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Electoral Behaviour in Western Ukraine in National Elections and Referendums, 1989–91

SARAH BIRCH

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT of democratic institutions, the factors which condition citizens' participation in elections and referendums are of major interest. While there has been debate as to the social and political processes that led to the establishment of Ukrainian independence in December 1991,¹ there has been little effort as yet to consider how the choices made by the Ukrainian electorate at this time represent the beginning of a pattern of electoral cleavage in the new country.² At the time of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 a number of large-scale electoral surveys were carried out,³ but because this was not the case for earlier elections, there has so far been little concrete evidence on the structure of the electorate and the development of electoral behaviour during the late Soviet period.

As a first step in this direction, the investigation which follows will be concerned to chart the social determinants of electoral behaviour in Western Ukraine in national elections and referendums between 1989 and 1991. Throughout the *perestroika* period, Western Ukraine's regional centre L'viv was, outside Kiev, the main base of democratically minded nationalist groups who saw independence as the way to political reform and economic recovery. Because the region was the most politically mobilised part of the country at that time, electoral cleavages here were particularly well defined. The analysis of electoral behaviour in Western Ukraine thus represents a valuable case study of the development of political allegiances during the crucial initial phase of electoral liberalisation.

Historical background

Unlike Eastern Ukraine, which had for centuries been part of the Russian Empire, the territory of what is now Western Ukraine was annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II. The area is made up of four culturally and historically distinct regions: Galicia, Bukovyna, Volhynia and Transcarpathia.⁴ Of these, Volhynia in the north-west is the only one to have been part of the Russian Empire, though it was under Polish rule during the inter-war period. Galicia, south of Volhynia, and the much smaller Bukovyna to the south-east of Galicia, are the eastern and northern fragments of those respective provinces in the Austrian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Galicia was also transferred to Poland as a result of the Treaty of Paris, while

Bukovyna was bequeathed to Romania. The city of L'viv (Habsburg Lemberg) was a major cultural centre and focal point in the rise of Ukrainian nationalism which occurred in Western Ukraine in the latter part of the 19th century. Transcarpathia, formerly part of Hungary, was incorporated into Czechoslovakia after World War I, was under Hungary for the duration of World War II, and was finally joined to the Soviet Ukraine in 1944.

Western Ukraine currently has a population of some 10 million people, and comprises seven *oblasti*. Volhynia, divided into the *oblasti* of Volyn' and Rivne, is the most agricultural area. The Galician *oblasti* of L'viv, Ternopil' and Ivano-Frankiv'sk are more industrially varied, with a significant amount of manufacturing in L'viv, a concentration of agriculture in Ternopil', and in mountainous Ivano-Frankiv'sk the extraction of oil, coal and gas. With large sections also located in the Carpathians, Zakarpattya (Transcarpathia) and Chernivtsi (Bukovyna) have significant coal mining industries; they are also sources of agricultural products. Despite the Soviet efforts at assimilation, Western Ukraine remains culturally distinct: L'viv is the only major city in Ukraine in which Ukrainian is the dominant language.⁵ Its ethnic recalcitrance earned Galicia a reputation within the Soviet Union for being a 'hotbed of nationalism', and having been subordinated to the Soviet Union for only 45 years, its inhabitants have retained a keener appreciation for the institutions of democratic government.

The region is distinguished from the rest of Ukraine by the fact of having had a significantly longer history of enfranchisement. Electoral participation at the national level in the Russian Empire was confined to the four indirect Duma elections which took place during the brief period between 1905 and 1917,⁶ whereas from 1873 the local populations of Galicia and Bukovyna elected representatives directly to provincial Diets and the Austrian Reichsrat, while those in Transcarpathia participated in elections to the Hungarian parliament. There were also elections to the Diet of the short-lived Western Ukrainian National Republic in 1918, and during the interwar period residents of all parts of Western Ukraine participated in elections held by their respective governments (though the electoral process was in places marred by violence and electoral fraud, by malapportionment, or by the limitation of choice).⁷ What is significant about these experiences of democratic institutions is that they were taken seriously enough in what was to become Western Ukraine for electoral reform to be a hotly debated topic and fraud often to precipitate a violent response on the part of electors.

These considerations perhaps provide one of the clues to the growing political significance of Western Ukraine in the period during which competitive elections were introduced to the Soviet Union. The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 were the first in recent Soviet history to offer the whole electorate any degree of choice.⁸ The difficulties encountered by many potential candidates in securing nomination prompted the nascent opposition to find more effective means of organisation. In late 1989 an umbrella organisation called the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika (Rukh) was formed by a number of the members of the Ukrainian Writers' Union to coordinate the activities of informal protest organisations around the country. Kiev and L'viv were, and continue to be, Rukh's main bases of support. The elections to the Ukrainian parliament (*Verkhovna Rada*) in 1990 were

the first in which an organised opposition was allowed to field candidates (though Rukh itself was prevented from taking part and had to act through a surrogate coalition). The newly elected parliament declared Ukraine's state sovereignty that July, and the declaration was supported by the people in a referendum on the status of Ukraine timed to coincide with the poll on the future of the Soviet Union held in March 1991. In the three western *oblasti* of Galicia, a third question, seeking support for outright independence, won approval by an overwhelming majority of voters. The abortive putsch in Moscow in August 1991 so graphically demonstrated the dangers of remaining within a crumbling Soviet Union that even most hard-line communists voted in favour of a break with the centre when the Ukrainian parliament declared independence on 24 August. This near-unanimity of the political forces in the country led to a 90% popular vote in favour of this declaration the following December. The referendum coincided with Ukraine's first presidential election, in which Leonid Kravchuk was elected president on 62% of the vote.

The series of elections and referendums which punctuated the path to independence at yearly intervals from 1989 to 1991 were testing grounds for the emergent opposition groups, the bulk of whose electoral support was in the West. These contests represented both a means whereby such organisations could demonstrate their powers of mobilisation, and arenas in which they fought with the authorities to enhance their official status. At the same time these polls were windows into the minds of a populace whose views and desires had never before been so objectively recorded. They served to define and to express popular opinion in a way that was to have significant consequences for the future development of Ukrainian politics.

The emergence of electorally relevant cleavages in Western Ukraine

A number of attempts have recently been made to predict the form social cleavages will take in the post-communist world, many of them drawing on Lipset & Rokkan's seminal work on social cleavages in Western democracies.⁹ The time frame of the present analysis does not permit such theories to be tested, but it is nevertheless possible to predict on the basis of Lipset & Rokkan's analysis that relevant cleavages will be of two types: pre-Soviet and Soviet-era divides. Pre-Soviet cleavages can be expected to be stronger in Western Ukraine than in the rest of the country, as the period of communist rule there was shorter, and social cleavages had already taken on a specifically electoral character prior to Soviet take-over. It is reasonable to suppose that the principal components of such cleavages are likely to be ethnicity, geography and economic interest.

Throughout much of its history, the majority of what is now Western Ukraine was structured by the tripartite distinction between rural Uniate Ukrainian peasants, urban Jewish merchants and Catholic Poles—be they landlords, peasants or urban dwellers. With Jews and Poles now almost all either gone from the region or assimilated into one of the present-day dominant cultures, the Ukrainians who remain are the representatives of a third of each of the traditional cleavages (ethnic, religious, geographical and occupational). Soviet social and economic programmes have further altered the demographic situation, such that the main contemporary ethnic divide is that between Ukrainians and Russians.

Of all those which structured the pre-Soviet past, the rural/urban cleavage is probably the one which has been best preserved. The rural parts of Western Ukraine are those least changed by the advent of industrialisation, and as such they are the regions which have been least affected by 50 years of communist rule. Many of their residents are elderly, so they remember the time before the Soviet annexation. Rural regions also tend to be the most ethnically homogeneous, with few Russians living outside cities and towns, and minorities clustered in clumps. The influence of historical traditions can thus be expected to be especially strong in the country, magnifying the patterns observed in the more cosmopolitan and more culturally diverse cities. The cities are, on the other hand, centres of political activity, and one would expect any trend in electoral behaviour to manifest itself first in those places where ideas are first articulated and disseminated.

Like the urban/rural divide, the historico-regional cleavage is composed of both cultural and geographical factors. Galicia is well known as a centre of nationalist activity, whereas the fact that Volhynia was for more than a century part of the Russian Empire may mean that its residents were not as sanguine about the prospect of independence. If a democratic, independent Ukraine means closer ties with her southern and western neighbours, the residents of Bukovyna and Transcarpathia could be anticipated to welcome it. If, on the other hand, they fear that nationalism might turn to xenophobia, the large numbers of Hungarians, Romanians, Moldovans and Gypsies in these regions would have cause for alarm. The lack of strong historical links between these two regions and the rest of Ukraine is also a basis for supposing that their enthusiasm for an independent Ukraine might be somewhat less ardent than that of those to the north.

A fourth relevant cleavage is religion, which also has both an ethnic and a geographical dimension in Western Ukraine. Among non-Ukrainians, religion and ethnic group largely coincide. Within the ethnic Ukrainian population, however, there is a distinction between the Uniates (Greek Catholics) who had traditionally lived in Galicia and Transcarpathia, and the Orthodox inhabitants of Volhynia and Bukovyna. The ethnic Ukrainians who migrated from Eastern Ukraine during Soviet rule would also have come from an Orthodox (or Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox) background. Within the Ukrainian community, the traditional religious denomination of one's family is thus in part an indicator of geographical origin, though many Uniates switched to Orthodoxy in 1946 when their church was banned, and remained Orthodox (Russian, Ukrainian or Autocephalous) even after the Uniate Church was re-legalised in 1989–90.

That economic interest should be a salient electoral cleavage would appear to be plain. The question which needs to be answered is where Western Ukrainians perceive their economic interests to lie. If, following Kitschelt,¹⁰ we hold economic interest in Eastern Europe to be defined by one's relevant skill level, then we should expect to see occupation and education playing an important role in people's attitudes toward change. But in Ukraine, class distinctions are compounded by ethnic distinctions. The issue which dominated the politics of the 1989–91 period was the status of Ukraine as a political entity, which was perceived as being inseparable from the issue of economic reform. It can only be fully understood how the positions of voters

on these two issues could coincide if account is taken of the relationship in Soviet Ukraine between social structure and ethnicity.

