



Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group

University of Glasgow

Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics

Author(s): Sarah Birch

Source: *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Sep., 2000), pp. 1017-1041

Published by: [Taylor & Francis, Ltd.](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/153588>

Accessed: 28/09/2014 21:01

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and University of Glasgow are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Europe-Asia Studies*.

<http://www.jstor.org>



Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics

SARAH BIRCH

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHERS have long been aware of the need to take contextual effects into consideration when analysing the determinants of political behaviour. Recent developments in both disciplines have pointed to the desirability of considering a range of different contexts at different levels (individual, local, regional, state, global) that work in different ways (via external environmental effects, social learning, the effects of differential information availability etc.). To explain adequately the impact of place on politics it is necessary to provide a convincing account of how hypothesised effects are understood to work and the level(s) at which they are believed to operate.¹

Region of residence is acknowledged to be one of the most significant cleavages in Ukrainian politics but, though numerous studies comment on this fact, few give convincing explanations for it. Many commentators assume that the well-known differences in political attitudes and voting behaviour across Ukraine's regions are simply the consequence of local variations in individual-level factors such as ethnicity, education level and occupational structure. Yet careful analyses of individual-level data reveal that even when socio-demographic attributes are controlled for, region still exerts an independent influence. Broadly speaking, residents of the industrialised and heavily Russian east of Ukraine have been found to be more left-wing and pro-Russian in their political orientations and voting proclivities, whereas those of the more agricultural and ethnic Ukrainian west of the country tend to favour market reforms and closer ties with the West.² What this research has not made clear is the meaning of these regional differences. Most studies assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that regional differences which transcend individual characteristics can be traced to one of two causes: historical experience or regional economic conditions. Though both hypotheses are plausible, it is important to recognise that they involve two very different explanatory strategies.

The main story behind the explanation of regional effects in historical terms draws on political culture arguments. It is posited that the marked differences in pre-Soviet political experiences among Ukraine's different regions have left lasting effects on these populations' perceptions of and reaction to Soviet collapse and transition toward market democracy. Because of their past incorporation into various Central European states and empires, so the argument goes, there is a tendency for western Ukrainians to perceive themselves to be 'Europeans' and to espouse 'European' views of political and economic processes, whereas eastern Ukrainians see themselves as being 'Eastern

Slavs', with all the differences this perception implies for geo-political value orientations and political behaviour.³

The second main way in which regional factors are interpreted is in terms of variations in economic conditions across different parts of the country. This argument draws on a body of political science analysis which has found that aspects of the circumambient economic environment can alter one's values. People in similar economic circumstances can nevertheless experience and react to those circumstances differently according to the prevailing economic climate of the region in which they live.⁴ A primarily economic interpretation of region in Ukraine is given by some scholars,⁵ but much work assumes some combination of economic and historical dimensions, often without specifying how they are related.⁶ This approach is problematic in that the main historical and economic variations to be found in Ukraine do not in all cases overlap. It is perhaps for this reason that there is often a tendency in the scholarship toward vagueness as to where the main fault lines are. Though there is a general consensus that Ukraine is divided primarily along an east–west axis, the point of division is drawn variously along the line that separates western Ukraine from Dnieper Ukraine, along the Dnieper river itself, or sometimes even further east, at the intersection of the agricultural Left Bank region and the more industrialised lands in the far east of the country.

Previous analysis has demonstrated that critical opinion-forming elites in the eastern city of Donetsk and the western city of Lviv both attribute considerably greater importance to historical than to economic factors in explaining their differences.⁷ But is this perception justified? Economic and historical explanations for regional influence on political behaviour are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Historical influences are more long-term and deeply embedded, whereas the impact of economic factors can be expected to be less long-lived and subject to greater change. It is important to tease these two apart if the true import of region in Ukraine is to be grasped. This article aims to investigate the two main interpretations of contemporary regional cleavages and to assess their relative importance for patterns of political belief and action. In so doing it seeks to clarify, both conceptually and empirically, *how* place matters in Ukrainian politics. The analysis draws on a combination of historical electoral data, aggregate-level economic indicators, and the results of a nation-wide sample survey of the adult population of Ukraine conducted prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections. The structure of the article is as follows. The first part details the political—and specifically electoral—correlates of historical divisions among the Ukrainian lands from the 19th century to the time of Ukrainian unification after World War II. The second part investigates Soviet and post-Soviet differences in the economic structure of Ukraine's regions and evaluates their potential political impact. The third section undertakes a multivariate statistical analysis to test the competing claims regarding the effect of region on patterns of party support. A final section concludes and draws out the implications of the research.

Historical divisions in Ukraine and their political correlates

As many before have pointed out, the word 'Ukraine' literally means 'on the edge'. For centuries the condition of being a border region was the geographical reality of

TABLE 1
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY REGION IN UKRAINE

Historical Region	Contemporary <i>Oblast'</i>
Former Habsburg lands	L'viv Ternopil' Ivano-Frankivs'k Chernivtsi (west) Zakarpattya
Volhynia	Volyn' Rivne
Right Bank	Kyïv city Kyïv <i>oblast'</i> Vinnyts'ya Zhytomyr Kirovohrad Khmel'nyts'kyi Cherkasy Chernivtsi (east)
Left Bank	Poltava Chernihiv Sumy Kharkiv Luhans'k Donets'k ^a Dnipropetrovs'k Zaporizhzhya (north) Kherson (north) Mykolaïv (north-east)
Former Ottoman lands	Zaporizhzhya (south) Kherson (south) Mykolaïv (south-west) Odesa ^b Crimea

Notes: ^aThe extreme south of present-day Donets'k *oblast'* was formerly part of the Ottoman empire.

^bThe extreme north of present-day Odesa *oblast'* was formerly part of the Habsburg empire.

the Ukrainian lands. It is possible to distinguish five main historical regions in contemporary Ukraine according to their varying experience of foreign rule (see Table 1).

(1) *The former Habsburg regions in the far west.* This area includes the historical regions of Galicia, Transcarpathia and Bukovyna. After the Habsburg collapse in World War I Galicia became part of Poland, Transcarpathia was awarded to Czechoslovakia, and Bukovyna to Romania. The three regions were then annexed to the Soviet Union in 1944 after the fall of Germany. Although there are important historical differences among them, their common characteristic of never having been part of the Russian empire is probably the most salient feature of these regions from the point of view of contemporary political attitudes.

(2) *Western Volhynia.* Though long part of Poland, Volhynia was gradually taken over

by the Russian empire during the partitions of Poland in the late 18th century. The western portion (commonly referred to now simply as 'Volhynia') was given back to Poland after World War I and remained under Polish rule during the interwar period. It was then incorporated into Soviet Ukraine along with the former Habsburg lands after 1944. Though the region experienced Western influence during the crucial interwar period, its history of having been part of imperial Russia for nearly 150 years left a significant imprint on its cultural development.

The western-most lands of Ukraine share the common feature of having been brought relatively late and rather brutally into Soviet socialism. The post-1945 Sovietisation drive coincided with a massive exchange of population between Poland and the new Soviet territory as well as many deportations of ethnic Ukrainians to Siberia and the Far East.

(3) *The Right Bank* of the Dnieper river was also part of Poland until Russia acquired it in 1793 but, unlike western Volhynia, it was incorporated into Soviet Ukraine when the USSR was founded in 1922. Until the end of the 19th century most of Right Bank Ukraine was owned by Polish landlords, whereas the peasantry which worked the land was mainly Ukrainian.

(4) *The Left Bank* of the Dnieper river and the lands to the east. This region has the greatest experience of Russian rule, having been controlled by its northern neighbour since the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654. Left Bank Ukraine was the area on which successive Cossack Hetmanates were located in the 18th century. A century-and-a-half later, the far-eastern Donbas river basin was one of the main sites of a massive industrialisation drive, and the area received considerable immigration from Russia at that time.

(5) *The former Ottoman lands of the Black Sea littoral*. At the same time as Russia was expanding into Polish territory in the 18th century, it was also winning land from the Ottoman empire in the southern steppe territory. This area had previously been wild and undeveloped, especially the inland portion of it, and it retained some of the character of the frontier well into the 19th century. 'New Russia' also underwent extremely rapid settlement and industrialisation during the last years of the Russian empire; the population increased seven-fold over the course of the 19th century as migrants flocked to develop a dense network of trade links along the coast and industry inland.⁸

These differences in historical experience of conquest, settlement and displacement have contributed significantly to identity formation and have helped generate networks of interaction that have strengthened regional differences in identity and perceptions of politics.⁹ Divergent historical experiences are also mirrored in variations in the electoral regimes implemented under different ruling powers, and this factor can be expected to have a profound impact on how Ukrainian citizens perceive competitive politics. It is therefore worth pausing to consider which issues have been most salient historically in the different parts of Ukraine and how electoral institutions have shaped attitudes on these issues.

