


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Elections and Democratization in Ukraine

Sarah Birch



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I of course take full responsibility for all errors factual and interpretive, as well as for inadequacies in the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of the analysis.

SARAH BIRCH

Note on Transliteration and Abbreviation

Transliteration

Standard conventions for the transliteration of Ukrainian will be employed in the text, with *ya*, *ye*, *yi*, and *yu* for soft vowels, a single inverted comma to represent the hard sign, and a double comma for the Ukrainian apostrophe.

I shall adopt the convention of referring to historical regions by the names familiar to English-language speakers. Ukrainian names will be used to denote territorial-administrative units within present-day Ukraine, with the exception of Kiev, Crimea, Volhynia, Galicia, Transcarpathia and the river Dnieper, for which the anglicized forms will be retained.

Russian words that have become common in English (for example, *perestroika* and *glasnost'*) will be transliterated from the Russian. Otherwise Ukrainian transliterations of Soviet terminology will be employed, accompanied where appropriate by the Russian version.

Names of ethnic Russians who are citizens of Ukraine will be transliterated according to Ukrainian conventions (Hryn'ov instead of Grinev), while the names of other Russians will be taken from the Russian.

Abbreviations

For the sake of convenience, references to the various census data employed in this volume will be abbreviated as follows:

Abbreviation Full reference

Perepis' 1939 *Vsesoyuznaya Perepis' naseleniya 1939 goda: osnovnye itogi*, Moscow: Nauka, 1992.

Perepis' 1959 *Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda. Ukrain-skaya SSR*, Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1963.

Perepis' 1970 *Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda*, Moscow: Statistika, 1972.

Perepis' 1979 *Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda*, Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Komitet SSSR po Statistike, 1989.

Perepis' 1989 *Itoqi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda*, Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Komitet SSSR po Statistike, 1993; microfiche version, Minneapolis, MI: East View, 1992.

1

Introduction

This book is about the formation of political identity in Ukraine, about the ways in which elite groups organized during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods and how different sectors of the citizenry have responded to their efforts to mobilize support. It charts the development of political structure in a nascent state, tracing the social correlates of Ukrainian voting patterns between 1989 and 1998 – from the time of the liberalization of the Soviet electoral system through to independent Ukraine's second parliamentary elections. The series of elections and referendums during this period held a mirror to the Ukrainian people, offering them a view of their collective political proclivities and contributing to the learning process through which popular opinion was transformed into public opinion. The successive ballots also provided elite actors with insights into the true shape of popular sentiment and taught them valuable lessons in strategy. After ten years of electoral liberalization we can begin to take stock of the long-term effects of holding competitive elections in Ukraine. How have they influenced democratization? How have they worked to structure society? It is these issues, among others, that this study will address.

The decade of transition was of crucial importance for the definition of the parameters of the Ukrainian state, for the negotiation of Ukrainian national identity, and for the construction of democratic institutions. Political structuration is one of the key features of successful democratization. In order for a political system to consolidate as a stable democracy, it must at a minimum have a structured electorate with clear links to sectors of the elite. Though this is not a sufficient condition for consolidation, it is necessary to prevent wild swings of support from one election to the next and sudden lurches of opinion in favour of demagogues. A second necessary condition of democratic

consolidation is, however, that electoral cleavages be not so pronounced as to be polarizing. Ideally, a number of cleavages will cross-cut each other, such that the polity will not divide too profoundly on any given issue. In this context, voting patterns are crucial. The question is whether recent political developments are leading to a potentially destabilizing situation in Ukraine, or whether the electorate has over the past decade become structured in such a way as to facilitate democratic consolidation.

While there has been debate as to the social and political processes that led to Ukrainian independence (Krawchenko, 1985, 1993; Motyl, 1993; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994; Nahaylo, 1999), there has been little effort as yet to consider how the choices made by the Ukrainian electorate at this time represent the beginning of a pattern of electoral cleavage in the new country. The factors that influence electoral outcomes are numerous and diverse, and only some of them are susceptible to even the most rudimentary measurements. The aim of the present analysis is therefore not to provide a complete explanation of voting behaviour in Ukraine, but rather to sketch the nature of the relevant divisions in Ukrainian society that are likely to form the basis for long-term electoral cleavages. The focus will be on the underlying social characteristics of the Ukrainian electorate, rather than on short-term effects such as views on contemporary issues or economic experiences (bearing in mind that the process of political and economic transition can transform even the most basic aspects of social identity). Two specific research questions are particularly pertinent in this context. Firstly, to what extent is Ukrainian electoral behaviour structured along the lines of socio-demographic cleavages? Secondly, which cleavages are most important, and how enduring are they likely to be?

Contrary to those who claim that the Soviet Union left in its wake an atomized society with weak social divisions, this study argues that the Ukrainian electorate has from the advent of competitive elections exhibited a relatively stable socio-geographic cleavage structure, a structure which can be explained to a great extent in terms of social cleavage patterns that developed in Soviet and pre-Soviet Ukraine and were made politically salient by the events of the transition period. It will be argued as a corollary that much of the volatility characteristic of electoral outcomes during the transition phase can be attributed to changes in the electoral alternatives on offer, rather than to changes in the underlying dispositions of voters.

This introductory chapter will start with a brief overview of historical developments in Ukraine, including a history of elections on the territ-

ory that now comprises the Ukrainian state. The role of elections in the collapse of the Soviet Union will then be assessed, and an outline will be given of subsequent party formation in Ukraine. The chapter will conclude with a synopsis of the structure of the book.

Ukraine past and present

Ukraine is a country of 50 million people covering 232 200 square miles of territory. It is larger in terms of area than any other European country except Russia. The name 'Ukraine', meaning 'on the edge', began to be used in the late sixteenth century. The territory now referred to by that name knew independence only for a brief period in 1918 and 1919; for most of the preceding 150 years it had been divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires (see Table 1.1). The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was definitively established in 1920 in a somewhat smaller version of what had previously been 'Little Russia'. In 1944 the Soviet Union annexed the former Russian and Habsburg lands which now comprise western Ukraine. In August 1991, with the Soviet Union in a state of terminal collapse, Ukraine declared itself an independent state.

At the start of the drive for independence in 1989, the Ukrainian SSR was an industrialized and urbanized country (66.7 per cent of the population lived in cities or towns). According to the Census of 1989, ethnic Ukrainians comprised some 72.7 per cent of the population and ethnic

Table 1.1 A brief chronology of Ukrainian history

<i>10th–12th c.</i> Kievan Rus'	
<i>13th–19th c.</i> Western and central Ukraine under Lithuanian, Polish, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian rule	Eastern Ukraine under Mongol, Tatar, Ottoman, Muscovite, Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian rule
<i>1918–19</i> Western Ukrainian Popular Republic	<i>1917–20</i> Ukrainian Popular Republic
<i>1919–23</i> Poland takes over the administration of Galicia and Volhynia; Transcarpathia joins Czechoslovakia; Romania takes over Bukovyna	<i>1919</i> Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic formed
<i>1944–45</i> Western Ukraine incorporated into the UkrSSR	
<i>24 August 1991</i> Ukraine declares independence	

Russians 22.1 per cent, with the rest being made up of more than a dozen other ethnic groups. A total of 64.7 per cent of the population claimed to be native Ukrainian speakers, while 32.8 per cent gave Russian as their mother tongue (*Perepis' 1989*). Traditional religions in Ukraine are Orthodoxy in the centre and east of the country (Dnieper Ukraine) and Greek Catholicism in the west.

Ukraine has long been known as one of the richest agricultural regions in Europe. Black earth lands make up a large part of the Left and Right Bank regions. In addition to being the traditional breadbasket of the USSR, Ukraine was home to one of the Soviet Union's largest concentrations of heavy and extractive industries: a full third of the Military Industrial Complex was based here, employing a fifth of the Ukrainian labour force. The republic also produced 31 per cent of the USSR's coal. But there are considerable regional variations in social and industrial structure that reflect different historical experiences.

Contemporary Ukraine can be divided for the purposes of analysis into five historical areas: (1) the lands in the west of the country that were joined to Soviet Ukraine in 1944 (the *oblasti* of Ivano-Frankivsk, L'viv, Ternopil', Volyn', Rivne, Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi); (2) the Right Bank, including the remainder of the territory to the west of the Dnieper river, which was under Polish control from the time of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Second Partition of Poland in 1793 (Kiev city and the *oblasti* of Kiev, Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Khmel'nyts'kyi and Cherkasy); (3) the Left Bank, the region to the east of the Dnieper river that was ruled by Russia during the same period (the *oblasti* of Chernihiv, Sumy and Poltava); (4) the south of Ukraine, including the historical region of Zaporozhia as well as the formerly Ottoman Black Sea littoral and the Crimean peninsula (the *oblasti* of Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhya, Mykolaïv, Odesa, Kherson and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea); and (5) the eastern regions of Kharkiv and the Donbas, which were the areas of heaviest industrialization and in-migration from Russia during the imperial and Soviet periods (the *oblasti* of Donetsk, Luhans'k and Kharkiv).¹

As one moves across the country from west to east, one witnesses an increase in the level of urbanization from a low of 40.5 per cent in Ternopil' *oblast'* to a high of 90.2 per cent in Donetsk. The proportion of the population that is ethnically Russian increases in tandem with the urban population, from 2.3 per cent in Ternopil' to 44.8 per cent in the Donbas *oblast'* of Luhans'k.² As one might expect, increases in the percentage of the population with higher education also accompany increased levels of urbanization.

The gradation from east to west structured the distribution of wealth during the Soviet period and continued to play a role in levels of economic activity into the post-Soviet years. Given that industrial workers were better paid in the Soviet Union than those who worked the land, it is not surprising that the lopsided occupational structure of the country translated into regional wage differentials. But within each category of worker there was also a marked regional difference in rate of pay between the west and the south-east during the late Soviet period. There was a similar regional differential in average annual per capita capital investment, which was also lowest in the west and highest in the east and south. Finally, though the south and the east have traditionally produced fewer consumer goods than the central and western regions, they consumed such goods at a higher rate.³

Starting in the 1970s, Ukraine began to suffer a decline in both agriculture and energy production, due to under-investment and technological obsolescence. Since the demise of the USSR, these trends have been greatly magnified; the new state suffered a precipitous fall in economic production during the early post-independence years and experienced vertiginous levels of inflation, especially in 1992 (average 33.5 per cent per month) and 1994 (average 47.1 per cent per month). By 1993 Ukraine was a net importer of grain, and by 1998 GDP was only 30 per cent of its 1990 level. Registered unemployment was still only 4.0 per cent at the close of 1998, but much of the labour force was on unpaid leave and many more were on short-time work, such that the average number of days really worked by those employed was only 75 per cent of the total number of work days. Much of the workforce was also effectively engaged in unpaid work, as wages were often delayed for several months, by which time their value had considerably diminished. Even for those being paid, the situation was grim; by 1996 real wages were 35 per cent of their 1990 level.⁴

One of the chief reasons for the scale of Ukraine's economic woes during much of this period was its dependence on energy sources from Russia, which were being sold at world prices by 1994. Inability to pay for oil and gas caused supplies to be periodically cut off, and much of industry either ground to a halt or greatly cut back its operations. The weak state of the economy was further exacerbated by the reluctance of successive governments to undertake serious privatization and by their willingness to issue soft credits to ailing industries, especially the energy-guzzling heavy industrial plants in the east of the country.

That variations in the social and ethnic structure of the different parts of Ukraine coincide with economic differences will have become

manifest over the course of this discussion. In both cases the main division is between the western and central regions on the one hand and the east and south on the other. A cursory glance at the results of any of the electoral contests which have been held in Ukraine since 1989 will be sufficient to establish that the same division is evident in the political structure of the country. The task for the political scientist is to tease out the precise relations between the different social and cultural characteristics which contribute to the country's distinct regional variations.

Elections in pre-independence Ukraine

It goes without saying that the course taken by political developments in Ukraine during the period of transition was strongly influenced by the electoral process. Yet elections are by no means neutral mechanisms for aggregating the preferences of voters; they are social as well as political institutions with associated histories and cultures. This section will review the history of electoral competition on the territory of what is now Ukraine, highlighting those aspects that are likely to have affected popular perceptions of the electoral process between 1989 and 1998.

The pre-Soviet period

Ukraine has never before known genuine democracy, but Ukrainians did participate in choosing representatives to popular assemblies at various points in their history. The form and extent of electoral experience varies greatly from region to region, however. The history of enfranchisement in western Ukraine under Austro-Hungary is significantly longer and more extensive than that in the rest of the country. The electoral politics of western Ukraine were characterized in the period prior to the First World War by the domination of the local land-owning minority (Poles in Galicia, Romanians in Bukovyna, Hungarians in Transcarpathia) over the largely Ukrainian peasant majority. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the ethnic Ukrainians of the Austrian lands became increasingly mobilized politically, demanding greater representation and protesting against fraudulent electoral practices (Baran, 1963; Stachiw and Sztendera, 1969; Ciuciura, 1984; Hryniuk, 1991). Through a series of reforms, the basis of representation gradually shifted from a class-based consociational or curial arrangement to an ethnically-based one which, though far from equitable, was more favourable to ethnic Ukrainians. This shift served at once to acknowledge as legitimate the political claims of Ukrainians and to institution-

alize ethnicity as the dominant political cleavage. This cleavage was evident also during the inter-war period, when elections were conducted by the various states of which the western Ukrainian lands were part: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania (Zaitsev, 1993; Stefan, 1963; Halip, 1963). At this time Volhynia, which had previously been part of the Russian empire, was also under Polish rule, and ethnicity became a dominant cleavage in elections there as well (Zaitsev, 1993). The legacy of this seminal period in Ukrainian electoral politics is difficult to judge, but if the political traditions inaugurated at this time have been carried down to the present day, we can expect residents of these regions to perceive electoral competition to be an efficacious means of representing their interests, and for ethnicity to be a dominant cleavage there.

The electoral experience of the inhabitants of Russian-ruled Dnieper Ukraine began in the nineteenth century with the *zemstvo* movement, which involved the establishment of local organs of self-government throughout much of European Russia. The *zemstva* tended to be dominated by local notables and members of the intelligentsia, but they were elected bodies in which the peasantry was represented. *Zemstva* were not allowed in the Right Bank provinces of Volhynia, Podolia and Kiev because of peasant disturbances in these regions. Here the elections to the first Russian Duma in 1906 represented an initiation to electoral politics. All in all, four Dumas were elected in Russia between 1905 and 1917. The elections were conducted, as in the Austro-Hungarian lands, according to a curial system with a weighted franchise. They were also indirect: the urban seats were filled through a two-stage process, the landowners' and workers' seats in three stages, and the peasants' seats in four. Elections to the third and fourth Dumas were conducted under an electoral law that gave an even greater advantage to landowners (Walsh, 1950; Emmons, 1983; Radkey, 1990; Thatcher, 1995).

Starting in 1917 equal and relatively free elections began to be held on the basis of proportional representation throughout Russia. After the October Revolution, an All-Russian Constituent Assembly was elected through direct, equal suffrage. At this point the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada (the short-lived independent Ukrainian government) were co-existing uneasily in Ukraine. The Rada allowed the elections to go ahead, but the delegates chosen from Ukraine never went to St Petersburg to attend the Assembly. Instead the Central Rada called elections to its own all-Ukrainian Constituent Assembly in January 1918. Though the Bolsheviks by and large acquiesced to the holding of the elections in the areas of Ukraine which they controlled at that point, fighting in

many parts of the country prevented the contests from taking place, and only 172 of 301 seats were filled.

Whereas in western Ukraine popular elections were held over a period of more than two generations, the eastern Ukrainian population gained its knowledge of national-level electoral politics over the course of 12 short and turbulent years. The brevity of this period and the magnitude of the social upheavals that accompanied it perhaps account for the fact that voting rights and fraud were never issues around which voters in the east could be mobilized in the same way that they were in the Austro-Hungarian lands. Electoral practices were not institutionalized to a great enough extent that the populace came to expect fair representation. Furthermore, voting cleavages were less clear-cut, as ethnic divisions sliced across the rural-urban divide. There are thus grounds for believing that the electorates in the two regions had rather different conceptions of what it meant to cast a vote.

Soviet elections

From the early 1920s in Dnieper Ukraine and from 1945 in the west, the people of Ukraine participated regularly in elections at every administrative level to representative bodies of the Soviet state. Decisions under the Soviet system were seen as an expression of the will of history as interpreted by the Communist Party. The act of voting therefore played virtually no role in the decision-making process after the early 1920s. Instead, voting provided the populace with a means of demonstrating its solidarity with and support for the regime, and it provided the regime with a means of binding the people to it. The most important function of the electoral process was to establish and maintain two-way channels of communication between the leadership and the people. Campaign periods were among the most prominent occasions on which people had the government's policies explained to them (Carson, 1956; Swearer, 1961; Mote, 1965; Gilison, 1968; Jacobs, 1970; Pravda, 1978: 186–92; Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978; Friedgut, 1979: 137–9; White, 1985). They were likewise opportunities for individuals to express grievances or complaints about the performance of the state, and there is evidence that in the post-Stalin period this aspect of elections often involved a certain amount of bargaining between voters and authorities. Votes were in effect exchanged for minor improvements in living conditions or rare consumer goods (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978). Elections thus represented a useful way of releasing frustration and afforded citizens a modest sense of efficacy.

The polling-day ritual also served the function of demonstrating the Soviet regime's capacity to mobilize its citizens. One of the principal aims of the authorities on election day was to display their ubiquitous control by obtaining universal turnout. Over the post-war period official figures came asymptotically close to this target: reported turnout for the 1984 elections was 99.99 per cent (Brunner, 1990: 37). But these figures are deceptive. Because of intense pressure by election 'agitators' to get out the vote and the ingenuity of methods employed to this end (Mote, 1965: 76–83), non-voting generally took the form of having one's name removed from the electoral register by applying for a 'certificate of the right to vote' which entitled one to vote anywhere but obliged one to vote nowhere. Various estimates put the proportion of the electorate who avoided their civic obligations in this way at between 2.5 and 10 per cent (Friedgut, 1979: 117; Karklins, 1986).⁵ The significance of 'total participation' lay not in its actual achievement, but in the magnitude of the organizational effort required to be able to proclaim it. Elections were periodic drills that tested the Soviet machinery of control. Far from being mere show-cases or masquerades, Soviet-era voting therefore served a number of useful functions, the most important of which was to maintain and strengthen the link between rulers and ruled.

From the perspective of deputy-selection, nomination was the crucial aspect of the electoral process. The choice of nominees was severely circumscribed by the party via strict quota rules governing the ethnic, occupational, gender, and age composition of the body of candidates, but it was at this stage that there was a degree of choice involved. Until 1989 candidates were nominated primarily by workers' collectives in meetings controlled by the party. Though it was not uncommon for several candidates to be nominated, all but one were invariably winnowed out at the pre-election meetings where nominations were confirmed. This filtering process was both a means by which the authorities could exercise control and an insurance mechanism giving them advance warning of a particularly strong degree of negative feeling toward a potential candidate. Following this, the election itself was a formality in which the voters expressed their unanimous support for the single candidate of the 'bloc of Communist and non-party people'.⁶

Starting in the late 1980s all this changed. In the local elections of 1987, approximately 5 per cent of the deputies were chosen from multi-member constituencies with five candidates on average for every four seats. A system of inverted approval voting was employed whereby voters could cross off the names of those candidates for whom they did not

wish to vote. All candidates who received more than 50 per cent of affirmative votes would be elected either as deputies or as alternates. In the event, fewer than 0.5 per cent of the candidates who stood in multi-member constituencies nation-wide were defeated (White, 1988: 9); in Ukraine the figure was 0.6 per cent (*Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 June 1987; see also Hahn, 1988). This experiment paved the way for the series of elections and referendums which punctuated the path to independence at yearly intervals from 1989 to 1991. These events were testing grounds for the emergent opposition groups; they represented both a means whereby such organizations could demonstrate their powers of mobilization, and arenas in which they fought with the authorities to enhance their official status. At the same time the late-Soviet polls were windows into the minds of a populace whose views and desires had never before been so objectively recorded. They served to define and to express popular opinion in a way that was to have significant consequences for the future development of Ukrainian politics.

Elections and the collapse of the Soviet Union

The political structure of the USSR became ossified during the 1970s and 1980s, and after Brezhnev's death it began to crack along a number of fault lines. There arose, on the one hand, increasing tensions over conflicts of interest between central and regional leaders (Motyl, 1987; 1990: 181–2; cf. Hough, 1980; Bialer, 1980; Burg, 1990). On the other hand, corruption and the abuse of privileges by the *nomenklatura* at all levels, combined with a decline in living standards in the late 1980s, generated growing popular resentment of political elites in general (Remington, 1990: 174–7; Hosking, 1991: 81; White, 1993: 71). *Glasnost'* had the effect of making these incipient divides more visible, while *perestroika* exacerbated them. Restructuring of the economy involved the nominal devolution of decision-making power to regional and sub-regional levels, giving local elites more opportunity to define, differentiate, and promote interests that had been constituted partially in republican terms by the federal structure of the Soviet state. At the same time the restructuring of the party, which Gorbachev saw as necessary to rid it of its more stagnant and bureaucratic elements, provided an avenue through which local actors could begin to aggregate their demands. This came about because the reformist new leader saw fit to use the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 to conduct a popular purge of the party elite.

On the face of it, elections appeared to be an ideal means of clearing the party of some of its dead wood, and at the same time increasing its

legitimacy in the eyes of the people (White, 1990a; Sakwa, 1990: 134). By forcing many local leaders to compete for office, elections should in theory have done what non-competitive elections in the Soviet Union had always done, only better. They were designed to further strengthen the link between the party and the people and improve the party's understanding of popular opinion (N. Robinson, 1995: 136–51). They should also have assuaged popular resentment of privilege and thereby lessened tensions between the people and the *apparatus*. Elections were fought within small geographical units, so there may well not have appeared to be any danger that electoral contests would exacerbate the regional–centre divide, since this would not be an object of competition. Yet because the discussion of contentious political issues in electoral campaigns was still strictly circumscribed, campaign speeches in 1989 tended to focus on consensus issues related to local needs. It is therefore not surprising that many of the candidates who were elected to the Congress of People's Deputies were people who were not only more in favour of Gorbachev's reforms, but also more likely than their predecessors to promote local interests and to want to distance themselves from the Soviet centre (Mihalisko, 1989a: 17; Roeder, 1993: 217; Lytvyn, 1994: 440–1).

The Congress gave them the opportunity to do so. When the newly-elected deputies gathered in Moscow, the voting situation within the body they formed was one which, whatever its imperfections from a democratic point of view, gave scope for the expression of local interests. A combination of the deputies' need to organize and nationalist sentiment spurred by nascent 'informal' social movements led to micro-regional constituency interests being aggregated to macro-regional republican and cross-regional interests. An Inter-Regional Deputies Group was formed and soon became the Trojan Horse of the opposition.

Between March 1989 and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the centre–periphery divide gradually came to structure many other issues – economic, institutional, and ethnic. For the republican elites, the reaction against Moscow was not just a reaction against Russian domination, it was a reaction against the whole system of centralized government which imposed policy on the republics and prevented them from pursuing their own aims. As such, it was in large measure a reaction against the structure and style of the party itself. Gorbachev's intended strategy of using elections to strengthen the party without aggravating regional divisions had exactly the opposite effect. Moreover, the fact that elections to republic Soviets were held in 1990, one year later than those to the all-Union Congress of People's

Deputies, meant that republican legislatures were more radical than their central counterparts, which reinforced the centrifugal processes already in motion.

The details of the events that followed will be dealt with in later chapters; what is important in the present context is that the first electoral contests held in the Soviet Union encouraged the development of a pattern of reinforcing issue cleavages at the elite level which was centred on the pro-dissolution/anti-dissolution divide. In many senses this convergence was inherent in the nature of the centralized Soviet system itself, where the structural centre was also the geographical centre. But the timing and mode of its eventual collapse were also functions of the peculiarities of electoral competition.

The formation of parties

In their seminal work on cleavage formation in Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) discern four basic cleavages in the party systems of Western democracies: central dominant culture versus peripheral subject culture, clerical versus secular, urban versus rural, and employer versus worker. The conditions under which these four cleavages developed historically, their relative strength, and their configuration (reinforcing or cross-cutting) are seen as the most crucial factors in determining the structure of the party systems that emerged at the time when franchises were made universal in Western Europe. There has been much debate about the relevance of Lipset and Rokkan's analysis to cleavage formation in post-communist societies,⁷ and certainly there is little reason to expect political cleavages in the East to reflect those in the West with any degree of fidelity. But two of the conclusions Lipset and Rokkan draw from their study can be generalized to provide useful starting points for an analysis of the Eastern European situation. The first is that the position of the active nation-building elite at the point of enfranchisement was especially important in influencing the shape of each Western European party system. The second relevant conclusion can be derived from the finding that where the clerical/secular cleavage was still strong in Western Europe, the employer-worker cleavage did not have as great an impact at the time of enfranchisement. This suggests the general hypothesis that the strength of new cleavage dimensions will be inversely proportional to the strength of existing ones.

In a country such as Ukraine, where social cleavages had long been de-politicized and the ruling elite survived the regime change virtually intact, we might expect new post-Soviet divisions rapidly to rise to prominence and the old Soviet *nomenklatura* to play a major role in

shaping these cleavages. The second part of this prognosis accords well with what we have actually observed in Ukraine over the past decade: many members of the old Soviet elite have indeed retained power in some form, and the pro-statehood/anti-statehood cleavage which emerged from the regime change has been largely shaped by members of this group. But the weakness of Soviet-era cleavages is more debatable, in that the relationship between the electorate and the party system in Ukraine was fundamentally different from that found in most Western European countries at the point of mass enfranchisement. As Lipset and Rokkan demonstrate, the early-twentieth-century extensions of the franchise in Western Europe led to the emergence of the electoral alignments that were to characterize the politics of those countries for several decades. But in as much as electoral alignment is a relationship between a party system and an electorate, the alignment process depends on the status of both these components. The major difference between the electoral alignments that took place in Western Europe at the start of the century and those currently taking place in the East is that the events which precipitated alignment were in the first case associated with the expansion of the *electorate*, while in the second case they have involved the expansion of the *party system*.

In Western European countries, multiple political parties were ready and waiting to provide frameworks along which newly-enfranchised electorates could align.⁸ In some cases enfranchisement made possible the creation of new parties, but the basic system was already in place, as were the institutional mechanisms through which it operated. This was not true for the Soviet Union. Here the de-monopolization of the political system involved the inauguration of competition. When there is an extension of the franchise, parties must bid for the favours of new voters. Once the market is saturated, the auction is complete and there is a stabilization on the basis of a new alignment. But one of the characteristics of a state monopoly on politics is that, as in the goods market, demand exceeds supply. If the electoral market is opened to competition, the excess demand generates a flurry of new parties that seek to establish themselves before adequate mechanisms are put in place to regulate competition.

Lack of institutional reform significantly retarded the development of multi-party electoral competition in Ukraine. Because the electoral laws of 1989 and 1990 included many restrictions on the nomination of candidates outside the workplace (that is, outside party-dominated structures), and because local authorities had wide powers to sanction

nomination meetings, approve nominees, and otherwise supervise the electoral process, it was nearly impossible for independent organizations to participate on equal terms.⁹ When the law legalizing alternative parties was finally passed in the autumn of 1990 it required that a party have 3000 members to register; though it was later reduced to 300, this was still at that time a formidable hurdle for most of the new organizations. It is indicative of the weakness of the new party system that neither of the main candidates in the 1991 presidential election was affiliated with a political party, and in 1994 only one serious presidential contender – the Socialist Moroz – was a party member.

But perhaps the most significant aspect of the liberalization process from the point of view of party formation was the sequencing of events. Alternative parties were legalized in 1990 but did not have to compete for votes until the parliamentary elections of 1994; this had a number of consequences for the way they developed in the interim. Firstly, organized politics tended to be structured around well-known personalities, many of whom relied for support on the moral authority they had gained through dissident and protest activity. As a consequence, few of the fledgling organizations conceived of their aims in terms of social bases and interest aggregation; they were divided along the lines of personal loyalties and friendship networks more than they were along ideological or social dimensions. They tended either to project imaginary constituencies or to aspire to the status of broad-based movements that would represent the interests of all society. In practice they were inward-looking and fissiparous, and the programmatic distinctions between them were often minimal.¹⁰ Secondly, because the new parties were formed in opposition to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the disintegration and eventual two-year eclipse of the latter deprived the former of their *raison d'être*; in their efforts to adapt to the new situation they began to multiply, fragment, and reform at such a rate that the electorate soon lost track of which party stood for what. Thirdly, the four-year incubation period during which the new parties developed in parliament without having to submit themselves to the rigours of electoral competition allowed them to be shaped by parliamentary and internal politics rather than by popular demands and the requirements of mass organization. By the time elections were held, the parties with the greatest amount of influence in parliament tended to be those with the weakest mass support bases, and vice versa (Lytvyn, 1992: 69).¹¹

When the new parties did finally turn their attention to electoral campaigning, lack of resources, limited media access, and simple ignorance

as to what the electorate wanted made mobilization of support difficult. Moreover, they tended to be loosely structured and undisciplined (partly as a consequence of their reaction against CPSU-style organization), and they were by definition inexperienced when it came to grass-roots activity. Their style was not one of mobilization but of moral suasion; this was not well-suited to the electoral arena.

The same conditions did not obtain across the political spectrum, however. The left-wing successors to the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) enjoyed a considerable organizational advantage over the new parties of the centre and right. When the CPU was banned in 1991, replacements quickly materialized to fill the gap. These included the Socialist Party and the Rural Party, which were eventually joined by a renewed version of the Communist party itself when the latter was re-legalized in late 1993. These resuscitated ex-communist parties had a clear head-start over their reformist counterparts in terms of experience, resources, and tactics.

The electoral law of 1994 made matters even worse for the new parties. Unlike in most other post-socialist countries, the cumbersome Soviet-era majoritarian electoral system underwent minimal changes between 1990 and 1994. By its nature, a majoritarian system emphasizes the role of individual candidates to the detriment of parties. In the parliamentary elections of March/April, non-communist parties won only 19 per cent of the vote and 24 per cent of the elected seats.¹² It was not till a semi-proportional electoral law was enacted for the parliamentary elections of 1998 that Ukraine can be said to have possessed anything resembling a national party system that was capable of mediating between the preferences of the electorate and the structure of parliament. In the interim the process of electoral alignment proceeded only fitfully, the nature of electoral competition varied considerably from constituency to constituency, and parties grew piecemeal rather than as nation-wide organizations. It remains to be considered how voters can be expected to have acted under these circumstances.

Overview of the book

Now that the historical and political background for the investigation has been established, it is possible to move on to more detailed analysis of the forces that have structured political identity during the transition period. The second chapter will provide a theoretical framework for this task; it will examine the existing literature on electoral behaviour in an effort to formulate hypotheses about the voting patterns we should

expect to observe in Ukraine in the late-Soviet and early post-Soviet years.

The next five chapters, which proceed chronologically, constitute the analytic meat of the study. Chapter 3 will examine the semi-competitive elections to the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies in 1989. These contests represented for the majority of Ukrainians the first opportunity to engage in electoral choice, but the fluidity of the competitive situation at this time means that an in-depth examination of voting patterns can only be undertaken in the context of the 1990 elections, to be dealt with in Chapter 4. The elections to the Ukrainian republican parliament in 1990 saw the rise to power of a substantial number of oppositional figures and marked the advent of true electoral competition. After this pair of parliamentary elections, Ukraine had three nationwide contests – two referendums and a presidential election – which will be the subject of Chapter 5. In March of that year there were two simultaneous polls, one on the status of the USSR and one on the status of the Ukrainian republic. Both gained majority approval, but their somewhat abstruse wording made the outcomes ambiguous. Nine months later a decisive referendum on Ukrainian independence received overwhelming support after an abortive putsch in Moscow had fatally weakened the Soviet centre. At the same time, Ukraine elected its first post-Soviet president, Leonid Kravchuk. Chapter 6 will analyse the first elections to be held in independent Ukraine, the parliamentary and presidential contests of 1994, which witnessed considerable turnover in Ukraine's highest assembly and a change of president. Finally, Chapter 7 will evaluate the parliamentary elections of 1998. Despite the introduction of a new semi-proportional electoral law, these contests gave evidence of considerable stability in the underlying features of the Ukrainian political system.

Chapter 8 will draw together the analyses conducted in the previous five chapters and evaluate the extent to which the results support the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 2. It will then be possible to formulate some general conclusions about elections and the democratization process in Ukraine, which will be assessed in comparative Eastern European perspective. A short conclusion will consider the implications of these findings for future political developments in Ukraine.

2

The Emergence of Electoral Cleavages: Theoretical Preliminaries

Chapter 1 laid the descriptive ground for the construction of an explanatory framework. We saw how elections shaped the actions of Ukraine's elite during the transition period. The development of political identity in Ukraine has been determined by the interaction between such organization at the elite level and identifications formed at the level of the citizenry. This chapter will elaborate a set of theoretical expectations as to how Ukrainian voters reacted to the momentous political events of 1989–98. These expectations will then be evaluated in subsequent chapters in the light of empirical evidence. A note on data and methods at the end of the present chapter details the means by which the evaluation will be undertaken.

It is a characteristic of competitive politics that social problems and value differences do not enter the political arena at random. The *potential* for politicization of an issue depends on the proximate historical situation; the *way* in which it is politicized is a matter of strategic action by politicians who seek to manipulate or break existing alliances so as to create power bases (Riker, 1982; Kitschelt, 1988). This strategy is most likely to be successful during times of major social change. But though existing political divisions may be greatly altered at such times, no society is without pre-existing cleavages, and new issues will tend to polarize along these lines.

The Soviet Union was no exception. Like all polities it was socially differentiated, yet explicit political cleavages only developed at the end of the 1980s as the result of the rise to saliency of certain issues. The major legacy of the Soviet-era geo-political cleavage analysed in the previous chapter was a pro-statehood/anti-statehood divide which

persisted as a defining issue in Ukraine well into the post-Soviet period. The pro-statehood political 'camp' among the Ukrainian political elite inherited the ideological and organizational apparatus of the movement for independence. These people were pro-democratic and mostly pro-market, and they tended to be concentrated in Kiev and the west of the country. The political camp less sanguine about independent Ukrainian statehood was largely composed of those who favoured a return to the past, and who were thus pro-'Soviet' in both the geo-political and institutional senses.¹ Such positions received the greatest amount of support in the east of Ukraine. These broad tendencies are well known to students of Ukrainian politics, yet the patterns of social divisions that structure the Ukrainian electorate are still a matter of debate.

Following in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan, scholars of post-socialist transformations in Eastern Europe generally agree that the political divides which emerge at the mass level after the demise of the old regime will depend on (1) the social and political structure of society before the regime change, (2) the form the regime change takes, and (3) the nature of ensuing transformations, including the extent to which parties are successful in mobilizing voters (Berglund and Dellenbrant, 1991; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Cotta, 1994; Waller, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Wyman *et al.*, 1995b). Chapter 1 provided a broad outline of the political dynamics of elite-level change in Ukraine, but to understand the mass-level sociological aspect of events during this period it is necessary to examine the factors that are likely to have influenced the basis on which Ukrainian voters made their decisions.

The formation of political identity: theories of electoral behaviour and the Ukrainian voter

There has been a succession of theories in Western studies of electoral behaviour, from the traditional sociological and socio-psychological accounts of the 1950s and 1960s, through the modern instrumental voter explanations of the 1970s and early 1980s, and on to the more differentiated and context-specific theories of the late 1980s and 1990s. This conceptual evolution has been partly the result of a changing world, and partly a matter of changes in ways of seeing that world. The various theories are conditioned by the contexts out of which they arose in two specific ways, firstly by having been devised to describe Western democracies, and secondly by having been devised by the citizens of those democracies. This does not mean that the substantial

body of empirical knowledge developed around Western models cannot provide clues to understanding electoral behaviour in other parts of the world, but neither does it make sense to adopt one or another of the theories and 'test' it in a context radically different from that in which it was developed. It is necessary instead to examine the assumptions behind them and the validity of these assumptions in the context of Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian society.

There is abundant evidence of a decline in Western democracies over the past thirty years of 'traditional' forms of socially-conditioned voting behaviour, and the rise of 'modern' voters who make their choices through deliberate evaluation.² The consequence of this is seen by many to have been a 'dealignment' of these electorates with respect to their party systems. Entering the world of competitive electoral politics at this stage of history, might not the new democracies of Eastern Europe also exhibit the characteristics associated with dealigned electorates? If this is true, it would provide an important clue as to the types of model best suited to predicting the behaviour of voters in these states.

Some voters will inevitably have a clear perception of where their individual interests lie and will perceive a link between those interests and one or more of the electoral options on offer. We can thus expect some individual voting to occur in any competitive polity. Following Herbert Kitschelt *et al.* (1995), it can also be conjectured that those voters who vote on the basis of their material interests will vote prospectively rather than retrospectively, as is the norm in most Western societies. In other words, they will evaluate electoral options on the basis of their perceived individual prospects for the future. In this context, they will be most likely to vote according to what Kitschelt *et al.* term the 'dynamic' dimension of their material assets rather than the 'static' aspect. They will vote, that is, on the basis of their capacity to adapt to economic change. This capacity will be most influenced by three factors: age, education, and urban versus rural residence. Younger, more educated voters living in cities will have both the opportunities and the cognitive skills to benefit from social and economic change, whereas older voters with limited education and those living in isolated rural areas will find it more difficult to undertake the career and lifestyle changes that success under the new economic regime requires (Kitschelt *et al.*, 1995: 147–8).

The suggestion that support for political and economic change should be greater among young urban intellectual elites is corroborated by evidence from other studies. Firstly, education was a good indicator of socio-economic status within the Soviet Union, and the Soviet

Interview Project in 1983 found that those with higher education levels appeared to be less satisfied with their lot than those at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder (Millar and Clayton, 1987).³ Disaffection with the Soviet regime among the privileged continued well into the *perestroika* and post-Soviet periods. Survey evidence suggests that that well-educated Ukrainians were less supportive of the Soviet regime and more in favour of political reform (A. Miller *et al.*, 1992; 1994; Gibson and Duch, 1993; Rose and Carnaghan, 1995; W. Miller *et al.*, 1998: 253–9). Secondly, studies of political attitudes have consistently found the younger generation also to be more alienated from the Soviet regime and more favourably disposed toward political dissidence and reform (Lane, 1992: 273–81; A. Miller *et al.*, 1992; Reisinger *et al.*, 1994; Gibson and Duch, 1993;⁴ Rose and Carnaghan, 1995; W. Miller *et al.*, 1998: 241–5).

Thirdly, the urban/rural divide can be seen largely as a secondary effect of other demographic factors (rural residents tend to be older, more often female, less well educated, and more often employed in agriculture). But the specifically geographical aspect of the urban/rural distinction also has social consequences. Rural areas are characterized by socio-cultural isolation, and, in the Soviet Union, inferior social services and significantly more limited access to goods not produced locally. Pointing to the historical importance of the urban/rural divide in the Russian Empire and its Soviet successor, some commentators have suggested that the urban setting was distinctive enough, independent of other socio-demographic attributes, to affect political attitudes and behaviour in the Soviet Union and after (Hough *et al.*, 1996: 5–8; Montgomery and Remington, 1994). Surveys during the late- and post-Soviet periods have also frequently found that urban residence has an independent effect on political values. In general, urban residents have been found to be more antipathetic to the Soviet regime and more supportive of democratic reforms than their rural counterparts (see, for example, A. Miller *et al.*, 1992; Reisinger *et al.*, 1994; W. Miller *et al.*, 1998: 263–4). Western Ukraine appears to be exceptional in this respect, however; rural residents in this region seem to have been even less favourably disposed to the Soviet regime than those living in cities (Hesli and Barkan, 1993).

There is thus some evidence for the view that political behaviour in the post-Soviet context is influenced by factors that affect individuals' potential for material success. Yet despite these findings, there are reasons to believe that in many respects Ukrainian society in the late 1980s and early 1990 was very unlike the dealigned societies of Western

Europe, and that most voters had neither the capacity nor the motivation to vote in terms of their individual interests. Instead they can be expected to have voted in terms of their perceived interests as members of various socio-demographic and geographic groups.

The literature on recent electoral change points to a number of characteristics of aligned and dealigned electorates that provide a useful starting point for an examination of individual versus group voting in Ukraine.⁵ It would appear that social cleavages are likely to be aligned with electoral options if voters have strong affective attachments to, and cognitive dependency on, social groups which are so aligned. This requires that the relevant social groups be characterized by high levels of group autonomy and cohesiveness. The bulk of the political information people receive must also be channelled through these groups.⁶ Finally, group leaders must have incentives to mobilize group support, and the institutional structure must facilitate – or at least not hinder – such mobilization. Dealignment is seen to occur as a result of a number of developmental processes that erode the communal forms of social interaction characteristic of societies with aligned electorates. These interrelated phenomena can be summarized under three main headings: socio-structural change, the particularization of lifestyles, and cognitive mobilization.

1. *Social-structural change.* The decline of the agricultural sector, followed by the relative decline of the industrial sector and dramatic rises in the size of the service sector have characterized Western societies in recent years. These changes have been accompanied by an increase in the complexity of social structure as each sector has witnessed internal diversification through stratification and segmentation along sub-sectoral divisions. The objective distinctions between social classes based on these divisions have thus become blurred. At the same time, relative economic equalization and a dramatic rise in living standards across the board have led to a reduction in the perceived inevitability of class conflict, a reduction in the differences in consumption patterns between classes, and an increase in concern with non-material aspirations which defy – or at least challenge – class-based interpretations of interest. All these factors have contributed to a weakening of the solidarity of those occupational social groups which previously anchored political party systems in many countries.

2. *Particularization of lifestyles.* The increased geographical and social mobility occasioned by changes in the social structure has further eroded group bonds by removing people from their traditional settings and creating social 'cross pressures': many people now have to choose between

alternative identifications. The resulting reduction in the social segregation and integrity of groups, combined with the diversification of social structure and lifestyle brought about by technological advances, has led to a multiplication of social influences which has tended to make both value orientations and partisan identification more a matter of individual choice and less a function of conditioning by the social environment.

3. *Cognitive mobilization.* Social-structural changes have also required a better-educated workforce, which has led to an expansion in education. The average voter now has more highly developed intellectual resources at his or her disposal and is therefore less dependent on others in forming his or her political views. At the same time, the spread of television has increased the amount of political information and the range of views to which the average citizen in a Western country is exposed. Contemporary voters are therefore politically sophisticated and are more likely to engage in independent evaluation.

In short, the consequences of modernization are seen to have been a weakening of (a) the coincidence of the objective interests of group members; (b) their subjective perception of the relevance of group identity to the definition of their own individual identities and their interests; and, as a result, (c) the ease with which they can be mobilized for political purposes on the basis of group membership. In countries where alignment is channelled through affective attachment to political parties, even non-group consonant party identification has declined because of the loosening of socio-psychological attachments to groups of all kinds. With decreases in both the incidence and the strength of group and party identification, voters are, on average, less likely than their predecessors to exhibit stable voting patterns from one election to the next.⁷

To what extent do post-Soviet electorates resemble the dealigned electorates of the West? On the face of it, there is a strong (and not coincidental) similarity between the 'atomised', 'mass' societies of the post-industrial era and the social structure of the Soviet Union (Kornhauser, 1960). According to the 'totalitarian' school of Sovietology, Soviet society was characterized first and foremost by direct and total state control over individuals; independent civil society was non-existent, the state strictly regulated virtually all horizontal links between people, and sectarianism was, in consequence, severely circumscribed.⁸ Soviet ideology, Soviet social organization, and Soviet methods of governance were all explicitly geared toward preventing political alignments from emerging by breaking the social and socio-psychological bonds which

had previously attached people to segregated groups and forestalling the emergence of new groups of this sort.

The convergence theories that dominated Sovietology in the 1970s discerned a gradual narrowing of the gap between West and East for different reasons. Starting with a rather more positive understanding of the social effects of modernization, they argued that the complexity of the developed industrial state required highly intricate forms of social organization which invariably led to a differentiation and pluralization of society, whatever the regime type.⁹ Both arguments would seem to suggest that at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet society fulfilled many of the conditions which have spawned dealigned electorates in the West: traditional groups had been broken by the state, and more 'modern' forms of social interaction had arisen in their place. We might thus expect post-Soviet electorates to be from the start 'non-aligned'.

