

Potichnyj, Peter J.

Elections in Ukraine

Köln 1990

4 Z 68.247-1990,34/44#36

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00051057-8

Die PDF-Datei kann elektronisch durchsucht werden.

---

Berichte des Bundesinstituts  
für ostwissenschaftliche  
und internationale Studien

---



---

## Elections in Ukraine

---

---

Peter J. Potichnyj

---

---

36-1990

---

Die Meinungen, die in den vom BUNDESINSTITUT FÜR  
OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN  
herausgegebenen Veröffentlichungen geäußert werden, geben  
ausschließlich die Auffassung der Autoren wieder.

© 1990 by Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und  
internationale Studien, Köln

Abdruck und sonstige publizistische Nutzung – auch auszugsweise –  
nur mit vorheriger Zustimmung des Bundesinstituts sowie mit Angabe  
des Verfassers und der Quelle gestattet.

Bundesinstitut  
für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien  
Lindenbornstraße 22, D-5000 Köln 30, Telefon 02 21/57 47-0

## CONTENTS

	Page
Kurzfassung.....	I
Legal Basis.....	1
Formation of Electoral Commissions.....	3
Registration of Candidates.....	6
Platforms and Programs.....	9
The Opposition.....	15
Attitudes.....	18
Elections - The First Round.....	23
The Second Round.....	24
Conclusions.....	28
Appendix I.....	29
Appendix II.....	30
Appendix III.....	31
Notes.....	32
Summary.....	43

April 1990

Die vorliegende Arbeit ist aus einem Forschungsauftrag des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien hervorgegangen.

Der Verfasser dieses "Berichts" ist Professor für Politische Wissenschaften an der McMaster Universität, Hamilton, Ontario/Canada.

Redaktion: Uwe Halbach



Peter J. Potichnyj

Wahlen in der Ukraine

Bericht des BIOst Nr. 36/1990

### Kurzfassung

Der vorliegende Bericht analysiert die am 4. und 18. März 1990 stattgefundenen Wahlen in der Ukrainischen SSR.

Das Analyseergebnis kann wie folgt zusammengefaßt werden:

1. Die rechtliche Basis für die Durchführung der Wahlen beruhte auf dem zuvor verabschiedeten Wahlgesetz und auf einigen Änderungen in der Verfassung der Ukrainischen SSR.
2. Diese Wahlgesetzgebung regelte den gesamten Wahlgang, einschließlich der Bildung, der Zusammensetzung und der Aufgabe der Wahlkommissionen, angefangen von der zentralen Wahlkommission bis zu den lokalen Wahlkommissionen.
3. Diese Kommissionen, die auf eine ausgesprochen administrative Art und Weise ins Leben gerufen wurden, dienten als Hauptinstrument des Parteiapparats zur Sicherung ihrer Kontrolle über die Kandidatenbenennung und deren Wahl. Das Vorgehen der Kommissionen hat auch dazu geführt, daß die Erfolge der Opposition erheblich eingeschränkt werden konnten.
4. Wenn die oppositionelle "Ruch"-Bewegung bei der Wahl trotzdem Erfolge verbuchen konnte, dann nicht nur dank ihres klar strukturierten und harmonischen Programms, sondern auch dank ideologischer und programmatischer Uneinigkeit innerhalb der Kommunistischen Partei, des Komsomols, der Gewerkschaften, der Frauenbewegung und der verschiedenen parteigebundenen Organisationen.
5. Trotz massiver Behinderung sowohl der oppositionellen Wahlkampagnen als auch der Aufstellung oppositioneller Kandidaten (die Anerkennung der "Ruch"-Bewegung wurde bis nach Ablauf des Termins für die Kandidatenaufstellung verzögert), gelang es dem Demokratischen Block (einer losen Sammelbewegung von 43 informellen Organisationen und freien Kandidaten), beeindruckende Wahlerfolge zu erzielen. Besonders in den großen Stadtgebieten gelang es der Partei nicht, die Aufstellung oppositioneller Kandidaten zu verhindern. Im Ergebnis errang der Demokratische Block ein Viertel der 450 Abgeordnetensitze.
6. Nach Berufsgruppen gegliedert, setzt sich das neue ukrainische Parlament wie folgt zusammen: 97 Parteifunktionäre, 54 Staatsfunktionäre, 29 Mitglieder der Armee und der Repres-

## II

sionsorgane, 118 Abgeordnete aus Wissenschaft, Kultur, Erziehung, Medien und Gesundheit, 92 Wirtschaftsmanager (einschließlich Kolchosleiter und Staatsgüterdirektoren), 38 Arbeiter, Gewerkschafter und Arbeitslose (die letzteren meist Oppositionelle, die keine Arbeit bekamen).

7. Nach nationaler Zugehörigkeit sind 75 % der Abgeordneten Ukrainer, 22 % Russen und 3 % anderer Nationalität. Insgesamt wurden 13 Frauen gewählt. Mindestens fünf von ihnen gehören dem Demokratischen Block an.

8. Der Autor betrachtet diesen langsam aber unnachgiebig zielbewußten Marsch zur Demokratie in der Ukraine, einer Republik von sehr hoher wirtschaftlicher, politischer und strategischer Bedeutung und einer Bevölkerung von fast 52 Millionen Einwohnern, als einen außerordentlich bedeutsamen Prozeß. Sollte dieser Prozeß gestoppt oder, unter welchem Vorwand auch immer, unterbrochen werden, würde dies außerordentlich negative Folgen sowohl für die Sowjetunion als auch für den Rest Europas mit sich bringen.

## LEGAL BASIS

In preparation for elections to councils at all levels which took place on March 4, 1990 in Ukraine, three laws had to be adopted: 1. The Law on Changes and Amendments to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Ukrainian SSR<sup>1</sup> 2. The Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR<sup>2</sup> 3. The Law on Elections to Local Councils of People's Deputies of Ukrainian SSR<sup>3</sup> 4. The Decree of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on amendments to the Ukrainian Criminal Code.<sup>4</sup>

In our analysis we will touch on various provisions of the above-mentioned laws as they pertain to a number of aspects of recent elections. It should be pointed out, that in some important respects, the new laws which were adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR differ from the provisions of the USSR constitution.

The preparation of the above laws began in August 1988 when the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet established two working groups with a goal of proposing a number of suggestions which could be incorporated into draft laws, which then could be submitted for a public discussion, and eventually for adoption by the Supreme Soviet.

A public discussion of the draft laws took some two and a half months in which some 15 million people took part. According to a report by V.S. Shevchenko, Chairman of the Presidium, the Commission on Legislative Proposals of the Supreme Soviet, received over 235,000 amendments and propositions from citizens (of which 150,000 were very concrete), and more importantly, 9 alternative drafts<sup>5</sup>, of which one of them, prepared by six People's Deputies of the USSR, was published in the press as an "alternative draft".<sup>6</sup>

It should be pointed out, that some very important suggestions which were proposed by the alternative draft, as well as by various opposition groups, primarily from RUKH circles, were selectively incorporated in the law adopted by the Supreme Soviet.<sup>7</sup>

The amendments to the Constitution pertain primarily to the question of how to bring about changes in the political structure of the existing system, which in turn might enhance a real growth in power of the Soviets of various levels, and especially of the republic Supreme Soviet.

The answer, in Ukrainian case, was to do away with the Congress of People's Deputies as the supreme power in the republic, and to retain the Supreme Soviet as the highest state power.<sup>8</sup>

Rejection of the Congress of People's Deputies as the highest state power places the Ukrainian Constitution in conflict with USSR Constitution.<sup>9</sup>

Still another provision which is in direct conflict with the USSR constitution is the rejection of election of deputies from the party and party dominated social organizations.<sup>10</sup>

The right to elect and be elected was retained at 18 years of age<sup>11</sup>, although there were suggestions that the right to vote should be lowered to 16 years and the right to be elected raised to 21, 23, and even 30 years.<sup>12</sup>

The citizen has the right to be elected deputy to no more than 2 councils at the same time, provided that he already is not a member of the Council of Ministers or of an Executive Committee of the local council.<sup>13</sup>

The size of the Supreme Soviet is being visibly reduced from 650 to 450 deputies.<sup>14</sup> The size of the local councils have been reduced about 1/3 from 500,000 to 310,000 deputies.<sup>15</sup>

The provision for nomination of candidates requires that only groups of electors who number 200 persons or more are able to nominate candidates.<sup>16</sup> The candidate is considered properly nominated when majority of electors at the nominating meeting cast their votes for him.<sup>17</sup> This provision was widely discussed and deemed controversial yet it was accepted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

No less insistence was offered by the people with regard to the question of alternative candidates.

Although absent in the draft law, this provision was introduced for a discussion and became part of electoral law.<sup>18</sup> Even though each nominating meeting can nominate only one candidate for a given electoral district<sup>19</sup>, the Constitution guarantees that there should be no limit to a number of candidates for each position and that the ballot should list all those who were properly nominated and registered as candidates.<sup>20</sup>

#### FORMATION OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

The Decree of the Supreme Soviet of 28 October 1989 created 450 electoral districts, each with approximately 82.2 thousand voters.<sup>21</sup>

At the same time the Central Electoral Commission was set up, composed of 31 members.<sup>22</sup>

On 24 November when the CEC met, the 450 District Electoral Commissions (DEC) were also organized and beginning to function.<sup>23</sup>

Although nothing was said at that meeting about the Local Electoral Commissions (LEC), these were probably in the process of being organized. Unfortunately, nothing is known about their composition.