Elections in pre-Soviet western Ukraine

Popular elections were held in some form in all the Ukrainian lands prior to the Soviet period, but the experience of elections under the Habsburgs and later in interwar Poland was the most extensive. Given that subsequent events removed most of the non-Ukrainian prewar population from the region, the electoral culture that developed among ethnic Ukrainians is most relevant to the concerns of this investigation. Following an abortive attempt in 1848 at introducing popular elections to the Habsburg lands, elected representative institutions were created in the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1861. These included the Reichsrat in Vienna, local diets in the provinces, and, in Galicia and Transcarpathia, communal councils. Between 1873 and 1914 all these bodies were subject to popular election according to a system of ethnic quotas. Electoral mobilisation was facilitated and structured by a well-developed cooperative movement and a dense network of civil society organisations that had formed largely along ethnic lines.¹⁰ Despite the fraud and intimidation that often accompanied elections in the two Austrian provinces, the period of electoral competition was one of representational improvement for the ethnic Ukrainian population. This experience spurred ethnic consciousness, which became the dominant political cleavage throughout the area.¹¹

During the interwar period residents of all parts of western Ukraine participated in elections held by their respective governments. In 1918 local legislative bodies in Romanian Bukovyna were abolished and Ukrainian political parties were banned. Elections to the Romanian parliament between 1919 and 1937 allowed some scope for political activity, but they were manipulated by the monarchy in such a way as to produce what Mattei Dogan describes as 'mimic democracy'.¹² The situation in Czechoslovak Transcarpathia was considerably more liberal. During the 1920s ethnic Ukrainian politics was dominated by the conflict between Ukrainophiles, Russophiles and various Rusyn' nationalist groups. In the national elections of 1924–25, 1929 and 1935, however, most ethnic Ukrainians supported all-Czech parties, especially the Communist Party and the Agrarians.¹³ The 1930s saw a rapid growth in ethnic consciousness among the Ukrainian population, such that by the time of the elections to the newly formed Subcarpathian Diet in February 1939 a coalition called the Ukrainian National Union received 86.1% of the vote on a 93.2% turnout.¹⁴

In Galicia and Volhynia elections were held in 1922, 1928, 1930, 1935 and 1938 to the Polish Sejm, and through 1930 to the Senate as well. The main electoral cleavage during this period continued to be that of ethnicity, with the distinction between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet parties representing a subsidiary division within each ethnic camp. In previously Russian Volhynia, the populist-socialist Sel'rob movement enjoyed the most initial success, whereas in Galicia the nationalist Ukrainian National Democratic Organisation dominated the political scene.¹⁵

The two most significant aspects of these experiences of democratic institutions are, firstly, the increasing importance of ethnicity as a shaper of electoral allegiance in the less politically-developed areas of Transcarpathia and Bukovyna and its persistence as the main political cleavage in Galicia and Volhynia. The main difference between the cleavage structure in the former Habsburg lands and that in Volhynia was that class divisions were significantly more important in the latter. Secondly, elections and

representative government were taken seriously. The population of the West of Ukraine had a strong sense of where its interests lay—though for historical reasons these interests were differently conceived in different regions—and it perceived parliamentary politics as an important potential means of pursuing them.

Elections in Russian Ukraine

Greater data availability and a closer correspondence between the pre-Soviet and post-Soviet population in Dnieper Ukraine make more extensive analysis of pre-Soviet voting patterns possible and relevant than was the case for the western regions. Popular elections were first held in imperial Russia after 1864 when local councils (*zemstva*) were established. *Zemstva* were not allowed to form until 1911 in the Right Bank territories, however, as these were still tightly controlled at the local level by the Polish land-owning aristocracy, and Russia feared Polish uprisings. Moreover, civil society was much more strictly regulated in the Russian Empire than in its Austro-Hungarian counterpart. In Ukraine this was compounded by the fact that Ukrainian language use and ethnically-based cultural development were severely restricted, especially in the latter part of the 19th century. The opportunities for political organisation among the predominantly ethnic Ukrainian population were thus limited.

The indirect elections to the four Russian Dumas between 1905 and 1917 were the first occasion on which all those living in imperial Ukraine could play a part in selecting their leaders, and the first chance any had to participate in polls for national-level representative institutions. Though the franchise in these elections was strongly weighted in favour of the land-owning and urban classes, comparison of the results across regions gives some indication of the relative strength of different political tendencies in different parts of Ukraine. The nine imperial provinces can be divided into three regions according to the classification outlined above: the formerly Polish Right Bank provinces of (eastern) Volhynia, Podolia and Kiev; the Left Bank, consisting of Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov; and the area in the south-east—most of which had been under Ottoman rule till the end of the 19th century—encompassing Ekaterynoslav, Kherson and Taurida.

Two parties dominated the first Duma elections, the intelligentsia-led Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) who appealed also to ethnic minorities, and the conservative nationalist Union of 17 October (Octobrists) who had strong links with industrialists.¹⁶ Popular elections were held for 'electors' who then went on to choose deputies at higher levels. Given that Ukraine was a predominantly rural area and the well-represented land-owning and urban classes included a strong minority presence, it is not surprising that the Octobrists should have done poorly here. Yet, despite alliances with ethnic parties in the provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, Chernigov, Taurida and Kherson, the Kadets received only moderate support.

Of all the electors elected in the first stage of the balloting, only 11.8% of those from Ukraine were Kadets, or slightly fewer than the all-Russian average of 12.7% (see Table 2). Non-party electors were generally of two types: leftists and peasants (though by no means were these categories mutually exclusive). Because for the most part the revolutionary leftist parties—the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social

TABLE 2

THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF ELECTORS IN ELECTIONS TO THE FIRST RUSSIAN DUMA (1906) BY REGION (%)

<i>Province</i>	<i>Kadet</i>	<i>Octobrist</i>	<i>Progressive</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>All left</i>	<i>All right</i>	<i>Non-aligned</i>	<i>Major party</i>	<i>Non-party</i>
Volhynia	6.7	4.1	9.7	6.7	16.4	10.8	72.8	10.8	89.2
Podolia	5.6	–	9.2	7.7	14.8	7.7	74.4	5.6	91.3
Kiev	5.8	0.5	8.9	5.3	14.7	5.8	39.1	6.2	53.3
Right Bank	6.0	1.5	9.3	6.5	15.3	8.0	61.0	7.5	76.7
Poltava	13.3	–	18.2	5.5	31.5	5.5	11.4	13.0	35.0
Chernigov	3.3	–	16.7	4.0	20.0	4.0	29.3	3.3	50.0
Kharkov	18.7	20.0	6.0	7.3	24.7	27.3	45.3	38.7	58.7
Left Bank	11.8	6.2	13.9	5.6	25.7	11.8	27.4	17.9	46.8
Ekaterynoslav	19.3	5.9	3.7	3.0	23.0	8.9	68.1	25.2	74.8
Kherson	19.3	–	8.7	23.3	28.0	23.3	33.3	19.3	72.6
Taurida	27.1	10.4	11.5	12.5	38.6	22.9	37.5	37.5	61.5
South-east	21.3	4.7	7.6	13.4	28.9	18.1	46.7	26.0	67.7
Ukraine	11.8	3.9	10.4	8.0	22.2	11.9	46.3	15.7	64.6

Note: Percentages do not always sum to 100 because they exclude adherents of small parties as well as those whose orientation could not be determined.

Source: Calculated from Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 297–298.

Democrats—boycotted these elections, those electors who were on the far left generally stood as independents. When we examine the composition of the electors chosen to represent each of the main regions of Ukraine, we see that the ideological structure of the Right and Left Banks is roughly similar: in each case the number of leftist electors—those from the Kadet bloc and ‘progressives’—is about twice that of Octobrists and other ‘rightists’.¹⁷ In the more Russified and industrial south-east the right is better represented. It is not possible with such limited data to disentangle the independent effects on voting behaviour of ethnicity, occupation and level of urbanisation, as these three cleavages are to a great extent mutually reinforcing. But it is clear that both historical regional and social divides contributed to the outcome of Dnieper Ukraine’s first elections to a national assembly.

By the time of the direct, unweighted elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1917, the process of political mobilisation had advanced and ethnic Ukrainians had begun to articulate demands for regional autonomy (though often in the context of all-Russian political organisations). In April 1917 a separate Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party (UPSR) was formed. In some areas this party entered into electoral alliances with the all-Russian SRs, and in other instances with the Rural Union and/or the Ukrainian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party (USDRP). The Russian Constituent Assembly elections were conducted according to a system of regional list proportional representation.¹⁸ The results of the elections are shown in Table 3. Though regional variations are still evident, their impact on the results of the elections was greatly reduced between 1906 and 1917 owing to the change in the structure of the franchise.¹⁹ With the bulk of representative weight now being made up of the relatively homogeneous Ukrainian peasantry, it is not surprising that this group should have been a ready constituency for the UPSR. The two UPSR-dominated blocs

TABLE 3
RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS TO THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (NOVEMBER 1917) BY REGION (%)

<i>Province</i>	<i>Ukrainian Socialist Bloc^a</i>	<i>UPSR^b</i>	<i>SR</i>	<i>Bolshevik</i>	<i>Kadet</i>	<i>Jewish National</i>	<i>Other</i>
Volhynia ^c	–	70.8	3.4	4.4	2.8	7.0	11.6
Podolia ^d	78.6	–	1.2	3.3	1.0	7.6	8.3
Kiev	77.3	–	1.3	4.0	1.4	6.0	10.0
Right Bank	57.8	18.1	1.8	3.9	1.7	6.7	10.0
Poltava	–	63.3	17.3	5.6	1.6	2.8	9.4
Chernigov	–	49.8	10.8	27.9	3.0	2.9	5.6
Kharkov	–	72.8	–	10.5	5.3	0.6	10.8
Left bank	–	62.4	9.5	14.0	3.3	2.1	8.7
Ekaterynoslav	46.6	–	19.4	17.9	2.3	3.1	10.7
Kherson ^d	n/a	n/a	–	13.2	8.7	13.9	n/a
Taurida ^c	–	10.7	52.2	5.5	6.8	2.4	22.4
South-east	31.5	3.5	22.3	13.7	5.0	5.7	18.3
Ukraine	29.2	32.5	10.2	10.3	3.2	4.7	9.9

Notes: ^a Includes the UPSR, the Rural Union and the USDRP.

