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On: 11 January 2015, At: 14:39

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:

1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,
London W1T 3JH, UK



Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs20>

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Published online: 12 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Taras Kuzio (1995) The 1994 parliamentary elections in
Ukraine, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 11:4, 335-361,
DOI: [10.1080/13523279508415294](https://doi.org/10.1080/13523279508415294)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523279508415294>

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The 1994 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine

TARAS KUZIO

As in all processes of democratization, elections have been playing a key role in post-Soviet Ukraine, and were part of the demands of reformers before the collapse of the USSR. The elections of 1993 and 1994 effected a peaceful transition from the Soviet-style parliamentary institutions elected in 1990 to the new parliament of independent Ukraine, based on a new electoral law. The results of opinion polls and of the actual voting promoted a growing range of parties, programmes and groups, and also revealed regional distinctions in their bases of support. While opposition parties complained of bias in favour of the 'Party of Power', and observers indicated the need for some changes in the electoral procedures, there is hope for stability following the successful resolution of constitutional conflicts between parliament and the presidency.

Introduction

Demands for new elections were a recurrent feature of the Ukrainian political scene after the disintegration of the former USSR and establishment of an independent Ukrainian state in December 1991. Attempts in 1992 by Rukh (the Ukrainian Popular Movement) to collect three million signatures to hold a referendum on dissolving parliament failed to collect the requisite number, made deliberately large so as to thwart such referendums. Instead, widespread strikes by coal miners in June 1993¹ forced parliament to agree to referendums in September of the same year concerning both itself and President Leonid Kravchuk. On 24 September 1993 a resolution of the Ukrainian parliament cancelled the referendum concerning confidence in parliament and president in favour of early parliamentary elections on 27 March and presidential and local elections on 26 June 1994.²

This article surveys the parliamentary elections between March 1993 and the end of 1994 which resulted in a peaceful transfer of power from the Soviet-era parliament and local councils elected in March 1990. It will not deal with the elections in the Crimea to the local and Ukrainian parliaments³ or the Crimean election of January 1994 and the Ukrainian presidential and local elections of June–July 1994.⁴ For convenience of analysis, the article

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has been divided into three sections: Ukraine on the eve of elections; the election campaign; and the aftermath. This article argues that, although most observers and analysts remained highly pessimistic about the outcome of these elections (a pessimism promoted by the electoral law, which was adopted one year into the existence of the new Ukrainian parliament), the parliament itself is pro-reform and co-operative with the president.

A. Ukraine on the Eve of the Elections⁵

The 1990–94 parliament had been discredited long ago in the eyes of the public. A poll on confidence in the authorities on the eve of elections found the following dismal levels of support:⁶

Armed Forces	20 per cent
Militia	6 per cent
President	4 per cent
Viacheslav Chornovil (leader of Rukh, the main opposition party)	4 per cent
Cabinet of Ministers	2 per cent
Local Councils	2 per cent

Parliament decided against holding a referendum on confidence in itself in September 1993 because it knew it would lose. It was partly discredited by its inability to launch a reform programme or deal with the domestic crisis, but also by much-publicized examples of corruption among deputies. Indeed, one mass circulation Kyiv (Kiev) newspaper published an article during the election campaign entitled 'Vote for the current deputies – they have already managed to obtain apartments in the capital'. One poll summed up voter disillusionment with the Soviet-era parliament as follows:⁷

	Question A	Question B
Kiev (no)	73	71
L'viv (no)	63	69

Question A: Would you vote for the same candidate again as in March 1990?

Question B: Do you remember whom you voted for in March 1990?

Another reason why voters were disillusioned with the 1990–94 parliament and, to a certain extent, with politics altogether, was its lack of accountability to voters. Other polls showed that only 50 per cent of the electorate were fully committed to voting in the next elections; the remainder were either

undecided or not interested.

There are 38 registered political parties in Ukraine. However, the majority of them have little influence on public life and, as the Ukrainian proverb goes, 'merely stew in their juice'. The majority of them are locally based; there are few which have an all-Ukrainian membership. Nationalist and national democratic parties tend to be stronger in western and central Ukraine while social-democratic, liberal and socialist or communist parties are stronger in the eastern and southern regions of the republic. Social democratic and liberal parties, on the one side, and national democratic and nationalistic, on the other, tend to be suspicious of one another, yet all are anti-communist and support an independent Ukrainian state.

Opinion polls testify to the fact that three issues would dominate the elections: the economic crisis, relations with Russia, and crime. The domestic crisis was severe, and showed no sign of slowing down, while the government had no programme to escape from it. Only in Kyiv and western Ukraine did voters regard as priorities the armed forces, cultural rebirth, maintaining territorial integrity and support for religion. Support for economic reforms was also higher in western Ukraine and in southern Ukraine (where ports such as Odesa hoped to obtain free economic zone status). Crime was high on the list of priorities for eastern and southern Ukrainian voters.

Another problem parties found was their inability to put their case across to the voting public. Many opinion polls during 1992–94 testified to the fact that the bulk of the population were unaware of political party programmes. If anything, they identified with personalities and leaders they knew. In an opinion poll undertaken in summer 1993 by the Democratic Initiative organization, the fictitious 'Party of Order and Justice' obtained more votes than many well-established parties. This lack of public awareness about political parties is, in turn, a reflection of the narrow political space available to parties owing to the absence, or slow pace, of reforms and weak civil society.

Voter participation, therefore, in the elections of 27 March 1994 was measured against the background of a lack of confidence in institutions, lack of public self-confidence in the ability to effect change, general socio-psychological depression, an amorphous and apathetic outlook on the part of the 'man in the street', and a yearning for law and order. Various opinion polls did show that political parties were popular in some regions and sections of the population, however. An RFE/RL Research Institute survey in mid-1993 found that half of respondents supported parties with a democratic orientation. Communist and socialist groups obtained ten per cent although the one-third who remained undecided closely resembled the demographic profile of the communist and socialist voters and were primarily based in eastern Ukraine. In the Polish and Lithuanian

parliamentary elections also, this undecided electorate voted for communist and socialist parties.

B. The Election Campaign

*Parliamentary Election Law*⁸

On 18 November 1993 the election law was approved by parliament on a vote of 271:31. The law rejected the proposals made by democratic parties that at least 50 per cent of seats be filled on the basis of party lists.⁹ Instead, all 450 deputies would be elected in single-seat constituencies on a majoritarian basis for a single-chamber legislative body by 50 per cent of those voting (which must represent not less than 25 per cent of the district's voters). The cost of the elections was initially estimated to be 1,000 million *karbovanets*, but this figure was exceeded owing to the numerous by-elections held throughout the second half of 1994.¹⁰ Twenty-eight political parties and 3,574 candidates were registered to take part in the elections. Of these candidates 2,082 (58.25 per cent) were nominated by groups of electors, 1,065 (29.80 per cent) by work collectives and 427 (11.95 per cent) by political parties and blocs. The largest number of competing candidates (15–20) were in six constituencies, particularly Kyiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Poltava, Sumy and elsewhere.

Citizens aged 25 or over who had resided in Ukraine for two years could be put forward as candidates either by 300 voters in an electoral district, or by political parties and blocs and labour collectives. Three positive factors in the election law included the fact that it would be professional (that is, deputies could not hold other posts) and deputies could not hold posts in local councils as well as in parliament (both problems led to widespread absenteeism in the 1990–94 parliament). In addition, presidential prefects, the armed forces, the judiciary and Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel were not allowed to put themselves forward as candidates.

