

CHAPTER VI

*Orthodoxy and revolt:
The role of religion in the
seventeenth-century
Ukrainian uprising against
the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth*

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THE sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were an age of wars of religion. From the Catholic-Huguenot struggle in France to the Defenestration of Prague (1618), religious differences both caused and justified numerous civil and foreign wars. In one case – the English Civil War – political and social radicalism grew out of religious disputes.¹ Although modern historians have come to question religious motives and justifications as the principal catalysts in struggles such as the Dutch war of independence, they have not questioned the importance of religious divisions within societies and monarchs' attempts to impose religious uniformity as major issues in early modern struggles. The European phenomenon stretched from the Urals to the Atlantic. In Russia, religious disputes and millenarianism played a major role in all revolts after the Old Believer schism of the late seventeenth century.

Few events in early modern Ukrainian history drew such widespread contemporary attention as the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Rumors of the slaughter of landlords, Jews, and Catholics in 1648 reverberated in the grain ports on the Baltic, in the Jesuit houses in central Europe, and in Jewish communities on the Mediterranean. The destruction of the armies of the

¹ On the role of religion in early modern revolts, see Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1982), Chapter 6.

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth led Sweden, the Habsburgs, France, and many other powers to reevaluate their view of the balance of power. The Cossack leader Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi had upset this balance by his alliance with the Crimean khan in early 1648. Within a year after he had started his revolt, Muscovite, Transylvanian, Moldavian, Polish, and Turkish emissaries came to the Ukraine to treat with this Zaporozhian Cossack hetman. A decade after the revolt began, all of eastern and northern Europe was involved in wars that had their origin in the Cossack stronghold on the lower Dnieper. By the late 1650s, Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi and his successor, Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, planned (with Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Transylvania) to partition the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and then, when this plan did not work, Hetman Vyhovs'kyi arranged an agreement with the Commonwealth to create a Duchy of Rus' in Ukraine and to abolish the Union of Brest, the agreement of 1596 through which Rome had gained control over some of the Commonwealth's Orthodox believers. Small wonder that the revolt and new political power in Ukraine attracted widespread attention.

The aspects of the Ukrainian revolt that received international attention in the 1640s and 1650s also draw today's specialist in early modern revolts to its study. It is one of the few popular uprisings in seventeenth-century Europe that defeated the upper classes and resulted in an improvement in the legal and economic position of the peasants, the urban populace, and other disadvantaged groups. Whether the Ukrainian revolt constituted a "social revolution" may be questioned, but it did serve as a rallying point for opposition to economic, social, and political repression well into the eighteenth century.²

The Ukrainian revolt shifted the balance of power in Eastern Europe. Although the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth survived the onslaught, it never regained the position it held before 1648. Muscovy suffered setbacks and defeats after Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich accepted the allegiance of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in 1654; however, that allegiance laid the foundation for the growth of the Russian Empire in the decades to follow. The Ottomans ultimately failed in their last effort to conquer the north, but the conspiracies and plots that began with the revolt so shook the political order in Eastern Europe that they challenged the Ottomans to attempt to assert control. By the early eighteenth century, a new balance of power had emerged in the eastern half of the

² See Frank E. Sysyn, "War der Chmel'nyts'kyj-Aufstand eine Revolution? Eine Charakteristik der 'grossen ukrainischen Revolte' und der Bildung des kosakischen Het'manstaates," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 43.1 (1995): 1–18.

continent, with a dominant Russian Empire under Peter I. Try as he would, Khmel'nyts'kyi's successor, Ivan Mazepa, could not shake that dominion.

The revolt in the Ukraine also produced a new political entity, the Cossack hetmanate. Although its period of full independence was relatively brief, the political order that endured until 1783 constitutes one of the few examples of "state-building" through a revolt that established the borders of a new polity. The Ukrainian revolt is comparable to the Dutch war of independence in this respect. Both conflicts encouraged the development of a national culture and consciousness that was associated with the new political order. In the Ukrainian case, both the political entity and the culture disintegrated in the eighteenth century and were submerged into the Russian Empire and Russian imperial culture, only to reemerge in the modern Ukrainian national awakening. But the more than one hundred twenty-five years of Ukrainian autonomy after 1648 nonetheless constitutes one of the most important instances of an early modern revolt creating a new political entity and reshaping a cultural pattern.³

Since the late seventeenth-century Ukrainian Eyewitness Chronicler, who asserted that the reason for the "war" was the "Poles' persecution of Orthodoxy," many commentators have believed that religious conflict caused the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising of 1648.⁴ Historians have also described the religious strife during the conflict and the function of religion in motivating both sides. Certainly the long-term outcomes of the war, the decline of religious pluralism in Ukraine with the establishment of the Orthodox Cossack hetmanate, and the triumph of Catholicism in the right-bank Ukraine and Poland speak for the importance of religion in the conflict. The tsarist government and Russian Orthodox Church in the nineteenth century viewed the religious issue as cardinal in their retrospective justification of revolt, war, and tsarist claims to Ukraine after 1654. Even Soviet historians admitted the importance of the religious issue, though they usually saw religious disputes as reflecting national and social tensions.⁵

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Ukraine seem to fit a general European pattern of strife caused by religious divisions and differences. Yet they differ in one way. In the Polish and Lithuanian

³ See Frank E. Sysyn, "The Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising and Ukrainian Nation-Building," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17.1-2 (Summer-Winter 1992): 141-70.

⁴ *Litopys samovydtisia*, ed. Ia. Dzyra (Kyiv, 1971), 45.

⁵ See V. Nikonov, "Rol' pravoslavnoi tserkvi v osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda," *Zhurnal Moskovskoi patriarkhii* 12 (1953): 31-43, and John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982).

states, contending Christian faiths – Catholic, Orthodox, and Armenian Apostolic – had long been permitted. No European states had developed societies with religious pluralism in the medieval period except for Poland and Lithuania.⁶ The Utraquist-Catholic split in Bohemia may be seen as an exception, but this situation was never stable. Some states also occasionally gave toleration to non-Christians, Jews or Muslims, but none permitted the existence of “error” among their Christian inhabitants. Christian diversity could only flourish in states such as the Ottoman Empire, where the rulers cared little about their subjects’ views about the Trinity or church governance.⁷ Only in the sixteenth century did the monolith of Western Christendom break down, occasionally leading to experiments in toleration such as in Transylvania after the 1560s and in the Holy Roman Empire after 1648 (at least on a territorial basis). Poland and Lithuania, states on the divide between Western and Eastern Christianity, had to accept religious pluralism from the fourteenth century because both states had numerous and well-established Ruthenian (Ukrainian-Belarusian) populations (a minority in Poland, a majority in Lithuania).⁸

From the late sixteenth century, the relations of the Polish-Lithuanian state with its Orthodox inhabitants became confrontational. As the Orthodox Church stood in opposition to the state’s religious policies and Orthodox believers opposed attempts at accommodation by their hierarchs, the Orthodox faith in the early seventeenth century came to symbolize revolt and challenge to authority. Therefore, when the great uprising in Ukraine against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth broke out in 1648, religious grievances intermixed with economic, social, and national issues. This chapter outlines how the Polish-Lithuanian state estranged its Orthodox inhabitants despite periods of attempted accommodation. It also analyzes to what degree Orthodoxy and the Orthodox Church caused and took part in the revolt. It is the story of

⁶ See Wiktor Weintraub, “Tolerance and Intolerance in Old Poland,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 13 (1971): 21–44.

⁷ On Ottoman religious policies, see Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge, 1968).

⁸ In this chapter, “Ruthenian” is used to render the noun *Rusyn* and the adjective *rus’kyi*, both of which are derived from the word *Rus’*, the name of the medieval East Slavic polity. In the seventeenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the terms were most often used to describe the Ukrainians and Belarusians, who shared a common literary language. Forms of these terms were also used by the Muscovites to refer to themselves, but were more seldom used to describe Muscovy and Russians in the Commonwealth, where Ruthenians (*Rusyny*) and Muscovites (*Moskva*) were often described as two peoples alongside other peoples of the region. The varying fates of Ukraine and Belarus in the seventeenth century greatly furthered the distinction between these otherwise closely related peoples and cultures.

how a conservative faith became revolutionary and how churchmen who sought to maintain the established political and social order found their Church and their faith increasingly drawn into and associated with the uprising.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, like the medieval kingdom of Poland, offered only limited toleration to Orthodox subjects.⁹ The Orthodox faced discrimination from statutes such as the Union of Horodlo of 1413 in Lithuania, only fully rescinded in 1563, and the Magdeburg law regulations in both states. Catholic theologians argued for rebaptism of Orthodox converts in the fifteenth century. After 1439, attempts were made to entice or pressure the Orthodox into accepting the Union of Florence (1439). Nevertheless, for three hundred years, Ukraine and Belarus were lands of overlapping Christian religious jurisdictions.¹⁰ The Orthodox-Catholic conflict did not, therefore, have the poignant newness that the religious divisions in France or England had in the sixteenth century. Indeed the initial climate of tolerance in Polish-Lithuanian society toward Western Christian schisms in the mid-sixteenth century may have stemmed, in part, from the long-term experience of Eastern and Western Christians coexisting.

