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Competing Concepts of “Reunification” behind the Liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church

NATALIA SHLIKHTA

Introduction

The L’viv Council of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, convoked by order of the Soviet regime on March 8, 1946, declared the “unanimous willingness” of the faithful of the Church in Eastern Galicia to “liquidate the Union, break all ties with the Vatican, and return to the Holy Orthodox faith of our ancestors and the Russian Orthodox Church.”¹ The Council’s decision, considered uncanonical by the majority of observers at the time and scholars in the decades to come, put an end to the legal functioning of the Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite in Western Ukraine, which had come into existence as a result of the 1596 Union of Brest. Just over three years later the Union with Rome was also liquidated in Transcarpathian Ukraine. This act of liquidation, accomplished without any formal council, was announced on August 28, 1949, during the celebration of the feast of the Assumption in the St. Nicolas Convent in Mukachevo. Archbishop Makarii (Oksiiuk) of the L’viv-Ternopil and Mukachevo-Uzhhorod Dioceses assessed the historical significance of this event: “A blessed time has finally come when the Union with Rome is liquidated on the whole territory of our Rus-Ukraine, which is Orthodox since time immemorial.”²

As a result of these events, the ecclesiastical situation in Western Ukraine changed quite visibly. Neither Soviet state archives nor church archives provide figures for the religious adherence of the West Ukrainian population after the official liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. However, available data on church networks in Western and Transcarpathian Ukraine—approached with all the necessary reservations with regards to Soviet statistics—point convincingly to


the fact that the vast majority of Greek Catholic Christians *did* “return the Holy Orthodox faith of [their] ancestors and the Russian Orthodox Church.” The official data for 1959 state that 3,289 out of 3,431 Greek Catholic parishes were registered as Orthodox, while 1,296 out of 1,643 Greek Catholic priests pledged their allegiance to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.³ In the same year Soviet officials recorded only eighteen unofficially functioning Greek Catholic churches. These records mention 347 non-registered priests, only ninety-seven of whom are designated as “active catacomb priests.”⁴

As if disregarding these visible achievements of reunification, Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), exarch of Ukraine, offered a considerably different assessment of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in 1971, the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the L’viv Council. In a speech to the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, he stated:

Over the last twenty-five years, our episcopate and clergy have accomplished a lot in order to overcome the consequences of the Union and strengthen the Orthodox consciousness [of the former Greek Catholics]. However, we cannot ignore that the Union, which existed for 350 years, undoubtedly influenced both church consciousness and rituals... [Therefore] the episcopate and clergy must continue to undertake every thoughtful effort to overcome the consequences of the Union, while simultaneously taking a careful approach [to the process of orthodoxization] and preserving those local church customs and rituals that do not contradict Orthodox teaching.⁵

Instead of treating the liquidation of the Union as an accomplished event (as, for example, Archbishop Makarii did in 1949), Metropolitan Filaret described it as a process that was still underway in 1971. Moreover, he warned against the artificial acceleration of this process.

Despite obvious parallels, the anti-Uniate action in Western Ukraine differed considerably from the contemporaneous anti-Uniate action in Romania, examined in other papers presented at our conference in Warsaw. The state was neither “the artisan” of the reunification, as Anca Şincan argued in the case of Romania, nor did it aim to “reward” the Orthodox Church for its collaboration, as Lucian Leus-



Map 2.

As the graphs show, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast had an unusually high number of unregistered Uniate clergy. As an explanation for this disparity, one can look at the oblast's unique ecclesiastical legacy. For forty years after 1904 the head of the local diocese of the Greek Catholic Church (Stanislaviv diocese) was by Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn (1867–1945), one of the most prominent opponents of "Easternizers" wing within the Church and author of many reforms aimed at furthering "Latin" practices, such as celibacy of the clergy and introduction of the Gregorian calendar. As a result, this diocese was the most "Latinized" in Western Ukraine, and members of its clergy were the least prepared and inclined to "reunite" with the Orthodox Church.

tean claimed.⁶ The Soviet government was the creator and driving force of the reunification, and it pragmatically employed the Orthodox Church to advance its aims—modernization and national assimilation—in Western Ukraine.

A forcible liquidation of the Uniate Church—as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was referred to in Soviet discourse—was a predictable outcome of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Galicia in 1939 and Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1945. The Uniate Church was considered an obstacle to the Soviet modernization project in Western Ukraine, for which secularization was both a necessary condition and an inevitable outcome. And, as a Ukrainian national church, it was also a serious obstacle to the assimilation of the population in this newly acquired territory.

The regime's decision to dissolve the Uniate Church through reunification can only be comprehended in the light of the regime's earlier experiences with the Russian Orthodox Church. During the antireligious assaults of the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet authorities learned that to liquidate the Church, they needed to do more than simply destroy the hierarchy and clergy. The regime, positioning itself as bearer of the most progressive (and atheist) ideology, realized that the destruction of the Church's institutional structure was not equal to the destruction of the Church or to the reduction of the relevance of Christianity. Upon the destruction of the Church's institutional framework, state authorities faced the challenge of the "uncontrolled masses of believers," whom there was no way "to get rid of" (the wording of official documents).⁷ The situation in Western Ukraine in the 1940s was even more complicated. Upon the extinction of the official Uniate Church, the Greek Catholic faithful, who constituted the vast majority of the population in the region, could turn to the Roman Catholic Church. The post-1946 experience proved that this option was pursued by many of those who refused to convert to Orthodoxy.

Faced with this situation, the communist regime did not even consider simply eliminating the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church as an institution. A number of considerations, examined in the following pages, forced Soviet officials to recognize that liquidation of the Uniate hierarchy had to be accompanied by "orthodoxization" of the Greek Catholic faithful, clergy, and local churches. "Orthodoxization" (*pravoslavnoe votserkovlenie*) was the term used in official documents

to describe the process of bringing the patterns of ecclesiastical life in Western Ukraine nearer to those of the Moscow Patriarchate. Even though the preservation of Eastern Orthodox rituals and local ecclesiastical traditions had been an essential condition of the Union of Brest, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church had undergone considerable transformation under the influence of Rome in the centuries after the Union, from the performance of rituals to the appearance of clergy and churches. At the same time, the religious life of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine had also transformed significantly after the 1686 change in its ecclesiastical subordination from Constantinople to the Moscow Patriarchate. Soviet-mandated orthodoxization therefore required the merging of worship practices that had diverged for more than two centuries.

The fact that these attempts at orthodoxization were inspired by republican and local government agents rather than the Orthodox Church is suggestive of the role of the Russian episcopate in the reunification process. The involvement of the Moscow Patriarchate in the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is often debated in scholarly literature. Post-Soviet historians are inclined to justify the Patriarchate's role by stressing that it was compelled by the regime, "had no choice," and displayed little willingness to assimilate the reunited flock.⁸ In contrast to this interpretation, I advance the argument that the Russian Orthodox Church's pragmatic desire to take advantage of its new role as an instrument of Soviet policies in Western Ukraine, and thereby secure its own position in the Soviet state, led to a cautious approach to the integration of West Ukrainian Christians.

This paper examines the concepts of reunification advanced by Soviet officials and Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities. "Reunification" was the official term used in Soviet and church documents to designate the change in West Ukrainian Greek Catholics' ecclesiastical subordination from the Vatican to the Moscow Patriarchate.⁹ However, contrary to the anticipations of Soviet and Russian Orthodox authorities, West Ukrainian Christians—clergy and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church—did not remain simply objects of the official reunification campaign. They became active subjects, turning reunification into a means of resisting Moscow's antireligious and assimilatory policies. In explaining the ultimate failure of this so-called reunification, a failure that became evident with the revival of the Ukrainian Greek

Catholic Church in the early 1990s,¹⁰ I argue that a key factor in the campaign's limited success was the incompatible understandings of reunification and religious and civic identity held by the Soviet authorities, Orthodox leadership, and West Ukrainian Christians.