In Ukraine there exist 450 single-mandate districts which were formed with approximately equal numbers of voters.¹¹ These districts were required to reflect the following conditions: deviation on the average in the number of voters in the district was not to exceed 12 per cent; the formation of electoral districts which included territories without a common border was not allowed; and there should be a review of the district borders every eight years. Electoral districts were divided into polling divisions, normally anywhere between 20 and 3,000 voters.

The system of electoral commissions was divided into the central, regional and district commissions. The Central Electoral Commission was to be approved by parliament on a submission from the chairman, provided

no less than one-third of its members had a legal training. All political parties and blocs registered to participate in the elections could appoint one representative to the Central Electoral Commission, whose term of office lasted four years (the same as the length of parliament).

The central electoral commission has a large number of clearly established duties. These include organizing and conducting elections, checking on the implementation of the election law, directing the regional and district election commissions, establishing the order for the use of funds for conducting elections, registering political parties and election blocs, arranging re-elections and considering complaints.

Regional electoral commissions are appointed by the relevant presidiums of local councils. Again, all parties and blocs registered in the given district could appoint a representative to the regional electoral commission. District electoral commissions are created by village, town or city councils and the same rule applies to registered political parties and blocs.

Public funding for candidates is to be channelled through the Central Electoral Commission while private funding is limited to six million *karbovanets* for each prospective deputy (approximately US\$200). Funding by foreign organizations is prohibited. It is not explained how foreign funds (for example, from Russia or the Ukrainian diaspora) can be controlled or how the Central Electoral Commission proposes to ensure that candidates do not overspend beyond the \$200 limit.

The nomination of candidates for election begins 90 days and ends 60 days before the election date. The nomination of candidates by political parties or electoral blocs is undertaken in the following bureaucratic manner. A meeting of the regional branch of the party or bloc is held, attended by two-thirds of the party's membership or two-thirds of the delegates elected to participate in the meeting. The regional branch is required to have no fewer than 100 members of the overall party or bloc membership. The regional branch then applies to the local electoral commission with the nominee's personal details and certified minutes of the meeting. Within three days of the receipt of the application, the local electoral commission must issue a certificate of registration of the candidate. As an alternative to the procedure described above, 300 voters in a given district may submit the name of a candidate of a party or bloc to the regional electoral commission no later than 45 days before election day.

From the moment of registration candidates have equal rights to media access. Candidates are not allowed to use their official position to promote their election campaign, although they are allowed free public transport within the electoral district and are released from their normal employment. During the election campaign registered candidates enjoy immunity from arrest.

Candidates have the right to discuss their programmes in the press, and

on radio and television. Premises for meetings must also be authorized. Regional electoral commissions will print 2,000 posters per candidate. According to Article 32 of the electoral law, 'Pre-election campaign publicity may be conducted in any form and through any means which do not violate the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine'.

Candidates have the right to free use of the state mass media in 'equal measure'. Article 34 states that the 'concrete amount and time of radio and television programmes for pre-election publicity shall be established by the regional electoral commission in agreement with the manager of the appropriate agencies of mass media'. Publicity in the independent media is to be charged at the same rate to all candidates.

An unorthodox voting procedure left from the Soviet era made voting a daunting task. Voters are asked to cross out every candidate they do not want, leaving unmarked the single candidate they choose. If a ballot is incorrectly filled out it becomes invalid. On the ballot each name is followed by the group sponsoring him or her. If the candidate is running independently the name will be followed by the number of citizens who endorsed him or her.

The election law states that a valid election will have taken place when more than 50 per cent of those voting choose one candidate. However, this figure must exceed 25 per cent of the total eligible voters in a district. This means, therefore, that a quarter of registered voters must vote for a candidate. If the first round of elections fails to produce a clear winner the two candidates with the highest number of votes go into a second round two weeks later.

Criticism of the Election Law

The election law has been criticized by a wide variety of observers. 'Ukraine has a very sophisticated election law', according to one election monitor. 'It is designed to prevent parliamentarians being elected.'¹² The election law has also been blamed for confusing the electorate with a large number of candidates and not filling all the parliamentary seats.¹³ The US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe pointed to a number of problems with the law:¹⁴

- membership of the Central Electoral Commission was derived from the post-soviet *nomenklatura* and included no democrats;
- it was far easier to submit nominations of candidates from labour collectives;
- more stringent and more numerous criteria were demanded of political parties in the nomination of candidates. Parties had to submit 30 pieces of information and descriptions dealing with the nomination of

candidates while groups of voters and labour collectives only required eight and one respectively;

- it favoured those candidates with a power base already;
- it encouraged negative voting (electors had to cross out all the names they did not want instead of indicating positive support for a candidate) which increased the possibility of errors and abuse.

This criticism of the election law was echoed by democratic groups because it reduced the role of political parties to a minimum and ensured the domination of electoral commissions by the *nomenklatura*. Proportional representation would have been a

logical step towards helping to create a multi-party system since it encourages nascent political parties to take responsibility for policies advanced either by one dominant political force or by a coalition of forces. Proportional representation breaks down psychological barriers to political activism and to party affiliation on the part of a population largely used to avoid trouble by avoiding politics.¹⁵

As for electoral commissions, the power of nomination placed 'the same people who sat on them when the Soviet Union was in existence'.¹⁶

Opposition to the election law was led by Rukh and the New Ukraine bloc, who argued that the majoritarian system favoured the Party of Power, thereby hindering political reform and democratization in Ukraine.¹⁷ Rukh accused the Party of Power of having 'placed parties on the same level as state enterprises and organizations in the pre-election campaign and thus factually left the old election laws intact'.¹⁸ The election of a large number of independents would also prevent the creation of stable parliamentary factions. Democratic groups argued in favour of 50 per cent of seats elected on the majoritarian system, which would ensure representation of regional views, while the remainder, elected on party lists, would force political parties to adopt programmes geared towards all-Ukrainian questions.

Taras Stetskiv, a deputy of the 1990-94 parliament and a member of the Party of Democratic Revival, argued that the law 'is a glaring reflection of the victory of post-communist forces in our parliament', and he continued: 'The communists, who dominate many regions, will have total control in their districts and in the media and will crush democratically oriented legislators.'¹⁹ Serhei Holovatiy, a senior Rukh member and chairman of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation, believed the law would not ensure free elections and would slow Ukraine's entry into the Council of Europe: 'This system reduces political parties to nothing. This decision is a move towards totalitarianism', he said.²⁰ Deputies who were elected would be accountable only to themselves, not to the discipline of political parties, argued the

Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine.²¹

Rukh criticized the election law as helping the Party of Power to remain in power, claiming that it was a throwback to the Soviet era when political parties were put on the same level as workers' collectives. 'Ukraine remains a stronghold of red autocracy in Europe. Under such conditions, Rukh will continue its struggle to turn Ukraine into a really democratic state', their statement argued. The Green Party claimed that the new law 'serves nothing but corporate and regional interests'.²²

Electoral Blocs²³

In October 1993 Rukh called upon other national democratic parties to establish a 'centrist' electoral bloc entitled the Association of Democratic Forces Elections-94.²⁴ In turn, national democratic parties and groups then went on to form a Permanent Standing Commission of Democratic Parties and Organizations composed of:²⁵

Centre-Right

Rukh

Democratic Party (DPU)

Republican Party (URP)

Peasant Democratic Party

(SeIDPU)

Christian Democratic Party

(KhDU)

Congress of Ukrainian

Nationalists (KUN)

National Conservative Party

(UNKP)

Memorial

All-Ukrainian Society of Former

Political Prisoners and Repressed

Union of Ukrainian Students

Ukrainian Youth Association

All-Ukrainian Union of Solidarity Toilers

Crimea with Ukraine Committee

Organization Soldiers' Mothers

Union of Ukrainian Writers

Union of Composers of Ukraine

Union of Ukrainian Officers

Ukrainian Cossacks

T. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society 'Prosvita'

