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## Democratization

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## Nomenklatura

### democratization: Electoral clientelism in post-soviet Ukraine

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# ***Nomenklatura* Democratization: Electoral Clientelism in Post-Soviet Ukraine**

SARAH BIRCH

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Electoral clientelism could represent a significant threat to democratic consolidation in post-communist states. Recent elections in Ukraine provide a prime example of the way in which communist-era elites have been able to use electoral mechanisms to launder their political resources. Evidence suggests that economic disarray has created a situation in which large sectors of the electorate are willing to have their votes bought by political machines, rather than having them won through competition between parties offering different policy packages. Clientelism of this type appears to be engaged in by two types of political actor in Ukraine: left wing parties and individual members of the economic and political elite.

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In recent studies of democratic transition, the principal threat to democratic consolidation has generally been assumed to be undue strengthening of the hand of the central apparatus of the state. But an equally important obstacle to democratic success is state weakness, which often takes the form of decentralized deviations in practice from institutional design. This article will analyse the causes and consequences of one particular form of deviation, electoral clientelism, in the newly competitive political system of post-Soviet Ukraine.

Electoral clientelism has a long and noble history. Until quite recently it was seen in most societies as perfectly legitimate and indeed fitting for those who stood for office to reward their supporters with the direct provision of individual benefits. Furthermore, the causes of the decline of clientelism in countries such as Britain and the United States had more to do with expediency than with considerations of democratic principle.<sup>1</sup> But gradually, and for different combinations of reasons, the normative understandings of democracy which underlay electoral institutions in these societies changed. According to popular conceptions of democracy today, one of the primary aims of representation through the electoral process is policy accountability, and elections are perceived as mechanisms for

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aggregating the policy preferences of voters. It follows that any practice which impedes this process is 'undemocratic'. The normative debates surrounding this issue are complex,<sup>2</sup> and it is not possible to do justice to them in the present context. The more limited goal of this analysis is to examine the functioning of electoral clientelism and its consequences for institutional consolidation in one newly-competitive system.

Electoral clientelism may be defined in theory as any mechanism through which individual benefits are substituted for collective benefits as the goods against which votes are exchanged.<sup>3</sup> But the practice of clientelism is more difficult to identify. In 1918 Max Weber noted that '*all party struggles are struggles for the patronage of office, as well as struggles for objective goals*';<sup>4</sup> in many respects this is undoubtedly still true today.

The idealized democratic system in which voters' preferences are translated into policy through some neutral and efficient aggregative mechanism is a myth. In reality, the dividing line between clientelism and more preference-responsive forms of representation is a difficult one to draw. Not only is there a fine gradation from clientelism through pork-barrel politics to policy preference aggregation, it might also be argued that clientelism does not in all cases preclude interest intermediation. It is, however, possible to make an analytic distinction between interest-aggregation and the clientelistic exchange of electoral support for material gain. Kay Lawson delineates four types of party-voter linkage: directive linkage, linkage by reward, policy-responsive linkage, and participatory linkage.<sup>5</sup> Directive linkage, characteristic of the USSR, involves a complete reversal of the aggregative process: voters' 'preferences' are determined for political purposes by the leadership itself. Linkage by reward is a more ambiguous case, as it is less a matter of outright coercion than co-optation in which voters freely agree to allow their allotted unit of input into the political process to be exchanged for more tangible benefits.

Bearing these considerations in mind, it is possible to formulate several hypotheses as to the conditions under which clientelism is most likely to flourish and the forms it is most likely to assume. For candidates to engage in patronage, they must have access to resources that voters desire, the ability to distribute them, and a means of guaranteeing that the distribution of rewards will be undertaken as promised. They must also possess the capacity to organize this distribution and to monitor compliance on the part of their clients. Finally, clientelism will need to be perceived by candidates as more economical and effective than other potential mechanisms for mobilizing support, such as ideological affinity or genuine interest aggregation. Their evaluation of this trade-off will depend in large measure on the attitudinal and behavioural dispositions of voters, but also on the risks incurred by violating legal regulations governing relations between candidates and voters.

Voters, for their part, want their votes to work for them. In the absence or perceived absence of reliable aggregative institutions which would provide them with an assured means of influencing policy-making, they have every incentive to opt instead for any immediate tangible benefits for which they can trade their votes.<sup>6</sup> The attractiveness of clientelism to voters can be expected to be a function of their degree of neediness, as well as their level of normative commitment to the representative process. Need will in turn be linked to the availability of alternative sources of the benefits offered by the patrons, be they jobs, favours, accommodation, food, or physical security.

Once we have established that clientelism is likely to be found in a given setting, it is necessary to examine the forms it will most probably take. In one sense this is a nearly impossible task, for the most striking characteristic of electoral clientelism is its adaptability and 'elasticity'.<sup>7</sup> Yet, on the basis of historical experience, a number of distinctions are possible. In general, clientelist relations vary according to the complexity of the patron-client relationship, and with this the immediacy and type of the reward given in exchange for a vote. In some cases, the relationship is purely electoral; the reward is immediate, and the relationship between patron and client is weak, occasional, and ephemeral. At the other extreme party 'machines' can be highly elaborated welfare agencies which in many cases usurp the role of the official social services in their territories of activity.<sup>8</sup>

The most common source of the rewards distributed by patrons is the state, because access to state coffers is the reward patrons themselves receive for establishing clientelist relations. But the distribution of state jobs and other benefits is only possible for successful patrons, and in competitive systems (whether or not they are democratic), some of those who engage in this process will always be unsuccessful. To guard against this eventuality, prudent patrons will keep in store other sources of 'goodies' to distribute. In many cases the political party serves this function of reserve resources. For new entrants the state is by definition not a potential source of rewards, which is one reason why many enter the game through a political party.

The party also typically provides the means by which rewards are distributed: an organizational network, backed up by an institutional infrastructure of other secondary organizations and a social network based on bonds of solidarity, long-standing relations of reciprocity, and all the other elements of continuity which it is possible for a party to offer but is more difficult for an individual to provide.<sup>9</sup> The organizational resources of a party can thus be used by patrons as a vehicle for the establishment and maintenance of clientelistic bonds.<sup>10</sup>

For independent entrepreneurial clientelism to be viable, the existing distribution of resources in society must be uneven enough that

considerable sums of wealth are accumulated in the hands of a few. This form of organization is tenuous, however, and is unlikely to be highly successful without some access to government funds. We can thus distinguish three types of patrons (bearing in mind that these categories may in certain instances overlap): government actors, parties, and wealthy private individuals.