The study has two aims. First, it seeks to contribute to the ambitious task of revising the dominant collaboration-resistance discourse in the study of religion in the communist states. Second, it seeks to offer insights into the complexity of state-society relations under Soviet rule. The research demonstrates that the life of the church under communism can be better understood by taking note of issues ignored by mainstream historiography, with its presentation of state-church relations according to the dichotomy of collaboration/compromise versus resistance/opposition.

View of Reunification by Soviet Authorities

The communist regime initiated and led the reunification, which was intended to serve the aims of Soviet policy in Western Ukraine. The Moscow Patriarchate, through its involvement in the campaign for the reunification, was to become the state's provisional instrument for assimilating West Ukrainian Christians.

The regime's decision to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was conditioned by an anti-Vatican objective, considerations of Soviet ecclesiastical-nationalities policy,¹¹ the regime's intolerance to the political philosophy of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (namely, its adherence to the idea of the separation of church and state), and its unwillingness to accept the Church's image as a socially active institution that counted as adherents an overwhelming majority of the population in Western Ukraine.

To properly understand the state's project, it is essential to know why and how reunification of Greek Catholics with the Russian Orthodox Church and their orthodoxization advanced the objectives of Soviet policy in Western Ukraine. Analyzing Soviet religious policy, Vasyl Markus argues, "Religion, like nationality and democracy, is viewed not abstractedly but specifically, as a concrete phenomenon or situation in a given setting of events and interacting forces."¹² In some settings, religion was seen as "useful," while in other settings it

was seen as "a nuisance or an outright social-political peril."¹³ Here, Markus clearly distinguishes between a Church that assisted the regime in its attempt to assimilate West Ukrainians (the Russian Orthodox Church) and a Church that was viewed by the regime as an obstacle to this assimilation (the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church). The study of the reunification also discloses the regime's pragmatic attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church. This Church was a "social nuisance" and sometimes even a "social-political peril" in a state where a grandiose modernization project was launched in the 1930s. The persecutions of religious groups in the 1920s and 1930s found their continuation in Nikita Khrushchev's antireligious campaign of 1958–1964. This latter offensive, variously described as a persecution comparable to that of Nero and Diocletian (Bourdeaux), as a "war" aimed at the complete destruction of the Church and religion (Shkarovsky), as "political war" (Chumachenko), and as a "latent civil war" (Merkatun), was primarily directed against the Russian Orthodox Church.¹⁴

Nonetheless, this persecution notwithstanding, the Russian Orthodox Church served as the regime's ally in Western Ukraine since the 1940s. In the post-1943 atmosphere of state-church rapprochement, cooperation between Soviet authorities and the Orthodox Church in the liquidation of another church appeared less unexpected than it would under any other circumstance. The ideological incompatibility of the Stalinist regime and the Russian national church was "overshadowed by their joint identification with the traditional Russian interest," of which hostility to the Greek Catholic Union and Ukrainian nationalism was a distinctive feature.¹⁵ According to Bohdan Bociurkiw, the liquidation of the Union became necessary after the rehabilitation of the Russian imperial heritage in the 1930s. The ecclesiastical-nationalities policy of the Soviet regime in Western Ukraine was the culmination of the policies of Catherine the Great; Nicholas I, who liquidated the Union in the Russian partition of Ukraine in 1839; and Alexander III, who liquidated the Union in Chełm in 1875.¹⁶ Integration of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics into Soviet society required their national, social, and political assimilation; an important precondition for this was their religious conversion, the negating of their distinctive religious identity.

Seeing no other way of liquidating the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, state authorities found it advantageous to accept the Russian

Orthodox Church's claim of its own Soviet identity, which they were unlikely to accept under other circumstances.¹⁷ The regime took for granted an Orthodox-Soviet linkage in implementing its social, national, and religious policies in Western Ukraine. In official documents, the term "orthodoxization" became almost synonymous with "sovietization" and "national assimilation." The progress of orthodoxization was viewed as "the progress of Soviet [socialist] construction" in Western Ukraine¹⁸ in state documents from the 1940s and 1950s, while state authorities insisted that the Greek Catholic faithful, unlike the Orthodox, could never become "Soviet citizens enjoying full rights."¹⁹

But, even though the Russian Orthodox Church could advance state interests in Western Ukraine, the authorities' attitude towards it remained restrained. Petro Vilkhovyi, representative of the Council for Affairs of Religious Cults in the Ukrainian Republic, stated in a report on February 2, 1948, that assistance in the reunification campaign was among the "most important national tasks" carried out by state organs.²⁰ He nonetheless criticized the inclination of the Ukrainian republican and local authorities to distinguish Orthodox and Uniate clergy, respectively, as "progressive" and "reactionary," or "Soviet" and "anti-Soviet." He explained, "In the eyes of Soviet power and the Communist Party all religious cults are equal: We [have to] stand against them all."²¹ Ultimately, state authorities viewed reunification and orthodoxization as steps that were both necessary and undesirable. The policies were not meant to strengthen the Russian Orthodox Church; they were instead a temporary strategy that would hasten the secularization of West Ukrainian Christians. This line of reasoning was disclosed when Khrushchev's antireligious campaign began in the late 1950s.

From a purely pragmatic standpoint, the regime's unwillingness to openly acknowledge the pro-Soviet stance of the Russian Orthodox Church was aimed at presenting the reunification solely as an internal church affair. Even under the conditions of the 1943 state-church rapprochement, the atheist regime was embarrassed by its cooperation with the Orthodox Church and by the common perception that officials of the Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, the agency responsible for overseeing the reunification, were working on behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate's ecclesiastical ambitions. The dissolution of the Greek Catholic Church brought its former clergy and

bishops under the purview of this Council (formerly, the Greek Catholic Church—like other non-Orthodox and non-Christian institutions—had been under the jurisdiction of the Council for Affairs of Religious Cults). Consequently, many West Ukrainian Christians came to view local officials, or “plenipotentiaries” (*upolnomochennyye*), of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church as “plenipotentiaries of/missionaries for the Russian Orthodox Church,” an impression that the Soviet state could not tolerate.²² State authorities recognized that they could not “count only on the clergy” of the Orthodox Church in the campaign against the remnants of the Union. “We have to lead [this struggle],” local officials were instructed. Still, Soviet officials also believed it possible to “accomplish those measures that are for our interests by priests’ hands.”²³ This strategy—directing a process for the benefit of the state, while using priests to carry it out and seeking to present the whole matter as an internal Church affair—was difficult, and local officials often did not fulfill Moscow’s expectations. The Council’s leadership criticized those republican and local officials who followed too literally the instruction to take the lead and thus not only disclosed to the public “but also stress[ed] that reunification is not solely the matter of the Church but a state matter as well.”²⁴

View of Reunification by the Ukrainian Republican and Local Officials

Examination of the reunification campaign provides insight into the study of policy adaptation in the communist state, and particularly its changes to the advantage of a particular religious group (or disadvantage of another), as has been outlined in the previous section. We find that what was described by Sabrina Ramet as the “local policy adaptation” was quite frequently adopted by local authorities in defiance of the central authorities.²⁵ Decisions by the Moscow authorities were not unconditionally carried out by the Ukrainian republican authorities in Kyiv, and decisions by the Kyiv authorities were not unconditionally carried out at a local level. In an examination of the state reunification project, three levels of policymaking must be clearly distinguished. The first level, that of the Soviet government in Moscow, was examined in the previous section. The other two levels are the republican and lo-

cal levels. When local policy adaptation in the USSR is analyzed, the role of republican and local officials of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church remains largely neglected. This neglect is surprising, given that the state agents' actual importance in administering the Church far exceeded their legally defined responsibilities as "mediators" between the Church and state bodies (Article 6 of the 1943 Statutes of the Council).²⁶ Local officials were quick to assume full control over church life in their oblasts.²⁷

This exercise of authority at the local level was particularly important in the process of reunification. The state's campaign against the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church consisted of two stages. The first stage, reunification in the strict sense, presumed to liquidate the ecclesiastical structure of the Church by reuniting its clergy with the Russian Orthodox Church and appropriating church property in Western Ukraine to the Moscow Patriarchate. The second stage was a process of orthodoxization in the reunited dioceses that would bring the patterns of Greek Catholic life into proximity with those of the Russian Orthodox Church. Disregarding Moscow's instructions to rely on the Orthodox Church, Ukrainian republican and local officials were convinced that it was "virtually impossible to remain completely neutral in the issue of the reunification."²⁸ This understanding resulted from the agents' close acquaintance with the implementation of reunification and orthodoxization. Further, they realized that it was impossible for the Russian Orthodox Church to accomplish this task of "foremost political significance" relying only on its own limited institutional resources. The republican and local officials recognized that they had to intervene in the transformation of Greek Catholic to Orthodox practice.