Centrist and Centre-Left

Party of Democratic Revival

(POVU)

Social Democratic Party (SDPU)

Green Party (ZPU)

Beer Lovers' Party (PPL)

New Ukraine Bloc

Ukrainian Students' Union

Social Democratic Youth

These parties wanted to prevent the mistakes made during the December 1991 presidential elections when democratic voters were divided among five candidates. In addition, they were all concerned at a victory by pro-communist and pro-imperial forces (which they view as synonymous). The

parties and civic groups would refrain from conflict and propose only one candidate in each district.²⁶ The Permanent Commission aimed to ensure that parties and civic groups coordinated their election platforms and activities. The Small Council of Rukh proposed the creation of a bloc entitled *Vybir-94* (Election-94)²⁷ because 'the victory of centrist parties is possible only in case of their coordinated efforts'.²⁸

All the national democratic members of the Permanent Commission went on to establish the Democratic Coalition Ukraine as an election bloc. Centrist and centre-left parties and civic groups left the Permanent Commission and joined two other electoral blocs (see below). Additional national democratic political parties and civic groups which joined those from the Permanent Commission in the Democratic Coalition Ukraine included the following:

- Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS)
- Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
- Union of Chernobyl
- Union of Ukrainian Women
- Green World Association
- Ukrainian Bible Society
- Brotherhood of A. Pervozvanyi
- League of Mothers and Sisters of Ukrainian Freedom Fighters
- Union of Journalists of Ukraine
- Union of Theatrical Women
- Union of Artists
- Organization of Families with Many Children
- Ukrainian All-World Coordinating Council

The New Ukraine bloc, originally a member of the Permanent Commission, and the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (SPPU) formed the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR) at its inaugural congress in Kharkiv on 21–22 January 1994.²⁹ From the launch of the Permanent Commission it was clear that centrist and centre-left political parties were ambivalent towards co-operating with national democrats and created their own temporary Democratic Centre organization which united New Ukraine, the PDVU, MRBR and the SDPU.³⁰ The joint chairmen of MRBR were Vladimir Grynev and Leonid Kuchma, chairmen of New Ukraine and the SPPU respectively. The MRBR mainly concentrated its election campaign in eastern and southern Ukraine where New Ukraine and the SPPU were strongest.³¹ Nevertheless, commentators gave the MRBR a short lease of life after the elections because of the unusual alliance of the Slavophile Citizens' Congress, industrialists, the pro-Western PDVU and others that 'made it seriously ill from the day it was born'.³²

The MRBR was strongly disliked by the national democrats allied in the Democratic Coalition Ukraine because of its alleged pro-Russian orientation. Viacheslav Chornovil, leader of Rukh, warned that the MRBR could become the most powerful anti-Ukrainian group in parliament. Holovaty depicted the MRBR as representing only 'the thinking of only one region of Ukraine. It doesn't have a cross-country appeal and therefore can't unite': in this he overlooked the fact that no election bloc or political party has cross-country appeal.³³ The feeling of hostility was mutual. Kuchma threatened to resign as co-chairman of the MRBR if it proved true that Grynev had signed an agreement with 'national chauvinist forces'.³⁴

The national democrats were particularly concerned with the MRBR's criticism of the 'cult of statehood', support for a 'strategic partnership with Russia', the liquidation of customs and border barriers within the CIS and its promotion of federalism and two state languages. The election slogan of Rukh, by contrast, emphasized 'Statehood – Democracy – Reform' (a slogan that placed it close to Western-style conservative parties) which united those in support of patriotism and a commitment to a market economy. Federalism was perceived as a threat to Ukrainian statehood, although Chornovil had supported it as chairman of L'viv *oblast* council between 1991 and 1993. Rukh and the MRBR looked respectively towards integration with Europe and with Russia and the CIS. However, Rukh and the MRBR were united in their anti-communism, support for reform and strong presidential power.³⁵

By mid-April 1994 though, after the second round of the parliamentary elections, the low number of elected democrats and the threat posed by the election of a large number of communists forced at least Rukh and the MRBR to begin negotiations on a tactical alliance. Kuchma, then co-chairman of the MRBR, called for 'unity among all centrist groups who hold Ukrainian independence dear'.³⁶ Indeed, there was more that united than separated Rukh and the MRBR, especially with regard to reform (although the same could not be said of the moderately nationalistic KNDS). In reality, as one author noted, 'The Ukrainian President has a tendency to always exaggerate the "pro-Moscow" sympathies of Grynev'.³⁷ Kuchma never supported the revival of the former USSR or the loss of Ukrainian independence but his comment that, 'Ukraine cannot exist without Russia' made the national democrats cool towards him.³⁸

Other democratic parties decided to attempt to win seats in the election independently of blocs, including the Party of Justice, the Constitutional Democrats, the Beer Lovers, and the Party of Solidarity and Social Justice, although some of these were also members of the New Ukraine bloc. The Labour Congress of Ukraine created an election bloc entitled 'Solidarity in Favour of Wellbeing and Progress' which united the Union of Leased

Enterprises and the Union of Small Enterprises (along with other, smaller civic groups). The Liberal Party, which joins together the representatives of new business and publishes a large number of party newspapers, attempted to compete against the Labour and Communist parties in eastern Ukraine. The Liberals also opted not to forge an election alliance with any other parties.

The Evolution of National Election Blocs

(A) *National Democrats*:³⁹

Rukh and the Congress of National Democratic Forces
 Permanent Standing Commission of Political Parties and Organizations
 Election-94
 Democratic Coalition Ukraine
 Statehood and Rukh parliamentary factions
 Reform parliamentary faction

(B) *Liberal Democrats*:⁴⁰

New Ukraine bloc
 Democratic Centre
 Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms
 Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms Party and parliamentary faction
 Reform parliamentary faction

The rural vote is important because 30 per cent of the electorate is based there, living in a highly conservative environment. 'The old mentality lives on here', an inhabitant of a village 90 miles northeast of Kiev said.⁴¹ But the rural vote is divided among three parties: the Peasant Party, with links to the communists and largely based in central and southern Ukraine, linking the interests of the rural *nomenklatura*; the Peasant Democrats, staunchly anti-Communist with strong support only in western Ukraine; and the Free Peasant Party, which was established as an offshoot of the Association of Private Farmers.

The authoritarian left initially aimed to establish an election bloc entitled Labour Ukraine, but this did not bear fruit. The putative bloc would have united the Communist Party (KPU, registered on 5 October 1993 after being banned in August 1991 for supporting the putsch), the Socialist Party (SPU, a moderate offshoot of the pre-1991 communist party),⁴² the Peasant Party (SelPU) and possibly the Labour Party. It predicted that it would win 20 per cent of seats in the new parliament. The Civic Congress, an organization of the Inter-Front type, also allies itself with the radical left on many questions

(both are pro-Russian and anti-Western) and had the backing of the deputy mayor of Donetsk, Yury Boldyrev, who was quoted as saying after the elections that 'A new union of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine is inevitable'.⁴³ The Labour Party is an offshoot of the SPPU and represents that section of industry which relies on state credits and markets and co-operation with Russia and the CIS.

The election platforms of the KPU, the SPU and the SelPU were similar as far as domestic political and economic affairs are concerned. The rhetoric of the KPU was often strikingly similar to that of the Soviet era when it proclaimed that it was against 'militant nationalism, anti-Orthodox clericalism, falsification of history, rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army, humiliation of the heroes who defended our Motherland'.⁴⁴ The KPU opposed any kind of privatization, and demanded state control of the economy, dual state languages and dual citizenship.