Yet there are two main reasons to doubt that this will be the case. Firstly, the Soviet Union never achieved the level of industrial development of Western democracies. Secondly, starting in the late Soviet period, commentators began to recognize that elements of 'neo-traditionalist' communalism operated in the interstices of the Soviet state (Jowitt, 1983; Ekiert, 1991). It is therefore necessary to analyse the social prerequisites of partisan dealignment laid out above from the perspective of the structure of post-Soviet society in general, and Ukrainian society in particular.

1. *Social-structural change.* By the 1970s Ukrainian society, like that of other Soviet republics, possessed a complex and diversified structure that was in many respects similar to those of Western countries. But despite the rapid pace of industrialization, a third of the Ukrainian work force was still engaged in agriculture in 1989, while only a quarter worked in the tertiary sector. Even in the wake of the collectivization of agriculture, Soviet farms were socially and culturally isolated (Laird and Francisco, 1980). In both the agricultural and industrial sectors there was a considerable degree of employment-based social segregation. Firms tended to be larger than in the West, and they played a far greater role in the social lives of their workers. They were typically the principal providers of accommodation, leisure activities, and, in many cases, child care and educational facilities as well as consumer goods. People who worked together also lived together, shopped together, and went on holiday together. This may have had the effect of lessening ethnic and religious ties, but it strengthened regional and sectoral communities. Moreover, sub-occupational divides such as public- versus private-sector

employment and trade union membership which have fragmented class distinctions elsewhere did not exist in the Soviet Union, as virtually everyone was a unionized public-sector employee.

Another important factor is that the blurring of distinctions which resulted from social-structural change in the West was hampered in the Soviet context by the official classification system. This system defined each person's group memberships for administrative purposes and made it possible for all forms of social, cultural, and political activity to be governed through a system of quotas. Because people were integrated into society on the basis of their multiple group identities, it is unlikely that any reduction of distinctness will have taken place. By explicitly naming ethnic and economic groups in order to engineer their integration 'scientifically', the Soviet system ended up preserving them in the popular consciousness, however inaccurate they were becoming as objective descriptions (see Hill, 1985: 41–57; Balzer, 1994; Brubaker, 1996).¹⁰

According to official doctrine, class conflict disappeared in the Soviet Union with the elimination of antagonistic classes. In reality, perceptions of class antagonism persisted, but as in the West, dramatic increases in living standards had the effect of dampening their saliency. Furthermore, the consumption patterns of all but the very privileged achieved a far greater degree of homogenization than they have in capitalist democracies (Yanowitch and Dodge, 1969). We might therefore interpret the rise of civil rights and nationalist movements in Ukraine in the 1980s as an indication that material satiety had engendered post-materialist values in the population. But this would be a misconception. Ubiquitous and perennial shortages of goods rendered the vast majority of Soviet citizens far more materialistic than their Western counterparts, as they were obliged by the circumstances of daily life to spend far more time providing for their material needs.

If economic development in the Soviet Union led to a social structure in many ways similar to those found in market economies, differences in degree of development, diversification, and affluence, as well as differences in mode of administration strongly suggest that Soviet society in the late 1980s was not inherently resistant to partisan alignment on the basis of social cleavages. The absence of an independent civil society made the definition and articulation of group interests extremely difficult in the Soviet context (Castles, 1969; Dobson, 1980b), but the existence of groups remained unquestioned. And despite differences among republics in the size of various groups, the fundamentals of the discourse of group definition and identity were determined by the central

party apparatus and manifested themselves in official pronouncements by party leaders throughout the Union. Just as the formal recognition of sovereign republics within the Soviet Union provided a lever which republican elites could use to mobilize support for republican interests, so the existence of distinct social cleavages in Ukraine represented a potential mechanism for politicizing society.

2. *Particularization of lifestyles.* Soviet society gave evidence of many of the accoutrements of Western-style cultural modernization, but modernization took a different form, and this difference has had significant consequences for subsequent electoral politics. In place of autonomous market economies and civil societies, the Soviet leadership created a system that was highly regulated and dependent on the state. Cultural modernization was largely, as in the West, a consequence of industrialization, but it was also a goal the state actively sought to achieve and manipulate through its social and cultural policies. The integrative processes of social mobility had many of the effects familiar to Westerners, including the reduction of differences in lifestyles and value orientations among different groups and an increase in the number of people with multiple group identities (Shkaratan, 1973; Gordon and Klopov, 1973). But in the Soviet Union these homogenizing processes were not accompanied by simultaneous differentiation and particularization. The state regulation of cultural and social life, the limited range of cultural goods and services available through the state distribution system, and the fact that the state actively sought to 'modernize' people's values by orienting them to serve its own needs created a situation in which people had an ambivalent attitude toward 'modernity'.

It is difficult to judge the extent to which the cultural change that occurred during the Soviet period was the result of socio-cultural engineering, and to what degree it was an inherent aspect of modernization. What is more important in the present context is the fact that both economic development and cultural change had been forced on the people by the state. This meant that their co-existence was bound to be *perceived* as being contingent, whether or not it actually was. Adherence to the modern cultural norms of active political participation, 'friendship between peoples', and 'harmony of interests' was thus in some sense also contingent. To an extent it was coerced, and to an extent it was the conditional result of a tacit bargain between the state and the citizenry that the latter would be provided with a decent standard of living in return for support and the renunciation of alternative allegiances. When, in the late 1980s, coercion was substantially reduced and at the same time the conditions on which the populace had entered the

bargain were being less and less adequately met, alternative allegiances that had lain dormant began to be re-examined.

Because people's prolonged separation from certain proscribed and discouraged group identifications had been the result – direct or indirect – of a planned transformation of the socio-economic system, the interests associated with them had never been *voluntarily* abandoned. Appeal to these interests was thus a powerful tool in the hands of a nascent opposition.

3. *Cognitive mobilization.* Soviet society was composed of well-educated voters who enjoyed virtually universal access to television. Moreover, electoral choice was an entirely new phenomenon for the vast majority of the Soviet electorate in 1989; the very novelty of the situation should have precluded any sort of conditioned behaviour. Voters should have had all the potential for making conscious, deliberate choices and none of the incentives, or even the opportunities, to resort to group norms or behaviour learned through political socialization.

But the ability to make a 'rational' choice or evaluation depends on more than just the quantity of information and cognitive sophistication a voter has at his or her disposal; it depends also on their quality and type. As a rule, the Soviet media provided the public with only very limited information as to the ideological differences between candidates in the elections of 1989 and 1990. This was in large part, of course, because there was in most cases very little ideological diversity among those who were allowed to stand, and undoubtedly also because the range of variation that did exist was curtailed by self-censorship.

Furthermore, while the typical Soviet citizen may have had highly-developed cognitive skills in some domains, deliberative evaluation was not one of them. Independent judgement was discouraged in the Soviet education system (Zajda, 1980: chap. 3), and discrimination was rarely called for in the marketplace. True, Soviet citizens regularly honed their cognitive skills by reading between the lines of the information available to them, but this led to sophisticated hermeneutic abilities, not the capacity to engage in cost-benefit analysis.

Finally, if Soviet political socialization was at all successful (and there is reason to believe that it was in many respects),¹¹ its probable legacy was an adherence to collective decision-making as a normative ideal which, in the absence of a transcendent agency to interpret the collective will, can be expected to have become the practical norm. Modernization theory notwithstanding, industrialization does not necessarily breed the requirement, the capacity, or the desire for independent decision-making, and there is no reason to believe that the Soviet

citizen of 1989 should have been any more advantaged in this respect than the British or American citizen during the era of electoral alignment. Regardless of the magnitude of subsequent socio-economic and political dislocation, the period between 1989 and 1998 is hardly long enough for deep-seated behavioural dispositions to have been fundamentally altered.

This discussion suggests that we can expect many Soviet voters to have relied to a great extent on family, friends, and associates in deciding how to vote, and that they would have been inclined to vote in terms of group interest, especially the interests of important reference groups. Which groups matter most? The relative importance of social categories for voting behaviour can be expected to be influenced by the proximate political context in which the voting decision is made. As we saw in the last chapter, the political situation in the late Soviet period foregrounded the ethno-regional divisions in Soviet society. It also emphasized the nature of the Soviet political system and the role of the Communist Party. Finally, the foregoing discussion suggests that much of Soviet life was structured around the workplace. Ethnic group, region of residence, Communist party affiliation, and production sector of employment can thus all be expected to have been salient group reference categories for the Ukrainian voter during this period.¹² These categories will be examined in turn.

If ethnicity can be expected to play an important role in voting behaviour, the bulk of the evidence suggests that ethnic Ukrainian nationalism *per se* is not deeply-rooted among most sectors of the population. During the Soviet period ethnic Ukrainians had many opportunities to climb the career ladder in all-Union structures through cultural assimilation, facilitated by the high degree of bilingualism which their cultural similarity to Russians made possible (Motyl, 1987: 123–38; Pirie, 1996). Though nationalist aspirations were tentatively voiced in the 1960s under Shelest, this phenomenon was confined to a very small and elite sector of the population. The rise of nationalism in the 1980s was thus a relatively recent phenomenon, which could well mean that ethnic consciousness among many Ukrainians will take second place to other cleavages as time progresses (cf. Wilson, 1997a).

Ethnic Russians, on the other hand, can be expected to have looked with some trepidation on the prospect of a break with their historic motherland, and the inevitable loss of relative advantage entailed thereby. There is also little reason to suspect – barring reunification of Russia and Ukraine or the intensive Russification of Ukrainian society – that the saliency of ethnic identity among Russians will dwindle with

time, and surveys have shown that they are significantly less sanguine about continued Ukrainian independence and the trappings of Ukrainian statehood than ethnic Ukrainians (Bremmer, 1994; Arel and Khmel'ko, 1996).¹³ Russian ethnicity can thus be expected to be a more distinctive determinant of voting behaviour than Ukrainian ethnicity.

It has been suggested, however, that native language, and possibly language use, are truer gauges of ethnic identification than the ethnic group recorded in a person's passport (Silver, 1978: 255; Motyl, 1987: 102; 1993: 7; Arel, 1995; Arel and Khmel'ko, 1996).¹⁴ Given the highly politicized nature of language use in Ukraine, especially since the start of *glasnost'*, that portion of the population capable of shifting easily from one language to another – the 56.4 per cent who claimed in the 1989 census to be fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian – are a crucial group. Survey research suggests that ethnic consciousness during this period was weakest among Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians, whose political views tend to be closer to those of ethnic Russians (Arel and Khmel'ko, 1996; Khmel'ko and Wilson, 1998; W. Miller *et al.*, 1998).

Religion represents a second factor which can be expected to play a role in conditioning ethnic identification. Religious and national politics have been intertwined throughout Ukraine's history, and Soviet policies in the two areas were closely linked (Bociurkiw, 1990b). Surveys conducted during the final months of the Soviet Union and the early post-Soviet period found that members of those churches banned during the Soviet period – the Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox – were considerably more alienated from the Soviet regime and more nationalistic than were other groups (A. Miller *et al.*, 1992; Hesli *et al.*, 1996: 16; tables 1–3; W. Miller *et al.*, 1998: 282–4). Conversely, because religiosity is linked to ethnicity in Ukraine, lack of religious affiliation may well have the effect of lessening ethnic awareness and intensity of feeling on political issues related to nationalism. Religion may thus account for sub-ethnic political divisions within the ethnic Ukrainian portion of the population.

As far as sector of employment is concerned, the three main economic sectors of agriculture, industry, and services occupied distinct places in the Soviet system and carried varying degrees of prestige. The distinction between agriculture and industry still has cultural and ideological resonances which go back to the Russian Empire's historic backwardness and Stalin's great industrialization drive (Hill, 1985: 41–5). Zaslavsky observes that the considerable pride and class awareness among industrial workers (due primarily to lack of access to resources

which enable upward mobility) would make it difficult for members of the intelligentsia to mount a cross-class appeal (Zaslavsky, 1980: 64). This is evidenced by the reluctance of discontented coal miners to link their economic grievances to nationalist demands during the Donbas strikes of 1989 (Marples, 1991: 175; cf. Krawchenko, 1990a: 14). But miners and other industrial groups eventually became politicized and incorporated for a time into the nationalist movement on the basis of the belief that Ukraine would profit economically from greater sovereignty. Later support for the nationalist cause declined in the face of the economic down-turn that accompanied independence (Marples, 1991; Rusnachenko, 1995; Friedgut, 1994). Despite this shift in value orientation, sectoral affiliation does seem to have had an effect on political attitude formation among industrial workers.

Collective farmers, on the other hand, were the most underprivileged group in Ukrainian society. This, according to Krawchenko, provides them with an 'objective basis for nationalism' (Krawchenko, 1985: 206). Yet, as Marxists and others have long realized, there are also many reasons why collective farmers are hindered from mobilizing politically on the basis of their 'objective' disadvantage. The *kolhospyky* generally lived in a tightly structured and isolated environment which means that they, more than any other occupational group in Soviet society, were deprived of the mechanisms for formulating and articulating their demands, aggregating their interests, and abstracting from their particular situation to the more general interests of the ethnic or territorial formation to which they belonged (Zaslavsky, 1980: 63, White, 1979: 43–4). Furthermore, because of the social cohesiveness of their environment, collective farmers were more easily mobilized by politicians who could successfully command the allegiance of their leaders. This group can thus also be expected to exhibit distinctive behaviour.

Turning now to region of residence, regional politics broke the Soviet Union apart, and regional tensions have reproduced themselves within the newly-formed Ukrainian state; we do not need statistical models to show that the west of Ukraine is the bastion of nationalism, and that many who live in the east and south are inclined toward communism. Electoral patterns and the behaviour of politicians over the past ten years have provided ample evidence of an east–west split in Ukrainian politics (Hesli, 1995; Holdar, 1995; Barrington, 1997; Craumer and Clem, 1999). The economic, historical, and cultural differences among regions have been described above. The important question in the present context is whether the regional 'effect' is more than just the product of the socio-demographic attributes of its inhabitants. There are

marked ethnic and ethno-linguistic differentials among Ukraine's regions which may account for variations in the political identities of their inhabitants. Only multivariate statistical analysis will allow us to determine the extent to which the regional factor in Ukrainian electoral politics is 'real'. If we do observe independent regional differences, we can expect them to reflect the historical variations in electoral experience outlined in Chapter 1. Residents of Western Ukraine should be more likely to welcome democratic modes of decision-making and Western cultural standards, whereas those who reside in the east can be expected to demonstrate greater allegiance to both the Soviet system and to Russia.

Communist party membership is the final group identification that may be expected to have an impact on the electoral behaviour of some Ukrainians. The influence of party membership on vote choice can be interpreted in terms of both group identification and material assets. But it would seem that its role in affecting group identifications and perceptions of group benefit was more important than its ability to determine individual material resources in the late Soviet period, given the limited material privileges rank-and-file members enjoyed (Hill and Frank, 1986: 147–8), and the relative decline in their privileges in the final years of the Soviet Union (Bahry and Silver, 1992: 166–9).

A more plausible claim is that Communist Party membership influenced lifestyle and patterns of social interaction in the Soviet system (Inkeles and Bauer, 1959: 303, 323; Bauman, 1974; Hill and Frank, 1986: chap. 2). One might think it obvious that party membership would dispose a person to support the regime, as the regime accorded party members a privileged role in political, social, and economic decision-making. Yet in assessing the influence of party membership on attitudes toward reform, two factors must be borne in mind: firstly, the principal incentive for most people to join the party appears to have been the enhanced career prospects it yielded (Bahry and Silver, 1992: 159). Secondly, in evaluating the prospect of regime change, it would have been rational for party members to weigh the benefits of their collective position in the Soviet regime against the expected benefits of their position in a non-Soviet regime, rather than against the benefits of other positions in the Soviet regime. If this is indeed what they did, it is not clear that they would necessarily have had overwhelming reason to support the perpetuation of the status quo. Not only were the relative privileges enjoyed by party members declining during the *perestroika* period, but those benefits were arguably not entirely dependent on the formal organizational structure of the party anyway. One of the most

prominent features of the party was the network of connections and contacts it represented (Willerton, 1988; Harasymiw, 1990; Bahry and Rykoff, 1992). If party networks could outlive the formal party organization, party members might be able to convert their political capital under the Soviet system to economic capital under the market system. This makes it seem unlikely that they would have been particularly supportive of the most economically conservative positions.

The extent to which party members would have been willing to support democratization and the devolution of political power from Moscow to Kiev is, however, more debatable, given that these processes heralded the demise of the very organization that bound them, and given that the approval of such measures was in many cases associated with rejection of the party itself. The evidence from surveys is inconclusive. Some studies have found that party members in the European USSR were marginally more likely to support the Communist regime, but the relationship appears to be weak (A. Miller *et al.*, 1992; Gibson and Duch, 1993). The Communist Party was in a state of considerable disarray between 1989 and 1991, wrought by internal division, confusion, and demoralization (White, 1991a; Harasymiw, 1991; Gill, 1994: 100–2, 153–5), and the electoral situation gave party members a positive incentive to distance themselves from the central party apparatus in Moscow (Mihalisko, 1989a: 17). Though it seems likely that party membership has been relevant in shaping vote choice, it is difficult to predict with any certainty the nature of its precise effect.

To sum up the discussion so far, it appears that though some Ukrainian voters will have voted in terms of their individual interests (as determined by their 'dynamic' resources), group identity and perceived group interests will have been the most important clue to vote choice for the majority of the electorate throughout the period under analysis.¹⁵ But in order to form concrete predictions about voting behaviour, it is necessary to take into consideration three other factors specific to the post-Soviet context: the 'representation of representation', identification with non-communist political organizations, and the role of patronage politics.

Firstly, the Soviet conception of representation encouraged the electorate to organize its view of the voting situation in group terms. Because elections to law-making bodies prior to 1989 had been governed by a quota system which ensured that a certain proportion of people from each occupational, ethnic, gender, and age group was represented in elected assemblies, the electorate was taught to think of such bodies as being socially representative (in the statistical sense) of

Soviet society. It is only one step from this conception to the view that it is proper to vote on the basis of the social characteristics of candidates. Such behaviour was also encouraged by the fact that group membership was one of the most readily available forms of information about a candidate: age, occupation, and place of residence were printed on the ballot, while gender and ethnic group could generally be guessed from a person's name. Candidate characteristics may well play an important role in guiding voters, especially during the early years of electoral competition, but we should expect to see their importance diminish over time as political parties come to be more successful in structuring political identity.

Secondly, it is likely that transition-era identifications will be influential in shaping the political identity of a portion of the electorate, especially those who have participated in independent political and cultural organizations and nascent political parties. By 1990, most major independent organizations were in one way or another linked to the Rukh umbrella movement. The influence of this type of involvement would have been a matter of party identification, which remained low in Ukraine throughout the post-Soviet period. Comparative survey findings show that in the early 1990s the Ukrainian electorate had the lowest level of party identification of any country in Eastern Europe, ranging between 10 and 15 per cent depending on the survey (Evans and Whitefield, 1995a; Rose, 1995a; Wyman *et al.*, 1995b), and by 1998 this figure had risen to barely 25 per cent.¹⁶ This can partly be explained by the fact that most parties were both too small and too ineffectual in this period to succeed in mobilizing significant amounts of grass-roots support. But the most common – and undoubtedly valid – explanation is that disillusionment with pluralist politics grew between 1991 and 1998 as a result of economic decline and immobilism within the leadership. This led to a generalization of the scepticism with regard to parties that was the legacy of coerced participation in the institutions of the party-state.

The results of the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections revealed exceptions at the two ends of the political spectrum – the nationalist-democratic right and the Communist/Socialist/Rural left. Not surprisingly, the national-democratic parties derived their support almost exclusively from those areas that were most active in the independence movement of 1989–91 – Kiev and western Ukraine. There are, however, marked differences between the socialization process undergone by these Ukrainian party identifiers and that normally experienced by voters in the West. Ukrainians were socialized abruptly by dramatic events

involving opposition to the regime at a point in their lives when most of them had already reached adulthood. The subsequent fragmentation of the pro-independence side of the emergent party system would have left many such voters with no strong sense of commitment to any one party. Though this section of the electorate is likely to have a high level of identification with parties in general, this can be expected to translate into weak attachment to any particular party. The only strong identification of such voters will be either Soviet-era loyalties or 'negative partisanship' *vis-à-vis* the Communist Party (Crewe, 1976; 1994). Positive identification with other parties can be expected to be largely a matter of economizing on information costs (Downs, 1957; Goldberg, 1969; Fiorina, 1981).

The final factor that needs to be considered is an additional motive for electoral choice not generally acknowledged in Western models of voting behaviour. Kitschelt questions whether in the former Soviet countries (as opposed to those of Central Europe) we ought to expect to see the formation of programmatic parties supported by fellow ideologues in the electorate. He argues instead that the type of 'patrimonial communism' which characterized the Soviet state will lead to patronage parties whose support is based on the direct provision of goods and services (1995). In an earlier paper, Alain Rouquié lists the main features of a polity that are susceptible to the development of clientelistic electoral linkages: (1) material insecurity, especially widespread unemployment; (2) social isolation, characterized by the preponderance of primary links such as family, ethnic group, and region over voluntary groupings (often found in a rural environment); and (3) the privatization and concentration of power, which usually takes the form of a hierarchical social structure and 'incomplete capitalist rationalization of the economy' (1978:25–9). As will by now be clear, all these conditions were met in the post-Soviet Ukrainian situation. Anecdotal evidence and press reports at the time of elections support the view that many local leaders – most of them members of the former Soviet *apparat* – took advantage of the networks of connections and existing patronage structures they had cultivated during the Soviet period to get themselves elected, often through the reborn Communist Party of Ukraine, the Rural Party, or in 1998 the Popular Democratic Party.

But Kitschelt perhaps over-estimates the extent to which Soviet society was in the late 1980s characterized by a compliant clientele for the 'patrimonial communists'. Certainly there was a great degree of opportunistic acquiescence to control by the institutions of the party and the state. But by 1991 there was also much resentment of party privilege.

The degree of antipathy was of course not uniform across different sectors of society or across different regions of Ukraine. Soviet-era patronage bonds can be expected to be stronger in the more isolated rural areas in which people were dependent on a small group of local leaders to provide for their needs;¹⁷ they can be expected to have been strengthened in those areas with high unemployment and strong negative sentiment toward the idea of an independent Ukrainian state. Though it will vary from constituency to constituency depending on the resources of local leaders, electoral patronage is therefore likely to be most prevalent within the rural electorate and that portion of the electorate that has not accepted the regime change and does not have as much reason to value democratic institutions.

The foregoing discussion suggests that electoral competition in Ukraine can be conceived of as being of three embedded types: contests for voters' souls, for their hearts, and for their minds. Voters whose souls are not bought by electoral patrons are then wooed by parties offering a political identity; those who resist both temptations are left to make a choice on the grounds of group or individual interests. Received wisdom has it that the early stages of party competition are characterized by electorates which are 'indeterminate' in the sense that their social attributes do not determine their vote choice (Rose and McAllister, 1986: 9). Yet we have seen that there are good reasons for believing that late-Soviet electorates were socially and politically structured electorates, and that, at least in the case of Ukraine, a considerable degree of socio-political structure is likely to persist into the post-Soviet period. The fact that the Ukrainian electorate is not strongly aligned to a party system is most likely in large measure due to the institutional difficulties that have beset the process of party formation in Ukraine.

In conclusion, the basic cleavage that structured Ukrainian electoral politics during the late-Soviet period was a pro-regime/anti-regime divide which, after independence, was transformed into a anti-statehood/pro-statehood cleavage. This was the legacy of the particular way in which the Soviet Union collapsed, itself partly a function of the results of the elections of 1989 and 1990. Voters' behaviour in this context can be expected to be influenced by a number of factors. The argument elaborated in this chapter suggests a theoretical framework with three distinct elements. Firstly, in the absence of the conditions necessary to facilitate individual interest voting, much of the electorate will vote according to perceptions of group interest. Though voters' primary concern will undoubtedly be their material well-being, it is likely that this will be

interpreted in terms of group welfare. The most influential reference groups in this regard are expected to be ethnic group, region of residence, Communist Party affiliation, and employment sector. Lacking a developed party system to aggregate their interests, voters can be expected to look elsewhere for clues as to who is most deserving of their vote. In this context candidates' social characteristics may also be an important factor in guiding vote choice; voters will opt for candidates whom they can trust, or those with whom they can identify. Secondly, cleavages related to individual interests will be of considerably lesser importance in determining vote, though they will undoubtedly play some role. The factors that will probably be most important in this context are age, skill level, and place of residence (urban or rural). Finally, the anti-statehood side of the main issue cleavage will tend to be colonized by patronage-based electoral mechanisms. These will be used by local leaders to convert Soviet-era resources into competitive political machines. A portion of the Ukrainian electorate will in all likelihood be removed from the arena of open competition by clientelistic relations of this sort.

Data and methods

In the previous sections a number of hypotheses were advanced regarding the social determinants of Ukrainian electoral behaviour in the late- and post-Soviet periods; this section will discuss the operationalization and testing of these hypotheses. First we will consider issues germane to the choice of the type of data to be used. The statistical methods employed to carry out the analysis will then be discussed.

Choice of data

In an ideal world, the hypotheses set out in this chapter would be tested with reference to complete data on the social characteristics and values of each member of the Ukrainian electorate, as well as knowledge of his or her voting behaviour in each election. It would also be necessary to have exhaustive information on the political situation itself – the issues that dominated the election campaigns, each candidate's views, reputation, and social characteristics, and knowledge of how all these aspects of the electoral situation were perceived by each voter. In the real world, no political scientist is fortunate enough to have access to exhaustive data of this kind, and choices must be made between potential data sources based on the quality and availability of different types of data as well as on the aims of the research project.

The two principal types of data that could be used in the present case are individual-level survey data and aggregate-level demographic and electoral data. In terms of quality and availability, there are advantages and disadvantages to each. As far as quality is concerned, aggregate-level demographic data have the advantage of relative completeness; they contain information on the entire population, rather than a small sample that excludes those unwilling to be interviewed. Electoral data have the added advantage that they represent highly accurate reflections of actual electoral behaviour, whereas survey data yield at best only respondents' accounts of their behaviour.¹⁸ Aggregate population data, on the other hand, have the disadvantage of all 'process-produced data' that they are collected for the needs of those collecting them, not those of the academic researcher, and that the form in which they are reported is not always well suited to the purposes of investigation. Furthermore, they are typically collected on a limited range of socio-demographic characteristics only.

The availability of aggregate-level data is determined by factors specific to the region under investigation. In the case of Ukraine, the main sources of demographic data include the 1989 Soviet census, data compiled annually by the Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics, and archival data on Communist Party membership. In each case data are aggregated to the level of the city or *rayon* (the principle sub-*oblast'* level Soviet administrative unit). Electoral data are aggregated to the constituency level for parliamentary elections and to the city/*rayon* level for presidential elections and referendums.

The availability of survey data is more problematic in the present case. Whether or not survey data are suitable for a historical analysis of electoral behaviour is in large part a function of the point in time at which surveys happen to have been conducted and the type of questions asked. A number of high-quality surveys were carried out in Ukraine between 1989 and 1998. But though these would yield reliable demographic data for the present study, only surveys carried out close to the time of each election might provide adequate data on vote choice, and they would have to have asked appropriate questions. In the present case suitable survey data were only available for the 1998 elections.

It is this last factor, above all else, which necessitates the use of aggregate-level data for all but the final portion of this investigation. But it will be well to consider both the limitations and the advantages of this type of data with respect to the aims of the research project in question.

One problem often encountered when using survey data is the 'individualistic fallacy' of neglecting to account for the effects of contextual factors on individual behaviour (Scheuch, 1966; 1969). A relevant instance of the 'individualistic fallacy' is the isolation of voting behaviour from the political context in which it takes place. Definition of the relevant 'political ecology' will vary from country to country and from period to period, depending on the nature of the political system in question, the cleavage structure of the country, and the issues that are electorally salient. Constituency-level variables will be considerably more important in a rapidly changing political situation where there is a weak or non-existent party system. The period in Ukraine between 1989 and 1998 was characterized by high information cost inflation and, for the majority of voters, no readily available 'safety net' such as the cost-economizing mechanism of party identification. In the parliamentary elections voters were disorientated due to electoral inexperience and rising numbers of unfamiliar candidates on their ballots, but the severity of their disorientation varied from constituency to constituency according to the number of candidates standing, the proportion of those candidates who were party- or bloc-affiliated, and the degree of familiarity of the parties or blocs to which they were affiliated. The solutions voters adopted to the problem of high information costs can also be expected to have been in part determined by the degree of variation among candidates with respect to their non-party characteristics. This is perhaps the strongest argument for using concentrated constituency-level data as opposed to a widely distributed sample when analysing electoral behaviour in Ukrainian parliamentary elections. While constituency-level factors are undoubtedly of some importance in any semi-majoritarian or majoritarian system, they are especially significant in situations where there is a high degree of heterogeneity across constituencies in the choices on offer, as has been the case in Ukraine. A survey response to a question about support for party X is a poor indicator of electoral behaviour if no candidate from party X is standing in the respondent's constituency.

For all of the above reasons, the choice of aggregate-level data appears to be an appropriate one for the purposes of the task at hand, and to this end the analyses of the 1989–94 period will employ data from the Soviet census of 1989 in conjunction with electoral results, data on candidates, and data on party membership from the archives of the Communist Party of Ukraine. At the time of the 1998 elections, however, it was possible to design a nation-wide electoral survey that focused on 25 constituencies, such that the electoral ecology at the

constituency level could be assessed. Both types of data are described in detail in Appendix 1, which also addresses the question of the validity of Soviet data and its appropriateness to the task at hand. The principal disadvantage of the census data is that figures on occupational sector were available for only a limited number of regions, gender differences across regions are not great enough to make this data usable, and there were no data at all on religious affiliation. For all of the other factors conjectured to be influential in determining vote choice, the creation of variables was relatively straightforward (see Appendix 1). Given the theoretical uncertainty as to whether stated ethnic group or language use was a better indicator of ethnic identification in Ukraine, both variables will be tested and the analysis will employ that which proves most statistically distinctive (explains the greatest amount of variance) in each case. To control for regional variations in ethnicity and other social attributes, regional controls (dummy variables) will be used in all analyses, except where very small numbers of cases makes their omission desirable.

Methods of analysis

The methods employed in many of the analyses undertaken in this study are straightforward and require little comment. For each of the parliamentary elections data were gathered on all or virtually all candidates, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to investigate the impact of their different social characteristics on their degree of electoral success. In the case of the 1998 elections, the availability of survey data make it possible to analyse vote choice for parties and party camps using the standard methods of logistic regression.¹⁹ But for some of the analyses, inferences as to individual-level behaviour will necessarily be made from relationships among different sets of aggregate data, and this raises some issues that require comment.

Since André Siegfried's (1913) classic study of the electoral geography of western France under the Third Republic, aggregate data have been used by political scientists, sociologists, and geographers to explore the relationships between socio-geographic patterns and electoral behaviour. But W. S. Robinson (1950) showed that aggregate-level correlation coefficients tend to exaggerate relations at the individual level because of the reduction in variance brought about through the aggregation process. He cautioned against what has been termed the 'ecological fallacy' of estimating effects at one level based on relations observed at another.

Fearing the consequences of aggregation bias, many have since shied away from using aggregate data to infer individual-level relationships.

Yet given the obvious benefits of data of this sort, a number of attempts have been made to deal with the statistical problems inherent in cross-level inference. Notable among these is the technique of ecological regression developed by Leo Goodman (1959), who claimed to have demonstrated that the ecological fallacy could be avoided if unstandardized regression coefficients were used in place of correlation coefficients.²⁰ It was subsequently demonstrated that though the use of unstandardized coefficients is advisable when dealing with aggregate data, aggregation bias can also affect these coefficients, given sufficient intra-unit variance in variables related to the dependent variable.²¹ It was thought that bias could still be avoided if the regression equation was properly specified at the individual level, but this has also been demonstrated to be untrue, as the effects of geographical grouping can generate bias regardless of how well-specified the model is (Achen and Shively, 1995: 94–115). Gary King has recently developed an alternative solution to the problem of cross-level inference based on maximum-likelihood techniques (King, 1997). At the time of writing the King method is probably the most reliable tool for minimizing the effects of aggregation bias. Unfortunately this method would not in the present context yield measures that were susceptible to ready interpretation. The King method produces indices of the proportion of social categories that vote in a certain way, rather than measures of their influence, whereas what is of interest in this study is the relative degrees of influence different factors exert over electoral outcomes.

Recent advances in the field have, however, also pointed to the fact that standard OLS regression is quite robust under cases of minimal aggregation bias (Owen, 1997). Aggregation bias is generated by geographical grouping, or what geographers term 'intra-unit spatial autocorrelation' – the (usually self-selecting) tendency of people who live near one another to share social characteristics. Fortunately for our purposes, Soviet social planning worked to minimize this tendency in the USSR. Though there was a considerable amount of sectoral segmentation in the distribution of the population within administrative units, the distribution of most of the variables employed here was more even than it might be in a society where there are high levels of geographical mobility and ample opportunity to choose one's place of residence.

Upon careful consideration it was decided that the benefits of OLS regression outweigh the dangers in the present instance. The flexibility of the tool, the opportunities it affords to test for violations of assumptions, and the ready interpretability of the results it yields are of considerable advantage. Furthermore, this investigation is concerned more

with overall patterns than with the precise magnitude of their effects. If we bear in mind that the reported coefficients may over- or underestimate the true impact of some variables (especially for those that represent small proportions of the population, such as Communist Party members and those with higher education), we can be reasonably confident that this technique will provide us with a good picture of the relationships in which we are interested.²² The main drawback to the use of aggregate-level data is that they only enable the researcher to uncover the most salient features of the relationships under analysis. Fortunately, the availability of survey data for the 1998 elections will enable us to examine the subtler nuances of voting patterns in greater depth.

Conclusion

Electoral results are a function of the dynamic interaction between voters' dispositions and the opportunities available to them. This chapter has argued that lack of partisan alignment in Ukraine is not caused by the same factors as it has been in many Western democracies. Rather, it is the joint consequence of the after-effects of Soviet rule which 'inoculated' voters against parties, and the dynamics of political de-monopolization which have made the formation of effective new parties particularly difficult. It will doubtless be some time before a nation-wide party system is firmly in place in Ukraine, and the road to democratic consolidation can be expected to involve considerable electoral volatility. But there ought nevertheless to have been from the start observable regularities in voting patterns, and these can be expected to be grounded in the social structure of the republic. Chapters 3–7 will evaluate this supposition in the light of empirical evidence.

3

The Beginning of Choice: Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, 1989

The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 were the first in recent Soviet history to offer the electorate any real degree of choice. Though the competitiveness of the race was still limited by bureaucratic measures designed to ensure outcomes satisfactory to the leadership, the elections unleashed democratic expectations and hopes that were to have important consequences in the months ahead. The elections also served as an important learning vehicle for voters and contenders alike (Kiernan, 1993: 159). The difficulties encountered by many potential candidates in securing nomination prompted the nascent opposition to find more effective means of organization, while the leadership received unexpected lessons in the dangers of complacency. For voters, the elections provided an opportunity to observe *demokratizatsiya* in action, and for many of them the 1989 contests were undoubtedly the moment when they realized that profound political transformation 'from below' might be a real possibility.

The dawn of opposition

Organized opposition to the Soviet apparatus was slow to form in Ukraine, due in large measure to the tight rein general secretary Shcherbyts'kyi kept on all political forces in the republic. By late 1988 only a handful of alternative groups had mass followings, and most of these were still 'informals' (*neformal'ni* – groups that had not received official sanction from the leadership). But the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies acted as a spur to group organization. The first few months of 1989 witnessed a flurry of founding congresses and draft

statutes, many of which served a secondary function as election rallies and manifestos respectively.¹

Starting in 1987–8 a number of informal social movement groups had begun to organize around issues such as civil rights, environmental preservation, and Ukrainian cultural heritage. Though the aims of these groups were not explicitly political, many of them used their para-political positions to question Soviet policy on several issues that were to prove crucial in the 1989–91 period. Most prominent among the informals were the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, Memorial, Zelenyi Svit and the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society.²

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union (a re-founded version of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group active in 1976 and 1977) commenced activities in 1987 and announced its official (re)formation in 1988. Its proclaimed aim was to oblige the Soviet Union to live up to the human rights commitments laid down in the Helsinki Accords, but the UHU was also one of the groups most radical in its advocacy of Ukrainian sovereignty (though at the time of the 1989 elections the official position of the group was that the Soviet Union should have a confederal structure. On the UHU, see Haran', 1993: 12–16; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 65–8).

Another prominent civil rights group was the Ukrainian branch of the all-Union Memorial movement, whose aim was to honour the victims of Stalinism and bring to light as much information as possible about Stalin's repressions. The Ukrainian Memorial began activity in 1987 but held its founding conference shortly before the elections in March 1989 (Nahaylo, 1989d; Wishnevsky, 1989; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 94–5).

The environmental movement had been sparked as early as 1986 by the Chernobyl disaster and the subsequent cover-up of the extent of the health risk it posed. By 1988 concern about environmental destruction had spread to other domains as well, including industrial pollution of air and water. The year of 1988 marked the beginnings of a nationwide organization called Zelenyi Svit ('Green World'), whose aim was to co-ordinate local environmental campaigns and to promote 'ecoglasnost' (greater openness on the part of the authorities about ecological problems). By 1989 one of the main demands of the movement was the devolution of economic decision-making from Moscow to Kiev, so that Ukraine could have control over its own environment. The imposition on Ukraine of a disproportionate share of the Soviet Union's large-scale industrial development projects was seen as one of the main reasons for the poor state of the republic's environment (see Marples, 1991: chap. 5; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 76–7).

The other main sphere of social movement activity in 1989 was the cultural domain. Though there were close links between cultural, civil rights, and environmental groups,³ a number of movements such as Spadshchyna, the Tovarystvo Leva, Hromada, and the Culturological Club were formed explicitly to promote Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian language. In the winter of 1989 a number of strands in this movement coalesced in the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, created within the Ukrainian Writers' Union.

The formation of the Shevchenko Language Society was the by-product of an unsuccessful attempt in 1988 to found a popular front movement in support of *perestroika* after the Baltic model (Haran', 1993: 27). The establishment of such an organization had been attempted in L'viv in the spring of 1988 by a coalition of groups ranging from the Ukrainian Helsinki Union to the L'viv Komsomol, but this effort had been strongly repressed by the authorities. That summer, however, the idea was taken up by groups within the Kiev branches of the Writers' Union and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. These were prestigious official organizations of republican stature, most of whose members were communists. An initiative group was formed in the autumn of 1988 to develop plans for a popular front organization called the Popular Movement in Support of Perestroika, or 'Rukh' (meaning 'movement' in Ukrainian) for short. The purpose of Rukh was to act as an umbrella organization to represent the interests of many of the informals, to co-ordinate their aims, and to promote democratic political and economic reform in Ukraine. A draft statute of Rukh was agreed in late January (the text was published in *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 16 February 1989: 3). But at that point – probably in view of the up-coming elections – the Ukrainian central authorities began a campaign against the idea, and against informal movements in general.⁴ The Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society served in some respects as a front for Rukh until the latter was allowed officially to form in September 1989.⁵

A final important rights cause was the legalization of the banned Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox churches. Church movements were represented at the time of the 1989 elections by various 'initiative groups', some of whose agendas were clearly nationalistic,⁶ and others that were more moderate. As far as the Greek Catholic Church was concerned, a main focus of attention was on persuading Pope John Paul to intervene with the Soviet authorities on the church's behalf (see Nahaylo, 1989c; Bojcun, 1990; Bociurkiw, 1990b; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 73–4, 89–92).

It is easy in retrospect to over-estimate the grip of the emergent protest movements on the popular consciousness at the time. There were a large *number* of such organizations in Ukraine – Communist sources put the figure at 60 000 (Lytvyn, 1994: 140) – and the larger movements were able to attract tens of thousands of people to rallies and demonstrations, but the people mobilized by these movements still represented a minority of the population. The available evidence clearly indicates that the majority of people in Ukraine, as in the Soviet Union generally, were more concerned with falling supplies of material goods during this period than they were with the supply of public information, with republican sovereignty, or with opportunities to participate in political decision-making (Krawchenko, 1990c: 8; Marples, 1991: 200–11; Lytvyn, 1994: 141; White, 1990a: 65; cf. Remington, 1990). Nevertheless, a basis for competition had been created.

Institutional reform and the 1989 elections

Institutional reforms made competitive elections possible for the first time in recent Soviet history, and developments at the grass-roots level made competition a reality.⁷ Electoral reform had been under discussion for a number of years in the Soviet Union (see Hill, 1980: chap. 2; Hahn, 1988; White, 1988; 1990a). Several of the Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern Europe had electoral systems with some degree of choice among personalities, while still allowing the party strict control over the policy-making process. It was thought that a similar system in the Soviet Union would give voters a greater sense of political efficacy and involvement, and that this would stimulate genuine support for the Soviet socialist system. The aim was to move from an electoral strategy of coercion to one of persuasion.

The outcome of these discussions was a dual reform; both the electoral system and the structure of the all-Union legislature itself were overhauled. At the Nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1988 a new all-Union legislative body called the Congress of People's Deputies was proposed. From this popularly elected body a smaller functioning chamber was to be elected on a rotating basis. The Congress was to be composed of 2250 deputies, 750 elected from 'national-territorial' constituencies distributed among the administrative areas of the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics, 750 elected from 'territorial' constituencies constructed according to population distribution, and 750 elected from officially sanctioned and controlled 'social organizations' (Ukr. *hromads'kyi orhanizatsii*; Rus. *obshchestvennye organizatsii*), ranging from the Communist Party to the Union

of Friendship Societies.⁸ Because Ukraine is a relatively densely populated country, it was allocated only 32 'national-territorial' seats but 143 'territorial' seats.

The second major set of reforms to be undertaken at this time (and ultimately the most significant) were changes to the electoral law.⁹ After the success of the initial experimentation with approval voting in the 1987 local elections (see Chapter 1), the principle of multiple candidates was extended to the national level. The most important change was undoubtedly an understanding that 'as a rule' there should be more than one candidate in each constituency.¹⁰ But three other reforms are also worthy of comment: firstly, residents' groups of 500 or more were for the first time given the right to nominate candidates (previously only workers' collectives or branches of official organizations had enjoyed this right); secondly, the nomination process was lengthened by provisions for a two-phase selection process ('nomination' and 'registration') involving two public meetings at each of which candidates had to receive an absolute majority of the support of those present in order to be allowed to proceed to the next stage; thirdly, candidates were obliged to campaign on the basis of electoral 'platforms' of their own devising. Multiple candidacies, popular nomination, and the requirement for individual platforms represented marked liberalizations of standard Soviet electoral practice, but much of their effect was undone by the strict and complex control on candidate selection.

Though the people were to be given a role both in the choice of candidates and the choice of deputies, this role was tightly circumscribed by the opportunities for intervention built into the electoral law (White, 1990a; Urban, 1990: 90–103; Lentini, 1991). All nomination and registration meetings had to obtain official sanction, and they tended to be dominated by the party faithful. What is more, voting was by show of hands or voices, which widened the scope for subtle pressure to be exerted on participants. The degree of control exercised appears to have varied from constituency to constituency (Chiesa, 1993: 32), but in many cases the candidates were closely matched by gender, age, and occupation, indicating that local officials had limited the 'choice' offered to the electorate as much as possible. The overall effect of the complex nomination procedure was to filter out both the most radical and the most conservative potential candidates. Prominent members of emergent opposition movements did manage to get their names on the ballot in some constituencies, but their nominations were blocked in many more (Haran' 1993: 38–9; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 92–4), provoking widespread criticism of electoral practices.¹¹

The electoral results

The limited effect of the reforms can be seen in the pattern of candidatures. A total of 7558 candidates were nominated throughout the Soviet Union, but only 2899 were eventually registered for the 1500 popularly-elected seats, representing a Union-wide average of 1.9 candidate per seat (Brunner, 1990: 42). In the 143 territorial constituencies of the Ukrainian republic, 44 (31 per cent) had one candidate, 88 (62 per cent) had two candidates, six had three, two had five, and one seven.¹²

Like the nomination procedures, the balloting was wracked with complexity. The majoritarian electoral system with single-member constituencies was an efficient and highly bureaucratic process before the advent of competitive elections. With the introduction of electoral pluralism, however, it entailed cumbersome and lengthy electoral cycles. For a candidate to be elected on the first round, he or she had to obtain more than 50 per cent of the vote. In constituencies with three or more candidates in the first round, a run-off was held, if necessary, between the two top-ranking candidates. In this second ballot a simple majority was sufficient for success. Where there were fewer than three candidates in the first round but none cleared the 50 per cent hurdle, the entire electoral process was begun anew with a fresh slate. This was a common occurrence in close two-candidate races, given the widespread practice of voting against every name on the ballot as a form of protest.¹³ The first round of elections was held on 26 March 1989. A total of 119 deputies were elected in the territorial seats in this round, and four more in run-offs held during the next two weeks. Twenty-six of the national-territorial seats were also filled at this time (all on the first round). Repeat elections were held in twenty territorial and seven national-territorial constituencies between 14 and 21 May to fill the remainder of the seats.