In his influential work *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine*, Krawchenko elaborates a relative deprivation thesis according to which the rising tide of Ukrainian nationalism in the postwar period was the consequence of frustration felt on the part of aspiring ethnic Ukrainians, who often found themselves unable to advance above a certain point in the power structure. Ethnic Russians, on the other hand, occupied a disproportionate share of top-level posts, which accorded them an inordinate number of privileges. The desire for independence on the part of the ethnic Ukrainian élite is interpreted by Krawchenko as being underlain by a desire to improve their social and material positions.¹¹

At this point cultural and economic cleavages can largely be seen to coincide, but class can be expected to play a cross-cutting role. While virtually all people believed that Ukraine would be better off economically as an independent state, the ethnic Ukrainian elite would, according to Krawchenko's argument, believe they had the most to gain, and should thus be the most fervid supporters of independence. Ethnic Russians at all levels could be expected to regard with some trepidation the consequences of independence for them personally, regardless of the improvements it might bring to the country. This fear would be likely to be especially strong among those in higher positions. The ethnic cleavage could thus be expected to widen the further up one goes on the social scale, bearing in mind that there are more Russians further up the scale than there are Ukrainians. This means that the vast majority of Russians should be quite negatively disposed toward independence, whereas the majority of Ukrainians should, all other things equal, be less strongly in favour of it. We should, in other words, expect to see an interaction between occupational-educational status and intensity of feeling on the issue of independence.

Finally, Communist Party membership is an obvious factor which would dispose one to support the regime, as it provided access to resources not available to others. Party membership is best seen as an alternative indicator of socio-economic status.

As in the Central European countries analysed by Kitschelt, moves toward a market economy in Ukraine were initially associated with progressive drives for civil rights, environmental protection, and a drastic reduction in the coercive powers of the state. But in Ukraine all these issues were subsumed under the paramount concern about the political status of the country. Overlying and (temporarily) subsuming basic social cleavages was the ideological cleavage between those who supported Soviet rule and those opposed to it. For the reasons just outlined, ethnic Ukrainians in Galicia with a strong sense of the past should be those most keen to see an independent Ukraine, especially if their family (or their church) had suffered repression under the Soviet regime. Ethnic Russians with prestigious jobs and party membership could be expected to be the most supportive of continued Soviet power. Those in between are likely to be aligned somewhere along this spectrum.

Methodology

Given the lack of appropriate survey data for the elections in question, the method which has been chosen for the present study is aggregate-level analysis of electoral

results and *raion*-level data from the Soviet census of 1989.¹² Based on the foregoing discussion, age, level of urbanisation, ethnicity, class, Communist Party affiliation, religion and region are likely candidates for inclusion in the model. But the data used are necessarily limited by those available. Not surprisingly, questions about religion did not figure in the Soviet census, so no indicator for religious denomination or religiosity could be employed. Figures for Communist Party membership were not available at this level either. Estimators for the other four variables were obtained from the census data.

The construction of indicators for age and level of urbanisation was straightforward. The best age variable was found to be the percentage of retired people, though it must be borne in mind that because this is a highly feminised sector of the population, the variable may in part be an indicator of gender. Ethnicity could be estimated in two ways: by stated membership in an ethnic group, or by native language. It has been suggested that native language might be a better indicator of ethnicity in Ukraine than ethnic group,¹³ but ethnicity generally performed better in the models. Because of this, and because native language data were not available for two of the seven *oblasti* in question, the straight ethnic variable was employed throughout.

The class indicators were more problematic. Data on higher education were readily available, but educational attainment is not necessarily an ideal indicator of class; it is desirable to include occupational structure as well. Unfortunately, of all the *oblasti* in Western Ukraine, only L'viv compiled figures on occupational structure at the sub-*oblast'* level. Division of the population into source of income, which was available for Chernivtsi, did allow the number of collective farmers to be included for this *oblast'*, but only within L'viv was it possible to know the relative proportions of manual and non-manual labourers.

Given that class is one of the most significant determinants of electoral behaviour in the West, this gap in the data would seem to represent a serious drawback. There are two reasons, though, for believing that the problem is not as severe as it might appear. First, the effects of the class variables can be analysed within L'viv *oblast'*, which contains a relatively large number of cases in 1990 (16) and 1991 (25). This analysis demonstrates that the percentage of white-collar workers is not a good predictor of any of the electoral variables. Evidently this group was too heterogeneous to have well defined political characteristics during the period in question.¹⁴ The percentage of manual labourers and percentage of collective farmers variables perform better. Their effects will be analysed below; suffice it to say here that inclusion of these predictors in the equations does not significantly alter the effects of the other variables.

The second reason for believing that the exclusion of class variables from the analysis will not seriously undermine the value of the model is that the primary aim of the present analysis is to chart the beginning of electoral cleavages which can be expected to develop over time. The social structure of Ukraine is in such a state of flux at the moment that the class divisions of the Soviet period are likely to be of decreasing relevance. More relevant to a person's political outlook will be the viability of the sector of industry in which he or she is employed and the skills he

or she possesses, rather than the fact of having worked in a factory or a shop.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the ideological importance of the cult of working-class culture in the Soviet Union lends intrinsic interest to analysis of the electoral behaviour of this class, and it is unfortunate that more data for this variable are not available.

In addition to data from the census, two sets of dummy variables were constructed to account for region, one based on *oblast'* boundaries and one on historical regions: those formerly under Russian rule (mainly Volhynia, but also several constituencies in the northern part of Ternopil' *oblast'* and the eastern arm of Chernivtsi *oblast'*), Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia. In the principal models detailed in this analysis the regional variables out-performed the *oblast'* variables, and it is the former which were used, except where otherwise noted.

Electoral data were obtained either directly from *oblast'* administrations or from newspaper reports. These data are nearly complete; the only gap is data for the presidential election of 1991 in Rivne *oblast'*. The census data and the electoral data were not in all cases based on the same territorial units. In the 1989 election to the Congress of People's Deputies, the 26 territorial constituencies located in Western Ukraine were composed of between one and seven *raiony* each, with no constituencies crossing *raion* or city boundaries. The census data could be aggregated with little difficulty to fit these divisions. The division of mandates in the election was such that there were also eight national-territorial constituencies covering the same area. Given their small number, these were excluded from statistical analysis. Many of the 84 Western Ukrainian constituencies in the 1990 election crossed *raion* boundaries and could thus not be fitted to the census data. It was only possible to include about half of the constituencies in the model constructed for this election. For the referendums and the presidential election of 1991, the fit between the census data and the electoral data is nearly perfect; both sets of figures are divided into 121 territorial units, making this by far the largest set of cases.

The technique chosen to analyse the relationships between these variables is that of ecological regression, in which multivariate ordinary least squares regression based on aggregate-level data is used to estimate individual-level behaviour. This technique is commonly employed by electoral historians who have no access to individual-level data; it is also used by political scientists confronted with the same problem and by those who wish to study variables for which there are no individual-level correlates. The method does, however, have intrinsic problems which are worth discussing in some detail.

In 1950 Robinson showed that aggregate level correlation coefficients tended to exaggerate relations at the individual level, and he cautioned against what has been termed the 'ecological fallacy' of estimating effects at one level based on observed relations at another.¹⁶ It has since been demonstrated that the ecological fallacy can be avoided if certain steps are taken to ensure that aggregation bias does not result. Firstly, standardised statistics such as correlation coefficients and standardised regression coefficients should not be relied on as measures of covariation, as they systematically distort the individual-level relation between the dependent and independent variables.¹⁷ Secondly, aggregation bias can be avoided if the regression equation is properly specified.¹⁸

In the present case specification is a problem. As mentioned above, data are not available for the potentially relevant variables of religion and CPSU membership, and only a limited amount are available for class-related variables. It is also possible that important regional variables related to the local economy and local traditions have been omitted, as well as other variables which have not been considered at all. In cases where a model is not fully specified, aggregation bias can still be avoided, however, if the data are grouped according to categories of a variable included in the regression equation or a variable related to the error term, and not according to categories of the dependent variable or related variables.¹⁹ The demographic patterns evident in many Western countries, in which people with similar social characteristics tend to live together, often result in grouping according to variables related to that under analysis. In Ukraine, however, central economic planning distributed the population in such a way that this type of pattern is less prominent. Obviously, there are rural–urban differences between constituencies, but this variable is accounted for in the equation.

For these reasons, aggregation bias should not be a serious hindrance. The main problem will be that of interpretation, which afflicts any incompletely specified regression analysis: the estimated effect of one variable may mask the effect of another non-included variable with which it is correlated. One might think this especially likely in the case of occupational group, but in fact analysis of the data from L'viv *oblast'* reveals that the most significant occupation variable, proportion of manual labourers, is uncorrelated with any of the variables included in the general model. The proportion of collective farmers is correlated with the number of retired people and inversely correlated with the number of urban dwellers and the number of ethnic Russians. There are good theoretical reasons for believing that the most important aspect of these relationships is the urban/rural divide. Analysis of the urbanisation variable will thus have to take account of the possibility that what it indicates is in part a function of the proportion of collective farmers in each constituency. As far as religion and Communist Party membership are concerned, the most that can be done is to be alert to the possible effects of these variables when interpreting the results of the analysis.

Another type of misspecification is failure to include in the model interactions between the independent variables. For the theoretical reasons outlined above, we should expect there to be an interaction between ethnicity and education. Accordingly, terms were introduced into the model to account for these effects, and in some cases there was found to be a significant interaction between the percentage of ethnic Russians and the percentage with higher education.

In general the models adhere well to the assumptions of ordinary least squares regression. In many cases, however, the regression line tends to curve up at the high end, indicating a possible context effect which it was not possible to model with a data set of this size. The existence of context effects in Western countries has been well documented,²⁰ so we should not be surprised to find it in Ukraine, but it is slight enough not to affect the fit of the model greatly.

*Voting behaviour in Western Ukraine, 1989–91**Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, 1989*

The Congress of People's Deputies, created at the 19th Party Conference of 1988, was composed of 2250 deputies, 750 elected on the basis of national-territorial constituencies distributed among the administrative areas of the Union and Autonomous Republics, 750 elected from territorial constituencies constructed according to population, and 750 elected from social organisations. Because Ukraine is a relatively densely populated country, it was allocated only 32 national-territorial seats (eight in Western Ukraine) but 143 territorial seats (26 in the West). The first round of elections was held on 26 March 1989.

