The constitutional change allowed former President Kravchuk to annul government, ministerial and Crimean acts.
27. *Holos Ukrainy*, 1 March 1994. The Crimean parliament voted in favour of dual citizenship in July 1994.
28. *AP*, 25 Feb. 1994.
29. See the statement explaining the position of the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice on Crimean laws and their compatibility with the Ukrainian constitution in *Uriadovyi Kurier* (Kiev), Nos.50–51 (31 March 1994).
30. *Reuters*, 15 March 1994.
31. *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 23 May 1994. See also Holovatiy's appeal to the CSCE (*Vechirnyi Kiev*, 25 May 1994). Holovatiy was referring to Kravchuk's initial support for Crimean autonomy in 1990–1993 when his ally, Bagrov, was in charge of the peninsula.
32. *AP*, 24 May 1994. This was also reported on Russian television five days earlier.
33. See former President Kravchuk's appeal to the Crimean parliament (*Uriadovyi Kurier*, No.18 [21 May 1994]) and the joint appeal by Ukrainian president and government (*Holos Ukrainy*, 19 May 1994). On Ukrainian television (19 May) Kravchuk drew a line in the sand, 'Everybody must understand that there is a limit for any society, for any state which no one is allowed to exceed. This limit is the territorial integrity of the state.'
34. *Agence France Presse* [hereafter *AFP*], 19 May 1994.
35. The presidential decree repealing this decision is in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, No.78 (21 May 1994). On tension between the Crimea and Ukraine see *Financial Times*, 17 March, 13 April, 24 May, 28–29 May 1994, *New York Times*, 23 March, 30 May, 1994 *Wall Street Journal*, 1 June 1994 and *The Independent*, 21 May 1994. Kuznetsov came out of retirement after he had been forced to resign from command of 32nd Corps in Simferopol in summer 1992 when he refused to take the Ukrainian oath of loyalty.
36. *Holos Ukrainy*, 24 May 1994.
37. *UNIAR news agency*, 20 May 1994. Leonid Hrach, leader of the Communist Party of the Crimea, issued a statement denouncing the return to the May 1992 constitution which, 'allows dishonourable leaders in Ukraine, Crimea and Russia to inflame interethnic hostility and a bloody conflict' (*UNIAR news agency*, 22 May 1994).

38. Kravchuk has often repeated that there are political forces in Ukraine and Russia who seek the restoration of the FSU but he warned that it would lead to civil war and bloodshed (Reuters, 3 June 1994).
39. See Kravchuk's speech to the Ukrainian parliament after the end of the ten-day deadline (*Holos Ukrainy*, 4 June 1994). See also *Wall Street Journal* and *Financial Times*, 2 June 1994. A resolution of the Ukrainian parliament on action to be taken followed Kravchuk's speech (*Holos Ukrainy*, 3 June 1994).
40. UNIAN news agency, 20 May 1994.
41. On the war of decrees over the basing of Crimean conscripts in the Crimea see *Narodna Armiya*, 5 April 1994, UNIAN news agency, 12 and 14 April and *Holos Ukrainy*, 16 April 1994.
42. T. Kuzio, 'Crimean Crisis Deepens', *Jane's Intelligence Review Pointer*, No.8 (June 1994).
43. See *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 19 and 23 May and *UNIAN news agency*, 25 and 28 May 1994. The changes to Ukrainian legislation on the militia in an attempt to bring the Crimean MVD back under Kiev's control is published in *Holos Ukrainy*, 8 July 1994.
44. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 Aug. 1994.
45. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 1 March and *New York Times*, 30 May 1994.
46. *Post Postup*, No.11 (15–21 April 1994).
47. AFP, 20 May 1994.
48. Ostankino TV (Moscow), 20 May 1994.
49. ITAR-TASS news agency 19 and 22 May, Reuters, 22 May 1994.
50. *Holos Ukrainy*, 30 Aug. 1994.
51. *Ukrainian News* (Kiev), No.20 (23 May 1994).