Political developments shaped the evolution of the church of the Ruthenians, which had originated in the conversion of Kyivan (Kievan) Rus' in the tenth century.¹¹ The Tatar-Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century that decimated the land and destroyed that state had profound consequences for the Church. After a relatively short time under the Tatars, the Orthodox of Ukraine and Belarus came under Catholic rule. The political divisions of the territories of the vast metropolitanate of Kyiv (Kiev) that had arisen in medieval Rus' and the migration of the metropolitans to the Russian northeast of their see in the early fourteenth century led to numerous attempts in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to recover the metropolitanate or to create a separate metropolitanate in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. The Orthodox Galician-Volhynian, pagan Lithuanian, and Catholic Lithuanian and Polish rulers all pursued this policy at times. A lasting separation occurred in the mid-fifteenth century in the wake of the unsuccessful Union of the Eastern and Western Churches at Florence (1439), the fall

⁹ See Kazimierz Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska: Zarys historyczny 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934) on the situation of the Orthodox Church.

¹⁰ See Eduard Winter, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine, 955–1939* (Leipzig, 1942).

¹¹ On the Christianization and the culture of Rus', see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*: vol. 1. *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997); A.P. Vlasto, *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom* (Cambridge, 1970); and Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus': 750–1200* (London, 1996).

of Constantinople (1453), and the establishment of a self-proclaimed autocephalous metropolitanate of Moscow. The erection of a Kyiv metropolitanate limited to the Lithuanian and Polish states ensured ever greater influence of the Catholic rulers of Poland and Lithuania in the appointment of Orthodox metropolitans and bishops, albeit with the metropolitans turning to Constantinople for consecration. The Kyiv metropolitanate became a church on the defensive against state-supported Catholicism, which sought to undermine its authority.¹²

The Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reform or Counter-Reformation radically changed the relation of rulers and ecclesiastical institutions in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, united as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the Union of Lublin of 1569.¹³ The Catholic Church split as reform groups such as the Lutherans, Calvinists, Antitrinitarians, Anabaptists, and Czech Brethren founded their own religious establishments and began successful missions among the Orthodox. While toleration for the Orthodox in the fourteenth century could be explained largely by the extent and populousness of the Ukrainian-Belarusian territories amassed by the Polish and Lithuanian rulers, the acceptance of religious multiplicity in the sixteenth century, legalized in 1573, derived chiefly from the decay of royal power and the sweeping rights of the nobility.¹⁴ Still, the decision of the last Jagiellonian kings not to adhere to any of the Reformed groups, and the increasing Catholic dedication of the elected kings of the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, above all of Sigismund Vasa, greatly benefited the Catholic Church. The ability of the king to favor Catholics in royal appointments and the presence of Catholic bishops in the Diet of the Commonwealth strengthened the Church's position. As the Counter-Reformation won over large numbers of the nobility, including Orthodox, in the early seventeenth century, the position of non-Catholics began to decline, as did the relative spirit of tolerance of the late sixteenth century.

¹² On the early church, see Andrzej Poppe, *The Rise of Christian Russia* (London, 1982) and his *Państwo i kościół na Rusi w XI wieku* (Warsaw, 1968); Sophia Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, vol. 1 (= *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* 243) (Rome, 1993); John Lister Fennell, *A History of the Russian Church to 1448* (London and New York, 1995); and John Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia* (Cambridge, 1981).

¹³ See Ambroise Jobert, *De Luther à Mohila: La Pologne dans la crise de la chrétienté 1517–1648* (= *Collection Historique de l'Institut d'Etudes Slaves* 21) (Paris, 1974).

¹⁴ See Janusz Tazbir, *A State without Stakes: Polish Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, trans. A.T. Jordan (New York, 1973); Mirosław Korolko, *Klejnot swobodnego sumienia: Polemika wokół Konfederacji warszawskiej w latach 1573–1658* (Warsaw, 1974); and Henryk Wisner, *Rozróżnieni w wierze: Szkice z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej schyłku XVI i połowy XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1974).

In crossing the line between the Western Christian Polish, Lithuanian, and German populations to the Eastern Christian Ruthenian population, the Protestants and Catholics challenged both the national and religious identity of the Ukrainians and Belarusians. The metropolitanate of Kyiv was usually referred to as the Rus' or Ruthenian Church, and the Ruthenians were seen as an ethno-religious community in which adherence to the Church was a necessary characteristic of Ruthenian identity. Indeed on this religious borderline, the Ruthenian faith was often placed in opposition to the Polish faith (the Liakhs' faith), with Western Christianity being defined by the major local ethno-cultural group that professed it.¹⁵ Hence conversion was generally perceived as a change of ethno-cultural allegiance.¹⁶

In addition to losses to Protestantism and Catholicism, the Orthodox Church suffered a schism in the late sixteenth century. Initially, reform movements within the Church, responding to Protestant and Catholic challenges, had produced divergent factions but no schisms.¹⁷ When some hierarchs negotiated an agreement recognizing papal jurisdiction over the metropolitan see of Kyiv (Union of Brest, 1596), however, a permanent schism resulted between Orthodox and Uniates. Unlike the Union of Florence, which was an attempt at a universal union, the Union of Brest was a local submission to a papacy that was now more centralized and less favorable to acceptance of other traditions and churches.¹⁸ In addition, the Latin-rite Church never gave equal status to Uniate Catholics, that is, the Christians of the Ruthenian rite who now accepted papal authority. Many Roman clergy would have preferred full

¹⁵ The identification of ethnicity with faith in Ukrainian territories was strengthened by the existence of the Armenian Church, a clearly defined ethno-national religious institution.

¹⁶ See Frank E. Sysyn, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and the National Conflict in the Khmel'nyts'kyi Movement," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. P. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980), 58–82. On the evolution of Ukrainian national identity in the early modern period, see the essays by T. Chynczewska-Hennel, Frank E. Sysyn, and Z. Kohut in *Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Europe*, Ivo Banac and Frank E. Sysyn eds. (= *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10.3–4) (Cambridge, MA, 1986), 377–92, 393–423, and 559–76, respectively; and Ihor Ševčenko, "The Rise of National Identity to 1700," in his *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996), 187–96.

¹⁷ On the religious revival of the late sixteenth century in Ukraine, see Ihor Ševčenko, "The Rebirth of the Rus' Faith," in *Ukraine between East and West*, 130–48, and William K. Medlin and Christos G. Patrinelis, *Renaissance Influences and Religious Reforms in Russia* (Geneva, 1971).

¹⁸ On the question of union, see Joseph Franz Macha, *Ecclesiastical Unification: A Theoretical Framework together with Case Studies from the History of Latin-Byzantine Relations* (= *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 198) (Rome, 1974).

conversion to the Latin rite. Also, the Uniate bishops were never given equality with the Latin-rite bishops by gaining seats in the Diet of the Commonwealth.¹⁹

Resistance to the Union of Brest among the clergy and the faithful undermined any chance of strengthening the Ruthenian Church through union with Rome. Acceptance or rejection of the Union dominated religious and political discussions from 1596 to the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. The Orthodox revulsion for the Uniate minority, especially in the Ruthenian palatinate (western Ukraine) and the Dnieper Basin (central Ukraine), split the Ruthenian community. The support of the king and the Diet for the Union and the Uniate hierarchy, stiffened by Rome whenever it wavered, made the "Rus' Church of the Greek religion from the East" illegal from 1596 to 1632.²⁰ This was an anomalous situation in a state that permitted toleration for Protestant and Armenian Churches, as well as communal autonomy for the Jews and rights of worship for the Muslims.

The Commonwealth could not act decisively against the widespread resistance to the Union because to do so would attack the liberties of Orthodox nobles, who could turn to Protestant nobles as allies, and because the adherents of Orthodoxy included armed supporters in Ukraine. Foreseeing collapse of their Church with the dying out of the hierarchy if the king refused to authorize new elections of bishops (a situation that the Old Believers in Muscovy later faced for their clergymen), the Orthodox had to resort to defiance of the state and to a show of arms in order to obtain a new hierarchy in 1620 from a visiting patriarch of Jerusalem (who was empowered by the patriarch of Constantinople). The "legal" Uniate and "illegal" Disuniate (the government's term for the Orthodox) Churches struggled for the loyalty of believers, each claiming to be the only legitimate Ruthenian Church and negating the right of the other to exist. Orthodox persistence forced royal recognition of Orthodox legality by the newly elected King Władysław IV in 1632, because the king needed Orthodox nobles' support for this election and had to ensure Ukraine's and Belarus's loyalty in an impending war with Muscovy. The government's attempts to divide the eparchies, churches,

¹⁹ On the Union of Brest, see Oskar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest, 1439–1596*, 2d ed. (New York, 1968); Borys Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); and M. Dmitriev, "The Religious Programme of the Union of Brest in the Context of the Counter-Reformation in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17.1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992): 29–44.

²⁰ On papal policy, see Sergei Nikolaevich Plokhyy (Plokhii), *Papstvo i Ukraina. Politika Rimskoi kurii na ukrainskikh zemliakh v XVI–XVII vekakh* (Kyiv, 1987).

and benefices of the Kyiv metropolitanate between the Orthodox and Uniates only unleashed new conflicts.²¹

Pressure from Catholic nobles and occasional defections of Orthodox dignitaries to the Uniates (Meletii Smotryts'kyi and Kasiian Sakovych) increased anxiety among the Orthodox. Suspicion reigned that betrayal would occur, particularly since the Church hierarchs could be attracted to enter into discussions with the Catholic Church by promises of legalization (before 1632), or later of elevation of their own social and economic status.²² Within the Orthodox community, each attempt to introduce new educational, publishing, and liturgical practices, a process that had been going on since the 1560s, made the innovators vulnerable to charges that they were betraying the true Orthodox tradition.²³ Attempts to define the place of the Orthodox in the matrix of contending Christian confessions appeared dangerous, especially when such discussions revealed how much was shared with the Latin-rite Catholics as opposed to with the more radical Protestants.²⁴

Fatigue owing to the constant efforts to defend properties, which required frequent mobilization of the embattled faithful, appeared among the Orthodox bishops and nobles. These efforts could backfire, such as when the burghers of Vitsebsk killed the Uniate archbishop of Polatsk, Iosafat Kuntsevych, thereby giving their opponents a martyr and calling forth persecution from the government. In addition, the endangered situation of the Church had spawned a whole series of institutions (e.g., brotherhoods²⁵) and practices (e.g., cooperation with Cossacks²⁶ and

²¹ On the religious policies of Władysław IV, see Jan Dziegielewski, *O tolerancję dla zdominowanych: Polityka wyznaniowa Rzeczypospolitej w latach panowania Władysława IV* (Warsaw, 1986).