^bIn Kharkov the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries formed a joint list with the left wing of the All-Russian SRs; the figure given here is that for the joint list.

^cData are somewhat incomplete (see Oliver H. Radkey, *Russia Goes to the Polls: The Election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, 1917* (Ithaca, NY, and London, Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 145).

^dData are substantially incomplete (see Radkey, *Russia Goes to the Polls*, p. 145).

Sources: Calculated from Radkey, *Russia Goes to the Polls*, Tables 1, 2 and 5; Steven L. Guthier, 'The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917', *Slavic Review*, 38, 1, 1979, Table 1.

together won an absolute majority in all three areas, though they were weakest in the south-east.

Elections were held in January 1918 to the Ukrainian Central Rada, but the results of these contests must be treated with a degree of caution, given the turbulent conditions under which they were conducted. Both Poltava and Chernihiv were largely controlled by the Bolsheviks in January 1918 and the front ran through Volhynia province.²⁰ Furthermore, because the results are only partial, it is difficult to make detailed comparisons with those of the all-Russian elections held two months earlier. Within each region, the Bolshevik vote increased in the areas in which it had been strongest before (also now territories which were under disputed control) but the UPSR vote held strong in Podolia and Kiev, despite the lack of a tradition of political organisation in these regions and despite the threat of imminent take-over by forces hostile to Ukrainian peasant demands (see Table 4).

In 1922, after a short-lived attempt at existence as an independent state, Ukraine fell once again under rule from the north-east. Dnieper Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the Socialist Soviet Ukrainian Republic. No truly competitive elections were held under Soviet rule until 1989, by which time the residents of Dnieper and Western Ukraine had suffered hiatuses in their electoral experience of 70 and 50 years respectively.

Several broad generalisations can be made on the basis of the foregoing analysis. Firstly, western Ukraine had a more extensive and more recent experience of competitive elections than other parts of the Ukrainian lands. The higher level of

TABLE 4
RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS TO THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA
(JANUARY 1918) BY REGION (%)

<i>Region</i>	<i>UPSR</i>	<i>Bolshevik</i>	<i>Other</i>
Volhynia	63.3	13.3	23.3
Podolia	80.0	0.0	20.0
Kiev	84.4	6.7	8.9
Right Bank	76.3	6.1	17.5
Poltava	60.0	33.3	6.6
Chernigov	35.7	60.7	3.6
Left Bank	48.3	46.6	5.1
Ukraine	67.4	19.7	12.8

Note: Includes Polish and Jewish parties

Source: Oleh Semenovych Pidhainy, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic*, Vol. 1 (Toronto and New York, New Review, 1966), pp. 228–231.

party organisation in the western region can also be traced to the extensive development of party politics during the pre-Soviet period. Not only was the experience of competitive politics in this part of the country more recent, but elections to Austro-Hungarian legislative bodies and those of the Empire's successor states were more heavily dominated by parties than was the case for Duma elections in Russian Ukraine. We would therefore expect that if remnants of prewar political culture have survived in Ukraine, their effect would be to make residents of the former Habsburg lands and Volhynia more supportive of democratic reforms. Their greater experience of integration into and contact with European states should also make them more inclined to favour policies associated with the West, such as market reform. Within the western regions, there is evidence that class divisions were more important in Volhynia than in the former Habsburg lands of Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia, though in both regions ethnicity was a major determinant of vote choice. We would thus anticipate that ethnic-consonant and nationalist political behaviour would be strong in both regions, but that class-related factors might also be prominent in Volhynia.

Dnieper Ukraine has a longer association with Russia (in both its imperial and Soviet manifestations), less contact with the West, and a longer experience of communism. It almost goes without saying that these characteristics should incline its residents to be more pro-Russian and pro-communist. Within Dnieper Ukraine, we could expect the Left Bank and eastern regions to be the staunchest supporters of the contemporary left, given that this is where the strongest pro-Russian and pro-Bolshevik voters were located in pre-Soviet times. Furthermore, Ukrainian nationalism and the parties associated with it should be stronger on the Right Bank than in the south. The political affinities of the south of Ukraine are more difficult to predict; all main groups gained some support in the most southerly provinces of Kherson and Taurida in the Duma elections, though the general level of party affiliation was relatively low. In the Constituent Assembly elections the results were again mixed, though support for the Ukrainian nationalist parties was weaker here than elsewhere.

We would thus not expect the present-day descendants of such parties to have much strength in the former Ottoman lands, though pro-Russian sentiment is also not predicted to be as strong here as in the regions to the north-east.

Economic divisions among Ukraine's regions

Historical differences in forms of political rule invariably shape a country's economic structure, but so do physical geography, trade routes and a myriad of other factors. In the Ukrainian case, regional variations in economic structure have for long cut across the traces left by the ebb and flow of empires. Despite the radical changes brought about by collectivisation and industrialisation, there was during the Soviet period a continuation of many of the economic trends of the 19th century. At the time of the 1989 census (see Appendix 1) one could observe a steady rise from west to east in population density, urbanisation, industrialisation, and the proportion of the population made up of ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians. The main division in Ukraine remained that between the predominantly agricultural western and central regions, on the one hand, and on the other hand the mostly industrial east and south. There was a broad similarity in occupational structure across the area stretching from the west to the Left Bank; in this part of the country the labour force was made up of approximately half workers, a quarter collective farmers and a quarter employees. The Right Bank was and remains the most agricultural region, followed by the Left Bank, and finally the less fertile west. By contrast, the labour force of the southern and eastern regions in 1989 was composed of between a half and two-thirds workers, a quarter to a third employees, and in almost all areas fewer than a fifth collective farmers. Significant differentials in pay levels, social welfare provision and investment accompanied these structural variations, with the southern and eastern regions being favoured in both respects.²¹

The West and Centre-North

When it was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1944, western Ukraine was economically backward in comparison with the Soviet east of the country. Industrialisation brought light industry and modern farming methods to the region, but it remained one of the least productive and poorest paid areas of the country. Though less fertile than the black earth further east, the soil of the western region continued to provide a livelihood for the majority of the local population; at the time of the 1989 census western Ukraine had yet to break the crucial 50% urbanisation level which is considered to be the threshold of modernisation.²² Volhynia, divided into the *oblasti* of Volyn' and Rivne, is the most agricultural area. The Galician *oblasti* of L'viv, Ternopil' and Ivano-Frankivs'k are more varied, with a combination of manufacturing and mining. With large sections of their territory also located in the Carpathians, Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) and Chernivtsi (Bukovyna) have significant coal mining industries, as well as being sources of agricultural products.

The *oblasti* which make up the central region of Ukraine—Kiev, Poltava, Cherkasy and Kirovohrad in the Dnieper basin, Khmel'nyts'kyi, Vinnytsya and Zhytomyr in the higher lands to the west, and Chernihiv and Sumy to the north-east—are likewise

dominated by agriculture and food processing. Light industry and engineering have also been developed in this area since the war. The Left Bank portion of this central region is endowed with considerable oil, gas, iron and coal deposits. As on the Right Bank, agriculture and the food industry play the most prominent role in the local economy, though engineering, metal and chemical industries are important as well. Kyiv city has a social and occupational structure rather different from those of the surrounding *oblasti*; as one might expect, it is significantly more industrial than the rest of the region, with half of the work force engaged in manual labour.

The South-East

The history of occupational differentiation between the Black Sea littoral and the steppe hinterland of southern Ukraine persisted through the Soviet period. The northern parts of Odesa, Mykolaïv and Kherson *oblasti* remained largely agricultural, while the coastal regions and the area around the southern Dnieper basin—Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovs'k—were Soviet Ukraine's industrial heartland. Dnipropetrovs'k also became a major centre of heavy industry, especially metal industries and weapons production.