Secondly, local officials were aware that every aspect of orthodoxization acquired a political importance and was inseparably linked to the advancement of the interests of the Soviet state in Western Ukraine. This view coincided only in part with that of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Council's leadership viewed the liquidation of the Union as a "national task," and it instructed local agents to not ignore the politically significant aspects of orthodoxization. Some major political aspects of orthodoxization included the introduction of prayers for the patriarch of Moscow, the Orthodox episcopate, and the Soviet state, instead of the prayer for the

pope, and the removal from churches of Uniate icons and other church attributes with a markedly "nationalistic" appearance. Simultaneously, however, state agents were told not to intervene in changes of a dogmatic and canonical character as well as changes in the everyday life of the religious community with no political significance, namely, the appearance of churches and priests, performance of ritual, prayers, etc.²⁹ The Council in Moscow warned local officials not to accelerate the orthodoxization process but rather to leave the changes to ecclesiastical authorities.

Unlike the leadership in Moscow, the Council's functionaries in the Ukrainian Republic realized that partial involvement in the reunification campaign would not accomplish the objectives of Soviet ecclesiastical-nationalities policy in Western Ukraine. These officials in Western Ukraine viewed as artificial any differentiation between those aspects of orthodoxization that were politically significant and those that had no broader political implications.³⁰ In their view, as long as the reunited dioceses preserved any distinctive feature in the performance of the liturgy and sacraments, the appearance of priests and churches, and so on, they retained their distinctiveness as a community that was only formally and mechanically incorporated into the Orthodox Church. This understanding reflected an appreciation of the role of material culture, the ways in which, as Colleen McDannell explains, objects such as images, vestments, candles, and church buildings contribute to "bringing about [specific] religious values, norms, behaviors, and attitudes."³¹ This awareness, perhaps no less a determinative factor than the requirements from Moscow, turned Soviet officials in Western Ukraine into "plenipotentiaries of / missionaries for the Russian Orthodox Church." Local officials played the leading role in the deanery meetings of Greek Catholic clergy that preceded the L'viv Council of 1946. Typically, the local official took charge of the "legalization of the ecclesiastical reunification" (*oformlenie tserkovnogo vossoedineniia*). And parish priests were summoned first to the office of the local representative of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church to sign reunification pledges. Only afterward did the state official direct the priests to the diocesan bishop, whose formal duty was to canonically introduce them to the Orthodox Church.³²

The eagerness of state officials to take the leading role in the legalization of the ecclesiastical reunification effectively served their goal

of accelerating that formal procedure, but it had far-reaching and, for Soviet authorities, undesirable implications. A procedure conducted in state offices allowed the Greek Catholic clergy to regard their signatures on reunification pledges as an official formality that did not violate their vows to the Holy See. The fact that they were required to pledge their allegiance to the Orthodox Church by an atheist representative of the state that persecuted religion only strengthened their conviction that reunification was a mere contrivance. In an interview, Iaroslava Datsyshyna, wife of Fr. Mykhailo Datsyshyn, a priest in the village of Nezhukhiv in L'viv Oblast, recalled his view of the signing of the reunification pledge:

And afterwards? Did your husband have to subscribe to Orthodoxy according to church procedure?

Datsyshyna: No.

Does this mean that there was only that document which he signed [with the state official]?

Datsyshyna: Yes, only that document, which he signed in the *raispolkom*.

Does this mean that he did not renounce his [Greek Catholic] faith?

Datsyshyna: No, he did not renounce his faith.³³

After the formal procedure of the reunification was completed, local cadres continued to keep the orthodoxization under close surveillance, initiating periodical checks of reunited parishes. Officials were primarily concerned with the formula that reunited clergy used in their prayers for the hierarchy. Six years after the L'viv Council, state functionaries observed, "Even today, many reunited priests pray for the Orthodox hierarchy in such a manner that the faithful cannot catch for whom they pray."³⁴ They also paid attention to those aspects of the orthodoxization that, in the view of the Council's leadership, had no political significance, such as the performance of the liturgy and rituals, local religious customs, and appearance of churches. State cadres did this because they understood the importance of religion's material dimension and were aware that any local distinctiveness remained an obstacle to the religious, and hence social, national, and political, assimilation of West Ukrainians.³⁵

View of Reunification by Orthodox Ecclesiastical Authorities

Scholars refer to the Moscow Patriarchate's cautious policy regarding reunited brethren to argue that reunification was exclusively a state project, absolving the Patriarchate of responsibility in the liquidation of a fellow church. The assumption that the Moscow patriarch played a marginal role in the reunification campaign can be supported by a critical analysis of archival sources, oral testimony, and the official periodical of the Moscow Patriarchate. Furthermore, this critical analysis prompts the claim that the religious conversion of West Ukrainians was more in the interests of the state than it was in the interests of the Church. Because orthodoxization was the only viable approach to the sovietization of West Ukrainian Christians, the regime was not satisfied with slow changes in their religious life and partial achievements of Orthodox missionary activities. By contrast, sources suggest that ecclesiastical authorities exerted little control over orthodoxization and that the Patriarchate was satisfied with minimal external changes in the religious practice of the reunited community.

In my view, such evidence both confirms the dependence of ecclesiastical authorities on the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and sheds light on their pragmatism. Because of their inability (mainly due to the absence of required institutional resources) to integrate several million Greek Catholics quickly and completely, the Patriarchal authorities opted for a slow process of orthodoxization and a policy of concessions as the only feasible strategy in Western Ukraine. This careful approach was first articulated by Patriarch Alexei in a letter of December 7, 1945, to the Chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church: "We will not insist on the rapid and violent change of the external forms of church service and even clergy appearance... Only essential changes are important."³⁶ An equally important reason for a cautious approach was the pragmatic desire by the Patriarchate to secure its position as an ally of the regime. As an agent serving to "integrate, denationalize, and assimilate or, more precisely, to sovietize and Russify" the population of Western Ukraine,³⁷ the Moscow Patriarchate acquired a bargaining power in its relationship with the state.

The Patriarchal authorities' view of reunification did not remain unchallenged over the decades after the L'viv Council. Contrary to what might be expected, the approach evolved from a virtual noninvolvement in the state campaign to a time when these authorities adopted the role of active fighters against the "remnants of the Union." The initial approach of ecclesiastical orthodoxy drew from its traditionally scornful attitude towards the particularism and material expressions of popular religion. The Moscow Patriarchate expected that the formal reunification of West Ukrainian Greek Catholics implied their conversion to Orthodoxy, while local ritual practices and customs were doomed to slowly disappear over time. By the mid-1950s it became apparent that this expectation was false and that more persistent efforts were required to orthodoxize the reunited flock. In 1954 the editors of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy* observed that former Uniates continued "to celebrate the liturgy using Roman (Catholic) prayer books and... a Roman (Catholic) spirit continues to manifest itself not only in sacramental customs but also in dogmatic understanding. It is quite possible that we [contribute to the] strengthening of the position of the enemies of Our Church and Our Motherland when we silence this."³⁸

Simultaneously, the bargaining situation that was behind the 1943 state-church concordat was losing its validity, as Nikita Khrushchev launched a renewed antireligious campaign. The Orthodox Church was forced to search for alternative means of securing its position in the Soviet state. The only bargaining tool at the Church's disposal was the establishment of an inseparable linkage between the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and the interests of the Soviet state, and the intensification of the "patriotic work" (as orthodoxization was commonly defined in church documents) in Western Ukraine.