²² In the Western Ukrainian Kholm eparchy in the 1630s and 1640s, the activist Uniate bishop Metodii Terlets'kyi spread the Union by force against the wishes of local burghers. In the Peremyshl' eparchy, the Orthodox nobles conducted armed struggles with the Uniate bishop Atanazii Krupets'kyi, but the courts passed strict sentences against them.

²³ See William K. Medlin, "The Cultural Crisis in Orthodox Rus' in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries as a Problem of Socio-Economic Change," in *The Religious World of Russian Culture*, ed. Andrew Blane (The Hague, 1973), 173–88, and the essay and appended bibliography to Ihor Ševčenko, "Religious Polemical Literature in the Ukrainian and Belarus' Lands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" in *Ukraine between East and West*, 149–63.

²⁴ See Frank E. Sysyn, "The Formation of Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking (Edmonton, 1991), 1–22.

²⁵ On the brotherhoods, see Iaroslav Dmytrovych Isaevych, *Bratstva ta ikh rol' v rozvytku ukrains'koi kul'tury XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1966).

²⁶ The Cossacks were an armed frontier population of the borderlands between the states of the Great Principality of Muscovy, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Kingdom of Poland (after 1569, the former composed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth)

noble participation in synods) that were not always to the liking of the hierarchs. Frequent intervention by Eastern patriarchs (based in the Ottoman Empire) opened the Kyiv metropolitan see to accusations that the Orthodox hierarchs were spies for the Ottomans, of whom the patriarchs were subjects. Indeed, Patriarch Cyril Lucaris of Constantinople included Kyiv in his plans for an anti-Catholic Orthodox-Protestant league. Search for support from Muscovy also lay the Church in the Commonwealth open to charges of disloyalty.²⁷

The position of the Orthodox Church entered a new phase under Metropolitan Peter Mohyla (1633–1646), a member of a once ruling family of Moldavia,²⁸ who tried to reinforce episcopal authority and the power of the metropolitan, define the faith, unify liturgical practices, and adapt the leading Catholic educational model to Orthodox education.²⁹ Selected as part of the compromise by which the new king, Władysław, and the Diet recognized the legality of the Orthodox Church, Mohyla sought to break with the rebellious Cossacks and demonstrate full loyalty to the Warsaw government. The opposition of Orthodox diehards and the growing Catholic intolerance in the Commonwealth hindered his efforts. Internally, the Orthodox Church remained free of full schism, despite considerable dissatisfaction, but no matter what Mohyla did, he could not stop the decline of the Orthodox Church's position in a Commonwealth ever more influenced by the Counter-Reformation. At the same time, he could not obtain permanent security for the Church since the policies of a new king, a diminishing number of Orthodox representatives in the Diet, or successful papal political pressure could undermine the Orthodox position and strengthen the Uniates. In the 1640s, Mohyla responded favorably to initiatives from Rome and other quarters to enter into negotiations that might heal the breach in the

and the Muslim Turkic steppe societies. Groups of Cossacks were enlisted in a register and paid to defend the frontier by the Commonwealth's government, but far larger numbers of the population considered themselves Cossacks and organized themselves to carry on campaigns in the Black Sea region and to resist the encroachment of the Commonwealth's social order.

²⁷ On the Orthodox Church in international affairs, see Gunnar Hering, *Ökumenisches Patriarchat und europäische Politik (1620–1638)* (Wiesbaden, 1968).

²⁸ Moldavia had a predominantly Romanian-speaking population but shared the Church Slavonic liturgical language with the Orthodox Slavs. Its culture had been greatly influenced by the West Ukrainian Galicia, and the Mohyla family had close contacts with Lviv. Therefore, in some sense, Mohyla could be seen as a Ruthenian, in a way that a Greek or South Slav would not have been.

²⁹ See the essay and bibliography of Ihor Ševčenko, "The Many Worlds of Peter Mohyla," in *Ukraine between East and West*, 164–86, and the classic study of Stefan Timofeevich Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki (opyt tser'kovno-istoricheskogo issledovaniia)*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1883–98).

Ruthenian Church, but he may have merely been mollifying the king and the Catholics; he also had to take into account continued widespread popular opposition to the Union.³⁰ At any rate, the increasing Catholic confessional consciousness among the Uniates and the Orthodox confessional consciousness among those who rejected the Union were undermining the common attachment to a Ruthenian Church.

What role did the Orthodox issue play in inspiring the revolt of 1648? Religious controversy greatly undermined the legitimacy of the Polish administration in the eyes of many of the Orthodox. To have had to maintain an "illegal" Church for thirty-five years inevitably inspired disaffection with the existing regime even among the otherwise loyalist nobility. The settlement of 1632 did not satisfy Orthodox complaints of discrimination.³¹ The Orthodox found that royal commissions were slow in assigning buildings and properties to them and that Catholic potentates could obstruct decisions and the law. In a land in which each noble aspired to be a law unto himself and each magnate virtually became one, the Orthodox could hold little hope for lasting amelioration of their situation. With the defection of more and more magnates to Catholicism, the Orthodox had to fear the consequences of the existing political arrangements.³² In a society in which violence was endemic, they learned that force and arms were better than any privilege. Seize the Kyiv Caves monastery or the St. Sophia cathedral and it was likely to remain yours.³³ The Orthodox understood that they could best wrest concessions during times of danger for the Commonwealth – such as the Turkish conflict of 1620 and the threat of Muscovite war in 1632. They also had learned to turn to foreign centers for support: spiritual from the Middle East and material and political from Moldavia, Wallachia, and Muscovy. Most importantly, they had come to realize

³⁰ See Atanasii Welykyj (Velykyi), "Anonymnyi proiekt Petra Mohyly po z'iedynnenniu ukrains'koï tserkvy 1645r," in *Svitla i tyni ukrains'koï istorii: pry chynky do istorii ukrains'koï tserkovnoï dumky* (Rome, 1969).

³¹ On the atmosphere surrounding the compromise of 1632, see Paulina Lewin and Frank E. Sysyn, "The *Antimaxia* of 1632 and the Polemic over Uniate-Orthodox Relations," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9 (1985): 145–65.

³² On conversion, see H. Litwin, "Stosunki wyznaniowe na Kijowszczyźnie i Braclawszczyźnie," *Przegląd Powszechny* 10 (1985): 58–70.

³³ Occasionally such techniques might backfire, as when the bishop of Peremyshl, Sylvestr Hulevych, and the local nobility were sentenced harshly for their seizure of properties that the Uniate bishop illegally retained. Still, the long discussions of the Peremyshl affair eventually ended with Hulevych retaining the properties for his own lifetime. See Frank E. Sysyn, "The Buyer and Seller of the Greek Faith: A Pasquinade in the Ruthenian Language against Adam Kysil," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995): 655–70.

that the Zaporozhian Cossacks served as an important guarantor of their position.

From the 1590s, the Orthodox cause and Zaporozhian Cossack rebellions were linked in the popular mind as "Nalyvaiko," the name of a Cossack leader of the 1590s, which became an epithet hurled by the Catholics at the Orthodox.³⁴ By the same token, the Commonwealth's need for Zaporozhian military support in time of war ensured Orthodox successes in 1620 and 1632. Against the common view that the original Cossacks were warriors for the faith, a counterpart to the Muslim *ghazis* whom they encountered in the steppe borderlands, it has been argued that they might have used the issue of Orthodoxy to further their revolt in the 1590s. In time, however, the Cossacks increasingly identified with the Orthodox cause. Cossacks assisted in seizing the Caves monastery in 1607, they enrolled in the Kyiv brotherhood in the 1610s,³⁵ and they prevented concessions to the Uniates at the Synod of Kyiv in 1629.

During the Smolensk War (1632–4), Metropolitan Mohyla had blessed the Cossack artillery to be used against the Orthodox Muscovites, but he soon tried to break with the Cossacks and dispense with their support for the Church. This break by the Mohylan Church seemed at first to work to the detriment of the Cossacks, as the failed revolts of 1635 and 1637–8 demonstrated. Ultimately, however, the Mohylan policy was a fragile one, for if the Commonwealth found a final resolution for the Cossack problem, the Catholic circles in the Commonwealth would have less reason to tolerate Orthodoxy.