Despite the populist mood of much of the electorate, the elections were a victory for certain sectors of the elite. The proportion of members of the intelligentsia rose from a tenth in the previous electoral event held in 1985 to a fifth four years later, while the number of working-class deputies elected fell from approximately a third to less than a sixth (1985 figures from *Pravda Ukrainy*, 8 February 1985: 1). In the first case, the rise occurred mainly at the candidate selection stage – 17 per cent of those contesting the elections were members of the intelligentsia, as were 20 per cent of the eventual winners. In the second case, however, the fall occurred at the ballot box: in both cases over a third of all candidates were workers, but in 1989 only 16 per cent of their

number succeeded. The proportion of female candidates also declined by half from 38 per cent in 1985 to 18 per cent in 1989, and there was a further fall to 8 per cent in the number of female candidates elected. Finally, the percentage of Communist Party members elected rose from 68 to 88 per cent. But this rise is deceptive, as it masks the fact that party members constituted 90 per cent of all candidates and were thus less successful in relative terms than their non-party counterparts.

The most spectacular results were in those constituencies where high-ranking officials were ousted from office, including the first secretary of the Kiev city party organization and the chair of the Kiev city soviet, as well as the first secretaries in four *oblasti* (L'viv, Zakarpattya, Chernivtsi, and Voroshylovhrad (Luhans'k)) and the head of the Black Sea Fleet. 'People power' was expressed primarily in a negative form in the 1989 elections; in conformity with Gorbachev's wishes, the people dealt a symbolic blow to those who had inspired the greatest amount of popular displeasure.

Voting patterns

Western analyses of electoral behaviour generally examine voting for parties. But in a one-party state such as the Soviet Union, the meaning of party affiliation is obviously different from its meaning in a competitive party system. Of the 213 candidates in 1989 for which data on party affiliation were gathered, only 21 were *not* members of the Communist Party, and these tended on the whole to be manual workers whose platforms were largely a-political. It therefore makes little sense to look at the characteristics of voting for Communist Party members, for in most constituencies there was no other choice. The alternative approach employed here is to derive a measure of candidates' ideological position from a content analysis of their campaign platforms. The requirement to produce a platform but the simultaneous restrictions on content posed somewhat of a dilemma for candidates. Most candidates were cautious; the language they employed was generally the formulaic jargon of officialdom, replete with the slogans and buzz-words characteristic of the current ideological discourse. With very few exceptions, platforms drew on themes developed in statements made at the time by all-Union and republican leaders, and on the official electoral platforms of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Ukraine. But official ideology in 1989 exhibited a certain range on some issues, and though the platforms were not meant to diverge from the party line on policy, they did

allow the expression of personal enthusiasm and commitment to take a variety of forms. Furthermore, the interpretation of key themes such as *perestroika*, *glasnost'*, and *demokratizatsiya* was open to a limited amount of debate. Issues such as the relative power of the party and the Soviets, the role of 'informal' organizations in society, and the status of the Ukrainian language were topics on which there was some disagreement among the party elite.

It was thus possible for candidates to give an indication of their ideological leanings by selecting topics on which to focus, and the electoral situation gave them an incentive to accord their statements with the dominant mood of the voters in their constituency.¹⁴ Neither those who emphasized the need for greater openness and the rule of law nor those who stressed the importance of strengthening the role of the party were deviating from the official party line, but their choice of official themes provided a good indication of both how politicized they were and how radical were their views. Though information in the press on candidate platforms was in many cases incomplete or indirect (reports of speeches, interviews, and so on), it was generally possible, through careful examination of the words and phrases used in platforms, the order in which themes were treated, and the weight given them, to code the candidates according to how radical their views were relative to the current orthodoxy.

Platforms varied along three principal dimensions: economic policy, political policy, and ethnic policy. Generally speaking, candidates fell into four categories on these dimensions: (1) the apolitical, who spoke of the need for better social services but made little reference to specific policies; (2) conservatives, who paid lip-service to the aims of *perestroika* but focused on improving the existing socio-political system; (3) reformers, who supported Gorbachev's aims to change the system while maintaining a one-party socialist Union; and (4) the very small number of candidates who advocated radical system change, involving extensive marketization, truly competitive elections, and/or far greater independence from Moscow in the cultural sphere.

For the purpose of analysis, each candidate's platform was coded on a four-point scale according to how radical it was on each of the three dimensions. In each case, a candidate was given 0 if no mention was made of the dimension in question (in practice, all candidates made some mention of economic issues, even if this only took the form of an appeal for better roads or an improvement in the food supply; a significant number of candidates made no reference to political themes, and the majority made no mention of ethnic policy).

A score of 1 was awarded to candidates who advocated amelioration of the existing system but did not mention the need for system change. In the economic domain such platforms typically focused on improved social services; political positions of this type often emphasized the need to 'strengthen the authority' of the Communist Party; and references to ethnic themes generally took the form of exhortations to promote 'friendship among peoples'.

A score of 2 was given to those candidates who subscribed to the moderate system changes promoted by reformers in the leadership. In the economic sphere, these included the desirability of introducing more extensive cost-accounting and giving greater economic independence to regions and individual enterprises. They also included calls for social justice, such as the need for society to repay its 'debt to rural areas' and to minimize or abolish elite privilege. In the political sphere, a score of 2 was accorded those candidates who expressed formulaic adherence to political reform, with little elaboration as to the forms this ought to take. This typically took the form of passing mention of *glasnost*, *demokratizatsiya*, and/or the political ideals of the electoral platform of the CPSU. Ethnic positions of this type were characterized by indication of the desirability of developing national cultures and the establishment of Ukrainian as the state language of the Ukrainian republic, but with the caveat that 'friendship among peoples' be strengthened and Russian be maintained as the language of inter-ethnic communication.

A candidate was given a score of 3 if he or she advocated more far-reaching reforms. In terms of economic policy, such measures included price deregulation, change in the ownership structure of enterprises, and development of the co-operative sector. Political policies of this type included calls for electoral reform, the introduction of the institution of the referendum, protection of the rights of the individual, and the establishment of rule of law. In the ethnic domain, a 3 was accorded those candidates who called for the development of Ukrainian culture and/or the establishment of Ukrainian as the state language, but made no reference to 'friendship among peoples' or the need for bilingualism.

Finally, the handful of candidates who received a score of 4 typically favoured wide-reaching marketization and privatization, called for the establishment of 'true' democracy (which was often explicitly contrasted with the *demokratizatsiya* advocated by reformers in the Soviet leadership), and/or criticized the repression of ethnic groups by the Soviet state. A score of 4 was also given to all candidates widely known to be associated with those independent organizations at the forefront of the

movement for radical change, including Rukh, the Shevchenko Language Society, Zelenyi Svit, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and Memorial.

Despite the ideological variation among candidates, the electoral situation facing many voters provided little potential for the expression of preferences on this basis. Nearly a third of constituencies offered no choice between candidates at all as there was only one candidate standing. Moreover, the filtering carried out during the nomination and registration process ensured that candidates were often matched in socio-demographic terms with their rivals; the consequence was in many cases competition between candidates whose ideological programmes exhibited considerable similarities as well. Finally, reports in the press, which were the main source of official information about candidates, did not always give detailed attention to electoral programmes, focusing instead on the personal characteristics and accomplishments of candidates.

It was predicted in Chapter 2 that the electorate would exhibit cleavages along the lines of support for regime change, and that these cleavages would be defined primarily by group affiliations. To test this hypothesis, a data set was constructed including those constituencies in which two candidates were standing and it was possible to distinguish one candidate as being more radical than the other. The degree of 'radicalness' of candidates was estimated by combining each candidate's score on the economic and political position scales described above. One point was then added to the resulting figure if a candidate's score on the ethnic scale was 3 or 4.¹⁵ In cases where candidates received an identical score, greater weight was given to their score on the political and ethnic scales than that on the economic scale, due to the more highly-charged nature of the former. In this way it was possible to code the relative positions of the candidates in 59 of the 88 two-candidate constituencies.¹⁶ The vote share of each of the candidates who scored higher on this composite ideological scale was then employed as a dependent variable (variable to be explained) in a regression model including only those candidates as cases. The model sought to explain ideological 'radicalness' in terms of ethnicity (including language), age, education, and party-membership.¹⁷ Because the proportion of the electorate that votes for a candidate will obviously be a function of the proportion who turn out and the number of candidates in the race, control variables were included for these factors.

In the event, the only social variable found to be significant was the percentage of Russian-speaking residents. As expected, Russophones appear to have been more reluctant to opt for candidates that pre-

Table 3.1 Vote choice on the basis of ideological position, 1989

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
Turnout	-.76	.57
Number of candidates	9.95**	4.41
% Native Russian speakers	-.27**	.11
Constant	105.14	56.71
N = 32		
Adjusted R Square .20		
* = $p < .1$; ** = $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$		

scribed ideological innovation. As indicated in Table 3.1, each 1 per cent increase in the proportion of native Russian speakers in a constituency corresponds with a fall of 0.27 per cent in the vote for ideologically 'radical' candidates. However, the strong positive coefficient for the variable representing the number of candidates in the race is unexpected and requires comment. This variable was included as a control in recognition that the more candidates there are in the race, the fewer votes each candidate is statistically likely to win. We would thus expect this figure to be negative. Contrary to expectation, it is positive and of impressive magnitude. Radical candidates evidently did better in *absolute* terms in those few constituencies with more than two candidates, despite the additional competition they faced. This apparent anomaly can be explained by the fact that these constituencies were the ones in which political leaders were liberal enough to allow a degree of competition not found elsewhere. The variable is thus best interpreted as a control for the political complexion of the local *apparat*, rather than a control for the statistical likelihood of winning votes.

The statistical limits of this analysis, based as it is on a small number of cases, point to the need to evaluate vote choice by means of other techniques. Furthermore, the socio-demographic attributes of *candidates* were also predicted to be important determinants of vote choice. A second model was therefore constructed in which the cases were all those candidates for whom demographic data were available, the variable to be explained was the proportion of the registered electorate who voted for each candidate, and this was modelled in terms of the socio-demographic characteristics of the candidates (entered as dummy variables). The results of this analysis, presented in Table 3.2, support the supposition that candidate characteristics were important determinants of vote choice in 1989.

Table 3.2 Vote choice on the basis of candidate characteristics, 1989

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
Number of candidates	-10.55***	1.12
Turnout	1.05***	.25
Gender (female)	-10.75***	3.48
CPSU member	-9.62**	4.03
Occupation:		
High state official	12.51**	5.43
Director-industrial	-14.60***	4.44
Director-agricultural	-14.04***	5.33
Military	13.23*	7.01
Professional	11.82*	6.33
Party or union worker	10.20*	5.85
Worker-industrial	-8.76***	3.05
Constant	-14.37	24.36
N = 196		
Adjusted R Square: .52		
* = $p < .1$; ** = $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$		

The size and significance of the coefficient for each aspect of a candidate's social profile indicate the role of that factor in determining his or her degree of success. It is evident from the large and highly significant coefficient for gender that female candidates fared poorly; all else considered, women gained on average more than 10 per cent fewer votes than their male counterparts (a result which undoubtedly has cultural rather than specifically political causes). More interesting in the present context is the fact that enterprise directors, both in industry and in agriculture, fared worse than members of any other occupational category. This finding suggests that such people had not by 1989 developed successful relations of electoral clientelism with their workers; the poor showing of directors may be interpreted as an indication of populist anger against privileged elites.

It is less clear, however, that party and government officials were objects of popular wrath. The occupational categories of all-Union, republican, and local party leaders were not significant in the equations. Furthermore, party and trade union workers at lower levels actually gained more support than other candidates. State officials at high levels also exhibited admirable success rates. It may be that members of the party and state elite were, in contrast to their industrial counterparts, successful in

mobilizing support on the basis of patronage networks, and that this counteracted the effects of anti-elite sentiment. But though the proportion of party members elected rose in 1989 at the aggregate level, simply being a member of the CPSU was a significant drawback for individual candidates. All else being equal, voters appear to have preferred independents to party members lacking strong political backing.

If there is evidence of a tendency to vote against local industrial elites and rank-and-file party members, support does not appear in most cases to have been transferred to manual workers.¹⁸ The clearest winners in this election were members of alternative elites such as state officials at the all-Union and republican level, military officers, and professionals. The success of high state officials may be attributed to popular allegiance to the state as opposed to party institutions (though, as mentioned above, state leaders at the local level do not seem to have benefited from this transfer of allegiance). The military may have been perceived as a less politicized source of authority, whereas certain professionals – members of the cultural intelligentsia and directors of service-sector establishments – no doubt benefited from wide-spread coverage in the press.¹⁹ Finally, though the language group of many voters influenced choices made in these elections, the ethnic group of candidates does not seem to have had much impact on their success, nor does their age. Gender, party affiliation, and occupation clearly stand out as the most important aspects of the average candidate's social profile.

Conclusion

At the end of the 1989 electoral cycle the Ukrainian party leadership could point to the large number of Communist Party members elected from Ukraine to the new assembly (87.6 per cent) as testimony to the continued strength and vitality of the party (cit. Lytvyn, 1994:141). But this was a Pyrrhic victory. Though in raw quantitative terms the party may have performed well, party membership actually constituted a liability for candidates. Moreover, in qualitative terms the leadership suffered considerably; the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies fragmented the party and galvanized the opposition, paving the way for the truly competitive contests of 1990.

Several of the hypotheses elaborated in Chapter 2 have received support from the analyses undertaken here. It seems evident that the voter characteristic most important in affecting choice was the ethnically-linked language factor. It also appears that vote choice in 1989 was strongly determined by the socio-demographic characteristics of

candidates, the most important of which were the status variables of party affiliation and occupation. This suggests that many voters took advantage of their first experience with competitive elections to vent their frustration in a populist protest against abuse of power by elements of the Soviet economic leadership. The elections were designed to be a competition among personalities rather than policies, but it appears that they ended up being something in between – a competition among professions. In subsequent chapters the greater availability and quality of data will make it possible to test the extent to which the findings recorded here are indications of enduring behavioural patterns.

4

The Crystallization of Opposition: The Parliamentary Elections of 1990

The republican parliamentary elections of 1990 were the first and last open electoral contests to be held in Soviet Ukraine. Liberalization of the nomination process and the development of an organized alternative to the Communist Party resulted in a parliament that was to prove considerably more radical than its predecessor and better positioned to promote political change than the Congress of People's Deputies elected at the all-Union level the previous year. The fact of holding competitive elections legitimized adversarial politics, while the consequent alteration in the composition of parliament shifted the terms of political debate in the republic, setting the scene for the dramatic events that led to Ukrainian independence in 1991.

The main reason for the increase in competitiveness between 1989 and 1990 was the opening up of the nomination process. Initially nearly four thousand candidates registered for the 450 seats on offer. Though many dropped out over the course of the campaign, the published results of the elections indicate a total candidate corpus of 2892, or 6.4 contestants per seat, more than three times as many as had contested seats the year before. Rukh and other democratic groups came together in November 1989 to form an (unofficial) electoral coalition called the Democratic Bloc (Marples, 1990a; Potichnyj, 1992b; 1993; Lytvyn, 1994: 202–4; Nahaylo, 1999: 242–50).¹ Bloc members stood in some 134 constituencies and the Bloc supported candidates in approximately 70 more (Potichnyj 1992b; *Ukrainian Weekly*, 4 March 1990: 9; 16 March 1990: 5–6; 18 March 1990: 1–2, 7–14). Mandates were eventually won by 118 of these candidates, 88 of whom were full Bloc members. Though its territorial penetration was limited, the Democratic Bloc

Table 4.1 Selected electoral statistics, 1990

	<i>First round (4 March)</i>	<i>Second round (10–18 March)</i>
Constituencies	450	333
Candidates	2892	646
Average number of candidates per seat	6.4	1.9
Turnout	84.7%	78.8%
Constituencies with Democratic Bloc candidates	134	78
Total Democratic Bloc candidates	171	86
Total elected	112	330
Democratic Bloc candidates elected	37	51

was the first organized alternative to the Communist Party in Ukraine since the advent of Soviet rule.² In those areas where the Bloc competed it met with high levels of success, demonstrating that many sectors of the electorate were eager for change (see Table 4.1).

Political developments in the inter-electoral period

The 12 months between the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989 and those for the Ukrainian republican parliament in 1990 were a time of rapid political change in the Soviet Union, and the 1989 contests were themselves an important impetus for this change. The Inter-Regional Deputies' Group (IRDG), established by radical deputies even before the opening of the Congress of People's Deputies, was the first instance of organized opposition within the organs of the Soviet state. In the run-up to the 1990 republican elections, the IRDG provided a base from which group members could agitate for change, and it is generally acknowledged that the IRDG played an important role in setting the political agenda in the inter-electoral months (Kiernan, 1993; N. Robinson, 1993: 99). The Ukrainian membership of the IRDG constituted a political force in its own right within Ukraine. A number of its members formed the Kiev Deputies' Group, which was instrumental in shaping the law that was to govern the 1990 elections, and they presided over many of the activities of the Democratic Bloc.³

Ukrainian republican politics was marked by two highly significant events during this period, both of which occurred in September 1989, mid-way between the two electoral events. The first of these was

the removal of the hard-line Brezhnevite leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi, and his replacement by the slightly more liberal Volodymyr Ivashko; the second was the founding congress of Rukh. These two developments both reflected and advanced a liberalization that was taking place throughout the Soviet Union. The presence of the intransigent Shcherbyts'kyi well into the *perestroika* period had caused considerable consternation to those in Ukraine who supported Gorbachev's reforms, but in the short time between the two sets of elections Ukraine went from being a relative political backwater to having one of the most vibrant opposition organizations outside the Baltics.

Alternative political organizations find their feet

In January of 1990 Rukh demonstrated the strength of its following by organising a human chain of 750 000 people from Kiev to L'viv and Ivano-Frankivs'k to mark the anniversary of the brief union in 1919 between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (Nahaylo, 1990). This was an event of considerable political significance, not only because of the implications it had for the eventual aims of the opposition, but because it demonstrated that Rukh's organizational capacity extended uninterrupted across half the length of the country. The feat was a prelude to the Democratic Bloc's success the following March.

Throughout most of the pre-election period, however, Rukh (and its electoral manifestation in the Democratic Bloc) cannot be said to have been a truly an opposition organization; it is best described as an alternative grouping on the fringes of power, on the fringes of the party, and on the fringes of legality. For this reason its strategies involved oblique rather than direct assaults on the party leadership. Bloc members called for the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) to live up to its own democratic rhetoric, often by subtly subversive mimicry of CPU language.⁴ Bloc member organizations also made explicit the connections between democratization and devolution of power to the republics.⁵ Another common strategy was to link popular concerns to Bloc members' own more explicitly political aims. Simultaneous sample surveys of Rukh party activists and the general population in September 1989 showed that the discrepancy between the priorities of the two groups had not diminished. Whereas for Rukh activists political and cultural issues were of utmost importance, ordinary people were still far more concerned with the economy and the environment (Paniotto, 1991: 179–90).

In this context, Rukh was obliged to emphasize the relationship between the two issue domains by promoting the view that the Soviet centre was exploiting Ukraine, and that Ukraine would benefit economically from greater autonomy.

Despite its rhetorical successes, the Bloc suffered from severe problems in the co-ordination and distribution of information. Rukh branches and member organizations were estimated to have had over a hundred newsletters in circulation at this time (*Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 April 1990), and use was made, especially by the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, of the tried-and-tested communist practice of establishing cells in the workplace (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 109). Yet Rukh suffered in the electoral campaign from the fact that it had no central clearinghouse for information and it had extremely limited access to the official media. Both parent and member groups were required to resort to hand-duplication of many materials due to the tight restrictions on typewriters and the virtual non-existence of photocopiers and computers (Mazurkevich, 1990). As a consequence many voters were ill-informed about Democratic Bloc candidates, to the extent that they often did not know if a Bloc member was standing in their constituency (Slider, 1990; *Ukrainian Review*, 38.2: 43). Given these difficulties, the symbolic and substantive victories of Rukh and associate organizations were impressive: they succeeded in liberalizing the electoral law (see below), they organized rallies and protest demonstrations across the country in the weeks prior to the elections, and they eventually won nearly a quarter of the seats in the new parliament.

The CPU employed a number of counter-strategies to suppress criticism and minimize the appeal of the Democratic Bloc. These tactics can be summarized under three labels: obstruction, assimilation, and imitation. The Party leadership's first instinct was to nip the emerging opposition in the bud. As mentioned in the last chapter, the months preceding the 1989 elections were marked by a severe crackdown on the nascent Rukh. Though pressure lessened somewhat after the departure of Shcherbyts'kyi, the 1990 electoral period nevertheless witnessed numerous incidents of unfair treatment and hostile acts by the party. The most blatant and the most resented of these was the refusal to register Democratic Bloc candidates. It was reported in the Western press that between 10 and 15 per cent of all candidates originally nominated were members of the Democratic Bloc and other independent organizations, but that only a third of these nominees had managed to be registered as candidates. There were also numerous allegations of outright fraud on election day, from ballot-box stuffing and illegal voting by proxy to the intimidation of

voters (*Ukrainian Weekly*, 11 February 1990; 11 March 1990; *Ukrainian Review*, 38.2: 43; Potichnyj, 1992b). This strategy backfired; popular wrath at official manipulation raised public awareness of electoral alternatives to the party and thereby legitimized their place in Ukrainian politics (see Potichnyj, 1993).

The second main counter-strategy adopted by the party was that of assimilation. In keeping with the ideological precepts of leaders in Moscow, the electoral platform of the CPU emphasized the need for the consolidation of all the 'healthy forces' in society and the desirability of co-operating with those in the so-called 'informal' organizations that espoused non-extremist views.⁶ But by blurring the distinction between party and alternative organization, this strategy worked to the benefit of the democrats as well, for it sheltered them from all-out attack and allowed them to deflect accusations of extremism.

Finally, observing the successes of a number of prominent Rukh members in the elections of the previous year, the party leadership strove to imitate the movement's publicity techniques (mass rallies, publicity stunts, and so on), selectively adopted its positions, and in some cases even attempted to infiltrate its organizational structures (Marple, 1990b; Potichnyj, 1992b). It also established a number of alternatives to Rukh – organizations such as the 'Consolidated Platform' (*Pravda Ukrainy*, 30 March 1989; *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 6 April 1989) and 'Unity' (Friedgut, 1994: 57). It is difficult to judge how credible such movements were in the eyes of the people; suffice it to say that they do not appear to have generated a lasting following.

The CPU was by this time beginning to experience serious attrition from its ranks (Mihalisko, 1989a; Lytvyn, 1994: 222–4). The party's efforts to obstruct the nomination of Bloc-allied candidates alienated many of its own liberal-minded members (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 124–5; Wilson, 1997a: 119–20). There was also much discussion at this time about the status of Article Six of the constitution, which guaranteed the privileged place of the party in Soviet politics. When a decision was finally made in February to amend the article so as to remove the party's leading role, anticipation of legitimate alternatives to the CPSU further weakened its position. The party that remained was riven with internal divisions, and its leadership was increasingly on the defensive.

The 1990 electoral law

The electoral law adopted in December 1989 represented a great improvement, in democratic terms, over that governing elections to the Congress

of People's Deputies the previous year. Reserved seats for the party and its affiliates were eliminated, the working parliament was directly elected (rather than being chosen from a larger legislative body), and many formal obstacles to nomination were removed. These changes came about partly as a result of simultaneous changes under way at the all-Union level, and partly as the result of a protracted campaign by the nascent opposition.

The original plan was for an electoral law that closely resembled that of 1989 (except that only 25 per cent of seats were to be reserved for social organizations).⁷ There were also broad provisions allowing electoral commissions to disqualify candidates on the grounds that their platforms contradicted the USSR and Ukrainian SSR constitutions. A number of alternative laws were drafted by members of Rukh and its affiliates.⁸ One that received especial attention was the version drawn up by members of the Kiev Deputies' Group, whose main aims were the direct popular election of all deputies and open nomination procedures.⁹ The initial refusal by the authorities to yield ground on this matter led Rukh to organize protest rallies and to threaten an electoral boycott. The party leadership eventually conceded to most of the democrats' demands: reserved seats were removed, as was the double legislature; the provision that candidates must not violate the constitution was replaced by a clause stating that they must not advocate the forceful overthrow of the state; and the number of voters required to nominate a candidate was reduced from 500 to 200.¹⁰

High expectations generated by the democrats' success in redrafting the electoral law translated into even greater frustration when its implementation was hindered by local election officials. The weeks prior to the elections were punctuated by mass demonstrations in protest against what were perceived to be unfair electoral practices.¹¹ Nomination meetings were denied approval, candidates nominated by Rukh member groups were refused registration, and Bloc candidates were slandered in the official press. Manipulation of the electoral process may have been less ubiquitous than it had been in 1989, but it was still extensive.

A note on the candidate data

The Democratic Bloc was conceived purely as an electoral coalition, a radical counterpart to the Communist party's time-honoured 'bloc of party and non-party candidates'. The Bloc was thus an umbrella over an umbrella, but its membership was in large measure dictated by the

alliances Rukh was able and willing to forge at the time. It therefore did not include a number of democratic groups in the most Russified areas of Ukraine – notably Crimea and the Donbas – that were wary of the nationalist overtones of many of Rukh’s statements and the dubious credentials of some of its more nationalist members. For the purposes of the present analysis, members of the Democratic Bloc proper will be grouped under a common heading with the members of four radical groups in Russified areas: Ekologiya i Mir and the Narodnyi Front Krymu in Crimea, and the Voters’ Associations of Donets’k and Luhans’k (Voryshylovhrad). I shall retain the term ‘Democratic Bloc’ for the sake of convenience, as the overwhelming majority of the deputies included in the analysis were members of this organization.

In the classification of candidates it was decided it was best to err on the side of caution and code a candidate as a Bloc member only if there

Table 4.2 A profile of the Democratic Bloc

Occupational characteristics	
Professionals	105
Engineers and technicians	14
Heads of public service-sector establishments	1
Heads of industrial enterprises	3
Administrators in industrial enterprises	2
Industrial workers	8
High state officials	3
Lower state officials	2
High party officials	1
Lower party officials	4
Military officers	1
None	9
Unknown	7
Total	171
Communist party membership	
CPSU members	83
Non-affiliated	86
Gender	
Women	12
Men	158
Region	
West	64
Right Bank	51
Left Bank	9
South	14
East	33

was unambiguous evidence of affiliation either with the Bloc itself or with one of its member organizations. Full members only were coded as Bloc affiliates in the candidate database used in this analysis, while Bloc-supported candidates were coded as non-Bloc members. The justification for this decision is that (a) information on Bloc-supported candidates (as opposed to full members) was incomplete and inconsistent; (b) there is a strong likelihood that Bloc support was not widely known among the electorate and may not even have been sought by the candidate himself or herself, whereas actual affiliation with a Bloc member group was more likely to have received publicity; and (c) institutional affiliation is a key marker of political loyalty, and thus of more use in studying the emerging bases of party support than institutional sympathy. Most accounts point to a total Bloc membership closely approximating that estimated in this study.¹² Table 4.2 provides an overview of the social characteristics of Democratic Bloc members.

Voting patterns

It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that statistical analysis of voting behaviour in the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies was hampered by the fact that there were relatively few constituencies in Ukraine, which meant there were often too few cases with which to construct statistical models to test certain hypotheses adequately. The 1990 elections represent a great improvement in this regard. Not only does a higher level of political organization provide a firmer basis for measuring vote choice, but the greater number of cases allows for more reliable and detailed models to be built.

As already mentioned, the Democratic Bloc contested 134 seats, and an estimated total of 171 candidates were Bloc members. The majority of the seats with more than one Bloc member were located in the city of Kiev, where one seat had as many as four such candidates standing. In geographic terms, the Bloc was strongly concentrated in Kiev city and the three western *oblasti* comprising Galicia. There were Bloc candidates in 20 of the 22 seats in the capital, and 44 of the 46 Galician seats (See Table 4.3). There were handfuls of Bloc candidates in the provincial capitals of most *oblasti*; elsewhere, the Bloc only had a significant showing in the urban areas of Kharkiv and Donetsk.

Support for the Democratic Bloc was *ipso facto* strongest in the regions where it fielded the most candidates, but Bloc candidates also gained more votes per seat contested in those regions. The Bloc's success rate was impressive by any standard. It won a total of 37 seats in

Table 4.3 Regional characteristics of the Democratic Bloc, 1990

<i>Region</i>	<i>All seats</i>	<i>DB- contested seats</i>	<i>DB overall vote share**</i>	<i>DB vote share in seats con- tested**</i>	<i>DB wins: first round</i>	<i>DB wins: second round</i>	<i>DB wins: all</i>
West	84	56	31.42%	47.09%	34	20	54
Right Bank	108 (35)*	34 (20)	7.03	21.74	2 (1)	17 (14)	19 (15)
Left Bank	42	7	4.25	22.11	–	3	3
South	118	13	1.57	13.66	–	2	2
East	98	24	5.03	20.96	1	9	10
All Ukraine	450	134	9.42%	31.16%	37	51	88

* Figures in brackets refer to Kiev city.

** Vote shares are shares of the registered electorate, not shares of those who voted.

the first round of elections and picked up a further 51 seats in the second round, to give it a total of 88. This means that overall the Bloc won two thirds of all the seats it sought. Though Bloc candidates represented only 5.9 per cent of the entire candidate corpus, they won nearly 20 per cent of the seats in the legislature, and 33.0 per cent of those won on the first round. A Democratic Bloc candidate was thus four times as likely to be elected as a non-Bloc candidate, and ten times as likely to achieve success in the first round.¹³

As can be seen from the regional distribution of success rates in Table 4.3, four-fifths of the Bloc's wins were in its western stronghold and Kiev city. The well-defined regional basis of Bloc support and the fact that the constituencies where its candidates stood were, outside Galicia, virtually all urban seats somewhat reduces the scope for demographic variation. We should thus not be surprised to find that demographic variables are poor predictors of vote for the Bloc, once the presence of a Bloc candidate is controlled for. The results of the analysis nevertheless suggest that the Bloc's adherents had a distinctive profile (see Table 4.4).

As in the elections the previous year, native Russian speakers were distinguished in their electoral behaviour, but in 1990 the direction of the relationship was reversed. Whereas in 1989 Russophones were less likely to support ideologically radical candidates, in 1990 they were *more* likely than others to support the Democratic Bloc. This could be an artefact of differences in the composition of the constituencies included in the two models, but it strongly suggests that the Bloc was able to mobilize across the ethnic divide, that it did not simply appeal to ethnic nationalist sentiment. Whatever significance we attach to this

Table 4.4 Democratic Bloc support, 1990¹⁴

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
% Native Russian speakers	1.36*	.68
% CPSU members (1989)	-9.35***	2.90
% Urban residents	.64***	.21
% Retirement age	3.60***	.79
West	47.59***	7.69
Constant	-68.59	25.42

N = 29
Adjusted R² = .65
* = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01

finding, it is evident that region of residence was a very important factor in these elections. Residents of western Ukraine gave a whopping 47 per cent more support on average to Bloc candidates than people living in other parts of the country. Another significant variable is age; contrary to our predictions as to the effect of material assets, the elderly were more willing to support Bloc members than the young. This may be attributed to the nationalist attitudes of many older residents in western Ukraine, where Bloc seats were disproportionately located. Elderly western residents remembered the pre-Soviet period before the Second World War and tended to be strongly opposed to Soviet rule. In this case cultural factors appear to have trumped material considerations. As was to be expected, however, the Bloc received more support in urban constituencies, where radicals tend to be most tightly organized.

It will be recalled that the expectation with regard to the influence of Communist Party membership was complex. On the one hand, one might think that party members had an interest in supporting a political system which accorded them a virtual monopoly on many kinds of power; on the other hand, some of the most prominent democratic reformers came from within the ranks of the party itself (just under half of all Bloc members were party members). It appears that in 1990 the conservative views of party members were most important in affecting vote choice (at least in those constituencies where Democratic Bloc candidates were standing), for a strong negative relationship is evident between Communist Party membership and vote for the Bloc.¹⁵

Most voters did not of course have the option of expressing their views of the Democratic Bloc at the polls, as the Bloc stood candidates in

only slightly over a quarter of all constituencies. On what basis did voters in the remaining three-quarters of the country vote? One of the much-noted ironies of democratisation in the post-Soviet world is that the composition of elected officialdom tends in the process to become less rather than more demotic. The shift from quota-based selection of representatives by the party elite to election by the mass public brought with it a considerable change in the candidate corpus in Ukraine. We saw this already in comparing the results of the 1989 elections with those of 1985, and in 1990 the trend was more pronounced still. Compared to the candidates who had 'contested' the previous republican elections in 1985 and compared to the candidates of 1989, the 1990 cohort was both more male and higher in occupational status. A total of 38 per cent of the candidates in 1985 were women, whereas the figure in 1990 was only 8 per cent. Over a third of those who stood in 1985 and 1989 were workers, but only 13 per cent of the contestants in the 1990 race hailed from the working class.¹⁶ Likewise, the 1990 elections witnessed a further rise in the proportion of members of the intelligentsia from 17 per cent in 1989 to 29 per cent. Party candidates had already increased from two-thirds to nine-tenths of all candidates by 1989. They remained at roughly the same level the following year (89 per cent), but there was a notable increase between 1989 and 1990 in the number of candidates from high state and party organs. Whereas in 1989 this group made up only 8 per cent of the candidate population, in 1990 they represented 18 per cent. The number of enterprise directors standing increased as well, from 14 per cent to 22 per cent. It may be that changing perceptions of the role of legislatures accounted for the greater attractiveness of parliamentary seats among the leadership, but it is also likely that more leaders were obliged to compete for election directly, as they could no longer rely on being able to exert control over the legislature by proxy through compliant non-party working class delegates.

The tendency toward greater elite participation was magnified by the success rates of candidates.¹⁷ A plurality of seats (174) were won by members of the *apparatus*. The second largest group was composed of professionals in the social and scientific spheres (128), followed by directors and managers in industry and agriculture (92). Only 26 of those elected were manual labourers.¹⁸

Given the opportunity to make a political choice, the electorate was once again most likely to choose those candidates whose institutional affiliations distanced them from the Communist leadership. As with the 1989 elections, a candidate-based model was constructed to probe the effects of candidates' demographic attributes on the support they

Table 4.5 Support on the basis of candidate characteristics, 1990

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Number of candidates	-.78***	.04
Turnout	.29***	.02
DB member	16.82***	1.01
CPSU member (1990)	-2.57***	.71
Gender (female)	-3.10***	.90
Ethnically ambiguous surname	-1.39**	.63
Occupation:		
High party official	9.44***	.76
High state official	6.27***	.89
Professional	1.34**	.68
Agricultural worker	-4.71**	2.23
Constant	-5.13***	2.24
N = 2304		
Adjusted R ² = .38		
* = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01		

enjoyed. Membership in the Democratic Bloc had by far the strongest effect on first-round support of any variable in the model of candidate success constructed (see Table 4.5). Bloc members won on average 16.82 per cent more than non-members. And as in 1989, Communist Party membership exerted a significant negative effect on the number of votes a candidate received.

The role of other demographic attributes was less marked but still significant. Female gender continued to be a deterrent. It also appears that some voters cast their ballots on the basis of a candidate's perceived ethnic identity; candidates with surnames that failed to give a clear signal as to their likely ethnic group received significantly less support than those whose names were unmistakably either Ukrainian or Russian.

The occupational characteristics that attracted and repelled voters underwent a significant change between 1989 and 1990. Whereas in 1989 one of the greatest liabilities a candidate could have was to be an enterprise director, in the first round of the 1990 race this variable was insignificant. The most likely explanation for this change is that directors had begun to adapt to the exigencies of electoral competition by using the substantial resources at their disposal to build successful political machines.¹⁹ This supposition gains support from the strong showing in 1990 of high party and state officials, who were even better placed than directors to engage in this type of activity. It may have

been that such people recognized it would be wise for them to find secure positions in the state apparatus as a form of insurance in the face of slipping party control. The greater success rates of high party officials may well have been to the detriment of their colleagues at lower levels, who were no longer at an advantage. Finally, as in 1989, the fact of being a professional enhanced a candidate's chances slightly, whereas being a worker decreased them.

Conclusion

The parliamentary elections of 1990 revealed an electorate that was becoming increasingly well-defined in social terms. This definition process appears to have operated at two levels. At the ideological level, support for the Democratic Bloc was strongest among residents of western regions and urban areas, among the elderly and among those whose native language was Russian; it was weakest among Communist Party members. At the candidate level, elites received more support than their more plebeian counterparts (partly, it may be conjectured, as a result of emerging clientelist relations), though party membership was still a significant deterrent to popular support.

Comparison with the 1989 models suggests that the two contests brought to the fore different sets of cleavages. This is undoubtedly in large part a function of the changing political situation. In 1989 the most salient vote choice cleavage was language; in 1990 language was still important, but other cleavages had risen to prominence. Yet there are some continuities between the two elections as well. As in 1989 the 1990 electorate was disinclined to support Communist Party members, and once more candidates from the political and professional elites had an advantage over those lower on the socio-economic ladder. But the evidence also points to a counter-mobilization drive on the part of those in the higher ranks of the *apparat*, who evidently began to deploy their skills and resources to compete in the new political climate.

These findings paint a plausible picture of the forces motivating electoral behaviour at this time, but because of the nature of the elections in question, they illuminate only the most salient overall divisions within the electorate. Parliamentary data are 'noisy' data, in that constituency-level factors and candidates' personal attributes exert as much if not more effect on vote choice as ideological considerations. A clearer picture of the link between social attributes and specifically ideological positions will emerge when we turn to the referendums and presidential election of 1991.

5

Mobilizing for Independence: The Referendums and Presidential Election of 1991

Between the spring of 1990 and the end of 1991 the Ukrainian political elite crystallized into groups that were to have lasting relevance for the fledgling country's politics. As the frank expression of political opinion was made increasingly possible, it became clear that opinion leaders were divided along two dimensions: nationalism and politico-economic reform. The events that took place over the course of 1991 served both to bring these divisions into relief and to shift the balance between groups. If the two dimensions are presented in schematic form, a number of possible categories result (see Figure 5.1).¹

	Nationalist	Anti-Nationalist
Pro-Reform	national democrats	liberals
Anti-Reform	national communists	imperial communists

Figure 5.1 A schematic representation of the structure of the Ukrainian political elite in 1991

Pro-reform nationalists are located in the upper left-hand quadrant; these eventually came to be known in Ukrainian parlance as 'national democrats'. Most in this category were from the west, where they were the dominant group at the time. But there were also handfuls of national democrats among the ethnic Ukrainian population in other parts of the country, especially among people whose families had suffered from the Stalinist repressions and deportations. The most respected leaders and spokespeople of this group were dissidents such as V'yacheslav

Chornovil and Levko Luk"yanenko. The other strand of pro-democratic thinking in Ukraine at the time was that of the less nationally conscious liberals. These tended to be young, well-educated urban residents who more likely than not spoke Russian, but who had no particular allegiance to Russia *per se*. Much of the liberal branch of the Communist Party fell into this category, including a number of the founders of Rukh in the Writers' Union and members of the Democratic Platform which formed within the CPU. Recognizing that they shared common short-term goals, these two groups came together in 1989 and 1990; Rukh was the symbol of their union and the nucleus of their organizational structure. But it is fair to say that the priorities of these two groups differed considerably: the national democrats viewed democracy as a means of achieving independence, whereas the liberals viewed independence as a means of achieving democracy. The combined strength of the two groups would not have been sufficient to bring success had it not been for a rift that began to emerge within the ranks of the communist faithful. While the democratic reformers were uniting, their anti-democratic counterparts were splitting into what became dubbed 'national communists' and 'imperial communists'. Again, evidence suggests that this was at least in part an ethnic split between Ukrainians willing to acquiesce to the idea of an independent Ukrainian state (especially if they saw it as the key to their political survival), and ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians who stood staunchly behind the Union (Arel, 1990/91).

In the event, the fate of Ukraine was decided not by the democrats but by the national communists, whose emergence as a distinct group tipped the balance in parliament in favour of what had initially been a pro-independence minority.² This shift is clearly illustrated by the events that took place over the course of 1991. In the March referendums the imperial communists favoured the all-Union question initiated by Gorbachev, whereas the liberals advocated a separate Ukrainian question (see below). National communists such as Kravchuk supported both, while the national democrats were unanimously opposed to the all-Union question but divided over the Ukrainian question (Solchanyk, 1991; Lytvyn, 1994: 263–6). By December all but the imperial communists were in favour of independence. The main divisions within the pro-independence majority were among democrats and anti-democrats on the one hand, and nationalists and non-nationalists on the other. In summary, the rapid pace of all-Union events during this period brought about dramatic changes in the positions of different elite groups with regard to the key question of independence, as first the liberals and

then the national communists came down on the same side as the national democrats. It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that the different groups came to hold this position for different reasons; the high degree of consensus finally achieved in late 1991 masked divisions that became evident in the presidential race of that year.

Pre-independence politics

Between 1989 and 1991 there was a gradual shift of focus across the spectrum of Ukraine's political elites from Moscow to Kiev, culminating in the declaration of independence in August 1991. This shift resulted from the coincidence of externally induced changes and developments within Ukrainian politics. Prior to Shcherbyts'kyi's removal in September 1989, the Ukrainian leadership was relatively conservative by contemporary Soviet standards. Ukrainian democrats often resorted to publishing their views in the Russian press, and they relied on liberalizers in Moscow for support. It will be recalled that when Rukh was first conceived in late 1988 its full name was Popular Movement in Support of *Perestroika*. As this name suggests, its mission was the implementation in Ukraine of Gorbachev's political reforms; Moscow was seen in this context as its natural ally, and Kiev its principal opponent. The 1989 elections and high levels of publicity surrounding the newly-elected Congress of Peoples' Deputies further focused attention on Moscow as the source of political innovation. By 1990 the situation had altered somewhat. Disillusionment with Gorbachev's attempts to manipulate the Congress of People's Deputies, followed by a turnover of leadership in Kiev, shifted attention to domestic politics as an arena for action. Finally, the electoral cycle contributed to the alteration of perceptions, as the main object of interest became the contest for seats in the republican legislature.³

Rukh's dual successes in reforming the electoral law and winning a quarter of the parliamentary seats catapulted the radical democrats from political oblivion to a position of institutional power and made the CPU seem decreasingly relevant in comparison. The simultaneous erosion of the CPU and Moscow-initiated moves to transfer power at all levels from the party to the state enhanced the political potential of the legislature.⁴ These developments worked progressively to extend Rukh's horizon of expectations. Once achieved, their initial stated goals appeared far too modest, and they soon began to press for the establishment of an independent and democratic Ukrainian state. Three institutional changes

provided the emergent opposition with the wherewithal to pursue its ambitions.

Firstly, the local elections held simultaneously with the parliamentary elections in 1990 resulted in victory for the Democratic Bloc in the three *oblast'* councils of Galicia, as well as the city council of Kiev. After some defections, Donetsk city council also fell to the control of the democratic opposition (Friedgut, 1994). The first act of the L'viv city council was, significantly, to have the traditional Ukrainian blue and yellow flag raised over the city hall along side the Soviet hammer and sickle. Control of the Galician councils provided Rukh with an organizational foothold in government that was arguably of as much importance in the period leading up to independence as their representation in the national parliament.

Secondly, at the national level, the parliamentary deputies elected from the Democratic Bloc formed a 125-member parliamentary faction called the Narodna Rada (People's Council). They were opposed by the 'Group of 239' hard-line Communists, but this latter faction soon began to weaken in terms of both numbers and resolve. At the same time the ranks of the Narodna Rada were rapidly swelling. The 35 members of the Democratic Platform formed by liberals within the party were among the first to defect, and others soon followed. The Narodna Rada's organizational enthusiasm within parliament gave it a further advantage over the dispirited hard-line majority, allowing it to gain control of many important committees.⁵

Thirdly, the decision to alter Article Six of the Soviet constitution opened the way for the formation of new parties. The consequence for the democrats was twofold: on the one hand it allowed – and even required – them to define themselves more formally and unambiguously as an opposition; on the other hand it led to fragmentation within this very opposition as parties proliferated. For the time being, however, most of the new parties were united enough in their common opposition to the CPU and their aim of securing Ukrainian independence that fragmentation was not a serious problem.