From the very beginning, 3 November 1989, when the nomination stage of the elections began, there were plenty of indications that neither the DECs, nor the LECs were functioning within the spirit of the newly adopted electoral law. One of the reasons may have been, that the right to create these commissions, according to Articles 23 and 26 of the Electoral Law, was given to the Oblast Executive Committees (Oblvykonkoms), and the Executive Committees of lower Soviets, majority of which were in the hands of the arch-conservative elements.<sup>24</sup>

It was especially difficult for some social organizations or even the voters' meetings in many localities to nominate their candidates without encountering all kinds of objections and in many cases harassment from the LECs and DECs. Quite often the interpretation of the law went against the so-called "informal organizations" (neformaly), that tried to nominate their candidates.<sup>25</sup>

The process of nominations proved unusually cumbersome. Not only in cases of a variety of informal organizations but also in cases of groups of voters who wanted to nominate their candidates by places of residence. These nominating meetings had to be called by the Executive Committees of local Soviets, and agreed to by the DEC. In cases where the voters attempted to organize such meetings without prior sanction from the local Executive Committees and the DECs, they were deemed in contravention of the law and, therefore, invalid.<sup>26</sup>

The required 200 voters' quorum of the nominating meeting was not so difficult. But the requirement that all voters attending had to register, and prove their residence and age<sup>27</sup>, created many difficulties, and resulted in the dissolution of the meeting even before it completed its business.

The procedure of ensuring legality of the meeting was also cumbersome. Thus the local Executive Committees had to make a formal decision about the meeting and to certify it in writing. Oral agreement for a meeting was deemed insufficient, because it could not be appealed to the higher electoral commission, be it DEC or CEC.<sup>28</sup>

As was already mentioned, the composition of LECs and DECs, as well as the negative attitudes among its members towards the "informal organizations", resulted quite often in the faulty interpretation of the Electoral Law, and in discrimination against candidates from these organizations. Thus, for example, the Shevchenko Society of Ukrainian Language, although a registered organization as of May 20, 1989, was prevented on many occasions from fielding its candidates.

The claim was, that the CEC did not certify the Society as a legal organization, and did not issue proper instructions to DECs to that effect.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the Chairman of the CEC, V.F. Boiko, claimed that because the Society was a registered organization, it required no special permission to nominate its candidates, and there was no need to notify the DECs about the status of the Society.<sup>30</sup> But in many cases the DECs would not change their decisions. Such cases occurred in Kharkiv, Ternopil, Rivne, and Mykolaiv, where a positive finding of the CEC on appeal from local organizations, reversing a decision of DEC, was simply ignored at the lower level.<sup>31</sup>

A variety of devices were used to prevent people from attending the nominating meetings. One of them was to schedule a meeting at an inconvenient time.<sup>32</sup> The other was to schedule a meeting in the evening and then to call it some 4 hours earlier, with only "reliable" persons notified about the change of time or place.<sup>33</sup> Still another device was to refuse a meeting for completely irrelevant and illegal reasons<sup>34</sup>, and then to refuse issuing a written justification for such a decision in order to prevent an appeal.<sup>35</sup>

The most blatant example of official interference was the refusal of the authorities to register an organization which had the best chances of becoming an official opposition. In this manner the Peoples' Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction, RUKH, the largest and the most authoritative organization in Ukraine was refused registration until February 1990 when it was entirely too late to nominate its candidates for elections of March 4, 1990.<sup>36</sup>

Confusion and incompetence also had its impact on the election campaign. At the session of the CEC on 22 December, 1989, Iu.P. Diachenko, responsible for the State Committee for Publications, was severely criticized for failing to produce and distribute copies of Electoral Law to many localities.<sup>37</sup> It also transpired at that session, that the LECs

were not functioning well and the CEC had to issue a special circular instructing them on how to organize their work effectively.<sup>38</sup>

#### REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES

February 4, 1990, marked the end of the registration stage of candidates for election to both the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and to local councils. This process, which began on 4 January, was on the whole well covered by the official media, although not free from bias and even exaggeration. Numerous cases of rejected candidates from "informal organizations" were not highly publicized. They did not go unnoticed, however, as objections to the activities of DECs began to grow and the appeals of rejected candidates began to rise.

Chairman of the CEC, V.F. Boiko, in his interview with the correspondent of Pravda Ukrainskaya, admitted that "cases of violation of Electoral Law did exist", but that "the EDCs were compelled to refuse registration of candidates", supposedly for valid reasons, thus shifting the blame to candidates themselves. However, he did decline information on the number of appeals received by the CEC.<sup>39</sup> He further stated that "questions of the right to nominate and subsequently to register candidates" from such organizations as the Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko are rising. That there are cases of candidates for registration from "inadequately established, in actual fact non-established organizations", and that these and other violations provide the basis for DECs' "decisions not to register candidates".<sup>40</sup>

The Secretary, M.O. Lytvyn, was less reluctant on this score and indicated, that according to the report of V.I. Kirnenko, the CEC received 800 complaints from voters, and that some 241 individuals made personal appearances before the commission.<sup>41</sup> He further stated, that majority of complaints had to do with the functioning of the DECs and that 134 complaints pertained to violations of Electoral Law.<sup>42</sup>

Closer to the election date the pressure began to rise once again and Mr. Boiko was required to give further explanations. Responding to the question from the RATAU correspondent whether the "DECs are creating artificial obstacles in registering candidates" from Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko, from the ecological association "Zelenyi Svit", and other informal organizations, he rejected such accusations, simply as "attempts to discredit these democratically created electoral organs, that have no basis in fact".<sup>43</sup> He admitted that the CEC did receive some 120 appeals questioning the decisions of DECs. Of this number, 68 were reviewed and in 42 cases decisions of DECs were upheld, and in another 16 cases, including 4 cases involving Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko, and "Zelenyi Svit", were reversed.<sup>44</sup>

That all kinds of obstacles were thrown in the way of candidates from informal organizations there can be no doubt. In some cases the same meeting that nominated acceptable candidates for local council who were then registered, was declared illegal by the DEC and the candidate for the Supreme Soviet nominated at that meeting was refused registration.<sup>45</sup> In Kharkiv, the refusal to register a candidate was based on the fact that no member of the DEC was present at the nominating meeting, even though such presence is not required by the Electoral Law.<sup>46</sup> In Bila Tserkva, efforts to nominate candidates from the Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko were being harassed by militia, and the attempts to publicize the meeting in press and on the radio got nowhere. When the candidate was finally nominated in the corridor of the "building of culture" (the room was refused), this decision was immediately "investigated" by "representatives from the leading institution" who had a distinct "odor of 1937" about them.<sup>47</sup> In Dnipropetrovsk, contrary to facts, the DEC declared that the Novomoskovsk Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko "is a primary organization" with no right to nominate, and refused to register its candidate.<sup>48</sup> In Rivne ob-

last, in order to undermine the Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko, the secretary of Kuznetsovsk gorkom, was sent on a special mission to Kiev, where he stole a blank, signed registration form for a "primary organization" from the Secretariat of the Society, and later used it as a proof that anybody can obtain such documents and that an organization may not in fact exist. On this basis, a candidate for the Society was refused registration.<sup>49</sup> These and other instances of discrimination resulted in the protest sent to the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet by the chairmen of two organizations, D.M. Pavlychko, Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko, and Iu.M. Shcherbak, Association "Zelenyi Svit".<sup>50</sup> In this protest, the two chairmen, both People's Deputies of the USSR, pointed out that the electoral commissions on all levels are violating Electoral Law, and that even the CEC very often does not follow legal advice which it seeks on its own initiative in special cases.<sup>51</sup>

They asked the Presidium to use the powers granted it by the Ukrainian Constitution (Article 104, § 3 and 6), to launch an investigation into violations of the Electoral Law. And secondly, to issue an authoritative interpretation of those provisions of the Electoral Law that the electoral commissions are misinterpreting and thus causing a great deal of protest among the citizens.<sup>52</sup>

Supported by a large rally in central Kiev that took place on 11 February, at which antisemitism and registration difficulties were the two main topics of discussion<sup>53</sup>, both men approached the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the issue of registration one more time.<sup>54</sup>

The problems in registering candidates from opposition circles tend to underscore the fear with which the party, and especially, party apparat, viewed the potential impact that these individuals, if elected, might have on the system as a whole, and on the future life of party functionaries. The events in Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, Ternopil, Odesa, Rivne, Poltava, Kiev, in connection with the registration of candidates

are, perhaps, the best proof of the resistance of party apparatus to new inroads that "glasnost" and "democratization" are making among the Ukrainian population.

#### PLATFORMS AND PROGRAMS

In preparation for elections the CC CPUkraine published its platform and the proclamation addressed to "all electors of Soviet Ukraine".<sup>55</sup>

In both these documents, but especially in the Proclamation, it is emphasized that the "guarantee of the reconstruction is the Communist Party. It alone is realistically capable of expressing the interests of all classes and social groups, of consolidating the society, and guaranteeing civic peace in our common house".<sup>56</sup>

The Proclamation further states that there are forces in the republic who "hiding behind the slogans of reconstruction and speculating on its difficulties, desire to destabilize the situation, to use elections for their narrow, egotistical goals, and to push people into political adventurism".<sup>57</sup>

These forces are capable of lies, of unrealistic promises, and the "most extreme elements" among them may even be capable of stirring up "national enmity" and of sloganizing a "fratricidal civil war".<sup>58</sup>

There are also those, it continued, "who are incapable of overcoming conservative attitudes and would like to turn our society to the old path".<sup>59</sup>

Thus the main enemy are clearly the forces united in the RUKH, while the party conservatives are simply viewed as an irritant. The atmosphere of danger and fear was being artificially created by rumours of anti-Jewish pogroms that swept various cities of the republic on the eve of elections, and by provocateurs who were spreading anti-semitic literature under the guise of RUKH members.<sup>60</sup>

Finally on 17 February, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR issued a proclamation to the citizens in which it called for calm and for support of the Soviet government.<sup>61</sup>

This was clearly an electoral ploy by the authorities, but because of the timely reaction of RUKH leaders, it failed in presenting the CPU as the last refuge for law and order. In fact, it may be argued that it worked against the party (the Government and the KGB finally admitted that this was a false alarm), and helped speed up the internal decay and disintegration within party ranks.<sup>62</sup>

The CP Platform received wide distribution, and was published in all newspapers, and in special brochures and posters.<sup>63</sup> In this manner the party hoped to retain the initiative in the elections, to continue its dominant position in the society. The party press continued to publicise the names of only party candidates. Others were treated with neglect or mentioned largely in a negative context.<sup>64</sup>

In short order, other mass organizations fell into step with the party leadership although with slightly different nuances. On 2 December, 1989, the VIIth Plenum of Trade Unions of Ukrainian SSR issued its election programme.<sup>65</sup>

Although in some areas the trade union programme was directed more specifically to a variety of problems faced by workers (unemployment, health, housing, inflation, disagreement with existing labour law, 40 hour week etc.), in general it followed the party platform.