The ecclesiastical authorities' attempt to exploit the West Ukrainian situation to strike a bargain with the regime is evident in the notions of reunification and orthodoxization that the Patriarchate advanced. On April 23, 1966, during festivities in L'viv devoted to the twentieth anniversary of the L'viv Council, Archbishop Alexei (Ridiger) of Tallinn and Estonia, head of the Chancellery of the Moscow Patriarchate, delivered a speech in which he expanded on the "national-political aspect" of the struggle against the Union in Western Ukraine. Presenting a detailed survey of the ecclesiastical history of "South-Western Rus" (*Iugo-Zapadnaia Rus*) from the perspective of national politics, he brief-

ly remarked only in conclusion that there was also an additional "religious and theological (*religiozno-bogoslovsky*) aspect" of this centuries-long struggle.³⁹

Analogous formulations are abundant in Metropolitan Filaret's official messages. The reunification of the "separated brethren" was described as their "liberation from national egoism and a way to overcoming hostility and separation [of the Eastern Slavs]."⁴⁰ The Union represented a political, not a religious, separation of the Slavs, while the reunification contributed to the reestablishment of the unity of the Ukrainian and Russian people. Such was the central message of Metropolitan Filaret's official speech during the 1971 Local Council.⁴¹ Regardless of their own ecclesiastical ambitions, the Moscow Patriarchate found it advisable to consider the liquidation of the Union in national-political rather than religious terms. It was no coincidence that church discourse conformed with the clichés of official Soviet rhetoric.

The "struggle against the Union," to use a conventional formulation from church documents, enabled the Russian Orthodox Church to lay claim to its Soviet identity, which was its declared civic identity ever since the 1927 Proclamation by Metropolitan Sergei (Stragorodsky). In order for the state to advance its objectives, it had to accept this claim. Communist authorities were forced to concede that the terms "Orthodox" and "Soviet," "orthodoxization" and "sovietization" had become synonymous in the West Ukrainian setting. The official Church never failed to remind the regime of this inseparable linkage. This helped to secure the position of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet state and prevent its isolation from society, which was the major aim of the regime's secularization effort. At the same time that the government branded the Church a "socially alien" body within the Soviet state, the Patriarchate's affirmation of the Orthodox-Soviet linkage countered these attempts to present the Church as a "traditionalist," "obsolete" institution irrelevant to the needs of Soviet society.⁴² Moreover, this approach allowed ecclesiastical authorities to compel the regime to modify, at least slightly, antireligious policies and make certain concessions in Western Ukraine (for instance, reducing taxes and closing fewer churches, monasteries and convents, and theological schools in the reunited dioceses).⁴³

The claim that the Moscow Patriarchate sought to stay apart from the Soviet regime's reunification campaign is misleading, because it

ignores the Patriarchate's appreciation of the leverage gained as a result of the coincidence of its aims and the state's policies in Western Ukraine. The Orthodox Church's approach to the reunification was less determined by its centuries-long ecclesiastical ambitions regarding the "separated brethren" than it was by its pragmatic desire to find an effective means of survival in the Soviet state.

Reunification from Below I: The Views of the "Sponsoring Group"

As creator of the reunification, the state attempted to present the campaign solely as an internal church affair. This version of events presumed that the Moscow Patriarchate had a leading role in the assimilation of West Ukrainians. It also presumed that the reunification was to be initiated from below, with West Ukrainian Greek Catholics craving to "return" to their "mother church." To present these "aspirations" of West Ukrainian Christians, security agencies and the state church-affairs councils created in May 1945 the so-called "Sponsoring Group for the Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church." Since none of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church agreed to participate, the original Sponsoring Group was formed of three priests, representatives of three oblasts in Galicia: the Rev. Havryil Kostelnyk from the L'viv Oblast; Fr. Antonii Pelvetsky from the Stanislaviv Oblast (future Orthodox archbishop of the Stanislav-Kolomyia Diocese); and Fr. Mykhail Melnyk from the Drohobych Oblast (future Orthodox bishop of the Drohobych-Sambir Diocese). The motivations and understanding of reunification expressed by these formal promoters of the reunification and by West Ukrainian Christians themselves are largely overlooked in mainstream historiography's black-and-white presentation of state-church relations under communism. An examination of official statements, archival documents, and oral sources, and the application of a historical-anthropological approach, challenge the oversimplified view of those Greek Catholics who reunited as "opportunists," "apostates," and "collaborators." A study of the reunification from below reveals a local project of survival under conditions of antireligious and assimilatory policies within a communist state. After examining speeches and letters

of Fr. Havryil Kostelnyk, leader of the Sponsoring Group, as well as considerations of West Ukrainian Christians who did not accept the reunification, I maintain that the "refusal [by subordinate social groups] to accept the definition of the situation as seen from above" can be viewed as their resistance to official policies.⁴⁴

Havryil Kostelnyk was convinced that preserving an institutional framework was essential for the religious life of West Ukrainian Christians, and he elaborated in detail his vision of reunification during the L'viv Council. Appreciating the conservatism of popular religion and the place of tradition in church life, Kostelnyk stated that any changes in the daily life of reunited parishes and in Greek Catholic rituals and customs could only be implemented "very wisely and carefully in order not to alienate people from the Church and not to diminish their religious spirit."⁴⁵ He declared that reunited parishes, as a "West Ukrainian Church," were to remain distinct from the "All-Russian Church" of the Moscow Patriarchate.⁴⁶ Finally, Kostelnyk left no doubts that the reunited community was to preserve its national character by resisting Moscow's efforts at Russification. He finished his speech during the Council with the telling phrase: "We are the Ukrainians and we are in Ukraine. No one will deprive us and our Church of this."⁴⁷

Several considerations shaped Kostelnyk's conviction that the reunited community had to remain a distinct body within the Russian Orthodox Church. The national motivation (as expressed above) was foremost, but it was not exclusive. Kostelnyk also refused a complete dissolution of the reunited community because he was influenced by the image of the Russian Orthodox Church as a conservative, traditionalist Church, lagging far behind the needs of contemporary society. "The Orthodox Church is conservative and behind the times," he said, "It will be a mistake if we choose to follow those who are backward."⁴⁸ In his private conversations with the clergy, he even suggested that the reunited community had the potential to become a "teacher" for the Orthodox Church. "After my visits to Kyiv and Moscow, I have realized that [the Orthodox] are willing to become students of West Ukrainians as concerns many questions of religious life. [Our] Church in Western Ukraine has to become a teacher for [Orthodox] Eastern Ukraine."⁴⁹ In 1945 Kostelnyk confirmed this vision of reunification in his letter to Patriarch Alexei, stating that the reunited West Ukraini-

ans would “contribute to the transformation of the Orthodox Church into the most contemporary (modern) Church... that would best correspond to the spirit of our time.”⁵⁰

Still, the primary motivation behind Kostelnyk’s acceptance of reunification (a factor that brought him the approval of many West Ukrainians and raised the objections of Moscow authorities) was the aim to protect the Ukrainian national community. In his speech during the L’viv Council, Kostelnyk referred to a widespread fear that “our unity with the Russian Orthodox Church will result in the Russification of our West Ukrainian Church.” Simultaneously, he presented his own belief that the Russian Orthodox Church would respect the “national principles” and “national feelings” of the reunited flock.⁵¹ Directly challenging the reunification projects devised in Moscow, Kostelnyk claimed that there was no equivalence between “conversion to Orthodoxy” and “conversion to Russian Orthodoxy.” Furthermore, Kostelnyk saw the unification with Orthodoxy, required by the regime, as a step that had certain positive potential for the whole Ukrainian nation. He believed that joining the Orthodox Church allowed for the re-establishment of the religious unity of the Ukrainian people and ultimately the reestablishment of a Ukrainian national church. “When all the Ukrainians are united into one state, their churches have to be unified into one Church—their own Church.”⁵²