A total of 7558 candidates were initially nominated for the elections, of whom 2899 were eventually registered for the 1500 popularly-elected seats, or a Union-wide average of 1.9 candidates per seat.²¹ Despite the liberalisation of the nomination procedure, the party still exercised considerable control, as is evident in the uniform demographic composition of the group of candidates put forward in each region.²² In some cases single-candidate elections were held to ensure the election of important government and party figures. In 14 of the 26 territorial and five of the eight national-territorial constituencies in Western Ukraine there were two candidates, in the rest one (see Appendix I).

According to White, 'the main objective of the exercise, from the point of view of the authorities, was less to select a group of deputies than to persuade the Soviet public to take a voluntary part in the political process'.²³ If uncoerced political participation was a major objective of this election, turnout provides a crucial measure of the degree of its 'success'. From the point of view of electoral behaviour, the decision whether or not to vote can be seen to be in many ways more critical than the voting decision itself, which was still largely determined by the party apparatus. We might expect the tradition of near compulsory electoral participation in the Soviet Union to have engendered a backlash when controls were removed, and this was indeed what happened. Commenting on the 1989 elections, a group of Soviet geographers remarked that '[In Western democracies] the proportion of the electorate which takes part in elections is the traditional indicator of the level of social activity [of the citizenry]. Here the reverse is true. The more active the population of a region, the lower the degree of participation of electors in elections and the higher the level of absenteeism'.²⁴ The results of a recent survey of Soviet emigres indicate that during the 1970s and 1980s non-voting in the USSR was associated with similar levels of political interest as voting in Western countries.²⁵ Turnout thus provides a good measure of the population's attitude toward the regime, though the interpretation of this measure in the context of Ukrainian elections changed as elections became increasingly free of traditional controls.

The Union-wide turnout rate was 89.8% in 1989; in the Ukrainian Republic it was 93.4%. Western Ukraine had a tradition of democratic participation equalled only in the Baltic Republics, so one would expect voluntary participation here to be higher than elsewhere in the Union. But the lower levels of participation among the most politicised sector should depress turnout. A boycott called by the Ukrainian Helsinki Union in protest against the non-democratic nature of the elections further encouraged

the most radicalised segments of the population to stay at home. The result was that, though turnout across the region was 95.1%, it was lower in those areas known for being the most radical—namely L'viv city and the surrounding area—and lower in cities than in rural districts (see Appendix VI).

The regression model constructed for turnout included as dependent variables the percentage of urban residents in each constituency, the percentage with higher education, the percentage retired, the percentage of ethnic Russians, and historical region, with Galicia serving as a baseline for comparison.²⁶ Regional variations might in part reflect the choice of candidates on offer, an aspect of the election governed in large measure by the local *oblast'* administrations. This leads one to consider the possibility that the differences in turnout may be a function of political factors such as the nature of the candidates running and variations in the general disposition of citizens toward the regime, an attitude which could have been at least in part conditioned by the degree of liberalism of the local authorities. In this light, electoral factors such as the number of candidates in a race and the reputation of the winning candidate can be considered to be largely independent variables, depending not on the voters but on the political structures which controlled the electoral process. Accordingly, the number of candidates (either one or two) and the reputation of the winning candidate for being either reform-minded or conservative were entered into the regression equation as independent variables.²⁷

Regional and ethnic variables accounted for the greatest amount of the variation in turnout (see Table I). The fact of a constituency being in Volhynia rather than Galicia was associated with an increase in turnout of nearly 2 percentage points. An increase in the number of ethnic Russians in a constituency depressed this figure: there was two-thirds of a percentage point drop in turnout for each percentage point rise in the number of Russians.²⁸ The hypothesised interaction between Russian ethnicity and higher education was not supported by the model, however. On the whole, members of other non-Russian minorities seemed to be marginally more willing to go to the polls; the slightness of this effect may be due to a difference in behavioural patterns between the various ethnic groups represented by this category.²⁹ The fact of the winning candidate having a reputation as a democrat increased turnout, whereas the fact of having two candidates in the race as opposed to one decreased it.³⁰ This implies that people in more 'liberal' constituencies took advantage of their new-found right not to vote, except when there was an especially appealing candidate on offer, in which case they turned out with greater frequency. Constituency-level political factors can thus be seen to account in large measure for variations in turnout.

Constructing a statistical indicator to estimate the attitudes of those who did participate in the elections is considerably more difficult, given the limited choice on offer. Any such indicator will reflect both the relative liberalism of the local party organisation and the preferences of the electorate. Legislative electoral data are 'noisy', in that variations depend to a great extent on local aspects of the contest in each constituency.

The proportion of 'negative' votes (votes against all the candidates on the ballot) and the number of spoiled ballots were found to be predicted mainly by other electoral data. In a model constructed for negative voting, the only significant variable was the number of candidates in the race. Having two candidates as opposed to one

TABLE 1
TURNOUT IN 1989

% ethnic Russians	- 0.6876 ^c	(0.1456)
% other ethnic	0.634 ^b	(0.0295)
% with higher education	- 0.0735	(0.1680)
% urban population	- 0.0153	(0.0242)
% retired	- 0.0316	(0.0541)
Regional variables:		
Volhynia	1.7538 ^c	(0.3373)
Transcarpathia	0.0708	(0.6743)
Bukovyna	0.7301	(0.7104)
Reputation of the		
winning candidate	1.2527 ^b	(0.5215)
Number of candidates	- 0.7158 ^b	(0.3113)
Constant	99.4739	(1.7472)
Number of cases	26	
Adjusted R^2	0.9588	
Standard deviation of turnout	2.86	

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

decreased the number of negative votes by over 20% ($p < 0.01$). The same variable actually increased the number of spoiled ballots by 1.67% ($p < 0.001$), but the fact that no spoiled ballots were reported as having been cast in any constituency in which only one candidate was standing (with the exception of constituency No. 451 in Zakarpattia, which reported 39) causes one to doubt the accuracy of the data in these cases. In the two-candidate races the figures do exhibit some distinct patterns. Having elected a candidate with a reputation for being a democrat was associated with a decrease in the number of spoiled ballots of 1.23% ($p < 0.1$), and the fact of a constituency being in Volhynia corresponded to a decrease of 1.06% ($p < 0.05$). Those electors in the region previously under Russian rule were evidently less willing actively to violate electoral norms, but they were apparently no less willing than their counterparts in other areas to indicate their dissatisfaction by voting against both the choices on offer. In neither the model for negative voting nor that for spoiled ballots was any of the other ecological variables significant. These results suggest that negative voting and ballot-spoiling are strategies determined largely by constituency-level factors.

In the absence of multi-party competition, the same is even more true for the distribution of votes among candidates. Given that there is no straightforward means of comparing the outcomes of individual races on the basis of raw data, and little readily available information on unsuccessful candidates, the reputational variable used in the turnout model was taken as an indicator of the preferences of the electorate within the confines of the options available to it. Unfortunately, as this is a dichotomous variable, it cannot be entered into a standard regression equation as a dependent variable without causing significant problems of interpretation, and the number of constituencies in the 1989 elections was too small for the more sophisticated techniques of logit and probit to be employed. The findings for negative voting and ballot-spoiling suggest, however, that the most important factors determining the

electoral result were ones conditioned by the political apparatus in each constituency. In the elections of 1989 it was in the choice of whether or not to vote that social characteristics played the greatest role.

The parliamentary elections of 1990

The parliamentary elections of 1990 were the first elections in Ukraine in which candidates from unofficial (non-communist) groups were allowed to participate. The electoral commissions were the object of a great deal of criticism for their efforts to block nominations and otherwise impede the democratic nature of the electoral process. It has been claimed that widespread violation of the electoral law 'served to discredit the party apparatus in the eyes of growing public opinion'.³¹ One of the actions which caused the most anger was the government's refusal to register Rukh as an official organisation until February, by which time it was too late for it to nominate candidates.

An organised opposition nevertheless emerged. In November 1989 a Democratic Bloc was formed by 43 organisations throughout Ukraine. The main participating organisations in Western Ukraine were moderate nationalist movements.³² The Bloc nominated candidates in 135 constituencies and supported 71 more. Of this total 118 eventually won mandates. In Western Ukraine the Democratic Bloc fielded 57 candidates and supported eight others. No fewer than 55 of these were successful, including many well known opposition figures and several former political prisoners. The Bloc won 43 of 47 seats in Galicia, and nine of 19 in Volhynia. In Bukovyna and Zakarpattia, however, it did poorly, winning no seats in the former region and only three in the latter (see Appendix II).³³

As mentioned above, not all constituencies in the 1990 elections could be fitted to the census data. The sample used to model turnout in 1990 consisted of 46 constituencies. As a group these were demographically typical (see Appendix III), though Uzhhorod in Zakarpattia was the only *oblast'* capital which it was possible to include. The model constructed was similar to the model for turnout in 1989, but no variables were included to represent the number of candidates running or the reputation of the winning candidate, as these could no longer be considered to be in any sense independent of the political attitudes of the electorate in a given constituency.

With the opposition actively participating in these elections and a wide range of candidates on offer, we would expect turnout to be higher than it had been the previous year. In fact, there appears to have been a slippage in the number who voted from an average of 97.1% across the region in 1989 to 90.7% in 1990 (see Appendix VI). The model shows neither region nor ethnicity to have been significant determinants of turnout in this poll (see Table 2). In contrast, level of urbanisation and the number of retired people in a constituency rose to saliency. A one percentage point increase in the number of retired people corresponded to a 0.36 percentage point rise in the number who voted; a similar change in the number of urban residents was associated with a 0.15 percentage point fall in this figure. This pattern conforms to what we know about turnout in the West, which is generally higher in rural than in urban constituencies and higher among the old than among the young.³⁴ It also

corroborates survey evidence that Soviet citizens born before 1931 are more likely to vote.³⁵ There are theoretical reasons for believing that the influence of retired people on the vote is mainly a cohort effect, given that many of the elderly participated in democratic elections before the Soviet period.

What is most striking about the 1990 model is the overall decline in the role of ethnicity *vis-à-vis* the elections of 1989. It may be that in 1989 ethnic Russians were unenthusiastic at the prospect of being represented by either a communist or a Ukrainian nationalist. In 1990 the wider selection of candidates on offer could have motivated more of them to vote. This explanation is confounded by the fact that turnout was over 6 percentage points lower on average than it had been the previous year; it is unlikely that ethnic Russians would have bucked this general trend. An alternative explanation is that the ethnic Russian population was quicker to take advantage of the relaxation of controls and by 1989 was already exercising *en masse* its democratic right not to vote. By 1990 this behaviour may have spread throughout a wider segment of the urban population, especially disaffected youth. Finally, it is possible that the discrepancy is due to the difference between the two samples. It will be recalled, however, that the exclusion of *oblast'* capitals from the 1989 model actually increased the effect of the ethnic variable, so this hypothesis is unlikely.