52. UNIAN news agency, 2 June 1994. See my two articles 'Ukrainian Paramilitaries' and 'Paramilitary Groups in Ukraine', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Dec. 1992 and March 1994.
53. See Igor Rotar, 'Crimea-Abkhazia-Pridniester. Similarities and Differences', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 March 1994.
54. On Russian policy towards the 'Near Abroad' and Crimea see later.
55. On regionalism in Ukraine see R. Solchanyk, 'The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/1 (Jan.-Feb. 1994), pp.47–68, Ian Bremmer, 'The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies* 46/2 (March–April 1994), pp.261–83 and Andrew Wilson, 'The Growing Challenge to Kiev from Donbas', *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/33 (20 Aug. 1993).
56. The poll was conducted by the Int. Inst. of Sociology, Kiev in April 1994. Its results are reflected in other polls in Ukraine. See the poll by the same institute and the Peter Mohyla Academy which gave only 33 per cent and 50 per cent support for Ukrainian independence in eastern and southern Ukraine respectively. Support for unification with Russia in these regions was also as high as 65 per cent and 49 per cent respectively (*Ukrainske Slovo* (Paris), 20 Feb. 1994).
57. *Vybor: gazeta sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii* (Luhansk), No.16, 1994.
58. *Patriot* (Moscow), No.20, 1994.
59. Deliveries of 28 officer-instructors of the Dniester Republican 'Ministry of State Security' as well as weapons and ammunition from Col. Mikhail Bergman, military commander of the Tiraspol garrison of Russia's 14th Army, to the Crimea began in June (UNIAN news agency, 25 June 1994).
60. See the telegram by Lavrov to the Sevastopol city council in *Slava Sevastopolya* (Sevastopol), 2 Feb. 1994.
61. The 'realities' referred to are an obvious reference to Ukraine's weak economic position and the pro-Russian lobby in the Crimea (UPI, 23 April 1994).
62. On the collapse of these talks where Grachev stormed out after not being granted what he had demanded see *Narodna Armiya*, 26 April 1994 and 'The Black Sea Fleet – A Deadly Game of Chess', *Jane's Intelligence Review Pointer* No.7 (April 1994).

63. Radio Moscow International, 10 May 1994.
64. On the tense negotiations of the sixth round of talks see *Uriadovyi Kurier*, Nos.80–81 and 82 (26 and 28 May 1994).
65. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2 June 1994.
66. UNIAN news agency, 25 June 1994.
67. *Holos Ukrainy*, 14 July 1994.
68. UNIAR news agency, 2 Aug. 1994.
69. *Holos Ukrainy*, 10 Sept. 1994.
70. UNIAR news agency, 25 August and *Holos Ukrainy*, 30 Aug. and 7 Sept. 1994.
71. *Holos Ukrainy*, 30 Aug., 2 Sept. and *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 27 Aug. 1994.
72. See the appeal of the second Congress of Ukrainian Citizens of Sevastopol in *Vechirnyi Kiev*, 26 July 1994.
73. See the statements by the President and law enforcement bodies respectively in *Holos Ukrainy*, 10 and 13 Sept. 1994.
74. This refers to the act of piracy undertaken by pro-Russian Black Sea Fleet officers who unilaterally transferred the fleet survey ship *Cheleken* from Odesa to Sevastopol. Nearly 200 paratroopers from the 1st Airmobile Div. at Bolgrad stormed the Odesa naval base and arrested Russian officers while Ukrainian fighter planes threatened to attack the *Cheleken*. The base was then nationalised by the Ukrainians and transferred to the Ukrainian Navy. Black Sea Fleet ships sent to defend the base were turned back by strong statements of former Defence Minister Radetsky. The incident showed how quickly a small conflict could escalate in the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea. One high-ranking Russian diplomat was quoted as saying, 'the incident in Odesa is the most large-scale and brazen anti-Russian action of all taken by the Ukrainian side' (*Washington Post*, 11 April 1994). See also *Narodna Armiya*, 12 and 15 April as well as the sharp statement by the Ukrainian Congress of National Democratic Forces, *Narodna Hazeta*, No.16 (April 1994).