Such an ecclesiastical dream is indicative of Kostelnyk’s naiveté and complete failure to comprehend the contemporary context, the character of Soviet ecclesiastical-nationalities policy, and particularly the equivalence of “Orthodox,” “Russian,” and “Soviet” inherent in the official reunification concepts. It also points to the continuity of his ideas with the missionary vision of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, charismatic leader of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church from 1901 until his death in 1944. The question of continuity or conformity between Sheptytsky’s and Kostelnyk’s concepts of a Ukrainian national church warrants a detailed examination.⁵³ For the purpose of this discussion, it is sufficient to mention that such a link was established by Kostelnyk, who claimed to follow and develop Sheptytsky’s ideas. He stated that “Sheptytsky dreamt about the reunification of the Orthodox Church with the Uniate Church under the Metropolitan in Kyiv. He only feared that Moscow would not allow the Metropolitan in Kyiv, which would lead to the Russification of

a [Ukrainian] Church."⁵⁴ More importantly, many West Ukrainian priests and believers recognized a continuity between Kostelnyk and Sheptytsky. The following extract is from my interview with Iaroslava Datsyshyna:

Mrs. Datsyshyna, did you know Rev. Kostelnyk?

Datsyshyna: Yes, a little bit.

And what compelled him to head the reunification action?

Datsyshyna: I think, an attempt to preserve something... His ideas were very similar to that of Cardinal Slipyi... He wanted to renew that all. He wanted to bring nearer these and those. Just as Metropolitan Sheptytsky wanted... He thought over this all the time and took different steps towards this. Everything has failed,... has failed... Kostelnyk was a good man.⁵⁵

Kostelnyk wanted to preserve traditional patterns of ritual performance and everyday church life in the reunited community. As Natalia Madei argues, the idea of the preservation of "our own West Ukrainian ritual," purged of "Roman (Catholic) innovations," returned to an indigenous Eastern or Byzantine rite, and untouched by Moscow's influences, testifies to the similarity in Sheptytsky's and Kostelnyk's thinking.⁵⁶ The retention of "our own ritual" was considered by both a crucial condition for the retention of the distinctiveness and national character of a Ukrainian Church. The claim that it is impossible to change ritual patterns and local traditions rapidly, forcibly, and completely is made in all official messages of the Sponsoring Group. Kostelnyk argued this to Patriarch Alexei: "Changes in ritual will occur over the following decades. During these decades, *our Galician Church* has to preserve its distinctiveness, let us say, *its autonomy within the Russian Orthodox Church*. The true reunification is not feasible otherwise... Orthodoxy [in Western Ukraine] has to retain its *specific appearance*."⁵⁷

An examination of Kostelnyk's concept of reunification prompts one to agree with Natalia Madei's contention that Kostelnyk understood the reunification solely as a change of subordination from Rome to Moscow, while preserving the "essence of the [Ukrainian Greek Catholic] Church."⁵⁸ Kostelnyk was forced to serve as an instrument of Moscow's policies in Western Ukraine; as such, he is depicted as a collaborator in the dominant collaboration-resistance discourse in the

field. My study suggests instead that his conscious objective in the reunification project was safeguarding the national and ecclesiastical distinctiveness of the West Ukrainian religious community, and therefore resisting Moscow's policies.

Whatever Kostelnyk's ecclesiastical vision was, the basic motivation of preserving the legal possibility to practice the faith in Western Ukraine impelled him and the Sponsoring Group to accept the regime's "offer" and become advocates for the reunification. This was the *raison d'être* of the reunited community. The alternative option, pursued by those Greek Catholic priests who refused to follow the Sponsoring Group, was to "preserve the faith... so that people know what it means to be a Greek Catholic."⁵⁹ The decision by clergy to "preserve the faith" meant a choice in favor of an illegal existence that could potentially deprive the flock of its pastors.

The dilemma faced by the West Ukrainian clergy illuminates the fundamental problem that the church under communism had to resolve: the choice between compromising with the regime in the hope that doing so would lead to institutional survival, and refusing to compromise, which would likely bring the repression of the church as a functioning institution.⁶⁰ The latter option turned those who pursued it into "martyrs of the faith." However, the path of martyrdom was not possible when the sacramental and pastoral care of a flock of millions was a necessity. As an Orthodox oppositional priest stated, only one thing was important for believers: "that in the closest church still existing, the divine service is carried out in its customary order."⁶¹

One idea the Sponsoring Group seldom voiced in public was that "there was no choice." Kostelnyk, however, often emphasized this understanding of the situation in his private talks with the clergy.⁶² Such an explanation of their move is also expressed in the memoirs of many reunited priests, adding evidence for claims about their "opportunism." Such accusations of opportunism are also abundant in official documents. Yet given the official concept of reunification, the regime was unsatisfied with priests signing the reunification pledge because "there was no choice" or to "save what could be saved." Because the state saw religious assimilation as the tool of sovietization, "insincere" conversion was considered a serious obstacle.

Reunification from Below II: Reaction of West Ukrainian Christians

After the formal liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, its faithful had to find ways to persist as a religious community within unfavorable ecclesiastical, national, and socio-political circumstances. "Believing without belonging" was not an option for members of a liturgical church coming from a Christian "civilization of the altar" as opposed to a "civilization of reading the Bible." Popular conservatism and habit also stood in the way of practicing the faith outside of a structured ecclesiastical community. Hence, only a minority chose the option of outright rejection of the reunification and living as catacomb believers. The majority of West Ukrainian Christians instead chose one of the realistic options: either to accept Moscow's reunification project, imposed by an atheist state and the Russian Church, or to support an alternative reunification project championed by Kostelnyk and those few Greek Catholic intellectuals who supported him. The fact that a small number of West Ukrainians did choose a third way, that of the underground church, can only be comprehended within James Scott's notions of calculated conformity and cautious resistance, and with regards to peculiar characteristics of popular religion, primarily the fact that its "historic strength... has resided in... non-compliance."⁶³ Examining the considerations of West Ukrainian Christians—particularly their identity construction—is difficult because they "are just members of the... church... who do not speak about their belief and their church in public."⁶⁴ However, thanks to oral testimony, it is possible to gain insights into a local project of survival. At the same time, it is difficult to explain the result of this project within the standard discourse of collaboration and resistance. These believers' choices brought the creation of a distinct religious community (that was, in a way, the realization of Kostelnyk's project) and prevented the assimilation of West Ukrainian Greek Catholics into the Orthodox Church.

A significant factor that undermined reunification and orthodoxization was West Ukrainians' negative image of the Russian Orthodox Church. West Ukrainians understood the Greek Catholic Church as their own, as a national church. This self-perception of Ukrainian

Greek Catholics falls within Sabrina Ramet's notion of "ecclesiastical nationalism," drawing from the assumption that a nation cannot survive without a national church. From this identification it follows that "the nation becomes infused with transcendent value and conversion becomes tantamount to assimilation."⁶⁵ In her study of Bulgaria, Daniela Kalkandjieva observes that ecclesiastical nationalism transforms the church from the Body of Christ into the body of the nation.⁶⁶ The words of a West Ukrainian priest convey this union of church and nation: "Never was our Church separated from the [Ukrainian] national state."⁶⁷ Owing to their notions of ecclesiastical nationalism, West Ukrainians could not view the Russian Orthodox Church as anything other than a Russian church, a willing agent of Moscow's Russification policy. West Ukrainians commonly referred to the "Muscovite Church" and associated "Russian" with "alien."⁶⁸ As another West Ukrainian priest observed of Moscow's ecclesiastical policy, "Stalin (similar to Peter the Great) imposed Orthodoxy... in order to establish Russian Orthodox control over our Ukraine."⁶⁹

According to West Ukrainian Greek Catholics, the Russian Orthodox Church was not simply an agent of Moscow's Russification policy. They saw the institution as a Bolshevik/state/bureaucratic (*kazionna*) church, subordinate to and controlled by the atheist regime (just as it had been previously to the autocratic regime). An Orthodox "Bolshevik" Church had "declined completely... It was evidently in the service of the state apparatus."⁷⁰ The Church's complete subordination to the regime was visibly manifested in its dependence on the Council's local representatives. One priest judged that "even Orthodox bishops could decide little. They had little power over the Church and their clergy. Everything depended on the officials for religious affairs."⁷¹ Because of the close association of the Russian Orthodox Church with the communist regime, West Ukrainians saw an inseparable link between "Orthodox" and "Soviet/communist." "Because they were Orthodox, they were all communists," one priest charged.⁷² Paradoxically, West Ukrainian Christians regarded orthodoxization in the same way as the Soviet authorities, as not only a tool of Russification but also a step towards the ultimate liquidation of institutional religion in Western Ukraine.⁷³ But the Moscow government's version of reunification was also rejected by West Ukrainians. Because of the Orthodox-Soviet linkage, the rejection of an Orthodox identity also assumed, in the view

of West Ukrainians and the regime, and arguably in the view of the official Church, the rejection of a Soviet identity.