Even before the Soviet period, the far eastern region of Ukraine (Donets'k, Luhans'k and Kharkiv *oblasti*) was the most industrialised and densely populated part of the Ukrainian lands. Coal mining is what the area is famed for, but it is also strong in other areas of heavy industry, particularly metals, chemicals and machine-tool production. In 1989 fully 90% of the inhabitants of Donets'k *oblast'* lived in cities or towns, and 70% of the labour force of the Donbas basin area was made up of workers, while only 5% were collective farmers. The east is a region in which strikes have mobilised the working class under imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet regimes to exert decisive influence over the course of political events. During the Soviet period the 'working class aristocracy' of the Donbas enjoyed a privileged status. They were better fed, clothed and housed than their counterparts elsewhere, and their contributions to the working class mythology merited them a special place in Soviet culture.²³

Regional differences in the post-Soviet period

Prior to independence many in Ukraine had believed that the country would benefit considerably from breaking ties with Moscow. During the Soviet period much of Ukraine's revenue was channeled directly through the centre, and the Ukrainian republic got back less than it contributed (at least when measured according to the methods of Soviet accounting).²⁴ The natural conclusion was that the Ukrainian economy would be strengthened if it were to be managed from Kyiv. Whether this will be true in the long run is a moot point. Suffice it to say that these expectations were rather different from the reality of the early post-Soviet years. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, the Soviet economy was highly integrated, with different regions specialising in different types of economic activity. When 15 separate states formed on what had previously been a single economic area all the new states suffered from the dislocations this caused in terms of broken trade links and discontinuities. Secondly, Ukraine suffered more than some of the former Soviet

states because of its strong dependency on Russian and Turkmen energy supplies. The Ukrainian economy, being one of the most industrialised in the Soviet Union, was also one of the most dependent on fuel. Furthermore, energy efficiency was not a priority in Soviet times, so many Ukrainian enterprises consumed far more energy per unit of output than their counterparts in the West. The Soviet accounting system significantly under-priced energy, thereby distorting the true balance between what Ukraine received and what it contributed. When energy prices were raised to close to world levels after the Soviet break-up, the Ukrainian economy was put under severe strain.²⁵ Thirdly, the transition from a command economy to a capitalist one invariably involves dislocations which result in short-term hardship as markets for goods, services and labour adapt. The slow pace of economic reform in Ukraine has prolonged this transition period. The private sector was slow to take off owing to the reluctance of successive governments (and parliaments) to engage seriously in the privatisation of state firms or to facilitate the growth of new private-sector enterprises.²⁶

The general trends that have characterised post-Soviet economic developments are (1) a dramatic rise in prices after price liberalisation in 1992; (2) a sharp fall in production, especially in industry; (3) poverty: though few people were actually made redundant, low pay levels and severe wage arrears in many sectors meant that the income generated from Soviet-era jobs was insufficient to maintain an adequate standard of living; and (4) growing wage differentials as certain sectors of the population found ways (legal and illegal) of benefiting from the changes and exploiting new opportunities, and many former members of the ruling elite converted their erstwhile political capital into economic assets.

These general patterns, however, are inflected with considerable regional variations in both the severity of the economic collapse experienced and in the speed with which the private sector established itself. Soviet-era trends have continued since 1991, with wages higher and unemployment levels lower in the south-east of the country than the west and centre-north (Kyiv city being an exception). And even if the greater wage arrears and higher cost of living in the south and east are taken into account, this area is still generally better off than the western and central regions (see Appendix 2).²⁷ The east-west divide is evident also in the distribution of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Outside Kyiv city, the highest numbers are in the east and south, with the centre and the west lagging considerably. However, the geography of privatisation is rather different: the former Austrian regions of Galicia and Bukovyna lead the pack in terms of per capita number of privatised firms, again excluding Kyiv city (see Appendix 2).

All in all, the areas that have weathered the economic turbulence of the past few years most successfully are the south-eastern *oblasti* of Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhya, whose metal and chemical industries have found ready markets abroad despite economic chaos at home. Areas on traditional cross-border trade routes such as Odesa, L'viv, Zakarpattia and Kharkiv have also done relatively well, whereas the more isolated agricultural central regions have fared the worst.

Two regions, the Donbas and Crimea, merit special attention because of the politicisation of region as an issue there. Judging by levels of popular protest over economic conditions, one could be forgiven for thinking that the miners of eastern

Ukraine were the worst hit by economic dislocations associated with transition. Certainly the Donbas mining industry was not well equipped to compete on the world market, but its decline had begun many years before the Soviet collapse. Transition-related factors may have exaggerated this trend, but they did not trigger it. The miners' strikes that have repeatedly taken place since the late Soviet period may well be more a symptom of anger over the secular decline of the prestige and status of the Donbas miner than an indication of objective destitution; the Donbas remains one of the areas with the highest average wages and the lowest unemployment rates in Ukraine. But strikes in the heavily Russian eastern extreme of the country have a political meaning that transcends both objective need and subjective feelings of discontent. There was long a fear among leaders in Kyïv (paralleled by hopes among some in the Donbas) that this region would break away and join Russia. Successful referendums on devolution, on the powers of Donbas *oblast'* administrations to legislate on language use, and on ties with neighbouring regions in Russia were held at the time of the 1994 elections, and pro-Russian groups gained momentum here as Ukraine's economy plummeted in relation to that of Russia.²⁸ It is now clear that the fears of secession were unjustified, but they were used by the east as a bargaining chip to obtain preferential treatment from Kyïv. This treatment somewhat softened the impact of transition but at the same time made it difficult for Kyïv to pursue a steady reformist course.²⁹

The potential break-away of Crimea was a more real possibility. Given to Ukraine in 1954 by Khrushchev to mark the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Crimea stands out from the rest of the country in terms of its legal status, its ethnic composition and its economic structure. In 1991 Crimea was upgraded from the status of *oblast'* to that of autonomous republic. Since then there have been considerable political tensions between Kyïv, Simferopil' and Moscow over the future of the region, a number of whose mainly Russian residents would prefer to rejoin the Russian Federation. The Crimean city of Sevastopol' is the base of the Black Sea Fleet, while civilian craft bring to the peninsula's other ports regular consignments of dollar-laden tourists, primers of the considerable entrepreneurial activity evident in the region (with the highest number of SMEs per capita outside Kyïv city—see Appendix 2). But Crimea is notorious for being riddled with corruption, and the republic is perpetually in need of hand-outs from the centre to keep it afloat. In the early post-Soviet years the peninsula's dire economic situation ultimately forced it to bow to the political demands of Kyïv rather than push for further autonomy. And once the Russian Federation officially renounced territorial claims to the peninsula (for fear of the implications this might have for the status of its own break-away regions), Crimea had little choice but to remain in the Ukrainian fold.³⁰

Prevailing economic conditions clearly exhibit considerable variation across Ukraine's regions, and there are thus grounds for suspecting that they might be an important differentiator of political attitudes. On the basis of the foregoing discussion we would expect to find that the areas which are most impoverished and have the lowest levels of private sector activity (mainly regions in central Ukraine) should be those that are least inclined to support political parties oriented toward market reforms, once other factors are taken into consideration. It is worth noting that these regions do not coincide with those predicted on the basis of historical factors to

support conservative forces. Though east–west divides are most salient in both historical and economic terms, the fault lines are different in the two cases. The main dividing line in historical terms is that between western and Dnieper Ukraine, whereas the most important economic division is that between the centre-west and the south-east. It is important that these two sets of factors have distinct patterns of regional distribution, for it allows us to employ multivariate statistical techniques to distinguish their impact on political values.

Interpreting the regional influence on contemporary political attitudes

To summarise the arguments advanced so far, political attitudes in Ukraine can be expected to vary from region to region according to two interrelated factors: (1) variations in attitudes and affect generated by historical geo-political experiences and (2) regional economic factors. To test these hypotheses, data from a survey conducted prior to the 1998 elections were used in conjunction with historical and economic regional indicators. A multivariate analysis of the effect of region on support for Ukraine's four main parties was carried out, controlling for individual-level socio-demographic factors known to affect political attitudes and behaviour.

The regional economic data included seven key *oblast'*-level measures designed to tap industrial and employment structure. Owing to the considerable correlations among many of these variables, it was desirable to reduce them to key indicators of each of the main attributes of interest. The underlying economic complexion of the *oblast'* was measured through per capita industrial output and per capita agricultural output. In addition to these production-sector divisions, distinctions among types of ownership are important in determining the degree to which a region is undertaking reform. There are two ways of looking at ownership: in terms of the number of formerly state-owned enterprises which have been privatised, and the number of new private enterprises that have started up. The sum of these measures was used as a proxy for the degree of overall private enterprise activity characteristic of the region. On the employment side, the most obvious measure of the health of the labour market would seem to be the rate of joblessness. But in the Ukrainian context this is not a particularly helpful statistic, as the numbers of registered unemployed are extremely low and do not reflect real unemployment rates.³¹ Moreover, employment versus unemployment is not necessarily the most relevant indicator of occupational status in Ukraine. The relationship between average wage, per capita wage arrears and the cost of living thus gives a better indication of relative affluence of a region's workforce. The measure used as an indicator for wage adequacy was the average wage minus per capita wage arrears, with this sum then divided by the estimated cost of a basket of essential food items. Details of the measurement of each of these variables can be found in Appendix 2.

