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## Peter I's Administrative Reforms in the Hetmanate during the Northern War

TATIANA TAIROVA-IAKOVLEVA

**W**HY DID HETMAN IVAN MAZEPA ABANDON PETER I and ally with Charles XII of Sweden? There are two standard answers to this important question. Ukrainian historians explain that Mazepa's decision to sever his relations with the tsar after almost two decades of successful cooperation was due to Russia's policies toward the Hetmanate. According to traditional Russian historiography, Mazepa was a traitor.

In letters that Mazepa wrote to his colonels immediately after his dramatic defection to the Swedes, the Ukrainian hetman spoke of "Muscovite tyranny" and Tsar Peter's plans to turn the Cossacks into ordinary soldiers, adding that Russia had begun to assert control over Ukrainian cities. No historian has ever bothered to verify if these reforms really took place. Could these statements have been nothing more than Mazepist propaganda? Some scholars, for example Igor Kurukin, one of the authors of a recent book on the Northern War, have even expressed disbelief that Peter would launch administrative reforms during such an arduous war.<sup>1</sup>

However, my research at the Russian State Archive of Early Acts has revealed that four different reforms of the Ukrainian Hetmanate took place in 1707: (1) a departmental reform, which transformed the Little Russian Department (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*), the office that was responsible for Ukraine, into the Department of Military Affairs (*Razriad*); (2) a provincial reform, which saw the creation of gubernias; (3) the formation of the companies (*kompanii*), professional (mercenary) military units that were supposed to comprise one-fifth of the personnel of Cossack regiments; and (4) the transfer of Ukrainian fortresses to the jurisdiction of the Russian military authorities. The latter two reforms were closely connected with the events of the Northern War, whereas the first two were part of Peter's plan to create a Russian empire.

It has been frequently observed that historians of Russia have little knowledge or understanding of the Ukrainian component of Russian imperial history. Moreover, historians of Ukraine are not very familiar with the internal affairs

of tsarist Russia. For example, there are dozens of Russian studies devoted to the provincial reform. Yet not a single one of these scholars saw fit to devote any attention to the Ukrainian aspect of this reform. Even Ukrainian historians have paid scant attention to this reform because it was completed in 1709, after Mazepa's death.

The first extant document pertaining to the departmental reform is dated 17 January 1707 (Old Style). This was an order issued by Peter to the boyar Tikhon Streshnev, the head of the Department of Military Affairs, to subordinate Kyiv and other Ukrainian fortresses to Belgorod and to appoint Dmitrii Golitsyn to head the Belgorod voevodship.<sup>2</sup> Golitsyn was also granted the title of "voevoda of Kyiv" (instead of the traditional title of "voevoda of Belgorod")<sup>3</sup> and his residence was to be based in Kyiv.<sup>4</sup>

On 28 February 1707 the secretary of the Secret Cabinet, Pavel Shafirov, gave an order to move all books and registers of Ukrainian cities from the Little Russian Department to the Department of Military Affairs, to which all clerks and their salaries were also transferred.<sup>5</sup> Shafirov personally reported about all these steps to Peter, who maintained control over the reform.

The departmental reform began in January 1707, but Mazepa learned of it only in March, during a meeting with the tsar in Zhovkva.<sup>6</sup> The list of cities that came under the control of the Department of Military Affairs included Kyiv, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, and Pereiaslav.<sup>7</sup> These so-called regimental cities—that is, the capitals of Cossack regiments—were the centers of the administrative system in the Hetmanate and thus an important part of its legal and military structures. Before 1707 Ukrainian cities were under the authority of the Little Russian Department, which was subordinated to the Department of Foreign Affairs (*Posol'skii prikaz*). Thus, in 1707 the autonomous state of Ukraine was on its way to becoming an integral part of the Russian state.

The second administrative reform was the provincial reform, which was initiated by Peter throughout the Russian Empire, including Ukraine. It began in December 1707, when Peter ordered the creation of gubernias, one of which was to include the Kyiv region. By late December 1707 Dmitrii Golitsyn, the voevoda of Kyiv, had drawn up a list of cities that he wanted to include in Kyiv gubernia.<sup>8</sup> Once certain revisions were completed in January 1708, the list was presented to Peter.<sup>9</sup> It contained forty-one cities, including the Ukrainian cities of Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, and Nizhyn, as well as parts of the Smolensk and Azov regions and part of Sloboda Ukraine.<sup>10</sup> The main principle governing which city was to be included in Kyiv and Smolensk gubernias was its proximity to the cities of Kyiv or Smolensk.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the old administrative borders of the Ukrainian Hetmanate were completely ignored.