Meanwhile the growing viability of the alternatives proposed by the opposition, the increasingly tenuous condition of the Union, and the acceleration of attrition from party ranks caused hard-line Communists themselves to question their unthinking allegiance to Moscow. There was a considerable amount of turnover within the CPU leadership at this time, most notably the departure of Ivashko to Moscow, and his replacement as speaker of the parliament by the master of political compromise, Leonid Kravchuk. Opposition to Moscow had by now

become a truly mass phenomenon and one that the leadership was finding it increasingly difficult to subdue. Until 1991 the demands of the workers' movement had been primarily economic, but by the spring of 1991 strike committees throughout the country had begun to coordinate their activities with opposition groups. A wave of strikes in February and March further served to raise awareness of political issues among manual workers (Marples, 1991; Rusnachenko, 1995). Growing pressure from both striking workers in the east and national democrats in the west spurred parliament in July to follow the Russian initiative and declare the legal sovereignty of Ukraine within the Soviet Union. A student hunger strike in Kiev in the autumn of 1990 succeeded in forcing the resignation of conservative Prime Minister Vitalii Masol and making the government agree to postpone consideration of the new union treaty being formulated in Moscow until such time as a revised Ukrainian constitution had been drafted.

Ukraine's position with respect to the new union treaty was the issue around which Ukrainian politics revolved for much of 1990 and the first half of 1991. The referendum called by Gorbachev to resolve this issue signally failed to do so; its main result was in fact to demonstrate the weakness of Moscow *vis-à-vis* the republics. Of the 15 constituent republics of the Union, only Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan held the referendum as instructed with no changes to the text and no additional questions. The Ukrainian opposition initially demanded that Ukraine refuse to hold the poll at all on the grounds that it had been called without consulting the republics and was therefore illegal. Under the influence of the Narodna Rada, the presidium of parliament drafted a resolution calling for an alternative question on Ukrainian sovereignty. The Group of 239 proposed a counter-resolution supporting Gorbachev's referendum. Neither resolution was able to achieve a majority. Kravchuk eventually negotiated a bargain whereby both questions would be put to the people (Solchanyk, 1992a; Lytvyn, 1994: chap. 6). The precise relation between the two questions was unclear; the all-Union question asked voters: 'Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedoms of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?', while the Ukrainian question was: 'Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign States on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine?' Kravchuk advised people to say 'yes' to both, and the vast majority of the Ukrainian electorate followed his advice; the all-Union question received the support of 70.5 per cent of those who voted (58.9 per cent of the registered

electorate), and 80.2 per cent answered in the affirmative to the Ukrainian poll (67.0 per cent of the electorate). The total was markedly lower in the west, however, as the opposition-controlled local councils in Galicia offered their voters the possibility of rejecting both proposals by voting for an additional more radical question: 'Do you want Ukraine to become an independent state which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, and which guarantees equal rights to all of its citizens, regardless of their national or religious allegiance?'. A total of 88.4 of per cent of Galicians answered 'yes' to their own question (84.7 per cent of those eligible to vote), while positive responses to the all-Union and Ukrainian queries in this region were only 38.8 per cent and 63.6 per cent respectively.⁶

The following June, Ukrainian legislators voted again to postpone consideration of the Union question, allowing them to play for time. By the end of August the terms of the debate had changed even more radically. When an attempted coup in Moscow revealed the weakness of the centre and developments in Russia indicated the possibility of a resurgent imperialism from within the Russian Federation itself, the Ukrainian parliament declared full independence (Laba, 1996). Having voted in July to establish a Ukrainian presidency, it called a referendum on independence to coincide with the presidential elections. The president was chosen according to a double ballot system similar to that for Soviet parliamentary elections (though in the 1991 election only one ballot was required).⁷ On 1 December Leonid Kravchuk was elected president with an absolute majority in the first round. The vote the same day in favour of independence was a stunning 90.3 per cent in the country as a whole, and a clear majority in even the most Russified regions of Crimea and the Donbas.

Voting patterns

The key question from the point of view of voting behaviour is how cleavages within the political elite translated into electoral support. It is evident from a quick glance at the overall results of the electoral events held in 1991 that approximately two-thirds of the population supported Kravchuk throughout the entire period, from his stance on the March referendum questions to his bid for the presidency. The main divisions were between this clear majority and the two minorities on either side: the imperial communists on the one hand, and the national democrats on the other. Following the analyses in previous chapters, we can

expect voters will have aligned themselves in 1991 along geographic and demographic lines.

The March referendums

As suggested above, interpretation of the March referendum results is problematic; the compatibility of the all-Union and Ukrainian questions was doubtful, yet the leadership actively espoused an affirmative response to both. Furthermore, the national democratic position demanded a firm 'no' to Gorbachev's formulation of Ukraine's status, but nationalist voters' attitudes toward Kravchuk's version were conditioned by whether or not there was another alternative on the ballot (as there was in Galicia). The situation was clear only for imperial communist supporters: they wanted as much union and as little sovereignty as possible.

The traditional party rank-and-file exhibited a high level of fidelity to the leadership; the coefficient for Communist Party membership indicates a positive influence on vote choice in the models for both questions (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). A contrary tendency is evident among those with higher education. The educated were apparently less likely to follow the guidance of their rulers, as were residents of cities, the elderly, and, in the all-Union vote, native Ukrainian speakers. In the case of the urban intelligentsia this can be interpreted as a continuation of the trend of disaffection with official politics among the most intellectually sophisticated. Though the age effect is more difficult to interpret, it may

Table 5.1 The 'yes' vote on the all-Union referendum question of March 1991⁸

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
% Native Ukrainian speakers	-.20***	.07
% CPSU members (1989)	3.29***	.94
% With higher education	-1.49***	.47
% Urban residents	-.26***	.06
% Retirement age	-.65**	.30
West	-47.78***	3.62
South	-.89	3.67
East	-5.01	4.55
Constant	115.06	10.83
N = 190		
Adjusted R ² = .75		
* = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01		

Table 5.2 The 'yes' vote on the Ukrainian referendum question of March 1991

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
% CPSU members (1989)	4.23***	.66
% With higher education	-1.60***	.40
% Urban residents	-.20***	.04
% Retirement age	-.76***	.25
West	-27.72***	2.99
South	3.96	3.32
East	-6.00**	2.90
Constant	96.58	8.36
N = 260		
Adjusted R ² = .54		
* = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01		

be that the old were suspicious of novelty in all forms, be it a renewal of the Union or enhanced sovereignty for Ukraine.

The final factor that had a significant impact on support for the referendum questions was region of residence. Western Ukrainians were clearly less supportive of both questions, though only on the Ukrainian question was the east significantly more opposed (the Right Bank is used here as a baseline for comparison).⁹ The influence of all the variables is markedly greater for the all-Union question than for its republican counterpart, undoubtedly due to the ambiguities surrounding the interpretation of the latter, but the similarities between the two models are striking. The only substantial difference between them is the significance of the ethnic factor for the all-Union question but not the Ukrainian poll; this suggests that Ukrainian speakers were disproportionately against the Union but were no less likely than other groups to vote in favour of increased sovereignty for Ukraine.¹⁰

The December referendum

If the declaration of independence in August was a revolt against the central party *apparatus* by its republican counterpart, the referendum of December was in large part a demonstration of popular faith in Ukraine's economic, geopolitical, and cultural potential as an independent state. The newly-converted national communist elite employed one of the national democrats' arguments and sought to convince the people that Ukraine was being exploited economically by the central bureaucracy in order to subsidize the poorer regions of the Union. The

Table 5.3 The 'yes' vote in the referendum of December 1991

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
% Native Ukrainian speaker	.22***	.02
% Urban	-.05***	.02
% Retirement age	.31***	.09
West	8.53***	1.16
South	1.95	1.35
East	-1.02	1.37
Constant	60.15	3.11
N = 158		
Adjusted R ² = .85		
* = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01		

strategy was successful in generating broad-based, cross-ethnic support for independence. Despite a massive media campaign by Russia to prevent the Ukrainian people from supporting secession, fewer than one in ten cast a negative vote.¹¹ This result can be traced to a coalescence of two behavioural tendencies that had hitherto divided the republic: national separatist feeling and acquiescence to the current leadership.

It is not surprising that native Ukrainian speakers should have been most supportive of independence (see Table 5.3), or that residence in the west of the country was associated with a higher-than-average tendency to vote 'yes' (though the generally high support rates across Ukraine make the regional differential less striking in this instance). There seems, however, to have been a change in the behaviour of older residents, who swung in favour of independence when it became a virtual inevitability. Urban residents, on the other hand, remained disproportionately opposed to this question, as they had been to the two March polls. This is an unexpected result, and it may perhaps be interpreted as lingering cynicism on the part of Ukraine's most worldly.

The presidential election

The December referendum revealed a high level of consensus in Ukraine in late 1991; the simultaneous presidential election gave evidence of the precise nature of this consensus. There were six contestants in the race: parliamentary speaker Leonid Kravchuk, and five members of the parliamentary opposition, the Narodna Rada.¹² The five had all won seats in parliament in the March 1990 elections, three of them as members of the Democratic Bloc. At the time of the presidential election they were

all leaders of opposition parties or movements, and all but one were ethnic Ukrainians. In other respects there were considerable ideological differences among them, presented in schematic form in Figure 5.2. Kravchuk's main opponent was V'yacheslav Chornovil, a journalist, Rukh member and long-time political prisoner.¹³ Since March 1990 Chornovil had also been head of the radical L'viv *oblast'* council. Among the less successful candidates was another former political prisoner, Levko Luk"yanenko, who had been one of the founding members and most prominent activists of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU). At the time of the election Luk"yanenko was leader of the newly-formed Ukrainian Republican Party which had grown out of the UHU. Two other candidates, Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi and Volodymyr Hryn'ov were liberals, though Yukhnovs'kyi, who had spent most of his career in L'viv, leaned more toward the national-democratic camp than the ethnic Russian Kharkivite Hryn'ov. Hryn'ov was a founding member of the centrist Party of Democratic Rebirth, formed on the basis of the breakaway Democratic Platform in the CPU. Yukhnovs'kyi had been head of the Narodna Rada parliamentary group since May 1991. The final candidate was Leopold Taburyans'kyi, an entrepreneur based in Dnipropetrovs'k who had emerged from the co-operative movement to found the minor and ideologically obscure People's Party.

Kravchuk was the youngest of the six candidates. He had spent most of his career in the party, and as head of the CPU's ideological division, he had been the major go-between in the negotiations over the preceding three years between the party and the nascent opposition. Kravchuk was famous for his cunning and his chameleon-like ability to adapt as circumstances demanded (see Motyl, 1995: 110–11). He had vacillated in this role as ideological chief between outright repression of Rukh and active support. Again during the momentous events of August 1991 he withheld judgement on the putschists in Moscow until it was clear that they were doomed to failure. Only then did he come

	Nationalist	Non-Nationalist
Pro-Reform	Chornovil Yukhnovs'kyi Luk"yanenko	Hryn'ov
Non-Reform	Kravchuk	

Figure 5.2 A schematic representation of the ideological positions of presidential candidates, 1991¹⁴

out in favour of full independence for Ukraine, whereupon he espoused the cause as his own.

Kravchuk's strong showing in the election (62 per cent of the vote) gave the clearest indication yet of the limits of national democratic support. It had been possible for the national democrats to blame their minority in parliament on the obstructionist tactics of the Communist Party during the 1990 electoral campaign. But in December 1991 the electorate was truly free to choose from a wide spectrum, and it became evident that the strength of the liberals and national democrats in the closed political world of Kiev was not reflected among the mass electorate.¹⁵ Though the nationalist Chornovil secured two-thirds of the vote in Galicia, he received only 23 per cent overall, while none of the other candidates managed even to reach the 5 per cent mark. For a few months before and after the December referendum, the issue of independence changed from being a substantive topic of debate to a 'valence' or consensus issue. In terms of their position on this central question there was little to choose between Kravchuk and his opponents; what divided them was rather their past histories and their reasons for advocating Ukrainian statehood.

The most striking aspect of the model for the Kravchuk vote (Table 5.4) is its resemblance to that for the vote on the all-Union referendum question the previous March (Table 5.1 above). As in the model for the all-Union vote, Communist Party membership exerts a strong positive effect which is counterbalanced by the negative impact of urban residence; Ukrainian ethnicity (understood in linguistic terms) also has a slight negative impact. Residents of western Ukraine were considerably

Table 5.4 The Kravchuk vote, 1991

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
% Native Ukrainian speakers	-.19***	.07
% CPSU members (1989)	2.18***	.84
% Urban residents	-.25***	.05
West	-45.37***	3.00
South	-5.61	4.29
East	-7.84*	4.41
Constant		
N = 174		
Adjusted R ² = .72		
* = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01		

less willing to support Kravchuk than those in other parts of the country, just as they had been less willing to support the preservation of the Union to which they had been forcibly annexed 40 years previously.¹⁶ It is intriguing, however, that the east came out slightly against Kravchuk, all else considered.¹⁷

The profile of the Kravchuk voter corresponds at the mass level to the national communists among the political elite. These tended to be Russian speakers (probably many of them ethnic Ukrainians) from central Ukraine with strong allegiance to the Communist Party. When the opportunity arose, it seems they followed their counterparts in Kiev and opted for independence, yet by no means were they inclined to see a need for radical political change.

The Chornovil vote is in many respects a mirror image of Kravchuk support. Communist Party membership and Ukrainian language use have opposite influences, suggesting that Chornovil supporters were more likely to be native Ukrainophones and less likely to be communists than the electorate at large (see Table 5.5). In geographical terms, the Chornovil vote was also decidedly urban and western, though residence in the east of Ukraine was also associated with a slight increase in support for Chornovil, once other factors are taken into consideration.¹⁸ If Kravchuk supporters are the correlates within the electorate of the national communist elite, the same can be said for Chornovil supporters and the national democratic elite. The model for Chornovil's vote corresponds closely to the image of the radical urban western Ukrainian that typifies this group.

Table 5.5 The Chornovil vote, 1991

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
% Native Ukrainian speakers	.35***	.06
% CPU members (1989)	-2.03***	.77
% Urban residents	.17***	.05
West	41.16***	2.74
South	5.74	3.93
East	8.26**	4.04
Constant	-14.71	7.41
N = 175		
Adjusted R ² = .76		
* = p < .1; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01		

Conclusion

Examination of the support bases of the two strongest presidential candidates goes some way towards illuminating the relationship between ideological structure at the elite level and the corresponding groups within the Ukrainian electorate. Of the four main elite types – imperial communists, national communists, national democrats, and liberals – all but the liberals have clear profiles in terms of electoral support. Evidence for the existence of the distinctive groups within the mass electorate corresponding to the main ideological camps at the elite level becomes clearest in analysis of the presidential election. The fact that no candidate stood for the imperial communists can be attributed to the weakened position of this camp in the wake of the official ban on the Communist Party, and to this camp's lack of support for the existence of an independent Ukrainian state. The model for support on the December referendum question affords some indication of the social characteristics of this sector of the population; if we invert the signs of the coefficients, we see that those *against* independence tended to be less Ukrainian, more urban, younger, and hailed mainly from Dnieper Ukraine.

Overall, the most important variables structuring vote choice in 1991 were region and place of residence, (recent) Communist Party membership, and native language. It is interesting that Ukrainian language use is the most distinctive ethnic variable. This suggests that on questions directly related to Ukrainian statehood, those most closely bound to Ukrainian culture had the most distinctive electoral profile. Though Russian language use could have been substituted in these models with little loss of explanatory power, the fact remains that the main line along which the population divided at this point was Ukrainophones versus all other groups.

In 1991 the question of regionalism within the parameters of the Soviet Union became a national issue within Ukraine, but it was an issue on which there was – for the moment at least – little disagreement. At this point in time there was therefore no evidence of sharp political cleavages; the differences within the country were differences of degree, not of kind. The split in the presidential vote in 1991 revealed a gradation in levels of support for independence and democracy, not any true policy division. But the nature of the fault line along which the Soviet Union split was to have important consequences for the subsequent development of electoral cleavages in its former republics. The social bases of the political positions that emerged in 1991 remained largely intact two and a half years later when Ukraine held its first parliamentary elections as an independent country and elected its second president.

6

Independent Ukraine Votes: The Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994

The year of 1994 was one of renewal and consolidation for Ukraine. Dual elections to parliament in March–April and to the presidency in June–July bolstered the state’s democratic credentials by ushering in peaceful and orderly transfers of power. The burgeoning party system was put to the electoral test, and Leonid Kuchma was elected as the country’s second president. The contrast between these events and the political violence in Moscow and Chechnya shed a new light on Ukraine’s political stability and its democratic potential. Finally, the severe economic troubles that had led many to question the viability of Ukrainian independence reached their nadir in late 1993, and by the following summer there were signs of the beginning of economic stabilization.

Yet during the period between 1991 and 1994 the broad consensus in favour of independence had frayed badly. This tendency had been especially notable in the eastern part of the country, which had suffered particularly in the wake of the fragmentation of the Soviet economic system. Regional polarization increased and was compounded by festering separatism in Crimea. Leonid Kravchuk devoted much of his presidency to preventing these growing divisions from tearing the country apart. His efforts to appease all sides resulted, however, in severe political paralysis marked by rising corruption and a failure to implement much-needed economic reforms. By the end of 1993 an estimated two-fifths of industry was at a stand-still with wages going unpaid, GDP had declined by over 30 per cent, and inflation had recently been as high as 70 per cent a month (Johnson and Ustenko, 1993; Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova*, 1994/95; ILO-CEET,

1995). Economic turmoil had been accompanied by extremely limited privatization and structural reform; the result was that an estimated 85 per cent of the population was living below the poverty line (Solchanyk, 1994: 38). In this context, the parliamentary and presidential elections were seen by many as an opportunity for the electorate to give its verdict on the future viability of Ukrainian statehood.

The parliamentary elections

The 1994 parliamentary elections were Ukrainian voters' first chance to go to the polls and choose between candidates representing different parties.¹ Elections were not due till 1995, but throughout the previous two years there had been demands from both the left and the right for the Soviet-era parliament to be replaced ahead of term. A wave of strikes in September 1993 finally forced the assembly to call for its own re-election the following March. Determined not to be alone in being put to the test, it also voted for presidential elections to be held in June.

Despite fierce debates over the electoral law,² the Soviet-era majoritarian system was left largely unchanged, and those alterations that were made proved detrimental to the development of organized multi-party competition and an orderly electoral cycle. Firstly, nomination of candidates by political parties was made considerably more difficult than nomination by workers' collectives or informal groups of voters. For a party to nominate a candidate, it was required to hold a conference of its regional branch attended by at least two-thirds of party branch members or more than fifty delegates. The party then had to submit a list of conference participants and numerous other documents to the local electoral commission. By contrast, only ten voters were required to constitute a 'group of voters' who could nominate candidates through much simpler procedures, and workers' collectives did not have to meet any size requirements to be able to back a nomination. Many candidates who were active in political organizations chose to run as independents for this reason (and also because of the low esteem in which political parties in general were held).³ Of 5833 registered candidates (an average of over 12 per seat), 1557 (26.7 per cent) were nominated by workers' collectives, 3633 (62.3 per cent) by groups of voters, and a mere 643 (11.0 per cent) by political parties.

The second problematic aspect of the electoral law was that, unlike in 1990, candidates had to obtain an absolute majority in the run-off to be elected. This might not seem like a particularly stringent requirement in a two-candidate contest, but a portion of the Ukrainian electorate was

still in the habit of voting against both candidates on the ballot as a form of protest; this meant that in a close run-off 'negative' votes could prevent either candidate from reaching the 50 per cent mark. The maintenance of a 50 per cent turnout requirement further reduced the efficacy of the elections. As the end of the first round, held on 27 March, and the run-offs held between 2 and 10 April, only 338 of 450 seats had been filled. In four-fifths of the remaining 112 cases, the failure to elect a deputy was due to the fact that neither candidate managed to clear the 50 per cent majority hurdle, while in the rest low turnout invalidated the races.

All but 25 of the vacant seats were eventually filled in an electoral cycle that lasted over two years (see Birch, 1996). Repeat elections were held in July and August 1994, November and December 1994, December 1995, and April 1996. These repetitions were in most cases required because of low turnout due to voter fatigue. As the electoral cycle wore on, parties also exhibited electoral weariness, partly in consequence of the stipulation in the 1994 electoral law preventing candidates who had lost one election from contesting a subsequent one. This rule gave an added advantage to well-established and well-staffed parties such as the communists, while newer and smaller political organizations soon ran out of candidates.⁴

From the point of view of parliamentary democracy, one of the most noteworthy features of the 1990–94 period was the development of the party system.⁵ Between the spring of 1990 when the ban on alternative political organizations was first lifted and the first multi-party elections four years later, a plethora of parties germinated, metamorphosed, split, merged, aligned and realigned, such that by 1994 a total of 32 parties were in a position to contest the parliamentary elections. Off-shoots of Rukh dominated the political scene in the year following independence, but as Ukraine's economic situation worsened and the euphoria of independence wore off, parties on the left gradually began to re-emerge and re-consolidate. When the CPU was banned after the failed putsch in Moscow in August 1991, the Socialist party led by Oleksandr Moroz was its main heir. The communists were allowed to re-found in the autumn of 1993, however, and they soon dominated the left, inheriting the mantle of the imperial communists (see Wilson, 1997a).

At the time of the 1994 elections, four party 'camps' were commonly distinguished in Ukrainian politics: the left, the centre, the national democrats, and the extreme right. These camps were aligned along a dimension that incorporated both the pro-independence and the pro-reform axes discussed in Chapter 5 with relation to the referendums

Table 6.1 Results of the 1994 parliamentary elections

<i>Party</i>	<i>Number of seats contested</i>	<i>Vote share, 1st round</i>	<i>Number and percent of seats won</i>	
Communist	294	12.7%	86	25.4%
Socialist	166	3.1	14	4.1
Rural	55	2.7	19	5.3
National Salvation	1	<0.01		
Total Left		18.6%	119	35.2%
Liberal	76	0.6%		
Democratic Rebirth	47	0.8	4	1.2%
Social Democratic		0.4	2	0.6
Green	37	0.3		
Labour	25	0.4	4	1.2
Civic Congress	23	0.3	2	0.6
Labour Congress	16	0.3		
Justice	15	0.1		
Liberal Democratic	9	0.0		
Slavic Unity	8	0.1		
Solidarity & Social Justice	6	0.04		
Constitutional Democratic	6	0.04		
Economic Rebirth of Crimea	5	0.1		
Beer Lovers	2	0.01		
Total Centre		3.4%	12	3.6%
Rukh	214	5.2%	20	5.9%
Republican	126	2.5	8	2.4
Democratic	67	1.1	2	0.6
Christian Democratic	31	0.4	1	0.3
Peasant Democratic	8	0.04		
Ukr. Christian Democratic	6	0.02		
Free Peasants	2	<0.01		
Total National Democrats		9.2%	31	9.2%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	55	1.3%	5	1.5%
Ukrainian Conservative Republican	28	0.3	2	0.6
Ukrainian National Assembly	22	0.5	1	0.3
Social Nationalists	21	0.2		
Organization of Ukr. Nationalists	11	0.1		
State Independence of Ukraine	11	0.1		
Ukrainian National Conservative	6	0.02		
Total Extreme Right		2.4%	8	2.4%
All parties		33.5%	170	50.3%
Independents		66.3%	168	49.7%
Total seats filled			338	100%

and election of 1991. Broadly speaking, the left tended to be both more anti-nationalist and more anti-reformist, while the right – at least in its national-democratic guise – favoured political and economic restructuring in the interest of consolidating the Ukrainian state. Many reform-minded centrists were willing to sacrifice a degree of Ukrainian sovereignty for the sake of improving the economy through stronger economic ties with Russia.

Two principal issue areas dominated the run-up to the parliamentary elections: economic policy and geo-political policy, with the focus in the latter case on ties with Russia (Wasylyk, 1994a).⁶ In both spheres the events of the past two years had made many voters sceptical of experimentation and inclined to favour the Soviet *status quo ante*. This allowed the left to make an electoral comeback, and the largest bloc in the new parliament was the leftist group of 120 deputies made up of Communists, Socialists, and Rural (*Selyans'ka*) Party members. The national democratic right retained approximately the same number of seats it had won four years earlier (about a quarter), but it failed to improve its position. The remainder of the deputies elected in March and April 1994 were centrists and independents (see Table 6.1).

Voting patterns

In conducting an analysis of the 1994 elections, we come up against the difficulty (discussed in Appendix 1) of data ageing. Given the likelihood of changes in the demographic structure of Ukraine between the time of the census in 1989 and the time of the 1994 elections, we should expect the census data to have lost a certain amount of their predictive strength. But, as we shall see, there were still discernible relationships between the demographic patterns recorded by the census and voting results five years later.

Voting for parties

The electoral support of the four main party camps – the left, the centre, the national democrats, and the extreme right – was probed with regression analysis, but it only proved possible to construct significant models for the leftist and the national-democratic vote.⁷ Each model included those constituencies contested by parties of the camp in question, so as to control for the distribution of candidates.⁸

The vote for candidates of leftist parties was found to be influenced by three factors: age, education, and region of residence. As is well known in Ukraine, leftist voters are on the whole older and less well

Table 6.2 Support for party camps, 1994

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>National Democratic</i>
% With higher education	-.51* (.27)	
% Retirement age	.79*** (.25)	
West	-9.12* (4.73)	10.83*** (2.07)
Left Bank	2.67 (3.22)	-2.38 (2.54)
South	7.20** (3.29)	-4.74* (2.46)
East	13.85*** (2.95)	-5.55** (2.38)
Constant	3.11 (8.07)	10.02 (1.31)
N	166	157
Adjusted R	.24	.26

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

educated than other voters. Left-wing support also conforms to the by now familiar east-west gradient (see Table 6.2). The model for national democratic support is distinguished by the fact that *only* regional variables are significant, but they are so significant that the model as a whole explains more of the variance in support than its left counterpart. The lack of significant social variables in the national democratic model can perhaps be explained by the hegemony exerted by the right over its western stronghold. Residents of this region who do not support a right-wing party may simply not vote at all or not support party candidates.

Overall, the support bases of ideological party camps are only weakly determined by demographic and regional variables; in fact, none of the camps exhibits an electoral profile considerably more distinctive than that of the Democratic Bloc in the previous elections four years earlier. This may be partly an artefact of the data, but is undoubtedly also due to the tendency of most parties to colonize areas of known support which are more demographically homogeneous than the country as a whole. It must also be recognized that the parties within each camp have different origins and strategies, and may thus attract different sectors of the population. In this context it will be instructive to disaggregate the camps, and examine the support bases of the main parties individually.

The small number of seats contested by most parties in the 1994 elections limits analysis of sub-sections of the party spectrum to four major organizations: the CPU, the Socialist Party, Rukh and the Republican Party. The CPU model is similar to that for the left as a whole, with

Table 6.3 Support for parties, 1994

Variable	Communist	Socialist	Rukh	Republican
% Native Russian speakers		.27* (.16)		
% With higher education	-.81*** (.25)			
% Urban residents		-.16** (.07)	.10*** (.04)	
% Retirement age				.71*** (.25)
West	-10.19* (5.79)	-1.27 (6.42)	8.21*** (2.33)	5.34* (3.01)
Left Bank	3.03 (3.54)	3.98 (3.77)	-.34 (2.74)	-3.81 (4.11)
South	2.99 (3.20)	-.57 (5.33)	-3.09 (2.79)	-.66 (4.07)
East	14.70*** (2.99)	-.26 (6.70)	-7.51*** (3.00)	-1.82 (4.05)
Constant	20.21 (2.88)	11.39 (3.69)	3.25 (2.46)	-10.69 (7.04)
N	134	51	103	58
Adjusted R ²	.23	.06	.19	.13

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

region and education exhibiting significant effects (see Table 6.3). The Socialist vote is distinguished by its rural base and by its Russophone character. Unlike the communists, whose voters were heavily concentrated in the east of Ukraine, the socialists enjoyed relatively evenly-spread support throughout the country (Birch, 1998b). They evidently appealed to a proportion of the Russophone population across Ukraine. The familiar geographical pattern of east–west differences is again evident in the models for the two national-democratic parties, Rukh and the Republican party (though the effect is considerably more pronounced in the former case). Rukh’s voters are more urban than most, a finding that accords with what we found in Chapter 5 about the urban distinctiveness of those who voted for Rukh leader Chornovil in the 1991 presidential elections. Republican voters tend on the whole to be older, as was the leader of their chosen party, Luk”yanenko (66 at the time of these elections). This former dissident may well have appealed to the disproportionately elderly western Ukrainian population who supported the Democratic Bloc in 1990 (see Chapter 4), people, moreover, who were never fully integrated into the Soviet system.

The two largest parties in the country – the CPU and Rukh – are those with the most distinctive electorates and those whose support is best

explained by socio-demographic factors (though the total amount of variation explained is still quite low). This might seem to bode well for the development of a structured party system in Ukraine, but the regional concentration of their respective support groups has the effect of isolating the communists from Rukh and preventing little true competition between them (see also Birch, 1998b).

Voting for people

Of the 5833 candidates who registered for the 1994 elections, 5597 eventually contested the race (the rest having withdrawn their candidatures during the campaign). Incumbent deputies were for the most part reluctant to stand for re-election. Whether this was because they feared defeat or whether it was a consequence of disillusionment with parliamentary politics is difficult to say, but the high proportion of candidatures withdrawn by incumbent deputies during the campaign inclines toward the first view. In the event, 182 sitting deputies (40.4 per cent) contested the elections, 116 of those in their own constituencies and 66 in different seats. Sitting deputies in the west were most likely to seek re-election, and candidates standing in seats other than their own were most likely to choose seats in this region, undoubtedly due to the greater degree of perceived ideological cohesion among the nationalist-minded electorates in this part of the country and the expectation that they would support deputies identified with the drive for independence. These calculations were not without foundation, as the outcome of the elections demonstrated. Four-fifths of incumbents who sought re-election in the west won their seats. In the country as a whole, those who contested their own seats were slightly more likely to be re-elected than those who opted for fresh electoral territory (33.6 per cent as opposed to 24.2 per cent), though not in the west, where the success rates of the two categories were approximately equal.

The fact that fewer than a third of all incumbents standing again were re-elected bears witness to the electorate's poor evaluation of Ukraine's first democratically elected parliament and the increased competitiveness of the race in 1994. Yet these results are in a sense deceptive, for incumbents were at a distinct advantage with respect to non-incumbents. Though they represented only 3.3 per cent of all candidates, they comprised 17.2 per cent of those successful. The relationship between ideological position and success among incumbents was weak; slightly fewer than half of all sitting deputies were affiliated with political parties, 25 with parties of the left, 13 with parties of the centre, 23 with parties of the national-democratic camp, and four with parties

of the extreme right. Of the winners, ten were members of leftist parties, three were centrists, 12 were national democrats, and one was a member of the far right Conservative Republican Party. The right was thus slightly more successful in getting its deputies re-elected than the left and the centre (48.1 per cent for the national-democrats and the extreme right combined, versus 40.0 per cent for the left and 23.1 per cent for the centre), but the small numbers involved caution against drawing any firm conclusions from these figures; certainly no camp had an advantage of such magnitude as to mark it out as especially popular, and in no case did the success rate exceed 50 per cent.

The most striking difference between the candidate corpuses of 1990 and 1994 was the overall decline in political identification. Compared with their counterparts in 1990, the candidates who contested the 1994 elections were far less likely to be party-affiliated; the proportion of independents increased from 11.0 per cent to 72.7 per cent of the total. Yet it can be assumed that in 1994 party membership meant considerably more than it had four years earlier, and that those who were members of parties – communist or otherwise – took the ideological precepts of their chosen organisation more seriously than had CPU members in 1990. There was again a slight decrease in the proportion of women candidates from 7.9 per cent in 1990 to 7.4 per cent in 1994 (though this reflects a substantial absolute rise). As in 1990, the ethnic composition of the candidate corpus was similar to that of the population overall: 77.4 per cent of all candidates were ethnic Ukrainians, and 18.9 per cent ethnic Russians. Candidates for parliamentary seats were on average quite learned; 89.5 per cent of all candidates, and a striking 96.2 per cent of the eventual winners had higher education.

In terms of occupation, the modal category in 1994 was that of the liberal professional; professionals constituted 22.7 per cent of all candidates in 1994, up from 16.3 per cent in 1990. There was also a rise in the proportion of high state officials from 7.2 per cent in 1990 to 12.6 per cent four years later, and a commensurate rise in lower state officials from 3.3 per cent to 8.2 per cent. Yet many candidates in leadership positions in 1990 were Communist Party officials who, for obvious reasons, had a rather different status in 1994. Whereas party officials at all levels represented 15.1 per cent of the candidate corpus in 1990, in 1994 those whose employer was a political party of any kind dropped to 1.1 per cent. If the categories of state and party officials are combined for the 1990 contest, their total proportion of the candidate corpus was 25.6 per cent, well above the proportion of state officials in 1994 (20.8 per cent).⁹

Another noteworthy change in the composition of the candidate corpus was the relative decline in the proportion of enterprise directors. Industrial directors had represented 16.3 per cent of the 1990 cohort, whereas they made up only 5.9 per cent in 1994; the figures for directors of agricultural enterprises are 6.5 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively. A new category of directors – those of service sector enterprises – rose to prominence in 1994, reflecting economic changes that had occurred in the intervening period. This category had been negligible in 1990, whereas in 1994 it represented 6.0 per cent of all candidates. Yet even taking this new category into account, the combined proportion of directors declined from 22.8 per cent in 1990 to 15.4 per cent in 1994. The proportion of manual labourers among the candidates also experienced a further decline from 11.2 per cent in 1990 to 7.1 per cent in 1994. The overall picture is that of a shift in the composition of the candidate corpus away from those employed in industry (41.8 per cent in 1990; 29.1 per cent in 1994) toward the intelligentsia and the non-commercial sector (58.0 per cent in 1990; 62.1 per cent in 1994). This is perhaps indicative of a change in strategy on the part of Ukrainian industrialists, who have increasingly chosen extra-political avenues to power. Yet it could also be taken to reflect the low esteem in which parliament was held in 1994, and a choice on the part of those employed in the commercial sector to seek to gain purchase on the political process through informal channels.

Those enterprise directors who *did* choose to compete for parliamentary seats were relatively successful, however. Though heads of industrial enterprises made up only 5.9 per cent of all candidates, they represented 8.5 per cent of the eventual winners in March–April, 1994. The figures for agricultural directors are even more striking. Heads of farms comprised 3.5 per cent of the entire candidate corpus, but 11.9 per cent of the winners. As detailed in Chapter 2, there are reasons for believing that this phenomenon may be related to the extensive networks of patronage, grounded in Soviet-era relationships of dependency, on which enterprise heads could rely for political success. In this context it is worth noting that the directors of the service sector enterprises were far less successful; though 6.0 per cent of all aspiring deputies fell into this category, they made up a mere 2.5 per cent of the winners. Clientelism may also account for the strong performance of high state officials, who comprised 12.6 per cent of all candidates, but a full 28.8 per cent of elected deputies. Professionals, who had far fewer resources of this type to rely on, were at a distinct disadvantage in the electoral contest; though 22.7 per cent of those who stood were in this group, they represented

only 17.6 per cent of the winners. Engineers and technicians ('technical specialists' in Soviet parlance) fared even worse: they comprised 5.2 per cent of the candidate corpus, but only 1.9 per cent of the new parliament.

The success rates of various categories of candidate are reflected in regression analyses of candidate support. As for the 1989 and 1990 elections, candidate support was modelled as a function of the demographic and political characteristics of the candidates. The model for voting in the first round (Table 6.4) indicates that many of the same demographic factors that appear to have influenced candidate choice in 1989 and 1990 continued to have an impact in 1994, despite the greater prevalence of meaningful political labels.

High state officials continued to enjoy greater support than most when other factors are taken into consideration, whereas workers were again at a disadvantage. But unlike in the two previous elections, professionals were no more likely than other candidates to be elected, and engineers and technicians actually gained less support. The reverse is true for directors of agricultural enterprises, who were far less likely than most to be elected in 1989 but witnessed a radical increase in popularity in 1994. This is probably, as mentioned above, due to the clientelist relations they were able to establish with their workers.

Members of political parties had no greater probability than independents of being elected, but members of most of the large parties were more popular than average (Liberal Party candidates being an exception). Communist and Rural Party membership appears to have been especially advantageous to a candidate, and there is evidence to suggest that these two parties were successful also in establishing clientelist-based electoral 'machines' to propel them to success (see Birch, 1997b). Such machines seem to have been particularly powerful in the rural setting, as witnessed by the 9 per cent advantage afforded by Rural Party membership. This mechanism appears to have been one that was used by many farm directors to bolster their already strong electoral position.

Incumbency is a second resource that can be used to build an electoral support base. The strong electoral advantage enjoyed by sitting deputies, even when the effects of party membership and demographic factors are discounted, indicates that many indeed used their terms in office to curry favour with their constituents. Only a minority of deputies sought re-election, however, and it is safe to assume that they were among the most popular. Contact with the local population was not necessarily the key to winning a seat. In fact, those who resided outside their constituency gained a notably *larger* proportion of the vote than

Table 6.4 Support on the basis of candidate characteristics, 1994

<i>Variable</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Standard error</i>
Number of candidates	-.31***	(.02)
Turnout	.01	(.02)
Candidate with higher education	1.22***	(.31)
Age	-.07***	(.01)
Resident in constituency	-2.93***	(.26)
Incumbent deputy	7.41***	(.55)
Ethnically ambiguous surname	.42**	(.22)
Occupation:		
High state official	2.42***	(.30)
Director of agricultural enterprise	5.94***	(.51)
Technical specialist	-1.30***	(.40)
Industrial worker	-.82**	(.39)
Agricultural worker	-2.62**	(1.30)
None	-1.71***	(.43)
Party affiliation:		
Communist (reformed CPU)	7.05***	(.6)
Socialist	2.90***	(.52)
Rural	8.99***	(.95)
Liberal	-1.52**	(.75)
Rukh	3.24***	(.44)
Republican	1.82***	(.60)
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	2.34***	(.94)
Constant	12.08***	(1.06)
N = 5577		
Adjusted R ² .29		
* = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01		

local candidates. A great number of such candidates were high state officials from cities who chose to stand in rural constituencies. This seemingly odd finding can again be explained by the prevalence of a system of clientelist relations that were deployed by local notables to 'deliver' the vote to their political patrons at higher levels.

In contrast to the models for the 1989 and 1990 elections, gender is not a significant variable in the equation constructed for 1994, and unlike in 1990, having an ethnically ambiguous surname seems to have given a candidate a slight advantage in 1994, whereas it represented a hindrance in 1990. A high level of education (on which data were for the first time available in 1994) also gave a candidate an edge over his or her less educated competitors. It may well be that as the political ter-

rain became better defined, the ascriptive traits of a candidate came to be seen as less important than achieved social and political attributes. Age, however, is for the first time significant in 1994, with a negative coefficient indicating that younger candidates fared better on average than their seniors.

The main conclusion to be drawn from analysis of the parliamentary elections of 1994 is that the electoral support bases of political parties were relatively ill-defined at this time, and that candidate characteristics continued to play a large role in influencing vote choice. This highlights the fact that weak structuration of party support bases does not necessarily imply a weakly structured electorate, as became manifest in the presidential election to which we now turn.

The presidential election

The issue of relations with Russia dominated the presidential race. It was not that economic issues were perceived as unimportant, but rather, as in 1991, that the key to Ukraine's economic success was seen in geo-political terms. The difference between the two elections was that whereas in December 1991 the vast majority of Ukrainian voters believed the country's economic salvation could only be achieved through independence, the intervening period had disabused them of this notion, and by 1994 a considerable portion of the electorate had come to adopt the opposite view, believing that Ukraine could only recover economically by building stronger ties with Russia.¹⁰

When it met in the spring of 1994, the new parliament elected as its Chairman the leader of the Socialist Party, Oleksandr Moroz. A month later it reinstated the communist-era prime minister Vitalii Masol, who had been removed from his post amid student hunger strikes in October 1990. In this climate Kravchuk became sceptical of his prospects for retaining the presidency and he attempted to delay the contest until such time as the role of chief executive had been more clearly defined under the law. But parliament was unwilling to call off the election, and Kravchuk eventually acquiesced when opinion polls showed him taking the lead in popular support.¹¹

The candidates

The weakness of political parties attested to by the relative indistinctness of their support bases in the parliamentary elections was confirmed in the contest for the presidency: of the seven candidates who stood, only one – Moroz – was a member of a political party. The selection of

candidates was also notable for the eclipse of both extremes of the political spectrum. The results of the parliamentary elections had demonstrated the considerable strength of the left, yet the communists declined to contest the executive. This was in part due to their continued ideological objections to the directly elected presidency as an institution, but it can also be seen as a realistic assessment of their electoral force. Though they had been strong enough to win a quarter of the seats in the new parliament, they evidently recognized that they would not be able to broaden their support base as far as the median voter who was crucial to the presidential race. They opted instead to give tacit backing to the socialist parliamentary chairman Moroz, who was further to the right than the communists but shared many of their views and orientations.

The strong showing of the left in March–April also had the effect of discouraging the national democrats from directly contesting the presidency. Instead they grudgingly threw their weight behind the incumbent. In the 1991 election Kravchuk had no rival to his left; though an advocate of independence, he had clearly not been an inveterate nationalist like his strongest competitors. He was therefore the choice of those who preferred to maintain links with the states of the former Soviet Union. Once elected, however, Kravchuk was gradually accepted by the national democrats, who chose to work with him to establish the institutions of their new country. On the whole he maintained a middle-of-the-road stance in both economic and foreign policy spheres, but it was in the interest of his position as president to strengthen Ukraine's statehood. The public perception of his ideological reorientation was magnified by the drift of popular opinion in the opposite direction. By the time he was obliged to stand for president a second time, Kravchuk thus faced a situation diametrically opposed to that of the 1991 contest: now he was the choice of the nationalist right and his significant opponents were to his left. Figure 6.1 provides a schematic representation of the ideological space in which the presidential candidates located themselves in 1994.¹²

Kravchuk's main rival was Leonid Kuchma, who had been Prime Minister for a period in 1992 and 1993 and before that head of a missile factory in Dnipropetrovsk. In early 1994 Kuchma had formed a centrist electoral coalition, called the Inter-Regional Bloc for Reforms, on the basis of the liberal New Ukraine group in parliament and the Ukrainian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. This bloc had played only a marginal role in the parliamentary elections, but it provided Kuchma with a base from which to launch his bid for the presidency.

	Nationalist	Non-Nationalist
Pro-Reform		Kuchma Lanovyi Babych
Non-Reform	Kravchuk Plyushch Talanчук	Moroz

Figure 6.1 A schematic representation of the ideological positions of presidential candidates, 1994

Kuchma's reputation for political integrity and a commitment to reform made him popular among many liberals, but his real source of strength was his emphasis on renewing economic ties with Russia. His image as an economic radical had become rather tarnished during his unproductive stint as Prime Minister, and he watered down his stated position on economic reform over the course of the campaign when it became obvious that the bulk of his potential support lay with the anti-reformist left. The fact that he was a Russophone Ukrainian was also significant, as this was the median position in Ukraine's ethnic spectrum.

Five other candidates gathered the requisite number of signatures to have their names put on the ballot paper. These included the socialist Moroz two self-proclaimed reformists and two members of the mythical 'party of power' that represented the reigning political establishment. The reformers were Volodymyr Lanovyi, a young liberal economist who had served in the government as economics minister between 1990 and 1992, and the ethnic Russian businessman Valerii Babych. The establishment candidates were Ivan Plyushch, Chairman of the 1991–94 parliament, and the elderly minister of education, Petro Talanчук.