The most likely explanation is that the form of protest of the most alienated ethnic Ukrainians had changed. The mean number of negative ballots cast dropped from 13.25% in 1989 to 6.63% in 1990, a fall of 6.62 percentage points. At the same time turnout fell by 6.44 percentage points. Those who had voted negatively in protest at the undemocratic nature of the elections of 1989 may have been less sure of their feelings in 1990 and simply decided to stay at home. There are too few cases in which the constituencies of the two contests can be fitted for this hypothesis to be tested statistically, but the evidence points in this direction.

It is also noteworthy that the regional variation between Galicia and Volhynia is no longer significant. This is most likely to be due to the substantial decline in *oblast'*-level coercive manipulation by the party *apparat* in this election and a consequent localisation of electoral competition which diminished the role of historical regional factors.

The results of the 1990 elections were modelled using a dichotomous variable which indicated whether or not the winning candidate in each constituency was a member of the Democratic Bloc.³⁶ Again, the number of constituencies was too small for a logit or probit model to be built, so a simple OLS model was employed instead, with the knowledge that standard errors are likely to be unreliable. As could have been anticipated, regional variables play a large role in this model. The fact of a constituency being in Volhynia, Transcarpathia or Bukovyna corresponded with probabilities of 0.70, 0.90 and 0.84 respectively that a Democratic Bloc candidate would *not* be elected. None of the ecological variables was found to be significant. It is clear that region was the most important determinant of the results of the elections in 1990.³⁷

The referendums of March 1991

After March 1990 the pro-independence movement gained momentum. The Declaration of State Sovereignty in July 1990 had the effect of galvanising the opposition,

TABLE 2
THE ELECTIONS OF 1990

	<i>Turnout</i>		<i>Result</i>	
% ethnic Russians	-0.1312	(0.3871)	-0.0164	(0.0215)
% other ethnic	-0.0058	(0.0568)	0.0009	(0.0029)
% with higher education	0.1728	(0.4272)	0.0015	(0.0215)
% urban population	-0.1460 ^c	(0.0522)	0.0046	(0.0029)
% retired	0.3574 ^b	(0.1513)	0.0109	(0.0083)
Regional variables:				
Volhynia	1.7526	(1.6277)	-0.7018 ^c	(0.0851)
Transcarpathia	3.0546	(1.9832)	-0.8998 ^c	(0.1085)
Bukovyna	3.7858	(5.3919)	-0.8380 ^c	(0.2044)
Constant	89.3278	(4.1281)	0.6121	(0.2371)
Number of cases	46		53	
Adjusted R ²	0.6325		0.8009	
Standard deviation of turnout	5.08			

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

which had recently become bolder in its demands for outright independence. With the removal of Article 6 from the Soviet constitution,³⁸ political parties had begun to form, some on the basis of previously existing movements—the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, for example, renamed itself the Ukrainian Republican Party—and some anew. The opposition was developing its organisational structures and flexing its muscles. At the same time rifts in the Communist Party were growing, with the reformist wing becoming more vocal in its support for the nationalist cause, and the hard-line contingent digging in its heels.

These tensions came to a head in the debate over the all-Union referendum on the future of the USSR held in March 1991. The opposition demanded that Ukraine refuse to hold it at all, but eventually Kravchuk negotiated a bargain whereby Ukraine would hold the referendum but at the same time a second question would be added to gauge public support for the July declaration of sovereignty. Whether a positive response to the question ‘Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedoms of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?’ was compatible with the same response to the question ‘Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign States on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine?’ was left to the interpretation of the electorate. Kravchuk advised people to say ‘yes’ to both questions, but the newly democratic local governments of Galicia offered their voters the possibility of rejecting both proposals and endorsing instead their own Galician question: ‘Do you want Ukraine to become an independent state which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, and which guarantees equal rights to all of its citizens, regardless of their national or religious allegiance?’. Support for the all-Union question was 70.5% in Ukraine as a whole, but only 38.8% in Western Ukraine, and a mere 18.7% in Galicia. The Ukrainian question received a positive response from 80.2% of Ukrainians, 63.6% of Western Ukrainians, and

TABLE 3
TURNOUT IN MARCH 1991

% ethnic Russians	- 0.5049 ^b	(0.2003)
% other ethnic	- 0.0257	(0.0306)
% with higher education	- 0.1401	(0.2505)
% urban population	- 0.0549 ^c	(0.0160)
% retired	0.2691 ^c	(0.0792)
Regional variables:		
Volhynia	- 1.8346 ^b	(0.7813)
Transcarpathia	- 5.3463 ^c	(1.1862)
Bukovyna	- 1.0585	(1.5557)
Constant	90.3468	(2.2164)
Number of cases	121	
Adjusted R^2	0.6960	
Standard deviation of turnout	6.39	

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

44.23% of Galicians, while 88.4% of Galicians voted 'yes' on their own question (see Appendix IV).

Interpretation of the results of this poll is difficult: the nationalist position demanded a firm 'no' to Gorbachev's formulation of Ukraine's status, but voters' attitudes toward Kravchuk's version were obviously conditioned by whether or not there was another alternative on the ballot. That the public was bewildered by the multiplicity of propositions put to it is evidenced by the considerable variation in the results across regions.

One immediately obvious indication of popular attitudes toward the referendum was the fact that for the first time turnout in Galicia was higher than that in the rest of Western Ukraine. In all areas a smaller portion of the electorate was reported to have gone to the polls than had the previous year, but the trend was especially marked in Volhynia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia (see Appendix VI). This difference is evident in the model constructed for turnout (see Table 3).

Again urbanisation and the number of retired people in a constituency had systematic effects on turnout, but this time the proportion of ethnic Russians also had a significant influence. The question of Ukraine's relations with Moscow is one likely to accentuate ethnic polarisation. It is not surprising, therefore, that ethnic Russians should be distinguished by their behaviour in this poll. The fact that so many fewer of them appear to have voted suggests, however, that their feelings on the issue of Ukrainian sovereignty were ambivalent.

Among those who did vote, there is a pronounced pattern which corresponds to the hypothesis advanced above that there would be an interaction between ethnicity and class. The model for the 'yes' vote on the all-Union question included those variables used in the turnout model, but an interaction term was added to account for the relationship between Russian ethnicity and higher education (see Table 4). The results indicate that in a hypothetical constituency with no ethnic Russians, every percentage point increase in the number of people with higher education would correspond to a large drop in the 'yes' vote, but each one percent increase in the number of Russians

TABLE 4
THE ALL-UNION REFERENDUM QUESTION OF MARCH 1991

% ethnic Russians	- 1.5834 ^c	(0.7397)
% with higher education	- 4.1208 ^c	(1.2223)
Russian-higher education interaction	0.2778 ^c	(0.0837)
% other ethnic	0.2964 ^c	(0.0908)
% urban population	0.0286	(0.0481)
% retired	- 0.9149 ^c	(0.2354)
Regional variables:		
Volhynia	42.4512 ^c	(2.3329)
Transcarpathia	32.5869 ^c	(3.5675)
Bukovyna	23.6662 ^c	(4.7580)
Constant	51.7779	(7.7920)
Number of cases	121	
Adjusted R ²	0.8162	
Standard deviation of the 'yes' vote:	24.43	

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

would diminish this effect by 0.28 per cent, such that at a threshold level of 14.83% Russians the two tendencies would cancel each other out. Unsurprisingly, the number of ethnic Ukrainians in a constituency had a negative effect on the 'yes' vote, but there was no apparent interaction between education and either of the other ethnic variables, confirming the supposition that the 'education effect' is a phenomenon most pronounced among Russians insecure about their prospects under a new regime.

Equally noteworthy is the strong negative impact of the number of retired people in the population.³⁹ Many in Western Ukraine belonging to this generation would be old enough to remember the time before the region was incorporated into the Soviet Union, and it appears that they are also the least favourably disposed toward maintaining it. Again this interpretation points to a cohort phenomenon rather than a true age (or gender) effect.

Within L'viv *oblast'*, greater numbers of the more 'cognitively mobilised' urban residents depressed turnout, as, more interestingly, did the number of manual labourers too (beta = -0.22, $p < 0.05$).⁴⁰ Until 1991, the demands of the workers' movement in Ukraine had been mainly economic, but by the spring of 1991 strike committees throughout the country had begun to coordinate their activities with opposition groups. A wave of strikes in February and March further served to raise awareness among manual labourers of political issues.⁴¹ The sector of the labour force from which workers distinguished themselves was that of collective farmers. In L'viv and Chernivtsi *oblasti* the proportion of collective farmers in the labour force boosted the 'yes' vote (beta = 0.20, $p < 0.1$), though the effect is less pronounced than that among the working class.

In the model for the Ukrainian question, an interaction effect between Russian ethnicity and higher education was again evident (see Table 5). Region remained highly important, but, unlike in the previous model, the age variable was not significant. Level of urbanisation, however, was a relevant cleavage in determining answers to this question. The similarity in the direction of the coefficients in this and

TABLE 5
THE UKRAINIAN REFERENDUM QUESTION OF MARCH 1991

% ethnic Russians	- 1.3545	(0.9442)
% with higher education	- 3.9905 ^c	(1.5603)
Russian-higher education interaction	0.2560 ^c	(0.1069)
% other ethnic	0.0547	(0.1160)
% urban population	0.1323 ^b	(0.0614)
% retired	- 0.4485	(0.3005)
Regional variables:		
Volhynia	42.3732 ^c	(2.9781)
Transcarpathia	26.9587 ^c	(4.5541)
Bukovyna	39.6830 ^c	(6.0738)
Constant	58.0990	(9.9470)
Number of cases	121	
Adjusted R^2	0.7043	
Standard deviation of the 'yes' vote	24.68	

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

the all-Union model indicates that the Ukrainian question was widely perceived by nationalists, especially those in the countryside, as not being nationalistic enough. But the model overall yields a rather poor fit (adjusted $R^2 = 0.70$), and we may surmise that the question was interpreted differently enough by different segments of the Western Ukrainian population to make generalisation difficult.