75. Radetskiy continued to insist that Sevastopol would be the main base of the Ukrainian Navy. His position on these questions became increasingly closer to his predecessor, Morozov, primarily in response to Russian negotiating tactics and growing into the post of Defence Minister.
76. UNIAN news agency, 21 June 1994.
77. *Radio Ukraine*, 20 April 1994. The Ukrainian Civic Congress, Cossacks and Ukrainian naval personnel in Sevastopol demanded that the city remain a Ukrainian naval base (*Kievskiy Vedomosti*, 21 April 1994).
78. See Kravchuk's speech to the Bolgrad 1st Airmobile Div. where he stated that, 'Ukraine cannot accept the formulation which Russia wants to force upon it, namely that Sevastopol is a base of the Russian Navy' (ITAR-TASS news agency, 16 June 1994). Kravchuk told servicemen that, 'The Ukrainian armed forces are prepared to defend their land, sovereignty and the inviolability of state borders' (Reuters, 17 June 1994).
79. *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 June 1994.
80. *Independent on Sunday*, 17 April 1994.
81. See comments by deputy editor of *Moscow News*, Alexei Pushkov, a foreign policy specialist in *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 June 1994. Ukrainian accusations of Russian stalling over negotiations on the Fleet and an interstate treaty are made in *Vechirnyi Kiev*, 24 May 1994.
82. Interview on Russian TV, 17 June 1994. See also interviews with Kuchma in *Trud*, 21 June 1994 and *Komsomskaya Pravda*, 27 June 1994.
83. On the ratings of Ukrainian and Russian TV in Ukraine see *Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy*, No.3 (Kiev: Academic Res. Inst. Democratic Initiative, 1993).
84. *Narodna Armiya*, 8 Sept. 1994.
85. *Slava Sevastopolya*, 17 Sept. 1994.
86. See the comments on no changes to Ukraine's position on the Black Sea Fleet question by Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov (ITAR-TASS, 26 Aug. 1994) and the division of the ships (*Holos Ukrainy*, 18 Aug. 1994).

87. UNIAN news agency, 13 Sept. 1994.
88. Reuters 27 May 1994. Of course, this is not necessarily incompatible with a lease where the fixed time period of the lease would be used to scale down Russian naval forces so that they completely withdrew from Ukrainian territory when the lease expired. The author elaborated such a series of proposals as 'Eight Steps to Solving the Black Sea Fleet Question' in *Narodna Armiya*, 17 May 1994.
89. *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 29 July 1994.
90. *Uriadovyi Kurier*, Nos. 128–129 and 137 (8 Aug. and 6 Sept. 1994).
91. *Holos Ukrainy*, 26 Aug. 1994.
92. See the statements by the Democratic Coalition 'Ukraine' (*Visti z Ukrainy*, 8–14 Sept.), Peasant Democratic Party (*Vechirnyy Kiev*, 30 Aug. 1994) and Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Visti z Ukrainy*, 1–7 Sept. 1994).
93. *Holos Ukrainy*, 13 Sept. and Reuters, 9 Sept. 1994.
94. On the problems of coming to accept loss of empire and great power status see the following articles by Vera Tolz and Elizabeth Teague, 'Russian Intellectuals Adjust to Loss of Empire', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/7 (21 Feb. 1991), John Dunlop, 'Russia: confronting a loss of empire' in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, *Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), pp. 43–72 and editorial, 'Withdrawal Symptoms', *Independent*, 16 Nov. 1992.
95. See interview with Alexander Rutskoi in *Newsweek*, 23 May 1994.
96. *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 8 Dec. 1992 and 5 Jan. 1994.
97. *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 21 June 1994.
98. 'I believe that a gradual reintegration is not only in Russia's interests but would be an advantage for the world as a whole', Gorbachev wrote in *La Stampa*, 25 Aug. 1994.
99. *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 26 June 1994.