It was clear by May that the real race was between Kravchuk and Kuchma. In the first round on 26 June, Kravchuk took 37.7 per cent of the vote to Kuchma's 31.3 per cent, while Moroz scored a mere 13.0 per cent, not significantly more than the 9.3 per cent obtained by the young Lanovyi (see Table 6.5). Regional divisions came graphically to the fore in the results of this contest. Kuchma was the clear favourite of the east and south, while Kravchuk swept the west of the country. In the Donbas, a strong showing for Moroz edged Kravchuk into third place on the first round, while in several regions of the centre and the northwest the socialist came second, but nowhere did he obtain the support of more than a quarter of the electorate. Lanovyi's support was

Table 6.5 Results of the 1994 presidential election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>First round (%)</i>	<i>Second round (%)</i>
Leonid Kravchuk	37.72	45.06
Leonid Kuchma	31.27	52.14
Oleksandr Moroz	13.04	
Volodymyr Lanovyi	9.32	
Valerii Babych	2.39	
Ivan Plyushch	1.29	
Petro Talanchuk	0.54	

Sources: Ukrainian Weekly, 3 July 1994; 17 July 1994.

erratically distributed, with his greatest success being in the city of Kiev. In the second round it appears that anti-incumbency sentiment on the part of a disgruntled electorate is what tipped the scales in favour of Kuchma, who won on 10 July with 52.1 per cent of the vote to Kravchuk's 45.1 per cent.

The regional distribution of the vote was even more marked in the second round than in the first; Kuchma received the support of only 3.9 per cent of the electors of the western region of L'viv but close to 90 per cent in the populous Donbas and in Crimea. The swing vote was provided by the central regions of the country which split along the Dnieper river, allowing Kuchma to edge into the lead.¹³

Regression analysis shows that the support bases of the main presidential candidates were more distinctive in socio-demographic terms than those of the parties that had contested the parliamentary elections (see Table 6.6). The variables found to have the greatest influence on presidential vote choice were region of residence, language use, former Communist Party membership and urban residence. In the first round there was a clear divide in regional support bases between Kravchuk on the one hand, and his closest competitors – Kuchma and Moroz – on the other. Kravchuk was the favourite in the west, while the other two were popular in the east and south. Lanovyi was the most unusual in this context: because his support was so strongly concentrated in Kiev, all of the other three regions showed negative coefficients in comparison with the Right Bank baseline category used in this model. Though these regional patterns can easily be seen from an examination of the breakdown of raw voting figures, it is interesting that they persist even when ethnic and other social aspects of the electorate are controlled for.

Table 6.6 First round presidential vote choice, 1994

Variable	Kravchuk	Kuchma	Moroz	Lanovyi
% Native Russian speakers			-.12*** (.05)	.03* (.02)
% Native Ukr. speakers	.19*** (.04)			
% CPSU members (1989)	-1.60*** (.34)			.42*** (.15)
% Urban residents		-.05** (.02)	-.09*** (.03)	
% Retirement age		-.40*** (.13)		
West	42.74*** (2.00)	-13.81*** (1.59)	-15.92*** (2.03)	-6.54*** (.87)
South	-6.51*** (2.01)	24.53*** (1.63)	.34 (2.17)	-6.63*** (.86)
East	-13.93*** (2.19)	20.69*** (1.38)	14.80*** (2.36)	-9.29*** (.95)
Constant	26.76 (4.40)	27.99 (4.17)	19.72 (1.41)	6.42 (1.18)
N	113	196	117	112
Adjusted R ²	.93	.82	.53	.62

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

In ethnic terms, however, there was no marked split between Moroz and Kravchuk. Both received disproportionate numbers of votes from native Ukrainian speakers, whereas it was Lanovyi who benefited from the Russophone vote. It is interesting that language use is *not* significant in the model of Kuchma's first-round vote. As a Russophone Ukrainian, Kuchma's ethnic identity was perhaps ambiguous enough not to have appealed primarily to ethnic identifications. Kuchma does appear to have attracted younger voters, and both he and Moroz seem to have been popular with the rural electorate (this is not surprising in Moroz's case, given the strong support for the Socialist Party in the countryside). Finally, voters divided according to whether or not they had been Communist Party members during the Soviet period; party membership is negatively associated with support for Kravchuk, while Lanovyi seems to have attracted former communists. It is likely that Lanovyi appealed

Table 6.7 Second round presidential vote choice, 1994

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Kravchuk</i>	<i>Kuchma</i>
% Native Ukrainian speakers	.19*** (.03)	
% CPSU members (1989)	-1.30*** (.26)	1.16*** (.29)
% Urban residents		-.10*** (.02)
West	46.73*** (1.39)	-28.25*** (1.54)
South	-14.20*** (1.76)	23.38*** (1.61)
East	-21.95*** (1.93)	27.27*** (1.50)
Constant	32.14 (3.78)	30.10 (2.27)
N	137	210
Adjusted R ²	.97	.91

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

to the liberal wing of the party which represented the backbone of the small liberal camp in Ukrainian politics at this time.

One of the most interesting features of these models is the inversion in Kravchuk's support between 1991 and 1994. Whereas he had attracted non-Ukrainophone former Communist Party members in his first bid for the presidency, he appealed to the opposite group of people in his second try. By 1994 Kravchuk had clearly taken over the mantle of the national democrats. The greater prominence of ethnicity in the models of the vote for president than those for parliamentary candidates cannot simply be attributed to the fact that individual candidates have definite ethnic identities, whereas most parties do not. Valerii Babych was the only non-Ukrainian candidate for president, yet ethnic variables did not prove significant in the model for Babych support (not reported here). Furthermore, ethnic Russians were disproportionately represented in the support base of the ethnic Ukrainian reformer, Lanovyi. It may be concluded that candidate ethnicity was less important for ethnic Russian voters in this election than other factors, but that it was a significant determinant of vote choice among strong Ukrainian identifiers, who preferred a fellow Ukrainophone.

There was much debate between the two rounds of the presidential race as to where the supporters of those candidates eliminated in the first round would place their votes in the run-off. Neither Moroz nor Lanovyi advised their adherents whom to choose in the second round, but the Communist Party gave a signal to leftist voters by announcing that it would *not* support Kravchuk. The incumbent president's electorate in the run-off is virtually identical to that in the first round (see

Table 6.7). For Kuchma, ethnicity was still not a significant factor, though he evidently picked up the second-round vote of former communists and he retained the allegiance of the rural electorate. This suggests that those who had voted for Moroz and Lanovyi in the first round plumped for Kuchma the second time round.

Conclusion

Studies of the social determinants of electoral behaviour in Western countries normally conceive of vote choice in terms of support for different political parties. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that such a conception may not be entirely adequate in the case of a young democracy such as Ukraine where the party system is still in its infancy and party identification is low. Yet this does not mean that voting in Ukraine is not influenced by social factors; rather, the role of these factors must be understood as being multi-dimensional. They operate in influencing ideological position and in translating ideological position into support for given electoral alternatives (be they parties or individuals), but they also operate more directly in aiding extra-ideological identification between voters and candidates. It is therefore only by examining electoral results from a number of different perspectives and in a variety of contexts that we can piece together a picture of the different social forces that affect vote choice in Ukraine.

The fact that parliamentary and presidential elections were held within a few months of each other in 1994 makes such an examination possible. In the parliamentary elections the large number of independents and the uneven distribution of party candidates across the country meant that voters in different constituencies faced very different choices. Patterns of socio-demographic support in these elections were thus only weakly defined in party-political terms and regional variations were considerably stronger than socio-demographic ones. Where socio-demographic factors did come into play, education level and urban residence were those most frequently significant. Though the evidence is weak, it appears on the whole that the better educated, more urban sectors of the electorate tended to support right-wing alternatives, while their less educated and rural counterparts voted more for the left. Finally, former CPSU membership played a prominent role in voting for president, whereas it does not appear to have counted much in the selection of deputies. It may be that presidential candidates were more clearly aligned along political lines than their parliamentary counterparts, and that this enabled the explicitly political variable of previous party membership to come to the fore.

Many of the basic voting patterns established during the Soviet period survived two and a half years of political and economic upheaval, testifying to a fair amount of stability in Ukrainian electoral behaviour. The nature of the political alternatives may have changed dramatically, but the same factors that impinged on vote choice in 1989 continued to exert an influence five years later. Whether a further four years of social and economic upheaval altered these patterns is the subject of the next chapter.

7

Party System Definition: The Parliamentary Elections of 1998

Political parties began to play a greater role in Ukrainian politics at the time of the 1998 parliamentary elections. The introduction of a new semi-proportional electoral law helped shape the party system and had the notable effect of leading to a consolidation of the centrist 'camp' in the ideological spectrum. Because the law required voters to state their party preference explicitly, it also brought parties' support bases into clearer relief. The results gave evidence that the overall patterns of voting established in previous electoral contests were indicative of enduring cleavages in the Ukrainian electorate. The now-familiar divisions based on ethnicity and region were again evident, and the overall left-right division in the new parliament was roughly similar to that in the old. At the same time, the rise to prominence of a new socio-economic cleavage represents an important development in patterns of political identification.

Recent Events

The period between 1994 and 1998 was one of definition and stabilization for Ukraine, but at the same time these were years of growing scepticism with regard to the capacity of the country's leaders to build institutions necessary to sustain a market democracy. Whereas in 1994 issues surrounding Ukraine's status as an independent state focused the electoral debate, these had largely been resolved four years later. President Kuchma had been successful in quelling an emergent secessionist movement in Crimea and regularizing relations with Russia; he had also overseen the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the decommissioning of Ukraine's Soviet-era nuclear arsenal. On the home front, the *hryvnya* was adopted as Ukraine's currency in September 1996, replacing the

temporary 'coupons' that had served as legal tender since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most important, perhaps, was parliament's passage of the country's first post-Soviet constitution in June 1996. The new constitution effectively entrenched the institutional status quo, but its adoption ended years of jockeying for power and wrangling over the design of the state, freeing the way for legislators to focus their attention on much-needed economic reforms.

Unfortunately, reform legislation was slow to be passed and even slower to be put into practice, and the proportion of the population that assessed the economic situation in Ukraine as 'very bad' rose from 38.4 per cent in 1994 to 43.3 per cent in 1997 (Democratychni initsiatyvy, 1998: 2). Kuchma's frustration with the political process was manifested in his repeated changes of government. The succession of prime ministers who held office during this period – Yevhen Marchuk, Pavlo Lazarenko, Valerii Pustovoitenko – left in its wake as many power bases, thereby exacerbating the already pronounced divisiveness of Ukrainian politics. Various 'clans', tied to different business interests, operated increasingly as patronage networks, and much of politics revolved around the distribution of state wealth among competing groups. It is not surprising that Ukraine was criticized by international lending organizations shortly before the March 1998 elections for being a particularly corrupt state even by post-Soviet standards; nor is it to be wondered at that the economic situation failed to improve for most and worsened for many.

The emergence of political fiefdoms in Ukrainian politics was reflected in the changing structure of parliament, where factions formed, dissolved, and reformed to such an extent that by 1998 the political structure of the assembly bore only a vague resemblance to the party affiliations of the deputies elected four years earlier. Communist and Rukh strongholds on the left and right still marked out the main ideological poles of the political field, but the region between these two factions was one of continued flux as aspirant leaders strove to attract followings from among the weakly-aligned centrist mass of the parliament (see Bojcun, 1995b; Chudowsky, 1996; Solchanyk, 1998: 25–9). In terms of party formation, the main inter-electoral developments were the common faction formed on the left between the Socialist and Rural (*Sel'yans'ka*) Parties, and the founding of a break away Progressive Socialist Party (which proved in fact to be even more staunchly communist than the communists themselves). A number of pre-electoral alliances formed on the right of the political spectrum, but there was little change in terms of party identity. It was in the ideological centre that the action was located.

Centrist parties were formed as vehicles for several important business interests in Ukraine's slowly-emerging market.¹ Late 1995 saw the establishment of a *de facto* party of government, the Popular Democratic Party, which was strongly – if indirectly – backed by president Kuchma. A breakaway Social Democratic Party (United) then re-grouped, benefiting from the patronage of former prime minister Marchuk and former president Kravchuk (now a parliamentary deputy). When it came Lazarenko's turn to vacate the prime ministerial seat, he created the Hromada party, centred around his Dnipropetrovs'k stronghold. The fourth main party to come to prominence in the centre was something of an anomaly. The Green Party of Ukraine had been in existence since 1990, and party members had contested 37 seats in the 1994 elections, but they had received only 0.3 per cent of the total vote and no seats. The one advantage the Greens enjoyed was their clean image (cleaner still for having not been soiled with power). Shortly before the 1998 elections, a group of Ukraine's new business elites mounted what was tantamount to a hijacking of the party, managing successfully to manoeuvre themselves onto the party list in exchange for financial backing.² In one sense it was inevitable that those holding economic power in Ukraine should want at some point to organize politically through the mechanism of parties; in another sense this organization was also a consequence of the incentives built into the new electoral law Ukraine adopted for the 1998 elections. It is to this law and its adoption that we now turn.

Electoral reform

The protracted series of repeat elections required to fill parliament after the 1994 elections generated virtually unanimous agreement that the electoral system had to be changed. Many also believed that something had to be done to strengthen Ukraine's party system in order that a more structured parliament could operate more effectively. A number of draft electoral laws began to be drawn up in 1995, most of them modelled on the Russian semi-proportional system in which half the seats are allocated according to a proportional distributive formula, and half filled through elections in single-member constituencies. Debate focused on, among other things, whether a turnout requirement ought to be maintained, how high the threshold ought to be, and how many proportional seats ought to be created (see Birch, 1997a). Though a draft law passed its first reading in November 1995, it was decided to put the law on hold until a new constitution had been adopted. When this was finally accomplished in mid-1996, a host of other legislation

needed urgently to be revised so as to conform to the constitution, and the electoral law was again put on the back-burner. In the end the new law was not passed till September 1997, barely two months before the electoral process was to begin.

The 1998 electoral law stipulated a fifty–fifty split between single-member and proportional seats; the 225 single-member seats were to be elected by a simple plurality rule in one round of voting, with no turnout requirement. The proportional seats were to be filled from a nation-wide ballot of parties and/or party blocs, each of which had to collect 200 000 signatures, including at least 10 000 in any of Ukraine's 26 administrative regions. The 225 list seats were to be distributed according to the largest remainders method among all parties that cleared a 4 per cent threshold.

The new law had a number of advantages, the most obvious being that it promised a speedier and more efficient electoral process. The opportunity for parties to stand on the ballot as parties increased their national profile. The law also provided an incentive for political entrepreneurs to form parties, rather than relying on local fiefdoms to gain seats, and the relatively high threshold encouraged party consolidation. At the same time it recognized the geographical heterogeneity of Ukrainian politics by allowing political organizations with concentrated regional support the opportunity to win seats locally without having to demonstrate national strength.³

The law also had its disadvantages, however. From the point of view of the voter, electoral reform generated confusion in at least three ways. Firstly, the number of electoral options open to voters increased considerably in the months before polling day. The existence of an alternative mechanism for election prompted a number of new parties to form in the hopes of securing 4 per cent of the national vote. A total of 40 parties contested the list vote, 21 alone and 19 as members of electoral blocs. Of these, 17 had been founded since the 1994 elections, and ten within one year of the date when party lists had to be presented to the electoral commission. Secondly, there was little systematic voter education to explain the workings of the new formula (nor either of the two new systems that were being adopted in elections to two tiers of local government). Thirdly, the parliamentary law was brought twice before the Constitutional Court during the campaign and twice found to be unconstitutional on numerous counts. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the elections could go ahead as planned, provided certain minor changes were made.⁴ These were enacted by the legislature, but their enactment did not prevent the entire process from being carried out under a shadow of dubious legality (see Kordun, 1998).

The elections went fairly smoothly on voting day itself (29 March) though lack of adequate resources meant that many polling stations were understaffed and voters often had to wait in long queues (OSCE, 1998). There were 3605 candidates on party lists and 4259 candidates registered in single-member constituencies (an average of 18.9 candidates per constituency); 38.5 per cent of the latter were also on lists.⁵ The total number of candidates was thus 6224, only slightly more than the 5597 who had stood in 450 single-member constituencies in 1994.

The first official results were released on 9 April, but these consisted only of party totals for the list voting. Finally on 18 April a list of 413 deputies was published. Legal squabbling as to who was eligible to fill the other 37 seats dragged on till July, when it was decided to re-hold five single-member constituency elections on 16 August. Table 7.1 presents the results of elections to all 450 seats, broken down by seat type. Eight parties cleared the 4 per cent threshold for representation in the party list component of the ballot. Candidates from 19 parties as well as 116 independents were elected to single-member seats. The parties elected through the list mechanism included, on the left, the communists and the Socialist/Rural bloc, Rukh alone on the right, and in the centre the Greens as well as the three 'prime ministerial' parties – the Popular Democratic Party of current prime minister Pustovoitenko, the Social Democratic Party (United) of Marchuk, and Lazarenko's Hromada. These results represented a significant increase in organized centrist support from the previous elections in 1994, and a slight increase in vote for the left. The remaining 22 entries on the list – corresponding to 34.2 per cent of the list votes – failed to clear the 4 per cent mark. Fortunately for the non-leftist parties, the communists fared considerably worse in the single-member constituency voting (partly because half these seats went to independents – almost exactly the same proportion as in 1994).

The constituency seat share of the right (national democrats and extreme right combined) was little changed from 1994, but the inability of right-wing parties to consolidate sufficiently to form effective coalitions cost the camp list seats (see Kozulya, 1997). The centre saw its single-member seats rise dramatically, perhaps a sort of 'coat-tail effect' attendant upon the organizational activity prompted by the incentives inherent in the PR component of the system. The result was a parliament in which the left was slightly stronger than it had been after the 1994 elections, the right barely maintained its strength, and the centrists made extensive gains, mostly at the expense of independents.⁶

Table 7.1 Results of the 1998 parliamentary elections

	<i>List votes</i>	<i>List seats</i>	<i>% List seats</i>	<i>SM seats</i>	<i>% SM seats</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>%</i>
Communist	24.65	84	37.33	38	16.89	122	27.11
Socialist/Rural	8.56	29	12.89	5	2.22	34	7.56
Progressive Socialists	4.05	14	6.22	2	.89	16	3.56
Working Ukraine	3.06	–	–	1	.44	1	.22
Defenders of the Fatherland	.31	–	–	–	–	–	–
All-Ukrainian Party of Workers	.79	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total left	40.63	127	56.44	46	20.44	173	38.44
Greens	5.44	19	8.44	–	–	19	4.22
Popular Democrats	5.01	17	7.56	12	5.33	29	6.44
Hromada	4.68	16	7.11	7	3.11	23	5.11
Social Democrats (United)	4.01	14	6.22	3	1.33	17	3.78
Agrarians	3.68	–	–	8	3.56	8	1.78
Razom	1.89	–	–	1	.44	1	.22
NEP	1.23	–	–	1	.44	1	.22
Party of Nat. Econ. Development	.94	–	–	–	–	–	–
Social Liberal Union (SLOn)	.91	–	–	1	.44	1	.22
Party of Regional Revival	.91	–	–	2	.89	2	.44
Soyuz	.70	–	–	1	.44	1	.22
Party of Women's Initiatives	.58	–	–	–	–	–	–
Social Democratic Party	.32	–	–	–	–	–	–
Party of Muslims	.20	–	–	–	–	–	–
Spiritual, Econ. and Soc. Progress	.20	–	–	–	–	–	–
European Choice of Ukraine	.14	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total Centre	30.84	66	29.33	36	16.00	102	22.67
Rukh	9.40	32	14.22	14	6.22	46	10.22
Reforms and Order	3.13	–	–	3	1.33	3	.67
National Front	2.72	–	–	5	2.22	5	1.11
Forward Ukraine	1.74	–	–	2	.89	2	.44
Christian Democratic Party	1.30	–	–	2	.89	2	.44
Republican Christian Party	.54	–	–	–	–	–	–

Ukrainian National Assembly	.40	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fewer Words	.17	-	-	1	.44	1	.22
Total Right	19.43	32	14.22	27	12.00	59	13.12
Against all Independents	5.26			116	51.56	116	25.78
Invalid	3.09						
Total	100	225	100	225	100	450	100

Sources: *Uryadovyi kyr"yer*, 9 April 1998, p. 5; 21 April 1998, pp. 4–10; *Holos Ukraïny*, 18 April 1998, pp. 3–9; 28 April 1998, p. 3; *Holos Ukraïny*, 18 August 1998, p. 2.

When parliament met for the first time in May, the eleven factions operational at the end of the old parliament had been replaced by eight new ones, based on the eight parties which had cleared the list threshold. In this sense it might be said that the new electoral law both consolidated the party system and provided the basis for the establishment of greater party-based accountability. Yet there was little evidence of the consolidation when parliament set to work on its first major task: the election of a speaker. Lack of consensus was so great that it took seven weeks and 19 rounds of voting before the deputies finally agreed on Oleksandr Tkachenko of the Rural Party, an uninspiring compromise candidate unlikely to enhance the stature of the legislative chamber as an institution.

Voting patterns

Shortly before the 1998 elections a survey of 1742 voters in 25 representative constituencies throughout Ukraine was conducted in the aim of teasing out the principal patterns of voter behaviour in the country. Data from this survey are used in this chapter to undertake individual-level analyses of cleavage structures, shedding more detailed light on patterns in the electorate than was possible in previous chapters.⁷ Because the variable we are mainly interested in – vote choice – is nominal in nature (vote for a party is an all-or-nothing event, there cannot be more or less of it at the individual level), logistic regression is the appropriate statistical tool to use in analysing vote choice. Following the method set down in the previous chapter, logistic regressions will be performed on vote choice (in this case the list vote) for party camps first, and then for those individual parties for which there are sufficient data.

Voting for parties

The main parties of the left were, as mentioned above, the Communist Party, the Socialist-Rural bloc, and the Progressive Socialists. Each of these won seats through the list voting, enabling them to gain enough seats in parliament to form a faction. Of the smaller left-wing organizations – Working Ukraine, the Defenders of the Fatherland, and the All-Ukrainian Party of Workers – only the first had a history of organization dating back more than one year before the elections.⁸ As a whole, the left gained two-fifths of all the list votes, making it far and away the largest party camp. The first stage in the analysis is to replicate the models constructed in previous chapters.⁹ Region of residence clearly has the greatest impact on left voting, followed by ethnicity and settlement size which exhibit patterns familiar from previous models (see Table 7.2, Model I). While significant, education level and age are less important. Production sector and former Communist Party membership were insignificant.

Table 7.2 Support for parties of the left (1998)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model I</i>	<i>Model II</i>	<i>Model III</i>
Age	.03*** (.004)	.03*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)
Settlement size	-.15*** (.05)	-.17*** (.05)	-.13*** (.05)
Education level	-.11* (.06)	-.11* (.06)	
Russian ethnicity	.18*** (.04)	.15*** (.04)	.14*** (.04)
Once-banned		-3.66*** (1.09)	-3.64*** (1.09)
Ukrainian church member			
Russian-associated church member		.38* (.20)	.37* (.20)
Income			-.33*** (.07)
West	-1.23*** (.25)	-.60** (.27)	-.69*** (.28)
Left Bank	.03 (.26)	-.09 (.27)	-.08 (.27)
South	-.16 (.18)	-.16 (.19)	-.11 (.19)
East	.71*** (.19)	.69*** (.19)	.79*** (.20)
Constant	-.72 (.40)	-.63 (.40)	-.46 (.32)
N	1022	1022	985
-2 Log Likelihood	1242.57	1206.12	1145.63
Model chi-square (df)	147.99 (8)	184.44 (10)	193.96 (10)
Percentage of cases correctly predicted	65.70%	67.07%	67.87%

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

The next stage in the analysis was to add those variables that were not previously available because of lack of suitable data: religion and gender. Gender did not prove significant and was therefore excluded from the model. Religion was, however, significant. The political significance of religious affiliation in Ukraine can be understood in terms of the national leanings of the country's various churches and their histories under communism. Four principal categories can be constructed: firstly, the most 'Ukrainian' of religious organizations, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches, which had been banned under the communist regime and are particularly closely associated with the nationalist cause; secondly, the church allegiances most closely identified with Russia: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church;¹⁰ thirdly, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kiev Patriarchate, which is the largest church in Ukraine, representing 45.7 per cent of all church affiliates; finally, other churches and religious organizations. As 88.0 per cent of all church members fell into one of the first three categories, they alone were used in the analysis.

The inclusion of religious variables in the model for the left vote does not greatly change the significance or direction of any of the existing variables, but it confirms expectations as to the role of religion in Ukrainian politics (see Model II). Two religious variables had large coefficients, and the most notable aspect of their combined impact was that it diminished the magnitude of the coefficient for residence in western Ukraine (suggesting that the importance of this variable in previous analyses partly but not wholly reflected the geography of religion). Adherents of the Russian-associated churches were more likely than others to vote for the left, even when ethnicity was controlled for. By contrast, members of churches most closely aligned with the Ukrainian nationalist cause were more likely to vote against the left. The latter variable exerted a particularly striking effect, indicating that affiliation with one of the previously-banned churches was a powerful deterrent to left-wing voting (though it must be pointed out that only a small proportion of respondents (6.4 per cent) were so affiliated).

The final step in the analysis was to consider factors that reflect the development of Ukraine's economic structure since the collapse of communism. The 1991–8 period was one in which a private sector emerged and occupational stratification underwent considerable change. This period also witnessed a widening gap between rich and poor; a growing number of people were unemployed, and at the same time income differentials increased. These changes can be expected to have exerted

considerable influence on vote choice. In order to analyse these effects, variables were included in Model III to account for (1) employment status (employed versus unemployed, with non-employed serving as a baseline for comparison), and among the employed, (2) private as opposed to public sector employment, as well as (3) a tripartite occupational stratification schema based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (International Labour Office, 1990), composed of managers and professionals, technical and service workers, and manual workers, with the intermediary category serving as a baseline. The final variable employed was (4) family income, adjusted for family size.¹¹ In the event, the only significant variable in this group was income – those in lower income groups were more likely to vote for the left – yet the inclusion of this variable had such a strong impact that education level was no longer significant. The other variables in the model were little changed.

When all is said and done, region of residence is one of the stronger determinants of left-wing support, and the same can be said for its right-wing counterpart. The three-stage modelling process was again undertaken for the rightist camp. It is clear that the most important

Table 7.3 Support for parties of the right (1998)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model I</i>	<i>Model II</i>	<i>Model III</i>
Education	.25*** (.08)	.30*** (.08)	.26*** (.08)
Gender (female)		-.48*** (.19)	-.40** (.19)
Once-banned Ukrainian church member		2.27*** (.38)	2.39*** (.39)
Private sector employment			.64*** (.24)
West	1.43*** (.24)	.65** (.29)	.58** (.29)
Left Bank	-.54 (.39)	-.51 (.39)	-.52 (.39)
South	-.67*** (.25)	-.64*** (.26)	-.63*** (.26)
East	-.38 (.33)	-.38 (.33)	-.47 (.34)
Constant	-2.73 (.38)	-2.78 (.42)	-2.72 (.43)
N	1071	1071	1056
-2 Log Likelihood	792.57	745.88	728.85
Model chi-square(df)	108.75 (7)	155.44 (8)	159.20 (7)
Percentage of cases correctly predicted	84.13%	87.19%	87.36%

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

effect is exerted by affiliation to a once-banned church (see Table 7.3). Yet even when religion is controlled for, region still plays a very important role in structuring the rightist vote. Education and gender exert secondary influences: rightist voters are slightly better educated on the whole, and more likely than supporters of other camps to be men.

Whereas income was the only employment-related variable to be significant in the model for leftist party voting, voting for parties of the right appears to have been influenced instead by the private-sector/public-sector distinction among the employed. Those employed by private enterprises and organizations were more likely to vote for parties in the right camp, suggesting once again a parallel between orientations toward state-building and orientations toward economic reform.¹²

The Ukrainian centre was still large and heterogeneous at the time of these elections, reflecting both the variety of opportunistic efforts to build party organizations among the fluid centrist electorate and diversity in the origins of the various organizations that aspired to capture it. It will be recalled that the centrist vote was so inchoate in 1994 and its geographical reach so restricted that it was not possible to model it statistically. The party list vote in 1998 provided a mechanism whereby the centre could appeal explicitly to ideologically middle-of-the-road positions, while still allowing voters to back established local figures from other parties – if they so chose – in the constituency elections.

One of the most striking aspects of the model for centrist support is that in many respects it is a mirror image of the left model (see Table 7.4). In both cases religious affiliation, income, region of residence, and age are the most important determinants of vote choice. Whereas older voters, those with lower income levels, and those in the east exhibited the greatest support for the left, younger voters, those with higher incomes, and those resident in other parts of the country tended to opt for the centre. Religion is the anomaly in this regard; the left vote conforms to the well-known Ukrainian versus Russian pattern, but members of both main religious groups tended to shy away from supporting centrist parties, indicating perhaps an aversion of these voters to ethno-religious identification *per se*. When the employment-related variables are added to the centrist model, settlement size and ethnicity drop out of the equation, and class becomes a prominent feature (in addition to income). Manual workers appear on the whole not to support the centre, establishing a picture of the centre as the camp of the affluent and those with the greatest material assets at their command.

Turning now to the support bases of specific parties, it was possible to model the list vote profiles of seven of the eight parties that crossed the

Table 7.4 Support for parties of the centre, 1998

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model I</i>		<i>Model II</i>		<i>Model III</i>	
Age	-.03***	(.004)	-.03***	(.004)	-.03***	(.004)
Settlement size	.14***	(.05)	.12***	(.05)		
Russian ethnic identification	-.08*	(.04)	-.07*	(.04)		
Once-banned Ukrainian church member			-.67*	(.39)	-1.02***	(.41)
Russian-associated church member			-.42**	(.21)	-.54***	(.21)
Manual worker					-.36*	(.19)
Income					.24***	(.07)
West	-.16	(.23)	.09	(.26)	.19	(.26)
Left Bank	.24	(.27)	.32	(.27)	.20	(.27)
South	.37**	(.19)	.41**	(.19)	.27	(.18)
East	-.62***	(.19)	-.59***	(.20)	-.60***	(.20)
Constant	.33	(.27)	.42	(.28)	.22	(.31)
N	1023		1023		1014	
-2 Log Likelihood	1252.13		1245.47		1213.75	
Model chi-square(df)	64.94	(7)	71.61	(9)	80.74	(9)
Percentage of cases correctly predicted	65.65%		65.93%		68.04%	

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

4 per cent threshold of representation in the proportional component of the voting. There were too few progressive socialist voters in the sample for their electorate to be analysed statistically, but models were constructed for the Communist Party and the socialist-rural bloc on the left, Rukh on the right, and in the centre the Popular Democratic, Hromada, Social Democratic (United), and Green Parties.

Communists constitute nearly two-thirds of all left-wing voters; it is therefore not surprising that the models for the communist vote should reflect those for the left as a whole (see Table 7.5). Aspects of the left model are also evident in the vote for the socialist-rural bloc, and comparison of these two sets of models reveals some interesting features of the intra-camp division of the vote. The age effect is one that is important for the communists, and lower education levels seem to be a characteristic of socialist-rural voters. Russian ethnic markers are significant determinants of the vote for both parties, but in the case of

Table 7.5 Support for the Communist Party and the Socialist-Rural bloc, 1998

Variable	Communist party			Socialist-Rural bloc	
	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model I	Model II
Age	.03*** (.004)	.03*** (.004)	.03*** (.01)		
Settlement size	-.14*** (.05)	-.15*** (.05)	-.09* (.05)	-.16* (.08)	
Education level				-.18** (.09)	-.20** (.09)
Russian ethnic identification	.13*** (.04)	.12*** (.04)	.12*** (.04)		
Russian language use				.13** (.06)	
Once-banned Ukrainian church member		-2.49** (1.10)	-2.47** (1.10)		
Russian-associated church member					.96*** (.28)
Income			-.31*** (.08)		
West	-1.42*** (.33)	-.89*** (.35)	-.99*** (.35)	.19 (.34)	-.01 (.34)
Left Bank	-.70** (.33)	-.72** (.33)	-.73** (.33)	1.00*** (.33)	.74** (.34)
South	.43** (.19)	.44** (.19)	.48** (.20)	-1.69*** (.42)	-1.58*** (.40)
East	.20 (.19)	.20 (.19)	.24 (.19)	.85* (.45)	.84* (.45)
Constant	-2.09 (.30)	-2.03 (.30)	-1.39 (.34)	-1.34 (.42)	-1.41 (.40)
N	1023	1023	985	1070	1071
-2 Log Likelihood	1132.39	1122.46	1070.51	545.59	543.46
Model chi-square (df)	138.14 (7)	148.07 (8)	159.56 (9)	50.73 (7)	57.36 (6)
Percentage of cases correctly predicted	71.83%	70.67%	71.83%	91.71%	91.89%

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

the communists it is simple ethnic identification that is important, whereas Russian language use and affiliation with a Russian-associated church are more influential for the socialist-rural bloc. It is also worth

noting that *none* of the employment-related variables were significant in support for the bloc; the influence of lower income on left support must be attributed mainly to its affect on support for the Communist Party. Finally, the communists and the socialist-rural bloc exhibited contrasting patterns of regional popularity. Interestingly, residence in the east of the country was only a determinant in the vote for the socialist-rural bloc, and even here it is only marginally significant (this is probably because the two parties divided the vote in this region, reducing its significance in the individual equations), but western residence seems to have been a powerful factor in determining antipathy to the communists. The main geographical contrast between the two parties is the Left Bank popularity of the bloc and its lack of support in the south. The communists, on the other hand, did well in the south, but poorly on the Left Bank.

The right of the political spectrum was fragmented in the 1998 elections, and Rukh was the only party for which it was possible to construct a model. It will be recalled that the model for Rukh support in 1994 was poorly defined in socio-demographic terms; only Western and urban residence were found to be statistically associated with support for this party. In 1998 the Rukh model is clearer; significant variables include western residence, non-Russian ethnicity, male gender, and manual employment (see Table 7.6).

Table 7.6 Support for Rukh (1998)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model I</i>	<i>Model II</i>	<i>Model III</i>
Russian ethnicity	-.20** (.10)	-.20** (.10)	-.16* (.10)
Gender (female)		-.78*** (.25)	-.55** (.26)
Manual employment			.98*** (.28)
West	.96*** (.32)	1.02*** (.33)	1.05*** (.34)
Left Bank	.09 (.45)	.09 (.46)	.06 (.46)
South	-.17 (.34)	-.14 (.35)	-.16 (.35)
East	-.74 (.49)	-.76 (.49)	-.93* (.53)
Constant	-2.22 (.26)	-1.86 (.27)	-2.31 (.31)
N	1024	1024	1009
-2 Log Likelihood	502.64	492.57	468.90
Model chi-square(df)	30.30 (5)	40.37 (6)	49.70 (7)
Percentage of cases correctly predicted	92.56%	92.56%	92.68%

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

That nationalism should be a working-class phenomenon will not seem strange to those familiar with West European politics; what is more intriguing is the fact that the national-democratic cause had previously been characterized by the elite nature of its adherents. Rukh seems to have maintained the support of those workers mobilized during the protests of 1990–91 – and those industrial workers who voted in large numbers for Rukh leader Chornovil in the 1991 presidential elections – whereas the party's more intellectual followers appear to have gravitated to other parties.¹³

The rise of the organized centre is perhaps the most notable feature of the 1998 elections, and the model for centrist voting overall gave evidence that these parties acted as a more effective counter-force to the left in 1998 than the nationalist right, with its limited natural constituency, could ever hope to do. We have seen that centrist voters were on the whole more privileged than their left-wing counterparts, and they tended to be younger. These, we might conjecture, are the voters of the future. But the centre is by no means united; in fact it is probably the most divided of Ukraine's three main political 'camps'. Whereas differences within the left and the right had mostly to do with personal antagonisms and variations in degree of radicalness, differences in the centre of the political spectrum had to do in large measure with competing economic interests within Ukrainian industry and competition between political 'machines' built by those who had held power since independence (see Birch and Wilson, 1999). Such differences are less ideological but in many respects less reducible than those that divide the camps at the two extremes of Ukraine's political spectrum.

A common feature of the models for the four main centrist parties is that the ethnic, religious, and regional variables which figure so prominently in support for leftist and rightist parties do not play an important role (see Table 7.7).¹⁴ Green voters are less likely to reside in the east than elsewhere and they are more likely to be Ukrainian speakers; there is also a tendency of centrist voters in southern Ukraine to back Hromada and not the Popular Democratic Party (NDP). Otherwise these variables have little impact. The factors that are important in shaping the vote for centrist parties have more to do with voters' material assets. Age is the most prominent of these variables; as in the model for the centrist camp overall, youth is a strong determinant of the vote choice for each of the four centrist parties except the PDP. This 'party of government' gained most support instead from men, those with higher education, and those with higher incomes – in a word, those who can be expected to have a favourable view of their prospects under the new

Table 7.7 Support for individual centrist parties, 1998

<i>Variable</i>	<i>NDP</i>	<i>Hromada</i>	<i>SDP</i>	<i>Green Party</i>
Age		-.03*** (.01)	-.03*** (.01)	-.04** (.01)
Settlement size				.22*** (.08)
Education level	.37*** (.14)	-.47*** (.12)		
Gender (female)	-.89*** (.31)			
Former CPSU member			1.16*** (.38)	
Russian language use				-.12* (.07)
Manager or professional			.59* (.37)	
Income	.31** (.15)	.30** (.14)	.30** (.15)	
West	-.20 (.47)	-.73 (.68)	-.04 (.54)	-.66 (.42)
Left Bank	.04 (.53)	.31 (.58)	-.08 (.63)	-.10 (.45)
South	-.69* (.41)	.80** (.38)	.14 (.40)	.37 (.32)
East	.28 (.45)	-.54 (.37)	-.12 (.41)	-.83** (.37)
Constant	-5.04 (.80)	-.94 (.84)	-2.85 (.69)	-.94 (.45)
N	1028	1028	1005	1071
-2 Log Likelihood	367.75	407.26	355.91	565.38
Model chi-square(df)	29.47 (7)	29.84 (7)	27.72 (7)	39.79 (6)
Percentage of cases correctly predicted	95.06%	94.38%	95.14%	91.63%

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$

Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors.

regime. Those with higher income levels also supported Hromada and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in greater numbers than most. The SDP model is the only in one in this chapter for which membership in the Soviet-era Communist Party figures. The presence of former president Kravchuk and former security service boss Marchuk high on the SDP list may have made this party attractive to those former CPSU members who had benefited from recent changes.

The Ukrainian centre appears to have developed as a alternative to the left among the non-nationalist electorate. This is evident through the examination of the variables that are most important in shaping the distinction between the two camps; both are influenced by age, income, and residence or non-residence in the south and east of Ukraine. The ethnic specificity of left-wing support, however, finds its counterpart in

that of the nationalist right. Both the centre and the right may be seen to be in opposition to the dominant left, the centre on economic grounds, and the right more for ethnic and nationalist reasons.

In terms of party system formation, the most important development of the 1998 elections was the 'filling in' of Ukraine's ideological centre and the rise to prominence of a group of parties which represent the economic interests of new sections of the population. The Ukrainian party system should be understood less as a linear continuum and more as a bifurcated opposition in which the left is opposed to two sets of parties distinguished by their regional bases and their values. Another notable development is the increased definition of the support bases of individual parties. The higher quality of the data used to analyse these elections undoubtedly accounts for the fact that a larger number of variables rose to prominence in the models presented in this chapter than previously, but the crucial point to note is that, unlike in the 1994 elections, the models for individual parties almost all had greater predictive power than those for aggregate party camps. Whether it was due to the introduction of a proportional element into the voting process or increased efforts to appeal to distinct sectors of the electorate, Ukrainian parties came into their own as organizations in 1998.

Voting for people

The 1998 elections were the first in which voters had been explicitly asked to vote for parties, and we have seen that their choice of party was influenced by many of the same factors that influenced vote choice in previous electoral contests. Yet voters also voted for individual candidates, as they had done before. Responses to survey questions probing the causes of vote choice suggest an answer as to why party affiliation was so poorly predicted by socio-demographic variables in the 1994 elections. Though approximately a quarter of the electorate claimed they felt close to one of the parties in 1998, only 3.0 per cent listed the party affiliation of a candidate as their primary criterion for vote choice in the single-member constituency elections, and a modest 7.4 per cent chose the candidate's political views (see Table 7.8).

This means that only about a tenth of the electorate based its views on the ideological tendencies of a candidate. It is clear that party labels do not yet count for much at the grass-roots constituency level. If party affiliation helped candidates win votes, it is most likely because of the organizational and material advantages it afforded, not because of its direct impact on voters' choice calculus. Instead, voters based their

Table 7.8 'When deciding which candidate to vote for, which of the following is most important to you?'

(a) the candidate's political views	7.4%
(b) the party he or she belongs to	3.0%
(c) the candidate's professional experience	26.2%
(d) the candidate's personal characteristics	12.5%
(e) whether the candidate supports people like you	41.6%
None	2.4%
Don't know	4.0%
No answer	3.0%

Table 7.9 'Which of these personal qualities of a candidate is most important to you?'

(a) age	1.4%
(b) gender	0.4%
(c) ethnic group	1.2%
(d) language	0.1%
(e) confessional affiliation	0.5%
(f) honesty	59.3%
(g) professionalism	30.7%
(h) none	1.9%
Don't know	2.5%
No answer	1.9%

choice of candidate on the candidate's experience, personal characteristics, and on their evaluation of his or her willingness to support 'people like [them]'. This is strong evidence in support of the thesis that the various groups to which candidates belong provide voters with important cues as to how to evaluate them.

When asked directly whether they based their decisions on the demographic, ethnic, and religious attributes of candidates, fewer than 5 per cent of voters were willing to admit that this was the case (see Table 7.9).

Nine out of ten claimed to be concerned instead with candidates' honesty or professionalism. Yet this leaves open the question of how they evaluated these traits. If we probe the political 'ecology' of vote choice in the 25 constituencies sampled, we find that in each case there was at least one candidate with a typically Ukrainian surname and one with a Russian surname. In these constituencies 59.2 per cent of respondents who identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians intended to vote for those with Ukrainian surnames, as opposed to only 46.0 per cent of

ethnic Russian identifiers; 14.8 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians intended to vote for those with Russian surnames, but a full 33.4 per cent of ethnic Russians did so. These figures strongly suggest the prevalence of ethnic-consonant voting, despite voters' failure to point to this motive as the most important consideration in making their choice.

There is also evidence that, as in 1994, candidates' occupation was of importance to voters. As the data in Table 7.9 suggest, lack of professional integrity appears to be one of the main complaints the electorate had about the outgoing parliament. When asked directly, 59.6 per cent of respondents believed that 'almost all' or 'all' deputies were corrupt. This might seem to bode well for political outsiders, and many candidates played on the theme of outsider innocence in their campaign speeches and other publicity. But whatever the electorate's opinion of its current representatives, it did not necessarily take the view that fresh blood was the solution. Respondents were asked a series of questions designed to tap their preference for outsiders as opposed to those with high positions or connections:

- If the elections were held today, which candidate would you rather support, one who is now or was previously a deputy, or one who has never been a deputy?
- If the elections were held today, which candidate would you rather support, one who holds quite a high post (minister, head of regional or city administration, and so on), or one who does not hold a high post?
- If the elections were held today, which candidate would you rather support, one who has contacts which could bring investment or subsidies to the constituency, or one who does not have such contacts?

Responses to these questions were used to construct a scale of propensity to support those with previous experience or connections. A respondent was given one point for each answer that indicated a preference for an 'insider' candidate (the first option in each of these questions).¹⁵ The resultant scale ranges from 0 to 3, with higher scores representing a stronger preference for political insiders. It is interesting to note that fewer than one in seven voters favoured those with no experience and no connections at all. Most voters indicated a preference for candidates who had at least one of the mentioned attributes, and nearly a third claimed they would most like to vote for someone who had the maximum possible number of insider attributes (see Table 7.10).

These data help elucidate the findings in previous chapters that candidates in high occupations have done considerably better than their

Table 7.10 Scores on the scale of preference for 'insider' as opposed to 'outsider' candidates

0	13.2%
1	33.2%
2	24.7%
3	28.9%

counterparts in lowlier professions. It may be in part because of the resources they can command, but it is also due to the fact that Ukrainian voters have a conscious tendency to vote for those who are already highly-placed. Though honesty appears to be their highest priority, the Ukrainian electorate is under no illusions that those new to politics will be more trustworthy than the experienced.

Conclusion

Electoral reforms undertaken in Ukraine prior to the 1998 elections created a situation in which voters had two distinct choices to make, and survey evidence indicates that they adopted very different approaches to the two votes. Ideological and partisan considerations appear to have had little bearing on voting strategies in the single-member constituency races. Instead voters seem to have relied on their evaluation of candidates' honesty and professionalism (quite likely coloured by their and the candidates' cultural characteristics), and on their perception of the potential deputies' 'connectedness'. These two criteria may at first glance seem contradictory given respondents' own poor evaluation of the honesty of current power-holders, but the 'better-the-devil-you-know' approach may have been seen to be a realistic compromise in a situation where virtually all political aspirants were perceived as corruptible.