The Platform of the Women Councils of the republic was even more closely aligned with the electoral position of the party.<sup>66</sup>

It did mention a variety of women needs, but in the field of nationality relations it simply called for "harmonization of international and national education" and "love for Ukrainian and other national languages, used by the inhabitants of Ukraine, starting with family, kindergarten and school".<sup>67</sup>

Rather different in tone and content were political programmes of the young candidates many of them komsomol members, especially the "Political Platform" of komsomol organization of the Kiev Politechnical Institute.<sup>68</sup>

In it the komsomol called for "transfer of real power from party to the Soviets; adoption of democratic laws for regulating strikes, meetings, demonstrations and press; steps to ensuring development of all constitutional social movements and formations; renewal of the treaty of the union by sovereign republics; rebirth of national consciousness, history and culture of all peoples living in Ukraine; return of land to peasants, factories to working collectives; introduction of economic cost accounting at all levels of the economy; growth of intelligent cooperatives; good policy for youth and especially students and better living conditions."<sup>69</sup>

The Platform supported M. Gorbachev and the perestroika in general, and came out against those who would want to see a capitalist Ukraine. It also called on its activists to support their candidates in the election.<sup>70</sup>

Even more radical is the "Proclamation" to the people of Ukraine issued in the name of the "young candidates", an interregional grouping. They proclaim, that "not being weighed down by bureaucratic chains, stereotypes, and ambitions", it will be easier for them "to bring about reforms, that would fundamentally change political and economic relations in the republic."<sup>71</sup>

This proclamation, which was signed by 37 candidates, highlights the fact that out of 3653 nominated candidates only 216 represent the young people. As if to underscore their differences with the party leadership they state, that "we do not separate ourselves in our views pertaining to the development of Ukrainian state from those programmes that have already been published. We support their radicalism...".<sup>72</sup>

In the "Position", issued by the same group, they indicate their support "for a sovereign in political and economic sense, socialist Ukraine, within a federation based on a new treaty of the union".<sup>73</sup> They also speak out for "increase in pensions, stipends, child supports etc., at least in proportion with inflation, and indexation of wages, and demand review of the distribution of national income in the direction of the growing social needs."<sup>74</sup>

Similar in content and tone are the proclamations and resolutions of the VIIIth Plenum of the CC Ukrainian Komsomol. More clearly than the party, the komsomol leaders identify the sources of political and economic problems that exist in the realm of nationality relations generally, as well as in Ukraine, and call for their resolution.<sup>75</sup>

The Plenum also issued two resolutions. One on the question of the "sovereignty of Ukrainian SSR"<sup>76</sup>, and on "national symbolism".<sup>77</sup>

Calling for a "real sovereignty" for Ukraine they emphasized the need for a new treaty of the Union, and demanded that the agenda of the first session of the Supreme Soviet after elections, include the question of the "Declaration of sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR", the contents of which are outlined in considerable detail and are much more specific than anything thus far undertaken by the party, and in many points similar or close to the position of RUKH on these matters.<sup>78</sup>

The question of national symbolism, the need for it, is also treated in a rather open and tolerant manner. Although the red flag of the state is defended, the use of the "blue-yellow" national flag in the life of society is fully accepted. It should be remembered that the Ukrainian national colours are not officially sanctioned, and at some demonstrations these flags were confiscated and their carriers beaten, arrested and heavily fined as dangerous "nationalists" and "extremists".

It should be pointed out, of course, that the party platform did not reflect the views of all party members. In fact, so many disagreements have surfaced within the party ranks that some were bound to ask "how many parties actually there are?"<sup>79</sup>

In order to have an appreciation of the wide ranging debate, and without any attempt at comprehensive treatment, here are a sample of proposals from individual communists as well as some local organizations of the party.

Academician K.M. Sytnyk, and CC member, speaking about the party platform, quite openly admitted that irrespective of the values and views expressed in the document "many people do not believe our assurances, promises, slogans, and declarations".<sup>80</sup> Pointing to shortages of soap and other goods of everyday need, Sytnyk hinted that "possibly there may exist in the country some real force, which, with a great deal of experience, and craftily, although in an underhanded fashion, creates artificial shortage of goods, the sharp deficit, that grows with each year".<sup>81</sup> Calling for continuing efforts in the direction of democratization and reconstruction he hits hard at the "conservatives" in the party who preoccupy themselves with "blackening RUKH members", rather than attending to important social and economic problems.<sup>82</sup> In order, for the party to perform its duties it should have in its ranks only the "modest, hard-working communists".<sup>83</sup> In his view, without RUKH, it would be almost impossible to fight the conservative party apparat. Therefore, any "good RUKH candidates who run in the elections should be welcome", while such moves against the RUKH as the creation of the Labour League for Reconstruction (Spilka Trudiashchykh za perebudovu), would lead to disharmony and could not be well considered.<sup>84</sup>

Some groups in the party were indeed quite radical in their call for reform and renewal.<sup>85</sup> "The transition from a totalitarian system with a monopoly of power in the hands of party apparat to a democratic political system demands a

truly democratic party, which builds its relationships with other organizations and movements on the basis of equal partnership, and intellectual and moral authority" states the preamble to the platform adopted by 1124 delegates of the party conference of the Kiev Politechnical Institute, which took place 18 January in Kiev.<sup>86</sup> Rejecting party monopoly, "dogmatic Marxism-Leninism", deformed model of democratic centralism, all powerful party apparat, the conference called for more power for local party organizations, rejection of Article 6 of the Constitution, new Party Rules and new Party Programme, an early Party Congress, active and constructive participation in elections, close cooperation with RUKH and other organizations and creation of proper condition for realization of the Law on Languages, and special efforts for broadening the functioning of Ukrainian language and culture.<sup>87</sup>

In almost all speeches as well as declarations and resolutions the highest organs of the CPUkraine came for a severe criticism.<sup>88</sup>

Even more critical were the suggestions outlined by the Kiev party committee of the Ukrainian Writers Union.<sup>89</sup> Here again, although the proposals were directed to the future party congress, having been published in the heat of electoral campaign, they must have had some impact on elections. In the proposals, the writers openly state that the pace of economic and socio-political reforms had slowed down and is characterized by the "crisis of ideas, degradation of economic structures and the lack of faith in the future by the wide masses of the people".<sup>90</sup> How to regain the lost legitimacy and to move reform forward? The answer is decentralization of the Soviet state and of the Communist Party. The Soviet Union should be a "voluntary union of republics-sovereign states, created on the basis of a new, just (in social and national sense) treaty of the union" in combination with a "voluntary union of communist parties of union republics, including a communist party of the peoples of Russia".<sup>91</sup> The transfer of

power from the party to the Soviets should be accompanied by a network of media serving the Soviets, and all efforts to rotate cadres from republic to republic, a practice which led to massive relocation of peoples and became a source of interethnic strife should be discontinued at once.

In addition, party should cut itself off from the crimes of Stalin, eject Stalin from the party, and place him before the "Court of Nations".<sup>92</sup> While Aliev, Grishin, Romanov, Kunaev, Shcherbytskyi, Medunov and others should also be stripped of party membership and placed on trial for the crime of having turned "the exalted ideas of communism" into "anticommunist" ones.<sup>93</sup>

Finally the party apparatus should receive a legal status and should serve at the pleasure of the elected party organs, and the party should lead society "to civil peace and to co-operation of all social organizations" and not be in "confrontation with them".<sup>94</sup>

The position of the group reflects many of the ideas of RUKH, which is not surprising as many of the signatories, among them Plachynda, Mushketyk and I. Drach are prominent members of RUKH.

#### THE OPPOSITION

The Constituent Congress of the People's Movement for Reconstruction in Ukraine (RUKH) which took place in Kiev in the fall of 1989 created a new, powerful organization that the party could not ignore. Composed of different organizations, who professed a great variety of political views and concerns, the congress represented some 280,000 members, organized in 1247 organizations from all areas of Ukraine. Out of 1158 elected delegates, 1109 actually made it to Kiev despite the obstacles created by the government and party institutions.<sup>95</sup>

In order to prevent the RUKH from participating in the forthcoming elections the authorities procrastinated with registering this organization until after the nominating of candidates for deputies were over.<sup>96</sup>

This action by the authorities and especially the vicious campaign that was unleashed against the RUKH was probably beneficial for the organization, because it helped keep it united. Without this pressure from outside, RUKH would have broken up into a number of political groupings, each pursuing its own specific political goals. In any case many of the component organizations of RUKH were officially registered and even though with some great difficulties were able to field their candidates.<sup>97</sup>

Most of them also issued their own electoral platforms and appeals.<sup>98</sup>

But the most important and authoritative programmatic statement was adopted by the Constituent Congress of RUKH, and in its general form became the electoral platform of the great bulk of the opposition candidates in Ukraine.