The Galician question evidently divided the electorate on dimensions not accounted for by the ecological variables employed here, for the model constructed to estimate the results yielded an even poorer fit to the data than for the Ukrainian question (adjusted $R^2 = 0.49$). Increases in the level of urbanisation had a slightly negative effect on the 'yes' vote (beta = -0.07 , $p < 0.001$). Within L'viv *oblast'*, the percentage of manual labourers in the labour force covaried with positive response to the question (beta = 0.12 , $p < 0.1$), but the effect of collective farmers was insignificant. It is curious that none of the ethnic variables is significant in this model; it may well be that religious cleavages played a role in confounding ethnic divisions, and that Orthodox Ukrainians and Russians alike were more hesitant to break completely with Moscow.

The referendums of 1991 are the first instance in which it is possible to analyse in detail not only the propensity of Western Ukrainians to vote, but also the patterns of the electoral choices they made. The picture which emerges is blurred by the fact that in three of the seven *oblasti* three questions were on the ballot, whereas in the other four there were only two. The situation was further complicated by the high degree of ambiguity surrounding interpretation of the different questions and the relations between them. But the prominence and relative stability of the relations between the variables in the different models points to the conclusion that social factors have a substantial and stable influence on voting behaviour.

The referendum and presidential election of December 1991

In the referendum of December 1991 the question put to the people was unambiguous, and their response showed there to be an equally clear popular consensus. The presidential election gave evidence of the precise nature of this consensus. Kravchuk's main opponent was Vyacheslav Chornovil, journalist, Rukh member, long-time political prisoner and, since March 1990, head of the L'viv *oblast'* council. Also running were the Ukrainian Republican Party leader, Levko Luk'yanenko, the nationalist liberal Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi, the pro-Russian liberal Vladimir Grinev, and the leader of the minor People's Party, Leopold Taburyans'kyi. Though Chornovil secured three-quarters of the vote in Galicia, he received only 23% overall, while Kravchuk won easily on the first round with 62% of the national total (see Appendix V).

For the few months before and after the December referendum, the issue of independence changed from a substantive topic of debate to a valence issue. In terms of their position on this question there was little to choose between Kravchuk and his opponents; what divided them was rather their pasts and their reasons for wanting Ukraine to go it alone. Western Ukrainians were in general more ambivalent about the prospect of having a former leading communist as their new president (even in Kravchuk's native Volhynia). The results of December's election testify to the growing geographical divisions in the country as the political attitudes of its citizens gelled, but a simple East–West polarity is not adequate to account for this multi-dimensional pattern. The 50 percentage point rift between the presidential preferences of Galicians and Ukrainians overall was no more than that between those of the residents of L'viv and neighbouring Transcarpathia.

The dual polls of December 1991 were the closest Ukraine came to having a 'founding election'. It would therefore not be surprising to find that turnout was substantially higher than it had been eight months earlier. In Ukraine as a whole there was in fact a rise of less than 1%: 84.18% of the electorate voted in December, as opposed to 83.52% in March (see Appendix VI). The downward trend beginning in 1989 was barely checked. In Western Ukraine, however, the situation was radically different. There was an overall rise of nearly six percentage points, and the turnout rate in L'viv was the highest it had been since 1987. Only in Transcarpathia and Bukovyna did the pattern conform to that of the rest of the country, with Chernivtsi witnessing an evident drop in electoral participation. This can be partly explained by the hostile attitudes of certain groups in the south-western *oblasti* to the idea of an independent Ukraine. In late November Romania announced that it would not recognise the results of the referendum in northern Bukovyna and southern Bessarabia, lands formerly under Romanian control and which contain substantial numbers of ethnic Romanians. In Transcarpathia the nascent Rusyn nationalist movement was agitating, with the support of the Czechoslovak Republican Party, for the annexation of Transcarpathia to its Western neighbour. In December the administrations of both regions put on the ballot questions regarding the creation of free economic zones in their respective *oblasti*.

Transcarpathia had already distinguished itself in March by the low level of its turnout in comparison with that of Galicia (see Table 3 above). In the model

TABLE 6
TURNOUT IN DECEMBER 1991

% ethnic Russians	- 0.4870 ^c	(0.1470)
% other ethnic	- 0.1295 ^c	(0.0225)
% with higher education	0.0867	(0.1838)
% urban population	- 0.0214 ^a	(0.0117)
% retired	0.1099 ^a	(0.0581)
Regional variables:		
Volhynia	- 2.6568 ^c	(0.5734)
Transcarpathia	- 9.2026 ^c	(0.8704)
Bukovyna	- 5.0935 ^c	(1.1416)
Constant	96.7607	(1.6265)
Number of cases	121	
Adjusted R^2	0.7853	
Standard deviation of turnout	5.55	

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

constructed for turnout in December, the difference was even more pronounced, and the change in the difference between Bukovyna and Galicia was proportionately greater still. Rather than actively voting against independence, many of the inhabitants of these regions appear to have chosen to ignore the electoral events completely.⁴² Among those members of minority ethnic groups who did vote, there was also an apparent tendency for their votes to be cast against independence (see Table 7).⁴³ The same seems to have been true for much of the better-educated sector of the ethnic Russian population, whose behaviour, according to the model, is roughly similar to what it had been in March.⁴⁴

It was possible to compare the geographical distribution of turnout levels across time by fitting the 1991 data to the 1990 constituencies. There was no significant relationship between either the March or the December 1991 turnout figures and those for the 32 parliamentary constituencies to which these data could be fitted. The relationship between turnout in March 1991 and turnout in December of the same year was also surprisingly weak, with the former predicting only 59% of the latter.⁴⁵ Though the social attributes which influence turnout are fairly constant from one model to the next, the nature and magnitude of their effect would appear to be subject to a great amount of variation.

The structure of the model for the 'yes' vote in December 1991 is virtually a mirror image of that for the all-Union 'yes' vote on the March ballot, though the actual covariation between the two sets of figures is not impressive ($R^2 = 0.46$).⁴⁶ Again, seven of the top 10 residuals were in Transcarpathia or Bukovyna, which prompts analysis of the *oblast*-level referendums held in each of the regions. Unfortunately no data are available for the Chernivtsi referendum, but it was possible to construct a model of the poll in Zakarpattia. Contrary to what one might have expected, the ethnic Hungarian and Romanian variables were not significant. The clue to variation in support for the idea of a free economic zone, which ranged from 54.1% to 89.7%, lay in geographical location. The further a *raion* was from the borders of Hungary and Slovakia, the less enthusiastic its inhabitants were about economic

TABLE 7
THE 'YES' VOTE IN THE REFERENDUM OF DECEMBER 1991

% ethnic Russians	0.0036	(0.0962)
% with higher education	0.4465 ^c	(0.16)
Russian-higher education interaction	- 0.0315 ^c	(0.0109)
% other ethnic	- 0.0885 ^c	(0.0118)
% urban population	0.0010	(0.0063)
% retired	0.1049 ^c	(0.0306)
Regional variables:		
Volhynia	- 2.3271 ^c	(0.3034)
Transcarpathia	- 3.2811 ^c	(0.4640)
Bukovyna	- 2.8248 ^c	(0.6188)
Constant	95.0556	(1.0134)
Number of cases	121	
Adjusted R^2	0.7571	
Standard deviation of the 'yes' vote	2.76	

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

autonomy. A geographical explanation also accounts partially for the variation in support for Ukrainian independence. In addition to Romanians and Hungarians, those in *raiony* in the more mountainous regions tended to be less in favour of a break with the Soviet Union. The areas most isolated and hence least susceptible to political mobilisation are thus also the most conservative.⁴⁷

The pattern of voting in the presidential election gives flesh to the broad behavioural outline adumbrated by the referendum results. The major fault line appears to be that between Kravchuk voters and the remainder of the electorate. Of the six candidates who contested the election, only two received widespread support in Western Ukraine: Kravchuk and Chornovil. As might have been anticipated, the models suggest that Kravchuk voters are those who supported the all-Union referendum question in March. The 'yes' vote in that poll predicts a healthy 86% of electoral support for the future president—the strongest cross-temporal relationship apparent in the data. At first it might seem odd that the vote in support of maintaining the Union reflected a similar set of views as that for the man who led the country to independence not nine months later. But Kravchuk was most probably seen by many as a lesser of evils, as someone who would preserve Soviet-style structures while breaking with the Union itself. This precipitous volte-face could also be interpreted as acquiescence on the part of a portion of the electorate, either out of cynicism or out of apathy, to the stated desires of the leadership at any one time.

It is evident from Table 8 that the models of support for the two top presidential contenders are symmetrical. Analysis of the data from L'viv *oblast'* reveals that industrial workers seemed to be less inclined to support Kravchuk (beta = - 0.17, $p < 0.5$), but even more favourably disposed toward Chornovil (beta = 0.28, $p < 0.05$). An opposite though less distinct pattern is evident in the preferences of collective farmers, who were apparently more likely to support the future president (beta = 0.15, $p < 0.1$) and less likely to vote for his opponent (beta = - 0.19, $p < 0.1$).

The vote in December 1991 gives the clearest indication so far of the electoral

TABLE 8
THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

	<i>For Kravchuk</i>		<i>For Chornovil</i>	
% ethnic Russians	-0.6005	(0.5222)	1.1613 ^a	(0.7102)
% with higher education	-1.3994 ^a	(0.8364)	1.0796	(1.3756)
Russian-higher education interaction	0.1103 ^b	(0.0570)	-0.1318 ^a	(0.0774)
% other ethnic	0.2492 ^c	(0.0596)	-0.2748 ^c	(0.0810)
% urban population	0.0261	(0.0317)	-0.0564	(0.0431)
% retired	-0.2019	(0.2028)	-0.1742	(0.2758)
Regional variables:				
Volhynia	41.9137 ^c	(1.7622)	-42.0312 ^c	(2.3968)
Transcarpathia	40.3605 ^c	(2.4429)	-39.3934 ^c	(3.3226)
Bukovyna	14.9651 ^c	(3.1312)	-13.6223 ^c	(4.2588)
Constant	20.4612	(6.4962)	72.3681	(8.8356)
Number of cases	104		104	
Adjusted R ²	0.9057		0.8314	
Standard deviation of the vote	22.74		22.23	

^a = $p < 0.1$; ^b = $p < 0.05$; ^c = $p < 0.01$.

Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

cleavages emerging in Western Ukraine. The findings of previous models are on the whole confirmed: regional and ethnic divisions are most closely associated with voting patterns. The models imply that ethnic minority groups were less willing to take part in the inauguration of their new country, and that when they did vote they tended to be less enthusiastic about independence. The older (largely female) portion of the population is evidently more nationalistic than the young, as are workers. All in all, ecological variables account for a substantial portion of the variation in electoral behaviour across the region, and many of the hypotheses about their performance elaborated in the models have been validated. It remains to consolidate the patterns which have been discerned and to evaluate their likely import in the future.

Analysis and conclusions

It might be expected that the transition to democratic electoral practices would be accompanied by a high degree of turbulence in the relative position and saliency of different cleavages. This hypothesis was only partially confirmed by the foregoing analysis. The saliency of the age and urbanisation cleavages did vary a good deal from election to election, as did the behaviour of non-Russian minority groups, but there was a high degree of stability in the overall cleavage structure. The most prominent variables were region, Russian ethnicity (coupled with higher education in the models of vote choice), age, and level of urbanisation.⁴⁸ It is worth analysing each of these in more detail.

Regional variables

Recognition that there are regional differences in electoral behaviour helps us to describe this behaviour rather than to explain it. There are a number of possible explanations for the phenomenon, but the fact that the most salient divisions are not those between territorial-administrative units but those between historical regions makes it appear likely that the differences are largely a matter of cultural tradition.

Variations in political culture across the four regions can be accounted for by differences in the length and extent of their experience of democratic institutions. In Volhynia, which was long dominated by Moscow, the limited experience of democracy can be seen to have led to more conformist behaviour. In comparison with their counterparts in the socially similar region of Galicia, Volhynians were slower to take advantage of the possibility of not voting, but when turnout did fall in Volhynia, it fell to a level closer to the national average. Support for both the all-Union and Ukrainian referendum questions of March 1991 was higher in Volhynia than in any other region when social factors are taken into consideration. The national consensus in December 1991 in favour of independence is reflected in a drastic narrowing of this gap, but again Volhynia is more distinct than the other regions in its presidential voting patterns. These findings indicate a behavioural pattern closer to that of Eastern Ukraine.

Of all the regions, Galicia had the greatest and longest uninterrupted experience of competitive elections. Here, unlike in Austrian Bukovyna, county councils were popularly elected prior to 1914, and there was also a much more highly developed civil society.⁴⁹ When controls on social and political life were relaxed, many of the clubs and societies of the pre-Soviet period were revived, and alongside them grew the demand that elections be truly democratic. The reason for the stronger organisational strength of opposition groups in Galicia must be located at least in part in the greater historical tendency of the local population to participate in grass-roots political organisations.

Though Bukovyna was also under Austrian rule, civil society and political consciousness never developed here to the extent that they did in Galicia. Martial law was imposed by Romania from 1918 to 1928, and subsequent electoral choice was more limited than it was in the Polish-held lands to the north. Perhaps the experience of electoral participation before 1914 accounts for the lack of any significant difference in turnout between Galicia and Bukovyna through March 1991. In the all-Union referendum Bukovyna was the region least distinct from L'viv when ethnic and other factors are taken into consideration; the same was true of presidential preferences. The situation with respect to the referendum on independence was otherwise. In Bukovyna the ethnic Romanian and Moldovan population combined is 20%, and given Romania's territorial claims on the region, the question of Ukrainian independence has an added dimension here. It is thus not surprising that turnout should have been markedly down in December 1991. But those who did vote were less distinct from Galicians in their choices than the residents of Transcarpathia, as they had been on the question of Ukrainian sovereignty the previous March. Taking account of ethnic and other factors, the electoral behaviour of the two former Austrian provinces had more in common than that of any other pair of Western regions.

Electoral participation in Hungarian Transcarpathia was more limited than it was in the Austrian provinces, and malapportionment under Czech rule resulted in the region being severely under-represented between the wars. By March 1991 far fewer Transcarpathians were voting than their counterparts elsewhere in the region; by December this gap had widened even further. Ethnic minorities comprise only a fifth of the population, as opposed to nearly a third in Bukovyna, so ethnic abstention alone cannot explain the low level of participation. The voters of Transcarpathia were least distinct from Galicians in their views on sovereignty, but most distinct in their expressed attitudes toward independence. In terms of choice of president, this region was considerably more in favour of Kravchuk than Chornovil.

It is necessary to situate Transcarpathia geographically and historically if these findings are to be properly interpreted. The region lies on the far side of the Carpathian mountains, at the crossroads of four Central European countries. In terms of ethnic composition it resembles the lands to its south and west more than it does the rest of Ukraine. It is thus not surprising that many Transcarpathians should be in favour of independence from Moscow, but unenthusiastic about the Ukrainian nationalist cause and nationalist figures such as Chornovil. Even the native Slavonic population here has an ambiguous sense of its ethnic identity, and support for Ukrainian nationalism is further diminished by the traditional animosity between Transcarpathia and Galicia. Yet there is little consensus among Transcarpathians on what they do support, as witnessed by the large intra-regional differences in the vote for the *oblast'* referendum question on economic autonomy. The lack of historical conditions under which a strong civil society and participatory culture could form, combined with the region's ethnic diversity, make electoral behaviour in Transcarpathia erratic and subject to a great deal of variation. In almost all the statistical models constructed, a disproportionate number of the constituencies with high residuals were located here, though there was no evident directional pattern to their deviation.

An alternative explanation for regional differences in voting patterns is that the regional variables are taking the place in the models of excluded variables which have regional components. Religious differences are one likely candidate for such a role, but there is little evidence on which to base a theory of regional religious cleavage. Only on the Ukrainian referendum question of March do the traditionally Orthodox regions of Volhynia and Bukovyna stand out from their Uniate counterparts. It is likely that the effect of religion on voting patterns varies according to the major ethnic and confessional divides in each area.

Another possible explanation for regional cleavages lies in the differing economic structures of the different parts of Western Ukraine. Agrarian Volhynia is distinguished from the more industrial Galicia by the fact that far more of its inhabitants are collective farmers, and collective farmers were shown, on the whole, to be one of the least radical groups. Yet if the difference between the two regions were entirely occupational in nature, we would expect Ternopil' to be even more conservative, for 32.5% of its labour force is composed of collective farmers, as opposed to only 24.9% in Volyn'. In some models Ternopil' did show itself to be less radical than L'viv, but only those models in which L'viv stood out from Ivano-Frankivsk as well. Moreover, Western Ukraine is more agricultural than the East, though political views in the latter

tended to be more conservative. The proportion of collective farmers in each area may have some effect on the vote, but by no means is it sufficient to explain the differences between regions. The same is true for the proportion of manual labourers. The greatest numbers of workers are in Transcarpathia, followed by Galicia, Bukovyna and Volhynia; again no pattern stands out.

Finally, the differences may be due to different degrees of *glasnost*' in the *oblast*' newspapers. This hypothesis is impossible to test without closer analysis of press reports in the period. Certainly the fact that local *oblast*' administrations in Galicia were taken over in March 1990 by the opposition would have had a liberalising influence on the press, which could have strengthened nationalist demands in those *oblasti*. But the reasons behind the opposition's success must be located in political views formed at an earlier stage. The finding that variables representing historical regions performed on the whole better than those representing individual *oblasti* makes it seem unlikely that variations in the regional press could account for the differences observed. If the press played any role, it most probably magnified existing tendencies, whose cause was primarily historical.

Ethnicity and education

Ethnicity is the second major cleavage dimension to have emerged from this investigation. Its significance is considerably easier to interpret than that of the regional variables. The hypothesis that the attitude of ethnic Russians toward Ukrainian independence would be conditioned by their position on the social scale was confirmed; the same hypothesis was not supported relative to ethnic Ukrainians, however. It was predicted that the effect would be slighter for this group, but the analysis actually demonstrated there to be an inverse effect: nationalist feeling was evidently more intense among workers, a disproportionate number of whom are ethnic Ukrainians.

The behaviour of other ethnic groups was not so well depicted by the statistical models but, when it could be traced, it nearly always corresponded to that of ethnic Russians. This indicates that the most important sectoral divide is not that between the hegemonic Soviet ethnic group and others, but that between ethnic Ukrainians and all minority groups in Ukraine. The distinctive and constant pattern of interaction in vote choice between Russian ethnicity and education was not observed relative to other ethnic groups. It would appear that for ethnic Russians the issue of relations with Moscow was closely linked to questions of status and self-interest, whereas the same factors were not so important for other minorities.

Age and urbanisation

Despite the weight often given to them in discussions of the demographic structure of the Ukrainian electorate, age and urbanisation do not stand out as strong and constant determinants of the vote. The performance of these variables was erratic and at times difficult to interpret. In 1990 and March 1991 urbanisation had a negative impact on turnout. It also influenced vote choice on the Ukrainian referendum question, in which urban residents appeared to be slightly more radical than their rural

counterparts. In Ukraine as a whole rural areas were more conservative than cities.⁵⁰ Survey evidence shows that fewer rural inhabitants were in favour of sovereignty when it was first put on the agenda in 1990,⁵¹ and more voted for Kravchuk the following year.⁵² Yet in Western Ukraine there is no evidence of such a pattern, and even hints of the reverse tendency. It seems that rural conservatism simply manifests itself differently in the two parts of the country. Being more ethnically homogeneous and having closer ties to the pre-Soviet era, the rural areas of Western Ukraine are also those in which traditional culture is strongest. In the East, allegiance to Moscow was for centuries an attitudinal norm among the peasantry. In both East and West the present-day patterns most prominent in the cities are often amplified in the adjacent countryside.

If the age variable is taken to represent a cohort effect rather than a true age (or gender) effect, it can be interpreted in similar fashion. The greater apparent propensity of the elderly to turn out, their evident aversion to the all-Union question in March 1991, and the high level of their support for the referendum question that December suggest that memories of the period before World War II have affected their electoral behaviour. In this sense age and level of urbanisation can be seen, within Ukraine as a whole, as aspects of the regional division between East and West.

Occupation

The tendency of collective farmers to vote for the more conservative options on the ballot undoubtedly had the effect of lessening the impact of rural nationalism. The strength of socialist values among collective farmers is not easily interpretable in terms of interest. The economic reforms brought about in the wake of independence have hurt agriculture less than they have many other sectors of the economy. It is likely, rather, that the social isolation of the farms and the strong control exercised by farm administrators served to insulate this group from changes which were taking place elsewhere.