The five historical regions described in the first section of this article were represented by dummy variables, with the Right Bank serving as a baseline for comparison. As indicated in Table 1, a number of the present-day *oblasti*—Chernivtsi, Kherson, Mykolaïv and Zaporizhzhya, and to a lesser extent Donetsk and Odesa—are split among historical regions. These *oblasti* were classified in the statistical analysis according to where the survey respondents were drawn from. No sampling

points were located in either Kherson or Mykolaïv. In the case of Chernivtsi, the respondents were drawn from the western, Habsburg, portion. Those in Donetsk were all drawn from sampling points in the Left Bank parts, while those in Zaporizhzhya and Odesa were drawn from the formerly Ottoman lands.

Finally, it is necessary to control for individual-level factors that are known to influence vote choice. The variables included can be divided, for the sake of convenience, into socio-demographic and economic categories. The socio-demographic variables employed were education level, age, ethnic group and religious affiliation (defined in terms of affiliation to the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church, the adherents of which have been found in previous studies to have the most distinctive voting patterns).³² Settlement size, though not strictly speaking an individual-level characteristic, was also included in this group. Individual-level economic variables included income adjusted for family size, production sector of employment (employment in the industrial and agricultural sectors were entered into the equations, with the service sector as a baseline for comparison), employment in the private sector and unemployment.³³ The precise definition of the individual-level variables is presented in Appendix 3. Details of the survey from which they were drawn can be found in Appendix 4.

Support for Ukraine's four most important political parties, the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), the Socialist-Rural bloc (SPU-RPU), Rukh and the National-Democratic Party (NDP), served as dependent variables in this analysis. The CPU was forcibly disbanded in 1991 but refounded in the autumn of 1993 and at the time of the 1998 elections was Ukraine's largest party. It was also the most hostile to Ukrainian independence and the most in favour of strengthening political ties on the territory of the former Soviet Union. As its name implies, the party is opposed in general to market reforms and would prefer the re-establishment of a state-owned centralised economy.

The Socialist Party of Ukraine took on the de facto role of communist successor party when it was founded in 1991, but it declined in importance after the CPU was refounded. During the 1994–1998 parliament it joined forces with the third principal communist successor, the Rural (*Sel'yans'ka*) Party, and these two parties fought the 1998 elections as a united bloc (SPU-RPU). The SPU-RPU bloc was more in favour of Ukrainian independence than the CPU and also less adamantly opposed to marketisation. Private ownership was still viewed with some trepidation by the bloc, however, and their geo-political orientation clearly leaned more toward Russia than toward the West.

The main counterweight to the communist successor parties was Rukh—or, according to its formal title, the Popular Movement of Ukraine. Rukh first formed in the final years of the Soviet Union as a pro-independence umbrella movement that aimed to secure democracy, market reforms and sovereignty for Ukraine. It is strongly pro-Western and anti-Soviet. The high point of its influence was the early post-independence period; since then its support has declined but it was still the second-strongest party at the time of the 1998 elections.

The final main party is the National Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDP), the so-called 'party of government', which relied largely on patronage-based ties to mobilise electoral support. Of the four main political actors on the scene of Ukrainian

politics the NDP is the newest, having been officially founded as recently as 1995. But its roots can be traced back to the liberal-centrist groups that formed in Kyïv during the later Soviet period and which have had a variety of incarnations since. In 1998 it was the party most closely aligned with President Kuchma and that of which Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko was a member. In ideological terms the NDP seeks to steer a course mid-way between the pro-Russian parties of the left and the nationalist parties of the right. Its main focus is on economic reform and a pragmatic foreign policy.³⁴

Support for these four parties/blocs was measured using survey questions in which respondents were asked to rate the parties on a scale of one to five, where 1 means '[they] strongly dislike that party or bloc', and 5 means '[they] strongly like that party or bloc'. There were a relatively large number of respondents who did not have or were not willing to express views on the parties—26.9% in the case of the CPU, 39.1% for the SPU-RPU, 30.0% for Rukh and 42.1% for the NDP. Nevertheless, a substantial majority of respondents were able to form such opinions, more than were willing to indicate party identification or vote choice. Attitudes toward parties thus represent useful indicators of political orientation and behavioural tendencies.

OLS regression was used to analyse the relationship between party support and the three sets of independent variables described above. For each party, a preliminary regression was run including only dummy variables for the historical regions and individual-level control variables. The regional-level economic indicators were then added in a second equation. Table 5 presents the results. The numbers in the columns are standardised regression coefficients, the magnitudes of which indicate the relative impact of each variable on the level of support for the party in question. Positive scores designate positive impacts (i.e. party support increases with increases in the value of the variable), and negative scores represent negative impacts. For example, the first model shows that when regional economic factors are *not* taken into consideration, the strongest impact on Rukh party support is that of Russian ethnicity. The negative coefficient indicates that ethnic Russians tend not to support this party, and the fact that the relationship is significant even at the 0.001 level shows that it is very robust (in other words, there is only one chance in a thousand that this result could have been obtained by chance). The next-strongest impact is exerted by adherence to the Ukrainian Catholic Church, with residence in the former Habsburg part of Ukraine coming next, and so on. The other models can be interpreted in similar fashion. In so doing, attention should be paid mainly to those variables significant at the 0.05 level or lower (as indicated by the superscripts). The total proportional variation in party support explained by each model is given by the adjusted R² figure.

These results presented here lend weight to both alternative interpretations of regional influences on party support. Historical regions are especially important in the models for the right-of-centre parties—Rukh and the NDP. The reformist parties draw their greatest strength from the former Habsburg regions. The NDP is strong also in the former Ottoman lands; it is thus a party of the peripheries with the greatest influence of non-Russian empires. Rukh, however, is clearly a party of the west. It finds support in the Habsburg lands and in ex-Polish Volhynia—those areas closest both geographically and culturally to Western Europe. The leftist parties are less

TABLE 5
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON PARTY SUPPORT

Variable	Party							
	Rukh		NDP		SPU-RPU		CPU	
Historical regions								
Former Habsburg lands	0.10 ^b	0.23 ^c	0.11 ^b	0.27 ^c	-0.05	0.11	-0.05	-0.04
Volhynia	0.08 ^b	0.14 ^c	0.002	0.06	-0.12 ^c	-0.09 ^a	-0.07 ^b	-0.09 ^b
Left Bank	-0.07 ^a	0.10	-0.09 ^a	0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.07 ^a	0.02
Former Ottoman lands	-0.07 ^a	0.03	-0.02	0.20 ^a	-0.17 ^c	0.13	0.06	0.13
Economic ecological variables								
Industrial output	0.10			0.22 ^b		0.34 ^c		0.05
Agricultural output	0.21 ^b			0.15		0.39 ^c		0.16 ^a
Privatised enterprises and SMEs	-0.07			-0.13		0.03		0.17 ^b
Wage adequacy	0.12 ^a			-0.05		-0.25 ^c		-0.14 ^b
Individual-level variables								
Education level	0.01	-0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.09 ^b	-0.07 ^a
Age	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.09 ^b	0.10 ^a	0.13 ^c	0.12 ^c
Settlement size	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.003	-0.14 ^c	-0.04	-0.08 ^b	-0.03
Russian ethnicity	-0.15 ^c	-0.08 ^a	-0.09 ^b	-0.04	0.04	0.05	0.08 ^b	0.06
Ukrainian Catholic Church adherent	0.14 ^c	0.12 ^b	0.01	0.01	-0.06	-0.04	-0.17 ^c	-0.16 ^c
Industrial sector employment	0.03	0.06	-0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05
Agricultural sector employment	0.04	0.03	-0.001	-0.01	0.09 ^b	0.10 ^b	0.07 ^a	0.08 ^a
Private sector employment	0.07 ^a	0.05	0.11 ^b	0.12 ^b	-0.004	-0.005	-0.06 ^a	-0.07 ^a
Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.08 ^a	0.09 ^b	0.04	0.04	-0.06 ^a	-0.07 ^a
Income	0.001	0.02	0.14 ^c	0.13 ^c	-0.003	0.003	-0.09 ^b	-0.07 ^a
N	1099	971	911	794	958	840	1146	1007
adjusted R ²	0.11	0.17	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.13

Notes: The figures in the cells are (standardised) Betas. ^a $p < 0.05$; ^b $p < 0.01$; ^c $p < 0.001$.

influenced by historical region, once other factors are controlled for. Yet the symmetry of the effects of the historical region variables in the models for Socialist-Rural and Communist support is striking. In both cases there is a slight antipathy toward those parties on the part of the residents of Volhynia (most likely to be because the newly formed Agrarian party, which has strong support in this region, had captured the allegiance of large numbers of former left-wing adherents, and because a number of well-known right and centre-right politicians are from there, including former president Kravchuk). All in all, the strongest differences brought out by these variables are those between the lands that joined the USSR after World War II and those that were part of Soviet Ukraine from its inception. Once other factors are controlled, there is no evident tendency for historical cultural differences to distinguish the Right Bank from the Left Bank nor, in most cases, from the formerly Ottoman lands of the south. In addition to the basic west-east divide, there were also regional variations within Dnieper Ukraine. But there is little support for the theory that these variations account for subsequent patterns in voting behaviour once other factors are taken into consideration. It is only the distinctiveness of electoral

behaviour in western Ukraine that can with any confidence be traced to historical experience.