It should be emphasized here that when Peter initiated this reform he did not view it as a move against Mazepa or the Ukrainian Hetmanate; rather, it was part of his overall reform strategy, specifically, the provincial reform.

Nevertheless, the abolition of the Little Russian Department and the replacement of the Belgorod voevoda by the voevoda of Kyiv destroyed the system of relations that had existed between the Ukrainian Hetmanate and the Russian borderlands. The provincial reform paved the way for a new reform that was implemented by Peter after the Northern War: the creation of the Little Russian College (*Malorossiiskaia kollegiia*), which was answerable to the Senate.

Soon after his appointment as voevoda of Kyiv, Golitsyn began exerting his authority over issues that had no connection to war or military affairs. Ukraine now appeared to be under the dual rule of the Ukrainian hetman and the Russian voevoda. In June 1708 Golitsyn wrote to Peter, informing him that he required additional manpower to complete the fortifications in Kyiv. Even after the tsar issued Mazepa an order to dispatch more workers, Golitsyn kept complaining that the hetman had sent only a couple of hundred men.<sup>12</sup> Golitsyn also began interfering in the internal affairs of the Hetmanate. On 27 May 1708 Mazepa was forced to justify himself in connection with a letter that Golitsyn had written to Peter's favorite and confidant, Aleksandr Menshikov. Golitsyn blamed Mazepa for the fact that Ukrainian citizens were reportedly not happy about paying taxes in order to provide the wages of the mercenary regiments (*serdiuky* and *kompaniitsi*). The hetman declared angrily that the mercenary regiments obtained their wages from "rents." In a number of letters written to Menshikov Mazepa explained the taxation system of the Hetmanate, including the system of rents.<sup>13</sup> According to the Kolomak Articles, a Ukrainian-Russian treaty concluded on 6 August 1687, internal policy in the Hetmanate, as well as tax collection, was the mainstay of the hetman's authority; Russian voevodas had no right to interfere in it.<sup>14</sup>

The provincial reform is directly responsible for Peter's plans to dismiss the Cossack officer staff (*starshyna*), which was described in a letter written by Mazepa's successor in exile, Pylyp Orlyk, to the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarch and the de facto head of the Russian Orthodox Church Stefan Iavors'kyi.<sup>15</sup> Very likely there were plans afoot not only to establish the office of Kyivan voevoda, but also to introduce an entirely new administrative system, including one to replace the old Cossack *starshyna*. Historians are more familiar with the reform that resulted in the transfer of Ukrainian fortresses to the jurisdiction of the Russian military authorities. This arrangement was mutually agreed upon by Mazepa and Peter, and on 22 November 1707 the hetman handed over the newly built Pechersk Fortress to the voevoda of Kyiv, Golitsyn.<sup>16</sup> Henceforward, all decisions on how to defend Kyiv (or not to defend it) were made by Golitsyn, not Mazepa.

Mazepa revealed his obvious displeasure with the new system in a letter written in November 1707 to Gavriil Golovkin. Until very recently the Ukrainian hetman had reported directly to Peter and received instructions only from him. It should be recalled that in 1689 Peter granted Mazepa the right to

issue orders concerning military affairs to Russian vоеvodas. Now everything was reversed and Golitsyn had the final say. He was the one who decided the number of Cossacks Mazepa could have in Kyiv, and the hetman had no choice but to follow his orders.<sup>17</sup> The new dual-rule system in Ukraine led to much confusion, many examples of which emerged in the summer of 1708, with Mazepa receiving orders from Dmitrii Golitsyn, Aleksandr Menshikov, and Golovkin.

Besides Pechersk, another important fortress transferred from Mazepa's administration to Golitsyn's was Novobohorodyts'ka (Novobogoroditsk) on the Samara River. This fortress was built by Mazepa in 1688 as part of a new line of defense against the Tatars. At the same time it helped maintain control over the Zaporozhian Sich, with which Mazepa did not have good relations. Initially, the fortress had been under Moscow's authority, but after the Azov campaigns of 1701 it was transferred to Mazepa's control,<sup>18</sup> one of several gifts from the tsar to the hetman (including the Order of St. Andrew). That same year Peter granted Mazepa full authority to protect the southern boundaries of his state.