### Clientelism in Ukraine: Hypotheses

Throughout the former Soviet Union, elite networks based on former ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its satellite organizations have provided a means by which members of the *nomenklatura* have been able to convert positions of power within the Soviet system into lucrative opportunities to benefit from economic reform, often by means of '*nomenklatura* privatization'. There is ground for supposing that such connections might also be enlisted in the political sphere to gain electoral support – a form of clientelism which I propose to call '*nomenklatura* democratization'.

Members of the former *nomenklatura* have undoubtedly *attempted* to adapt the Soviet-era structure of intra-elite, top-down patronage relations into a bottom-up one of electoral patronage. Anecdotal evidence and press reports at the time of the parliamentary elections of 1994 in Ukraine suggest that many were successful, whether their vehicle was one of the heirs of the Soviet-era Communist Party of Ukraine, or the mythical 'party of power'.<sup>11</sup> What is less immediately clear is the degree of prevalence of this phenomenon, the areas and conditions under which it flourished, and the form(s) it took.

Well into the *perestroika* period, entrenched patronage networks played a significant role in elite selection in Ukraine, most notoriously in the Dnipropetrovs'k region.<sup>12</sup> When in the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies coercive mobilization of the electorate was relaxed, and for the first time popular opinion began to influence elite selection, the reaction of Ukrainian leaders, like their counterparts in other parts of the Soviet Union, was to engage in a rearguard damage-limitation exercise. They manipulated electoral institutions so as to restrict the ranges of choices on offer, and, through a variety of other legal and not-so-legal practices, to ensure in most cases the success of their own.<sup>13</sup> There is evidence that such tactics were again attempted in the republican elections of 1990,<sup>14</sup> but this time they were far less fruitful. Instead, leaders were obliged to mobilize the vote through positive incentives. Despite these constraints, traditionalists were largely successful in gaining parliamentary seats; the opposition Democratic Bloc won 117 of 450 seats, virtually all of them in the most

radicalized regions of Western Ukraine and Kiev, whereas 248 mandates were won by members of the apparat and the security services.<sup>15</sup>

By 1994 the situation had, however, changed. The breakdown of the party and diversification of ownership structures led to loss of co-ordination capacity among the elites and the rise of competition between patrons. At the same time, the majoritarian electoral law used in 1994 discriminated heavily against political parties by, among other things, making it extremely difficult for them to nominate their members for office.<sup>16</sup> This created a political vacuum which had the effect of particularizing competition, allowing it to be structured to a great extent by local and personal factors. Approximately half of the deputies eventually elected were independents. As in the 1990 elections, the east-west divide was prominent. The left-wing heirs to the Soviet-era Communist party proved strongest in the heavily industrialized east of the country, while the so-called 'national democratic' parties and groups that had led the drive for Ukrainian independence three years earlier held fast in their western stronghold.

The analysis in the previous sections of the facilitating conditions for clientelism allows us to evaluate the extent to which Ukrainian society in 1994 was conducive to the growth of electoral clientelism. *Prima facie* evidence suggests that in 1994 Ukraine was extremely fertile ground for this type of practice.

First, patrons must have something to give away, and a large state sector will mean more goods for state actors to distribute. Because of the slow rate of privatization in Ukraine between 1991 and 1994, the lion's share of resources of all kinds were still publicly controlled at the time of the 1994 elections.<sup>17</sup>

Secondly, restricted organizational pluralism in the social sphere will increase the dependence of voters on a limited number of income and benefit sources, making it easier for potential patrons to gain monopolies over the goods they exchange for votes. The large size of Soviet-era firms meant that directors had regular contact with a sizeable proportion of the voters in their constituency. Firms traditionally played the role of providers of social services; and many political and civic activities were workplace-based during the Soviet period, increasing the coercive power enterprises could exercise over their employees.<sup>18</sup> Though the social, economic, and political importance of the workplace declined somewhat after 1991, firms and the semi-official trade unions dominated by directors still served as vital providers of benefits, significantly reducing incentives to collective action by workers against their employers.<sup>19</sup> Marketization also engendered survivalist strategies on the part of many firms, which actually increased the solidarity which is so vital in guaranteeing effective patron-client relations.<sup>20</sup> Organizational pluralism was especially restricted in rural areas,

where collective farms often provided the *only* source of many necessary goods and services.<sup>21</sup>

Thirdly, long-standing networks of close social relations among members of a community represent for patrons cheap organizational resources; they are particularly valuable during periods of economic turbulence as they are not subject to the ravages of inflation or recession. Furthermore, previously existing social ties provide patrons with the *credibility* necessary to assure voters that promises will be fulfilled. A tight-knit social structure with many 'traditional' elements, including an extensive and largely intact network of informal relationships based on reciprocity, was inherited from the Soviet system.<sup>22</sup> Although this network can be expected to have frayed somewhat between 1991 and 1994, it may well still have served as a means by which elites could exchange favours amongst themselves and, in some cases, mobilize significant amounts of electoral support.

Fourthly, geographical and social proximity of voter to candidate (or candidate's broker) will also be conducive to organization and will make monitoring of compliance more effective. Ukraine's first-past-the-post electoral system with relatively small constituencies (85,000 voters on average) localized competition. The plethora of unfamiliar candidates on most ballots gave the advantage to well-known local leaders. This contributed to the personalization of the campaign and played into the hands of potential patrons.

Fifthly, weak state institutions will make it difficult for central authorities to monitor and control the illegal aspects of clientelism. Patrons will thus be less likely to be caught than they would be in a state governed by strict rule of law.<sup>23</sup> The process of state-building in Ukraine is still incomplete. Delays in the adoption of a new constitution and ongoing wrangling between the executive and the legislative branches over functional jurisdictions have further weakened the capacity of centralized state institutions to monitor and control activity at other levels.