Yet historical factors manifestly cannot account for all of the effects of region on political orientation, as demonstrated by the strong significance of the regional-level economic variables. The impact of these indicators varies considerably from party to party, as does the range of variables that reach significance. Rukh has an impressive showing in agricultural areas (though employment in agriculture at the individual level does not have a significant impact on attitudes toward the party) and also in those areas that are most affluent. It is noteworthy that regional variables of both types are the strongest of all determinants of Rukh support; only the cultural variables of ethnicity and religion exert a significant impact at the individual level. It seems that local economic conditions and local political culture are proportionally more important in determining attitudes toward this party than toward others. This makes sense if we consider that Rukh is, of all Ukrainian parties, the most rooted in independent civil society.

The models for NDP support suggest that the adherents of the 'party of power' tend to be located disproportionately in industrial areas. Other than that, the ecological economic variables have little impact. Individual-level economic factors such as private sector employment and income are more important in influencing attitudes toward the NDP than circumambient conditions. If Rukh is the party of affluent regions, the NDP is the party of affluent individuals.

As we might expect, the reverse pattern is evident in support for the parties of the left. Given its dual identity, the SPU-RPU bloc is able to compete both with Rukh in agricultural regions and with the NDP in more industrial *oblasti*. But in contrast to the right, the SPU-RPU finds most favour in areas of relative economic deprivation. The Communists are also strong in the farmlands, once other factors are controlled, and in areas that are least advantaged economically. Interestingly, we find that they have greatest strength in *oblasti* that have the largest number of private enterprises. This is evidently not due to support for the private sector among CPU adherents, as indicated by the negative coefficient in this model for private sector employment at the individual level. It is likely that Communist supporters are those who are disillusioned by the effects of private sector development, such as growing wage differentials (from which they suffer disproportionately, having lower-than-average income levels), and perhaps the widely perceived link between the private sector and criminal or corrupt activity.³⁵

Having examined the effects of regional variables independently, it is worthwhile devoting some attention to the relations among them. In about half the cases the variables used to denote historical regions increase in magnitude and significance when their economic counterparts are added to the equations. This is convincing evidence that not only do historical and contemporary economic factors exert independent effects but their influences are often at odds and need to be separated. Moreover, it indicates that controlling for historical region alone sometimes gives a false picture of the nature of political attitudes. For example, when historical variables alone are entered into the model for Socialist-Rural support, it appears that the formerly-Ottoman south of Ukraine is a haven for opposition to the bloc, yet this variable is no longer significant when the regional economic indicators are added to

the equation. It also appears that the well-known tendency of voters in the Left Bank of Ukraine to support the Communists and shun the parties of the right is more a matter of individual-level attributes and the prevailing economic conditions in those regions than historical cultural factors.

The overall picture painted by these figures is one of patterns of party support that are heavily dependent on regional variations in both political culture and economic conditions. Once local economic conditions are controlled for, the effects of historical region are relatively slight for the left-wing parties. For the right, on the other hand, more of the variation in support is determined by the historical variables than by their economic counterparts. The answer to the central research question posed in this study is thus ambiguous: both types of regional effect have strong influences on party preferences, but which influence is strongest depends on the party. For the parties of the left, local economic conditions are more important, whereas historical factors play the greatest role in determining right-wing support.

Conclusions

Multivariate analysis of political values and voting behaviour demonstrates beyond a doubt that the 'regional effect' in Ukraine is not simply the consequence of other factors having regional dimensions. True, more ethnic Russians live in eastern Ukraine than in the west of the country, and true more people are employed in heavy industry in the east, but region exerts an independent impact on political beliefs even when factors such as ethnicity and occupational sector are controlled for. This does not in and of itself explain the significance of the regional effect in Ukrainian politics, however. As political geographers are keen to stress, place matters in politics, but it matters in different ways, depending on the historical, physical and socio-cultural context. This investigation has gone some way towards illuminating the import of this 'regional effect' in the Ukrainian context.

If the analysis presented here reveals few surprises in terms of the direction of the influence of individual variables, it sheds considerable light on their combined impact and the relations among them. Firstly, historical factors clearly have a role to play, especially as regards the former Habsburg lands, and there can be no doubt that cultural differences exert influences above and beyond those of individual-level factors and variations in regional economic conditions. But economic conditions were found to be more important than historical factors on the left of the political spectrum and, given that the left commands the greatest share of the vote (the combined party list vote share of the Communist Party and the Socialist-Rural bloc was 33.2% as opposed to only 14.4% for Rukh and the NDP together), economic context is likely to have a greater effect on political outcomes in Ukraine than historical variables.

Secondly, historical influences and local economic conditions work in different ways; in political science terminology, they are cross-cutting rather than reinforcing cleavages. The fact that regional economic affluence predicts right-wing support is revealing, as it is the west of the country, which is less well off in economic terms, that is generally thought of as being the most right-wing. Clearly, regional economic conditions have an impact that counter-balances those of historical and individual-level factors. This finding points to the need to take account of the multiple contexts

that are relevant in Ukrainian politics and to specify clearly what regional differences in political outlook signify. Only then can we appreciate what they have to tell us about the complex set of forces that structure political beliefs.

University of Essex

Research for this article was partly funded by a generous grant from the ESRC (number R000222380). I am grateful to Andrew Wilson and to Ivor Crewe for valuable comments on earlier versions of the text.

¹ For overviews of the literature on this topic from political science and political geography perspectives respectively see Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, 'Citizens, Contexts, and Politics', in Ada W. Finifter (ed.), *The State of the Discipline II* (Washington, DC, American Political Science Association, 1993), pp. 281–302; and John Agnew, 'Mapping Politics: How Context Counts in Electoral Geography', *Political Geography*, 1, 2, 1996, pp. 129–146.

² Vicki L. Hesli & Joel D. Barkan, 'The Centre-Periphery Debate: Pressures for Devolution within the Republics', in Arthur Miller, William M. Reisinger & Vicki Hesli (eds), *Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies* (Boulder, CO, Westview, 1993), pp. 124–152; Vicki L. Hesli, 'Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 1, 1995, pp. 91–121; Lowell Barrington, 'The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine', *Post-Soviet Geography*, 38, 10, 1997, pp. 601–614; Sarah Birch, 'Party System Formation and Voting Behaviour in the Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of 1994', in Taras Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation* (London and New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 139–160; Andrew Wilson & Sarah Birch, 'Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51, 6, 1999, pp. 1039–1068.

³ Taras Kuzio & Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (London, Macmillan, 1994), pp. 31–32; Ian Bremmer, 'The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 46, 2, 1994, pp. 261–283; Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 117–146, 163–168; Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr & Edward Allworth, *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 6. For explanations of regional variations based on ethno-linguistic differences, see also Dominique Arel & Valeri Khmel'ko, 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', *The Harriman Review*, 9, 1–2, 1996, pp. 81–91; and Valeri Khmel'ko with Andrew Wilson, 'The Political Orientations of Different Regions and Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Ukraine since Independence', in Taras Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation* (London and New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 60–80.

⁴ See, for example, Thad Brown, 'On Contextual Change in Partisan Attitudes', *British Journal of Political Science*, 11, 1981, pp. 427–448; R. J. Johnston, C. J. Pattie & J. G. Allsopp, *A Nation Dividing? The Electoral Map of Great Britain 1979–1987* (London: Longman, 1998), chapter 2; David R. Segal & Marshall W. Meyer, 'The Social Context of Political Partisanship', in Mattei Dogan & Stein Rokkan (eds), *Social Ecology* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1974), pp. 217–232.

⁵ Peter R. Craumer & James I. Clem, 'Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 40, 1, 1999, pp. 1–26; Hesli, 'Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine'.

⁶ For example, Sven Holdar, 'Torn Between East and West: The Regional Factor in Ukrainian Politics', *Post-Soviet Geography*, 36, 2, 1995, pp. 112–132; Barrington, 'The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine'; William L. Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Post-Communist Europe* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998), pp. 276–279; William Zimmerman, 'Is Ukraine a Political Community?', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 31, 1, 1998, pp. 43–55; Melvin J. Hinich, Valeri Khmel'ko & Peter C. Ordeshook, 'Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections: A Spatial Analysis', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 15, 2, 1999, pp. 149–185.

⁷ Stephen Shulman, 'Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity', *Political Geography*, 18, 1999, pp. 913–939.

⁸ Volodymyr Kubijovych, 'The Size and Structure of the Population', in Volodymyr Kubijovych (ed.), *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 168–179.

⁹ See also Shulman, 'Asymmetrical International Integration'.

¹⁰ Stella Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1880–1900* (Edmonton; Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991); Jean-Paul Himka, 'Voluntary

Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (the 1870s)', in Andrei S. Markovits & Frank E. Sysyn (eds), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982).

¹¹ M. Stachiw & J. Szendera, *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History 1918–1923*, vol. 1 (New York, Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1969), pp. 62–66; Piotr S. Wandycz, 'The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy', in Markovits & Sysyn (eds), *Nation-Building and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austria Galicia*; Theodore Bohdan Ciuciura, 'Galicia and Bukovyna as Austrian Crown Provinces: The Ukrainian Experience of Representative Institutions 1861–1918', *Studia Ucrainica*, 2, 1984, p. 177; Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto, Buffalo and London, University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 332; Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise*, pp. 197–198.