Some West Ukrainians did choose the catacomb Greek Catholic Church. Those who pursued a catacomb existence resolved to preserve their religious-national identity by rejecting the imposed Orthodox and Soviet identities and thereby excluding themselves from socialist society and risking persecution for "anti-Soviet activities." The choice of the reunited community was different. While externally accepting Orthodox and Soviet identities, those Greek Catholics constructed a new identity or, to use David Thompson's notion, a "lived" identity,⁷⁴ which helped them preserve their religious and national distinctiveness. This identity was understood as standing against the imposed identities and drew on a clear "us-versus-them" opposition. "They" were "Orthodox," with all the meaning with which this concept was linked. "We" consisted of those priests who signed reunification pledges and their parishioners who continued to attend their *own* churches, even though these churches were suddenly declared "Orthodox." "People attended a church, because it was their own church. This is our church. We built it," recalled one woman.⁷⁵ Notions like "our," "our own," "true," and "Galician," and a strong communal spirit were essential to the identity of the reunited community.⁷⁶ Fr. Illia Ohurek recalled, "People stated, 'This is our native... our native church. We do not have anything else.'"⁷⁷ Inseparably linked to each other by this awareness of their distinctiveness from the Russian Orthodox Church and a common desire to survive Moscow's effort at unification, various members of the dissolved Greek Catholic Church from the laity, clergy, and episcopate, regardless of the sincerity and motives of their conversations, formed a "Church within the Church" in Western Ukraine.⁷⁸

The "Church within the Church" was a religious community closed to outsiders—Orthodox priests. It was a common understanding that only "our own" priests could serve in "our own" churches of the *reunited* flock and that only "our own" bishop was suitable to administer a diocese in Western Ukraine. "Those bishops who came from there [i.e., from the East], they were not trusted by our priests, and they did not trust our priests," remembered Iaroslava Datsyshyna.⁷⁹ A necessary condition for the reunification, advanced in deanery meetings before and after the 1946 dissolution of the Union, was the appointment of bishops from among the local clergy.

The existence of the reunited community within the hostile ecclesiastical and socio-political environment strengthened communal links among its various members: episcopate, clergy, and laity. These relations became less formal than they traditionally were in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In response to the threat of Moscow's antireligious and assimilatory policies, the reunited community weakened the strict hierarchical subordination in the "Church within the Church," with the intention of reinforcing internal communal links and the community itself. The West Ukrainian episcopate came to realize that "we [i.e., bishops] do not simply lay certain demands upon our clergy, but simultaneously should meet their [and our flock's] requirements."⁸⁰

Local agents of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and the leaders of the Sponsoring Group correctly saw (although they drew opposite conclusions from this observation) a causal relationship between the preservation of local ritual practices and material manifestations of religious life and the community's potential to resist state policies. Popular inertia and habit—an important motivation in choices of West Ukrainian Christians—secured the ecclesiastical distinctiveness of the reunited community, even though it was formally part of the Russian Orthodox Church. Preservation of the traditional performance of rituals and celebration of feasts, retention of popular customs and traditional appearance of churches and priests ensured the separateness of reunited Greek Catholics. Already in 1946 a reunited priest concluded: "The eradication of Latin innovations that contradict the spirit and dogmas of the Orthodox Church cannot be our main task in the present moment. People are accustomed to the existing rituals. We have to be satisfied that they attend us [i.e., Orthodox churches] and should not attempt to change rituals, which would alienate believers from the [Orthodox] Church."⁸¹ With little modification, this realization was restated in many official messages of the Orthodox hierarchy and the exarch of Ukraine during the decades after the formal reunification.⁸²

The "Church within the Church" allowed for the persistence of institutional religion in Western Ukraine. It also allowed for the preservation of the distinct religious-national identity of West Ukrainians and local traditions of church life. Hence the choice of West Ukrainian Christians, which is commonly depicted as, and indeed was, a result of compromise and accommodation, ultimately became a way of resisting Moscow's antireligious and assimilatory policies.

Conclusion

The subject of this paper is the varied understandings of reunification held by those involved in the process of the formal liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The objective behind Moscow's reunification project was to destroy the religious, national, and socio-political distinctiveness of the West Ukrainian population. Although the ambitions of Soviet and Russian Orthodox Church authorities in Western Ukraine coincided, the approaches of the two were different. Soviet authorities called for an accelerated reunification process, considering this as the inevitable first step in the transformation of West Ukrainian Christians into loyal Soviet subjects. The regime's pragmatism allowed it to use religion (Russian Orthodoxy) in the modernization project they started in Western Ukraine after World War II. In contrast, the Moscow Patriarchate opted for slower and partial changes in the religious practice of the reunited flock. An important reason for this strategy was the same appreciation that orthodoxization and sovietization were synonymous in the West Ukrainian setting. Emphasizing its "patriotic activities" in Western Ukraine, the Orthodox hierarchy attempted to preserve its usefulness in the eyes of the regime and thus secure the Russian Orthodox Church's position in the Soviet state at a time of renewed antireligious oppression in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Moscow Patriarchate therefore approached reunification pragmatically as a means of resisting the regime's secularization project.

The principal objective behind the Ukrainian Greek Catholics' conversion to Orthodoxy was to secure the legal practice of their faith (an alternative option pursued by the catacomb church was to "preserve the faith") and, moreover, to secure their distinct religious-national community. This understanding of the reunification concept illustrates James C. Scott's point that false compliance is an effective tool of subordinate (oppressed) groups to undermine claims by dominant groups. If Danièle Hervieu-Léger's concept of religion as communal chain and religion as collective memory is applied,⁸³ it becomes evident that, on the fundamental level, the choice of those West Ukrainians to distinguish themselves as a "Church within the Church" did not differ substantially from those who entered the catacomb church. Both were local solutions aiming at and contributing to the preserva-

tion of ecclesiastical tradition and resisting forced secularization in Western Ukraine.

The research suggests the significance of issues of identity within the study of religion under communism. Different understandings of what it meant “to be Orthodox” and “to be Soviet” and the linkage between the two were behind the incompatible concepts of reunification examined in this paper. For the Russian Orthodox Church, the establishment of the Orthodox-Soviet linkage was a crucial element in its survival strategy. For the Soviet leadership, the recognition of the Orthodox-Soviet linkage was a realized necessity, a step approximating the assimilation of West Ukrainian Christians. For West Ukrainians, the recognition of the Orthodox-Soviet (-Russian) linkage meant the impossibility of genuine conversion to Orthodoxy and, respectively, of complete integration into Soviet society. An examination of this conception of the reunification held by West Ukrainian Christians offers a case study of everyday resistance in the communist state. Practical adaptability, cautious resistance, and the creation of a timely identity proved to be viable tactics for its subjects to resist state policies. Because the regime met with this routine resistance when implementing its policies in Western Ukraine, its reunification project ultimately failed.