It called for political and economic sovereignty of the republic within the USSR, and for national, cultural and religious development of all nationalities inhabiting Ukraine.<sup>99</sup> When the election date came closer, and the attacks on opposition members multiplied, it was deemed necessary to face the election in a coordinated fashion. The experience of the Baltic republics was studied and in many cases adopted to the local situation. Chairman of RUKH Secretariat, Mykhailo Horyn admitted as much in his interview for newspaper "Viche", when he said that he was working on setting up "pre-electoral coordinating councils and preparing a list of 500-600 candidates for nomination".<sup>100</sup>

On November 18, 1989, under RUKH auspices, some 43 different organizations came together in Kiev to form a Democratic Bloc<sup>101</sup>, hoping in this manner to present the elec-

torate with a clearer, identifiable alternative to party nominees, who quite often tried to camouflage their attachments.<sup>102</sup>

This group of candidates issued their own Electoral Manifesto<sup>103</sup>, in which they condemned the slow process of "reconstruction" in Ukraine, and proposed to bring about "a real political and economic sovereignty for Ukraine, political pluralism and a multiparty system based on a variety of equal forms of ownership (state, cooperative, private, individual, corporate, and mixed), a new constitution for Ukraine with a strong component of individual human rights and freedoms, national revival of Ukrainian people and free development of cultures and languages of minorities in Ukraine, real freedom of belief and worship for all, and legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Ukrainian Catholic Church) and of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church.<sup>104</sup>

In addition to the collective platform each of the candidates had one of his own. And some of them had a good fortune of being interviewed by a newspaper or radio correspondent, and their views were actually published.<sup>105</sup> Each candidate also had a limited number of leaflets published presenting his own views.

What is interesting to observe is how well coordinated were the platforms of the candidates that were published in Literaturna Ukraina. As the titles of their programs clearly show (which because of limited space could not be reproduced here), there was very little repetition in their views, or to put it more correctly, the ideas that united them were implied rather than expressed. In this manner publicity that they received, even though limited, allowed them to present a wide spectrum of ideas which characterized the entire democratic slate. The role played in this activity by the newspaper Literaturna Ukraina, (in addition to a number of komsomol publications, and Radio Kiev), which was the true spokesman for the candidates of the Democratic Bloc cannot be overestimated.

There is no doubt that the candidates of the Democratic Bloc were expressing the attitudes of the electorate more closely than the bland assurances that all will be well of party candidates. The secret instructions issued to party candidates by the First Secretary of Lviv obkom Ia. Pohrebniak clearly show this.<sup>106</sup>

#### ATTITUDES

In order that one may properly judge the outcome of any election it would help to know the thinking of the electorate beforehand. Unfortunately studies of voting behaviour in the Soviet Union are not well developed and moreover, are not available to us. We are not completely helpless, however, because election results give us a general idea what main ideas may have motivated the voter at the time of elections. The situation in the country preceding the elections is also a good indicator of the attitudes of the people. Demonstrations, strikes, even civil strife, provide for us very general indications of the conditions in which elections take place, and therefore, also the trends in voters' minds.

Some crude surveying of peoples' attitudes does, of course, exist in the Soviet Union, as the Ia. Pohrebniak's secret instructions clearly reveal.<sup>107</sup> The party secretary of an obkom can also rely on the reports from local organs of the party and, of course, on police surveys.

Pohrebniak in his instructions states that "the political situation in the oblast is characterized by the growing preelectoral differentiation of public opinion about the assessment of contemporary socio-economic, political and ideological situation". This opinion is "adequate to preelectoral platforms and programmes" which are presented by the party and other social organizations. In order to fight the "anti-Soviet" forces, it is necessary to "unmask populist and openly adventurist ideas, that are contained in their preelection platforms and programmes". Of special importance, therefore, "is wide propaganda effort about constructive and cal-

culated approaches applied by party organs to the solution of the most important problems in the oblast". In particular, the population should be given timely information about the import and export of goods to and from the oblast, as this is not only an economic, but a political question, on which the "leaders of informal organizations base their conceptions about political sovereignty of Ukraine".<sup>108</sup>

Pohrebniak warned the party faithful that members of RUKH "are collecting compromising information on party, soviet and economic workers", and that RUKH leaders have "intensified their criticism of party organs and of oblast' leadership", especially in the outlying districts.

He recommended a number of steps to rectify the situation.

1. At the registration stage "of principal importance is to ensure the right distribution of candidates from among the party and Soviet workers". Taking into consideration that party and Soviet candidates are primarily supported by certain categories of the population such as "members of CPSU, office workers, soldiers, Russians, non-Ukrainians generally, and pensioners".

Pohrebniak felt that it was possible to predict how much backing each candidate can expect in a given district, especially, as "the leaders of informal organizations are supported by young Ukrainian workers of large industrial enterprises".<sup>109</sup>

2. Knowledge of the local needs by a candidate "will, in large measure influence the outcome of elections", as will a "constructive approach to the solution of existing problems, such as road repairs etc.". <sup>110</sup>

3. Because such organizations as RUKH, Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko etc. are quite popular it might be advisable for some party candidates to join them in order to get their backing.

4. Party canvassers should be carefully selected, well instructed and well supplied with proper election literature, especially, as the "previous elections have shown that the canvassers were able to influence 19 per cent of the voters".<sup>111</sup>

5. Face to face meeting of voters is also important and especially of the invalids, and pensioners. In Lviv oblast', according to Pohrebniak, "the pensioners make up 40 per cent of those eligible to vote".<sup>112</sup>

A number of reports in Soviet Ukrainian press and media also show the prevailing attitudes of people. Responding to a question from a listener in England if the "perestroika" is noticeable in the streets of Kiev, Radio Kiev answered that, indeed, "there are fewer signs which call for fulfillment and overfulfillment of plans", "we look more critically at the future", face "half-empty store shelves", stand in "lines for soap and cigarettes", and "with great passion discuss questions of ecology, loss of spirituality, status of Ukrainian language and other questions".<sup>113</sup>

Lamenting the fact that for much too long a time "we were being educated on the postulates that were beyond any doubt", a pluralism "of ideas is not coming easy". Perestroika is slow, and the "coming elections" might resolve many of the problems. "People believe, that they will open a new page in the history of perestroika".<sup>114</sup>

The same source reported the results of a sociological survey carried out in a preelection period, which showed that 41 per cent felt that perestroika did not fulfill their ex-

pectations, 42 per cent that their expectations have been partially met, and 9 per cent who were dissatisfied with both the tempo and the results of perestroika.<sup>115</sup>

It also mentioned great dissatisfaction among miners, who produce coal at a high price of 850 dead workers on the average per year.<sup>116</sup>

Perhaps the most comprehensive survey which addressed the question of "social justice" and "perestroika" was carried out by the Ideological Department of the CC CP Ukraine in 1989.<sup>117</sup> From it we see that much heralded reconstruction has not changed the life of the people for the better. Two thirds of respondents felt that social justice "in working collectives is being violated". Some 80 per cent of workers and engineering-technical workers, 76 per cent of office workers (sluzhbovtsiv), and 59 per cent of collective farmers think that way.<sup>118</sup> Only 43.9 per cent of those surveyed (42.1 per cent workers, 40.2 engineering-technical workers, 63.7 per cent collective farmers, and 44.4 per cent office workers) get involved in trying to do anything about the instances of social injustice, but never "go beyond words", and only about 3.5 per cent get results in their intervention.<sup>119</sup>

One of the sharpest question in the survey was the "topic of privileges" and it was primarily as result of this sharpness, that "secret distribution centres were liquidated" and many "state and administrative buildings were transformed into kindergardens and hospitals".<sup>120</sup>

What are the basis for social injustice in public opinion?

The answers are given as follows:

1. Low level of culture and legal knowledge by people - 67.5%
2. Not enough severity against those who eat but do not work - 66.0 %
3. Lack of consumer goods - 65.9 %
4. Widespread "blat", corruption etc. - 62.6 %
5. Unhealthy desire to enrich oneself - 60.7 %
6. Falsification of records - 52.4 %
7. Protectionism, theft, speculation - 47.0 %
8. Unwillingness to work, alcoholism, drug abuse - 46.9 %
9. Acceptance by public opinion.
10. Absence of "glasnost" and condemnation of injustice - 37.1 %.<sup>121</sup>

What was the best way to remedy the situation? Especially many suggestions were made "to improve the quality of party, Soviet, and economic cadres, and the style and method of their work".<sup>122</sup>

Closer to elections several other surveys were made. One such survey, conducted by the Ukrainian Section of the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion concentrated on the attitudes of young people.<sup>123</sup>

Their answers show that Pohrebniak was quite right about the opinions that young people had of the party. Among those who were 20 or younger there was not a single individual who believed that the party was functioning better than in the past. Some 45 per cent preferred their candidate not to be a party member. Some 75 per cent felt that their candidate should possess oratorical skills, and 55 per cent preferred them to be economists, jurists, and sociologists. Also the nationality of the candidate was considered very important for 17 per cent of those younger than 20, but only for 6 per cent for those in 20-29 age bracket. Finally, optimists, pessimists and those completely indifferent had 33 per cent each.<sup>124</sup> The question of nationality relations in Ukraine

became also a very hot topic as the date of elections was approaching. Elsewhere in this paper we mentioned several articles which dealt with this problem. Here it may be useful to state that threats of anti-Jewish pogroms, allegedly scheduled for the 4th of March, the date of elections, probably were intended to frighten members of certain nationalities from participating in elections.<sup>125</sup>

The question of the multiparty system was also one of the burning questions in Ukraine and it is close to the surface in many statements from various opposition leaders to public at large.<sup>126</sup>

The religious question which in both, Eastern and Western Ukraine, is closely tied with the nationality problem also played an important role in the electoral campaign.<sup>127</sup>

Finally, the collective memory of the horrible man-made famine of 1932-33, and inability of the party leadership to disassociate itself from it, and unwillingness to punish those who were guilty for carrying it out, also worked against the party in the last elections.<sup>128</sup>

#### ELECTIONS - THE FIRST ROUND

On March 4, 1990 the first round of elections took place with some rather interesting results. Deputies were elected only in 112, or 25 per cent of Electoral Districts.<sup>129</sup> In 331 or 73.5 per cent of Electoral Districts no candidate received the necessary majority vote and the second round of elections was scheduled for March 18, 1990. In 1 ED, election results have been suspended due to alleged violations of electoral law. Finally, in 6 EDs where only two candidates were running, and neither had obtained the required majority vote, the new elections were to take place in two months time.<sup>130</sup>

Of 37,264,666 eligible voters, some 31,560,229 or 84.6 per cent took part in the elections, thus ensuring a reasonably high participation rate.