With regard to these questions there was little to differentiate the three parties of the radical left. The differences arose only with regard to foreign and military policy. Whereas the KPU called for the revival of the former USSR through a 'Union of Sovereign States' (similar to Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal before the disintegration of the Soviet Union and also to that of the then current Russian leadership), the SPU and SelPU were committed to an independent Ukraine. On foreign policy the SPU and SelPU therefore were close to the MRBR which championed a 'strategic partnership' with Russia primarily in the economic field but fell short of eroding Ukraine's independence through full political and military integration with Russia and the CIS. Hence, during the presidential elections the left could readily transfer its support to Kuchma in the second round (in the first round it backed Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the SPU) although as the new parliament would show, the left and the MRBR were completely at odds over questions of economic and political reform.⁴⁵ The KPU and the SPU, although they contested the presidential elections, have remained hostile to the institution of the presidency as such. The revived Komsomol has allied itself with the KPU and also put forward its election platform.⁴⁶

The radical right was not united in any electoral bloc. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, an offshoot of the émigré Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera faction), claimed to have 'democratized' itself during 1992–94 and espouses policies similar to those of the national democrats: hence its membership of the Democratic Coalition Ukraine.⁴⁷ But the election slogan of KUN reflected its radical right origins: 'Nationalistic Order – Mighty State – Social Justice'.

The Conservative Republicans⁴⁸ (the radical right of the Republicans who broke away to form their own party in the summer of 1992) proposed

an electoral alliance with the most extreme of the radical right groups, the All-Ukrainian Association 'Ukrainian State Independence' (known by its Ukrainian abbreviation of DSU), and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine (OUNvU).⁴⁹ The Ministry of Nationalities and Migration condemned the election broadcast of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine for its claim that Russians and Jews ruled Ukraine. The Ministry believed that such statements created discord and inter-ethnic tension.⁵⁰

The largest authoritarian right party is the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) which ran by itself owing to the high public profile of the UNA and its paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian People's Self-Defence Forces (UNSO). The UNA championed the slogan 'Vote for the UNA and you will never be asked to come to elections again' and its election slogan was 'Force – Order – Prosperity'. According to the head of UNA, Oleh Vitovych, 'Our main difference with democrats is in our way of thinking. It is like comparing people who wallow in the mud like pigs and others who stand up like Cossacks'.⁵¹ The UNA election leaflets were highly populist: 'To each worker a country house, a car and an apartment, to his wife the chance to raise children instead of working, to pensioners meat every day, to criminals a comfortable jail cell.'⁵²

The election programme of the UNA called for an East Slavic empire centred on Kyiv, the annexation of neighbouring Ukrainian 'ethnic territories' in Moldova and the Russian Federation, support for the Ukrainian diaspora in the former USSR, a military alliance with Belarus or its neutrality, opposition to the expansion of NATO and the maintenance of nuclear weapons and the military-industrial complex.⁵³ The UNA claimed that the publicity it had received during the elections had doubled its membership (a highly dubious claim), after they had won two out of 49 seats in the first round and ten of their candidates had reached the second round, including some in Kyiv.⁵⁴ The Social-National Party of Ukraine also ran independently of any blocs but remained confined to L'viv *oblast* where it failed to win any national seats. But the party's leader, Yuri Krivoruchko, warned: 'This is our first campaign and the idea is to publicize our name.'⁵⁵

The Party of Power represented a fifth election force which could not be described as a 'bloc'. The Party of Power in Ukraine was represented by former high-ranking members of the communist party turned national communists within the presidential administration, the Cabinet of Ministers, the security forces, enterprises and local councils. In the election campaign the Party of Power was not united and its candidates often competed against one another, depending on the region and loyalty to either parliamentary speaker or president. Because the Party of Power never represented a bloc

– unlike the attempt to structure two Party of Power blocs in the December 1995 Russian elections – it had no single election platform or election strategy.

Of the total number of candidates registered for the parliamentary elections of March 1994 the Party of Power was represented among the 300 presidential prefects, 250 collective farm chairmen, 28 former or current government ministers and six security service personnel.⁵⁶ Their main 'power base' remained central Ukraine. The electoral strength of the Party of Power can be gauged from their influence in rural areas (30 per cent of the vote), enterprises (20 per cent) and the state administration (20–30 per cent). The Party of Power is represented in the newly elected parliament within such factions as the Centrists, *Yednist* (Unity) and the Independents.⁵⁷

Regional Divisions

Ukraine can be readily divided into four regions and four significant political groups (see 'Electoral Blocs', above):

West: Ukrainian-speaking, nationally conscious peasantry;

East: Russian-speaking, highly urbanized;

Centre: Ukrainian-speaking, national consciousness eroded by the 1933 famine;

South: Russian-speaking cities, inactive Ukrainian peasantry,

In the March 1990 parliamentary and local elections the Democratic Bloc won 122 out of 450 seats (27.1 per cent), concentrated in western Ukraine, Kyiv and the urban centres of central Ukraine. The countryside (30 per cent of voters) remained controlled by radical left groups except in western Ukraine. Independents and centrists remained strongest in the urban centres of central and eastern Ukraine. This regional division of support for political tendencies was re-confirmed by the March 1991 referendum for a 'Renewed Federation' and the presidential elections of December 1991. The 1994 parliamentary elections showed that the national democrats had been unable to break through to Russian-speaking regions (Russian-speakers account for approximately 40 per cent of Ukraine's population), had failed to mobilize the peasantry outside western Ukraine and merely competed in their traditional strongholds against the radical right.⁵⁸

Regional variations in the manner in which local branches of political parties allied themselves in the election campaign reflected the different local conditions and level of national consciousness:

Region	Name of Bloc	Members
L'viv ⁵⁹	New Wave	Liberals and Conservatives
Volyn ⁶⁰	Well-Being, Justice and Order	URP, DPU, KUN, KNDS
Donets'k ⁶¹	People's Congress	National Democrats
Donets'k	Democratic Donbas	Rukh and KUN
Zaporizhzhia ⁶²	We	PDVU
Dnipropetrovs'k ⁶³	Centre Political Initiative	Liberals and Businessmen
Kharkiv ⁶⁴	Business Assembly	Liberals and Businessmen
Kharkiv	Inter-Party Electoral Association 'Justice'	National Democrats
Poltava ⁶⁵	Pre-Electoral Bloc of Officers	Union of Ukrainian Officers

In L'viv the *Nova Khvyliia* (New Wave) electoral bloc united those centrist and centre-left political parties and civic groups that joined the MRBR in eastern and southern Ukraine – groups that had always been members of or close to the New Ukraine bloc. 'We established our movement as a bulwark against radicals [national democrats and the radical right]. We bring together professionals and moderates', Stetskiv explained.⁶⁶ Founded as a centrist bloc on 30 November 1993 by Victor Pynzenyk's Fund in Support of Reform, the New Wave is 'a general centrist association of national democratic forces. The association's economic programme is based on the principle of the need for urgent economic reforms, while its political principle is that of the middle class to power', according to Ihor Koliushko, elected on a New Wave ticket.⁶⁷

In contrast to the MRBR, which stressed its liberal democratic credentials and was accused by national democrats of 'cosmopolitanism', reformist blocs in western Ukraine had no choice but to adopt a patriotic image which gave them a centre-right profile close to West European and North American conservative political parties. The New Wave bloc became the kernel that created the Reform parliamentary faction in the newly elected parliament (see below).