NOTES

- 1 Cited in Volodymyr Serhiichuk, compiler, *Neskorena Tserkva: Podvyzhytstvo hreko-katolykiv Ukrainy v borotbi za viru i derzhavu* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 2001), 109.
- 2 The message was published by the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy* (JMP) 10 (1949): 8.
- 3 *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF)*, F. 6991, O. 2, File 256, pp. 1–2. Reference to archival sources is given according to the established reference system in Ukraine and the Russian Federation: *Name of the archive*, F. (Fond–collection) No., O. (*Opys* or *Opis*–inventory) No., File No., p. No.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- 5 *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia Ukrainy (TDAVO)*, F. 4648, O. 5, File 278, p. 129.
- 6 Anca Şincan, “From Bottom to Top and Back: On How to Build a Church in Communist Romania,” and Lucian Leustean, “Saints and Communists: The Orthodox Church and the Romanian Road to Commu-

- nism, 1953–1955" (papers presented at the conference "Religion and the Challenges of Modernity: Christian Churches in 19th and 20th Century Eastern Europe," German Historical Institute, Warsaw, June 24, 2006).
- 7 *TDAVO*, F. 4648, O. 5, File 128, pp. 103b–103c.
 - 8 Viktor Ielensky and O. Patalai, "...Partiia vse vypravliaie, pryznachaie i buduie za odnym pryntsyptom..." *Liudyna i svit* 3 (1992): 39–41; Volodymyr Pashchenko, *Hreko-katolyky v Ukraini: vid 40-kh rokiv XX stolittia do nashykh dniiv* [The Greek Catholics in Ukraine: From the 1940s to the Present] (Poltava, 2002); Tatiana Chumachenko, *Gosudarstvo, Pravoslavnaia Tserkov, Veruiushchie: 1941–1961 g.g. (Seria "Pervaia monografiia")* (Moscow: "ANRO-XX," 1999), 51–54; Mikhail Shkarovsky, *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov pri Staline i Khrushchiovie (Gosudarstvenno-tserkovnye otnosheniia v SSSR v 1939–1964 godakh)* (Moscow: Krutitskoe patriarshee podvorie; Obshchestvo lubitelei tserkovnoi istorii, 2000), 104–105; and Oleksandr Lysenko, *Tserkovne zhyttia v Ukraini, 1943–1946* (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1998), 285.
 - 9 The term "reunification" is itself inaccurate, however, as the Eastern-rite Church in Ukraine had not been a part of the Moscow Patriarchate but of the Constantinople Patriarchate prior to its Union with Rome.
 - 10 There was not a single registered community of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church prior to its legalization in 1989. In 1991 the number of the registered communities was 2,001, while in 2006 there were 3,438 communities, according to the official site of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (http://www.ugcc.org.ua/ukr/church_in_action/structure/). By comparison, before 1946 the number of registered churches of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was 3,431. In *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 2, File 256, p. 1.
 - 11 In the words of Bociurkiw, the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has to be examined within the "Kremlin's church policy at the point where the latter converges with the regime's nationalities policy, one of the principal variables of Soviet ecclesiastical policy." Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 7, no. 1 (1965): 89–90.
 - 12 Vasyl Markus, "The Suppressed Church: Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Union," in Richard T. De George and James P. Scanlan, eds., *Marxism and Religion in Eastern Europe: Papers Presented at the Banff International Slavic Conference, September 4–7, 1974* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976), 119.
 - 13 *Ibid.*
 - 14 Michael Bourdeaux, *Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church Today* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 15; Mikhail Shkarovsky, *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov pri Staline i Khrushchiovie*, 357; Tatiana Chumachenko, *Gosudarstvo, Pravoslavnaia Tserkov, Veruiushchie*, 231–232; I.P. Merkatun, "Antyrelihiina kampaniia 50–60-kh rokiv na Ukraini," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1 (1991): 76.

- 15 Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Religion and Nationalism in the Contemporary Ukraine," in George W. Simmonds, ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: The University of Detroit Press, 1977), 82.
- 16 Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996), 101.
- 17 I provide a detailed discussion of the Soviet identity of the Russian Orthodox Church and the regime's attitude towards it in my article: Natalia Shlikhta, "'Greek Catholic'—'Orthodox'—'Soviet': A Symbiosis or a Conflict of Identities?" *Religion, State & Society* 32, no. 3 (September 2004): 261–267.
- 18 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 222, p. 34.
- 19 *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy (TDAHO)*, F. 1, O. 23, File 5096, p. 31.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 31.
- 22 *Arkhiv Istitutu Istorii Tserkvy, L'vivska Bohoslovska Akademiia (AIIT)*, *Interviu z otsem Mykoloiu Tsarykom* [An interview with Fr. Mykola Tsaryk], February 7, 1993, L'viv // P-1-1-315, pp. 14, 25; *Ibid.*, *Interviu z iepyskopom Pavlom Vasylykom* [An interview with Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk], October 22, 1996, Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivska Oblast // P-1-1-455, pp. 31–32; Volodymyr Serhiichuk, compiler, *Neskorena Tserkva*, 25. Reference to oral sources is given according to the reference system suggested by the AIIT.
- 23 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 1442, p. 29 (the 1960 report, *O merakh po usileniu borby s ostatkami unii v Zapadnykh i Zakarpatskoi oblastiakh*). See also *Rossiiskiy gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI)*, F. 5, O. 33, File 22, p. 98.
- 24 *TDAHO*, F. 1, O. 23, File 5667, p. 242.
- 25 Sabrina P. Ramet, "Phases in Communist Religious Policy," in *Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East Central Europe and Russia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 11.
- 26 Tatiana Chumachenko, *Gosudarstvo, Pravoslavnaia Tserkov, Veruiushchie*, 25–26.
- 27 A valuable contribution is an examination of the role of the local representative of the Department for Religious Denominations in socialist Romania in Anca Șincan's paper.
- 28 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 222, p. 3.
- 29 *Ibid.*, File 1271, p. 154; *Ibid.*, File 1054, pp. 210–211.
- 30 *Ibid.*, File 1271, p. 154. See also *Ibid.*, File 922, p. 216; *Ibid.*, File 1054, p. 209; *Ibid.*, File 222, p. 34.
- 31 Colleen McDannell, *Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 2.
- 32 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 238, p. 238; *Ibid.*, O. 2, File 549, p. 48; *TDAHO*, F. 1, O. 23, File 4555, p. 212–213.