100. Reuters, 23 Nov. 1993.
101. Shumeyko's comments were reported by *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 9 June 1994. The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy 'Strategy for Russia (2)' appeared in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 27 May 1994. It openly called for the establishment of a new Union. Karaganov believes that Russia faces a choice between 'the recreation of a Union' (which he supports) 'and the imposition of an empire' (*Financial Times*, 18 April 1994). From the perspective of Kiev there is little difference between the two concepts.
102. *Independent*, 30 May 1994.
103. Reuters, 6 Aug. 1994.
104. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 5 May 1994.
105. Y. Afanasyev, 'A New Russian Imperialism', *Perspective* 4/3 (Feb.–March 1994) and Anatolii Chernayev, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 April 1994. Chernayev, former Gorbachev adviser on foreign affairs, accused the 'Kozyrev doctrine' of 'recking of Zhirinovskiy'. See also Therese Raphael, 'Russia: The New Imperialism', *The Wall Street Journal*, 22 June 1994.
106. Interfax (Moscow), 8 June 1994.
107. On Russian peacekeeping in the CIS see A. Kozyrev, 'Russia's Peacemaking: There Are no Easy Solutions', *New Times* (Moscow), No.4, 1994, S. Crow, 'The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR', *RFE/RL Research Report* 1/37 (18 Sept. 1992), idem, 'Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping', *ibid.* 2/15 (9 April 1993) and Michael Orr, 'Peacekeeping – A New Task for Russian Military Doctrine', *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6/7 (July 1994).
108. The use of Belarussian bases as an example of how the Russian military would like other former Soviet states to follow is outlined in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25 June 1994.
109. On Russia's Monroe Doctrine see *Izvestiya*, 7 Aug. 1992, Paul A. Goble, 'Russia and its Neighbours', *Foreign Policy*, No.90 (Spring 1993), pp.79–89, John Lough, 'Defining Russia's Relations with Neighbouring States', *RFE/RL Research Report* 2/20 (14 May 1993) and Jonathan Eyal, 'Russia's covert colonialism', *Independent*, 16 Nov. 1993.
110. See article by Pavel Baev in *Novoe Vremya*, no.35 (1993).

111. As note 4.
112. The draft Russian treaty was published in *Vechirnyi Kiev*, 21 Sept. 1994. Its implementation would have *de facto* created a new Union or confederation (*Guardian*, 22 Sept. 1992).
113. In Aug. 1992 Russia proposed its draft treaty but it was rejected by Ukraine. Kiev has still to obtain a reply to its draft proposal of Dec. 1992. As early as April 1992 Kozyrev told the Russian parliament that recognition of the territorial integrity of FSU republics was conditional on their membership of the CIS (*FBIS Daily Report: Central Eurasia*, 22 April 1992).
114. *Rossiyskiye Vesti* (Moscow), 18 Nov. 1993. See Ukraine's criticism of the military doctrine by Ihor Kharchenko, Head of the Political Analysis and Planning Dept. of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Polityka i Chas* (Kiev), No.1, 1994).
115. On the Russian diaspora see Leon Gudkov, 'The Disintegration of the USSR and Russians in the Republics', *Journal of Communist Studies* 9/1, (March 1993), pp.75-87, William D. Jackson, 'Imperial Temptations: Ethnicns Abroad', *Orbis* 38/1 (Winter 1994), pp.1-17 and 'Russians abroad: pawns or knights?' *Economist*, 10 July 1993.
116. Radio Ukraine, 1 March 1993 and *International Herald and Tribune*, 2 March 1993. See also the Russian Foreign Ministry refutation of Ukrainian charges of neo-imperialism (ITAR-TASS news agency, 3 March 1994).
117. Yeltsin pointed to Armenia, Georgia and Moldova as states where Russia would like forward military bases (Interfax, 10 June 1993). On plans for a military base in Moldova see also *Megapolis-Express* (Moscow), 2 March 1994.
118. ITAR-TASS news agency, 28 Feb. 1994.
119. *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 7 April and *Rossiskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 29 April 1994.
120. ITAR-TASS news agency, 18 and 19 Jan. 1994
121. *Segodnya* (Moscow), 31 May 1994.