The defense of Orthodoxy had mobilized the Ruthenian population of the Commonwealth for over seventy years before the great uprising of 1648. Nobles had threatened to break up Diets and dietines, they included Orthodox demands in the programs of confederations such as the Zebrzydowski revolt (1606–9), and they took part in the defense and seizures of church properties.³⁶ Burghers had formed brotherhoods,

³⁴ On the Cossacks and the religious issue, see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*: vol. 7. *The Cossack Era (to 1625)* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999), which contains updates on the literature by the editor, Serhii Plokhy. While the designation may have referred originally to the Orthodox cleric Demiiian Nalyvaiko, it was interpreted as referring to his more famous brother, the Cossack leader Severyn Nalyvaiko. Of course, the very fact that a Cossack and an Orthodox leader were brothers showed how closely Church and Cossacks were connected. For a recent examination of the role of religion in the revolt, see Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in the Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, 2001).

³⁵ See Iaroslav Dmytrovych Isaievych, "Zv'iazky bratstv iz zaporiz'kym kozatstvom u XVII st.," in his *Ukraina davnia i nova: Narod, relihiiia, kul'tura* (Lviv, 1996), 105–13.

³⁶ On the religious issue in noble political culture, see Frank E. Sysyn, "Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility's Grievances at the Diet of 1641," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6.2 (June 1982): 167–90.

financed delegations to the Diet, and occasionally participated in Cossack revolts. Peasants had been drawn into conflicts as early as the 1590s, but little is known about their views on religion or any other topic.³⁷ Although it is questionable to accept uncritically that the peasants were “conservative” in religion, it is more certain that they hated Catholicism and Protestantism as landlords’ faiths and viewed the attempt to impose the Union as but another interference of the lords in the peasants’ world.³⁸

The clergy were most closely identified with the Church and its policies. By the sixteenth century, the Orthodox clergymen of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth differed greatly from their predecessors. The metropolitans and bishops of the Kyivan Rus’ period had frequently been Greeks, and as late as the fifteenth century South Slavs were prominent. But by the late sixteenth century, Ruthenian nobles, appointed by the king and frequently tonsured and ordained to receive their office, dominated the higher clergy. Inferior hierarchs had been one of the causes of the Church’s decline and the rise of a reform movement among the laity. But the bishops were inferior not only because they often came to their posts with no clerical education but also because they lacked the power and status of Roman Catholic prelates since they did not have seats in the Diet. Hence the Union of Brest was partially an attempt by the bishops to regain control of the Church and to achieve equality with the Latins. In their plans, they would have improved the positions of all of the clergy by reducing control over monastic and ecclesiastical offices by lay patrons, many of whom were not Orthodox, and by abolishing the humiliating, virtually subject status of the village clergy. The bishops sought a reform and elevation of their Church through union with Rome, but their plans miscarried because they underestimated the need to gain a consensus among their own faithful before proceeding, and they themselves broke ranks. Opposition to the Union ranged from powerful Orthodox magnates to enserfed peasants.

³⁷ On popular views on the basis of Russian sources, see B. Floria, “Natsional’no-konfesiina sviodomist’ naseleennia Skhidnoi Ukraïny v pershii polovyni XVII stolittia,” in *Beresteis’ka uniiia ta vnutrishne zhyttia Tserkovy v XVII stolitti*, ed. Borys Gudziak (Lviv, 1997), 125–47.

³⁸ On social groups, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Social Causes of the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising,” in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, Samuel Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann eds. (DeKalb, IL, 1997), 52–70. There were also Orthodox landlords, but in relations with them religion was not a factor of demarcation and Orthodoxy was a faith that included various social strata. In rural areas in much of Ukraine, however, almost all Protestants and Catholics were nobles, whether landowners or their servitors, or clergy.

The Orthodox Church after 1596 presents a mixed picture of decline and of growth.³⁹ On the one hand, most bishops left the Church, large numbers of benefices were lost, and the conversion of the upper social strata to Catholicism continued. On the other hand, new monasteries were founded, schools were established, and the educational level of the clergy was improved. The Mohylan solution provided stability for this growth by a compromise with the government. Hence in contrast to the virtual opposition to the government by the hierarchy of 1620, which actively sought help from the enemies of the Commonwealth, the post-1632 hierarchy was solidly loyalist. In addition, while bishops before 1632 had given tacit approval to Cossack and peasant rebels who struggled for the Church's interests, the Mohylan hierarchy withdrew this support. It did not abandon violence as a solution, as the Peremyshl bishopric affair and the forceful assertion of Orthodox rights by Mohyla demonstrated, but these ventures were undertaken by nobles and Church retainers.

At the highest level, the Church had begun to reach an accommodation with the Commonwealth. But the bishops could not undo the consequences of the long years of struggle: suspicion from Catholics, indictment from the Uniates, and popular Orthodox distrust of the Catholic state and the hierarchs' accommodation. Closely allied to the bishops were the archimandrites of the great monasteries, many of which had revived activities in the early seventeenth century. Institutions such as the Caves monastery had been crucial to saving the Orthodox position, and the monasteries had reemerged as centers of education and book production. In the 1630s, the monasteries of the Trans-Dnieper region had resisted Mohyla's religious and political policies, but they had been brought in line with dissidents fleeing to Muscovite territory. By the 1640s, many monastic leaders (*hegumen*) favored cooperation with the Commonwealth's authorities, partially because many of them came from the nobility. In contrast, the lower ranks were less committed to such a course. In one case, Heguman Afanasii Filipovich had rejected Mohyla's line of conciliation and had even disrupted a Polish Diet in an attempt to have the Union abolished.⁴⁰ Other monks may have been closer to the tradition of withdrawal from the corrupt world preached by Ivan Vyshens'kyi, a monk trained at Mount Athos.⁴¹ This was not a

³⁹ On the state of the Orthodox Church in this period, see Ivan Wlasowsky (Vlasovs'kyi), *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*, 2d ed., vol. 2 (New York, 1979).

⁴⁰ See A.F. Korshunov, *Afanasii Filippovich: Zhizn' i tvorchestvo* (Minsk, 1965) and my discussion of this work in *Kritika* 8.2 (Spring, 1972): 1–12.

⁴¹ See Harvey Goldblatt, "Ivan Vyshens'kyj's Concept of St. John Chrysostom and his Idea of Reform for the Ruthenian Lands," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 16 (1992): 37–66.

course available to educators and chaplains, men who had to confront the Catholic challenge and to respond. Some, like Kasiian Sakovych, capitulated, probably reinforcing discontent at lower levels.⁴² In the struggle for control of churches in the towns, the urban clergy played a major role. At the base, the village clergy, frequently treated as virtual serfs by the largely non-Orthodox lords, had little reason to support the accommodations. In sum, the troubled clergymen were not a united group, but they did provide considerable numbers of detractors of the Polish administration.

The policies of the Commonwealth and the tactics of the Orthodox Ruthenians had led to a climate of confrontation between the state and the Orthodox that Metropolitan Mohyla and King Władysław IV had been unable to defuse. Did Church circles, clergy and laity, actively conspire in the planning and execution of the great revolt? How important were Orthodox demands for the rebels? What did the revolt mean for the Church as an institution?

In some ways, it made little difference whether the clergy supported the revolt or the rebels made religious demands. From the very first, Counter-Reformation opponents of Orthodoxy focused on the religious issue, seeing the "schismatic" clergy and nobles as masterminds of the revolt, in part because they refused to believe that the lower orders could be so ingenious. They argued that the very toleration of the Orthodox had brought divine retribution on the Commonwealth.⁴³ Certainly Polish retribution against the clergy as planners and supporters of the revolt both radicalized the Church and enhanced its position in rebel ranks. The execution of Afanasii Filipovich in Brest in 1648 on charges of supporting the Cossacks gave the Church and the revolt a martyr.

As in so many early modern revolts, the attempt of the government to bring about change provoked a revolt. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the seventeenth century was a republic, in which power was shared among the king, the Diet, and local dietines. Hence, the attempt of the king to embark on a foreign war against the will of the Diet and most of the nobility destabilized Ukraine. Before the revolt, the king hoped to incite a war to humble the Ottoman foe of Christendom, to be paid for by Venice, which was then involved in the War of Candia. A foreign war also could have strengthened his own power in his realm.

⁴² On Sakovych, see David A. Frick, "'Foolish Rus': On Polish Civilization, Ruthenian Self-Hatred and Kasijan Sakovyc," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 18.3-4 (December 1994): 210-48.

⁴³ For treatment of religious issues in contemporary literature, see Frank E. Sysyn, "Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5.4 (December 1980): 430-66.

Therefore he had negotiated a defensive alliance with Muscovy against the sultan's vassals, the Tatars, in 1647, though given the Diet's suspicions, all the terms had to be left vague. In this strategy, the Cossacks were essential, particularly because the king might need them to incite a Tatar attack, thus setting his plans in motion, and certainly would need them in any war. His secret negotiations with the Cossacks from 1646 raised their expectations that they could undo the harsh terms imposed after the revolt of 1638.