Sixthly, material need on the part of voters will increase their availability for clientelistic mobilization. In early 1994 Ukraine was experiencing severe economic difficulties as a result of the semi-liberalization of prices and trade, unaccompanied by extensive privatization or reduction in state subsidies to unprofitable enterprises. Many workers were under-employed because of declining production, inflation had recently been as high as 70 per cent a month, and there had been a drastic decline in real living standards since 1991.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, a history of forced political compliance, typical of post-authoritarian polities, will have instilled in the electorate both a habit of electoral participation and cynicism with regard to the efficacy of that

participation. This will make them more readily available to mobilization through clientelist relations. Weak or lacking normative commitment on the part of the electorate to the institutions of representative democracy will also facilitate the development of alternative mechanisms of mobilization.<sup>25</sup> The Ukrainian electorate had become habituated to clientelistic relations during the Soviet period, and this factor is undoubtedly of considerable importance in preparing them to accept new forms of clientelistic practice in the post-Soviet age. But compliance and cynicism has varied in Ukraine according to the degree to which different sectors of the electorate were mobilized politically against the Soviet regime in the late *perestroika* period, and the degree to which they are supportive of the existence of an independent Ukrainian state.

Given that Western Ukraine was the cradle of the independence movement, and it was here that the nascent opposition groups were able to organize politically to the largest extent between 1988 and 1991, we should expect this to be the terrain least susceptible to clientelist relations. The east of Ukraine, on the other hand, is the area most heavily populated by ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians, who have been shown in surveys to be least supportive of the institutions of the Ukrainian state.<sup>26</sup> In 1994 the Ukrainian electorate had little faith in the mechanisms of interest-aggregation offered by non-clientelist forms of representation. Surveys at or near that time revealed a level of party identification low even by Eastern European standards, a similarly low level of normative commitment to the principles of democracy, a poor opinion of the legislature, and little expectation of policy accountability or efficacy.<sup>27</sup> Only 17 per cent of survey respondents interviewed in March 1994 believed there were *any* leaders capable of effectively leading their country.<sup>28</sup>

It appears that the conditions for the growth of electoral clientelism were largely fulfilled in 1994. We can thus go on to make several hypotheses as to the form clientelism will take. Two questions are of particular interest in this context. First, what are the mechanisms by which Soviet-era practices have been adapted to the new situation? This is not so much a matter of the degree of continuity or change, but rather of the means by which adaptation has taken place and the nature of the clientelism that has emerged. Secondly, who has been most successful in adapting and through what institutional channels have they been most successful in doing so? Though the broad picture is one of a self-transforming elite which has maintained a great degree of its former power, this does not necessarily imply that the very same people have retained power, nor that the positions they occupy are exactly the same.

As mentioned above, Ukrainian society was in a state of rapid social and economic change in 1994. New economic elites were emerging in the

private sector (often as a result of illicit business dealings), and old elites were jockeying with various degrees of success for executive patronage and control over the process of economic restructuring (regulation of the privatization process, control over permits and licences and so on). Reforms in both the political and the economic spheres had altered the traditional relationships between leaders and the electorate. Patrons were also competing amongst themselves for resources that were fast drying up in the economic collapse the economy was experiencing. Finally, *perestroika* had brought to the surface long-simmering dislike of elite privilege and a general distrust of local leaders among large sections of the population. In some places this took the form of active opposition to old elites and support of the political parties and opposition groups that formed in the early 1990s; in other areas it translated into a more general resentment and distrust of elites. The situation was thus one of instability and uncertainty.

Under these circumstances we would expect clientelist relations to be characterized by immediacy of reward. Rapid social change in a previously 'traditional' society will uproot people from traditional structures; this will make them more likely to prefer the reliability of explicit exchange to vague promises of interest representation. Despite the slow pace of economic reform in Ukraine, the country underwent considerable social change between 1990 and 1994 due to rapidly falling living standards, widespread under-employment, and extensive exploitation of alternative sources of income.<sup>29</sup> With society in flux, the social fabric unstable, and a low degree of trust between patrons and clients, it is unlikely that extensive networks of welfare provision would be widespread. In certain types of constituency, however, tighter bonds of loyalty and even solidarity might be expected to form between patron and client. This can be expected to be the case in socially and physically isolated communities (collective farms, 'company towns'), and in areas experiencing particularly severe declines in production, where a survivalist mentality would bind all members of a firm to the enterprise, make the enterprise director appear best placed to obtain aid from the central authorities.

It is therefore possible to make several predictions as to who will be those most likely to play roles in the clientelist relationship. Patrons can be expected to be of various types: entrenched local leaders from the Soviet period or their younger rivals, aspiring leaders, current power-holders or the new rich. Brokers will include enterprise managers and local administrative executives with control over state resources. The types of voters most likely to be tempted by clientelism are the poor, the politically apathetic, and those living in isolated communities.

It is difficult to predict the extent to which clientelist relations will be party-based and the extent to which they will be conducted by independents.

Given the heterogeneity typical of clientelism, we should expect to see both types of relations in existence, with highly-placed independents relying on access to state resources, and those less advantageously placed making use of party organizational structures. We can expect, however, that it will be mainly those off-shoots of the Soviet-era Communist party in the best position to exploit its organizational infrastructure that will be most successful in engaging in clientelism.

The above considerations lead us to predict that electoral clientelism in Ukraine could take three principal forms: (1) 'pork-barrel politics', (2) the individual fiefdom of a non-party patron, and (3) the party 'machine'. The analysis which follows will attempt first to identify the existence of clientelism in the 1994 parliamentary elections, and then to determine which type or types were most prevalent, before concluding with a brief evaluation of the likely implications of the practices described for party formation and the consolidation of democratic institutions.

### **Clientelism in Ukraine: Analysis**

Evidence for the existence of clientelistic relations in Ukraine is most readily available through the analysis of its effects, namely the relative success rates of different types of candidate. The foregoing discussion suggests that likely patrons are of three types: government officials, enterprise directors, and members' parties, especially those of the left, including the Socialist party – heir to the Soviet-era Communist party after the latter was banned in 1991, the Communist party re-founded in 1993, and the Agrarian party.

In occupational terms, two-thirds of all those who gained at least ten per cent of the vote in March 1994 were high government officials, enterprise directors, or professionals.<sup>30</sup> High government officials were the most successful group, representing 29 per cent of all those who gained over ten per cent of the vote, 31 per cent of plurality winners, and over half of all those who won a plurality on the first round (see Table 1).<sup>31</sup> Professionals were the next largest category of those who won at least ten per cent in the first round, but they were slightly less successful at gaining pluralities and made considerably fewer first-round wins. Enterprise directors (including farm directors) constituted a larger proportion of plurality winners than of over-ten-per cent winners, though they were slightly less successful at achieving victory in the first round. It is thus clear that those in high positions both in government and industry were most capable of mobilizing large amounts of support; their success together accounted for half of all the plurality winners in the March/April elections, though only 32.7 per cent of high government officials and 38.7 per cent of enterprise directors in this

category were members of political parties (as opposed to 62.2 per cent of professionals).