The growing power of the regions, particularly the Donbas of eastern Ukraine, was reflected in the 1994 elections.⁶⁸ In Dnipropetrovs'k a Centre for Political Initiative was established by a 32-year-old businessman, Hennady Balashov, as a vehicle to unite reformist groups and entrepreneurs. In Kharkiv *Dilovi Zbory* (Business Assembly) was established by groups close to the MRBR and the New Ukraine bloc that agreed to co-operate with

the Party of Labour, the political offshoot of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, but rejected any *modus vivendi* with the radical left. National democratic groups (URP, DPU, KhDPU and SDPU) in Kharkiv created the much weaker Inter-Party Electoral Association 'Justice'. The Liberal Democratic Party resigned from this bloc after the removal from its election programme of a provision on a possible future federal structure for Ukraine.⁶⁹ A major cleavage between national and liberal democratic groups continues to exist over their attitudes towards a federal structure for Ukraine.

Democratic groups in the Donbas, though, despite their small numbers, failed to unite into one electoral campaign bloc. In October 1993 two such blocs were established entitled the People's Congress of the Donets'k Region (NKD) and Democratic Donbas (DD). The split occurred along fault lines which had developed during 1992–93 between those who espouse a willingness to co-operate with national communists in the interests of statehood (NKD) and those who have maintained an anti-communist profile (DD). The former therefore included centre-right parties grouped within the Congress of National Democratic Forces while the latter brought together Rukh and its allies, including the KUN. In November 1993 the NKD demanded that the government introduce a state of emergency in the economy and presidential rule in the Donbas, prohibit strikes and demonstrations, control the export of foodstuffs and struggle against profiteering and banditism. The NKD also adopted an election programme that called for Ukraine's withdrawal from the CIS, opposition to federalization, support for national minority rights, priority for private enterprise and the creation of a social market economy, land reform, encouragement for the development of industry and defence of the national economy.

But the main battles in the parliamentary elections in the highly urbanized Donbas were between moderate and radical left groups (Communist, Socialist and Labour parties), on the one hand, and the liberals (MRBR and the Liberal Party) on the other. The leadership of the NKD therefore announced its intention to co-operate with the liberals, in an attempt to prevent the victory of the left and 'Red Directors', as the Labour Party is most commonly known. The Union of Donbas Community Organizations was also an ally of the left, which linked together separatist and pro-Russian movements, such as the Inter-Front and the Civic Congress of Ukraine.

C. The Aftermath

Issues

The 1994 parliamentary elections were held at a time of deep economic crisis in Ukraine which would tend to lead to the assumption that this issue

would dominate the election campaign. In a pre-election poll in Chernivtsi which asked whom the electorate would vote for, the highest figures were given for jurists (65.7 per cent) and economists (64.1 per cent).⁷⁰ Another poll asked a similar question: Who could rescue Ukraine from its crisis?⁷¹ and produced the following results:

Parties and organizations in favour of union with Russia	20 per cent
The Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR)	12 per cent
President Leonid Kravchuk	5 per cent
Radical right nationalists	2 per cent

Those hankering after a strong hand or a nationalist saviour were in a minority – as reflected in the meagre electoral support granted to radical right parties:⁷²

In favour of a strong hand	31 per cent
Ukrainian nationalists	33 per cent
Authoritarian state	34 per cent

The issue of the economy was uppermost in the minds of electors, especially in eastern and southern Ukraine.⁷³ Yet, political parties and election blocs failed to reflect this concern. All political parties in the elections

have one common weakness: they are burdened by unnecessary issues (e.g. the percentage of income taxes), while pivotal questions are articulated in general and vague terms. In particular, this weakness is most evident in the economic sections of party programs, despite the fact that most of Ukraine's parties claim to put a premium on economic matters.⁷⁴

Even when election blocs discussed the causes of the economic crisis they blamed different factors:

- (1) Collapse of the former Soviet economic space and ties with Russia (MRBR);
- (2) Ukraine's continued colonial economy (Democratic Coalition Ukraine);
- (3) The switch to a capitalist economy and reforms (radical left parties).

The MRBR and the Democratic Coalition Ukraine agreed that the absence of reforms was a major factor in the economic crisis. But when the MRBR blamed the Party of Power for giving priority to state- and nation-building at the expense of the economy the national democrats disagreed. The 'most comprehensive and candid' election platform was represented by the MRBR but the bulk of the economic programmes would serve only to

confuse voters.⁷⁵ In contrast, most political parties and civic groups that comprised the Democratic Coalition Ukraine lacked clear-cut socio-economic programmes. The call by the Democratic Coalition Ukraine for the strengthening of statehood 'will have little chance of success'.⁷⁶

*The Elections*⁷⁷

The importance of the elections to Ukraine's post-soviet development was spelled out by President Kravchuk's presidential adviser on domestic questions, Mykola Mykhailchenko, who was concerned that insufficient voter participation in the elections would have made them 'invalid'. This would, he asserted, 'have been a direct threat to Ukrainian statehood'.⁷⁸

President Kravchuk argued that if the elections did not take place or failed to elect a sufficient number of deputies for a constitutional quorum then he would be forced to introduce presidential rule. 'This period could be very difficult. We face the threat of a power vacuum. We do not know how long the elections will last ... We do not know whom to elect as President.'⁷⁹ The prospect of presidential rule was in itself sufficiently unpopular to encourage voters to participate heavily in parliamentary elections.

Parliament appealed before the elections for a large voter turnout as a means to encourage the continued peaceful transformation of Ukraine as a European power. With reference to Russia, the appeal added that it was, after all, a positive sign that Ukraine 'has avoided the use of armed force to change political power'. Ukraine needed successful elections and rejected those that hoped for an invalid result which would lead to a 'power vacuum'. If the elections were unsuccessful that would entail 'political and economic instability and lead to a constitutional crisis in Ukraine'. Then the current unpopular parliament would be forced to continue until the end of its mandate (March 1995).⁸⁰

In contrast to the apathy found in most electorates of post-Soviet states respectively 75 per cent and 65 per cent of Ukrainian voters participated in the March and April elections (20 percent more than in the Russian elections of December 1993). The highest turnout levels were in the three Galician provinces of Ternopil (91.92 per cent), Ivano-Frankivsk (88.47 per cent) and L'viv (87.56 per cent). In a comment on the elections, Ivan Yemets, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, observed: 'The pessimistic predictions that the turnout would be too low to be valid have been proven wrong. The Ukrainian people have demonstrated they want change for the better and are deciding their own future.'⁸¹ The turnouts were particularly encouraging because 47 per cent of those respondents in one poll believed that the elections would change nothing.⁸²

The first round of the elections in March–April 1994 elected only 72 percent of seats (324 out of 450).⁸³ The numerous run-offs to fill the vacant

seats held between April and December 1994 led to lower turnouts, and eventually 45 seats were left permanently vacant. In the words of one voter, 'How many times can I go in to vote? They're exhausting my democratic right.'⁸⁴

Despite the severity of the economic crisis and strained relations with Russia the radical right failed to win a large number of seats. They mainly competed with national democrats in western and central Ukraine. The KUN and UNA proved again that they were the only two radical right parties with influence and support. The remaining radical right groups failed to win any seats: the SNP, the OUNvU and DSU.

The KPU won 90 seats, far fewer than the 239 it obtained in March 1990 but, at the same time, representing the largest faction within the new parliament. It failed to obtain support throughout Ukraine and has become a regional party with its roots and base in the Donbas. In the newly elected parliament the communists joined forces with their radical left allies – the socialists and agrarians. However, since the elections the agrarians have split into pro- and anti-reform branches.