At the same time, the king sought to assure the support of the Orthodox Church. In what seems to the modern eye a flight of fantasy, he hoped to heal the split in the Ruthenian Church in order to create a united front and also to be able to hold out to Rome, an important partner in the anti-Turkish plan, the chance of bringing the entire Kyiv metropolitanate into union. Mohyla's death had not halted discussions for a new religious compromise. Religious affairs may have been the issue that led Crown Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński to confer with the new Orthodox metropolitan, Sylvester Kosiv, and the leading Orthodox layman and senator, Adam Kysil, in the summer of 1647. At any rate, it seems certain that the metropolitan must have been apprised of the plans afoot. Certainly Ossoliński's and Kysil's later actions seemed to indicate that they thought Kosiv their man. Well into 1648 the papal nuncio saw the matter of an accommodation coming to fruition with the call for meetings in Vilnius. But the king's plans aroused great suspicion in the Commonwealth that he was conspiring with the Cossacks and the Orthodox against the interests of the Polish nobility. For the Orthodox hierarchy, the war plan could strengthen their position, though it would also involve them in an intricate game. At the same time, the plans put zealous Orthodox on guard that some new sell-out might occur. Then King Władysław IV, who inspired considerable trust in Orthodox circles for his attempts to moderate the Counter-Reformation, died unexpectedly in May 1648, thus removing the linchpin for all arrangements with the Cossacks and the Church.⁴⁴

While the higher clergymen may have known of the Ottoman war plans, which involved the Zaporozhians, did they conspire with Khmel'nyts'kyi in late 1647 and early 1648 in his great change of plans and alliance with the Tatars to launch the revolt? In the late fall of 1647, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, persecuted by borderland officials, fled to the Cossack stronghold and from there made an alliance with the Crimean Tatars. There is no evidence, but circumstances seem to show that the

⁴⁴ On this period, see Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, MA, 1985), 117–28.

Cossack campaigning of the spring of 1648 came as a shock to the Church leadership. It has been argued that Khmel'nyts'kyi was an outsider in the Orthodox milieu, little known or trusted by the clerical establishment, which only came to terms with him after his great victories.⁴⁵ In contrast to Karpo Skydan, leader of the Cossack revolt in 1637–8, who immediately focused on the religious issue in calling for support, Khmel'nyts'kyi was muted in discussing the religious issue, perhaps indicating that he expected little active support from the Church. Although we know little of the particulars of Khmel'nyts'kyi's first negotiations with the Tatars and Turks, there seems to have been no active participation by the Eastern patriarchs.

Thus the Church did not plan with the Cossacks to initiate the revolt. Still, the event of 1648 was much more than a Cossack revolt; it was also a popular uprising. Here it seems we can give credence to the Polish charges that the clergy incited and led the masses. There is no Motryns'kyi monastery as a center of the revolt and no Archimandrite Melkhizedyk Znachno-lavors'kyi as in the eighteenth-century Koliiv uprising, but there are too many accounts of priests with swords in hand to disregard. What this phenomenon revealed was the limited nature of the success of the government's and Mohyla's policies. Despite the policy of accommodation, the Church was drawn into a Cossack revolt both because the Poles were sure that it was implicated and because the lower clergy, in fact, joined it. However tactful the Mohylas and Kosivs might be, the lower clergy seethed with hatred against the haughty Latins. They had also suffered the socioeconomic humiliation visited on their peasant flocks. Hence the Church was tied to the Cossacks as protectors; however, its hierarchs might have wished otherwise: The Cossacks, as fellow Orthodox, felt they had full rights to intervene in Church affairs. By the same token, however little interest Khmel'nyts'kyi initially may have had in Church affairs, he put the alleviation of the grievances of the Church forward as a way of gaining popular support and legitimacy.⁴⁶ The Church and the Cossacks may have been on the outs from 1638 to 1648, but their links were too strong to be sundered by a mere falling out.

For the hierarchs, the revolt called for rapid decisions. First, they had to choose sides quickly, if for no other reason than to decide whether

⁴⁵ See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 3 (Kyiv, 1995), 122–9.

⁴⁶ See S. Ploky, "Sviashchenne pravo povstannia: Beresteis'ka uniia i relihiina legitymatsiia Khmel'nychchyny," in *Derzhava, suspil'stvo i tserkoa v Ukraïni XVII stolitti*, ed. Borys Gudziak (Lviv, 1996), 1–13.

to remain in Ukraine or to flee with the landowning nobility. In general, bishops and archimandrites remained at their posts. While we may never know whether the bishop of Luts'k, the brotherhood of Lviv, or the archimandrite of Brest sent gunpowder and information to the approaching rebels, as the Polish side alleged, we may be sure that they would have seen the need to appear to be on the side of the victorious armies. By late 1648, the Church could see that the Cossack victories had ended the necessity of keeping up the intricate and dangerous discussions with the Latins and presented great opportunities for abolishing the Union and limiting Latin Catholic influence in Ukraine.⁴⁷ The patriarchs and clergy reinforced this positive evaluation of the revolt, since they could see the revolt as rooting out Latin influence. In addition, traveling so frequently to Moscow for alms, they could envisage a new Orthodox alliance, comprising a Muscovy recently awakened to the outer world, particularly in religious affairs, a Cossack Ukraine, and the Romanian principalities. They could also support Khmel'nyts'kyi's negotiations with the Ottomans, since even a Ukraine as an Ottoman vassal would revive Orthodox fortunes.⁴⁸

While foreign Orthodox prelates could see the revolt as offering a chance for better times for the Orthodox oecumene, the Orthodox metropolitan saw the delegation sent by the Commonwealth in early 1649, led by the Orthodox Adam Kysil, as constituting recognition that the Orthodox issue had come to the fore as one on which the government might make concessions. Polish members of the delegation had charged that secret negotiations had taken place between the rebels and the Orthodox members of the delegation; the demands subsequently made by the rebels, that three Senate places should be reserved for Orthodox nobles, and that the metropolitan, Sylvester Kosiv, should enter the Diet, as well, seem to confirm this allegation. The negotiations came to naught and soon Kosiv could see the negative as well as positive consequences of the revolt. He had to fear reprisals against his Church in the lands where the Cossacks did not triumph. After the Zboriv Agreement between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth

⁴⁷ On the Church in this period, see Metropolitan Ilarion (Ivan Ohienko), *Ukraïns'ka tserkva za Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho 1647–1657* (Winnipeg, 1955).

⁴⁸ On the Eastern patriarchs, see P. Nikolaevskii, "K istorii snoshenii Rossii s vostokom v polovine XVII stoletii," *Khristianskoe chtenie*, pt. 1 (1882): 242–67, 732–75; D. Olianchyn, "Do stosunkiv het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Ierusalym'skym patriarkhom Paisiiem u 1648–1649," *Bohoslovs'kyi vistnyk* 2 (1948), 51–3; and Maria Kowalska, *Ukraina w połowie XVII w. w relacji arabskiego podróżnika Pawła, syna Makarego z Aleppo. Wstęp, przekład, komentarz* (Warsaw, 1986).

(August 1649), he became increasingly dependent on Cossack power, which, despite the agreement, did not secure his place in the Diet in 1650 and did not protect his titular city of Kyiv from the Commonwealth's armies when war resumed in 1651. Kosiv's noble background and his fear of social turmoil caused him to backslide toward a pro-Commonwealth position in 1651. Just as importantly, Metropolitan Kosiv had to fear for the unity of his see if indeed Khmel'nyts'kyi broke away from Poland.⁴⁹

When, in 1653, Khmel'nyts'kyi turned decisively toward Moscow, the metropolitan and higher clergy saw another danger for their Church: a forcible break with the distant and lightly enforced jurisdiction of Constantinople and incorporation into the Muscovite Church. With its traditions of clerical privileges and self-government, and its higher clergy's noble political culture, the Ukrainian Church could only look with apprehension at the Muscovite Church, dominated by the tsar. In addition, these two Churches, which had emerged from the final division of the metropolitanate of Kyiv in the fifteenth century, had taken on very different cultural and ecclesiastical practices. In the 1620s, the Muscovites had burned Ruthenian books and rebaptized Ukrainians. Hence there arose the opposition of Metropolitan Kosiv and the higher clergy to the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement, which sought Orthodox reconciliation between the Ukraine and Muscovy, and the willingness of some of his successors to side with the Commonwealth and the Ottomans.

The establishment of the Cossack hetmanate did, however, improve the Church's position, granting the Church rights to peasant labor services on its lands, even if these privileges were hard to enforce.⁵⁰ The homogenous Orthodox Cossack Ukraine that emerged from the revolt underwent a religious revival, and the wealth of the new elite poured into monasteries and church building. It was clear by the 1650s that Orthodoxy would be secure as far west as the border of the Cossack polity extended.

To what degree did religion serve to justify and legitimize the revolt? Did Orthodoxy serve as an "ideology" of the rebels? While there was no theological decision in support of revolt, statements and actions of the Orthodox Church from within and from outside Ukraine allow us to address this question.

⁴⁹ On the relationship of Kosiv and Khmel'nyts'kyi, see O. Ohloblyn, "Problema derzhavnoi vлады na Ukraïni za Khmel'nychchyny i Pereiaslavs'ka uhoda 1654 roku," *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 2.1–2 (1965): 2–13; 2.3–4 (1965): 11–16.

⁵⁰ See M. Chubatyi, "Pro pravne stanovyshe tserkvy v kozats'kii derzhavi," *Bohosloviia* 3.1–2 (1925): 19–53, 181–203.

Many of the Orthodox statements on the political order came in religious polemical works.⁵¹ The Church had to answer the challenges of the Catholic and Protestant Churches, which had been so successful in winning away the Orthodox upper classes, and which represented clearly superior “modern” civilizations. After 1596, the formation of the Union of Brest made this challenge an assault on the very existence of the Orthodox Church. Before the revolt of 1648, the Orthodox thus had to cope with the triumph of wrong-believing states, the loss of social elites, and the desertion of the bishops and leaders entrusted to preserve Orthodoxy. In dealing with these difficult questions, they did realize that they were not alone, as the Council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople showed, but the common humiliation of defeat they shared with the Eastern patriarchates could hardly give them comfort. In this situation, they differed from the Muscovites, who remained safe in their isolated Orthodoxy, but who were for that reason to suffer a more traumatic and permanent shock less than a century later during the reign of Peter the Great.