In terms of party list vote choice, it is clear from the foregoing discussion that the rise of the political centre in 1998 coincided with an increase in the prominence of voters' material assets as determinants of vote choice. Yet group-related variables together still constitute the most important determinants of list vote choice for the majority of the electorate – those who support the parties of Ukraine's leftist and rightist camps. It is interesting in this context that production sector does not figure in any of the analyses presented here. It had been conjectured that the lack of significance of this variable in the analyses

conducted in previous chapters had been in part due to gaps in the data. Its continued failure to exert a significant effect on vote choice for any of the parties and party camps examined here points to the conclusion that working in industry as opposed to agriculture or the service sector had little relevance for vote choice, once other factors are controlled. Also noteworthy is the unimportance of employment status; despite widespread fears of the political dangers of rising unemployment, there is no evidence to suggest that this factor played any significant role in the 1998 vote for parties.

The inclusion in the models of additional employment-related variables does not appear to have greatly altered the effect of those variables examined in earlier chapters. This is welcome evidence that the omission of gender, religion, and income data from previous models did not cause mis-specification sufficient to have generated misleading conclusions. But the opportunity to include these variables in this chapter does yield important insights as to the cleavage structure of the Ukrainian electorate. It is no secret that religion is highly politicized in Ukraine, and this is reflected in the findings reported here. There are two groups of church identifications that are distinctive in electoral terms: on the one hand membership in the previously-banned Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church, and allegiance to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church on the other. These two groups together represent a relatively restricted portion of the Ukrainian electorate. As mentioned earlier, members of the once-banned churches together constitute only 6.4 per cent of the sample, while adherents of the 'Russian' churches make up 12.6 per cent. But this small group – together less than a fifth of the sample – appears to be quite distinctive in electoral terms, supporting those alternatives typical of the ethnic group with which the respective churches are most closely linked. Church affiliation appears to reinforce the ethnic identification of this segment of the electorate, making it more likely that ethnicity will impinge on vote choice.

Political parties are important mechanisms for channelling dissent in a democratic polity, and survey evidence from Ukraine shows there to have been considerable opportunity in 1998 for those who undertook to attract the disconsolate. There was a steady rise between 1994 and 1997 in citizens who were 'entirely dissatisfied' with their lives from 16.8 per cent in 1994 to 32.6 per cent in 1997 (Democratychni initsiatyvy, 1998: 25). The enhanced strength of the left undoubtedly reflects growing disillusionment with post-independence political representation

in Ukraine.¹⁶ Yet political parties commonly serve other functions in democracies as well. One of these is the representation of prominent elite groups in society. Between 1994 and 1998 it was parties of the second type that made the greatest overall gains in Ukraine, establishing themselves at the ideological and political centre of gravity. The analyses presented above suggest that these were parties which appealed to voters who had done better than average out of recent economic change and those who could be expected to have a relatively sanguine outlook on the future.

The results of Ukraine's second multi-party elections therefore indicate that socio-economic differences, which had not heretofore played a prominent role in Ukrainian electoral politics, were brought to the fore by the political structuration of the ideological centre. It is important to recognize that this new cleavage did not displace but rather supplemented the existing regional and ethnic divides represented by the right-left axis. The process of cleavage formation in Ukraine would appear to have resulted in an overlapping structure of loyalties and behavioural dispositions not so different from those found in many western European democracies. It remains to review the role and prominence of these different cleavages over time and to place them in the context of post-communist electoral behaviour in general.

8

Democratization and Electoral Behaviour in Ukraine, 1989–98

The preceding five chapters have presented the principal results of this study, but little attempt has yet been made to synthesize them or to interpret their collective import. This chapter will undertake this task by first examining the effect of the individual socio-demographic variables employed in the analyses with reference to the hypotheses set out in Chapter 2, before considering their combined impact on electoral behaviour in Ukraine. In the final section, Ukrainian voting patterns will be placed in the context of electoral behaviour in other ex-communist countries in the aim of distinguishing between those aspects that are common across the region, and those specific to Ukraine.

Testing the hypotheses

Two broad explanations were elaborated in Chapter 2 to account for the effect of socio-demographic variables on voting decisions in Ukraine. It was argued that, on the one hand, people might base their vote choice on perceptions of their individual economic prospects in Ukraine's developing market economy, and that these would be strongly influenced by age, education level, and place of residence (urban or rural). Yet it was pointed out that the majority of people would find it difficult to evaluate their economic prospects in a situation of rapid socio-economic change such as that experienced by Ukraine during the period under analysis. The other main hypothesis was that many if not most people would vote on the basis of group experiences and identifications as well as perceptions of group interest. The most important groups in this regard were predicted to be ethnic group, employment sector, region of residence, and Communist Party membership. It was further argued that, though group identification could be expected to have the greatest

impact on vote choice, different sectors of the electorate would use different strategies to make their voting decision, and that perceptions of individual interest would be important for a significant minority of the population. Finally, it was predicted that those groups most in need, and those least supportive of Ukrainian statehood would turn to clientelist electoral structures which would mobilize votes on the basis of particularistic rewards. This section aims to evaluate these complementary hypotheses. The effects of individual variables will be reviewed first, before presenting an overview of results.

(1) Ethnicity

Ethnicity appears to have exerted considerable influence on electoral behaviour in Ukraine during the 1989–98 period, both in terms of the frequency with which it figured in the vote choice models and the magnitude of the coefficients representing it. Native Russian speakers were disinclined on the whole to support the most radical candidates in the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, but, surprisingly, they tended to vote for the radical Democratic Bloc in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections the following year. By 1991 there was a clear relationship between Ukrainian language use and the 'no' vote in the all-Union referendum question, and an equally strong relationship between this variable and the 'yes' vote in the December referendum. The tendency of Ukrainianophones to support Chornovil's candidacy for president and to vote against Kravchuk is consonant with these findings, for though Kravchuk sought to associate himself with Ukrainian independence, he was widely perceived as the candidate most likely to preserve close ties with Russia. Kravchuk's nationalist credentials had been clearly established two and a half years later when he sought re-election, and again the ethnic effect was readily interpretable: in both rounds of the presidential race Ukrainian speakers were more likely to support Kravchuk and less inclined to vote for Kuchma.

Ethnicity does not seem to have played a large role in the 1994 parliamentary elections; there is evidence that Russophones voted in disproportionate numbers for the socialists, but ethnic variables were not significant in the models for other parties, nor those for Ukraine's emerging party 'camps'. The localized nature of the vote in these elections appears to have diminished the effect of this variable; at the constituency level other factors were evidently more important. When nation-wide party list voting was introduced in 1998, ethnic variables were more prominent. Ethnic Russians and affiliates of 'Russian' churches were

more supportive of the left than of the right, whereas voters who claimed affiliation with one of the churches most closely identified with ethnic Ukrainian identity tended to exhibit the opposite behaviour.

It is thus clear that, with the exception of the 1994 parliamentary elections, ethnicity was a highly influential factor throughout the entire period. The findings reviewed here give strong support to the hypothesis that ethnicity should have been an important determinant of attitudes *vis-à-vis* Ukrainian independence and statehood. As expected, Russian ethnic variables were for the most part linked with less nationalist electoral options, while Ukrainian ethnicity tended to be positively associated with the cause of independent statehood. It is interesting to note that through 1994 language use was a more significant determinant of vote choice than ethnic identification *per se*, whereas the combination of declared ethnicity and church affiliation exerted the strongest effect in 1998. This is most likely due to the fact that language use in Ukraine is a composite of several factors, including ethnicity and religious affiliation; it is, in political science terms, an intervening variable that mediates between ascriptive characteristics and vote choice (see also Wilson and Birch, 1999).

Another intriguing finding is the evidence presented here that Russian ethnic variables were, as expected, more significant than their Ukrainian counterparts in predicting parliamentary electoral results, but that the reverse was true for referendums and presidential elections. No immediately obvious explanation for this trend presents itself, but it may be due to the fact that issues of minority representation are evoked by the rhetoric of parliamentary races, whereas the definition of the state – a topic which has the potential to set ethnic Ukrainians against the rest – is perceived to be more important in nation-wide contests with a single outcome.

(2) Region of residence

Regional differences in Ukraine are often interpreted in ethnic terms, but it is clear from the persistent significance of regional variables throughout this study that region exerts a strong independent effect on vote choice. In Rokkan and Urwin's (1982) terms, Ukraine has strong 'membership space' characteristics. The logic of the candidate-based vote choice models constructed for the 1989 elections precludes examination of regional patterns, but regional dummy variables introduced as controls in other models displayed strong patterns. Through 1994 the western region was consistently most distinctive and consistently

most nationalistic. Western voters tended to vote for the Democratic Bloc in 1990, against both March referendum questions in 1998, for the independence referendum in December of that year, and for Chornovil (as opposed to Kravchuk) in the presidential contest. In 1994 and 1998 they voted against the left – especially the communists – and for candidates of the right.

The east was the next most distinctive region, but eastern voters have been less consistent in their allegiances. They were reluctant to support Kravchuk's bid for president in 1991 when he was the most leftist of the candidates on offer, and again in 1994 when he was perceived as being the most nationalistic. In party political terms, easterners were clearly more leftist than other voters in both 1994 and 1998 (though not consistently opposed to the right). A breakdown of the left vote reveals that this is due mainly to their support for the communists.

Southern residence exerted only patchy effects on vote choice, but when this variable was significant it tended to reflect in less prominent form the same patterns as in the east. The exception to this rule was the 1998 elections, which demonstrated an increase in regional differentiation. In this year the south came out decidedly against the right, whereas eastern residence was insignificant in the model for right-wing vote choice. Though southern voters seem to have supported the communists and Hromada in considerable numbers, they tended to shy away from the socialists and the Popular Democrats; in this region the left-centre ideological distinction appears to have been less important than allegiance to individual party organizations.

The Left Bank was, overall, the least distinctive region in comparison with the base-line Right Bank (partially, admittedly, due to lack of data for this variable in the referendums and presidential elections). The only parliamentary election in which the Left Bank stood out was the 1998 race, in which residence there had a modest differential impact on voting patterns within the left camp in that the socialist-rural bloc gained votes at the expense of the communists.

(3) Communist party membership

It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the anticipated effects of (former) Communist Party membership were hard to judge. There are reasons to believe that party members benefited from the Soviet system, but also reasons to think that they might be particularly well placed to take advantage of the opportunities resulting from the transition. The effect of this variable was greatest during the years of Soviet collapse

and diminished considerably thereafter. In 1990 and 1991 party members exhibited pro-establishment behaviour, supporting in large numbers both March referendum questions as well as the communist leader Kravchuk. By 1994 former communists had deserted Kravchuk, though they only came out significantly in favour of his rival Kuchma in the second round of the presidential elections. Intriguingly, affiliation with the Soviet-era party organization had very little impact on support for post-Soviet political parties. This variable had no significant effect in the 1994 contests, and in 1998 the only discernible impact was a slight tendency for ex-communists to vote for the SDP – ironically the party of Kravchuk, whom many of them had shunned in his bid for the presidency four years earlier. It is likely that the decline over time in the influence of former CPSU membership reflects substantial experiential differentiation during the immediate post-Soviet years among former rank-and-file party members. Though contacts made through the party may have been instrumental in enabling many in this group to adapt to the new cultural and economic situation, perceptions of common interest apparently failed to survive the party's demise, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the current Communist Party of Ukraine has inherited the support base of its predecessor.

(4) Production sector employment

The production sector in which a person is employed was predicted to be an important determinant of vote choice in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the sectoral data used in most of this analysis were less complete than those for other variables, making it difficult to evaluate this core hypothesis. On the whole, sector was *not* found to exert a great influence on vote choice, once other factors are accounted for, and indeed it was not significant for a single one of the parliamentary vote models. There is, however, evidence that production sector divisions played some role in the crucial nation-wide votes of 1991: those employed in industry seem at that point to have been mobilized in support of radical nationalist positions; they appear to have voted disproportionately against both March referendum questions and for Rukh leader Chornovil. Employment in the agricultural sector, by contrast, was associated with support for the more moderate presidential candidate, Kravchuk.¹ After 1991 the impact of this variable declined; it was not significant in either of the elections in 1994, nor the 1998 contests, despite the better quality data available for the latter.

This last finding suggests that the lack of significance of this variable in previous analyses was not an artefactual consequence of inadequacies in the data employed. How then might this result be interpreted? It may be that the Ukrainian electorate was not sufficiently attuned to the economic implications of political change to be aware of the differential impact this would have on individual branches of the economy. The explanation for the continuing lack of impact of sectoral variables in 1994 and 1998 is somewhat more problematic, as we would have expected the hardships associated with economic change to have brought such factors to the fore. Yet it must be noted that economic hardship was experienced across all the major branches of the economy, and it could be that, on the one hand, the diversification of income sources that resulted from falling pay obscured differences across sectors, and on the other hand, sectoral effects operated differentially across regions and within sub-branches of each sector, such that they could not be detected by the admittedly crude distinctions employed here.

It can be concluded from the foregoing discussion that the main hypothesis of this study has received considerable support. Of the variables that were predicted to have been most influential in shaping voters' perceptions of group interest, only production sector fails to figure prominently in the analyses undertaken here. Ethnicity, region of residence, and to a lesser extent Communist Party membership were significantly related to voting behaviour in both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, and the effects they exhibited conformed for the most part to expectations.

The variables hypothesized to be linked to voters' individual material assets also had significant influence on vote choice, but the nature of their effect was not always as anticipated.

(5) Education

All in all, education level appears to have had only a modest impact on electoral behaviour, once other variables are controlled for. Those with higher education tended to vote against both March referendum questions in 1991, but this is the only discernible effect of this variable in the electoral events of the pre-independence period. In the parliamentary elections of both 1994 and 1998, higher education was associated with an anti-left vote, yet whereas in 1994 it was the communists who suffered most at the hands of the intellectual elite, in 1998 the Socialists fared worst among this group. In 1994 candidates from the right did well among the educated, while it was the centrist Popular Democratic Party

that benefited the most from their support four years later. The lack of a strong consistent impact for this variable suggests that skill level was of secondary importance in guiding voters during this period, but where it was significant it was associated, as expected, with pro-reform options.

(6) Age

The effect of age on vote choice underwent a marked change between the late Soviet period and 1998. Contrary to expectations, many elderly voters appear to have held pro-independence positions in 1990 and 1991, voting in large numbers for the Democratic Bloc and against both referendum questions in March 1991; they also came out in support of the referendum on independence. The 1990 result may be interpreted in terms of the pro-nationalist sentiment of those western Ukrainians old enough to recall pre-Soviet times, given that the analysis focuses on those constituencies with Democratic Bloc candidates, a large number of which were located in western Ukraine. The evident antipathy of the elderly to the March referendum questions remains somewhat of a mystery, but in as far as non-western voters are concerned, it may be explicable in terms of suspicion of change, rather than active protest against the current regime. This explanation is somewhat at odds, however, with the finding that older voters gave overwhelming support to independence in December.

Whatever the explanation for these results, by 1994 many of Ukraine's pensioners had had sufficient time to recognize that the political and economic developments of recent years had caused them considerable hardship. It is therefore not surprising that age was associated with support for the left in the elections of this year. This support continued to be a factor four years later, and in these elections the elderly appear to have been especially reluctant to vote for the new centrist parties.

(7) Urban/rural residence

Urban versus rural residence was a variable that consistently exerted a significant impact on vote choice between 1990 and 1998. As expected, residence in Ukraine's cities was associated mainly with pro-reformist positions. Urban residence predicted support for the Democratic Bloc in 1990, for Rukh in the 1994 parliamentary elections, and for centrist parties in 1998 (especially the Greens). The exception to this generalization is the curious finding that urban voters were more likely than their rural counterparts to vote 'no' on the independence referendum (as they had in the two referendums of March that year); this may indicate that

urban voting patterns were more a reflection of anti-establishment sentiment than of reformism itself.

The three variables just examined – education, age, and urbanization – are those expected to reflect the individual resources of voters. Young, educated, urban voters were expected to have more opportunities to benefit from political change and better chances of coming out on top in a non-communist independent Ukraine. They were therefore predicted to support electoral alternatives identified with Ukrainian statehood, political reform, and marketization. These findings are only partially confirmed by this analysis. The effects of age and place of residence are more significant than that of education level, but neither of these variables behaved fully as one would expect based on their contribution to an individual's material assets. Other cultural factors are most likely also at play here, suggesting that perceptions of material interest were less important for most Ukrainian voters throughout most of this period than were perceptions of collective group interests.

The 1998 elections gave evidence that this may be changing; income differentials and social stratification variables were particularly important as predictors of centrist party support. Unfortunately, indicators for these variables were not available for the analysis of previous elections, where education was employed a proxy for the skill-level factors associated with income and class.² The relative modesty of the impact of education in the models for previous elections suggest that the influence of skill level on vote choice increased in importance over the course of the post-independence period; it is the centrist parties which rose to prominence in 1998 that brought the socio-economic cleavage to the fore. It thus appears that the factors which helped determine individuals' material assets – age, education level, and place of residence – only began to exert strong effects of the type expected when their potential had been realized in the form of income. Ukrainian voters seem to have been less likely to have made the abstract connection between their potential assets, as determined by the factors mentioned above, and political choice. Prior to the increase in income differentials which occurred after 1992, factors linked to group identity were the most important determinants of vote choice for most Ukrainians, and even after 1992, these factors still played the strongest role in distinguishing Ukraine's two largest political camps – the left and the right.

The final hypothesis regarding electoral clientelism was for obvious reasons difficult to test directly. But the patterns of support in the 1990 and 1994 parliamentary elections for candidates from Ukraine's political and economic elite are consonant with the predicted effects of the

development of clientelist networks. The same is true for the finding that non-local candidates had an advantage in these contests. This suggests that political elites were quick to adapt to competitive elections, learning from past failures and deploying their resources in such a way as to maximize their success. In some cases it appears that this involved the establishment of party 'machines' and other particularistic reward systems designed to ensure the loyalty of voters. More direct evidence from the 1998 survey sheds light on these findings. Though corruption in official structures was one of their main concerns, many Ukrainian voters consciously favoured 'insider' candidates. Cynicism is widespread among the Ukrainian electorate. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those who have had their fill at the parliamentary 'trough' are considered less likely to engage in further corrupt activities and more likely to be in a position to help their constituents than those still hungry for the fruits of office. Accurate or not, this perception opens the door to the growth of clientelist politics and goes some way toward legitimating corruption as the essence of the political game. Such a development would be unfortunate in a country such as Ukraine, where interest and involvement in politics are already low. Fortunately, as we have seen, other factors are also influential in determining vote choice for much of the electorate.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that Ukraine had two principal types of cleavage during the period studied. The first was a composite dimension made up of ethnicity and region (occasionally influenced by Communist Party membership). Though the two principal aspects of this dimension had independent effects, they tended in large measure to reinforce each other. This was the most important cleavage in determining attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood, and it therefore came out in greatest relief in contests in which statehood was most at issue. The second main type of cleavage was that related to individual resources: education, age, place of residence, and employment-related variables. This cleavage was, as predicted, less important than the first, but the analyses presented here demonstrate that individual-resource variables played an increasing (though still subordinate) role in structuring vote choice during this period. The specific nature of the dominant issues in Ukrainian politics during the Soviet collapse was such that independence, economic reform, and political reform remained for the most part conflated into a single pro-statehood versus anti-statehood dimension. Evidence from the 1998 elections suggests that as time goes on the two composite cleavages are coming to divide the Ukrainian electorate into more distinct groups. But it seems likely that

the social factors distinguished here will continue to play a significant role in Ukrainian electoral behaviour for some time to come.³

The theoretical considerations developed in Chapter 2 were designed to provide the basis for the examination of the role of specific social factors in influencing Ukrainian electoral behaviour, but it was not possible at that point to make any precise predictions as to how important the aggregate effect of these influences would be. The question of how much socio-demographic factors matter in determining vote choice is nevertheless of considerable interest and worthy of comment.

How socially structured is the Ukrainian electorate?

The degree of structuration of the Ukrainian electorate can be examined from three perspectives. Firstly, it is possible to assess the level of synchronic structuration (how structured the electorate has been at each election). Secondly, it is possible to analyse the degree of diachronic structuration (how stable the structure has been over successive elections). In practice, these two aspects of electoral structure are closely related, for low levels of synchronic structure tend to allow for greater change over time. The question can also be examined from a third perspective, that of the degree of homogeneity of structuration across regions (the degree to which the factors that determine vote choice vary from region to region).

The first two perspectives are best examined in tandem. The social structure of electorates is generally thought of in terms of the social bases of party support. But it is necessary to differentiate the *level* of social structuration of the electorate from the extent to which social structuration correlates with patterns of support for different parties. The Ukrainian case demonstrates that a relatively high level of electoral structure is possible even when political parties are under-developed; in other words, electorates may be structured without at the same time being aligned to party systems. There are two related explanations for this situation. Firstly, throughout post-communist Europe, links between parties and distinct sectors of the electorate are weak; politics is organized around issues more than it is around parties. This is primarily because electorates are suspicious of parties, and many political leaders are lacking in the linkage skills required to engage in aggregative representative politics (Agh, 1995; Miller *et al.*, 1998). Links that have been successfully established have in most cases been based on top-down clientelist relations, rather than bottom-up interest- and preference-aggregation (Kitschelt, 1995; Agh, 1996). Ex-communist parties are in

the best position to maintain and build the first sort of link, while the new non-communist parties are faced with the double constraint of popular mistrust of political parties in general and a dearth of organizational resources. This problem has been compounded in Ukraine by two factors. Firstly, Ukraine has held relatively few elections in comparison with most post-communist countries.⁴ Moreover, the lengthy period of time between the legalization of alternative political parties and the first multi-party elections allowed Ukraine's emerging party system to develop in the sheltered context of parliament, giving it little incentive to establish bonds with the electorate. The second factor specific to the Ukrainian situation is the maintenance of a single-member electoral system through the first multi-party elections.⁵ This law included significant hurdles to the nomination of party candidates, and it allowed many independent candidates with local popularity to gain access to parliamentary seats without establishing ties to a party organization.

A related but analytically distinct reason as to why Ukrainian political parties do not have structured support bases is that the Ukrainian party system remains fluid. In contrast to the situation in countries such as Hungary and the Czechoslovak successor states where the main parties established at the start of the transition have remained the most important political actors since, the Ukrainian party system has experienced a protracted and disjointed development. This is partly because competitive elections were introduced much more gradually in the (former) Soviet republics than they were in most Central European countries (Poland being the exception, and an exception also to the norm of relative party system stability in Central Europe), and because during this period the laws governing party formation changed substantially. Organized parties were not allowed to contest the elections of 1990 in Ukraine, resulting in a lopsided communist-dominated race. In the immediate post-Soviet period, by contrast, the Communist Party itself was banned; this allowed the newly-established parties to gain more parliamentary strength than their notional electoral support warranted. When the Communist Party was allowed to re-form in the autumn of 1993, the party system was once again fundamentally altered. Finally, the 1998 elections saw the rise of a group of parties in the centre, based largely on a socio-economic cleavage that was beginning to differentiate itself from the ethno-regional divides that had heretofore been most prominent.

Turning now to the degree of uniformity of electoral structure across Ukraine's various regions, it is clear from the foregoing analysis that vote choice in parliamentary elections in Ukraine has been strongly

influenced by regional factors. This has two important consequences for future electoral outcomes in Ukraine. Firstly, it suggests that even if the party system does stabilize it is likely to remain disjointed in that different parties will compete in different parts of the country. This problem has been partially alleviated by the move toward proportional representation. Though a forceful case has been made in the Latin American context for the incompatibility of presidentialism and PR (Mainwaring, 1993), this rests on the conventional wisdom that PR necessarily generates fragmented party systems, whereas single-member electoral formulae reduce the number of significant parties in the legislature to two or three. The Ukrainian experience demonstrates the flaws in this argument, which relies on an assumption of relative uniformity in electoral support across regions. In the Ukrainian case, a move toward PR can be expected in the long term to result in a party system that has fewer parties and is less regionalized. In the short term it has enabled the rise of a new crop of parties which draw support from across the country. Bearing these considerations in mind, the social bases of *party* support examined in this study are likely to be of less long-term consequence to political developments in Ukraine than the underlying social factors determining vote choice in general.

Ukrainian electoral behaviour in comparative perspective

The results of this investigation are potentially of some interest to students of Ukrainian politics, but if they are to be made relevant to the concerns of a wider audience it is necessary to situate them in the context of electoral behaviour in Eastern Europe in general. To this end, the present section will compare the social bases of electoral support in Ukraine with those in other countries in the region. The reference countries include those whose political developments are most comparable Ukraine's. The Yugoslav successor states and Albania will for this reason not be examined, as these countries were for most of the post-war period outside the Soviet Bloc and they underwent distinct patterns of political development. A number of them are also distinguished from most of the Soviet Bloc countries by the violence that accompanied their transitions from socialism. For similar reasons, the analysis of the Soviet successor states will be confined to those of the European USSR.⁶

Electoral behaviour in post-communist Eastern Europe has been influenced by many factors, some of which operate at the country level and some of which differentiate voters within countries. While not wanting to deny the importance of country-level determinants of vote

choice, our present aim is to examine commonalities rather than differences. Despite differences among the Eastern European countries, voting behaviour has exhibited a number of patterns which transcend state borders and which can in many cases be linked to their common experience of state socialism and its rapid collapse at the end of the 1980s. One of the phenomena that has affected all countries in the region is the prevalence of low levels of party identification and lack of widespread trust in the institutions of representative politics (Haerpfer and Rose, 1994; Hibbing and Patterson, 1994; Rose and Mishler, 1994; Rose, 1995a; Wyman *et al.*, 1995b; Mishler and Rose, 1997). Another common feature of post-communist electoral experience in Eastern Europe has been that, as in Ukraine, variations in historical experience of democracy have been important in determining the success with which the different countries have established effective democratic institutions. They have also been influential in determining the precise level of trust in and identification with parties in the post-communist period, whereas specific party allegiances have been far less prominent (Berglund and Dellenbrant, 1991; 1992; Korosenyi, 1991; Cotta, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Wightman, 1995; Rivera, 1996).⁷

Within this comparative frame, the hypotheses elaborated by Evans and Whitefield (1993) about the likely social bases of electoral support in the region appear for the most part to have been substantiated. Broadly speaking, Evans and Whitefield predicted that Eastern European electorates would divide along three principal dimensions, depending on (1) their ethnic structure, and (2) whether or not they had established statehood prior to the regime change. In those countries with large ethnic minorities, ethnicity was predicted to be a dominant cleavage, and in states that gained independence at the time of the transition, issues surrounding statehood (often linked, for obvious reasons, to ethnic concerns) would dominate politics during the immediate post-transition period. Elsewhere, economic dimensions of electoral competition and social stratification variables were predicted to be most important, especially in those countries that had successfully weathered economic liberalization. As we have seen, this pattern holds for Ukraine, where questions surrounding statehood have structured politics since 1989 and ethnicity has played a leading role in determining voting patterns.

The prediction that ethnically-charged issues of statehood would be of highest salience in new multi-ethnic states has proved accurate elsewhere in the region as well.⁸ Ethnicity has been found to be a significant determinant of political values and vote choice in Slovakia, Moldova, Romania, and the Baltics (Shafir, 1992; Eyal, 1993; Gorat and Marciniak,

1995; Rose and Maley, 1994; Fitzmaurice, 1995; Crowther, 1997; Rose, 1997; Wolchik, 1997:215–16; Miller *et al.*, 1998).⁹ It also plays a significant secondary role in Bulgaria and Russia (Kitschelt *et al.*, 1995; Clem and Craumer, 1995; White *et al.*, 1997). In the newly-independent states occupational stratification dimensions have generally been found to be less important. But as in Ukraine, variables related to individual economic resources, such as education level, age, urban residence, and income, have in many cases appeared to be strong determinants of support for economic and political reform (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; Hesli and Barkan, 1993; Gibson and Duch, 1993; Rose and Carnaghan, 1995; Miller *et al.*, 1994; Pammatt and DeBardeleben, 1996; Wyman, 1997; Miller *et al.*, 1998). As in Ukraine, younger, more highly educated, urban residents have generally been found to be most supportive of reform.¹⁰ A similar but weaker pattern has been discerned in the established states of East Central Europe (Rose and Carnaghan, 1995; Rose and Mishler, 1994; Evans and Whitefield, 1995b; Kitschelt *et al.*, 1995; Keri and Levendel, 1995),¹¹ though in these countries occupational variables often tend to be as important as education, age, and place of residence, perhaps reflecting the greater degree of crystallization of occupational stratification that has resulted from more extensive reforms.¹²

One exception to this general pattern is the role played by religion in the predominantly Catholic countries of Poland and Hungary (Rose and Mishler, 1994; Evans and Whitefield, 1995b; Rivera, 1996). Finally, former Communist Party membership does not appear to be a strong correlate of political attitudes in any of the countries (including Ukraine) in which surveys were conducted (Gibson and Duch, 1993; Rose, 1996; Miller *et al.*, 1998). That it was found to affect *vote decisions* in certain Ukrainian elections might be linked to the role played by clientelistic structures based on former communist party networks. Clientelism was hypothesized by Herbert Kitschelt (1995) to be important in Eastern Europe, especially in those countries with less pre-Soviet experience of democracy, and his predictions are borne out by Attila Agh's (1996) analysis of Eastern European party formation (on the Russian case, see also Helf and Hahn, 1992; Vorozheikina, 1994; Golosov, 1997).

The countries considered here are different from Ukraine in many ways, and though there are similarities in voting patterns across them, the comparative perspective will be more useful still if focus is narrowed to those polities with which Ukraine has most in common – Poland and Russia.¹³ Ukraine shares many historical and cultural similarities with these countries. And like Ukraine, both experienced relatively protracted

transition processes, moving through a stage of semi-competitive elections. Poland and Russia, unlike any of the other countries of Central Europe, also both opted for directly elected presidents, and their party systems both underwent severe fragmentation at the time of the first fully competitive multi-party elections. Finally, the number of votes received by ex-communist parties in both Poland and Russia doubled between the first and the second post-transition parliamentary elections, paralleling the unexpectedly large proportion of votes won by the CPU in Ukraine's post-Soviet parliamentary elections. Given these similarities, comparisons between voting trends in the three countries will shed additional light on the peculiarities of Ukrainian electoral behaviour.

Religious affiliation is a strong predictor of political views and electoral behaviour in Poland, as has been found to be the case in Ukraine (see Chapter 7). Not surprisingly, there is an apparent tendency for the pious to support Poland's small Catholic parties in disproportionate numbers and to be disdainful of a return to state socialism (Wade *et al.*, 1994; Rose and Mishler, 1994). In Poland as in Ukraine, communist-era determinants of economic prospects such as education level, age, and place of residence (urban versus rural) have also been found to be closely associated with political attitudes and electoral support patterns (Cline, 1993; Millard, 1994; Wade *et al.*, 1994; Gibson and Cielecka, 1995; Tworzecki, 1996). The direction of these effects is for the most part congruent with that found in the post-independence period in Ukraine. Younger, more highly educated, urban Poles who were not members of the Communist Party are more likely to support post-Solidarity reformist parties and candidates, and less likely to support the ex-communist Democratic Alliance of the Left (SLD).¹⁴ As in Ukraine, occupational variables seem to have had only a marginal impact on vote choice in Poland, with the exception of the strong industrial working-class support for the nationalist Confederation for an Independent Poland (Tworzecki, 1994; Freyer and Vanlaer, 1994; Millard, 1994). The leftist portion of the Polish electorate seems actually to be less working-class than the electorate overall, and the support base of the SLD appears to be composed of two distinct types of voter: members of the former communist elite who are often doing quite well under the new economic conditions but who find it convenient to have their fellows in positions of power; and the disaffected who have suffered the most from the strains of economic and political transition (Wade *et al.*, 1994; Cline, 1993; Millard, 1994).¹⁵

As in western Ukraine, there is evidence of a tradition of radical nationalism among certain portions of the Polish peasantry which is at

odds with the general pattern of conservatism among agricultural workers (Ammeter-Inquirer, 1992; Freyer and Vanlaer, 1994; Gibson and Cielecka, 1995). This can be understood in terms of the two different types of 'conservatism' that operate in the post-Soviet region: aversion to radical reform on the one hand, and, on the other hand, allegiance to independent statehood based on pre-communist ideological commitments.

The final factor that needs to be considered is the role of region in Polish voting behaviour. Like Ukraine, Poland was long divided between neighbouring states, and as in Ukraine, there is some evidence that voting patterns reflect these historical divisions (Freyer and Vanlaer, 1994).¹⁶ Yet it is unclear to what extent these differences can be accounted for by differences in socio-economic structure. Furthermore, in Poland regional differences are cross-cut by other divides. In Ukraine the areas longest under Soviet rule are also the most secularized and industrialized; a pro-Soviet orientation is predicted by all three factors. In Poland, by contrast, the lands under Russian rule in the nineteenth century are the most religious and the most agricultural. This situation suggests conflicting predictions as to party allegiance in the post-communist context. It is thus not surprising that the south-east of Poland is the stronghold of the Peasant Party, a party that espouses religious values but has at the same time formed alliances with the ex-communist SLD.

Indeed, one of the main features of Poland's political structure is that there are many cross-cutting divides. Though the factors that determine electoral support are by and large the same as those in Ukraine, they combine in different ways. The principal difference between the two countries is the importance of ethnicity in Ukraine.¹⁷ In Ukraine, ethnicity and region reinforce each other to a great extent, creating a simpler cleavage structure. The ethno-regional cleavage is mobilized around the statehood question, which is more salient in Ukraine because of the recency of the country's political integration. The salience of the issue has the effect of further consolidating the cleavage structure.

Regionalism also plays a significant role in influencing electoral behaviour in Russia. The industrialized north and east of the country have been consistently more anti-communist and more pro-reform than the rural south and most of European Russia (the metropolises of Moscow and St. Petersburg being notable exceptions). The north-east also remained faithful to president Yeltsin even when his support suffered considerable attrition elsewhere (Reisinger *et al.*, 1994; White *et al.*, 1994a; Clem and Craumer, 1993; 1995; Hough *et al.*, 1996; White *et al.*, 1997). Yet there is an important difference between electoral regionalism in Russia

and Ukraine. Despite the marked divide between the north-east and the south-west, regionalism in Russia is multi-polar. There is little cohesiveness within each of the macro-regions, and micro-regional variations are equally important. The south-east and the west in Ukraine are much more distinctive as regions, because regional differences coincide to a great extent with historical and ethnic differences and with differences in economic structure. As in Poland, the importance of the regional factor in Russia is mitigated by the many other cleavages that cross-cut it. In other respects, however, Russian voting behaviour exhibits considerable similarities with that in Ukraine: members of the titular ethnic group and religious believers have been found by some studies to be supportive of electoral options associated with reform (Clem and Craumer, 1995; White *et al.*, 1994b; White *et al.*, 1995; Hough *et al.*, 1996:25–7; White *et al.*, 1997; Wyman, 1997:227–8). Yet, unlike in Ukraine, the most important determinants of vote choice in Russia appear to be factors relating to individual resources: age, income, urban residence, and, to a lesser extent, education. As is the case throughout the Eastern European region, those better placed to benefit from reform have tended in many cases to support electoral alternatives associated with it and to vote against the left (Reisinger *et al.*, 1994; White *et al.*, 1994a; Hough *et al.*, 1996; Wyman, 1996; 1997:chap. 8; White *et al.*, 1997; Miller *et al.*, 1998). Another difference is that former Communist Party membership has not been found to be significantly related to vote choice in Russia. Comparative studies between the two countries have found that in general socio-demographic factors are more important in influencing political attitudes and behaviour in Ukraine than in Russia (Hesli and Barkan, 1993; Pammett and DeBardeleben, 1996), and there is evidence that party support in Russia became less distinct in socio-demographic terms between the elections of 1993 and those of 1995 as parties widened their support bases (Wyman, 1996). This may well be a consequence of the simpler bi-dimensional cleavage structure in Ukraine, which has polarized parties and electorates alike according to their stance on the statehood issue.

Conclusion

There are clear patterns in voting behaviour in Eastern Europe that have roots in historical political experiences, the effect of communist rule on the social structure, and challenges posed by the transition process. Though there are differences among the countries in the effects of each of these factors, there are also considerable similarities. In this regard,

Ukraine is not exceptional. Though the indices used in this study to measure these relationships are somewhat crude, the findings offer a good picture of the basic outlines of the emerging electoral cleavage structure in Ukraine. The relative unimportance of occupation in determining vote choice and the greater significance of age, education level, urban versus rural residence, and income correspond to trends evident across the spectrum of post-communist countries. Contrary to the predictions of some commentators, the slow pace of reform in Ukraine has not prevented the electorate from becoming structured in socio-demographic terms. Instead, clear political cleavages have emerged and coalesced along the dimensions of ethno-regional orientation and, more recently, individual socio-economic resources. The strong influence of region on voting behaviour marks Ukraine off from the other countries in Eastern Europe. In no other country is region as decisive and polarizing as it is in Ukraine, once other factors are taken into consideration. This is undoubtedly partly because Ukraine is a large country by Eastern European standards, and local identifications are bound to be of more significance in larger polities. But it is also because regional divisions largely reinforce others, and because Ukrainian territory was so recently and for so long divided between different states. In the Conclusion we shall consider the implications of this situation for future political developments in Ukraine.

Conclusion

Like other former Soviet states, Ukraine underwent modernization without the development of the party-group links characteristic of democracies in most Western countries. At the time of the advent of electoral competition in Ukraine it was unknown the extent to which traditional identities from the pre-Soviet period had survived intact and the extent to which the Leninist experience had structured society in ways that could become politically relevant. The analyses presented in this volume suggest that both the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods left their marks on Ukrainian society, and that the social structure which evolved prior to independence played a large role in shaping political identities and their manifestation in voting patterns in Ukraine's first competitive electoral contests.

There is, however, little evidence to suggest that this structure has yet moulded itself closely to that of the party system (or vice versa). The support bases of most of Ukraine's parties remained relatively ill-defined even in 1998. This was undoubtedly due in large measure to the electoral inexperience of many party strategists, but it can also be attributed to popular aversion to party politics as such and a tendency for many voters to vote on the basis of the non-party attributes of candidates. It can be predicted that with time Ukrainian parties will succeed in targeting distinct sectors of the population and that a party system will develop along the main lines of ethnicity, region, and economic resources. This closing chapter will consider some of the implications of this prediction for the future development of political identity in Ukraine as well as the broader implications of the findings of this study for the comparative analysis of electoral behaviour.

What is the probability the electoral cleavages in present-day Ukraine will remain 'frozen' in future? It might be argued that the continuity of

electoral behaviour over the period analysed here is a function of the relative lack of social-structural change in Ukraine. The slow pace of economic reform has undoubtedly hindered the social restructuring attendant upon the establishment of a market economy and has held the statehood issue at centre stage. On this view, the 1991–8 period could be seen as a period of temporary but deceptive calm that will be subsequently shattered by the emergence of new electoral cleavages based on new dimensions of economic stratification. It would thus be a fallacy to portray the electoral structures described in this investigation as anything more than ephemeral epiphenomena of the transition process. This argument certainly has its merits, but two points may be made by way of counter-argument. Firstly, the experience of electoral cleavage formation in Europe, as detailed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) among others, has shown that decisive historical changes establish socio-political divisions in society that have lasting impacts on patterns of electoral support long after the issues that led to the divisions have lost salience. One of the reasons for this is that, as Sartori (1969) has pointed out, social cleavages do not have a simple one-way effect on the structure of party systems; party systems also structure social cleavages. In as much as the parties that form in the early stages of system development are able to guide the transition process and entrench themselves in Ukrainian politics, they may well be successful, through the establishment of even limited party identification and the selective appeal to those social characteristics that define their support bases, in manipulating electoral politics in such a way as to ensure the lasting salience of the cleavages that have become electorally relevant in the early period of party formation. Secondly, and following again from the analyses of Lipset and Rokkan, electoral cleavages do not typically replace one another; rather, they accumulate over time. The emergence of new cleavages will undoubtedly change the structure of the Ukrainian electorate, but it will most likely not eliminate the importance of the cleavages outlined here. This phenomenon was already evident in the 1998 parliamentary elections, when the centrist parties mobilized a previously latent socio-economic cleavage, while at the same time leaving the principal left–right ethno-regional divide intact.

What are the implications of this situation for democratization and regime stability? A pro-statehood/anti-statehood cleavage such as that found in Ukraine is potentially destabilizing in the context of severe economic crisis. Empirical and normative democratic theory alike have stressed the importance for democratic consolidation of placing the boundaries of the polity beyond the sphere of political competition

(Dahl, 1989: chap. 9; Rustow, 1970: 350–2; Linz and Stepan, 1992; 1996). In many respects it is remarkable that the drastic economic downturn Ukraine experienced in the crucial first years of independence did not lead to an authoritarian backlash. There are three potential reasons why economic collapse did not derail Ukraine's fragile democracy: firstly, there was no obvious culprit; secondly, there was no obvious solution; and thirdly, the structure of economic deprivation contained a strong element of age stratification. The young were able to integrate more easily into the emerging market economy and could thus subsidize their parents (and grandparents). Through family networks and various other informal and quasi-formal economies, most people were able to get by (Rose, 1995b).

Yet these explanations are potentially valid for all states in the region. Ukraine has an advantage over many other Eastern European countries which lies in the nature of its cleavage structure. There are distinct regional, ethnic, and resource-based cleavages in Ukraine that prevent populists from sweeping to power on the basis of waves of undifferentiated protest. At the same time, the most potentially destabilizing cleavages are blurred at the edges. There is no clear dividing line between Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, nor is there any obvious geographical fault line along which the country might split. The most distinctive area – the west – is too committed to the idea of Ukrainian statehood to consider secession, and regional differences within Dnieper Ukraine are not salient enough to be threatening (with the possible exception of Crimea). Finally, electoral cleavages in Ukraine cross-cut each other enough to prevent a polarized situation: young, urban, educated ethnic Ukrainians have as much, if not more, in common with young, urban, educated ethnic Russians as they have with old, uneducated Ukrainian peasants. Though a superficial examination of the regional and ethnic situation in Ukraine might lead to the conclusion that the country's social structure was destined to tear it apart, a more nuanced examination of the range of electoral influences exerted by social-structural variables suggests that this is not likely to be the case.

It goes without saying that these conclusions are in need of confirmation through further research. One area in which additional investigation might be fruitfully carried out is comparative generalization of this study's main findings. There are three broad comparative hypotheses that could be generated from the results of the analyses undertaken here. (1) The underlying political cleavage structure of Eastern European electorates is relatively stable during the post-communist period. Though this structure does evolve as the socio-economic structure of

the country changes, much of the observed political volatility is due to elite-level restructuring and the short-term effects of perceptions of well-being rather than changes in the basic factors that structure electoral decision-making. (2) The underlying determinants of voting behaviour in the region are not entirely reducible to socio-economic and ethnic structure; voting decisions are also a function of regional variations in historical political experience. (3) In the early stages of democratic consolidation, local and particularistic factors exert a strong influence on vote choice. These include the socio-demographic attributes of candidates, as well as locally-based economies of clientelism. Clearly these hypotheses are more plausible with respect to some countries than others; candidate- and constituency-level factors have far greater scope for operation in systems where voters vote for individuals rather than parties. But it is hoped that the analyses conducted in this study will stimulate research and reflection on the nature of electoral processes in post-communist Europe as well as contributing to our understanding of the variety of electoral behaviour in the contemporary world.

Appendix 1: Description of the Data

This Appendix provides details of the sources of the data employed in this study, the form in which they were collected, and the ways in which they were used to construct variables suitable for statistical analyses. It is structured according to data type. The aggregate population data are described in the first section, with special attention to questions of validity surrounding the Soviet census of 1989. This is followed by details of the aggregate electoral data collected, along with a description of the process employed to fit aggregate population and electoral data. The third section details the individual-level data collected on candidates, while the final section describes the individual-level survey data gathered for this investigation and the ways in which they were used to construct variables.

Aggregate population data

Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, the following variables are candidates for inclusion in the present analysis: ethnicity, employment sector, Communist Party membership, region of residence, education level, age, and place of residence (urban or rural). Available sources of aggregate-level data provide reasonable estimators for the majority of the variables hypothesized to influence vote choice during the period in question.