The democrats were divided along regional lines into two election blocs. The MRBR competed with the radical left in eastern and southern Ukraine while in western and central Ukraine the Democratic Coalition Ukraine largely competed against the radical right and independents in the 342 constituencies where it put forward candidates.⁸⁵ The highly optimistic predictions of many leading democrats that they would win at least half of the seats in the new parliament proved to be illusory: they barely increased their proportion won in March 1990.⁸⁶ Both the MRBR and Rukh claimed they would win at least 100 seats each, whereas they succeeded in obtaining only a quarter of that number.⁸⁷ Rukh qualified its statements in a press conference in Kyiv on 28 March 1994 where Chornovil claimed it would win 50 per cent of seats in the event of an electoral law similar to the one used in the December 1993 Russian elections. Rukh was forced to admit, though, that it had 'suffered a defeat' in the elections,⁸⁸ and Chornovil said: 'This is no triumph for us. We have only work ahead.'⁸⁹ The Socialists also admitted that they had not been successful in the elections.⁹⁰

The largest group of elected deputies had no party political allegiances. These independents comprise a large body of academics, entrepreneurs, chairmen of collective farms, state officials and members of the presidential apparatus. Centrists and independents, they were mainly elected in 11 *oblasts* lying between radical left-dominated eastern Ukraine and the national-democratic-dominated western Ukraine.⁹¹

Violations⁹²

Numerous infringements of the regulations were recorded during the

Ukrainian elections, including the following:

- threat of loss of employment;
- use of official cars;
- denial of the registration of candidates without adequate reasons by the Central Electoral Commission;
- the favouring of one candidate by local councils and electoral commissions;
- denial to some candidates of access to factories;
- physical assaults on democratic candidates;
- attempts to buy the loyalty of voters;
- pressure on businessmen who gave financial support to democratic candidates.⁹³

UN and CSCE observers pointed to the pressuring of rural voters, a poorly functioning Central Election Commission and the denial of access to foreign observers into polling stations. The Parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE described the elections as successful within the law, 'carried out with great enthusiasm and a desire for accuracy'. The discrepancies that were found (physical force, spoilt ballots, withholding of information, voter manipulation and ballots with duplicate votes) 'could not be regarded as serious enough to invalidate either the individual polls or, more specifically, this first part of the election'.⁹⁴

An observer from the British Helsinki Group found no systematic fraud but felt, at the same time, that the election law allowed an opportunity to influence the results by cheating or incompetence. She found widespread multiple voting, large-scale bribery and a lack of control over mobile ballot boxes.⁹⁵ The Non-Party Committee of Ukraine's Electors, uniting 3,880 members monitoring the elections in 150 districts of 20 *oblasts*, compiled 265 reports of violations. Of these, 200 cases were filed at the Procurator's Office and another 85 at the Central Election Commission.⁹⁶

Roman Zvarych, head of the Elections 94 Press Centre, concluded that 'There has been systematic and widespread corruption'.⁹⁷ The former chairman of parliament, Ivan Plyushch, was alleged to have redirected 20 billion *karbovanets* (approximately \$1 million) to his constituency in Chernihiv before the campaign.⁹⁸ In Dnipropetrovsk⁹⁹ candidates handed out condoms to young voters with the slogan 'Make the safe choice',¹⁰⁰ while others pledged (for the benefit of older voters, who represented 76 per cent of eligible voters in that district) to promote a law to make the government pay for burials.¹⁰¹ Humanitarian aid was distributed in such a manner as to obtain signatures for registered candidates while rural voters were often bribed with mineral fertiliser or construction materials.

Rukh complained of many instances of 'terror' against its candidates and

supporting offices. 'Political pressure', 'pogroms' and 'physical violence' against members, candidates and local branches frequently occurred.¹⁰² Rukh statements discussed threats made against businessmen who financially supported Rukh which they characterized as 'nothing but an attempt to deprive our movement of any support during the election campaign'. Rukh offices in Chernivtsi, Ternopil and Kirovohrad were vandalized, the children of Rukh activists in Odesa were beaten up and there was a failed attempt to kidnap Les Taniuk, another prominent Rukh activist. Rukh's candidate in Vynnytsia was also beaten up. The Rukh leadership regarded the level of violence, intimidation and tension during the election campaign as worse than that encountered in the run-up to the March 1990 elections.

In mid-January 1994 Mykhailo Boychyshyn, the head of Rukh secretariat in Kyiv and chairman of the Rukh central electoral commission, was kidnapped by unknown assailants and has still not been found. It took the Ministry of Interior nearly two weeks before an operational investigation was established which brought together the Ministry of Interior, the Procurator's Office and the Security Service.

Rukh has since claimed that the disappearance was hushed up on state television and radio, which its members picketed. The coordinating committee for combating corruption and organized crime, which was chaired by President Kravchuk, ordered an investigation of Rukh's financial accounts in order 'to rake up as much dirt as possible on Rukh's finances'.¹⁰³ The disappearance of Boychyshyn, who would have played a key role in Rukh's election campaign, evoked various theories. One was linked to the alleged receipt from unnamed US sources of \$12 million for the elections; others believed it was the work of organized criminals afraid of the exposure by Rukh of their activities; finally, the blame was laid at elements of the security service, afraid of an election victory by Rukh. Other accusations have centred upon the Russian security services because Boychyshyn was the secretary of the Baltic-Black Sea conference of political parties and was planning to hold an international conference in Kyiv on 29-30 January 1994. The documents for this conference also disappeared at the same time as he did.¹⁰⁴

Other candidates of the People's Congress in the Donbas region complained that they were denied television and radio time, their campaign pamphlets were stolen and meetings with voters were disrupted.¹⁰⁵ Konstantin Morozov, former Defence Minister and a democratic candidate in Kyiv, was the subject of a particularly brutal campaign against his election as a deputy in Kyiv.¹⁰⁶ British election observers checking the polling station where Morozov stood were roughed up while a second observer and a diplomat were verbally abused by electoral commission officials. According to the election observers, the officials 'were looking for

reasons to declare Morozov's vote invalid'.¹⁰⁷ Morozov's opponent was Victor Medvedchuk, a communist attorney who had promised to free suspected criminals awaiting trial if they voted for him and provide free life insurance for pensioners.

Two deputies who were elected in Odesa and Kharkiv respectively – Grynev, co-chairman of MRBR, and Pavlo Kudiukin, president of the Blasco Shipping Company – lost their mandates in a parliamentary vote of 205:49 on 12 May 1995. Their rivals had polled fewer votes in the first round and had pulled out before the second round, so Grynev and Kudiukin had run unopposed. They were also accused of overspending on campaign funds, violating use of the media and extending the time open for the polls. Altogether ten infringements of the electoral law were registered, including 18 types of campaign posters and the introduction of food counters at polling stations.¹⁰⁸ The mandates of other deputies with similar infringements were registered by parliament, and the refusal to register Grynev and Kudiukin may have been politically motivated. The MRBR was co-chaired by Kuchma as his presidential election bloc while Kudiukin was later arrested on corruption charges.

Prospects for Reform

After the first two rounds of the elections in March–April 1994 most predictions concerning support for reform within the new parliament indicated that they were poor. 'There will be no majority for reform in parliament', complained Yuri Yekhanourov, then deputy economics minister.¹⁰⁹ The immediate prospects for reform did not seem good because the large number of radical left deputies were primarily elected in the first rounds and this enabled them to elect Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the Socialists, as parliamentary chairman and to choose both deputy speakers from the Agrarian faction and a pro-left independent.

By the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995, after parliament gave up temporarily attempting to elect all 450 deputies (300 were required for a constitutional majority), parliament had settled into stricter parliamentary factions and the number of unaffiliated deputies who did not belong to any faction had dwindled to only a fraction of their original number. Support for a radical programme of reform by the newly elected President Kuchma proved crucial in forcing deputies to choose where they stood on the question of reform (a proposition that former President Kravchuk had never posed to his parliament).