The most remarkable fact of the elections, in addition to an unusually large number of runoffs, was the strong showing of the opposition candidates which were grouped in a loose Democratic Bloc. In the first run they won 43 or 38.3 per cent of the seats mostly in the western regions. Lviv, Ivano-Frankivske and Ternopil. The winners here included former political prisoners and leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. Viacheslav Chornovil, Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn, Stepan Khmara and Ukrainian Catholic rights activist Iryna Kalynets' in Lviv oblast', and UHU president Levko Luk'ianenko and Bohdan Rebryk in Ivano-Frankivske. Also winning seats were leaders of RUKH, Ivan Drach, in Lviv and Volodymyr Iavorivskyi in Kirovohrad oblast', as well as representatives of other public organizations and strike committees, environmentalists and progressive communists that formed the Democratic Bloc opposition. In addition, some 124 of the opposition candidates were running in 112 EDs in the second round, in all parts of the republic.<sup>131</sup>

In contrast, some of the prominent Party apparatchiks were forced into the second round. This fate befell Volodymyr Ivashko, First Secretary of CPU and a member of Soviet Politburo, and a number of other powerful party leaders such as Ia. Pohrebniak in Lviv, Kriuchkov in Odesa, and several others in various parts of the country.

A number of prominent party figures such as Prime Minister Vitalii Masol, CC Secretaries, S. Hurenko, Leonid Kravchuk, E. Chulakov, K. Prodan, A. Savchenko, B. Kachura, all CC members, as well as Matvienko. First Secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol, were elected, but had to run in rural districts.<sup>132</sup>

#### THE SECOND ROUND

Although the Electoral Law specifies that the runoff elections should take place not later than two weeks after the first round, a decision when to schedule the contest was left in the hands of District Electoral Commissions. Thus for example in three Electoral Districts - ED No. 73 of Voroshy-

lovhrad, and No. 424 and No. 427 of Cherkasy oblasts, elections took place on 10 March, 1990, while in 10 EDs of Mykolaiv oblast on 15 March 1990. The rest of Voroshylovhrad and Cherkasy EDs as well as Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (57 EDs), held their elections on 17 March, while all the other oblasts scheduled their elections a day later, on 18 March, 1990.<sup>133</sup>

Of 27,434,673 eligible voters, some 20,830,573 actually voted. Thus, the turnout of voters was anywhere from 60-70-80 per cent, depending on the local circumstances and should be considered as being quite satisfactory.<sup>134</sup>

Contesting the elections in the second round were 664 candidates, and 330 were elected in the second run.<sup>135</sup>

Thus in the elections of 4 March and 18 March, some 442 out of 450 deputies were elected. In 6 EDs new elections were scheduled for 22 April, and in another two, recounts were being held, and probably new elections would also be ordered.<sup>136</sup>

Among those elected 331 are Ukrainians, 99 Russians, 5 Belorussians, 4 Jews, 1 Armenian, 1 Bulgarian and 1 German.<sup>137</sup>

The composition of the new Supreme Soviet from an occupational profile of its members is quite interesting.

The party functionaries of all levels captured some 97 seats. The largest grouping are the Raikom and Gorkom secretaries (60 seats), followed by Obkom secretaries (22 seats), and functionaries of the Central Committee of CPU (15 seats).<sup>138</sup>

The state apparatus gained 54 seats distributed over all levels. The functionaries of the Oblast Executive Committees obtained 23 seats, Raion and City Executive Committees 9 seats, while the republic level echelon (top government officials, Premier, ministers, state committee chairmen etc.) were able to elect 22 individuals.<sup>139</sup>

Scientific, educational and cultural workers represent a large group of 67 deputies, and together with another 16 specialists of various backgrounds, will have 83 deputies.<sup>140</sup>

Physicians represent a group of 20 deputies, or even more if one is to count professors of medical schools among them.<sup>141</sup>

Another large group represents the management sector. These are very powerful and highly influential Combinat, factory, trust and production-association directors, many of them the proverbial "steel eaters" of the Soviet economy.<sup>142</sup>

The agricultural sector is represented by 33 collective farm chairmen and state farm directors. There is not a single farm worker among them.<sup>143</sup>

The military has 16 deputies and repression specialists (KGB and MVD personnel) 13 deputies.<sup>144</sup>

The workers are not well represented at all. Some 21 deputies come from the industrial heartland of the republic, 3 are workers in cooperatives, and two are trade union functionaries. This fact only underscores the prevailing sentiment among the workers, that their demands, even though supported by strike action, did not lead them to seek redress for their problems by a political action.<sup>145</sup>

The media people are also only slightly represented by 14 deputies, all of them, with one exception, newspaper or journal editors.<sup>146</sup>

A rather interesting, and for the Soviets an unusual group, are deputies which are labelled unemployed. Almost the entire group (7), are the leading members of the opposition, and former political prisoners. None of them are party members. The two labelled temporarily unemployed are party members and by this designation have been pointedly differentiated from the former group.<sup>147</sup>

In order to better understand potential power blocs within the Supreme Soviet, the appendices, in addition to professional profile, also provide a territorial grouping of deputies. The country has been divided into three zones,

East, West and South, to test the conventionally held wisdom that only the western part represents the bastion of Ukrainian national consciousness.

The evidence gathered here is, of course, much too superficial, to answer such complicated questions as national consciousness, commitment to cultural traditions, or the exercise of political will in harmony with the principle of self-government and self-determination. Yet, although it is clear that many people in different parts of Ukraine see their problems in the same way, there are profound differences between East-South and the West.

The Eastern part, with some notable exceptions, which is heavily industrialized and also quite russified, continues to be the strongest recruitment base for the party, state and police functionaries, as well as the economic managers, workers, and even agricultural politicians. Only in science, culture, education and health is Western Ukraine able to compete on, more or less, even basis.

There are, however, interesting exceptions to this rather depressing scenario. These exceptions are well illustrated by the inroads that the Ukrainian national movement has been able to make in the last few years in Eastern Ukraine, and especially in the last elections.

What is quite striking is that in all three Ukrainian capitals, Kiev, Lviv and Kharkiv the National Movement for Reconstruction in Ukraine (RUKH) has done exceptionally well. In Kiev RUKH candidates were able to win 18 out of 22 electoral districts representing 1.4 million voters out of 1.8 million of total electoral cohort. In Kharkiv slightly more than one third of electoral districts were won by RUKH adherents while in Lviv all 24 electoral districts returned RUKH candidates. In all, the candidates of Democratic Bloc, or those supported by them, won seats in 21 out of 27 administrative subdivisions of the country, and in Western Ukraine by a landslide.<sup>148</sup>

The real extent of the RUKH victory can only be properly judged when the results of the local elections are fully known. There are already indications that many of the local regional and city councils are in the hands of new deputies and are beginning to function without too much regard for the local party bosses.<sup>149</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

Ukraine is very important geographically, economically, politically and psychologically not only for the Soviet Union but for Europe as a whole. If it succeeds in emancipating itself from the centralism and exploitation of the present system, its 52 million people, endowed with a highly developed sense of Western culture and civilization, and a rich natural and industrial base, can play a very constructive role for the benefit of all Europeans, including the Russians.<sup>150</sup>

If the beginnings of these hopeful changes are not allowed to develop properly, or worse yet, if they are once again drowned in blood and repression, we can only foresee a very bleak future for all of us.

### Appendix I

#### Territorial Distribution of Deputies (Party, State, Military, Police)

Category	East	South	West	Total
Gorkom Secretaries	14	5	5	24
RaiKom Secretaries	17	6	13	36
Obkom Secretaries	12	4	6	22
Republic Apparat	10	2	3	15
Party Apparat Grand total	<u>53</u>	17	27	97
Gorispolkom chairman	1	2	2	5
Raispolkom chairman	2	-	2	4
Oblispolkom chairman	12	7	4	23
Republic Apparat	16	4	2	22
State Apparat Grand total	<u>31</u>	13	10	54
Military	6	7	3	16
Repression Specialists	9	2	2	13
Military + Repression				
Grand total	<u>15</u>	9	5	29
	99	39	42	180

Note: Only main categories are listed. At the time of Publication the results of elections in 6 electoral districts were not known. The total does not cover all 450 electoral districts.

## Appendix II

### Territorial Distribution of Deputies (Science, Culture, Education, Health)

Category	East	South	West	Total
Academy of Sciences	10	2	9	21
Education	13	3	12	28
Culture	5	1	13	18
Health	10	3	7	20
Other specialists	8	1	7	16
Grand total	<u>46</u>	10	48	104
Media	5	3	6	14
Management Sector:				
Combinat Directors	12	-	-	12
Factory Directors	20	2	5	27
Production-Ass.Directors	12	3	5	20
Grand total	<u>44</u>	5	10	73
Agricultural Sector:				
Collective Farm Chairmen	13	8	6	27
State Farm Directors	4	-	2	6
Grand total	<u>17</u>	8	8	33
Workers	21	2	-	23
Cooperative Workers	1	1	1	3
Unemployed	2	-	7	9
Trade Unionists	2	1	-	3
Grand total	<u>26</u>	4	8	38
	138	30	80	248

Note: Only main categories are listed. At the time of Publication the results of elections in 6 electoral districts were not known. The total does not cover all 450 electoral districts.