That Orthodoxy did not split into various sects and groups in Ukraine and Belarus as it did in Muscovy was partially owing to the gradual nature of the challenge to the Ruthenian Orthodox worldview and partially owing to the need to maintain unity in the face of Catholics, Protestants, and later the Uniates. The Western Christian challenge, the debates of the various Protestant groups, and the redefinition of Catholicism at the Council of Trent forced the Kyiv metropolitanate and the Ruthenians to formulate more clearly their confessional allegiance. Indeed in the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories, new precision in defining the structure of an “Orthodox Church” and its dogmas arose in response to the new confessionalism of the Western Christians. As the Kyiv metropolitanate and the Rus’ Church made more explicit their relationship with other Eastern Churches, the conception of Orthodoxy became clearer, and wider circles of adherents of the Ruthenian community came to think in confessional terms.

As to their existence in a heretic state, there was little the Orthodox could say: They had endured in such a way for a very long time. The Eastern Orthodox Church had taken shape in a transformed Christian Roman Empire and conceived of the emperor as essential to its well-being.⁵² In converting a number of Slavic and East European peoples

⁵¹ In addition to Ševčenko, “Religious Polemical Literature,” see David A. Frick, *Meletij Smotryc’kyj* (Cambridge, MA, 1995) and A. Martel, *La langue polonaise dans les pays ruthène: Ukraine et Russie Blanche 1569–1667* (Lille, 1938).

⁵² See Joan Mervyn Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford, 1986).

through the Slavonic tongue, Orthodoxy became associated with specific state traditions and cultures, albeit as part of the Byzantine Commonwealth centered on the imperial city.⁵³ Yet by the late sixteenth century, many Orthodox had existed for hundreds of years in non-Orthodox states, deprived of the support of a right-believing empire. For most Orthodox peoples, this meant existence in the Ottoman state. Despite Ottoman pressure on the Church, the institution gained a certain authority as the representative of its faithful and bearer of the Byzantine-Hellenic legacy. The Russians were to undergo a similar, if shorter, experience under the Mongol-Tatars, who in many ways improved the situation of the Church, preparing the way for its reemergence as an ideological force in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Muscovy.

For the Orthodox of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, God had seen fit to send the Mongols against Kyiv in the thirteenth century, to bring an end to the Orthodox rulers of Galicia-Volhynia, to convert the grand dukes of Lithuania to Catholicism in the fourteenth century, and to destroy the Christian empire in the fifteenth century. The grand princes of Orthodox Muscovy might theoretically lay claim to all the Rus' lands, but in the late sixteenth century no one foresaw the extension of their rule to Kyiv and Vilnius. Their newly proclaimed patriarchate (1589) also counted for little except as a source of alms. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Belarus conceived no new worldview to square its present status with the vision inherited from Byzantium. Only at the end of the sixteenth century did increasing Western influences and pressures force the Church to express new views on church, state, and people. On the one hand, the Church asserted that the faith it professed was the ancient and correct one, even if in recent times the Church of Rome had enjoyed more success than that of Constantinople. The metropolitanate constantly asserted its identity as the Greek faith adopted six hundred years earlier in Kyiv. With this assertion came the contention that the Church enjoyed the privileges granted by the Rus' princes, Lithuanian grand dukes, and Polish kings, though Catholics pointed out that the major privileges had been issued at times when it could be argued the Union of Florence was in force. In political terms, the Orthodox simply had to stand by their ancient privileges and, after 1596, to point out that the Ottomans were less repressive of the Greeks than were the Catholic Poles of the Ruthenians.

⁵³ For a treatment of the relationship of the East Slavs, in general, and the Ukrainians, in particular, with Byzantium and the Byzantine Church, see Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West*, essays 2–4, 6–7; and Dimitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth* (New York and Washington, DC, 1971).

In practice, the political culture of the Orthodox Church had been deeply penetrated by the political culture of Poland. While the Church might lack a right-believing ruler, it did claim the allegiance of many members of the political nation, that is, the nobility. Since this political nation had secured the right of freedom of conscience by the late sixteenth century, the Church could depend on its great men. Because the most powerful of these men were princes who descended from former ruling families, the Church could even locate them in the political ideology it had inherited from Kyivan Rus'. This amalgam of old and new authority within a noble political nation was reflected in the very structure of the Church in matters such as the role of Orthodox nobles at synods. Consequently, when the princes and other nobles continued to desert the Church after the Union of Brest, Orthodoxy faced a new crisis. In tracts like Smotryts'kyi's *Trenos* (1610) or Kopyns'kyi's call to Iarema Vyshnevets'kyi (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the scourge of the rebels in 1648) in 1631 not to convert to Roman Catholicism and to return to the faith of his fathers,⁵⁴ the Church expressed its alarm over these defections. Ascetics and monks such as Ivan Vyshens'kyi cited biblical passages on the relative chances of rich and poor men to enter Heaven, and other polemicists argued that, freed of worldly power, the Orthodox Church increased in sanctity. Still, the leaders of the earthly Church knew that without nobles their Church could not survive. Hence Kopyns'kyi had reminded Vyshnevets'kyi that one could hardly call the faith of the Greek emperors a peasant faith. But the image of past glories could not overshadow the cultural and social realities of the present, which meant that noble converts went directly over to the dominant Latin-rite Church, bypassing the Uniate Church. Before the Union of Brest, the Orthodox Church had taken some extraordinary measures to ensure its continuity. Monasteries and brotherhoods were placed under the Eastern patriarchs, whose role in the Church was augmented. It was almost as if the Church knew it could not depend on its hierarchy.

The Union of Brest might appear to the modern eye as a moderate plan to solve the Church's predicament. Yet its initial failure cannot be explained solely by the powerful opposition of Prince Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi, the palatine of Kyiv and one of the richest men in Europe.⁵⁵ Nor can it be attributed merely to some deep-seated conservative Orthodox faith of the masses. Rather, the fact that obedience to Rome

⁵⁴ The text is published in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, ed. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi (Wacław Lipiński) (Kyiv and Cracow, 1912), 121–2.

⁵⁵ See Tomasz Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski* (Torun, 1997).

was so roundly rejected, even with the seemingly acceptable retention of all the externals of the Ruthenian Church, must also be explained by the long seige mentality of the Orthodox Ruthenian population, which viewed the Union as a symbol of unacceptable social, cultural, and political innovations. The rejection of the Union also demonstrated how limited the power of the bishops was in an already fragmented Church, and how far the Orthodox had already advanced in answering the Latin challenge.

The Union had introduced a new dimension to the religious struggle in Ukraine and Belarus. Latin Catholicism might be abhorred, but it was the proper faith of the native "Liakhs" and had long existed in the Ukrainian land. Protestant groups were a "heresy" from the Latin schism.⁵⁶ But no loathing could compare to that which the Orthodox held for the Uniate "turncoats." The Uniates, after all, had gained recognition for the privileges and institutions that the Orthodox claimed and almost had succeeded in interrupting the apostolic continuity of the Orthodox Church. But in essence, neither Uniate nor Orthodox could accept the other as legitimate. There was room for only one Ruthenian Church and the compromise of 1632 never gained sincere acceptance from either side. The increasing Catholic confessionalism of the Uniate Ruthenians inevitably stimulated the Orthodox to think in more confessional terms. In 1648, the Uniates were still a long way from challenging the Orthodox claim to be the Ruthenian Church, particularly in Ukraine, but they had shown disturbing signs of becoming more than an artificial implant.⁵⁷ Indeed, Archbishop Smotryts'kyi, even before accepting the Union, had issued a challenge to one of the major premises of the Orthodox defense by insisting that it was blood and descent, not faith,

⁵⁶ The Protestants had occasionally demonstrated good will toward the Orthodox, assisting them intellectually and politically. In the end, the Orthodox masses showed a greater antagonism toward the Protestant innovations than toward their old Latin opponents. This partially may be due to the continuing dynamism of the Protestant group in Ukraine in the 1630s and 1640s, long after they had peaked in Poland. The Protestants also represented a landlords' faith in Ukraine and Belarus, while Catholicism had a more socially varied constituency. Most telling, the Protestants, in particular the Antitrinitarians, held "abominable" heresies. On Protestants in Ukraine, see George H. Williams, "Protestants in the Ukraine during the Period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2.1–2 (1978): 41–72, 184–210.

⁵⁷ By the 1640s, the Uniates had succeeded in taking root among a mass following in some areas (the Belarusian towns after the suppressions following Iosafat Kuntsevych's martyrdom and the Kholm area, under Bishop Metodii Terlets'kyi's energetic rule). Even more importantly, Metropolitans Potii, Ruts'kyi, and Seliava had trained a group of clergy dedicated to the Union. See Sophia Senyk, "Methodius Terlec'kyj – Bishop of Xolm," *Analecta OSBM* 12 (1985): 342–73, and "Dva mytropolity – Potii i Ruts'kyi," in *Istorychni kontekst, ukladennia Beresteis'koï unii i pershe pouiniine pokolinnia*, ed. Borys Gudziak (Lviv, 1995), 137–48.

that defined a Ruthenian.⁵⁸ For the Orthodox, one issue was clear – any way the Union could be destroyed was legitimate.