Only the Communists and Socialists have remained adamant opponents of reform while the Agrarians have divided into two approximately equal groups. The first two of these have also remained opposed to the constitutional arrangement between parliament and president enshrined in the Law

'On State Power and Local Self-Government'. Although the majority of parliamentary factions have united in favour of reform and presidential power they remain regionally divided. The overwhelming majority of members of radical left MRBR and Unity factions are from eastern and southern Ukraine. In contrast, Rukh and Statehood, who during the election campaign joined forces in the Democratic Coalition Ukraine, remain confined to western and central Ukraine. The Centrists and Independents, meanwhile, are based exclusively in central Ukraine. The newly created Reform faction primarily includes former members of Rukh, or post-nationalists who desire to create something resembling a Western-style Conservative Party. Some of the members of the Reform faction have joined the Liberal Party, which fared badly during the elections.

Conclusions

The 1994 parliamentary elections in Ukraine led to the peaceful transfer of power from the Soviet-era parliament to a newly elected Supreme Council. Yet this occurred despite a poor election law that was deliberately biased against political parties, an acute economic crisis, public apathy and disillusionment. Participation rates remained high although they understandably dropped as by-elections were increasingly held to fill vacant seats throughout 1994. The new parliament is not dominated by the radical left, as many initially feared it would be. While the radical right fared poorly during the elections. Democratic parties, meanwhile, did not improve on their March 1990 performance and remain regionally- and urban-based.

Despite the election of a large number of unaffiliated deputies, something designed to happen through the election law, by the beginning of 1995 parliament had settled into a number of structured factions. Parliament has become divided over the question of reform into two camps but it remains committed to compromise over key questions which divided voters during the election campaign in order to overcome these divisions and secure a stable polity. The Law 'On State Power and Local Self-Government' coupled with the Constitutional Agreement in May-June 1995 has also peacefully resolved constitutional conflicts between the legislature and executive which have plagued post-Soviet societies.

NOTES

1. See Rick Simon, 'Workers and Independence in Divided Ukraine', *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, No.49 (Autumn 1994), pp.18-34.
2. *Holos Ukrainy*, 28 Sept. 1993.
3. See Andrew Wilson, 'The Elections in the Crimea', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.25

(24 June 1994).

4. On the presidential elections see Taras Kuzio, 'Leonid Kuchma: Ukraine's Second President', *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 31 July 1994, and 'Ukraine Since the Elections: From Romanticism to Pragmatism', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol.4, No.12 (Dec. 1994). See also Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, 'Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.32 (19 Aug. 1994).
5. See Myron Wasylyk, 'Ukraine Prepares for Parliamentary Elections', and 'Ukraine on the Eve of Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, Nos.5 and 12 (4 Feb. and 25 March 1994).
6. See the poll conducted during Feb.-March by Democratic Initiatives in *Molod Ukrainy*, 23 March 1994.
7. *Post Postup*, No.45 (9-15 Dec. 1993).
8. *Zakon Ukrainy pro Vybory Narodnykh Deputativ Ukrainy: Ofitsiynyi tekst* (Kyiv: Ukrainian Independent Centre for Political Research, 1994), and *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 27 Nov. 1993. See also *The Election Law of Ukraine 'Made Easy'* (Kyiv: Working Group of the Committee on Legislation and Legitimacy, Council of Advisers to the Parliament of Ukraine, 1993). English translations of the Law of Ukraine 'On the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine' can be found in *The Verkhovna Rada Elections in Ukraine: March 27 to April 10, 1994* (Kyiv: Report of the Democratic Elections in Ukraine Observation and Coordination Centre. Part One, 1994), pp.99-146, and *Elections in Ukraine 1994* (Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1994), pp.141-57.
9. See the article by Artur Bilous, 'Na Vybory - Ukrainskym Velosypedom?', *Polityka i chas*, 1994, No.1, pp.40-43, which discusses the three types of electoral systems: majoritarian, proportional and mixed.
10. UNIA News Agency, 13 Jan. 1994.
11. *Uriadovyi kurier*, No.180 (18 Dec. 1993), lists the 450 electoral districts.
12. *The Independent* (London), 28 March 1994.
13. See the comments by the election observer Magdalena Hoff (*Reuters*, 27 March 1994) and Olha Zhukovska, 'Chomu v zali bahato vakantnykh mist?', *Holos Ukrainy*, 22 April 1994.
14. *Ukraine's Parliamentary Election. March 27, 1994 to April 10, 1994* (Washington, DC: The Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, April 1994), pp.10-11.
15. *The Verkhovna Rada Elections in Ukraine*.
16. *Ibid.*, p.10.
17. See the statement by the Congress of National Democratic Forces which criticized the law for preserving the power of the *nomenklatura* (*Robitnycha hazeta*, 3 Dec. 1994).
18. *Ukrainian News*, 1993, No.47.
19. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 14 Nov. 1993.
20. *Ibid.*, 21 Nov. 1993.
21. *Radio Ukraine*, 18 Nov. 1993.
22. *Ukrainian News*, 1993, No.47.
23. See M. Wasylyk, 'Ukraine's Parties Offer Their Wares', *Wall Street Journal*, 25 Feb.-6 March 1994, which surveys the four main national election blocs: the radical left, the MRBR, the Democratic Coalition Ukraine and the Party of Power. Wasylyk ignores the radical right as a fifth election force.
24. See the call for 'one democratic election bloc' by Serhii Holovatiy, then a leading member of Rukh and president of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation (*Ukrainske Slovo*, 7 Nov. 1993).
25. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 20 Oct. and *Ukrainski Visti*, 24 Oct. 1993.
26. In Chernihiv no seat was won by democrats because of their lack of coordination; the first secretary of the local Communist Party won a large majority over Rukh and the URP (*Holos Ukrainy*, 12 April 1994).
27. *Post Postup*, No.40 (4-10 Nov.), *Holos Ukrainy*, 11 Dec., and *Narodna hazeta*, 1993, No.48 (Dec.).
28. *Ukrainian News*, 1994, No.44.
29. *Holos Ukrainy*, 8 Dec. 1993; 21, 25 and 27 Jan. 1994.
30. *Holos Ukrainy*, 29 Dec. 1993.