Appendix III  
Electoral Statistics

Number Oblast	Electoral District Numbers	TOTAL Size of Electorate	Electorate Represented by Demobloc	TOTAL Number of Electoral Districts	Electoral Districts won by Demobloc	Number of Democratic Bloc Candi- dates	Candidates Supported by Demobloc
1. Kiev-City	1- 22	1,806.8	1,446.8	22	18	20	1
2. Vinnytsia	23- 39	1,415.6	162.8	17	2	2	3
3. Volyn	40- 48	734.4	490.7	9	6	6	-
4. Voroshyllov.	49- 73	2,045.6	-	25	-	2	2
5. Dnipropetr.	74-107	2,803.7	149.4	34	2	2	2
6. Donetske	198-152	3,752.3	785.6	45	9	5	2
7. Zhytomyr	153-166	1,122.5	69.0	14	1	5	1
8. Zakarpattia	167-177	822.9	204.7	11	3	4	1
9. Zaporizhzhia	178-195	1,503.2	-	18	-	4	8
10. Ivano-Frank.	196-207	966.5	890.6	12	11	11	-
11. Kiev	208-244	1,407.6	239.1	17	3	8	8
12. Kirovohrad	225-235	902.1	274.0	11	3	1	2
13. Sevastopil-City	236-239	317.1	-	4	-	-	-
14. Krym	240-257	1,462.2	167.2	18	2	2	1
15. Lviv	258-281	1,948.6	1,948.6	24	24	24	-
16. Mykolaiv	282-292	945.7	-	11	-	2	3
17. Odesa	293-315	1,793.8	233.4	23	3	-	1
18. Poltava	316-331	1,291.1	159.3	16	2	1	1
19. Rivne	332-341	790.2	243.8	10	3	3	4
20. Sumy	342-354	1,051.0	203.0	13	2	4	8
21. Ternopil	355-364	834.1	652.1	10	8	8	-
22. Kharkiv	365-392	2,331.4	962.5	28	9	10	-
23. Kherson	393-402	867.4	-	10	-	2	6
24. Khmelnytskyi	403-415	1,114.2	147.7	13	2	1	6
25. Cherkasy	416-429	1,128.1	153.4	14	2	3	3
26. Chernivtsi	420-437	647.4	-	8	-	1	3
27. Chernihiv	438-450	1,063.2	166.7	13	2	4	2
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>38,868.7</b>	<b>9,571.9</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>71</b>

Sources: "Ob izbiratel'nykh okrugakh po vyboram narodnykh deputatov Ukrainskoi SSR", Pravda Ukrainsky, 4.XII.1989, pp.4-5; Anatolii Dotsenko, RUKH Korpunkt, Moscow. Courtesy Radio "Liberty". Total population of the republic stands at 51.8 million.  
 "Spisok narodnykh deputatov URSR, izbrannych 4 marta 1990 g.", in: Pravda Ukrainsky, 13.III.1990, pp. 2-4; "Spisok narodnykh deputatov URSR, izbrannych pri povtornom golosovanii: Po sostojaniju na 18 marta 1990 g.", in: Pravda Ukrainsky, 24.III.1990, pp. 2-3.  
 "Narodni deputaty Ukrains'koii RSR obrani v berezni 1990 roku." Kyiv, 1990.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Radianska Ukraina, (R.U.), 31.X.1989, p. 1ff.
- <sup>2</sup> R.U., 1.XI.1989, p. 1.
- <sup>3</sup> R.U., 2.XI.1989, p. 1ff.
- <sup>4</sup> R.U., 13.II.1990, p. 2.
- <sup>5</sup> R.U., 26.X.1989, p. 2ff, and Pravda Ukrainskoy (P.U.), 15.XI.1989, p. 2.
- <sup>6</sup> P.U., 14.IX.1989, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>7</sup> Vilne Slovo, No. 4, September 1989, p. 2; Ibid., p. 5; Radio Kiev-3, 12.I.1990; UCIS (London), 9.II.1990; Radio Kiev-2, 12.II.1990; Holos, No. 9, 26.XI.1989, p. 6; Vilne Slovo, No. 7, January 1990, p. 2.
- <sup>8</sup> See: Chapter XII, Article 97 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. See: Article 105, and Article 107 of the Constitution, and proposals of the Alternative Draft to elect the President of Ukraine by direct popular elections. (Articles 42-42, P.U., p. 3), were rejected.
- <sup>9</sup> See: Article 97, Constitution of Ukrainian SSR.
- <sup>10</sup> The amendment which was proposed to the USSR constitution at the last Congress of People's Deputies did not receive the necessary 2/3 votes. Radio Kiev-3, 18.XII.1989.
- <sup>11</sup> Art. 85 of the Constitution; article 2 of the Electoral Law although there were suggestions that the right to vote should be lowered to 16 years and the right to be elected raised to 21, 23, and even 30 years.
- <sup>12</sup> The "Alternative draft" proposes 16 and 21, for citizens who have resided in the republic for at least one year. Art. 3.
- <sup>13</sup> Article 85 of the Constitution; Article 12 of the Electoral Law lists all positions which cannot be held by a deputy.
- <sup>14</sup> Art. 98 of the Constitution; Article 16 of the Electoral Law.
- <sup>15</sup> R.U., 26.X.1989, p. 2ff.
- <sup>16</sup> Art. 34 of Electoral Law.
- <sup>17</sup> Art. 34 of Electoral Law.
- <sup>18</sup> Art. 89 of the Constitution.
- <sup>19</sup> Art. 34 of Electoral Law.

<sup>20</sup> Art. 89 of Constitution.

<sup>21</sup> P.U., 25.XI.1989

<sup>22</sup> P.U., 25.XI.1989.

<sup>23</sup> The creation of DECs was to be completed by 18 November 1989. R.U., 14.XI.1989, p. 2; According to the report submitted to the CEC, the 450 DECs were composed of 6063 persons, of which 2601 were women, 1945 workers and peasants, 4025 members and candidate members of the party, 624 members of komsomol, and 2038 non-party people. P.U., 25.XI.1989.

<sup>24</sup> P.U., 25.XI.1989, p. 2.

<sup>25</sup> Literaturna Ukraina (L.U.), 14.XII.1989, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup> R.U., 3.XII.1989, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> L.U., 14.XII.1989, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> L.U., 21.XII.1989, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Kultura i Zhyttia, 11.XII.1989, p. 2; See: R.U., 14.II.1990, p. 3, a report that some 4000 voters called an officially sanctioned meeting to protest the machinations of the DEC.

<sup>32</sup> Molod Ukrayiny (M.U.), 16.XII.1989, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> Radianska Osvita (R.O.), 19.XII.1989, p. 2

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> M.U., 1.II.1990, p. 1. In this manner, in Kiev, candidates of "Zelenyi Svit", Serhii Fedorinchyk, Iurii Mishchenko, Vadym Skurativskyi, Roman Serhienko, Volodymyr Tykhyi, Viktor Chariniok, and Vitalii Kriukov were refused registration.

<sup>36</sup> M.U., 15.II.1990, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> R.U., 24.XII.1989, p. 4.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> P.U., 20.I.1990, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> P.U., 21.I.1990, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> P.U., 4.II.1990.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. A rather interesting case on how irresponsibly some of the DECs approached their work can be found in P.U., 19.I.1990, p. 1, where the case of V.V. Poliushko, a journalist working for the newspaper "Industrialnoe Zaporozhé", is discussed.

<sup>45</sup> L.U., 25.I.1990, p. 3.

<sup>46</sup> Kultura i Zhyttia (K.i Z.), No. 4, 28.I.1990, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup> R.O., 30.I.1990, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> L.U., 1.II.1990, p. 2.

<sup>49</sup> L.U., 8.II.1990, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> M.U., 13.II.1990, p. 1. See also: L.U., 15.II.1990, p. 8.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. See also: L.U., 15.II.1990, p. 1.

<sup>55</sup> R.U., 3.XII.1989, p. 2ff, or Kommunist Ukrayny, No. 1, January 1990, p. 7ff; R.U., 3.XII.1989, p. 1, or Kommunist Ukrayny, ibid., pp. 5-6.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> L.U., 8.II.1990, p. 1; M.U., 22.II.1990, p. 4; Visti z Ukrayny, No. 6, February, 1990, p. 1; P.U., 13.I.1990, p. 2; Radio Kiev-1 and 3, 5.III.1990.

<sup>61</sup> Rabochaia Gazeta, 20.II.1990, p. 1. See also: S.V., 24.II.1990, p. 2ff; R.H., 24.II.1990, p. 1ff; Radio Kiev-3, 14.XII.1989.

<sup>62</sup> See: Radio Kiev-2, 12.XII.1989; R.U., 10.XII.1989, p. 2; Kom. Ukrayny, No. 12, 1989, pp. 66ff. See especially: Radio Kiev-26.III.1990. The report of TASS from 29 March, 1990, that the CPU Secretariat decided to purge 3 members who proposed to create an "alternative Communist Party for Ukraine". See also: V. Drozd, "Rasplata", Pravda, 30.III.1990, p. 3, in which political situation in Ukraine is analyzed.

<sup>63</sup> R.U., 3.XII.1989, p. 1. In this decree the party committees of all levels were ordered to explain the Platform to population and to "show people the danger that comes from extremist and anti-socialist forces".

<sup>64</sup> M.U., 30.I.1990, p. 1ff; R.U., 26.XII.1989, p. 3; R.H., 16 and 22.XII.1989; R.U., 23.XII.1989. Strongly accused of using his position to advantage in elections was editor of "Vechirnyi Kyiv", V. Karpenko, who was considered as an oppositionist. See: P.U., 14.II.1990, p. 4.