But by 1707 the hetman's authority was significantly eroded. On 20 July 1707 Shafirov received an order from the tsar to assign Novobohorodyts'ka Fortress to the Department of Military Affairs.<sup>19</sup> During the Northern War Ukraine was increasingly subordinated to the authority of high-ranking Russian officers. In May 1708 Vasiliï Dolgorukii, a major in the Preobrazhenskii Regiment, was appointed chief commander of all troops in Ukraine, including Russian forces, the hetman's registered Cossacks, and Ukrainian mercenary regiments.<sup>20</sup>

The dual-rule system was already functioning in Ukraine in the summer of 1708. I will cite several examples of this practice, which gave rise to all sorts of inconsistencies and sparked numerous misunderstandings. On 17 June Mazepa received an order to build some bridges near Kyiv; meanwhile, an identical order was sent to Golitsyn, the vоеvoda of Kyiv.<sup>21</sup> On 25 June Mazepa wrote to Menshikov, informing him that he had received his order to march with his army to Prypiat. The very next day Golovkin countermanded Menshikov's order, instructing the Ukrainian hetman to head for Kyiv.<sup>22</sup>

The last of Peter's reforms, but by no means the least important, was the creation of "companies," or mercenary units, that were supposed to be formed of one-fifth of the personnel of Cossack regiments. On 10 August 1707 Peter sent a letter to Mazepa in which he insisted that these units be organized during the winter to be ready by spring. The tsar fumed about the Cossack regiments, calling them inefficient and irregular, adding that the only activity in which the Cossacks had engaged during the last campaign was robbery.<sup>23</sup> Mazepa, who understood the crucial need to reorganize the old Cossack regiments because they did not meet modern requirements, agreed to form these units.<sup>24</sup> However, he soon realized the difficulties in implementing this reform. I recently uncovered a fascinating letter written by Mazepa to Golovkin, in which the

Ukrainian hetman, alarmed by “rumors” that were circulating among the Cossacks, insisted that the planned changes not be made precipitously. His advice was to commence the reform with the Starodub and Chernihiv regiments, which were the “quietest ones” in his opinion, and situated far enough from Zaporizhia. Mazepa, who was perturbed by the behavior of his colonels, was concerned about a possible revolt among the Cossacks if the changes to the regiments proceeded too quickly. When the Cossack colonels learned of Peter’s order about the *kompanii* (that is, the reform of the regiments) they called it a violation of their liberties and blamed Mazepa for it.<sup>25</sup> Thus, in 1707–8 Mazepa faced strong opposition from the Cossack officer staff, and he did his best to delay the reform of the Cossack regiments.

The launch of Peter’s complex and multilateral administrative reforms in 1707 significantly eroded the authority of the hetman and was a step closer toward the abolition of the Hetmanate’s autonomy. The voevoda of Kyiv acquired complete authority in all military and administrative matters, and the hetman found himself on the verge of forfeiting his position as Ukraine’s ruler. There is little doubt that Mazepa was extremely displeased by this turn of events. From his point of view, everything that he had achieved through his long and faithful service was suddenly abolished by the tsar without cause (the hetman initiated contact with the Swedes only in the spring of 1707). But the reforms had nothing to do with Peter’s personal attitude toward the hetman. They marked the beginning of the complete reconstruction of Russia’s administrative system—the creation of an empire, a process that was greatly stimulated by the Northern War.

#### NOTES

1. V. A. Artamonov, K. A. Kochegarov, and I. V. Kurukin, *Vtorzhenie shvedskoi armii na Getmanshchinu v 1708 g.* (St. Petersburg, 2008).
2. I. I. Golikov, *Deianiia Petra Velikago, mudrago preobrazovatel'ia Rossii, sobrannyyia iz dostoviernykh istochnikov i raspolozhennyia po godam*, 15 vols. (Moscow, 1837–43), 3:224–25.
3. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (hereinafter: RGADA), fond 229 (Malorossiiskii prikaz), list 2, file 101, fols. 48r–48v.
4. *Ibid.*, fol. 48v.
5. *Ibid.*, fols. 48v–49r.
6. *Ibid.*, fols. 83v–84r.
7. *Opisanie dokumentov i bumag, khраниashchikhsia v moskovskom arkhive ministerstva iustitsii*, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1888–), 7.
8. E. G. Avsharov, “K istorii oblastnoi reformy (1707–1709 gg.),” in *Russkii gorod: Issledovaniia i materialy*, Moscow State University Series (Moscow, 1982), 94–95.
9. *Ibid.*