122. Nikolayev's comments are reported by *UNIAN news agency*, 3 Aug. 1994. Ukraine's views of the CIS borders were made by Deputy Defence Minister Bizhan at the Moscow CIS summit (Reuters, 9 Sept. 1994). The sensitivity of this question for the newly elected Ukrainian president can be gauged from the refutal of a report that the Ukrainian-Russian border would be henceforth jointly patrolled by both countries (*Holos Ukrainy*, 26 Aug. 1994).
123. *Respublika* (Kiev), No.23 (4-10 Nov. 1993).
124. The Ukrainian reply appeared in *Holos Ukrainy*, 13 July 1993. Bohdan Horyn, then Deputy Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, called these Russian claims 'an undeclared war', *Narodna Armiya*, 27 March 1993.
125. *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 28 May 1994.
126. UNIA news agency, 19 March 1994.
127. *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 1 June 1994.
128. UNIA news agency, 17 May 1994.
129. ITAR-TASS news agency, 5 May 1994. See also Leyla Boulton, 'Russia to build up ties to Crimea', *Financial Times*, 31 March 1994.
130. ITAR-TASS news agency, 23 May and *New York Times*, 25 May 1994. See also John Lloyd, Jill Barshay and Leyla Boulton, 'Russia, Ukraine in war of words', *Financial Times*, 30 May 1994.
131. *The Times*, 21 Dec. 1993.
132. Speech repr. in S. Crow, 'Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?' *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3/18 (6 May 1994).
133. See Lee Hockstader, 'On Some Issues Yeltsin Appears to Play to Russia's Extreme Nationalists', *Washington Post*, 4 Aug. 1994.
134. ITAR-TASS news agency, 17 Jan. 1994.
135. See Dave McCurdy, 'The Evolving US Policy Toward Ukraine', *SAIS Review*, 14/1 (Winter-Spring 1994), pp.153-70.
136. The West's 'strategic arthritis' with regard to Russia and willingness to accept Russian intervention were even criticised by the International Institute Strategic

- Studies in its *Strategic Survey, 1994–1995* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, May 1994).
137. See three articles by Jonathan Eyal, Director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute, in *The Independent*, 11 May, 20 Dec. 1993 and 13 Jan. 1994. See also Therese Raphael, 'Kozyrev's Doctrine: The CIS is Our Turf' and Adrian Karatnycky, 'Back to the USSR', *Wall Street Journal*, 20 June and 1–2 July 1994.
 138. See *Estonian Radio*, 5 Aug. 1994 and *Holos Ukrainy*, 1 July 1994.
 139. 'Yeltsin's "Peace-Keeping"', *Washington Post*, 15 Sept. 1994.
 140. *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 Feb. 1994. Tarasiuk repeated the same warning two months later (*Washington Times*, 7 April 1994). The centrality of Ukrainian security fears to nuclear weapons is discussed in my article 'From Pariah to Partner. Ukraine and Nuclear Weapons', *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6/5 (May 1994).
 141. Reuters, 16 May 1994.
 142. *Sunday Telegraph*, 22 May 1994.
 143. *Washington Post*, 24 May 1994.
 144. *Kievskiy Vedomosti*, 30 June, 7 July 1994 and *Reuters*, 28 June 1994.
 145. *Holos Ukrainy*, 22 June 1994.
 146. See Vladimir Socor, 'Demirel Asserts Turkish Interests in Ukraine and Moldova', *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/31 (12 Aug. 1994). The Turkish-Ukrainian joint communiqué is repr. in *Holos Ukrainy*, 2 June 1994.
 147. *Narodna Armiya*, 29 July 1994.
 148. See Daniel A. Connelly, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation', *RFE/RL Research Report* 3/26 (1 July 1994).
 149. ITAR-TASS news agency, 25 May 1994.
 150. These two questions are discussed in my two articles, 'Ukrainian Security to The End of the Decade', *Ukrainian Times* (Kiev), 26 April–10 May 1994 and 'How Much Peace Will \$12bn Buy?' *Independent*, 12 Jan. 1994.
 151. See Steve Crawshaw, 'Russia must be told where its borders end', *Independent*, 24 June 1994.