<sup>65</sup> R.U., 9.XII.1989, p. 3.

<sup>66</sup> P.U., 17.XII.1989.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Kyivs'kyi Politekhnik, 5.10.1986, p. 1.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> M.U., No. 18, p. 1, and Radio Kiev-3, 30.I.1990.

<sup>72</sup> M.U., No. 18, p. 1.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> On the question of nationality relations see: M.U., 22.II.1990, p. 1.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> R.U., 13.I.1990, p. 2.

<sup>80</sup> Ukraina, No. 1, January 1990, p. 4.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> This description of a party bureaucrat can easily be applied to G.K. Kriuchkov, First Secretary of Odesa Obkom. See his article in Kommunist Ukrayny, No. 12, 1989, p. 20. See also an article in M.U., 17.II.1990, in which Kriuchkov is attacked, and his response, in M.U., 24.II.1990, p. 1, in which he rejects an accusation of being a Russian chauvinist. He lost the elections and was removed as Obkom First Secretary.

<sup>83</sup> Ukraina, No. 1, January 1990, p. 4.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. Regarded by many observers as the Interfront in Ukraine, the idea to create the Soiuz Trudiashchikhsia Ukrainy (Spilka Trudiashchykh Ukrainy or STU), emerged in December 1989, in Kiev, Cherkasy and Chernihiv oblasts. R.U., 2.XII.1989, p. 1; R.H., 2.XII.1989, p. 1; Radio Kiev-1, 27.XII.1989. Widely supported by the party press the Union began to organize rapidly in various regions of the republic, and in January 1990, published its programme, in which it called for "splochenie" of all nations and nationalities of the republic and the country, on the basis of patriotism and internationalism, equality of rights and respect for each other interests, and "NO" to antisocialist forces, extremist and nationalist happenings, totalitarianism and bureaucratism on all levels. For accusation of party leadership of improper moves in the elections, especially Ia. Pohrebniak, First Secretary of Lviv obkom, see: in "Viche", No. 10, November 1989, pp. 2-3; M. Horyn, Head of RUKH Secretariat accused the party of pouring out a "virtual river of lies" against non-official candidates. See also Sovetskaia Molodezh, 11.I.1990, p. 2.

<sup>85</sup> Kyivs'kyi Politekhnik, 25.I.1990, p. 1.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>89</sup> L.U., 8.II.1990, p. 1.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. A special commission of the Politbureau has been working on the crimes of Stalin for some time. See: R.U., 10.XII.1989, p. 3.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> There were among the delegates 944 Ukrainians, 77 Russians, 9 Jews, 6 Poles, 6 Belorussians, 2 Armenians, and Koreans, Greeks, Hungarians, Czechs, Germans, Estonians, and Crimean Tatars with 1 delegate each. Their professional profile was also quite varied - 109 workers, 16 workers in agriculture, 329 engineers, 5 students, 104 cultural workers, 42 journalists, 48 physicians, 25 jurists, 3 priests, 130 educational workers, 6 workers in cooperatives, 6 soviet and party apparat, 5 actors, 3 accountants, 2 architects, 2 unemployed, 1 soldier, 1 procurator, and 1 housewife. Some 150 delegates did not show their profession.

228 delegates were communist party members and 24 were members of komsomol. The Ukrainian-Christian Democratic Party had 5 delegates.

Among delegates were 98 women, while 167 delegates were below 30 (average age of delegates was 42). There were 800 delegates with higher education, 44 incomplete higher, 94 with special-secondary, 169 with secondary and incomplete secondary and 2 with elementary education.

There were 9 Peoples' Deputies of the USSR as delegates (24 Peoples' Deputies of the USSR participated in Congress), 3 academicians and 2 corresponding members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 28 doctors of science and 96 candidates of science.

The following cultural and social organizations that were active in Ukraine were represented: Russian, Jewish, Polish, Armenian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, Moldavian, Hungarian, Gagauz and Bulgarian. Also, Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko, Memorial, Ukrainian Society for the Protection of Historical Heritage, Moscov Ukrainian Society "Slavutych", Ukrainian Helsinki Union, "Zelenyi Svit" (Green World), "Spadshchyna" (Heritage), Zhytomyr Citizens' Front, All-Ukrainian Society of Victims of Repression, Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia, Ukrainian National-Democratic League, Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Catholic Church, Church of Evangelical-Baptists, and Russian Orthodox Church. See: L.U., October, 1989.

<sup>96</sup> RUKH was registered only in February 1990.

<sup>97</sup> This is true especially of "Memorial", the Ukrainian Language Society and others.

<sup>98</sup> See: "Pre-election Appeal of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union", Ukrainian Central Information Service, 17/90, February 9, 1990, London. Many of the semi-legal publications of various regional affiliates of RUKH, such as "Hromada", "Holos Karpat", "Viche", "Vilne Slovo", or of separate organizations such as Levy, "Postup", Memorial, "Poklyk Sumlinnia", SNUM, "Moloda Ukraina" and "Ukrainske Iunatstvo", Deputies Club, "Holos", and many others also published their own platforms. In Kiev a special journal devoted to elections was published. Called "Pryzvy - 1990" it was issued by Soiuz Demokraticheskoe Deistvie in Russian and Ukrainian with a byline: "Demokraticheskim kandidatam nuzhna podderzhka naroda: oni lisheny liuboi inoi", it provided platforms for the electorate of a number of candidates.

<sup>99</sup> For an excellent review of RUKH programme see: Zhovten', No. 11, 1989, pp. 75-79.

<sup>100</sup> Viche, No. 8, October 1989, p. 3.

<sup>101</sup> The following organizations sent 118 delegates: RUKH, Ukrainian Language Society of Shevchenko, "Zelenyi Svit" (Green World), "Memorial", Ukrainian Helsinki Union, Ukrainian Association for Protection of Historical Heritage, Association "Vyborets'" (Elector), Ukrainian National Democratic League, All-Ukrainian Association of the Victims of Repression, Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Strike Committees of Donets'ke, Stakhanov, Mykolaiv, and Lviv oblast', Org-

nizing Committee for Independent Workers' Union, and Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM).

<sup>102</sup>See a very interesting, secret document issued by Ia. Pohrebniak, a conservative First Secretary of Lviv Obkom "Pro politychnu obstanovku v hrudni 1989 roku", in which instructions were given for party members to join RUKH and other organizations and in this manner ensure for them-selves greater support among the population. Ukrainian Media Digest, UF 6701-02, 2.III.1990.

<sup>103</sup>Vilne Slovo, No. 7, January 1990, p. 2.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid.

<sup>105</sup>L.U., 22.II.1990, p. 2-3; Radio Kiev-3, 1.III.1990; L.U., 15.II.1990, p. 7; Ukrainia, No. 2, January 1990, pp. 6-7; L.U., 25.I.1990, p. 2; Radians'ka Osvita (R.O.), 19.I.1990, p. 2; Radio Kiev-2, 9.II.1990; L.U., 4.I.1990, p. 2; L.U., 1.III.1990, p. 2; L.U., 8.II.1990, p. 2; M.U., 18.I.1990, p. 1; Radio Kiev, 1.II.1990; Radio Kiev-3, 10.I.1990; Radio Kiev-2, 7.II.1990; Kul'tura i Zhyttia, 21.I.1990, p. 1; Radio Kiev-2, 6.II.1990; Radio Kiev-3, 7.II.1990; Radio Kiev-3, 15.I.1990; Radio Kiev-2, 9.I.1990 and Radio Kiev-3, 22.I.1990; Radio Kiev-2, 30.I.1990; Radio Kiev-2, 12.II.1990; Ogonek, No. 3, 1990; M.U., 20.II.1990, p. 1; Visti z Ukrayny, No. 6, February, 1990, pp. 2-3; Kultura i Zhyttia (K. i Z.), 18.II.1990, p. 2; R.O., 27.II.1990, pp. 1-2; M.U., 28.II.1990, p. 2; M.U., 1.III.1990, pp. 2-3; Radio Kiev-2, 15.I.1990; Radio Kiev-1, 2.III.1990; L.U., 15.III.1990, pp. 2-3; K. i Z., No. 9, 4.III.1990, p. 1.

<sup>106</sup>According to this instruction, which is based on the "sociological" findings of....the only groups of voters that will support party candidates are soldiers, Russians, pensioners, and generally non-Ukrainians. The young Ukrainian workers are strongly for RUKH candidates. Ia. Pohrebniak, op. cit.

<sup>107</sup>Evidently Lviv obkom has an Institute of Study, Formation and Prognostication of Public Attitudes which is part of a House of Political Education attached to the obkom. See: Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>Radio Kiev-3, 18.XII.1989.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Radio Kiev-3, 26.XII.1989.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>Ukraina, No. 50, 1989, pp. 4-5.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid. The "express survey" about the availability of food products gave the following results: 43.0 % felt that shortages occurred quite often; 38.0 % that about one half of income has to be spent on food; 43.0 % complained about absence of inexpensive goods; 76.0 % that there is shortage of meat, fish and poultry; and 71.0 % that too much time is wasted in lines.

<sup>122</sup>Ukraina, No. 50, 1989, pp. 4-5. An interesting information, on party workers wages is contained in P.U., 14.II.1990; See also: M.U., 9.XII.1989, which describes callous treatment by functionaries of needy and defenceless individuals and their families. An official economic report shows that very little economic progress took place in the republic in 1989. M.U., 2.II.1990, p. 1. There were also those who felt that even "glasnost" has a long way to go, and suggest that the regime ought to stop a "ludicrous campaign of control over xeroxing machines" and do something more constructive instead. M.U., No. 18, 1990, pp. 1-2.