¹² This is a multi-party system in which the alternation of parties in power is orchestrated from above, and voter support is manufactured through coercive means (Mattei Dogan, 'Romania, 1919–1938', in Myron Weiner & Regun Ozbudun (eds), *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Chapel Hill, Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 369–389).

¹³ Volodymyn Kubijovyc (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1984), p. 808; Paul Robert Magocsi *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848–1948* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 202–233.

¹⁴ A. Stefan, 'Ukraine Between the Two World Wars: Transcarpathia (Carpatho-Ukraine)', in Kubijovych (ed.), *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, p. 854.

¹⁵ The Sel'rob movement was subsequently discredited, however, by cultural repression, collectivisation and famine in Soviet Ukraine (O. Yu. Zaitsev, 'Predstavnyky ukrains'kykh politychnykh partiï zakhidnoi Ukraïny v parlamenti Pol'shchi (1922–1939 rr.)', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1993, 1, pp. 72–84; Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*, p. 45).

¹⁶ The second Duma elections were least corrupt and had the highest rate of party participation; unfortunately detailed data on the results are not available. Though most leftist parties boycotted the first Duma elections, they make a better object of analysis than the third and fourth elections, in which the strongly weighted franchise, accompanied by extensive coercion, make the results next to useless for an evaluation of the electoral preferences of the majority of voters. See Ian Thatcher, 'Elections in Russian and Early Soviet History', in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and the Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly* (Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 15–35.

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion of these ideological classifications see Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1983).

¹⁸ For a detailed account of the electoral process see Oliver H. Radkey, *Russia Goes to the Polls: The Election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, 1917* (Ithaca, New York and London, Cornell University Press, 1990).

¹⁹ It must also be borne in mind that the data on which the above analysis of the first Duma elections is based do not reflect vote share but the proportion of elected representatives in each category, and we would expect the process of vote aggregation to magnify regional variations somewhat.

²⁰ Pidhainy attributes the high Bolshevik vote in Volhynia to the presence there of large numbers of 'demobilised and demoralised' soldiers (Oleh Semenovych Pidhainy, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic*, vol. 1 (Toronto and New York, New Review, 1966), p. 229), but other evidence suggests that soldiers were among the most fervent supporters of the UPSR. See Steven L. Guthrie, 'The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917', *Slavic Review*, 38, 1, 1979, p. 42.

²¹ See Appendix 1 for *oblast'* by *oblast'* details of the differences described in this paragraph.

²² Karl W. Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', *American Political Science Review*, 55, 3, 1961, p. 495.

²³ For more detailed analyses of the Soviet-era industrial structure of Ukraine see F.D. Zastavnyi, *Heohrafiya Ukraïny* (L'viv, Svit, 1994); and O.I. Shabliya (ed.), *Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskaya Geografiya Ukrainy* (L'viv, Svit, 1995).

²⁴ See, for example, Volodimir N. Bandera, 'Income Transfers and Macroeconomic Accountability from the Standpoint of Ukraine', in I.S. Koropec'kyj (ed.), *The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, Challenges* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992); V. N. Bandera, 'External and Intraunion Trade and Capital Transfers', in I. S. Koropec'kyj (ed.), *The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet* (New York and London, Praeger, 1977), pp. 235–267; James W. Gillula, 'Input-Output Analysis', in Koropec'kyj (ed.), *The Ukraine within the USSR*, pp. 193–234; I. S. Koropec'kyj, *Developments in the Shadow: Studies in Ukrainian Economics* (Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1990); Z. Lew Melnyk, 'Regional Contribution to Capital Formation in the USSR: The Case of the Ukrainian Republic', in V. N. Bandera & Z. L. Melnyk

(eds), *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective* (New York, Washington and London, Praeger, 1973), pp. 104–131; Z. Lew Melnyk, 'The Economic Price of Being a Soviet Republic: The Case of Ukraine', in Walter Dushnyk (ed.), *Ukraine in a Changing World: Papers Presented at the Conference Dedicated to the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the Ukrainian Quarterly* (New York, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1977), pp. 153–172.

²⁵ Ustina Markus, 'Debt and Desperation', *Transition*, 1, 5, 1995, pp. 14–19; Oles M. Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 1, 1995, pp. 67–90.

²⁶ See Andreas Wittowsky, 'Western Privatization Assistance Brings Mixed Results', *Transition*, 2, 22, 1996, pp. 26–29, 64; Raphael Sten, *Ukraine's Economic Recovery* (Westport, CT and London, Praeger, 1996), chapter 7; Paul Hare, Mohammed Ishaq & Saul Estrin, 'Ukraine: The Legacies of Central Planning and the Transition to a Market Economy', in Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of the Post-Soviet Transition*, pp. 181–200.

²⁷ See also M. Chumachenko, 'Problemy rehionalnoho samovryaduvannya v Ukraïni', *Ekonomika Ukraïni*, 1993, 6; Grigori Nemiria, 'L'Etat et les régions', *L'Autre Europe*, 30–31, 1995, pp. 165–177.

²⁸ Andrew Wilson, 'The Growing Challenge to Kiev from the Donbas', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, 33, 1993, pp. 8–13; Monika Jung, 'The Donbas Factor in the Ukrainian Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 12, 1994, pp. 51–52.

²⁹ Sarah Birch & Ihor Zin'ko, 'The Dilemma of Regionalism', *Transition*, 2, 22, 1996, pp. 22–25, 64; Andrew Wilson & Igor Burakowsky, *The Ukrainian Economy Under Kuchma* (London, Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1996).

³⁰ See Chrystyna Lapychak, 'Crackdown on Crimean Separatism', *Transition* 1, 8, 1995, pp. 2–5; Tor Bukkvoll, 'A Fall from Grace for Crimean Separatists', *Transition*, 1, 21, 1995, pp. 46–49.

³¹ International Labour Office-Central and Eastern European Team, *The Ukrainian Challenge: Reforming Labour Market and Social Policy* (Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 55–59.

³² See note 2. Ethnic group has been used instead of language in this analysis because language, although closely related to political identification, has been shown to be an intervening variable that is itself largely an effect of other variables such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, region of residence and education level (Wilson & Birch, 'Voting Stability, Political Gridlock').

³³ Gender and class-related variables were not found to have significant effects on party support once the other economic variables were controlled for. They were thus not included in the final equations presented here.

³⁴ For fuller details of the positions of these parties at the time of the 1998 elections see Nadia Diuk, 'Ukraine: A Land In Between', *Journal of Democracy*, 9, 3, 1998, pp. 97–126; Serhiy Tolstov, 'Elections 1998 in Ukraine: Expectations and Results', *Ukrainian Review*, 45, 2, 1998, pp. 3–23; Hinich *et al.*, 'Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections'; Wilson & Birch, 'Voting Stability, Political Gridlock.'

³⁵ It is intriguing to note that once income is taken into account, individual-level unemployment is associated with support for the reformist centre rather than the conservative left. This may well be due to the fact that many of those officially unemployed have lucrative income from unofficial work. Clearly unemployment does not have the relationship with left-wing support predicted by many commentators.

³⁶ For a discussion and justification of this measure see Wilson & Birch, 'Voting Stability, Political Gridlock', Appendix 1.

Appendix 1: Selected Social Statistics, Late Soviet Period

	Ethnic Ukrainian	Ethnic Russian	Urban	Higher education	Worker	Employee	Collective farmer ^a	Average annual per capita capital investment 1976-87 ^b	Average monthly wage in 1990, rubles ^c			
									workers and employees	collective farmers	workers and employees	
<i>West and Centre-North</i>												
Vinnitsya	91.5%	5.9%	43.9%	7.0%	44.0%	21.7%	34.1%	314	222	(62)	199	(112)
Volyn'	94.6	4.4	48.6	7.4	46.5	21.0	32.4	353	221	(59)	192	(159)
Zhytomyr	84.9	7.9	52.9	6.9	49.7	22.6	27.5	315	227	(66)	189	(128)
Zakarpattia	78.4	4.0	40.6	7.2	59.4	19.5	16.2	294	223	(57)	207	(120)
Ivano-Frankivs'k	95.0	4.0	41.7	8.3	53.5	21.5	24.5	371	227	(68)	239	(109)
Kiev (city)	72.5	20.9	100.0	24.5	49.9	49.3	00.7	550	248	(50)	239	(121)
Kiev (oblast')	89.4	8.7	53.3	8.3	57.2	23.5	19.1	589	280	(90)	239	(121)
Kirovohrad	85.3	11.7	59.5	7.9	47.1	23.3	29.5	477	240	(60)	235	(87)
L'viv	90.4	7.2	59.1	11.1	56.1	26.9	16.8	378	234	(58)	191	(127)
Poltava	87.9	10.2	56.1	8.4	48.7	23.7	27.5	505	243	(61)	235	(96)
Rivne	93.3	4.6	45.2	7.5	50.0	20.4	29.5	418	221	(59)	191	(133)
Sumy	85.5	13.3	61.5	8.0	51.4	23.3	24.9	487	237	(65)	217	(103)
Ternopil'	96.8	2.3	40.5	7.4	38.7	19.7	41.3	311	218	(61)	200	(133)
Khmel'nyts'kyi	90.4	5.8	47.1	7.1	41.8	22.0	36.0	355	227	(64)	179	(108)
Cherkasy	90.5	8.0	52.5	8.1	46.1	23.1	30.7	412	238	(66)	223	(99)
Chernivtsi	70.8	6.8	41.9	7.6	48.5	20.6	30.6	263	221	(64)	197	(119)
Chernihiv	91.5	6.8	53.1	7.4	44.1	22.0	33.7	367	221	(58)	197	(114)
<i>East and South</i>												
Crimea	25.8	67.0	69.3	12.7	57.5	33.1	9.3	493	250	(62)	278	(87)
Dnipropetrovs'k	71.6	24.2	83.2	11.5	62.0	28.1	9.8	545	255	(56)	249	(101)
Donets'k	50.7	43.6	90.2	9.6	70.0	25.0	4.9	462	268	(54)	293	(129)
Zaporizhzhya	63.1	32.0	75.6	10.7	59.0	27.4	13.4	540	257	(61)	280	(124)
Luhans'k	51.9	44.8	86.3	9.0	70.5	23.7	5.7	471	262	(53)	271	(122)
Mykolaitv	75.6	19.4	65.5	10.0	56.1	26.7	17.0	549	250	(66)	249	(106)
Odesa	54.6	27.4	65.7	13.3	50.0	30.7	19.2	488	242	(56)	219	(101)
Kharkiv	62.8	33.2	78.4	14.4	58.3	32.2	9.4	471	255	(60)	255	(109)
Kherson	75.7	20.2	61.1	9.0	59.0	26.0	14.8	508	241	(61)	251	(90)
<i>All Ukraine</i>	72.7%	22.1%	66.7%	10.4%	55.4%	26.5%	17.8%	452	247	(59)	220	(87)