Figures for Communist Party membership were obtained from the archives of the Communist Party of Ukraine.¹ This material takes the form of membership figures aggregated to the level of city and *rayon* (including urban *rayony* in the larger cities). Data were gathered for 1 January 1989, 1 January 1990, and 1 January 1991. Because data on party membership were compiled according to place of work rather than place of residence, there is likely to be some discrepancy between the actual membership totals of the residents of a given constituency and the total number of members who work there. This will be especially likely in *rayony* within cities, but the effects in other constituencies should be minimal.

A further problem with these data is that their validity is subject to question. A suspiciously high number of the membership totals remained exactly equal from 1990 and 1991, when party membership as a whole was falling.² There are two possible explanations for this: outright falsification of the figures by local party secretaries, or intense recruitment drives by particularly devoted party leaders to ensure that membership remained at the previous year's level. Given the precision of the correspondence of the figures in successive years, the first possibility seems most plausible. It was therefore decided to employ the 1989 data only. The variable thereby constructed can be taken as a measure of the base-line party membership at the start of electoral liberalization. This choice of indicator can also be defended on theoretical grounds. It is possible that by 1990 and 1991 membership in the CPU was tainted by the cognitive consequences of political

behaviour in the 1989 and 1990 elections. The use of 1989 data precludes the possible effect reciprocal causation.

Estimators for the variables of ethnicity, employment sector, skill level, age, and place of residence were derived from the Soviet census of 1989.

The Soviet census: format and general procedures

The Soviet census of 1989 was carried out between 12 and 19 January. Its goal was to enumerate all people present on the territory of the USSR at that time, as well as Soviet citizens abroad. Census enumerators visited each residence individually and recorded answers to questions on census forms. In cases where a person was repeatedly absent when the enumerator called, information was obtained from family members, neighbours, or, in some cases, local records ('Organizatsionnye . . .', 1993: 416).

The population is counted in two ways in the census results: as those 'present' at the time of the census, and those who qualify as 'permanent' residents of the place in question. The 'permanent' population of a given region includes all those enumerated in their places of permanent residence, as well as those who were not present at the time the census was taken, but whose expected period of absence was not longer than six months.³ Because the 'permanent' population corresponds closely to the population listed in the residence records from which the electoral register is compiled, it is this category which will be used as the basis for calculation of the percentages of given groups in each region.

The basic census questionnaire (form 2S) contains twenty-five questions covering demographic characteristics. In addition, a second questionnaire (form 3V), comprised of questions relating to employment, was administered to 25 per cent of households.

The Soviet census: validity of the results

It goes without saying that there are inaccuracies in the Soviet census data, as there are in any social data. But different types of error have different consequences for statistical analysis. Mechanical errors in the recording and processing of the census results can be assumed to be randomly distributed. Thus, while they may *decrease* the revealed strength of the relations the data are used to measure, they should not *distort* the results.⁴ Of more concern are factors that might lead to the systematic distortion of results. Five types of factor are potentially of concern in evaluating the validity of the Soviet census data and its appropriateness for use in comparison with electoral data: (1) theoretical and methodological problems with the construction and administration of the census; (2) inadequacies in the procedures of collecting, processing, and reporting the data; (3) intentional falsification of the results; (4) ageing of the data; and (5) lack of coincidence between the census population and the electorate.

(1) Theoretical and methodological problems

The guiding sociological principle of the Soviet census is that answers to questions should reflect the respondent's subjective evaluation of the category into which he or she falls. This principle poses two problems, one theoretical, and the other methodological: (a) respondents may have different understandings of the categories in question, and, (b) in cases where family members, neighbours, or

local authorities are called upon to answer questions on behalf of absent residents (including those members of the 'permanent' population who do not happen to be at home when the census enumerator calls), answers do not reflect the subjective judgement of the person enumerated. The problem of subjective assessment is obviously of greatest concern with reference to the data on ethnicity and language, but it also in some cases affects inclusion or non-inclusion of people in the category of 'permanent' residents (Anderson and Silver, 1985b). These problems relate less to the validity of the figures concerned than to their interpretation, and the ambiguity they entail has been borne in mind in constructing the variables used in the present analysis.

(2) Procedural error

Errors in the execution of the census may be due to a number of factors, including incomplete enumeration, inadequate explanation of the census categories to the respondent on the part of the enumerator, mechanical errors in recording the data on the census forms, and errors in coding, processing, and reporting the published results. In the case of the 25 per cent sample, sampling error must also be taken into consideration.

The technique of personal interviewing ensures that Soviet censuses achieved virtually complete coverage of the population. There are, however, reasons to believe that this coverage was not total. Two weeks after the main census, a 25 per cent repeat census was conducted in an effort to catch people missed the first time. In 1989 the repeat sample uncovered a further 0.15 per cent of the population, who were then added to the original count ('Organizatsionnye... ', 1993: 418). If it is assumed that a complete repeat census would have uncovered four times those found by the 25 per cent recount, it can be estimated that at least 0.45 per cent of the population went unenumerated (and probably more, given that the recount itself was undoubtedly also incomplete).

What is crucial for the present purposes is not absolute under-count, but differences across different social groups in completeness of the results. It has been found that most of those not counted are children and young adolescents – those who are in any case ineligible to vote (Anderson and Silver, 1985a:298–9). There does, however, appear to be a difference in the factors which affect completeness in rural and urban areas, which could lead to differences in the types of people missed off. Because rural residence records on the basis of which enumerators compile lists of census respondents tend to be less complete than those in urban areas, the rural population is in all probability slightly under-counted in the census (Anderson and Silver, 1985a: 300; Isupov, 1991: 12).

(3) Falsification

There is a relative consensus among Western scholars familiar with Soviet statistics that they are not the product of overt falsification. Rather, data are in some cases manipulated through selective reporting and publication in forms that are not easily interpretable (Clem, 1986: 23; Anderson and Silver, 1990a: 196). For the research reported in this study, nearly complete data were obtained from the basic questionnaire, though the sensitivity of the issue of language use in Ukraine may partly explain why data on native language were more readily obtainable than those on fluency (see below).⁵ The fact that the results of the

main questionnaire were considerably more accessible than those from the 25 per cent sample on employment may also have been affected by ideological considerations.⁶ Enough of the latter data were, however, obtained for indicators to be constructed on this basis. The changes in the ideological climate since 1989 and the multitudinous factors which impinged on the availability of the data make it seem unlikely that any effort at systematic suppression of certain data greatly affects the results of the present analysis.

(4) *Ageing of the data*

The 'permanent' population enumerated in the census of 1989 can be assumed to correspond closely to that resident in Ukraine at the time of the elections of 1989. To a lesser degree this population also corresponded to that resident at the time of the 1990 and 1991 elections, but by 1994 the census data had 'aged' considerably. The question obviously arises as to the validity of using 1989 population data in conjunction with 1994 election results.

There are six aspects to this problem: (a) continuation of Soviet-era demographic and social-structural trends; (b) transformation-induced changes in demographic trends; (c) transformation-induced migration; (d) transformation-induced changes in subjective classification due to ethnic and linguistic re-identification; (e) transformation-induced changes in the objective classification of individuals in terms of occupation; and (f) transformation-induced changes in the relevant classification categories themselves. How significant has each of these changes been? And to what extent do they compromise the usefulness of indicators derived from the 1989 census data as predictors of behaviour in 1994?

(a) *Continuation of Soviet-era trends.* The continuation of Soviet-era trends probably only had slight effects on the social structure of the Ukrainian population. Though changes in certain of the variables (education, age) are not insignificant, *differential* rates of change are minimal.

(b) *Demographic changes.* Between 1989 and 1994 the total population in Ukraine fell from 51.8 million to 51.3 million. Economic hardship is seen as an important factor in the recent decline in Ukraine's birth rate and the increase in its death rate, especially among working-age men. The result has been an overall increase in the proportion of the population past retirement age (Khainats'ka, 1993; Chernyakov and Ivanova, 1993; Lakiza-Sachuk, 1994).

(c) *Migration.* Ukraine has not experienced the post-independence exodus of ethnic Russians that has taken place in some other former Soviet republics (Bodrova and Regent, 1994; Kaiser, 1995). In fact, there was between 1989 and 1994 a net in-migration of 21800 people from Russia to Ukraine (Robertson, 1996: 118). And though there has been a sharp rise in the rate of cross-border migration since 1989, the absolute numbers are still small.⁷ The only place where immigration has significantly altered the social composition of the population is Crimea, which had by 1994 experienced an influx of approximately 250 000 Crimean Tatars returning to their historic homeland from other parts of the former Soviet Union (Wilson, 1998). Another potentially more relevant type of migration in the present context is movement to and from cities. Though there was a decrease in the overall level of urbanization in the immediate post-

independence period, this trend masks a rise in urban migration by the young, which is offset to an extent by the return of older people to their villages (Mishura, 1993). The result of this process is an increase in the age polarization between urban and rural areas.

(d) *Change in subjective classification.* Changes in subjective classification are more difficult to gauge, since the available measures are not the same as those used in the census, and they are in any case subject to random variation. A survey conducted in 1994 indicated there to be 22.6 per cent self-identified ethnic Russians in Ukraine as against 22.1 per cent recorded by the 1989 census, but this difference is well within the margin of error of such a sample, so no definitive conclusions can be drawn from these data.⁸ Surveys have also shown there to have been variations in language use of about 5 per cent during the same period (Khmel'ko and Wilson, 1998). Though this most likely represents real change, it is again difficult to disentangle sampling error from fact. Suffice it to say that there appears to have been a relative stability in ethnic and linguistic identification between 1989 and 1994.

(e) *Changes in objective classification.* There is some evidence to suggest that there has been a Ukrainianization of the workforce since 1991.⁹ This is due to the fact that the highest levels of unemployment are in the most Russified areas of the east, whereas in Western Ukraine there appears to be a perception among ethnic Russians of ethnic favouritism in hiring practices (Kaiser, 1995: 105–9). There may in consequence be an ethnic differential in employment rates, especially in the west.

(f) *Structural change.* Though economic change in Ukraine was slow by regional standards, the Ukrainian economy had been significantly transformed by 1994. It is obviously not possible to derive data on economic variables relevant in 1994 from the 1989 census. Material available from other sources at the sub-*oblast'* level on income and income-related variables is extremely limited. But even had they been more widely available, official data of this type are of dubious quality for the period in question, due to massive under-reporting and the importance of the unreported 'grey' economy.

(5) *The census population and the electorate*

The electoral register is compiled from local residence registers by the local executive authorities, who then submit them to the electoral commissions in each constituency.¹⁰ It is well known that these registers are incomplete (Anderson and Silver, 1985a). Though the electoral register is open to public scrutiny before the election and electoral commissions are obliged to amend it where inaccuracies are discovered, it is unlikely that all those left off the register will have taken action to have themselves included. Those most likely to be omitted are the most mobile sector of the population, as well as those living illegally in a given constituency. The greater mobility of the younger portion of the population and the fact that most illegal residents are found in large cities will decrease the accuracy of urban registers, whereas the greater inaccuracy of rural residence records will contribute to under-registration in rural areas. It has been estimated

that between 1 and 3 per cent of the population is left off the register for these reasons (Brunner, 1990: 38; Karklins, 1986: 452–3).

The census suffers similar defects for similar reasons, but it is more complete than the residence registers, and thus probably more complete than the electoral register, especially in urban areas (Anderson and Silver, 1985a). In both cases the younger portion of the population is likely to be slightly under-represented. There is reason to believe, on the basis of studies of voting behaviour in Western countries, that those left off the census and the electoral registers are also those least likely to vote, but estimations of turnout itself may be affected by the discrepancy between the two enumerations.

A factor which is potentially more significant in affecting the correspondence between the census data and the electoral register is the fact that the former includes, in theory, the entire population, whereas the latter includes only those 18 years or older who are not incarcerated and have not been judged legally insane.¹¹ while the incarcerated and the insane can be assumed to constitute a relatively small portion of the population, regional variations in the age structure of the census categories may affect the comparability of the two sets of data. For the majority of the variables employed, this is not likely to be a serious problem. Most variables include only the population 16 years or older in 1989, which corresponds closely to that 18 years or older in 1989, 1990, and 1994. The variables used as indicators for age, education, and employment sector all include only the adult population. Those for ethnicity and language reflect the entire population, however, and are thus susceptible to distortion if there are significant differences across constituencies in the age structures of different ethnic and linguistic groups. The differences between Ukraine's two principal ethnic groups are not great in the country as a whole: 28.7 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians were under twenty years of age in 1989, versus 29.4 per cent of ethnic Russians. Unfortunately, the lack in the published census results of cross-tabulations at sub-republic levels make it impossible to estimate the degree to which these differences are subject to regional variation. Nor were cross-tabulations of linguistic categories and age available, making it impossible to judge the extent of the variation across regions in the relationship between age and ethno-linguistic characteristics. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these differences are great, given the similarity in fertility rates of the two ethnic groups.

The Soviet census: availability of the results

The results of the 1989 Soviet census were published in more exhaustive form than those for any previous census. Publication of data at the sub-*oblast'* level depended, however, on the means and inclinations of the various regional statistical administrations. Some *oblast'* administrations published booklets of data and made them available to the public. Other *oblasti* were willing to supply typed or hand-copied data upon request. In still other cases it was necessary to consult the archives of the individual *oblast'* administrations. These archives took the form of computer print-outs compiled in books, either by *rayon/city*, or by census question. Most archives were complete, but it was in some cases not possible to gain access to them, and other less complete sources had to be employed. The form in which data were obtained thus varied from *oblast'* to *oblast'*, as did its completeness (see Appendix 2 and Table A.1). Gaps in the data include the following:

Table A.1 Completeness of the census data by *oblast'*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Urb.</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Edu.</i>	<i>Eth.</i>	<i>Nat. lang.</i>	<i>Fluency</i>	<i>Emp. sector</i>	<i>Rayony</i>
West								
Volyn'	F	F	F	F	–	–	–	17/17
Zakarpattia	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	15/15
Ivano–Frankivs'k	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	15/15
L'viv	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	29/29
Rivne	F	F	F	F	–	–	–	16/16
Ternopil'	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	17/17
Chernivtsi	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	10/13
Right Bank								
Kiev city	F	F	F	F	–	F	–	14/14
Kiev <i>oblast'</i>	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	28/28
Vinnysya	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	28/28
Zhytomyr	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	24/26
Khmel'nyts'kyi	F	F*	F	P	–	–	–	6/22**
Cherkasy	F	F*	F	F	F	–	–	22/25
Left Bank								
Poltava	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	26/31
Sumy	F	F	F	F	F	F	P	27/27
Chernihiv	F	F	F	F	F	–	F	24/26
South								
Dnipropetrovs'k	F	F*	F	–	–	–	–	26/45
Zaporizhzhya	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	19/24
Kirovohrad	F	F	F	F	F	F	–	22/25
Crimea	F	F*	F	P	–	–	–	20/27
Mykolaïv	F	F*	F	F	F	F	–	20/24
Odesa	F	F	F	F	F	–	–	28/37
Kherson	F	F	F	F	F	F	–	25/27
East								
Donets'k	F	F	F	F	F	F	–	33/53
Luhans'k	F	F	F	F	F	F	–	17/21
Kharkiv	F	F	F	F	F	F	–	25/34
	666	666	553	503	454	240	61	553/666
	100%	100%	83%	76%	68%	36%	9%	83%

Notes: Age data are for three age groups only.

** In Kmel'nyts'kyi *oblast'*, ethnicity data are for six *rayony* only.

Key: 'urb.' = level of urbanization; 'edu.' = education; 'eth.' = ethnicity; 'nat. lang.' = native language; 'fluency' = fluency in Russian and Ukrainian; 'emp. sector' = employment sector; '*rayony*' = number of *rayony* (and cities with no *rayony* within them) for which data were obtained/total number; 'F' = full data; 'P' = partial data.

Sources: See Appendix 2.

- (1) The breakdown of data for those cities containing *rayony* within them was only available for five of 26 cases, or 25 of the 120 intra-urban *rayony*. There is therefore a rural bias in the usable sample.
- (2) Data from the 25 per cent sample on employment were obtained for only four *oblasti*.
- (3) Data on native language were not available for the *oblasti* of Volyn', Dnipropetrovs'k, Crimea,¹² Poltava, Rivne, or Khmel'nyts'kyi, nor the city of Kiev; data on language fluency were obtained for ten *oblasti* only.
- (4) Ethnicity data for Dnipropetrovs'k were unavailable, and those for Crimea and Khmel'nyts'kyi were incomplete.

Full data for all categories were obtained for only 61 *rayony*, or 9.2 per cent of the total number, yet this figure rises dramatically to 68.2 per cent if we omit employment sector and language fluency. The *oblasti* for which full data were available include L'viv in the west, Vinnytsya on the Right Bank (central-west), Chernihiv on the Left Bank (central-east), and the urban *rayony* of Sumy in the north-eastern part of the Left Bank. This represents a geographically varied selection, but it does not include any of the industrial east or the south of the country.

Because the data obtained are incomplete, and because the gaps in them are not evenly distributed with respect to the variables under consideration, it is clear that the sample on which the analysis is based will not be entirely representative of the Ukrainian population as a whole. The problem of unrepresentativeness is one that has plagued studies of the Soviet population by Western and Soviet scholars alike. As has been noted in the past, however, this difficulty is somewhat mitigated when the object of analysis is the relative effects of variables, rather than absolute effects (Millar, 1987: 24).

Variable construction

Indicators for the variables of ethnicity, employment sector, education level, age, and place of residence were constructed from the census data as follows:

(1) *Ethnicity*

The discussion of ethnicity in Chapter 2 found there to be three main ethnically-related social characteristics among the Ukrainian population: ethnic group, language, and religion.

(a) *Ethnic group.* Unlike in the West, where ethnic identity is generally taken to have a highly subjective interpretation, in the Soviet Union one's ethnicity (Rus. *natsional'nost'*, Ukr. *natsional'nist'*) had a similar status to one's name. Membership in an ethnic group, determined usually by the ethnicity of one's father, was inscribed in one's internal passport at age 16, and it was regularly noted on official documents. Though the ethnic question on the census was *in principle* a question about ethnic self-identification ('Ukazaniya . . .', 1993: 429), the official gloss of the census admits that the category written in a person's passport 'does wield some influence' (Sobolev, 1989: 8) on self-designation.¹³ Western commentators on ethnicity in the Soviet Union have noted the importance of 'passport ethnicity' in ethnic self-identification, not least because of the role it plays in job

applications, applications to institutions of higher education, and other situations in which ethnic quotas were in force during the Soviet period (Clem, 1980:50). Studies of inter-censal changes in the ethnic composition of the Soviet population note that 'passport ethnicity' fails to account for multiple ethnic identity. It has been suggested that this is particularly true in Ukraine, where a large number of 'passport Ukrainians' identify themselves as ethnic Russians or as bi-ethnics (Motyl, 1993: 17; Arel, 1995; Arel and Khmel'ko, 1996; Pirie, 1996; Wanner, 1998). But ethnic identity cannot be abstracted from the context of identification, and ethnicity as expressed in census responses can reasonably be understood to represent the respondent's ethnic self-identification in the context of his or her relations with the Soviet state in 1989. In as much as subsequent changes in ethnic self-identification were conditioned by political attitudes, and therefore not entirely independent of electoral behavioural variables, ethnic self-definition in 1989 represents a useful time-zero indication of ethnicity against which subsequent developments can be compared.

Unfortunately there are too few representatives of non-Russian minority groups in Ukraine and they are too geographically concentrated for them to be included in nation-wide comparisons. The census variables employed will thus be the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians and the proportion of ethnic Russians in each unit of aggregation.

(b) Language. It has been suggested that language use is a better indicator of ethnic identity in Ukraine than ethnic group (Motyl, 1993: 17; Arel, 1995; Arel and Khmel'ko, 1996), but responses to the census questions on language are even more difficult to interpret than those for ethnicity. Two questions on the census dealt with language: 'native language', and a language 'of the peoples of the USSR' other than his or her native language which the respondent could 'freely command' ('Ukazaniya . . .', 1993: 429). Soviet and Western scholars have noted the ambiguity of the census question on native language. While the census defines native language as the language best known and most often used by the respondent ('Ukazaniya . . .', 1993: 429), it is thought that many people give as their native language the language of their childhood, or that of their ethnic group, even though this may not be the language they know best and use most (Kozlov, 1988: 183; Guboglo, 1972: 30; Silver, 1978: 267; 1986: 89). It is thus unclear whether answers to this question are behavioural or attitudinal indicators.

Another problem with the language questions is that the criteria for second language fluency are not defined, leaving a wide margin of interpretation open to the respondent (Kozlov, 1988: 167; Silver, 1986: 90). Because census enumerators are all fluent in Russian, respondents in doubt about whether their knowledge of a language classifies them as fluent speakers may be more willing to claim fluency in non-Russian languages than they would fluency in Russian (Silver, 1986: 93). This is counteracted by the tendency to under-estimate those fluent in Ukrainian as a second language which results from the fact that a respondent can claim fluency in two languages only. Those respondents whose first language was a language other than Russian and Ukrainian but who was nevertheless fluent in both of the latter had no way of indicating this. In Ukraine most such people used Russian in public during the Soviet period, so this is the language they would most likely list as their second language, though they

might be fluent in Ukrainian as well. According to the census, 2.4 per cent of the population claimed an 'other' language as their native tongue, of which the majority speak Russian as their second language. One can only speculate as to how many of these were also fluent in Ukrainian, but the number is likely to be small in relation to the total population.

(c) *Religion.* Unsurprisingly, religion did not figure in the Soviet census, and no other source of data on religion affiliation or religiosity at the sub-*oblast'* level could be found.¹⁴ It is thus not possible to include religion in the analyses employing census data.

(2) *Employment sector*

From the point of view of the present analysis, it would be best to classify the employed population of Ukraine according to whether they worked in services, agriculture, light industry, heavy industry, or the extractive sector. Unfortunately, the Soviet census provides us with rather deficient tools for making such distinctions. The census classification of employment sector distinguishes between the 'productive' and 'non-productive' sectors. The 'non-productive' sector includes administration, health, education, culture, science, and other services. The 'productive' sector is divided into agriculture; industry; transport and communications; construction; trade, distribution, and catering; and 'other'. If the 'trade, distribution, and catering' category is combined with the 'non-productive' sector, it is possible to construct a tripartite distinction between services, industry, and agriculture, which is used in this analysis.¹⁵

(3) *Education level*

The census data divide formal education into four broad categories: higher, specialized secondary, general secondary, and primary (with additional categories for unfinished higher and incomplete secondary). The categories of primary, secondary, and specialized secondary education are less desirable indicators in the present context than higher education. This is true for three reasons. Firstly, the latter category indicates an educational level attained after a person has reached voting age. Secondly, higher education in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Ukraine generally consists of a rigorous five-year degree scheme. The increase in skill level between secondary and higher education is thus significantly greater than that between, for example, secondary and specialized secondary. Thirdly, the figures for education were compiled by some *oblasti* for the population six years and older, and by other *oblasti* for the population 15 years and older, making comparability at the lower levels problematic.

(4) *Age*

The population is divided in the census into age groups of five-year bands, and also into the categories 'younger than working age', 'working age', and 'older than working age'.¹⁶ Because women in Ukraine retire at the age of fifty-five, whereas men retire at sixty, the 'older than working age' category is not a pure indicator of age, yet it is a useful category in as much as the age of retirement is a relevant break-point in the life cycle. It must be noted, however, that the 'older than working age' population is somewhat feminized. Analysis of this segment

of the age distribution is thus have treated with caution, as it may be partially an indicator of gender.

In constructing an indicator for age, it is necessary to choose between simple age bands and a more complex index which would be indicative of the age distribution of the population (for example, the average age, the median age, or the dependency ratio – the portion of the population of employment age minus those older and younger). The desirability of including as much information about the age structure as possible encourages use of an index of some kind. But the use of simple age bands increases the interpretability of the results, because it involves the comparison of demographic and electoral population percentages, whereas the relationship between demographic indices and electoral percentages is less intuitively accessible. Age bands are thus used in the analysis, with attention to the distinction between the working-age and retirement-age sectors of the population.

(5) Level of urbanization

Settlements in Ukraine are divided into cities, 'settlements of an urban type', and villages. If the population of a given settlement exceeded 10 000 inhabitants at the time of the census, and, in addition, over 85 per cent were employed in spheres other than agriculture, it was classified as 'urban'.¹⁷ All the inhabitants of such settlements were counted as urban dwellers, while all others were enumerated as members of the rural population ('Organizatsionnye . . .', 1993: 415).¹⁸ In correspondence with this categorization, the indicator for place of residence is the proportion of urban residents in each unit of aggregation.

(6) Region

The final variable that needs to be defined is region. Following the analysis presented in Chapter 1, region is understood in historic terms. The precise breakdown to be employed is detailed in Table A.2.

The foregoing discussion points to a number of factors indicating the likelihood of inaccuracies in the data. It is also evident that in many cases the operationalization of the variables under analysis involves approximation. Finally, some of the data are highly incomplete. Do these problems undermine the task at hand? It cannot be denied that the inadequacies of the data lead to a reduction in the

Table A.2 Definition of historic regions

<i>Region</i>	<i>Oblasti included</i>
West	Volyn', Zakarpattya, Ivano-Frankivs'k, L'viv, Rivne, Ternopil', Chernivtsi
Right Bank	Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Kiev city, Kiev <i>oblast'</i> , Khmel'nyts'kyi, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad
Left Bank	Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv
South	Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhya, Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson
East	Donets'k, Luhans'k, Kharkiv

predictive power of the models constructed on their basis. Fortunately, however, this should result in the more benign tendency of the results *not* to confirm the hypotheses tested (type II error) rather than the more worrisome possibility of spurious conclusions (type I error). In as much as the analyses reported in this investigation support the hypotheses they are designed to test, the theoretical propositions outlined in Chapter 2 can be taken to have received strong confirmation. We can be less confident that the hypotheses are false simply because the statistical analyses do not support them. But there is little danger of reaching false conclusions as to the positive effects of the variables under investigation. Inadequacies in the data may fog the analytic lens, but they should not flaw it.

Electoral data

Electoral data were obtained either directly from central and *oblast'* administrations or from newspaper reports (see Appendix 3). The Vyborg-1994 data base, constructed by the Petro Mohyla Society of Kiev, provided the data for the parliamentary elections of 1994. Electoral data are of two types: electoral results and, in the case of the parliamentary elections of 1989, 1990, and 1994, demographic data on individual candidates.

For the four parliamentary elections under analysis electoral result data are complete or nearly complete.¹⁹ Data for the referendums of 1991 and the presidential elections of 1991 and 1994 are much more patchy (see Table A.3), but in all three cases it was possible to obtain sufficient data to conduct statistical analyses.

In each case data include the number of registered voters in the constituency or territorial unit, the number of registered voters who voted, the number of votes cast for each option, and the number of spoiled ballots.

Validity of the electoral data

In one sense official electoral results are by definition valid, for they are the figures which – save for minor mechanical errors in reporting the results in official documents and the press – determine the outcome of the electoral contests. But from the point of view of electoral behaviour, it is obviously necessary to determine the extent to which the reported results of the elections reflect the choices made on election day by the electorate and the degree to which the electorate was free to express its choice at the polls. In each of the parliamentary elections in question there were numerous allegations of efforts to prevent oppositional candidates from appearing on the ballot, as well as attempts to influence vote choice by means of vote-buying and more subtle forms of coercion. Yet these do not have a direct bearing on the ability of voters freely to choose from among the choices on offer when they arrive at the polling station. The types of violation relevant to a discussion of the validity of the electoral data can be divided into two broad categories: actions that impair the ability of voters to cast their vote for the option of their choice, and intentional irregularities in the counting and reporting of results.

In both cases there appears to have been a decrease between 1989 and 1994 in the extent and the severity of electoral violations, though no evident decrease between 1994 and 1998 (see Birch, 1995b; Birch and Wilson, 1999). There also appear in general to have been more irregularities in parliamentary elections than in presidential elections or referendums, presumably because of the greater opportunities parliamentary candidates have to interfere with local electoral processes.

Table A.3 Completeness of electoral data (referendums and presidential elections) by *oblast'*

<i>Region</i>	<i>T.O.</i> 3/91	<i>A.U.</i> 3/91	<i>Ukr.</i> 3/91	<i>T.O.</i> 12/91	<i>Ref.</i> 12/91	<i>Pres.</i> 1991	<i>T.O.</i> 6/94	<i>R. 1</i> 6/94	<i>T.O.</i> 7/94	<i>R. 2</i> 7/94	<i>ray.</i>
West											
Volyn'	F	F	F	F	F	P*	F	F	F	F	17/17
Zakarpattia	F	F	F	F	F	F				F	15/15
Ivano-F.	F	F	F	F	F	F				F	15/15
L'viv	F	F	F	F	F	F	F		F	F	29/29
Rivne	F	F	F	F	F	F					16/16
Ternopil'	F	F	F	F	F		F	F	F	F	17/17
Chernivtsi	F	F	F	F	F	F					10/13
Right Bank											
Kiev city											
Kiev <i>oblast'</i>											
Vinnitsya											
Zhytomyr	F	F	F	F		F	F	F	F	F	26/26
Khmel'nyts.					F						6/22
Cherkasy	F		P	F			F		F		22/25
Kirovohrad	F	F		F	F	F	F	F	F	F	19/24
Left Bank											
Poltava											
Sumy											
Chernihiv				F	F						24/26
South											
Dnipro.											
Zaporizhzhya	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	19/24
Crimea**	F	F		F	F	P*	F				20/26
Mykolaïv	F	F	F								20/24
Odesa											
Kherson											
East											
Donets'k	F	F	F	F		F	F	F	F	F	33/53
Luhans'k	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	17/21
Kharkiv											
All Ukraine	341 51%	273 41%	237 36%	351 53%	224 34%	220 33%	266 40%	148 22%	240 36%	207 31%	

Notes:

* Kravchuk vote only.

** Data were obtained for Sevastopol city as a whole for all the 1991 referendums, and for the Kravchuk vote in 1991.

Key: 'T.O.' = turnout; 'A.U.' = All-Union referendum; 'Ukr.' = Ukrainian referendum; 'Ref.' = December 1991 referendum; 'Pres.' = presidential election; 'R. 1' = round one; 'R. 2' = round two; 'ray.' = *rayony*; 'F' = full data obtained; 'P' = partial data obtained.

Sources: See Appendix 3.

But it is difficult to judge the extent of the irregularities from isolated reports. A group of Soviet geographers devised a more reliable statistical method to test for fraud throughout the Soviet Union in 1989; Berezkin *et al* (1989; 1990) note a clustering of vote totals in two-candidate races just above the 50 per cent level required for victory, and a dearth of totals just below this figure. They cite these findings as evidence of manipulation of electoral results. It is noteworthy that no such distribution was apparent in the Ukrainian figures for 1989.²⁰ As this type of falsification is most likely to affect the counting process, its absence is reassuring.

The reported number of spoiled ballots in the 1989 elections is, however, a serious cause for concern. Most of the uncontested constituencies reported that no ballots had been spoiled at all. This is obviously an extremely unlikely result, especially when over a million votes are in question, as was the case in some of the larger constituencies.

Another set of suspicious figures in the 1989 contests are those for turnout, which were in many cases over 90 per cent. But it must be borne in mind that in the western part of the Soviet Union, coercion, rather than outright fraud, was the most frequent means of getting people to the polls prior to 1989 (Friedgut, 1979: 118; Brunner, 1990: 37). Moreover, it appears that the 1989 elections marked a dramatic strategic shift in Soviet electoral policy; a genuine effort was made to entice people to the polls with the prospect of true choice, rather than coercing them with threats. Turnout in all the elections under analysis was consistently higher in the more radicalized west of Ukraine and lower in the more traditional east. This fact suggests that variations in the figures do indeed represent variations in the willingness of electors to vote. It is also possible, however, that the electoral register was incomplete, and that high turnout figures reflect this (see above). But it does not appear that the high turnout rates could be accounted for entirely by faults in the register. It is more probable that the practice of having one's name removed from the register continued to be employed by those who did not wish to vote, even after the use of coercive measures was discontinued. People who resorted to this method were unlikely to have gone to the trouble a year later, when it was obvious that evasive action was no longer necessary. There was a decline in turnout between 1989 and 1990 (from 89.8 to 84.7 per cent). These patterns suggest that the composition of the register played a relatively minor role.

Though the electoral data cannot be taken to be an entirely accurate reflection of the will of the Ukrainian electorate, the consequence of electoral violations, like those of inaccuracies in the census data, will be to weaken the relationship between the ecological and electoral variables; far from invalidating the results of the analysis, falsification and other types of fraud will most probably tend to lead to an under-estimation of their real import.

Fitting the data

The census data and the electoral data were not in all cases based on the same territorial units. The results of the referendums and presidential elections were reported by city and *rayon*, so for these contests the units of aggregation are identical, but this is not true for the parliamentary elections. In the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies the 143 territorial constituencies located in Ukraine were composed of between one and seven *rayony* each, with no constituencies crossing *rayon* or city boundaries. The census data could be

Table A.4 Constituencies fitted to census data in 1990 and 1994

<i>Region fitted</i>	<i>1990</i>			<i>1994</i>		
	<i>Total number</i>	<i>Number fitted</i>	<i>% fitted</i>	<i>Total number</i>	<i>Number fitted</i>	<i>% fitted</i>
Volyn'	9	5	55.6%	9	7	77.8%
Zakarpattya	11	9	81.8	10	4	40.0
Ivano-F.	12	4	33.3	12	5	41.7
L'viv	24	20	83.3	23	11	47.8
Rivne	10	4	40.0	10	3	30.0
Ternopil'	10	6	60.0	10	8	80.0
Chernivtsi	8	2	25.0	8	2	25.0
West	84	50	59.5%	82	40	48.8%
Kiev city	22	4	18.2%	23	3	13.0%
Kiev <i>oblast'</i>	17	10	58.8	17	13	76.5
Vinnysya	17	11	64.7	17	13	76.5
Zhytomyr	14	11	78.6	13	10	76.9
Khmel'nyts.	13	7	53.8	13	7	53.8
Cherkasy	14	11	78.6	13	10	76.9
Kirovohrad	11	9	81.8	11	8	72.7
Right Bank	108	63	58.3%	107	64	59.8%
Poltava	16	11	68.8%	16	10	62.5%
Sumy	13	13	100.0	13	13	100.0
Chernihiv	13	3	23.1	12	9	75.0
Left Bank	42	27	64.3%	41	32	78.0%
Dnipro.	34	8	23.5%	34	4	11.8%
Zaporizhzhya	17	6	35.3	18	5	27.8
Crimea	18	9	50.0	19	8	42.1
Sevastopil' city	4	0	00.0	4	0	00.0
Mykolaïv	11	2	18.2	11	5	45.5
Odesa	23	11	47.8	23	10	43.5
Kherson	10	5	50.0	11	7	63.6
South	117	41	35.0%	120	39	32.5%
Donets'k	45	16	35.6%	47	13	27.7%
Luhans'k	25	15	60.0	25	16	64.0
Kharkiv	28	15	53.6	28	15	53.6
East	98	46	46.9%	100	44	44.0%
Total	450	227	50.2%	450	219	48.7%

aggregated with little difficulty to fit these divisions. But many of the 450 constituencies in the 1990 and 1994 elections crossed *rayon* boundaries, and could thus not be fitted to the census data; it was only possible to fit about half of the constituencies in each case (see Table A.4).

Candidate data

In the case of the 1989 elections, information on candidate platforms published in the local press provide the raw material for a content analysis of the platforms of most of the candidates who stood.²¹ In the case of the 1990 elections the most

Table A.5 Completeness of demographic data for candidates in 1989 by *oblast'*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Total number*</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Party affil.</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Residence</i>	<i>Perceived ethnic group</i>	<i>Actual ethnic group</i>	<i>Pol. orientation</i>
Volyn'	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	–	4
Zakarpat.	8	1	7	7	7	3	5	–	7
Ivano-F.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	3
L'viv	15	9	15	9	11	3	11	2	9
Rivne	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	–	2
Ternopil'	6	4	6	5	6	4	3	–	6
Chernivtsi	8	6	8	4	8	6	4	–	6
West	54	37	53	42	49	27	40	7	37
Kiev city	19	19	19	16	19	1	17	19	13
Kiev <i>obl.</i>	12	3	12	4	12	–	12	–	10
Vinnnytsya	12	11	12	9	12	2	10	1	3
Zhytomyr	12	8	12	11	12	11	11	–	5
Khmel'.	8	1	8	5	7	5	5	–	8
Cherkasy	10	10	10	10	10	4	9	–	10
Kirovohrad	9	9	9	8	9	8	9	4	9
Right Bank	82	61	82	63	81	31	73	24	58
Poltava	10	10	10	6	10	9	10	–	10
Sumy	8	–	8	5	8	2	8	–	8
Chernihiv	10	9	10	10	10	3	9	–	10
Left Bank	28	19	28	21	28	14	27	0	28
Dnipro.	22	22	22	13	22	18	18	–	22
Zaporizh.	12	11	12	10	12	11	11	–	8
Crimea 11	11	11	11	11	11	7	8	–	11
Mykolaiv	8	8	8	8	8	1	7	5	5
Odesa	16	16	16	16	16	7	13	12	2
Kherson	7	7	7	7	7	4	4	–	2
South	76	76	76	65	76	48	61	17	50
Donets'k	31	31	31	17	31	31	27	–	18
Luhans'k	19	19	19	18	19	6	17	17	15
Kharkiv	18	10	18	9	18	10	15	–	12
East	68	60	68	44	68	47	59	17	45
Ukraine	308	252	308	235	302	173	260	65	218
		82%	100%	76%	98%	56%	84%	21%	71%

Note:

* Total number of candidates included in the data set.

Sources: See Appendix 3.

Table A.6 Completeness of demographic data for candidates in 1990 by *oblast'*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Total number*</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Party affil.</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Residence</i>	<i>Perceived ethnic group</i>	<i>Actual ethnic group</i>
Volyn'	68	68	21	67	68	67	57	–
Zakarpattya	85	81	85	81	81	81	69	–
Ivano-F.	79	79	79	79	79	79	63	–
L'viv	168	134	168	134	155	134	136	–
Rivne	80	77	80	77	79	77	71	–
Ternopil'	43	42	43	42	43	42	37	–
Chernivtsi	46	45	46	45	45	45	31	–
West	569	526	522	525	550	525	464	–
Kiev city	272	230	230	229	230	224	180	–
Kiev <i>obl.</i>	139	131	139	132	139	133	129	–
Vinnitsya	56	–	56	25	56	47	45	–
Zhytomyr	89	11	88	39	74	12	66	–
Khmel'nyts.	68	64	64	59	64	64	56	–
Cherkasy	77	36	63	62	69	36	59	–
Kirovohrad	61	61	55	61	61	59	47	–
Right Bank	762	533	695	607	693	575	582	–
Poltava	104	103	104	103	102	103	92	–
Sumy	82	82	82	79	82	26	72	–
Chernihiv	64	39	64	41	49	40	58	–
Left Bank	250	224	250	223	233	169	222	–
Dnipro.	198	194	195	194	195	194	189	–
Zaporizh.	95	95	95	95	95	95	84	–
Crimea	137	105	99	103	114	136	98	61
Sevastopol'city	28	–	27	4	9	–	21	–
Mykolaïv	60	58	60	58	58	37	53	36
Odesa	129	128	129	128	129	126	113	–
Kherson	64	60	64	60	63	57	56	–
South	711	640	669	642	663	645	614	97
Donets'k	297	58	59	58	59	55	270	–
Luhans'k	148	148	148	147	148	148	127	–
Kharkiv	171	120	171	144	162	123	143	–
East	616	326	378	349	369	326	540	–
Ukraine	2908	2249	2514	2346	2508	2240	2422	97
		77%	86%	81%	86%	77%	83%	3%

Note:

* Total number of candidates included in the data set.

Sources: See Appendix 3.

relevant distinction for our purposes is that between candidates affiliated with the Democratic Bloc – the opposition umbrella group formed to contest the elections – and non-Bloc candidates, and a variety of sources were used to establish the membership of the Bloc. The main sources of information on Democratic Bloc membership were the following: *Narodna hazeta*, no. 3, April 1990; *Holos*, various issues 1990; *oblast'* newspapers, various issues; *Ukrainian Weekly*, various issues February–April 1990; Potichnyj, 1992b; Arel, 1990/91. Newspaper reports were relied on as a source for social data on the candidates in these elections. Gaps in these data are indicated in Tables A.5 and A.6. Virtually complete data on candidates in the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections were obtained from databases constructed by the Petro Mohyla Scientific Society of Kiev and from *Vybory '98: Politychnyi Kompas vybortsya*, Kiev: K.I.S., 1998, *Vybory '98: Yak Ukraïna holosyvala*, Kiev: K.I.S., 1998, and the Website of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems at www.ifes.kiev.ua.

Survey data

Design

The survey was carried out by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology under the supervision of Professor Valerii Khmel'ko and Ihor Yaroshenko. Interviewing was conducted in 25 constituencies selected through stratified random sampling (see Table A.7).

The survey employed a multi-stage clustered probability sample design. The population sampled consisted of adults 18 years or older on 29 March 1998 (the day of the elections). The primary sampling units were the 25 constituencies described above. Within each constituency postal catchment areas were selected, and within these blocs of contiguous addresses. Respondents were selected within these blocs by the random route method (approximately ten per postal

Table A.7 Constituencies sampled

<i>Number</i>	<i>Administrative centre</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Administrative centre</i>
10	Simferopil'	112	Stanychno-Luhans'ke
20	Luts'k	135	Odesa
24	Dnipropetrovs'k	138	Bilyaivka
30	Dniprodzerzhyns'k	150	Karlivka
34	Zhovti Vody	173	Kharkiv
43	Donets'k	192	Kam"yanets'-Podil's'kyi
46	Artemivs'k	194	Starokostyanyntyniv
58	Slov"yans'k	202	Chernivtsi
65	Berdychiv	207	Chernihiv
83	Polohy	218	Kiev city
89	Nadvirna	222	Kiev city
92	Myronivka	225	Sevastopil'
101	Znam"yanka		

catchment area). Within each constituency 82 respondents were selected, for a total sample size of 2050. No substitutions were allowed.

The questionnaires were translated into Russian and Ukrainian, and the translations checked by the project researchers. Both questionnaires were pre-tested between 17 and 27 February. Interviewing took place between 14 and 28 April. The vast majority – 83.3 per cent of the interviews – were conducted in the six-day period between 17 and 22 March. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. Respondents were interviewed in their homes. The average length of the interviews was 50.1 minutes. All interviewers were fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian. The choice of language of interview was made by the respondent. The response rate was 1742 or 85.0 per cent. The data were weighted to compensate for under-representation of the western region in the achieved sample.

Further details of the survey design and execution are available from the author upon request.

Variable construction

Age was entered in numbers of years.

Gender was entered as a dummy variable, with 1 = female, 0 = male.

Education level was measured on a six-point scale, where 1 = less than four years; 2 = 4–6 years; 3 = 7–9 years or 7–8 years plus vocational training; 4 = 10–11 years; 5 = 10–11 years plus vocational training; 6 = higher (at least three years).

Level of urbanization (settlement size) was conceptualized as a measure of ‘urban-ness’, with 1 = village, 2 = town (‘settlement of an urban type’ in Soviet parlance); 3 = city of less than 200 000 inhabitants, 4 = city of between 200 000 and 500 000, and 5 = city of more than 500 000.

Ethnicity: Given that most majority of Ukrainian citizens locate themselves somewhere along the spectrum ranging from pure Ukrainian to pure Russian, ethnicity was measured on a five-point scale, where 1 = ‘Ukrainian only’, 2 = ‘more Ukrainian than Russian’, 3 = ‘equally Ukrainian and Russian’, 4 = ‘more Russian than Ukrainian’, and 5 = ‘Russian only’. This method of operationalizing ethnicity captures many of the nuances of subjective ethnic identification in Ukraine; it has the disadvantage, however, of excluding all those who belong to ethnic groups other than Ukrainian or Russian. Yet this group comprises only 73 of the 1742 respondents in the present sample or 4.2 per cent. It is worth noting that in statistical terms, this variable is a measure of ‘Russianness’, as high values indicate a stronger Russian-oriented identification.