TABLE 1  
OCCUPATION OF CANDIDATES

Occupation	Over 10%		Plurality winners		First-round winners	
Enterprise director	178	16.7%	84	19.2%	7	14.3%
High government official	273	25.6%	138	31.6%	25	51.0%
Professional	253	23.7%	93	21.3%	5	10.2%
Manual worker	47	4.4%	21	4.8%	1	2.0%
Other	316	29.6%	101	23.1%	11	22.4%
All	1067		437		49	

Notes: Due to rounding error, not all columns sum to exactly 100 per cent.

Sources: 'Vybory-1994' database constructed by the Petro Mohyla Scientific Society; *Khto Ye Khto v ukrains'kyi politytsi*, Kiev: Kyivs'ke naukove tovarystvo im. Petra Mohyly, 1995.

Party members were in general more successful than their independent counterparts. Only 28 per cent of all candidates belonged to a party, yet party members won half the seats filled.<sup>32</sup> Of those who gained at least a tenth of the vote on the first round, 42 per cent were party members, and they made up 53 per cent of all first-round winners (see Table 2).<sup>33</sup> At each level of increasing success, party members thus represented a larger proportion of the total, but the increase was modest after the ten per cent level. Furthermore, independents still constituted more than half of those winning pluralities.

TABLE 2  
PARTY MEMBERSHIP OF CANDIDATES

Occupation	Over 10%		Plurality winners		First-round winners	
Left	273	25.7%	140	32.3%	15	31.9%
Centre	44	4.1%	17	3.9%		none
National-Democratic	123	11.6%	47	10.8%	6	12.8%
Extreme Right	17	1.6%	6	1.4%	3	6.4%
All party members	457	43.0%	210	48.4%	24	51.1%
Independents	606	56.0%	224	51.6%	23	48.9%
All	1063		434		47	

Note: Due to rounding error, not all columns sum to exactly 100 per cent.

Sources: As in Table 1.

In conformity with our hypothesis, left-wing parties have a more impressive ability than their right-wing counterparts to mobilize large numbers of voters: of those Agrarian party members who cleared at least ten

per cent of the vote in their constituencies, 58 per cent went on to be plurality winners; this figure is 50 and 48 per cent respectively for the Communist and Socialist parties, whereas the two main parties in the national-democratic camp – Rukh and the Republican Party – managed to propel only 41 and 35 per cent members of this category to plurality victory (see Table 2). Although this evidence is not conclusive, it does support the above hypotheses, suggesting the probability of electoral clientelism in Ukraine. We may therefore move on to an examination of the forms clientelism can be expected to take.

The first form of clientelism hypothesized to be prevalent was one governed by pork-barrel politics, in which incumbent legislators are supported in their re-election bids by local business leaders whose interests they serve in the legislature. Whether for a dearth of pork in the lean years between 1990 and 1994, political inexperience, or turnover within the elite, the successful establishment of this type of relationship does not appear to have been widespread. Only 174 of the 1990 cohort of deputies actually stood for re-election, and of these only 49 were elected, making up approximately a tenth of the new parliament. Given that there were an average of 13 candidates per constituency, a sitting deputy's chances of being returned were greater than those of most candidates, but this may be partly because only those incumbents who positively evaluated their chances chose to stand. It is notable that a disproportionate number of registered candidates who withdrew from the race prior to election day were sitting deputies. Moreover, there is scant evidence that sitting deputies were more successful than non-incumbents in mobilizing the vote. Overall, turnout was 2.87 per cent higher in constituencies in which incumbents were standing, but when regional variations are accounted for in multivariate regression analysis, the effect of incumbency on turnout is insignificant (see below).

There is, however, evidence that in some cases legislative seats have helped deputies to build support bases; this is most notable in the west of the country and in the 'national-democratic' sector of the party spectrum.<sup>34</sup> Party membership among incumbents was generally low, perhaps because alternative parties were legalized after they had been elected in March of 1990, and their positions in the legislature obviated the need for them to join parties. By 1994 only about a third of all incumbent candidates were party members; this is only slightly more than the 27.2 per cent of all candidates who fall in this category. But party affiliation did appear to have enhanced incumbents' success in all parts of the country: membership was over 50 per cent among those who won a plurality in their district. Though there were as many incumbent candidates on the left as on the right, they represented a larger proportional share of right-wing 'national-democratic' candidates,

and proportionally more of them stood in the west of the country where the national-democratic camp is strongest. This is also where incumbents were most successful at actually winning pluralities. Many of these deputies were members of the late Soviet opposition, and loyalty to them appears to be associated with loyalty to the pro-independence forces in the country. This area is that with the strongest levels of party identification, and this, rather than patronage relations, is most likely the basis for their support.

One reason why incumbents do not seem to have been more successful political patrons may be that the incentive structure in the country's current political system is not conducive to the type of incumbency entrenchment observed elsewhere. 'Kolbasa politics' differs from 'pork-barrel' politics in that (1) it is not orchestrated by a competitive party system which would provide continuity and accountability; (2) it is not mediated by civil society which could articulate and communicate interests to the candidate/deputy and monitor his or her performance if elected; (3) most benefits to constituents are not effected through interest intermediation within the legislature, but through behind-the-scenes bargaining; (4) there is little incentive for re-election – and little perceived chance, given drastic economic decline and unpopularity of the legislature. Deputies therefore have the incentive to enrich themselves for one term of office before returning home to enjoy the fruits of their labours.

The second possible type of patronage is the individual fiefdom, dominated by a local leader, who simply 'buys' support from the electorate by the direct provision of benefits. If enough votes can be reliably mobilized, they serve as resources which can either be cashed in directly or traded for other favours.<sup>35</sup> In this way electoral politics is integrated into an existing economy of exchange which largely works to bypass formal institutional structures. If this is the type of 'machine' which was in operation in the 1994 elections, we should expect to see not only a high success rate among leaders, but a tendency for above-average turnout to accompany this success as well. There should also be evidence of candidates standing in those constituencies in which 'deliverable' votes can be negotiated; we should thus observe a large amount of what Helf and Hahn term 'outside seating'.<sup>36</sup> Given the higher degree of social and economic isolation of rural areas and the dependency on leaders which this entails, rural votes should be easier to deliver, and we should not be surprised to find that many members of the so-called 'party of power' choose to stand outside cities.