^aPercentages for the three main occupational categories do not sum to 100 as they exclude the small portion of the workforce which listed other sources of income or neglected to answer this question.

^bThis and subsequent per capita figures are in rubles.

^cFigures in brackets are percentage increases between 1980 and 1990.

Sources: Gosudarstvennyi Komitet SSSR po Statistike, *Itoqi vnesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda*, microfiche version (Minneapolis, East View, 1992), Vol I: Table 4, Vol. II: Table 5, Vol. VI: Table 2, Vol. IX: Table 3; *Narodnoe khozyaistvo Ukrainской SSR v 1987 godu* (Kiev, Tekhnika, 1988), pp. 195, 230.

Appendix 2: Economic Data, 1998

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<i>West and Centre-North</i>								
Vinnitsya	2.7	128.0	85.38	92.90	184.45	999.40	0.88	1.28
Volyn'	5.0	123.2	105.91	84.10	73.51	739.77	1.20	1.07
Zhytomyr	4.4	130.1	98.35	94.60	144.26	749.43	0.98	0.75
Zakarpattia	3.7	110.4	34.54	98.10	50.77	462.66	0.94	1.25
Ivano-Frankivs'k	5.5	131.6	79.12	87.20	242.83	543.18	1.20	1.67
Kyïv city	0.5	242.3	n/a	102.20	312.44	0.00	1.50	4.84
Kyïv oblast'	4.0	171.3	n/a	96.60	251.82	895.92	0.99	1.36
Kirovohrad	3.8	134.6	128.40	97.70	103.61	862.41	1.09	1.17
L'viv	4.6	137.5	84.46	88.20	187.51	447.51	2.03	1.65
Poltava	3.3	163.4	95.59	98.60	530.59	856.99	0.87	1.48
Rivne	3.7	132.9	107.11	88.80	238.80	680.25	1.08	1.66
Sumy	3.8	141.2	108.48	90.60	353.48	745.36	1.08	1.10
Ternopil'	4.2	123.5	99.11	80.80	84.47	808.80	1.24	1.29
Khmel'nyts'kyi	2.9	127.4	103.12	82.80	160.60	872.99	1.06	1.23
Cherkasy	2.9	132.3	93.46	97.00	178.33	900.11	0.86	1.10
Chernivtsi	2.4	118.1	82.47	87.40	76.61	609.48	1.32	1.18
Chernihiv	5.0	136.7	103.38	99.80	191.73	919.98	0.75	0.92
<i>East and South</i>								
Crimea	2.1	148.8	78.59	121.70	123.95	393.35	0.91	3.02
Dnipropetrovs'k	2.1	201.4	149.18	109.30	765.56	419.56	1.14	2.27
Donets'k	2.2	205.3	155.02	104.10	673.88	263.01	1.24	2.69
Zaporizhzhya	2.2	188.8	108.45	110.30	756.96	502.33	1.06	2.02
Luhans'k	2.1	171.2	181.61	108.50	417.86	306.31	0.90	2.19
Mykolaïv	2.8	154.9	102.61	96.30	331.87	650.28	1.19	2.19
Odesa	0.6	166.6	59.03	116.10	134.12	595.81	1.07	1.17
Kharkiv	2.4	162.9	102.30	95.50	367.21	511.51	0.96	2.74
Kherson	1.8	131.8	103.79	97.20	95.93	817.29	0.86	1.88
All Ukraine	2.8	165.8	105.55	64.68	339.88	562.79	1.12	1.97

Key:

1. Registered unemployment rate, 1 April 1998 (%).
2. Average nominal monthly wage, March 1998 (Hrn).
3. Per capita wage arrears, 1 March 1998 (Hrn).
4. Average cost of a basket of food (22 principal items), April 1998 (Hrn).
5. Per capita industrial output, January–March 1998, current prices (Hrn).
6. Per capita agricultural output in 1997 (1996 Hrn).
7. Number of privatised enterprises per thousand population, 1 January 1998.
8. Number of small and medium size enterprises per thousand population, 1 July 1997.

Source: Calculated from *Ukrainian Economic Trends*, Quarterly Report, March 1998, Tables 2.1–2.4.

Appendix 3: Definition of Individual-Level Socio-Demographic Variables

Age was defined in numbers of years. *Gender* was entered in the equations as a dummy variable, with 1 = female and 0 = male. *Education* was measured on a six-point scale, where 1 = less than 4 years, 2 = 4–6 years, 3 = 7–9 years or 7–8 years plus vocational training, 4 = 10–11 years, 5 = 10–11 years plus vocational training and 6 = higher (at least 3 years). *Ethnicity* was measured on a five-point scale, where 1 = 'Ukrainian only', 2 = 'more Ukrainian than Russian', 3 = 'equally Ukrainian and Russian', 4 = 'more Russian than Ukrainian' and 5 = 'Russian only'.³⁶ *Ukrainian Catholic Church*: Declared adherence to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. *Settlement size* was conceptualised as a measure of 'urbanness', with 1 = village, 2 = town ('settlement of an urban type' in Soviet parlance), 3 = city of less than

200 000 inhabitants, 4 = city of between 200 000 and 500 000 and 5 = city of more than 500 000. *Economic variables:* Employment status, production sector of employment and budgetary sector (private vs public) were entered into the equations as dummy variables. Income was measured in terms of per month household income (hryvnya) from all formal and informal sources. It was adjusted for size of household before being entered into the equations.

Appendix 4: The Survey

The survey was carried out by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology under the supervision of Professor Valerii Khmel'ko and Ihor Yaroshenko. Interviewing was conducted in 25 constituencies selected through stratified random sampling.

CONSTITUENCIES SAMPLED

<i>Number</i>	<i>Administrative centre</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Administrative centre</i>
10	Simferopil'	112	Stanychno-Luhans'ke
20	Luts'k	135	Odesa
24	Dnipropetrovs'k	138	Bilyaivka
30	Dniprodzerzhyns'k	150	Karlivka
34	Zhovti Vody	173	Kharkiv
43	Donets'k	192	Kam'yanets'-Podil's'kyi
46	Artemivs'k	194	Starokostyanytniv
58	Slov'yans'k	202	Chernivtsi
65	Berdychiv	207	Chernihiv
83	Polohy	218	Kiev city
89	Nadvirna	222	Kiev city
92	Myronivka	225	Sevastopil'
101	Znam'yanka		

The survey employed a multi-stage clustered probability sample design. The population sampled consisted of adults 18 years or older on 29 March 1998 (the day of the elections). The primary sampling units were the 25 constituencies listed above. Within each constituency, postal catchment areas were selected, and within these, blocs of contiguous addresses. Respondents were selected within these blocs by the random route method (approximately 10 per postal catchment area). Within each constituency 82 respondents were selected, for a total sample size of 2050. No substitutions were allowed.

The questionnaires were translated into Russian and Ukrainian, and the translations checked by the project researchers. Both questionnaires were pre-tested between 17 and 27 February. Interviewing took place between 14 and 28 March. The vast majority—83.3% of the interviews—were conducted in the six-day period between 17 and 22 March. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. Respondents were interviewed in their homes. The average length of the interviews was 50.1 minutes. All interviewers were fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian. The choice of language of interview was made by the respondent. The response rate was 1742 or 84.98%. The data were weighted to compensate for under-representation of the western region in the achieved sample.

Further details of the survey design and execution are available from the author upon request.