Language use in Ukraine is, like ethnicity, best understood as a continuum rather than a series of discrete categories. The measure employed to operationalize this variable was the six-point scale derived from the interviewers’ initial enquiry as to language preference. Respondents were first asked whether they would prefer to speak Ukrainian or Russian, and if they indicated that they could speak either, they were further probed to determine which language to conduct the interview in. This process generated a six-point scale, ranging from an unequivocal preference for Ukrainian to a definite preference for Russian. As with ethnicity, this

measure can be understood statistically as an indicator of predilection for Russian language use, as high values indicate a stronger preference for Russian.

Religion: Recent years have witnessed a number of divisions within the churches that have traditionally existed in Ukraine. Given the close ties between religious politics and questions of nationalism, it was decided to divide church affiliates into three main categories; first, those who belong to the two Ukrainian churches banned during the Soviet period, the Autocephalous Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches, second, those who claim adherence to either the Russian Orthodox Church or its Ukrainian incarnation as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate, and, finally, the largest of the churches in membership terms, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kiev Patriarchate. This classification excludes only that small number of respondents (2.5 per cent) who belonged to other religious denominations. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kiev Patriarchate was used as a baseline for comparison, and the other two categories entered as dummy variables.

Production sector: Dummy variables were used to designate the following categories: agricultural, industrial, and service, with the service sector serving as a base-line.

Private versus public sector employment: A single dummy variable was constructed to account for employment in the private sector.

Employment situation: Dummy variables were used to distinguish between the employed, the unemployed, and the non-employed. The third category served as the base-line.

Occupational stratum: Dummy variables were constructed to correspond to employment in three broad strata: (1) manual workers; (2) clerical, technical, and service workers; (3) managers and professionals, with the intermediary category serving as the baseline. This categorization is designed on the basis of the International Labour Office International Standard Classification of Occupations (International Labour Office, 1990). The categories were created by conflating the ISCO groups 1 and 2, groups 3, 4, and 5; and groups 6–9. This classification is broadly intended broadly to reflect differentials in skill level associated with the occupations in question.

Income was coded on a six-point scale, based on responses to the following question: ‘What is the overall (total) average monthly income of your family (including all payments and any other income in cash or kind)?’ Respondents were shown a card with six bands on it, corresponding to the following incomes: 1–80 hryvna; 81–150 hryvna; 151–300 hryvna; 301–600 hryvna; more than 600 hryvna; no income. They were then asked how many people were in their family, and a six-point scalar variable was created on the basis of income adjusted for family size.

Communist party membership was entered as a dummy variable, according to response to the question ‘Were you a member of the CPSU?’

Region: Five dummy variables were created to designate Ukraine’s five historical regions (see Table A.2 above). The Right Bank was used as the base-line category.

Appendix 2: Sources of Census Data by *Oblast'**

Volyn': Archives of the Statistical Administration of Volyn' *Oblast'*.

Zakarpattia: Archives of the Statistical Administration of Zakarpattia *Oblast'*.

Ivano-Frankivs'k: *Riven' osvity naselelnyya Ivano-Frankivs'koï oblasti (za danamy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1989 roku)*: *Statystychnyi zbirnyk*, Ivano-Frankivs'k: Ivano-Frankivs'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1991; *Chysel'nist' i sklad naselelnyya Ivano-Frankivs'koï oblasti za natsional'nistyuu i prirodnoyu movoyu*: *Statystychnyi zbirnyk*, Ivano-Frankivs'k: Upravlinnya Statystyky Ivano-Frnkivs'koï Oblasti, 1991; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Ivano-Frankivs'k *Oblast'*.

L'viv: *Naselelnyya L'vivs'koï oblasti (za danamy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya na 12 sichnya 1989 roku)*, Vols 1 and 2, L'viv: L'vivs'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1990–1; additional data supplied by the 'Atlas of L'viv City' Project at the Department of Geography, L'viv State University.

Rivne: Archives of the Statistical Administration of Rivne *Oblast'*.

Ternopil': *Chysel'nist' i sklad naselelnyya Ternopil's'koï oblasti za natsional'nistyuu (za danamy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1979 i 1989 pp.)*, Ternopil': Ternopil's'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1991; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Ternopil' *Oblast'*.

Chernivtsi: Archives of the Statistical Administration of Chernivtsi *Oblast'*.

Kiev city: *Pidsumky Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1989 roku*, Kiev: Kyïvs'ke Mis'ke Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1990.

Kiev oblast': *Naselenie Kievskoi oblasti (po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda)*, Kiev: Kievskoe Oblasnoe Upravlenie Statistiki, 1990; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Kiev *Oblast'*.

Vynnytsya: *Pidsumky Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1989 roku*, vol. 4: *Rozpodil naselelnyya oblasti po suspil'nyim hrupam ta haluzyam narodnoho hospodarstva u spoluchenni z vikom ta rivnem osvity*, Vynnytsya: Vynnyts'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1992; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Vynnytsya *Oblast'*.

Zhytomyr: *Naselelnyya Zhytomyrs'koï oblasti (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1989 roku)*, Zhytomyr: Zhytomyrs'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1991; *Osvita naselelnyya Zhytomyrs'koï oblasti (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1989 p.)*, Zhytomyr: Zhytomyrs'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1992.

Khmel'nyts'kyi: *Riven' osvity naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Vol. 3, Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1993; *Vikova Struktura Naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Kiev: Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1992; *Korchahinets' 3 August 1991*, p. 2.

Cherkasy: *Riven' osvity naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Vol. 3, Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1993; *Vikova Struktura Naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Kiev: Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1992; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Cherkasy Oblast'.

Kirovohrad: *Naselelnyya Kirovohradskoï oblasti (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1989 roku)*, Kirovohrad: Kirovohrads'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1991.

Poltava: *Vikova Struktura i rozmyshennyya naselelnyya Poltav's'koï oblasti po danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1990 [sic] roku*, Poltava: Poltav's'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1990; *Riven' osvity naselelnyya Poltav's'koï oblasti za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselelnyya 1989 roku*, Poltava: Poltav's'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1991; *Natsional'nyi sklad naselelnyya Poltav's'koï oblasti*, Poltava: Poltav's'ke Oblasne Upravlinnya Statystyky, 1992.

Sumy: Archives of the Statistical Administration of Sumy Oblast'.

Chernihiv: *Raspredelenie naselenie po vosrastu (itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda)*, Chernihiv: Chernigovskoe Oblasnoe Upravlenie Statistiki, 1990; *Sotsial'na i profesiino-haluzeva struktura naselelnyya Chernihiv's'koï oblasti*, Chernihiv: Upravlinnya Statystyky Chernihiv's'koï Oblasti, 1993; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Chernihiv Oblast'.

Dnipropetrov's'k: *Riven' osvity naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Vol. 3, Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1993; *Vikova Struktura Naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Kiev: Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1992.

Zaporizhzhya: *Chislennost' naselelnyya Zaporozhskoi oblasti (po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda)*, Zaporizhzhya: Zaporozhskoe Upravlenie Statistiki: 1991.

Crimea: *Riven' osvity naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Vol. 3, Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1993; *Vikova Struktura Naselelnyya Ukraïny (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu 1989 r.)*, Kiev: Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1992; additional data provided by Andrew Wilson.

Mykolaïv: Archives of the Statistical Administration of Mykolaïv Oblast'.

Odesa: Archives of the Statistical Administration of Odesa Oblast'.

Kherson: *Sotsial'noe i ekonomicheskoe razvitie Khersonskoi oblasti ot vyborov k vyboram: Statystycheskii sbornik*, Kherson: Khersonskoe Oblasnoe Upravlenie Statistiki, 1990; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Kherson Oblast'.

Donets'k: *Naselenie Donetskoï oblasti (po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1989 g.)*, Donets'k: Donetskoe Oblasnoe Upravlenie Statistiki, 1991; Archives of the Statistical Administration of Donets'k Oblast'.

Luhans'k: *Naselenie Lugans'koi oblasti (po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naselenie 1989 goda)*, Luhans'k: Upravlenie Statistiki Luganskoï Oblasti, 1991.

Kharkiv: Archives of the Statistical Administration of Kharkiv Oblast'.

*Figures for total and rural populations for all *oblasti* were taken from *Perepis' 1989*.

Appendix 3: Sources of 1989–91 Electoral Data and 1994 Presidential Electoral Data by *Oblast'*

Volyn': *Radyans'ka Volyn'*; archives of the Volyn' *Oblast'* Council.

Zakarpattia: *Zakarpats'ka pravda*; *Zakarpattia*.

Ivano-Frankivs'k: *Prykarpats'ka pravda*; *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*; *Halychyna*; archives of the Ivano-Frankivs'k *Oblast'* Council.

L'viv: *Vil'na Ukraïna*; *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*; *Vysoky zamok*; archives of the L'viv *Oblast'* Council.

Rivne: *Chervonyi prapor*.

Ternopil': *Vil'ne zhyttya*; *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*; archives of the Ternopil' *Oblast'* Council.

Chernivtsi: *Radyans'ka Bukovyna*; archives of the Chernivtsi *Oblast'* Council.

Kiev city: *Vechimyi Kyïv*.

Kiev oblast': *Kyïvs'ka pravda*.

Vinnytsya: *Vinnyts'ka pravda*.

Zhytomyr: *Radyans'ka Zhytomyrshchyna*; archives of the Zhytomyr *Oblast'* Administration.

Khmel'nyts'kyi: *Radyansk'ke Podillya*.

Cherkasy: *Cherkas'ka pravda*; *Cherkas'kyi krai*; archives of the Cherkasy *Oblast'* Council; TsVK*

Kirovohrad: *Kirovohrads'ka pravda*; archives of the Kirovohrad *Oblast'* Council; TsVK.

Poltava: *Zorya Poltavshchyny*.

Sumy: *Lenins'ka pravda*; TsVK.

Chernihiv: *Desnyans'ka pravda*.

Dnipropetrovs'k: *Dneprovskaya pravda*.

Zaporizhzhya: *Zaporiz'ka pravda*; archives of the Zaporizhzhya Oblast' Council.

Crimea: *Krymskaya pravda*; archives of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Crimea; TsVK.

Sevastopil' city: *Krymskaya pravda*; archives of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Crimea.

Mykolaiv: *Pivdenna pravda*.

Odesa: *Chornomors'ka komuna*.

Kherson: *Naddniprovs'ka pravda*.

Donets'k: *Radyans'ka Donechchyna*; *Vechernii Donetsk*; archives of the Donets'k Oblast' Council; TsVK.

Luhans'k: *Voroshlovgradskaya pravda*; archives of the Luhans'k Oblast' Administration.

Kharkiv: *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna*.

* 'TsVK' = Archives of the Verkhovna Rada Ukraïns'koï RSR: Tsentral'na Vyborcha Komisiya po Vyborakh Narodnykh Deputativ Ukraïns'koï RSR, 'Statistichni vidomosti pro rezultati vyboriv narodnykh deputativ Ukraïns'koï RSR, pochato 04 bereznya 1990 r., zakoncheno 20 travnya 1990 r.', Fond R-1, opys 28, odyynyt'sya zberihannya 111, sprava 08-2/46.

Notes

Introduction

1. For alternative divisions, see Szporluk, 1975: 202; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 31–4; Wilson, 1997a: 23; *Perepisi 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989*.
2. It is Crimea, however, which has the largest concentration of ethnic Russians (67.0 per cent).
3. The interested reader may consult the data collected in the following sources: *Perepis' 1989*, especially vol. I: table 4, vol. II: table 5, vol. VI: table 2, vol. IX: table 3; *Narodnoie Khoziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR v 1987 Godu*, Kiev: Tekhnika: 1988; *Statystychnyi Shchorichnyk Ukraïny za 1995 rik*, Kiev: Tekhnika, 1996; 1997; Kornieiev and Lukashenko, 1994.
4. Data from *Ukrainian Economic Trends*, various issues.
5. One estimate put the figure as high as 25 per cent in urban areas (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1978: 365), but this claim has been contested by Roeder, who uses ecological regression to estimate a true national figure of between 3.6 and 6.8 per cent in the 1980s. Cross-sectional analysis using 1970 census data suggest, however, that electoral avoidance was approximately 30 per cent lower in the Ukrainian republic than in the Union as a whole (Roeder, 1989: 473–5).
6. The electoral law allowed for multiple candidacies, as did electoral ballots, which requested voters to cross off all the names of the candidates for whom they did not wish to vote. But despite suggestions by Soviet scholars from the 1960s onwards that more than one candidate be allowed to stand (see Hill, 1980: chap. 2), multiple candidacies were only introduced in the late 1980s.
7. See, for example, Evans and Whitefield, 1993; Cotta, 1994; 1996; Kuusela, 1994; Mair, 1996; White *et al.*, 1997: 64–73, 147–8.
8. It may be noted that this was also generally the case when franchises were extended following independence in former European colonies.
9. See Chapters 3 and 4 below.
10. See Haran', 1991: 28; Lytvyn, 1992: 69–100; Bilous, 1993: 46; Wilson and Bilous, 1993; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 150.
11. The Ukrainian experience substantiates Maurice Duverger's (1955) claim that parties created within parliaments tend to be less centralized, less disciplined, and less ideologically coherent than those which form outside parliaments, but also more committed to the institution of parliamentary democracy.
12. With the Communist Party included, these numbers are 31 and 50 per cent respectively. The other seats were won by independent candidates. Figures calculated from the 'Vybory-1994' database constructed by the Petro Mohyla Scientific Society of Kiev.

2 The Emergence of Electoral Cleavages: Theoretical Preliminaries

1. The position of this camp on economic issues was more varied, as there were significant portions of the republican elite who were in favour of economic reform within a renewed union on the territory of the former Soviet state.
2. Major cross-national studies include Dalton *et al.*, 1984; Franklin *et al.*, 1992. See also Budge and Farlie, 1977; 1983; Crewe and Denver, 1985; Lewis-Beck, 1990.
3. Soviet surveys confirm this finding. See Connor, 1977: 112. In the last five years of the Brezhnev era there was an increase in the discrepancy between education and occupation, with more people working outside the field of specialization for which they had been trained (Zimmerman, 1987: 347).
4. Though the results in this study are not broken down by republic, there is little reason to believe that the effects of the age variable in Ukraine would have been substantially different from its effect in the other European Soviet republics covered by the survey.
5. See especially: Butler and Stokes, 1974: chap. 9; Nie *et al.*, 1976: chap. 4; Crewe, Särilvik and Alt, 1977; Särilvik and Crewe, 1983: chaps 2 and 3; Dalton *et al.*, 1984; Rose and McAllister, 1986: chaps 1 and 2; Inglehart, 1990; Franklin *et al.*, 1992: chap. 20.
6. The classic description of how these processes operate is given by Berelson and Lazarsfeld (see Lazarsfeld *et al.*, 1948; Berelson *et al.*, 1954).
7. This is of course an over-simplified account of the process of dealignment. It notably neglects consideration of the counter-tendencies evidenced by the recent resurgence in many developed countries of regional, ethnic, and religious group politics, as it does the rise to relative prominence of secondary status cleavages. Such simplification can be justified on the grounds that few of these counter-developments have (yet) been of both sufficient magnitude and longevity to merit the label 'realignment'.
8. See especially Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956; Castles, 1969; Schapiro, 1972; 'Z', 1990; Malia, 1992.
9. See, for example, Skilling and Griffiths, 1971; Hough and Fainsod, 1979; Starr, 1988; Lapidus, 1989; Pye, 1990; Ruble, 1990.
10. This policy did, however, mean that groups which were officially discouraged, such as religious groups and the minuscule private sector, had difficulty maintaining their distinct identities.
11. See Friedgut, 1979; White, 1979: 43–9; Barghoorn and Remington, 1986: 162–4; Bahry, 1987; Wanner, 1998.
12. Another cleavage that has been found by some surveys to be related to vote choice is gender (for example A. Miller *et al.*, 1992; Gibson and Duch, 1993; W. Miller *et al.*, 1998: 245–7), but it is unclear whether this is a short-term effect of differences in general orientation to politics or a long-term determinant of party support. Like their counterparts in the West, Soviet men were found to be more interested in politics than women, and more likely to engage in politically non-conformist behaviour (Bahry, 1987: 86–8). Perhaps because they had lower expectations, Soviet women were more

satisfied with their jobs and the quality of their lives generally (Inkeles and Bauer, 1959: 105; Millar and Clayton, 1987: 51). These findings suggest that Soviet women were less likely than men to favour political change, but they also suggest that this difference was conjunctural rather than ideological. Unfortunately the nature of data used for most of this analysis precludes the inclusion of this variable, but its significance will be tested in the context of the 1998 parliamentary elections.

13. The orientations of other ethnic groups toward independence are more difficult to gauge, as there is considerably less information on them. In most cases (with the exceptions of Poles in western Ukraine) they are linguistically assimilated into the Russian language, but this does not necessarily mean that they would have been more supportive of continued Soviet dominance.
14. For an opposing view, see Krawchenko, 1985: 196–7.
15. It must be emphasized that the two main hypotheses advanced here – that people vote on the basis of group identity and that people vote on the basis on individual interests – are not mutually exclusive, because both processes can be expected to play a role in vote choice, in as much as different sectors of the electorate are influenced by different factors, and individual voters are influenced by more than one factor. For this reason, no attempt will be made to devise a ‘critical test’ that might enable us to choose between the two hypotheses. Rather, they allow us to predict the relative importance of different sets of variables.
16. The pre-electoral March 1998 survey employed in the present study found that 19.0 per cent of the electorate claimed to feel close to one party, and a further 5.7 per cent felt ‘a little closer’ to one party than to the others. See Chapter 7 below.
17. Stephen Fish found this to be the case in Russia in 1989 and 1990 (1995: 162–70).
18. Electoral data are of course accurate in this respect only in as much as the aggregation process is free of fraud or manipulation, which may not be entirely the case in the present instance. But, as with demographic data, they can still be assumed to provide a more accurate reflection of behaviour than surveys. See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the possibility that Ukrainian electoral data are biased due to error and electoral fraud.
19. Logistic regression is the appropriate tool in this case because the dependent variable (vote choice) is categorical in nature, rather than being located on an interval scale. See Aldrich and Nelson, 1984.
20. This technique was actually developed in 1932 by F. Bernstein (reprinted in Achen and Shively, 1995), but it was not widely used until after the hazards of ecological correlation had been pointed out by Robinson.
21. See Langbein and Lichtman (1978: 15–17) for a discussion of the literature on this topic.
22. The amount of variance explained by each model will be indicated by the R^2 statistic, but it must be borne in mind that with aggregate data this measures variance explained at the aggregate level only and is not likely to be a good measure of the proportion of individual-level variation explained.

3 The Beginning of Choice: Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, 1989

1. Zelenyi Svit, the Ukrainian Memorial Society, and the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society all held conferences between January and March 1989.
2. For further details on developments during this period, see UCIS, 1989; Kuzio, 1990a; Kuzio, 1993; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 63–92, Nahaylo, 1999.
3. Indicative of this stance is the 1989 claim of Iosyp Terelia, head of the Initiative Group for the Defence of Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine that ‘the opposition of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church and of the Ukrainian Catholic church is not simply the opposition of the church against communism; it is the spiritual opposition of the people against Russian imperialism’ (Terelia, 1990: 57).
4. Ukrainian cultural groups talked, for example, of the ‘linguistic Chernobyl’ wrought on Ukraine by Soviet language policy, or the destruction of Ukrainian ‘cultural ecology’. See Wanner, 1998: 27–33 for an analysis of the symbolism of the Chernobyl disaster.
5. On the genesis of Rukh, see Solchanyk, 1992a; Movchan, 1992; Nahaylo, 1989a; Kuzio, 1990b; Haran’, 1993: 9–48; Nahaylo, 1999: chap. 7.
6. The official focus of the Shevchenko Language Society was, however, limited to the linguistic and literary sphere, and though it claimed to be a republic-wide organization, its geographical range was effectively confined to the central and western regions of Ukraine (Haran’, 1993: 27).
7. For general accounts of the 1989 elections and the events leading up to them see Berezkin *et al.*, 1989; 1990; Mote, 1989; Sakwa, 1990; Urban, 1990; White, 1990a; White, 1991b; Lentini, 1991; 1995; Chiesa, 1993: chaps 3 and 4; Kiernan, 1993; White *et al.*, 1997: 22–9; Hough, 1997: chap. 5. For accounts of the elections in Ukraine, see Lytvyn, 1994: 138–41; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 92–4; Wilson, 1997a: 117–18, Nahaylo, 1999: chap. 8.
8. For a full list, see Yasmann, 1989:10.
9. The text of the law can be found in *Pravda Ukrainy*, 4 December 1988: 1–3.
10. The initial draft of the electoral law included a clause to this effect, though it was left out of the final version (White, 1990a: 60).
11. See, for example, the draft Rukh programme, *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 16 February 1989: 3; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994: 92–3; Haran’, 1993: 38–9. A number of the electoral gains made by members of prominent informal groups were the result of successes in repeat elections held where no deputy had received a majority in the initial contest (or the run-off where one was held). In repeat elections the restrictions on candidate nomination were in many cases much less stringent than in the initial elections; as many as 33 candidates were registered in one Kiev constituency.
12. For two constituencies data were unavailable (see Appendix 1).
13. As explained in Chapter 1, Soviet voters indicated their choice by crossing off the candidates they did not wish to vote for, leaving one name. As single candidate elections were the norm throughout most of Soviet history, compliant voters had merely to place their ballot paper in the box without marking it in any way, but a small minority would invariably cross off the one and only name. Until the Gorbachev era, no candidate was ever denied

- a mandate at the republican level or higher through 'negative votes' of this kind (Brunner, 1990: 38).
14. Commentary on the elections has pointed to the scepticism with which many voters received platforms and the success of the authorities in creating a situation in which personality remained the dominant differentiating factor among candidates (Urban, 1990: 109; Lentini, 1991: 83). Obviously this hypothesis cannot be tested with the data available, but if it is true, it represents a further restriction of the *political* competitiveness of the contests.
 15. Few candidates mentioned ethnic issues at all, and a number of those who did refer to them did so in the context of answers to interview questions. Given that the majority of scores of 2 on this scale reflect moderate positions, simple addition of this score to the others would have biased the result.
 16. The analysis includes the 143 territorial seats only, as there were too few national seats for extensive statistical exploration to be undertaken, and elections to the seats reserved for official social organizations were elected from among the ranks of each group, rather than by universal franchise. Analysis is also limited to the first round of elections, due to the small number of cases in the subsequent run-offs and repeat elections.
 17. It was not possible to test sectoral variables due to the small number of cases that could be fitted to constituencies for which data on sectoral structure were available. The logic of this and subsequent candidate-based models precludes the use of geographical variables (region and level of urbanization), as it is based on the relative success of different types of candidate within constituencies.
 18. The coefficient for workers in industry is negative, as can be seen from Table 3.2, whereas that for agricultural workers is insignificant.
 19. It might be conjectured that these effects are a consequence of differences in ideological position across occupational categories. To control for ideology, the ideological index described above was dichotomized about the mean and entered into the equation as a dummy variable. This variable was insignificant, however, as were a number of similar variables representing different dichotomizations of the index. It appears that a candidate's occupational category exerted a direct influence on vote choice, independent of his or her ideological position.

4 The Crystallization of Opposition: The Parliamentary Elections of 1990

1. As neither the Democratic Bloc nor Rukh was registered as an official organization at the time, they could not nominate candidates directly. Most Bloc candidates were nominated at voters' meetings (see below).
2. Montgomery and Remington (1994) stress the importance of the territorial penetration of alternative political organizations in the Soviet republican elections of 1990. Their analysis shows the Ukrainian pattern of interaction between the communist leadership and the emerging opposition to have been broadly consonant with developments in other Soviet republics.

3. See the group's publication, *Holos*, various issues September 1989–April 1990.
4. For example, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union's campaign slogan was 'All power to the democratic councils. Vote for the Ukrainian Helsinki Union' (cited in the *Ukrainian Weekly*, 4 April 1990: 15).
5. Consider the following Rukh statement: 'as long as one party exists, with one centre for all the nations of the USSR, there will exist national, social, and spiritual oppression' (*Literaturna Ukraïna*, 8 March 1990: 1).
6. See the CPU election platform published in *Pravda Ukrainy*, 3 December 1989: 1. This strategy was echoed by Rukh itself, which declared that it was prepared to work with all 'healthy forces' within the CPU (*Literaturna Ukraïna*, 8 March 1990:1).
7. See the draft law published in *Pravda Ukrainy*, 6 August 1989: 3–5.
8. See Potichnyj, 1993: 123 for details.
9. The draft law was published in *Holos*, 6 August 1989, and *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 14 September 1989.
10. The text of the law was published in *Pravda Ukrainy*, 1 November 1989: 1–3. See also Potichnyj, 1992b; 1993; Mihalisko, 1989b.
11. There were reports in the Western press of demonstrations in Kiev, Kharkiv, Odesa, Vinnytsya, Poltava, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Ternopil', and Chernivtsi (*Ukrainian Weekly*, 11 February 1990:1,15; 18 March 1990:1; Potichnyj, 1992b:182; Mihalisko, 1989b).
12. The discrepancies between different counts mainly surround the distinction between full Bloc members and Bloc-supported candidates. This is in part a reflection of the actual state of affairs in Ukraine at the time; because the Bloc did not have official status, 'membership' could be variously defined, and there may have been differences of opinion among participants as to what did or did not constitute a 'member' of the alliance. Inherent difficulties of measurement were compounded by lack of detailed information for some constituencies. There were several seats where by some accounts a Bloc candidate stood but none was definitively identified through a search of information sources. It is thus possible that several Bloc candidates have been mis-classified (see Appendix 1 for a full list of sources).
13. The Bloc was slightly disadvantaged by malapportionment. As in many countries, rural seats in Ukraine contained fewer voters on average than those in cities. Because the Bloc stood most of its candidates in urban seats, it suffered from under-representation. The total number of registered voters in the seats contested by the Bloc was 11 216 285; had there been perfect apportionment, 136 seats would have been allocated to these voters instead of the 134 seats they actually received. Given that the Bloc won two-thirds of the seats it contested, its estimated loss due to malapportionment was 1.33 deputies. See Helf and Hahn (1992) for an analysis of malapportionment in the Russian elections of 1990 that comes to parallel conclusions.
14. The cases in this model are all constituencies in which a Democratic Bloc member stood. The dependent variable is the proportion of the registered electorate who voted for the Bloc candidate(s) standing in each constituency. Insignificant regional variables were omitted so as to maximize degrees of freedom.

15. Unfortunately, employment sector data were available for too few cases for the effects of this variable to be estimated in the above model.
16. The data on 1985 candidates are taken from *Pravda Ukrainy*, 8 February 1985: 1.
17. The two rounds of voting resulted in 442 of the 450 seats being filled. In two cases elections were re-held because of allegations of irregularities. In the other six cases the clumsy election law was again to blame: as in 1989, a candidate had to secure an absolute majority in the first round to be elected. In these six seats there were only two candidates in the first round, each of whom came just short of a majority. Elections thus had to be re-held.
18. It was reported at the end of the nomination process that 73.2 per cent of all candidates were ethnic Ukrainians and 22.8 per cent ethnic Russians (*Pravda Ukrainy*, 23 February 1990). Three-quarters of deputies elected were Ukrainian and slightly over a fifth Russian, corresponding with remarkable precision to their relative weights in the population overall (see the Helsinki Commission Report, reprinted in the *Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 April 1990: 8; Potichnyj, 1992b: 200). Communist Party membership was 84.8 per cent at the start of the parliament.
19. Anecdotal evidence of such practices are reported in White, Gill and Slider, 1993: 35–7. Helf and Hahn (1992) also give evidence that electoral clientelism had begun to emerge in Russia by the time of the 1990 elections.

5 Mobilizing for Independence: The Referendums and Presidential Election of 1991

1. This diagram obviously represents a considerable simplification, but it provides a useful heuristic for conceptualizing the changing political situation in Ukraine during this period.
2. See Kuzio and Wilson, 1994 and Motyl and Krawchenko, 1997 for further development of similar arguments.
3. Linz and Stepan (1992; 1996) note the importance of electoral sequencing in the process of democratization and give the Soviet case as an example of a situation in which the relative timing of national and sub-national polls contributed to the centrifugal forces that ultimately broke the country apart.
4. Contemporary opinion polls give clear evidence of a decline in popular support for the all-Union legislature and the simultaneous rise in support for its republican counterparts between the spring of 1990 and the end of 1991 (see Wyman, 1997: 73–5).
5. For detailed analysis of the internal dynamics of the parliament during this period, see Arel 1990/91; 1994.
6. See Birch, 1995a for an analysis of voting patterns in the Galician referendum.
7. 'Zakon Ukraïns'koï Radyans'koï Sotsialistychnoï Respubliky pro Vybery Prezydenta Ukraïns'koï RSR', Kiev: Ukraïna, 1991. The main difference between the two types of procedure was that a presidential nominee had to gather 100000 signatures to be registered as a candidate.

8. The Left Bank is not included in this and the other models in this chapter due to lack of data.
9. A dummy variable for the three *oblasti* of Galicia was initially included in the equation to account for the presence of the third question on the ballot there. The variable was not significant, however, and was therefore removed.
10. Models were constructed for both votes on the basis of the more restricted datasets that included occupational sector. Employment in agriculture did not seem to have a significant impact on vote choice, but industrial workers appear to have been disinclined to support either referendum question. This confirms anecdotal evidence of a rising tide of industrial radicalism at this time (see above).
11. It has been argued that the intensity of the pressure put by the central Soviet media on Ukraine actually had the effect of helping the pro-independence forces (Potichnyj, 1992a: 129). Contemporary survey evidence lends support to this hypothesis, as only two-thirds of the population was found to be in favour of independence a month before the poll (Khmel'ko, 1992); even if we assume that all non-voters would have voted 'no', the vote on 1 December reflects a pro-independence stance on the part of three-quarters of the adult population.
12. A seventh candidate, the loyal communist Tkachenko, pulled out at the last minute in favour of Kravchuk.
13. Biographical information on the candidates was taken from *Khto ye khto*, 1995. For general accounts of the presidential election, see also Potichnyj, 1992a; Lytvyn, 1994: 284–8; Wilson, 1997c, Nahaylo, 1999: 406–13.
14. Due to the obscurities of Taburyans'kyi's ideological positions, it was not possible to classify him according to the criteria employed in this schema.
15. See Wilson, 1997a for a detailed development of this argument.
16. The north-western *oblasti* of Volyn' and Rivne (Kravchuk's home region) were somewhat exceptional in this regard, as they displayed patterns of electoral support more similar to those found in central Ukraine; see Birch 1995a.
17. A second model using sectoral variables found that those employed in agriculture were more likely than those in other sectors to support Kravchuk, once other variables are controlled for.
18. Further analysis on the restricted case set provides evidence that industrial workers voted in favour of Chornovil with greater frequency than workers in other sectors.

6 Independent Ukraine Votes: The Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994

1. For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the electoral campaign, see Birch, 1998a. For general accounts of the elections, see also Arel and Wilson, 1994a; Kremen' *et al.*, 1994; Birch, 1995b; Bojcun, 1995a; Kuzio, 1995b; Wilson, 1995; Kuzio, 1997: chap. 1.
2. See Wasyluk, 1994a; Arel and Wilson, 1994a; Bojcun, 1995a.
3. The text of the law was published in *Holos Ukraïny*, 27 November 1993. An English-language version can be found in the *Election Law Compendium of*

Central and Eastern Europe, Kiev: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1995.

4. The main losers from the protracted electoral process were of course the citizens of those constituencies not represented in parliament in the interim. These seats were spread throughout the country, but they tended to be disproportionately concentrated in urban areas and in the central regions (especially Kiev city) where turnout was lowest. The result was a heightening of the regional divisions in parliament, as the most politicized areas of the east and west occupied a greater proportion of filled seats than was their due. The large number of vacancies also made it easier – especially in the first few months of the new legislature’s life – for relatively small groups of deputies to paralyze parliamentary procedure by refusing to attend, thereby preventing the chamber from reaching quorum.
5. See Haran, 1991: 5–32; Lytvyn, 1992: 62–101; Bilous, 1993; Wilson and Bilous, 1993; Kuzio and Wilson, 1994; Kuzio, 1995a.
6. Important subsidiary issue domains included language and regional policy, as well as crime and corruption.
7. Taken as a bloc, non-party candidates had no evident demographic peculiarities and are therefore not included in the analysis.
8. Strictly speaking, most of the candidates included in this analysis were not actually nominated by their parties (primarily due to the organizational hurdles this would have involved and the ease with which candidates could be nominated by other means), but all candidates who were party members will be considered, for the purpose of the present investigation, to have represented their party in the elections. Though this might in some instances involve a distortion of the truth, it is most likely a reasonable assumption for the majority of cases.
9. In absolute terms, however, there was a large rise in the numbers of officials who contested parliamentary seats, from 648 in 1990 to 1164 in 1994.
10. For a further elaboration of this argument and an examination of survey evidence, see Birch, 1998a.
11. For general accounts of the presidential election, see Arel and Wilson, 1994b; Marples, 1994; Lytvyn, 1994: chap. 10; Birch, 1995b; Wilson, 1995; 1997c; Kuzio, 1996; 1997: chap. 2.
12. Like the similar diagram in Chapter 5, this representation is somewhat simplified for purposes of clarity; it conflates candidates’ positions on a number of sub-dimensions and fails to take into account the ambiguity of some of their stances.
13. The negligible number of votes given to the two non-incumbent establishment candidates, Plyushch and Talanchuk, indicates the extent of the popular disaffection with the ruling elite.

7 Party System Definition: The Parliamentary Elections of 1998

1. This is not to say that all business interests supported the centre, for a number of right-wing parties gained substantial backing from such sources as well. See Kuzio, 1998: 61; *Politychnyi kalendar*, 6 (1998), 4–5.

2. For further details of the parties contesting the 1998 elections, see Birch and Wilson, 1999.
3. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of the law, see Birch, 1998c.
4. The rulings were published in *Holos Ukraïny*, 5 March 1998, pp. 3, 5–6; 28 March 1998, p. 6.
5. *Holos Ukraïny*, 29 January 1998; 19 February 1998.
6. For general accounts of the 1998 elections, see Diuk, 1998; Tolstov, 1999; Birch and Wilson, 1999; Craumer and Clem, 1999; Hinich *et al.*, 1999; Wilson and Birch, 1999.
7. Full details of the methodology employed in the survey can be found in Appendix 1.
8. The Working Ukraine bloc was composed of members of the former Civic Congress and the Party of Justice (based on the Union of Veterans). It performed moderately well on the list vote, but not well enough to gain the 4 per cent necessary for representation.
9. As many variables as possible were entered in interval or scalar form, given that logistic regression performs less well when large number of dummy variables are used. Language, ethnicity, settlement size, and education were scalarized, while age was entered as number of years. See Appendix 1 for full details.
10. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate is officially the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, but many respondents listed the latter rather than the former as the church to which they belonged.
11. For full details of variable construction, see Appendix 1.
12. For an elaboration of this argument, see Wilson and Birch, 1999.
13. It is likely that the newly-established Party of Reforms and Order, led by popular national democrat Viktor Pynzenyk, attracted a large number of former Rukh supporters; unfortunately too few of this party's voters were sampled for this hypothesis to be tested.
14. The models presented here were again constructed in a three-stage process, starting with those variables included in previous chapters, then adding those variables conjectured to have been important but for which data had not before been available, and finally adding the employment-related variables that can be expected to have reflected the economic changes undergone by Ukraine during the transition period. Only the final models are reported here, as there are no previous centrist models with which these can be compared, and the addition of successive waves of variables did not greatly affect those variables already in the equations.
15. This scale was based on the answers of all respondents who replied to all three questions, or slightly over half the total sample. Cronbach's alpha for the scale is .61.
16. The gains in support made by the left in the 1998 elections were also partly a consequence of the electoral law. The eight parties that cleared the 4 per cent threshold in the list voting divided up all 225 list seats among them, and though the 'extra' seats gained in this way were distributed roughly in proportion to each of these parties' list vote strength, the left benefited the most in absolute terms; left parties overall won 40 per cent of the list vote but 56 per cent of the list seats.

8 Democratization and Electoral Behaviour in Ukraine, 1989–98

1. It may be that these findings do not hold for all parts of Ukraine; the data available to analyse the 1991 polls were concentrated disproportionately in the west of the country, so caution should be exercised in interpreting these results.
2. The close link between these variables is evident in the models constructed for the 1998 elections, where the inclusion of the employment-related indicators invariably leads to a decline in the magnitude and significance levels of the coefficients for education.
3. Possible objections to this argument will be addressed in the Conclusion.
4. In explaining the surprisingly high degree of structuration of the post-communist Bulgarian party system, Herbert Kitschelt *et al.* point to the fact that Bulgaria had in 1995 held more parliamentary elections than any other post-communist country (Kitschelt *et al.*, 1995).
5. Belarus and Macedonia were the only other countries in post-communist Europe not to abandon the single-member system in favour of a mixed or proportional alternative in their first post-transition elections.
6. Moldova was the only European Soviet successor state to experience a significant amount of violence at the time of the transition, and in this case militant political activity was confined to a small portion of the country.
7. For a dissenting view, see Waller, 1996.
8. A word of caution is in order as to the sources of the findings reported in this section. Most of the analyses on which the following overview draws are survey-based studies of political attitudes and voting intentions. In many cases the results are presented only in the form of frequencies or cross-tabulations, making it extremely difficult to determine how significant the different variables are. Moreover, virtually all of the multi-variate analyses include attitudinal variables in the same equation as socio-demographic variables. Attitudinal variables operate closer to vote choice in the 'funnel of causality' than socio-demographic variables, and ought therefore to be modelled as intervening variables. Their inclusion in the same equation makes it difficult to evaluate the indirect effects socio-demographic variables might have via attitudes. It is notable that the only analysis cited here which employs the techniques of structural modelling discerns strong effects for socio-demographic variables (Kitschelt *et al.*, 1995), but that most of these effects are indirect.
9. The electoral prominence of this cleavage in Estonia and Latvia has been somewhat reduced by restrictive citizenship laws that have limited the number of ethnic Russians who can claim the franchise.
10. There has been debate about the link between higher education and support for economic liberalization (see Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; Miller *et al.*, 1994; 1996; Finifter, 1996), but most surveys have found that those with university degrees are inclined to favour both political and economic reform.
11. An exception is the radicalism of many Polish peasants, discussed in greater detail below.

12. It is notable that Bulgaria, which has experienced less extensive reforms, resembles more closely the ex-Soviet pattern in which age, education level, and place of residence (urban or rural) are more important than occupation in determining political attitudes and vote choice (Rose and Mishler, 1994; Kitschelt *et al.*, 1995).
13. Belarus falls into this category as well but will be omitted from the present comparison due to the dearth of research on Belarussian voting behaviour, and also because the most recent elections in Belarus have been severely marred by allegations of fraud and coercive practices, rendering them less than ideal objects for an analysis that takes free electoral choice as an underlying assumption.
14. There has apparently been a reversal of this trend among the very youngest age groups; the ex-communists seem to have picked up a disproportionate number of votes from the 18–24 age group in 1993 (Cline, 1993: 20), and from the 18–29 age group in 1995 (Tworzecki, 1996: 408).
15. There is some evidence of the emergence of a public-sector versus private-sector cleavage in Polish voting behaviour (Gibson and Cielecka, 1995), which was found to be a distinguishing factor in right-wing support in the Ukrainian elections of 1998.
16. A slightly different interpretation of this phenomenon is given by Władysław Martin ('Jeden rzut oka na Polskę A i na Polskę B', *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 October 1993, cited in Gibson and Cielecka, 1995: 769).
17. Though the small ethnic German minority in Poland is electorally cohesive, it represents such a minute fraction of the electorate that it does not play an important role in structuring behaviour overall.

Appendix

1. Partiynyi Arkhiv Institutu Istorii Partiy pri TsK Kompartiy Ukraïny, Fond 1, Opis 48, Spravy 112, 116, and 120.
2. According to official party records, party membership declined by 337 603 between 1 January 1989 and 1 January 1991. This represents a fall of 10.2 per cent.
3. For precise definitions of the categories 'present' and 'permanent', see 'Organizatsionnye ...', 1993: 417. See also Anderson and Silver, 1985b.
4. There was criticism after the 1989 census was conducted of the amount of copying of respondents' names and addresses that was done by hand, as well as the amount of tabulation of results which enumerators were required to do, also by hand (Pylayev and Skalenko, 1990). This leads one to assume a fair amount of randomly distributed mechanical error.
5. In some cases there are also gaps in the reporting of fluency data, especially in cities other than *oblast'* capitals.
6. This supposition is supported by the fact that, of the three booklets devoted to this data published by regional branches of the Ministry of Statistics, two were published after Ukrainian independence, and the third was compiled in 1991 by the L'viv branch, at a time when the L'viv *oblast'* council was controlled by the democratic opposition.
7. The average yearly number of people moving to and from Ukraine between 1970 and 1988 was 4800, but rose to 90700 per year between 1989 and

- 1991 (Khomra, 1993: 98), and by 1994 it was 548 661 (*Statystychnyi Shchorichnyk Ukraïny 1994*, Kiev: Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukraïny, 1995: 34), but this still represents only .01 per cent of the population.
8. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty survey; results supplied to the author by the RFE/RL Research Institute.
 9. According to the 1989 census, the ethnic structure of the workforce closely reflected that of the population at large: ethnic Ukrainians comprised 71.8 per cent of the workforce and 72.2 per cent of the population, while ethnic Russians represented 22.7 per cent of the former and 22.1 per cent of the latter.
 10. These stipulations are made in the laws governing each election. See the 1989 electoral law, 'O Vyborakh Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR', *Pravda Ukraïny*, 4 December 1988, pp. 1–3, Section 5, Article 32; the 1990 electoral law, 'O Vyborakh Narodnykh Deputatov Ukraïnskoï SSR', *Pravda Ukraïny*, 1 November 1989, pp. 1–3, Section V, Article 30; the 1994 electoral law, 'Pro Vybory Narodnykh Deputativ Ukraïny', *Holos Ukraïny*, 27 November 1993, pp. 3–6, Section V, Article 20; and the 1998 law, 'Pro Vybory Narodnykh Deputativ Ukraïny', Kiev: Central Electoral Commission, 1997, Section 3, Article 18. The 1994 and 1998 laws are available in English translation on the Website of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems at www.ifes.kiev.ua. The 1994 law is also reprinted in English translation in Nix, 1995: 345–84.
 11. 'O Vyborakh Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR', *Pravda Ukraïny*, 4 December 1988, pp. 1–3, Section I, Article 2; 'O Vyborakh Narodnykh Deputatov Ukraïns'koï SSR', *Pravda Ukraïny*, 1 November 1989, pp. 1–3, Section I, Article 2; 'Pro Vybory Narodnykh Deputativ Ukraïny', *Holos Ukraïny*, 27 November 1993, pp. 3–6, Section I, Article 2.4; 'Pro Vybory Narodnykh Deputativ Ukraïny', Kiev: Central Electoral Commission, 1997, Section 1, Article 3.
 12. Though now an autonomous republic, Crimea was at the time of the census an *oblast'*.
 13. Soviet scholars have also noted the difference between 'passport ethnicity' and ethnic self-identification, and have admitted the ambiguity of the census question (Kozlov, 1988: 191, 217, 219).
 14. The best available proxy for the regional distribution of religious affiliation is the number of parishes in a given region belonging to each denomination. But this has been found to be a poor indicator of individual-level religious identification (Martyniuk, 1994), and such data are in any case only readily available at the *oblast'* level (see figures published in Zastavnyi, 1994: 450–1).
 15. In some cases it will be necessary to use data on collective farmers as a proxy for data on the agricultural sector as a whole, given that the former were more complete. The disadvantage of this is that the collective farm population excludes those employed on state farms.
 16. For some *oblasti* only the broader age bands were available; see Appendix 3.
 17. This definition of 'urban' holds for Ukraine only, as the census defined the term differently for different republics.
 18. The area falling under the jurisdiction of some city councils included suburban settlements which were classified as 'rural', hence a small number of

non-urban inhabitants are included in the constituencies of many large cities.

19. Gaps in the 1989 data include missing data for constituencies 416 (Ivano-Frankivs'k), 518 (Ternopil'), and 523 (Kharkiv). Data are missing in the 1990 set for constituency 244 in Crimea.
20. Of the 51 candidates in the 45 per cent to 55 per cent band, 25 – a slight minority – received more than 50 per cent of the vote. Twelve of the 21 candidates in the narrower 48 per cent to 50 per cent band received a majority, but this difference is not statistically significant, and in the 49 per cent to 50 per cent band the numbers are evenly matched at six and six.
21. The classification derived from the platforms is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.

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