The Orthodox had not evolved a justification for rebellion, but in the decades after Brest, they had tacitly come to accept that the state had to be challenged if the Church was to survive, and that lower orders had to be depended upon if the upper classes proved unreliable. Their most concentrated effort went into giving the Zaporozhian Cossacks historical and political legitimacy in the 1620s. In that decade, the legitimacy of the Church depended on a defiance of royal authority that would not have been possible without the Cossack army. In declaring the Cossacks Christian knights and the descendants of the followers of the tenth-century Rus' Prince Oleh, the clergymen had decided to draw the Cossacks into the defense of the Rus' inheritance.⁵⁹ They could not easily expel them from this role later. Mohyla tried to build his image of a hierarchically ruled Church in accordance with the political and social structure of the Commonwealth, but he built his edifice on Ukrainian quicksand. The Church could not depend long on a government in which men such as the zealous Catholic Stanisław Albrycht Radziwiłł, Lithuanian vice-chancellor, were becoming more and more numerous.⁶⁰ It also could not expel from its laity the Cossacks and burghers whom it had formerly courted.

Did the Church give legitimacy to the revolt? In the popular imagination, it did so immediately. In the face of the Cossack armies, Uniates, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews fled, converted, or were destroyed. The Cossack realm would be an Orthodox one, even though in the first agreements expulsion of Catholics (as distinct from expulsion of the Jesuits) was not a demand. It is not until Christmas of 1648 that echoes of an active program by the Church to legitimize the revolt appear. The students and professors of the Kyiv Academy, who had so enthusiastically greeted a Polish-appointed Orthodox castellan of Kyiv in 1646, now greeted a Zaporozhian hetman as "Moses, well-called Bohdan (God-Given)" liberator of his people from the Polish servitude.⁶¹ Also important was the role of the Ottomans, who, in trying to maintain "Byzance après Byzance," had a custom of extending their sphere of influence with the cooperation of leading Christians at the Ottoman court and the great families of Moldavia and Wallachia; in this case, the patriarch

⁵⁸ For Smotryts'kyi's view on nationality, see Frick, *Meletij Smotryc'kyj*, 227–45.

⁵⁹ This text is the epigraph of volume seven of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.

⁶⁰ The diaries of Radziwiłł constitute one of the most graphic testimonies of the new Counter-Reformation thought. See *Memoriale Rerum Gestarum in Polonia 1632–1656*, 5 vols. (Wrocław, 1968–75).

⁶¹ See Sysyn, *Between Poland and Ukraine*, 164–5.

of Jerusalem sent greetings to the hetman as *Illustrissime Princeps*, and the metropolitan of Corinth presented him with a sword from the Holy Sepulchre. Impressed by a hetman who had scored so many victories over the Polish state, seeming to ensure God's deliverance of his true believers and chastising the evil Latins, the Eastern clergy could dream of a new Orthodox order.⁶² But the new Orthodox order proved ephemeral in 1649. Instead of seizing the mantle of authority, Khmel'nyts'kyi continued to negotiate with the Poles. Worse, the Crimean khan's politics and the Zboriv agreement deprived Khmel'nyts'kyi and Orthodoxy of final victory. The Ottomans were too cautious to envision Ukraine as an Orthodox vassal. By 1650, the metropolitan of Kyiv could see the negative side of a Cossack yoke, that is, intervention in Church affairs, and the possible dangers a separate Cossack Ukraine would hold for the patriarchate. Thus when the metropolitan of Corinth perished at the Battle of Berestechko, with the holy sword blessed in Jerusalem beside him, the metropolitan of Kyiv preferred to intervene personally with the Lithuanian authorities to gain clemency for his city of Kyiv. Cossack hetman and metropolitan often clashed after this time, including at the Pereiaslav oath of 1654, by which the Cossacks submitted to the tsar of Muscovy. Hence the Ukrainian Church was not present to bless this new relationship with Moscow. The Greek and Arab clergy remained more enthusiastic about Khmel'nyts'kyi, perhaps seeing him as a more vigorous Vasile Lupu, the contemporary Moldavian *hospodar* who served as a protector of the Orthodox. At any rate, Paul of Aleppo praised to the skies the hetman and his pious Orthodox subjects. For the Arab prelate, at least, the Orthodox triumph over non-Orthodox believers (Catholics, Protestants, Armenians, and Jews) remained the major reason and justification for the war.⁶³ It was not just any Orthodox ruler and people that Paul praised. He made clear that he preferred the Church and political culture of Ukraine to that of Muscovy, even though the Pereiaslav Agreement had already been negotiated at the time of his journeys.

In contacts with Muscovy, Orthodox justifications of the revolt emerged most clearly. The Muscovite state feared social unrest and remembered the damage done to Muscovy when the Cossacks intervened during the Time of Troubles and sided with the Commonwealth during

⁶² On contacts with the Eastern patriarchs, see Olianchyn, "Do stosunkiv."

⁶³ The relish with which Paul of Aleppo described attacks on the Armenians reflected antagonisms in the Middle East. Kowalska's edition has information on the original and English, French, and Russian translations. Volodymyr Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to the XXth Century* (New York, 1953), contains excerpts, including on Khmel'nyts'kyi.

the Smolensk War. The Muscovite Church had until recently condemned the innovations of the Ruthenians' Orthodoxy. Therefore, it was the Ukrainian side that had to play the pan-Orthodox card first. If Muscovy was to be convinced to renege on its defensive alliance agreement of 1647 with the Commonwealth against the Tatars, or to break its Eternal Peace of 1634 and come to the rebels' assistance, only arguments of religious persecution and Orthodox solidarity could be used as a justification. Fortunately for the Ukrainians, the new Muscovite patriarch, Nikon, sought to make his see a center of the Orthodox world, so he was receptive to the entreaties carried back and forth by the Greek clergy.⁶⁴ By 1650, Muscovy had introduced religious issues into its negotiations with the Commonwealth; by 1653, it had decided to break with the Commonwealth and take a Ukraine in dire need of foreign support under the "high hand of the tsar."⁶⁵

It is at Pereiaslav that we see the most clear-cut use of Orthodoxy as an ideology. The Ukrainians put forth common Orthodoxy as the major theme of the negotiations, and this argument resonated with the Muscovites. For them, persecution of the Orthodox legitimized the Ukrainians' breaking their oath to the Polish king and the Muscovite tsar's breaking his eternal peace with Poland. Desire to live under an Orthodox ruler explained the decision at Pereiaslav. In the later Muscovite interpretation, only heretics opposed this Orthodox reconciliation – particularly in 1658 the "Jew" or "Lutheran" (i.e., Antitrinitarian) Iurii Nemyrych. A number of Ukrainian petitions to Muscovy and the accounts by the Muscovites of Khmel'nyts'kyi's conducting of the Pereiaslav council also reflect this ideology. But these Ukrainian accounts are difficult to evaluate. The Ukrainian texts of 1654 are extant only in a Russian translation prepared for the Muscovite court. Also, the Ukrainians and Khmel'nyts'kyi knew well how to frame their petitions and letters to fit with the differing political cultures of Muscovy, the Commonwealth, the Crimean khanate, and the Ottoman Empire. But whatever the true feeling of the Cossack administration and the Church in 1654, they were soon to show that they could conceive of other possibilities for an Orthodox people than life under an Orthodox tsar. At the negotiations for the Hadiach Union (1658–9), the convert to Orthodoxy, Nemyrych, and Khmel'nyts'kyi's successor, Hetman

⁶⁴ On the consequences of the Russian Church reform, see Hedwig Fleischhacker, "Der politische Antrieb der moskauischen Kirchenreform," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 2 (1937): 224–33.

⁶⁵ See Robert Stupperich, "Der Anteil der Kirche beim Anschluss der Ukraine an Moskau (1654)," *Kirche im Osten* 14 (1971): 68–81.

Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, supported by Metropolitan Dionisii Balaban, gained a position for the Orthodox Church in the Commonwealth that would not have been dreamed of by Mohyla.⁶⁶ But here was the rub. Once again the Orthodox masses would not trust the "Liakhs," and the revolts against the agreement took on a religious coloration. Considering the trouble that the Commonwealth had in accepting the Hadiach Union and the papal nuncio's protests, the masses were quite correct. The Counter-Reformation was gaining the upper hand in the Commonwealth, as the expulsion of the Antitrinitarians in 1658 demonstrated, and there could be no real accommodation with the Orthodox Cossack hetmanate.

In the long run, while Moscow's theme of common Orthodoxy may not explain the Pereiaslav oath, it did come to serve as a binding ideology, particularly after the annexation of the Kyiv metropolitan see to the Moscow patriarchate in 1685–6.⁶⁷ The guarantees to maintain the autonomy and traditions of the Kyiv metropolitanate were soon broken, just as Moscow undermined the political autonomy of the hetmanate. Once the Orthodox clergy found themselves in a political arrangement with a universally recognized Orthodox sovereign, they could reorient themselves to return to more traditional Orthodox relations with the state. In addition, the Muscovite ruler laid hereditary claim to the core lands of Kyivan Rus', and the Ukrainian clergy, who had spent so much of their energy defending the rights of the Church on the basis of the conversion of Kyivan Rus', could now turn their knowledge to the service of the Muscovite tsar. In the same way, they could shift their focus from the Ruthenians to an East Slavic unity, characterized by the Greek derived name for Rus', *Rossia*, of which Muscovy was "Great"; Ukraine, "Little"; and Belarus, "White." During the 1620s, they had developed some of the basis for this view in the appeals for assistance, above all in emphasizing the use of Little and Great *Rossia*. Hence the Ukrainian clergy came to play a major role in reconceiving identities from the old divide between Ruthenians and Muscovites to a new concept of Little and Great Russians as part of an Orthodox East Slavic people, though for them the distinction between Ukrainians and Russians remained quite sharp. Midcentury, Muscovy offered tremendous opportunities to the Ukrainian clergy, above all in carrying on the Nikonian reform in the Russian Church. Even those clergy who remained in Ukraine would

⁶⁶ See Janusz Tazbir, "The Political Reversals of Jurij Nemyryč," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5 (1981): 306–19.