- 33 Interview with Mrs. Iaroslava Datsyshyna, March 22, 2002, Stryi, L'vivska Oblast, Ukraine, interviewer Natalia Shlikhta. See also *AIIT, Interviu z otsem Ivanom Kubaiem* [An interview with Fr. Ivan Kubai], April 10, 1993, the village of Zymna Voda, Pustomytskyi rayon, L'vivska Oblast // P-1-1-192, p. 19.
- 34 *TDAHO*, F. 1, O. 24, File 1572, p. 43 (the 1952 report by the Ukrainian Republican Representative of the Council, Korchevoi). See also *Ibid.*, File 2741, pp. 304–305 (the 1953 report by Korchevoi).
- 35 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 532, p. 45; *Ibid.*, File 222, p. 34; *Ibid.*, File 922, p. 217.
- 36 *Ibid.*, File 1442, p. 163.
- 37 Gerd Stricker, "Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov v soveskom gosudarstve. Ocherk otnoshenii mezhdru Tserkoviu i gosudarstvom," in *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov v sovetskoe vremia (1917–1991). Materialy i dokumenty po istorii otnoshenii mezhdru gosudarstvom i tserkoviu*, vol. 1 (Moscow, Propilei, 1995), 46.
- 38 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 2, File 126, pp. 46–47.
- 39 *TDAVO*, F. 4648, O. 5, File 17, pp. 104–105.
- 40 *Ibid.*, File 69, p. 114 (Archbishop Filaret's message on the fiftieth anniversary of the Ukrainian Republic [December 12, 1967]).
- 41 *Ibid.*, File 278, pp. 128–129, 135, 142.
- 42 For further elaboration, see Natalia Shlikhta, "'Greek Catholic'—'Orthodox'—'Soviet': a Symbiosis or a Conflict of Identities?," 264–266.
- 43 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 1442, p. 153; *Ibid.*, O. 2, File 255, pp. 3–4; *Ibid.*, File 80, p. 42; *Ibid.*, File 204, pp. 103, 107, 141; *Ibid.*, File 177, p. 19; Nikolai Tuchemsky (rev.), "V Volynskoi dukhovnoi seminarii," *ŽMP* 8 (1954): 62.
- 44 James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, 240.
- 45 Havryil Kostelnyk, "Pro motyvy vozziednannia Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy z Rosiiskoiu Pravoslavnoiu Tserkvoiu," in *Vybrani tvory* (Kyiv: Vydannia Ekzarkha vsiiei Ukrainy Mytropolyta Kyivskoho i Halytskoho, 1987), 21.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 22.
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 Cited in: Volodymyr Pashchenko, *Hreko-katolyky v Ukraini*, 89.
- 49 *TDAHO*, F. 1, O. 24, File 3613, p. 27.
- 50 Volodymyr Serhiichuk, compiler, *Neskorena Tserkva*, 97.
- 51 Havryil Kostelnyk, "Pro motyvy vozziednannia Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy z Rosiiskoiu Pravoslavnoiu Tserkvoiu," 22.
- 52 Volodymyr Serhiichuk, compiler, *Neskorena Tserkva*, 62 (from the appeal of the Sponsoring Group of May 28, 1945). Italics are mine.
- 53 The issue is in the focus of Natalia Madei's study of Kostelnyk's concept of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. For more details, consult Natalia Madei, *Kontseptsiia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy H. Kostelnyka v konteksti istorii Unionskykh tserkov* (PhD dissertation abstract, L'viv Ivan Franko University, 2001); Natalia Madei, "Havryil Kostelnyk

- i L'vivsky Sobor 1946 roku," *Visnyk L'vivskoho universytetu. Filozofski nauky*, no. 2 (L'viv: L'vivsky natsionalnyi universytet im. Ivana Franka, 2000).
- 54 *Rossiysky gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI)*, F. 17, O. 125, File 313, p. 21.
- 55 Interview with Mrs. Yaroslava Datsyshyna, March 22, 2002, interviewer Natalia Shlikhta. See also *RGANI*, F. 5, O. 33, File 126, p. 204.
- 56 Natalia Madei, *Kontsepsiia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy H. Kostelnyka*, 11–12.
- 57 Cited in: Volodymyr Pashchenko, *Hreko-katolyky v Ukraini*, 93. Italics are mine.
- 58 Natalia Madei, "Havryil Kostelnyk i L'vivsky Sobor 1946 roku," 146.
- 59 *AIIT, Interviu z Nataliieiu Stadnyk (sestroiu Neoniloiu, Zhromadzhennia Sester Presviatoi Rodyny)* [An interview with Nataliia Stadnyk (sister Neonila)], February 9, 1994, Chortkiv, Ternopil'ska Oblast // P-1-1-285, p. 28.
- 60 Although approaching the persistence of institutional religion in Romania from quite a different angle, Anca Șincan discloses in her paper the same linkage between the Church's institutional survival and its readiness for certain compromises.
- 61 Hansjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917–1979*, trans. Sandra Smith (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1981), 5.
- 62 *AIIT, Interviu z otsem Mykoloiu Markevychem* [An interview with Fr. Mykola Markevych], March 17, 1993, Mykolaiv // P-1-1-337, p. 9.
- 63 James C. Scott, "Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition," *Theory and Society* 4, no. 2 (summer 1977): 218.
- 64 Árpád von Klimó, "Catholic Identity in Hungary and Italy between 1945 and 1970" (paper presented at the conference "Religion and the Challenges of Modernity: Christian Churches in 19th- and 20th-century Eastern Europe," German Historical Institute, Warsaw, June 22, 2006).
- 65 Pedro Ramet, "Autocephaly and National Identity in Church–State Relations in Eastern Christianity: An Introduction," in Pedro Ramet, ed., *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1988), 8.
- 66 Daniela Kalkandjieva, "The Impact of Secularization on the Bulgarian Orthodox Church," (paper presented at the conference "Religion and the Challenges of Modernity: Christian Churches in 19th- and 20th-century Eastern Europe," German Historical Institute, Warsaw, June 23, 2006).
- 67 *AIIT, Interviu z otsem Petrom Dutchakom* [An interview with Fr. Petro Dutchak], May 20, 1994, the village of Lysets, Tysmenytsky rayon, Ivano-Frankiv'ska Oblast // P-1-1-385, p. 25.
- 68 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 373, p. 7; *RGANI*, F. 5, O. 60, File 24, p. 155; *AIIT, Interviu z otsem Iosyfom Kladochnym (monakhom Ieremieiu)* [An interview with Fr. Iosyf Kladochnyi (monk Jeremiah)], May 27, 1993, L'viv // P-1-1-304, p. 29.

- 69 *AIIT*, *Interviu z vладыkoіu Sofronom Dmyterkom* [An interview with Bishop Sofron Dmyterko], November 6, 1997, L'viv // P-1-1-419, p. 22.
- 70 *Ibid.*, *Interviu z ієpyskopom Mykhailom Sabryhoіu* [An interview with Bishop Mykhailo Sabryha], March 30, 1994, Ternopil // P-1-1-321, p. 49; *Ibid.*, *Interviu z vладыkoіu Sofronom Dmyterkom* [An interview with Bishop Sofron Dmyterko], November 26, 1993, Ivano-Frankivsk // P-1-1-419, p. 5; *Ibid.*, *Interviu z otsem Ivanom Kubaіem*, p. 39.
- 71 *Ibid.*, *Interviu z vладыkoіu Sofronom Dmyterkom*, November 26, 1993, Ivano-Frankivsk, p. 5.
- 72 *Ibid.*, *Interviu z otsem Myronom Beskydom* [An interview with Fr. Myron Beskyd], June 5, 1996, Mukachevo, Zakarpatska Oblast // P-1-1-687, p. 6.
- 73 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 222, p. 4; *TDAVO*, F. 4648, O. 1, File 436, p. 409.
- 74 David M. Thompson, "Earthen Vessels or God's Building? The Identity of United and Uniting Churches" (paper presented at the World Council of Churches' Sixth Consultation of United and Uniting Churches, Driebergen, Holland, 2002). I use the paper with the kind permission of the author.
- 75 *AIIT*, *Interviu z pani Liubomyroіu Venhrynovych* [An interview with Ms. Liubomyra Venhrynovych], November 5, 2001, L'viv // P-1-1-218, p. 56.
- 76 I discuss in detail the identity of West Ukrainians after the *reunification* in my article: Natalia Shlikhta, "'Greek Catholic'—'Orthodox'—'Soviet': A Symbiosis or a Conflict of Identities?," 267–269.
- 77 *AIIT*, *Interviu z otsem Illeіu Ohurkom* [An interview with Fr. Illia Ohurok], October 20, 1997, L'viv // P-1-1-739, p. 16.
- 78 For the original use of the term with regards to Ukrainian Greek Catholics after the liquidation of their Church, see Vasyl Markus, "The Suppressed Church," 122–123.
- 79 Interview with Mrs. Iaroslava Datsyshyna, March 22, 2002, interviewer Natalia Shlikhta.
- 80 *GARF*, F. 6991, O. 1s, File 1442, p. 139.
- 81 *TDAHO*, F. 1, O. 24, File 783, p. 50.
- 82 See, for instance: *TDAVO*, F. 4648, O. 5, File 17, p. 90 (Archbishop Iosyf's [Savrash] report of April 9, 1966); *Ibid.*, File 393, p. 59 (Metropolitan Filaret [Denysenko] during the meeting of the West Ukrainian episcopate on February 20–21, 1974). See also Metropolitan Filaret's observation quoted in the Introduction.
- 83 For more details, see Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, trans. Simon Lee (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