Evidence of the existence of political machines of this type was presented at the start of this section. Officials and enterprise directors achieved disproportionate success in the 1994 elections, even though few of them appear to have been operating through political parties. Additional

support for the supposition that these groups mobilized votes on the basis of patronage relations can be found in the fact that turnout was on average 7.0 per cent higher in seats where high government officials succeeded in gaining at least ten per cent of the vote, and 3.6 per cent higher in constituencies where enterprise directors met similar success. Outside seating is also in evidence among successful government officials, 47 per cent of whom stood in constituencies other than those in which they worked. A disproportionate number of these stood in rural constituencies, where they were unusually successful (see Table 3).

TABLE 3  
OCCUPATION OF CANDIDATES IN URBAN AND RURAL SEATS

	Over 10% – urban*		Over 10% – rural		Plurality winners – urban		Plurality winners – rural		First- round winners – urban		First- round winners – rural	
Enterprise director	56	12.0%	118	20.1%	30	14.6%	51	22.4%	2	12.5%	4	12.5%
High government official	100	21.4%	171	29.1%	49	23.9%	88	38.6%	9	56.3%	16	50.0%
Professional	123	26.3%	139	23.7%	53	25.9%	40	17.5%	1	6.3%	4	12.5%
Manual worker	33	7.1%	14	2.4%	16	7.8%	5	2.2%	1	6.3%	none	
Other	156	33.3%	145	24.7%	57	27.8%	44	19.3%	3	18.8%	8	25.0%
All	468		587		205		228		16		32	

*Note:* Due to rounding error, not all columns sum to exactly 100 per cent.

*Sources:* As in Table 1.

\* A constituency is classified as urban if over 75 per cent of its residents were so classified in the census of 1989.

Of the 178 directors who cleared the ten per cent hurdle, 104 were directors of farms or plants related to agriculture; such people made up a similar proportion of plurality winners (47 of 84). Other directors were approximately evenly divided between industry and the service sector.<sup>37</sup> It does appear that the rural setting is one more conducive to mobilizing the vote, and that directors of farms and other agricultural enterprises are especially well placed to perform this task. This occupational category accounts for about one in seven deputies elected in March and April of 1994.

The third possible form of electoral patronage is one in which leaders use political parties as agents to help them mobilize the vote, or, alternatively, parties use the resources of local leaders to build their own machines. It may be that certain parties have managed to transform themselves into modern party machines by using a communist-era social infrastructure of elite networks to orchestrate the mobilization of electoral support in exchange for goods or other guarantees of material security.

The figures cited above give evidence of the remarkable success of left-wing parties in the elections of 1994. But to shed light on the nature of this support, it is instructive to analyse the composition of successful party candidates. We have already seen that most successful elite candidates were independents, but there are some striking variations within the two broad categories of high government officials and enterprise directors: of those high government officials who belonged to the legislative branch of government, just over a third were party members at the ten per cent cut-off level, nearly half at the level of plurality winners, and over half of first-round winners. Among members of the executive branch, however, the figures are about an eighth for each of the first two categories and none for first-round winners. A similar distinction is evident among enterprise directors when we control for economic sector. About half of directors of agricultural enterprises were party members (approximately evenly divided between the Communist and Agrarian parties), whereas among directors of industrial and service enterprises, party affiliation was notably lower (see Table 4).

TABLE 4  
BREAKDOWN OF ENTERPRISE DIRECTORS BY SECTOR\*

Sector	Over 10%	Plurality winners	First-round winners
Agriculture	104 (47=45.2%)	47 (24=51.1%)	3 (3=100%)
Industry	24 (7=29.2%)	13 (4=30.8%)	1 (1=100%)
Services	27 (10=37.0%)	15 (3=20.0%)	1 (0)
Unknown	23 (4=17.4%)	9 (2=22.2%)	2 (0)
All	178 (68=38.2%)	84 (33=39.3%)	7 (4=57.1%)

Sources: As in Table 1.

\* Figures in brackets represent party membership.

These figures suggest that certain categories of leaders found it convenient to make use of political parties to serve their electoral interests, but it is by no means the case that the entire left was dominated by elites. A breakdown of the three left-wing parties by occupation reveals that the Agrarian party was most heavily saturated at all levels of success by elite

candidates: over two-thirds of those who won at least ten per cent of the vote. A similar number of plurality winners were directors in the agricultural sector, and elite candidates constituted virtually all of those who achieved some degree of success through this channel. Membership in this party appeared to enhance farm directors' chances of success. In a multivariate regression analysis of agricultural directors who achieved at least ten per cent of the vote, the only significant variable (aside from regional dummies) was Agrarian party membership, which increased the chances of directors in this category by an average of 3.9 per cent. But if the Agrarian party is a party of collective farm directors – especially in the central regions of Ukraine – it is not *the* party of this group, for only about a quarter of those who cleared ten per cent were members, while another quarter were members of the Communist party.

The Communist party appears to be less dominated by elites, and this is even more so for the Socialist party.<sup>38</sup> Though one might expect the Communist party to have been a haven for 'red' factory directors, this is manifestly not the case. There were only two such candidates among the 34 Communist directors to have reached the ten per cent mark, and two also of the 17 plurality winners in this category.

The picture thus far painted is one of the partial intersection of elite and left-wing party patronage structures which varies from party to party. These relationships can be summarized in the form of multivariate regression models for constituency-level turnout and candidate-level electoral support. Each regression equation includes all candidates who received at least ten per cent of the vote. The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Turnout levels are most strongly affected by geographic variations, which appear to be largely independent of constituency-level factors associated with candidates. As in many countries, more rural residents vote than their urban counterparts, regardless of geographic or constituency-level factors. In comparison with the base-line region of the Left Bank, voters on the Right Bank and in the east were moderately less likely to exercise their franchise, and those in the south were noticeably less prone to do so. In conformity with the hypothesized effects of clientelistic mobilization by elites and leftist parties, the presence of candidates falling into these categories has a significant positive impact on turnout. Just as notable are the variables that were not significant in this model: the presence of a sitting deputy on the ballot had no discernible effect on electoral participation, nor did the presence of members of any of the other major parties, party blocs, or occupational categories. The ability to bring voters to the polls appears to be confined by and large to those in positions of economic or political power, and to left-wing patronage parties.<sup>39</sup>

In the model for electoral support, geographical variations were not

TABLE 5  
REGRESSION MODEL FOR TURNOUT

Variable	B	Standard Error
Enterprise director standing	2.36***	0.61
High government official standing	2.27***	0.52
Urban constituency	-14.80***	0.46
Member of a party of the left standing	1.55**	0.52
West <sup>a</sup>	0.89	0.91
Right Bank	-5.19***	0.85
South	-11.53***	0.84
East	-5.39***	0.88
Constant	87.55***	0.82

Adjusted R Square .66

N 1054

\* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < .001$

<sup>a</sup> The Left Bank is the base-line region.