<sup>123</sup>Radio Kiev-2, 30.I.1990.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid. In another street survey by Radio Kiev, some individuals complained that the reconstruction is being sabotaged by 80 per cent of the party apparat, while others revealed a large dose of cynicism about the future. Some complained that the four aims of the 1917 October Revolution, Land to the Peasants, Factories to the Workers, Peace for Nations, and All Power to the Soviets were never fulfilled. While still others spoke for the multiparty system, some also proposed that the emphasis on republic sovereignty should also include demands of a "separate, professional Ukrainian army". Radio Kiev-2, 9.II.1990. See also: R.H., 15.II.1990, p. 4 which is a criticism of calls for a separate Ukrainian army. R.H., 23.II.1990, p. 4.

<sup>125</sup>At least this was the opinion of Les Taniuk, one of the candidates. Vechernii Kiev", 15.II.1990, p. 2. On the other hand both A.H. Pohribnyi, and O.Ie. Shevchenko, saw this as a clear attempt to prevent a sovereign Ukrainian state from becoming a reality, while Drach called it an attempt of those in power to retain it in their hands at all costs. Ibid.; Estonian view of the situation in Ukraine is nicely summarized in an article highly critical of V.A. Ivashko. Atmoda, 18.XII.1989, p. 4.

<sup>126</sup>For example, in addition to several small groupings that call themselves political parties, large organizations such as "Zelenyi Svit" expressed intention of organizing themselves into a political party. Radio Kiev, 2.III.1990; Volodymyr Iavorivs'kyi, on the other hand,

proclaimed an intention of organizing a "Fraction of the Communist Party of Ukraine" in order for the communists to separate themselves from those leaders in the party like Kriuchkov and Dikusarov who are guilty of leading the party into decline. It is interesting that a few days afterwards, Ivan Drach did propose formation of a new party, which was to be discussed on 25 March by 95 members of the RUKH Council. Ibid. See also: Vil'ne Slovo, No. 7, January, 1990. In Rivne an organizational committee was set up with Mykola Perovs'kyi as its head, for a purpose of organizing the Ukrainian Communist Party. In Chernivtsi, Lviv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr and Kiev initiatory groups were also created. Ukrainski Visti (Detroit), 4.III.1990, p. 1. On 7 February, 1990, the Organizing Committee issued its "Proclamation to Communists of Ukraine", in which it called for a Communist party, independent from the imperial centre in Moscow. Ibid., 25.II.1990, p. 1.

<sup>127</sup>For a competent summary of the question see: Stefan V. Mardak, "Kirchenstreit in der Westukraine", Aktuelle Analysen (BIOst), No. 21, 12.III.1990. Unfortunately, in dealing with Orthodox-Catholic dimension of the question, he did not deal with growing protestant denominations in Ukraine, which by some accounts number nearly 5 million people.

<sup>128</sup>In the beginning of February, party leadership admitted that the famine was man made but did it without much enthusiasm. Lazar M. Kaganovich, who carried out this genocidal policy in Ukraine, still lives in Moscow, as a party member in good standing. Radio Kiev, 14.II.1990. See also: K. i Zh., 18.II.1990, p. 8.

<sup>129</sup>According to the Central Electoral Commission, there were 2999 candidates running in 450 EDs. In 4 EDs there were single candidates; 34 EDs had 2 candidates; 130 EDs had from 3 to 4 candidates; 211 EDs had from 5 to 9 candidates; 64 EDs had from 10 to 19 candidates; and 7 EDs had 20 or more candidates. See: P.U., 13.III.1990, p. 2.

<sup>130</sup>See: Art. 53 of Electoral Law.

<sup>131</sup>The only exception were the oblasts of Voroshylovgrad, Poltava, Sumy, and the city of Sevastopol, where according to some reports Democratic Bloc fielded no candidates. See: The Ukrainian Weekly, March 18, 1990, p. 11.

<sup>132</sup>In the local elections some 307,267 mandates were being contested, for 25 oblast, 469 raion, 434 city, 120 city-raion, 820 settlement and 8996 village councils. On 4 March, 265,912 (86.5 %) deputies were elected. Among them were: 46,484 (17.5 %) workers, 103,382 (38.9 %) collective farmers, 94,488 (35.5 %) women, 137,101 (51.5 %) party members, 128,811 (48.5 %) non-party people, 16,497 (6.2 %) komsomol members. Some 35,054 (13.2 %) of the candidates, were 30 years of age or younger. In 20,326 EDs second round elections were ordered, and in 21,029 EDs new elections were ordered. See: "Ob itogakh vyborov deputatov mestnykh Sovetov narodnykh deputatov Ukrainskoi SSR dvadtsat' pervogo sozyva", P.U., 14.III.1990, p. 1.

<sup>133</sup> Radio Kiev, 17.III.1990, and Radio Kiev, 18.III.1990.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. See also: Rabochaia Gazeta, 24.III.1990, p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.; Radio Moscow, 18.III.1990.

<sup>136</sup> Radio Kiev-3, 21.III.1990. In local elections, additional 18,736 deputies were elected in the second round. Thus, in both rounds 284,648 or 92.6 % of all mandates were filled. The rest were to be elected in second half of April. Radio Kiev-3, 22.III.1990.

<sup>137</sup> See: Radio Kiev-2, 22.III.1990; Radio Moscow-1, 22.III.1990.

<sup>138</sup> See: Appendix I.

<sup>139</sup> See: Appendix I.

<sup>140</sup> See: Appendix II.

<sup>141</sup> See: Appendix II..

<sup>142</sup> See: Appendix II.

<sup>143</sup> See: Appendix II.

<sup>144</sup> See: Appendix II.

<sup>145</sup> See: Appendix II.

<sup>146</sup> See: Appendix II.

<sup>147</sup> See: Appendix II.

<sup>148</sup> For an overview of the electoral results see: Appendix III.

<sup>149</sup> For example, in Lviv, Ternopil and Stryi the newly elected city councils decided to remove the official flag of the Ukrainian SSR from its buildings and to replace it with the Ukrainian national flag (blue-yellow) to the great consternation of party officials. On the events in Stryi see: TASS, Kiev, 29.III.1990. About Ternopil see: Radio Kiev, 30.III.1990.

<sup>150</sup> See an excellent statement on this theme by a newly elected deputy to Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, P. Movchan to the Second Regional Conference of the International Pen-Club, on February 27, 1990 in Vienna. "Svoboda zovnishnia i vnutrishnia", L.U., No. 12, 1990, p. 2.



Peter J. Potichnyj

Elections in Ukraine

Bericht des BIOst Nr. 36/1990

Summary

The present report analyses recent elections (March 4 and March 18, 1990) in Ukrainian SSR.

The findings can be summarized as follows:

1. The legal basis for electoral activities are provided in a newly adopted Electoral Law and in amendments to the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR.
2. This legislation regulates, albeit imperfectly, the electoral process in general, but also the composition, role, and functions of the Electoral Commissions on all levels, from Central Election Commission on down.
3. These commissions, which were set up in an administrative fashion, became the main instruments by which the party apparat tried to control the nomination and registration of electoral contestants, with generally negative results for opposition candidates.
4. The political platforms of the Communist Party, the Komsomol, Trade Unions, official Women Organizations, and various organized components of the Party, show a great deal of ideological disagreement and disunity. The platform of the Democratic Bloc, based largely on RUKH programme was quite well structured and harmonious, and judging by results had an appreciable impact on voters.
5. Despite a very difficult electoral campaign and numerous obstacles faced by the opposition (the RUKH was not registered as a legal organization in time and could not field candidates), the Democratic Bloc (a temporary alliance of 43 informal organizations), was able to win substantial victories, on both, the local and republic level, in all parts of Ukraine, and as a result will be able to control about 1/4 of the seats in the 450-member legislature.
6. The occupation profile of the newly elected deputies is the following: Party functionaries - 97; state functionaries - 54; military and repression specialists - 29; science, culture, education, media, and health - 118; manag-

ers of various enterprises, including the collective farm chairmen and state farm directors - 92; and workers, trade unionists, and unemployed (largely members of the opposition) - 38.

7. The nationality of the elected deputies is as follows: Ukrainians - 75 per cent; Russians - 22 per cent; others - 3 per cent. Among members of the legislature are 13 women which are divided more or less equally between supporters of the regime and the opposition.

8. This painfully slow, yet unrelentingly deliberate march towards democratic goals in Ukraine, a country of some 52 million inhabitants, is viewed by the author as a very significant process, in a republic which is economically, politically, and strategically very important. Should this process be stalled or interrupted, the consequences of such a development could only be profoundly negative for both the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe.



---

**Neuere Arbeiten aus dem Bundesinstitut  
für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien**

---

**Sowjetunion 1988/89**

Perestrojka in der Krise?

Carl Hanser Verlag, München/Wien 1989, 359 S.

**The Soviet Union 1986/87**

Events, Problems, Perspectives.

Westview Press, Boulder/London 1989, 373 S.

**Christopher Davis/Hans-Hermann Höhmann/Hans-Henning Schröder (Hg.)**

Rüstung - Modernisierung - Reform

Die sowjetische Verteidigungswirtschaft in der Perestrojka.

Bund Verlag, Köln 1990, 274 S.

**Hans-Hermann Höhmann/Gertraud Seidenstecher (Hg.)**

Die Wirtschaft Osteuropas und der VR China 1980-1990.

Bilanz und Perspektiven.

Verlag Weltarchiv, Hamburg 1988, 648 S.

**Carsten Herrmann-Pillath**

China - Kultur und Wirtschaftsordnung.

Eine system- und evolutionstheoretische Untersuchung.

Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart/New York 1989, 420 S.

**Osteuropa und der internationale Kommunismus:**

Band 18:

**Joachim Glaubitz/Dieter Heinzig (Hg.)**

Die Sowjetunion und Asien in den 80er Jahren.

Ziele und Grenzen sowjetischer Politik

zwischen Indischem Ozean und Pazifik.

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1988, 370 S.