31. On the formation of the MRBR and its election programme see *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, No.44 (19 March); *News from Ukraine*, 1994, No.6; and *Elections 94 Press Center: Dateline Ukraine, An informational and Analytical Bulletin*, No.5 (21 March 1994).
32. *Post Postup*, No.1 (3–9 Feb. 1994). See the article by Grynev, 'Cherez Ob"iednannia do Real'nykh Peretvoren', *Viche*, Feb. 1994, pp.63–7.
33. *Wall Street Journal*, 8 April 1994.
34. UNIAR News Agency, 21 Feb. See the denial by Grynev (UNIAR News Agency, 23 Feb. 1994).
35. See the comparison between Rukh and the MRBR in *Elections 94 Press Center: Dateline Ukraine, an Informational and Analytical Bulletin*, No.2 (24 Feb. 1994).
36. *Reuters*, 12 April 1994.
37. *News from Ukraine*, 1994, Nos.2–3.
38. *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 25 March 1994.
39. The election programmes of national democratic groups can be found for Rukh – *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.11–12 (20 Jan. 1994), and *Rada*, 10 Feb. 1994; for the KhdPU – *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 18 March 1994; for the UNKP – *Ukrainskyi chas*, 1993, No.2; for the SelDPU – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, No.17 (29 Jan.), and *Zemlia i volia*, Jan. 1994; for the DPU – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, Nos.11–12 (20 Jan.); for the URP – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, No.17 (29 Jan.), and *Narodna hazeta*, 1994, Nos.1–2 (Jan.); and for the KNDS – *Narodna hazeta*, 1993, No.49 (Dec.), and *Holos Ukrainy*, 15 Feb. 1994.
40. Liberal democratic and centrist election platforms of the Beer-Lovers' Party are in *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1993, Nos. 160–61 (2 Nov.); of the Labour Party – *Silski visti*, 5 Nov., and *Holos Ukrainy*, 11 Nov. 1993; of the Party of Justice – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, No.21 (5 Feb.); of the Constitutional Democratic Party – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, No.21 (5 Feb.); of the Party of Solidarity and Social Justice – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, No.25 (12 Feb.); of the Labour Congress of Ukraine – *Holos Ukrainy*, 24 Dec. 1993, and *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, Nos.27–8 (17 Feb.); of the Green Party – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, Nos.31–2 (24 Feb.); and of the Liberal Democratic Party – *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, Nos.35–6 (3 March).
41. *Financial Times*, 23 March 1994.
42. On the different social backgrounds of the KPU and SPU see D. Arel and A. Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.26 (1 July 1994), p.13.
43. *Izvestiya*, 29 March 1994.
44. *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, Nos.27–8 (17 Feb.).
45. The election platforms of the SPU and SelPU can be found, respectively, in *Uriadovyi kurier*, No.44 (19 March) and *Nezavisimost*, 16 March 1994.
46. *Holos Ukrainy*, 11 Feb. 1994.
47. The election programme of the KUN is in *Shliakh peremohy*, 29 Jan., and *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.35–6 (3 March 1994).
48. Their election programme is printed in *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1994, No.44 (19 March).
49. The election programmes of the OUNvU and the DSU, respectively, are in *Neskorena natsii*, 1994, No.5, and *Nezboryma natsiya*, 1994, No.1 (Jan.). The mainstream official press refused to publish their election platforms.
50. UNIAR News Agency, 28 Jan., and *Neskorena natsia*, 1994, No.3.
51. *Reuters*, 8 April 1994.
52. *Washington Times*, 22 March 1994.
53. *Ukrainski obrii*, 1994, No.1 (Jan.).
54. *UPI*, 30 March 1994.
55. *Reuters*, 8 April 1994.
56. See *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 20 Jan., and *Visti z Ukrainy*, 1994, No.41.
57. Artur Bilous, 'Bereznevi vybory i perspektyvy novoho Parlamentu', *Suchasnist*, 1994, No.3 (March), p.81.
58. See Arel and Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections'.
59. UNIAR News Agency, 30 Nov. 1993.
60. *Radio Ukraine*, 26 Dec. 1993.
61. *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 3 Feb. 1994.

62. *Demos*, 1995, No.8. Three members of this election bloc who went on to be elected joined the Unity parliamentary faction.
63. *Halytski kontrakty*, 1994, No.7, and *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 1 Dec. 1993. See also the article by Valery Babich, President of the Ukrainian Financial Group and a leading businessmen from Dnipropetrovsk, 'Professionalnyi Parlament: buty chy ne buty', *Viche*, Feb. 1994, pp.68-71.
64. *Post Postup*, 1993, No.40 (4-10 Nov.).
65. UNIAN News Agency, 3 March 1994.
66. *Reuters*, 8 April 1994. See also Stetskiv's article in *Post Postup*, 1994, No.9 (1-7 April).
67. UNIAN News Agency, 30 Nov. 1993. See also *Halytski kontrakty*, 1994, No.8 (Feb.).
68. See Monika Jung, 'The Donbas Factor in the Ukrainian Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.12 (25 March 1994).
69. UNIAR News Agency, 14 Jan. 1994.
70. *Holos Ukrainy*, 2 March 1994.
71. Democratic Initiatives, *Politychnyi portret Ukrainy: Hromadska dumka i vybory Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1994, No.8 (May).
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 Feb. 1994.
74. *Elections 94 Press Center. Dateline Ukraine. An Informational and Analytical Bulletin*, No.4 (11 March 1994).
75. Democratic Initiatives, *Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy*, op. cit.
76. Dr Heorhii Kasianov, 'Ukraine Before the Elections', *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol.XL, No.4 (Winter 1993), p.7. See also *Ukrainske slovo*, 20 Feb. 1994.
77. See the very pessimistic predictions of the elections in 'Settling in for More of the Same', *The Economist*, 19 March 1994; 'Forget the Fantasies', *Business Central Europe*, March 1994; and Editorial, 'Ukraine Adrift after Elections', *Financial Times*, 15 April 1994. For a survey of the forces shaping the elections see T. Kuzio, 'The Implications of the Ukrainian Elections', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol.6, No.6 (June 1994).
78. *Reuters*, 28 March 1994.
79. *Reuters*, 11 March 1994.
80. *Holos Ukrainy*, 26 Feb. 1994.
81. *Reuters*, 28 March 1994.
82. *Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy: Naperedodni Vyboriv* (Kyiv: Democratic Initiative, 24 March 1994).
83. The deputies elected in the first two rounds of voting are published in *Holos Ukrainy*, 27 April 1994, and *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.62-3 (21 April 1994), and those validated by parliament are in *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 May 1994. See also 'Ukraine Turns Out', *The Economist*, 2 April 1994, T. Kuzio, 'Elections in Ukraine', *Freedom Review*, Vol.25, No.3 (June 1994), and Judge Bohdan Futey, 'The Vote for Parliament and Ukraine's Law on Elections', *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 5 June 1994.
84. *UPI*, 25 July 1994.
85. *Silski visti*, 22 Feb. 1994.
86. See the comment by Levko Lukianenko, honorary chairman of the URP, who predicted democrats would obtain 50 per cent of seats (*Radio Ukraine*, World Service, 6 Jan. 1994).
87. See Rukh's predictions of winning 25 per cent of seats, in *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 Feb. 1994.
88. RIA News Agency, 11 April 1994, and 'Rukh ne vyhrav vyboriv ale i ne prohram', *Rada*, 14 April 1994.
89. *The Guardian*, 12 April 1994.
90. *Kyivska pravda*, 22 April 1994.
91. Marco Bojcun, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.47, No.2 (March-April 1995), p.245.
92. See Chapter VI, 'An Overview of Election Violations', *The Verkhovna Rada Elections in Ukraine. March 27 to April 10, 1994* (Kyiv: Report of the Democratic Elections in Ukraine Observation and Coordination Center. Part One, 1994), pp.26-98, and *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 17 April 1994.
93. *Ukraine's Parliamentary Elections. March 27 to April 10, 1994* (Washington, DC: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1994), pp.15-16,

94. Reuters, 28 March 1994.
95. *The Times*, 14 April 1994.
96. UNIAR News Agency, 14 April 1994.
97. *Washington Post*, 12 April 1994.
98. *Ibid.*
99. See Vadym Ryzhkov, 'Covert Electoral Fraud: How Elections can be rigged. Case Study – Dnipropetrovs'k', *Demos*, Vol.1, No.1 (10 Oct. 1994),
100. *Derby Evening Telegraph*, 11 April 1994.
101. *Reuters*, 23 Feb. 1994.
102. See 'Politychnyi terror proty rukhu ta ioho lideriv i aktyvistiv', *Rada*, 3 Feb. 1994.
103. *Kreshchatyk*, 1 Feb. 1994.
104. *Holos Ukrainy*, 5 May 1994, and *Rukh Press*, 30 March 1994.
105. *The Washington Times*, 27 March 1994.
106. Morozov's election manifesto is published in *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 7 and 8 July 1994.
107. *Washington Post*, 12 April 1994.
108. UNIAN News Agency, 13 July 1994.
109. *Financial Times*, 13 April 1994.