TABLE 6  
REGRESSION MODEL FOR ELECTORAL SUPPORT

Variable	B	Standard Error
Incumbent	7.09***	1.41
High government official (excluding parliamentary deputies)	4.00***	1.00
Enterprise director	3.43***	0.99
Resides in constituency	-5.60***	0.82
Member of the Agrarian party	9.02***	2.13
Member of the Communist party	5.04***	0.91
Member of the Socialist party	3.66*	1.86
Constant	22.37***	0.80

Adjusted R Square .16

N 1060

\* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < .001$

significant;<sup>40</sup> nor, interestingly, were the demographic characteristics of candidates, such as age, gender, ethnic group, or education level. As in the turnout model, elite occupations and membership in a left wing party are prominent among the variables found to have a significant relationship to electoral success; other occupational categories and other parties failed to achieve significance.<sup>41</sup> Also prominent in the vote model were incumbency and local residence. The strong negative impact of local residence confirms the supposition that the most successful candidates were often those 'parachuted' in from outside as a result of intra-elite bargains; this provides support for the interpretation of elite success in terms of clientelism, rather than the genuine popularity of local leaders.

## Conclusion

A difficulty inherent in analysing all forms of institutional distortion is that though they may be everywhere observable, they are nowhere measurable. Evidence is perforce indirect, chains of inferential reasoning long, and conclusions tentative. Much remains unclear as regards the most common currency of clientelistic relations in Ukraine and the mechanisms by which exchanges are effected and enforced. In-depth case studies would be a valuable means of investigating these issues, and examination of the roll-call behaviour of suspected 'patrons' in the legislature would shed light on the extent to which patronage relations undermine legislative accountability.<sup>42</sup>

Yet the foregoing analysis does strongly suggest the prevalence of electoral clientelism in Ukraine, and it appears that this phenomenon is of two principal types: elite machines and left-wing party machines. In some respects this can be seen as a modification of the patronage structures which existed during the Soviet period: deliverable votes have simply been added to the resources which local elites are able to manipulate and trade amongst themselves for other types of favours, and leftist parties are still being used as much to co-ordinate such activities as to aggregate the interests or promote the ideological views of their members. But in other respects what we have observed represents a change from the past. The party 'machines' that were most prominent in the 1994 elections may have been based on old structures, but they were conveying new elites to central government. Directors of agricultural enterprises provide a good example, for they appear to have been among the most successful patrons in these elections, yet only two of those who won pluralities were sitting deputies. Still, the Communist party and the Agrarian party are by no means workers' or farmers' parties; rather, they are parties in which political and economic elites play an important role. Lack of effective reform has created in Ukraine a situation in which a large section of the electorate is susceptible to having its votes 'appropriated' by local political machines, rather than having them won through competition between parties offering different policy packages. The interests of these voters are projected onto them rather than being aggregated through the electoral process.

Detailed analysis of the ways in which the phenomenon of electoral clientelism affects the political process in Ukraine is beyond the scope of this article, but a few brief indications of the possible consequences of this phenomenon are in order. Electoral patrons are fortunate in being able to command the support of workers in the most bloated sectors of the economy. But because these are the least efficient and the most in need of government subsidies, the interests represented in the parliament tend to be

skewed in favour of those industries that are least economically viable in a market economy and those that in proportional terms generate the least wealth. Leaders in those economic sectors which are most vibrant are least able to command widespread electoral support through vote-buying, but they are also less dependent on the state and therefore have less incentive to try to gain control over budget allocations.

The result has been that the parliament elected in 1994 has repeatedly voted to grant subsidies to ailing industries, and has been reluctant to back the structural reform programmes of president Kuchma. Conflicts between the parliament and the president have weakened the former and given it a primarily negative role of blocking change and delaying legislation. This in turn has led to a rise in voter disaffection and a decline in normative support for elected institutions which, it was argued above, is one of the factors which help to make voters available for electoral clientelism. A vicious circle may well be in the making.

This analysis has tried to show that high levels of electoral participation and strong support for political parties do not necessarily indicate that representative institutions are responding to popular demands. On the contrary, the widespread existence of electoral clientelism will tend to block the organized integration of civil society into electoral politics by intervening at the grass-roots to co-opt voters and limit their access to structures which would allow them to articulate and aggregate their interests.

But this is not meant to imply that clientelism provides the only mechanism for vote mobilization in present-day Ukraine, nor that it is firmly entrenched where it does exist. As we have seen, even the clientelistic landscape is variegated, and there is evidence of the development of party identification and legislative responsiveness in certain parts of the country. It remains to be seen whether the new generation of parliamentarians will be able to consolidate their support bases through a strengthening of their newly-formed clientelist relations, or whether these will prove as ephemeral as those of their predecessors. Much will depend, in this connection, on their ability to return benefits to those who delivered the votes which elected them; with the decline in power of the parliament since the election of Kuchma, this is becoming increasingly difficult. The end of electoral clientelism is not likely to be near, but clientelistic relations in Ukraine will again have to adapt to a new environment. In the next elections they will undoubtedly take new and different forms which will reflect these changes. More like living organisms than machines, structures of electoral clientelism in Ukraine are perhaps most notable for their capacity for survival through evolution.

As a limiting case, Ukraine is of intrinsic interest in the study of post-

Soviet political transformation. In the absence of a developed party system, pathologies of democratization which may play a less visible but still significant role in other Eastern European countries come into full relief. But this is not to say that we can expect to find precisely the same mechanisms of patronage elsewhere in the region. Future research on this topic would benefit from a comparative perspective which would examine the extent to which such practices can be traced back to the Soviet system, and whether there is anything about electoral clientelism in post-Socialist countries that distinguishes it from electoral clientelism elsewhere. Also of interest would be more investigation into the longitudinal aspect of the phenomenon to discover how different mechanisms of vote mobilization adapt and change over successive elections.