The radicalisation of the working class was more obviously based on perceptions of self-interest. Demands of strikers and independent trade unions were first and foremost economic during this period; only when the idea spread that independence would improve their material condition did the workers begin to espouse the nationalist cause.⁵³ This particular cleavage is not one that is likely to persist. The restructuring of the Ukrainian economy since 1991 has altered perceptions of interest such that the working class is no longer united behind a common cause. It remains to be seen whether an alternative economic cleavage will emerge.

In contrast to the tradition which sees communist societies as atomised, amorphous and potentially volatile, the foregoing analyses point to the existence of strong cultural divisions within Western Ukrainian society which form the basis of political attitudes. Support for independence here was not a blind rush behind nationalist demagogues, but can largely be explained in terms of the social and historical factors which structured people's perceptions of the issue and their willingness to express their views through electoral participation. During the period between 1989 and 1991, Western Ukraine was to Ukraine as a whole what the Baltic Republics were to the Soviet Union: a catalyst for change and a testing-ground for strategies of opposition.

The tradition of political involvement in the region was an enabling condition which allowed oppositional activity to gain substantial support among those sectors of the population with the strongest ties to the pre-Soviet past and the greatest perceived interest in independence.

The above analyses suggest that two social cleavages are of particular relevance to electoral behaviour in Western Ukraine. On the one hand, differences in cultural heritage make region one of the most important determinants of voting patterns. At the national level, urbanisation and cohort act to magnify the effects of the East-West regional divide; within Western Ukraine they can be seen as an aspect of the historical circumstances which united the seven *oblasti* politically during the period in question. The second major cleavage is that of Russian versus Ukrainian ethnicity, which is conditioned on the Russian side by level of education. The first is a decidedly pre-Soviet divide. The second is a product of Soviet-era demographic patterns, but is analogous to ethnic cleavages prominent in the region before 1944.

What the role of these cleavages will be in the future cannot be ascertained from the analysis undertaken here, but in the light of the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, it is clear that regional differences are still extremely important, and it appears from survey evidence that ethnicity is also a significant determinant of vote choice. The fact that these two cleavages are cross-cutting may, in the short run at least, be Ukraine's salvation, for it means that there is no clear line along which the country could divide. In the longer run, Ukraine's prospects are less clear. While there is a tendency in the literature on democratisation to see the potential for stable party systems as lying solely in Western-style class-based or catch-all parties,⁵⁴ it is not altogether obvious that a system based on other social cleavages would necessarily lead to instability. Whatever developments the future may bring Ukraine, the foregoing analysis suggests that political turbulence at the élite level during the crucial period between March 1989 and December 1991 masked a relatively stable development of politically relevant cleavages among the electorate.

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¹ Alexander Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London, Macmillan, 1985); 'Ukraine: The Politics of Independence', in Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras (eds), *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1993), pp. 75–98; Taras Kuzio & Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (London, Macmillan, 1994).

² Some preliminary work in this area has been undertaken by Dominique Arel as part of an analysis of voting patterns in the Ukrainian parliament, yet the data Arel employs are not sufficiently disaggregated for detailed analysis of the structure of the electorate to have been possible. See Dominique Arel, 'The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, 1, 4, 1990–91, pp. 108–154.

³ Accounts of surveys carried out at this time can be found in Dominique Arel & Andrew Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 26, 1 July 1994, pp. 6–17; 'Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to "Eurasia"?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 32, 19 August 1994, pp. 1–11; and Sarah Birch, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994', *Electoral Studies*, 14, 1, 1995.

⁴ I shall adopt the convention of referring to historical regions by the names familiar to English language speakers, while Ukrainian names will be used to denote territorial-administrative units within present-day Ukraine.

⁵ Unlike in the rest of Ukraine, assimilation into Russian culture has actually decreased in the Western *oblasti* since 1960. See Roman Szporluk, 'West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation', *Soviet Studies*, XXXI, 1, January 1979; Roman Szporluk 'The Strange Politics of L'viv: An Essay in Search of an Explanation', in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), *The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR* (London, Macmillan, 1992), pp. 215–231.

⁶ The inhabitants of Russian Ukraine also had the opportunity to participate in the direct elections to the all-Russian Constituent Assembly in 1917 and, in parts of the country, those to the Ukrainian Central Rada in 1918.

⁷ Piotr S. Wandycz, 'The Poles in the Hapsburg Monarchy', *Nation-Building and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982).

⁸ In the local elections of 1987 approximately 5% of the deputies were elected from multi-member constituencies in which there were on average five candidates for every four seats. A system of what could be termed 'disapproval voting' was employed, whereby voters could cross off the names of those candidates for whom they did not wish to vote. All candidates who received more than 50% of affirmative votes would be elected either as deputies or as alternates. In the event, fewer than 0.5% of the candidates who stood in multi-member constituencies nation-wide were defeated. Stephen White, 'Reforming the Electoral System', *Journal of Communist Studies*, 4, 4, 1988, p. 9; see also Jeffrey Hahn, 'An experiment in Competition: the 1987 Elections to the Local Soviets', *Slavic Review*, 47, 2, 1988, pp. 434–438. In Ukraine the figure was 0.6%. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 June 1987.

⁹ Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments', in Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan (eds), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York, The Free Press, 1967). See especially Geoffrey Evans & Stephen Whitefield, 'Identifying Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe', *British Journal of Political Science*, 23, 4, 1993, pp. 521–548; Herbert Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Systems in Eastern Europe', *Politics and Society*, 20; and Paul Lewis, Bill Lomax & Gordon Wightman, 'The Emergence of Multi-Party Systems in East Central Europe: A Comparative Analysis', in Geoffrey Pridham & Tatu Vanhanen (eds), *Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives* (London, Routledge, 1994), pp. 151–188.

¹⁰ Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Systems in Eastern Europe'.

¹¹ Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine*.

¹² On the definition of Soviet census variables and the reliability of such data, see Ralph S. Clem (ed.), *Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses* (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1986).

¹³ Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence*, p. 7.

¹⁴ The percentage of non-manual labourers is highly intercorrelated with both the percentage with higher education and the percentage of ethnic Russians. It is likely that these variables largely capture the effects of the non-manual variable, if there are any. The fact that higher education is never significant on its own leads one to believe that the ethnic Russian variable represents a true ethnic effect, and is not a surrogate for class.

¹⁵ Evans & Whitefield, 'Identifying Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe'; Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Systems in Eastern Europe'.

¹⁶ W. S. Robinson, 'Ecological Correlations and the Behaviour of Individuals', *American Sociology Review*, 15, 1950, pp. 351–357.

¹⁷ For this reason unstandardised betas and standard errors only will be reported. The (adjusted) R^2 statistic can and will be employed as a valid measure of goodness of fit.

¹⁸ Laura Irwin Langbein & Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference* (Newbury Park, CA and London, Sage, 1978), pp. 13, 33–36.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15–17.

²⁰ For an overview of the literature on this topic see Martin Harrop & William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction* (London, Macmillan, 1987), pp. 207–211.

²¹ Georg Brunner, 'Elections in the Soviet Union', in Robert K. Furtak (ed.), *Elections in Socialist States* (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 42.

²² Stephen White, 'The Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies March 1989', *Electoral Studies*, 9, 1, 1990, pp. 59–66.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁴ A. V. Berezkin, V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaya, N. V. Petrov & L. V. Smirnyagin, *Vesna 1989: Geografiya i Anatomiya Parlamentskikh Vyborov* (Moscow, Progress, 1990), p. 107; cf. A. V. Berezkin *et al.*, 'The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)', *Soviet Geography*, 30, 8, 1989, p. 618.

²⁵ Rasma Karklins, 'Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Non-Competitive Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 80, 2, 1986, pp. 449–469.

²⁶ In cases where constituency boundaries crossed these historical divides, a constituency was coded as being part of a region if over 75% of its territory fell in that region. Otherwise it was not coded. In this way all except constituency 517 in northern Ternopil' *oblast'* were coded.

²⁷ Reputation was determined by consulting with historians and political scientists in L'viv. It is likely that memories of a candidate's reputation at the time of the election were coloured by their subsequent attitude toward reform, which may have changed considerably from 1989 to 1994 when the candidates' reputations were evaluated. Nevertheless, this indicator gives some information, not readily available from official sources, on the political orientation of the winning candidates at the time of the campaign.

²⁸ Because this coefficient is suspiciously high, it is worth considering the possibility that the relationship might be explicable in terms of the geographical distribution of Russians rather than their ethnicity as such. Participation in elections was traditionally lowest in the cosmopolitan centres of the Soviet Union. See Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 118; and Robert K. Furtak, 'The Fundamentals, Characteristics and Trends of Elections in Socialist States', *Elections in Socialist States* (London and New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 38. In Ukraine these are also the areas with the largest number of ethnic Russians. To test the hypothesis that it was in fact the disproportionately Russian intelligentsia of the most cosmopolitan cities who were staying away from the polls, and that ethnicity was incidental to the true causes of the phenomenon, the regression was re-run omitting the seven *oblast'* capitals. The coefficient for the ethnic Russian variable had an even greater magnitude in this model (-0.94) and was still highly significant ($p < 0.01$); the other coefficients were little changed, indicating that the presence of Russians in a constituency does appear to have an impact independent of the size of the city in which they live. When introduced into the equation, an interaction term between the ethnic Russian variable and the urban variable was insignificant, which confirms the interpretation that the effect on the vote of ethnic Russians is independent from that of urban dwellers. The high coefficient is probably a function of a slight interaction effect.

²⁹ There are unfortunately too few cases in each area and too few members of each ethnic group across Western Ukraine for good models to be constructed at this level.

³⁰ A similar relationship was reported also at the all-Union level by Berezkin *et al.*, 'The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)', pp. 623, 632.

³¹ Peter J. Potichnyi, 'The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine', in Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present* (New York, St Martin's Press, 1993), p. 126.

³² Radical groups to the right of the Democratic Bloc, such as the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front and the Ukrainian National Party, boycotted the elections on the grounds that Ukraine was still an 'occupied territory' which would not see truly democratic elections while it remained under Soviet rule. See Kuzio & Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*, pp. 136–138.

³³ There is evidence of substantial electoral fraud having taken place in Bukovyna, which may account for the result in this *oblast'*; see Arel, 'The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?'

³⁴ Ivor Crewe, 'Electoral Participation', in David Butler & Howard R. Penniman (eds), *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections* (Washington, DC and London: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 184; Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie & Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), ch. 13.