10. RGADA, fond 9, pt. 2, bk. 89, fol. 104r.
11. Ibid., fols. 104r–104v.
12. “А от гетмана работников прислано 200 человек и в оных работниках упираетца и пишет, будущее, что присланы будут. Прошу вас, моего государя, аще воля ваша будет, прикажи ко мне написать письмо и спросить: Печерская крепость делаетца ль и сколько работников от господина гетмана прислано, дабы я то письмо мог показать гетману. И чаю, что по оному вас, моего государя, письму работников вскоре пришлет.” See *Severnaia voina 1700–1721: Sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 1, 1700–1709 (Moscow, 2009–), doc. no. 322, [p.] 348.
13. Archive of the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (hereinafter: ИИ РАН), fond 83, list 1, file 58, fols. 1r–2v.
14. “Удивился такой плевосеятелной лжи, [ко]торою вашу княжю светлость напрасно якийсь неспостоянной лживец потурбовал, а я известую вашей княжей светлости чистою совестию и правдою христианскою, что на сердюков и на компанію никогда ни с кого здесь в малороссійских рейменту моего городах ни по единой копейке не выбираетца, и обыкновенія такого издревле не было, и теперь нет...” (I was surprised by such an incipient lie, with which some fickle liar vainly troubled your princely highness, but I am informing your princely highness with a pure conscience and Christian truth that not a single kopeck has ever been taken for the serdiuks and the kompaniitsi here in the Little Russian regiments of my cities, and since the earliest times there has never been such a custom, nor now...). ИИ РАН, fond 83, list 1, file 58, fols. 1r–2v.
15. See “Pys’mo P. Orlyka S. Iavors’komu,” in Orest Subtelny, *Mazepyntsi: Ukraïns’kyi separatyzm na pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1994), 163–64.
16. “Остановилем президиального рейменту моего войска полку стародубовского 500 человек людей надежных и с своими борошенными запасами с полковником их наказным, старшиною и с сотниками” (I have left behind the presiding regiment of my army, 500 reliable people of the Starodub regiment, and with their supplies of flour and their acting colonel, Cossack officers and their captains). RGADA, fond 229 (Malorossiiskii prikaz), list 4, file 137, fols. 1r–1v.
17. RGADA, fond 229 (Malorossiiskii prikaz), list 4, file 137, fol. 1v.
18. RGADA, fond 229 (Malorossiiskii prikaz), list 2, file 86, fol. 118r.
19. RGADA, fond 229 (Malorossiiskii prikaz), list 2, file 101, fols. 184r–184v.
20. *Pis’ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo*, vol. 7, bk. 2 (Moscow; Leningrad, 1946), 681.
21. RGADA, fond 229 (Malorossiiskii prikaz), list 1, file 62, fols. 1v–2r.
22. “Писмо вашей княжой светлости всякой чести достойное восприял я с подобающим гонором вчерась июня 24 через нарочного курьера с таковым в нем изображенным предложением, дабы я по нынешнему неприятелскому действию приказал полковнику Стародубовскому приблизитца с полком к Днепру для осмотра п[ассо]в, а сам подался з войском к Припети. А ныне в 25 июня получил я писаніе сіятелнейшего графа его милости Гаврила

Ивановича, чтоб мне самому итить к Киеву, а ближайшіе полки от Литвы послать к Днепру.” IH RAN, fond 83, list 1, file 63, fol. 1r.

23. *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo*, vol. 6 (St. Petersburg, 1912), doc. no. 1901, [p.] 44.
24. *Ibid.*, 287.
25. “К тому ж и то говорят, что грамота до них обнадеживательная при древних правах и волностях их пребывать прислана. А ныне де паче на деяния их иной указ прислан. О чем на него гетмана сю вину нарекают.” RGADA, fond 24 (Malorossiiskie dela, 1703), no. 5, fols. 113r–113v.