However difficult it may be to identify and define with precision, and however unclear its normative status, fully-fledged clientelism is a form of electoral linkage which differs markedly from that based on true policy responsiveness. Whether we view it as a natural stage in the development of a party system or as an aberration characteristic of less democratic societies, the prevalence of clientelism in post-communist polities will have a significant influence on party formation: it will largely determine who rises to prominence, how parties mobilize support, and what party members do when in office. By making access to resources the primary basis on which leaders are chosen, clientelism has the effect of reinforcing the structure of relations between rulers and ruled which predominated during the Soviet period and curtails the development of mechanisms of genuine interest aggregation. This can be expected to lead to the entrenchment of a debilitating cynicism on the part of already disillusioned electorates.<sup>43</sup> It is surely too early to predict that machine politics will come to dominate the electoral arena in the countries of Eastern Europe, but such a development cannot be ruled out; much will depend on willingness and ability of those in power to bring about the privatization of property while preventing the privatization of politics.

#### NOTES

1. Cornelius O'Leary, *The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections, 1868-1911* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Michael Johnston, 'Historical Conflict and the Rise of Standards', in Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp.193-205.
2. Many have argued that what we too easily label 'corruption' is often a set of practices that are perceived as legitimate within the contexts in which they operate, and that it can have numerous benefits (for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.60-70; James C. Scott 'Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.63 (1969), pp.1142-58. See also J.S. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-

- Benefit Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.61, No.2 (1967), pp.417-27; [reprinted in Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), pp.564-78]; Robin Theobald, *Corruption, Development, and Underdevelopment* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp.107-32; Johnston *op. cit.*
3. Any relationship of this type will, for the purposes of this article, be termed 'clientelism'. Such practices range from the archetypal elaborated clientelism of the party machine to the simple and more perfunctory exchange of votes for cash.
  4. Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 2nd edn., H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and eds.) (London: Routledge, 1991), p.87.
  5. Kay Lawson, 'Political Parties and Linkage', in Kay Lawson (ed.), *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp.3-24.
  6. To the extent that lack of capacity for abstraction may in some cases prevent voters from using available aggregative mechanisms instrumentally, the resort to immediate gain will be even more frequent than predicted by models of 'rational' calculation.
  7. Steffen Schmidt, 'Patrons, Brokers, and Clients: Party Linkages in the Columbian System', in Kay Lawson (ed.), *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective*, (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1980), p.297.
  8. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Political Manipulation and Administrative Power* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp.1-17; Alain Rouquié, 'Clientelist Control and Authoritarian Contexts', in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié (eds.), *Elections Without Choice* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978), pp.19-35.
  9. Indeed, Herbert Kitschelt questions whether in the post-Soviet context we ought to expect to see the formation of programmatic parties at all. He argues instead that the type of 'patrimonial communism' which characterized the Soviet state will lead to patronage parties whose support is based on the direct provision of goods and services (Herbert Kitschelt, 'Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions', *Party Politics* Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.447-72). Kitschelt perhaps overestimates the extent to which Soviet society was in the late 1980s characterised by a compliant clientele for the 'patrimonial communists'. Certainly there was a great degree of opportunistic acquiescence to control by the institutions of the party and the state. But by 1991 there was much resentment of party privilege. The degree of antipathy was of course not uniform across different sectors of society and across different regions of Ukraine, and one of the recurrent motifs of the present argument is that regional variation provides an important key to understanding contemporary Ukrainian politics.
  10. This is not to say that party organization need be used in this way; for it can also be used to aggregate preferences.
  11. For accounts in English, see Marko Bojunc, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994', *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol. 47, No.2 (1995), pp.229-49; *Verkhovna Rada Elections in Ukraine: March 27 to April 10, 1994*, Part I (Kiev: Elections in Ukraine Observation and Co-ordination Center, 1994).
  12. Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Political Patronage and Perestroika: Changes in Communist Party Leadership in Ukraine under Gorbachev and Shcherbytsky', in Romana N. Bahry (ed.), *Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine* (North York, Ontario: Captus University Publications, 1990) pp.28-39. John P. Willerton, Jr., 'Elite Mobility in the Locales: Towards a Modified Patronage Model', in David Lane (ed.), *Elites and Political Power in the USSR* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988).
  13. A.V. Berezkin, V.A. Kolosov, M.E. Pavlovskaya, N. V. Petrov, and L.V. Smiryagin, 'The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)', *Soviet Geography* Vol.30, No.8 (1989), pp.607-34; *Vesna 1989: Geografii i Anatomiiia Parlamentskikh Vyborov* (Moscow: Progress, 1990); Michael Urban, *More Power to the Soviets: The Democratic Revolution in Russia* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), pp.89-123; Stephen White, 'The Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies March 1989', *Electoral Studies* Vol.9, No.1 (1990), pp.59-66; *After Gorbachev*, 4th edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.46-52.