³⁵ Karklins, 'Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Non-Competitive Voting', pp. 458–463.

³⁶ In this model it was possible to incorporate 53 cases, including most of the constituencies in *oblast'* capitals, by aggregating several constituencies in which the results of the elections were the same.

³⁷ Models designed to predict the number of spoiled ballots and the number of negative votes did not yield noteworthy results. In both cases the variable for Volhynia was significant, being associated with a 4.1 percent drop in the number of spoiled ballots but a 1.2 percent rise in the number of negative votes. These findings correspond to those for 1989.

³⁸ The notorious Article 6 guaranteed the Communist Party a role as the 'leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system' (*Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (Moscow, Novosti, 1977)). It was officially removed from the Constitution of the USSR in March 1990, and shortly thereafter from republic constitutions.

³⁹ The unrealistically high coefficient is most likely to indicate the presence of a context effect that it was not possible to model with the size of the sample used here.

⁴⁰ The small number of cases included in this model (24) makes the magnitude of the coefficients unreliable, though their direction should be accurate.

⁴¹ David R. Marples, *Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt* (London, Macmillan, 1991); Krawchenko, 'Ukraine: The Politics of Independence', pp. 79–80.

⁴² Nine out of ten of the constituencies with the highest residuals were located in Transcarpathia or Bukovyna. In a model for these *oblasti* alone, the variables for the numbers of ethnic Romanians and Hungarians both had strong negative impacts on turnout.

⁴³ The vote choice of different ethnic groups very probably cancels itself out to a great extent in this model, as the ethnic Poles in Galicia were generally pro-independence.

⁴⁴ The threshold at which the number of ethnic Russians negated the positive influence of the highly educated was 14.17%. The similarity of this figure across the three referendums indicates that the relationship is an enduring one.

⁴⁵ Weighted least squares regression was used in these and other similar models to treat the heteroskedasticity exhibited by the relationship between the electoral variables.

⁴⁶ The relationship between the 'yes' vote on the Ukrainian question in March and the same response to the December referendum question is even less pronounced. Again, the relationship is negative, but the R^2 is only 0.26. The reduction in magnitude of the coefficients in the December model reflects the substantial reduction in variation which needs to be explained.

⁴⁷ Of secondary importance was the number of independent farmers in a *raion*. In most parts of Ukraine this category is minuscule, but in Transcarpathia it reaches as high as 4% of the labour force in some areas. Large concentrations of the socially isolated independent farmers had a negative influence on the vote for a free economic zone.

⁴⁸ These findings confirm analysis by Arel which found region to be the best predictor of support for democratic candidates in Ukraine as a whole, followed by urbanisation and ethnicity; see Arel 'The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?', pp. 132–137.

⁴⁹ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, University of Toronto Press, 1988), ch. 17.

⁵⁰ Arel, 'The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?', p. 119.

⁵¹ Cited in Krawchenko, 'Ukraine: The Politics of Independence', p. 86.

⁵² Kuzio & Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*, p. 186.

⁵³ Marples, *Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt*.

⁵⁴ For a critique of this bias, see Vicki Randall, 'Parties and Democratisation in the Third World', paper presented at the Party Politics Conference, Manchester, 13–14 January 1995.

APPENDIX I

ELECTIONS TO THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

	Territorial seats			National-territorial seats		
	USSR	Ukraine	Western Ukraine	USSR	Ukraine	Western Ukraine
Total seats	750	143	26	750	32	8
First election, 26 March 1989						
Candidates	1431	253	40	1419	59	15
Candidates per seat	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.9	1.8	1.9
Elected	590	118	22	636	26	6
	(78.7%)	(82.5%)	(84.6%)	(84.4%)	(81.2%)	(75.0%)
Turnout	89.8%	93.4%	97.1%	89.8%	93.4%	97.1%
Runoff, 9 April 1989						
Elected	46	4	—	30	—	—
Turnout	NA ^a	NA	—	NA ^a	—	—
Second election, 14 May 1989						
Seats contested	114	24	3	84	3	2

Candidates	743	NA ^b	21	473	NA ^b	7
Candidates per seat	6.5	7.8	7	5.6	NA	2.9
Elected	36	5	1	36	2	0
Turnout	NA ^c	NA	86.2%	78.4%	NA ^c	80.4%
Runoff, 21 May 1989						
Elected	78	16	2	48	4	2
Turnout	NA	NA	76.7%	NA	NA	76.7%

^a74.5% in national and national-territorial seats combined.

^b210 in national and national-territorial seats combined.

^c78.4% in national and national-territorial seats combined.

Sources: *Pravda Ukrainy*, 5 April, 16 April, 23 April, 6 May, 23 May 1989; *Vil'na Ukraina*, 28 March, 16 May, 21 May 1989; *Radyans'ka Bukovyna*, 28 March, 16 May, 23 May 1989; *Prykarpats'ka Pravda*, 28 March 1989; *Vil'ne Zhyttya*, 28 March 1989; *Chervonyi Prapor*, 28 March 1989; *Zakarpats'ka Pravda*, 28 March 1989; *Radyans'ka Volyn'*, 28 March 1989; A. V. Berezkin *et al.*, 'The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)'; *Vesna 1989*; Georg Brunner, 'Elections in the Soviet Union'; Stephen White, 'The Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, March 1989'.

APPENDIX II

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1990

	<i>All Ukraine</i>	<i>Western Ukraine</i>
First round, 4 March 1990		
Constituencies	450	84
Candidates	2999	568
Candidates per seat	6.7	6.8
Turnout	84.7%	90.7%
Democratic Bloc candidates	135	57
Candidates supported by the DB	71	8
Total elected	112 (24.9%)	45 (53.6%)
Democratic Bloc candidates elected	43	32
Runoffs, 10, 18 March 1990		
Constituencies	332	38
Turnout	78.8%	83.5%
Democratic Bloc candidates stood	124	NA
Democratic Bloc candidates elected	74	19

Repeat elections were held in six seats, one in Western Ukraine, on 22 April. A member of the Democratic Bloc was elected to fill the Ternopil' seat.

Sources: *Pravda Ukrainy*, 13, 24 March 1990; *Za Vil'nu Ukrainu*, 8 March, 22 March 1990; *Radyans'ka Bukovyna*, 8 March, 21 March 1990; *Prykarpats'ka Pravda*, 7 March, 8 March, 21 March, 22 March 1990; *Vil'ne Zhyttya*, 8 March, 21 March 1990; *Chervonyi Prapor*, 7 March, 21 March 1990; *Zakarpats'ka Pravda*, 7 March, 21 March 1990; *Radyans'ka Volyn'*, 8 March, 21 March 1990; Peter J. Potichnyi, 'Elections in the Ukraine, 1990', in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), *The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR* (London, Macmillan, 1992), pp. 176–95; Taras Kuzio & Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*; Darrell Slider, 'The Soviet Union', *Electoral Studies*, 9, 4, 1990, pp. 295–302.

APPENDIX III
MEAN DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTITUENCIES
ANALYSED IN THE 1990 ELECTIONS

	All	(%)		Result model
		Turnout model (first round)	Turnout model (runoffs)	
Ethnic Ukrainians	91.98	90.49	86.95	89.87
Ethnic Russians	3.10	3.18	3.92	3.62
With higher education	4.80	4.75	4.96	5.23
Urban	38.85	39.63	41.33	41.47
Retired	21.36	21.15	20.50	20.70

APPENDIX IV
REFERENDUMS OF MARCH AND DECEMBER 1991

	(%)			
	All-Union 'yes' vote	Ukrainian 'yes' vote	Galicia 'yes' vote	December 'yes' vote
Ukraine	70.50	80.18		90.32
Western Ukraine	38.75	63.57		95.99
Galicia	18.70	44.23	88.43	97.99
L'viv	16.43	30.15	89.62	97.46
Ternopil'	19.27	35.22	85.35	98.71
Ivano-Frankivs'k	18.20	52.11	90.01	98.42
Volhynia	54.01	78.85		96.14
Volyn'	53.74	78.01		96.32
Rivne	54.26	79.62		95.96
Transcarpathia	60.19	69.53		92.59
Bukovyna	60.70	83.44		92.76

Sources: *Pravda Ukrainy*, 23 March, 7 December 1991; *Za Vil'nu Ukrainu*, 26 March 1991; *Prykarpats'ka Pravda*, 20 March 1991; *Chervonyi Prapor*, 21 March, 5 December 1991; *Zakarpats'ka Pravda*, 26 March, 4 December 1991; L'viv, Ternopil', Volyn', and Chernivtsi *oblast'* administrations.

APPENDIX V
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF DECEMBER 1991

	(%)					
	Kravchuk	Chornovil	Luk'yanenko	Grinev	Yukhnovs'kyi	Taburyans'kyi
Ukraine	61.59	23.27	4.49	4.17	1.74	0.57
Western Ukraine	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Galicia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
L'viv	11.50	75.86	4.70	0.83	4.43	0.18
Ternopil'	16.79	57.45	19.60	0.43	3.19	0.18
Ivano-Frankivs'k	13.70	67.10	11.81	0.56	3.32	0.14
Volhynia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Volyn'	51.65	31.39	8.90	0.83	3.25	0.34
Rivne	53.07	25.65	13.38	0.80	3.57	0.43
Transcarpathia	58.03	27.58	4.98	1.32	2.83	0.14
Bukovyna	43.56	42.67	4.40	1.42	1.97	0.42

Sources: *Pravda Ukrainy*, 7 December 1991; *Prykarpats'ka Pravda*, 4 December 1991; *Chervonyi Prapor*, 3 December 1991; *Zakarpats'ka Pravda*, 4 December 1991; L'viv, Ternopil', Volyn', and Chernivtsi *oblast'* administrations; Peter J Potichnyi, 'The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 33, 3, 1992.

APPENDIX VI
TURNOUT

	1989	1990	(%) March 1991	December 1991
USSR	89.8		80.0	
Ukraine	93.4	84.7	83.5	84.2
Western Ukraine	97.1	90.7	88.7	94.2
L'viv	95.0	86.5	89.2	96.2
Ternopil'	98.6	94.3	91.2	97.1
Ivano-Frankivs'k	98.0	88.9	88.6	95.7
Volyn'	98.4	93.7	87.6	93.2
Rivne	98.3	94.4	87.5	93.1
Zakarpattya	97.4	91.0	82.4	82.9
Chernivtsi	97.5	92.2	88.3	87.7