⁶⁷ See Natala Carynnyk-Sinclair, *Die Unterstellung der Kiever Metropole unter das Moskauer Patriarchat* (Munich, 1970).

come to find the tsar and the Russian Empire more stable and appropriate as civil authorities than the Cossack hetman and the hetmanate, though this issue was not fully resolved until the defeat of Hetman Ivan Mazepa at the Battle of Poltava (1709). Tsar Peter the Great used the Church to anathematize this great patron of Orthodox culture, thereby showing how the Church could be mobilized against political dissidence and revolts in Ukraine.

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This discussion of the role of Orthodoxy in the revolt against the Polish-Lithuanian state has concentrated almost entirely on inter-Christian relations. In doing so, it has reflected the major religious trend within the conflict and the discourse of the age. Two important issues have not been explored here: Muslim-Orthodox relations and Orthodox-Jewish relations. Despite the long-term conflict between the Cossacks and the Muslim world, the leaders of the revolt were able to ally with a Muslim power and ignore the Commonwealth's appeals to Christian solidarity. The degree to which they succeeded remains to be fully explored.

The cultural and national convergence of Orthodox Ukraine and Muscovy was based, to a considerable degree, on a joint struggle against the Tatars and Islam. Yet prior to the last third of the seventeenth century, the Ukrainian struggle with the Tatars and the Ottoman Empire was not sharply reflected as a religious issue. Ukrainian writings on Islam date only from Ioanikii Galiatovs'kyi's works of the 1670s and 1680s. Perhaps the focus on the struggle with the Catholics had hitherto muted the Muslim issue earlier. The original plan of an assault against the Tatars came from the Polish court in the 1640s and was framed as a general Christian alliance including Muscovy. Khmel'nyts'kyi had begun his revolt by allying with the Muslim Tatars, and in the Polish tradition this break in Christian solidarity was widely condemned, though this did not stop the Poles from wooing the Tatars away from Khmel'nyts'kyi and allying with them. The Orthodox clergy, who had so long pointed out that the Greeks fared better under the Ottomans than they did under the Poles, had in some sense laid the groundwork for Khmel'nyts'kyi's alliance. Earlier countervailing plans for an Orthodox or Orthodox-Protestant alliance against Islam came largely from the Greek and Arab clergy. With the formation of a Ukrainian-Russian bloc, however, the intervention of the Ottomans in Ukraine could be condemned in religious terms, though Hetman Petro Doroshenko still succeeded in the 1670s in winning the support of the Orthodox metropolitan in his plans to bring Ukraine under Ottoman protection. The popular historical songs (*dumas*) may

reflect an anti-Muslim spirit of the masses, but it is difficult to establish their time of composition.⁶⁸

More essential to the origins of the revolt and its course was the relationship of the Orthodox Church and population to Jews and Judaism. Despite the considerable literature on the massacres of Jews during the revolt, their religious context has not been fully examined. The revolt of 1648 resulted in the killing of many of Ukraine's approximately 100,000 Jews. Resentment of Jews – especially of Jewish estate managers – intertwined with the new economy of enserfment, manorial estates, and leaseholds that was being introduced in Ukraine. The social and religious aspects of anti-Semitism in Ukraine are very difficult to distinguish. The revolt of 1648 also resulted in widespread massacres of landlords and Catholic clergy. Yet prior to the revolt, relatively little anti-Jewish literature emanated from Orthodox sources (in comparison to Catholic circles). The most common refrain was that the Jews were given more freedom in the Commonwealth than were the Orthodox (also said of the Armenians). During the revolt, the major Orthodox expressions of antagonism toward the Jews came from Paul of Aleppo in correspondence with Muscovy. Indeed, Shmuel Ettinger saw Muscovite influence as decisive in the formation of anti-Jewish sentiments. In these sources, and in later justifications and discussions of the revolt, anti-Jewish themes (e.g., purported Jewish leaseholds for use of churches and performance of sacraments) came to play a greater role. The only source during the revolt making the same allegations was authored by a Dominican.⁶⁹ Popular sentiments are harder to gauge, but it seems certain that the fact that daily contacts with the new manorial enserfment and taxation systems were frequently with Jews rather than with the Orthodox or other Christians must have further alienated the masses from the existing order. The *dumas* are the major popular source on attitudes.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ For the *dumas*, see George Tarnawsky and Patricia Nell Warren, *Ukrainian Dumy* (Toronto and Cambridge, MA, 1979).

⁶⁹ See Frank E. Sysyn, "A Curse on Both Their Houses: Catholic Attitudes towards Jews in Father Ruszel's *Fawor Niebieski*," in *Israel and the Nations: Essays Presented in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger* (Jerusalem, 1987), ix–xxiv.

⁷⁰ For bibliography on the topic, see Majer Bałaban, comp., *Bibliografia historii Żydów w Polsce i w krajach ościennych za lata 1900–1930* (Warsaw, 1939); Gershon Hundert and Gershon Bacon, *The Jews in Poland and Russia: Bibliographic Essays* (Bloomington, IN, 1984); *Sistematičeskii ukazatel' literatury o evreiaxh (1708–1889)* (St. Petersburg, 1892); Joel Raba, *Between Remembrance and Denial: The Fate of the Jews in the Wars of the Polish Commonwealth During the Mid-Seventeenth Century as Shown in Contemporary Writings and Historical Research* (Boulder, CO, 1995); and my review, "The Jewish Massacres in the Historiography of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: A Review Article," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 23.1 (Summer 1998): 83–9. For additional literature, see the notes in

Contrary to the statement of the Eyewitness Chronicler, the primary and immediate cause of the revolt was not the religious issue. The Byzantine-Latin Christian divide was, however, a faultline in the Polish-Lithuanian state. The religious ferment of the sixteenth century that had increased missionary activity and improved the institutions of Western Christians upset the balance between Western and Eastern Christianity in Ukraine and Belarus. The intervention of the state in the failed attempt to respond to this challenge that the Ruthenian bishops attempted at Brest and the increasing religious consciousness among all nobles made the maintenance of the older coexistence untenable. Almost against its will, the Orthodox Church had come to destabilize the state and legitimize revolt and resistance in the early seventeenth century. Once the Cossacks began the great revolt, both sides in the conflict almost

the articles by J. Pelenski, "The Cossack Insurrections in Jewish Ukrainian Relations" and Frank E. Sysyn, "The Jewish Factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyi eds., 2d ed. (Edmonton, 1990), 31–42, 43–54; the introduction to Jacob Schatzky et al., *Gzeires takh* (Vilnius, 1938), and S. Borovoi, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda protiv pol'skogo vlaychestva i evreiskoe naselenie Ukrainy," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 9 (1940): 81–2, 102.

For general literature, see the notes in Salo Wittmayer Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*: vol. 16. *Poland-Lithuania 1500–1650*, 2d ed. (New London, 1976); Bernard D. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community of Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia, 1972); and Simon Dubnov, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1916).

On the works of Ukrainian historiography, see Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 2 (repr., New York, 1956), 199–224, and O. Efymenko (Aleksandra Iakovlevna Stravrovskaia Efimenko), "Bedstviia evreev v Iuzhnoi Rusi XVII veka," in her *Iuzhnaia Rus': Ocherki, issledovaniia i zametki*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1905), 1–11. The forthcoming volume from the conference held at Bar-Ilan University on May 18–20, 1998, "Gezerot Tah-Tat/Eastern European Jewry in 1648–49: Context and Consequences," will contain many contributions on this topic.

A number of sources and secondary works hitherto only in Hebrew have appeared in translation recently. See Saul Iakovlevich Borovoi's translation of three of the Hebrew chronicles in *Evreiskie khroniki XVII stoletii. (Epokha "Khmel'nychiny")* (Jerusalem and Moscow, 1997); the Russian translation of Samuel Ettinger's work *Rossiiia i evrei* (Jerusalem, 1993); and the English translation, "The Legal and Social Status of the Jews of Ukraine from the Fifteenth Century to the Cossack Uprising of 1648," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17.1–2 (1992): 107–40. On demography and the number of victims, see Frank E. Sysyn, "Ievrei ta povstannia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho," in *Mappa mundi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Iaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Lviv, Kyiv, and New York, 1996), 479–88; Bernard Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 153–77; Maurycy Horn, *Żydzi na Rusi Czerwonej w XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII wieku: Działalność gospodarcza na tle rozwoju demograficznego* (Warsaw, 1975), 310; and Samuel Ettinger, "The Participation of the Jews in the Settlement of Ukraine" (in Hebrew), *Zion* 24.3–4 (1956): 107–42 (in Russian translation: *Rossiiia i evrei*, 87–154) and "Jewish Participation in the settlement of Ukraine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Aster and Potichnyi, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, 23–30.

automatically saw it as a war of religion. What the masses of the population thought is more difficult to ascertain. Clearly the religious issue, associated with Ruthenian identity and xenophobia against alien faiths and communities, had great resonance. Ultimately, the religious issue played a major role in the negotiations with Muscovy and the swearing of allegiance to the tsar. With the formation of the hetmanate and the new link with Muscovy, Orthodoxy no longer found itself allied with the forces of social and political discontent.