14. Gavin Helf and Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', *Slavic Review* Vol.51, No.3 (1992), pp.511–30; Stephen M. Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). On clientelism in recent Russian elections, see Tatiana Vorozheikina, 'Clientelism and the Process of Political Democratization in Russia', in Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata (eds.), *Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society* (Boulder, CO and London; Lynne Reiner, 1994), pp.105–20, and Grigorii V. Golosov, 'Russian Political Parties and the "Bosses": Evidence from the 1994 Provincial Elections in Western Siberia', *Party Politics*, Vol.3, No.1 (1997), pp.5–21.
15. Peter Potichnyi, 'Elections in Ukraine, 1990', in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), *The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp.196–7.
16. See Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report* Vol.26, No.3 (1994), pp.6–17; Bojcun, op. cit.
17. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 1994–1995* (March, 1994); International Labour Office-Central and Eastern European Team, *The Ukrainian Challenge: Reforming Labour Market and Social Policy* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995).
18. Fish, pp.162–73.
19. Stephen Crowley, 'Between Class and Nation: Worker Politics in the New Ukraine', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.28, No.1 (1995), pp.43–69.
20. International Labour Office-Central and Eastern European Team.
21. Fish, pp.162–70.
22. Ken Jowitt, 'Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime', *Soviet Studies*, Vol.35, No.3 (1983), pp.275–97; Grzegorz Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol.21 (1991), pp.285–313; Rachel Walker, 'Informal Relations in Russia: Towards "Unconsolidated Democracy"?' , paper presented at Fifth World Congress for Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 6–11 Aug., 1995.
23. Although the law governing the Ukrainian parliamentary elections of 1994 does not explicitly prohibit the exchange of material rewards for votes, it does prohibit the use by a candidate of his or her official position to promote his or her campaign, and the intimidation of voters (Ch. VII, Art. 27.3, and Ch. XII, Art. 51.1 respectively; *Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe* (Kiev: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1995)).
24. Simon Johnson and Oleg Ustenko, 'Ukraine Slips into Hyperinflation', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.2, No.26 (1993), pp.24–32; Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine: A Year of Crisis', *RFE/RL Research Report* Vol.3, No.1 (1994), p.38; Economist Intelligence Unit; International Labour Office-Central and Eastern European Team.
25. This analysis accords broadly with examinations of the phenomenon in other contexts. Colin Leys cites as conditions for political corruption the following: inequality of wealth, changing moral codes, weakness of the mechanisms of law enforcement, and the absence of a strong sense of national community (Colin Leys, 'What Is the Problem about Corruption?' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.3, No.2 (1965) pp.215–24). To this list, J.S. Nye adds the weakness of the legitimacy of government institutions. Huntington, Scott, and Theobald all cite the predominance of primordial relations as one of the main facilitating conditions of clientelism and other forms of corruption. Scott and Theobald stress the importance of material insecurity, scarcity of goods, and weakness of central state structures, while Huntington and Scott emphasise the role of 'social disorganisation'. Eva Etzioni-Halevy makes a strong case for the role of politicised administrations in promoting clientelism, but this would seem to be a secondary feature derivative of the factors already mentioned (see Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Political Manipulation and Administrative Power*).
26. Ian Bremmer, 'The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol.46, No.2 (1994), pp.261–83; Vicki Hesli, 'Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns', *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol.47, No.1 (1995), pp.91–121; Valery

- Khmel'ko, 'Politicheskie orientatsii izbiratelei i itogi vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet (mart-aprel' 1994 goda)', *Ukraina segodnya*, Vol.5 (1994), pp.55-63; Valeryi Khmel'ko and Dominique Arel, 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', paper presented at the Conference on 'Peoples, Nations, Identities: The Russian-Ukrainian Encounter', Columbia University, 21-23 Sept., 1995.
27. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'The Political and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol.23, No.4 (1995), pp.485-514; Richard Rose, 'Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies', *Party Politics* Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.549-64; Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller, and Paul Heywood, 'The Place of "Party" in Post-Communist Europe', *Party Politics* Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.525-48; *Politychnyi portret Ukrainy: Hromads'ka dumka: vybory Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy 1994 roku*, No.8 (1994).
  28. *Politychnyi portret Ukrainy* No.8 (1994) p. 23.
  29. World Bank, *Ukraina: sotsial'na sfera u perekhidnyi period: analiz svitovoho banku*, (Kiev: Osnovy, 1994); International Labour Office-Central and Eastern European Team.
  30. The category of 'high government officials' was defined according to potential ability to command resources at the constituency level, either directly or through intermediaries. It includes the following positions: parliamentary deputies, heads of *oblast'*, city, and *raion* councils, ministers, deputy ministers, heads of departments in ministries, heads of departments in the presidential administration; heads and deputy heads of *oblast'*, city, and *raion* administrations, heads of local administration departments which wielded significant economic or physical power, representatives of the president in *oblasti*, cities, and *raiony*, and regional heads of the Ukrainian Security Service. Professionals include academics, lawyers, doctors, teachers, consultants, engineers and other technical specialists.
  31. For the purposes of this analysis, winning a plurality will be taken as the main criterion of electoral success. Because actual election was based on a turnout requirement, it is a conceptually heterogeneous category and is better 'unpacked' into its component parts.
  32. More still are affiliated with a party through nomination or support in the campaign; see Arel and Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections'.
  33. The figures in Tables 2-6 exclude in each case a small number of candidates for whom full information was not available.
  34. I use the conventional classification of Ukrainian political parties into left, centre, national-democratic, and extreme right camps; see Table 1. For an overview of political parties in Ukraine prior to the elections of 1994, see Andrew Wilson and Artur Bilous, 'Political Parties in Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol.45, No.4, (1993).
  35. Gavin Helf and Jeffrey Hahn.
  36. *Ibid.*
  37. Although a sub-classification according to ownership type might well shed light on the nature of the interests being pursued by director candidates, the data source employed in this analysis do not in most cases give adequate information for this classification to be made with certainty. Furthermore, the structure of ownership was complex to the point of ambiguity in Ukraine in 1994, and it is doubtful whether a sharp distinction between public and private ownership would be possible to make, even were the requisite information available.
  38. A contemporary study of the composition of Communist and Socialist party members found the former to have far more government officials than the latter (cited in Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, *op. cit.*, p.13).
  39. A regression equation including the three left-wing parties separately found the presence of Communist and Agrarian party members to be significant, though the Socialist party just fails to reach significance at the .05 level. The presence of a Communist party member on the ballot is associated with a 1.2 per cent increase in turnout, while the presence of a member of the Agrarian party boosts turnout by an impressive 3.0 per cent.
  40. In as much as the party system is geographically fragmented, with left-wing parties dominating the east and the south, and national-democratic parties the West and the Right Banks, regional differences are accounted for by the inclusion in the equation of a variable for left-wing party membership.

41. Neither was there any significant association between electoral support and the branch of industry in which a candidate was employed, nor, among high government officials, between those who were members of the executive and legislators.
42. There is some evidence to suggest that accountability is on the whole low, but that it is greater among party members. Arthur Miller, 'Establishing Representation in Post-Soviet Societies: Change in Mass and Elite Attitudes Toward Democracy and the Market, 1992-1995', paper presented at the Conference on Civic Culture in Post-Communist Societies, Nuffield College, Oxford, 8-9 March 1996. Further analysis would be necessary to determine the extent to which this is the case across parties.
43. Attila Agh, 'From Nomenklatura to Clientura: The Emergence of New Political Elites in East-Central Europe', in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), *Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.44-68. Clientelism also has several consequences which are detrimental to economic reforms in Eastern Europe. The high costs of electoral clientelism encourage administrative corruption by power-holders, which exacerbates the problems attendant upon the formulation and implementation of reforms. Politicians have every incentive to resist sales of state property unless they can find a way to benefit from it directly.