Between Poland and Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky's Dilemma, 1905–1907

Serhii Plokhy

> Пишу Вам по-русски, не умея писать по-малороссийски, и думая, что неприятно Вам будет, если напишу по-польски.
>
> Nevill Forbes to Mykhailo Hrushevsky
> Oxford, 27 June 1911[1]

Most of Ukraine's history since the early modern period has been determined by its location between the two major political, economic, and cultural powers of Eastern Europe—Poland and Russia. Their competition for the "lands in between" naturally involved military, political, and economic dimensions, but our concern here is with culture, particularly questions of religion, language, literature, and history, which became especially pronounced in the nineteenth century, after the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The nascent Ukrainian national movement was profoundly influenced by the clash between Ukraine's two powerful neighbors. Inspired by the ideas of Poland's "great emigration" of the nineteenth century, it also took advantage of the Russian imperial struggle against Polish cultural influence in the wake of the Polish uprisings of 1830 and 1863. Ukrainian activists, who were persecuted in the Russian Empire, found better conditions for their publishing activities in the Habsburg province of Galicia, which was largely controlled by the Poles in the last decades of the nineteenth century. To survive and extend its influence over the Ukrainian masses, the Ukrainian national movement had to make its way between the two East European cultural giants, who regarded the Ukrainians as raw material for their respective nation-building projects. The task facing the Ukrainian national "awakeners" was never easy and

[1] Nevill Forbes, one of the leading twentieth-century Western experts on the languages, history, and culture of the Slavs, was a reader in Russian at Oxford University when he wrote this letter. For the text, see Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy u Kyievi (henceforth TsDIAK), fond 1235, no. 303, pp. 107–10.

always full of internal contradictions. But without finding the right course between Ukraine's West, represented by Poland, and its East, represented by Russia, the Ukrainian national project would never have come to fruition.

Among Ukrainian activists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, no one was more involved in negotiating Ukraine's political course and formulating its historical and national identity vis-à-vis Poland and Russia than Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), the greatest Ukrainian historian of the twentieth century and the first head of an independent Ukrainian state (1918). Hrushevsky was born in the Kholm region of the Russian Empire. His father, a prominent Ukrainian pedagogue, was sent to the Ukrainian-Polish borderlands to de-Polonize and Russify the local Ukrainian population in the aftermath of the Polish uprising of 1863. The young Hrushevsky was educated as a historian at Kyiv University, where his professor was the well-known Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908). Antonovych forsook Roman Catholicism for Orthodoxy and abandoned the "high" Polish culture of his home to embrace the "low" Ukrainian culture of the local peasantry and become one of the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in the second half of the nineteenth century. Upon graduating from Kyiv University, Hrushevsky accepted a position in East European history at Lviv University, where he taught Ukrainian history from 1894 until the outbreak of World War I. During that time he served as president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, founded the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv, and edited Ukraine's most influential monthly of the period, *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*.[2]

Hrushevsky had been regarded as the leader of the Ukrainian movement by its proponents and opponents in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire alike. What helped him cross the boundaries between the two empires and the two branches of the national movement as easily as he did was that for all the differences in tactics, the movement had a common ideology and long-term goal: territorial autonomy within the respective empires. It was Hrushevsky, the recognized exponent of the Ukrainian cause on both sides of the border, who led it to the achievement of its immediate and prospective goals. Hrushevsky was a villain for Polish and Russian nationalists and a national prophet in the eyes of

[2] On Hrushevsky's academic career, see Thomas Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Liubomyr Vynar [Lubomyr R. Wynar], *Mykhailo Hrushevskyi i Naukove tovarystvo im. Tarasa Shevchenka, 1892–1930* (Munich: Dniprova khvylia, 1970); and my *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

his followers. His friends were impressed with his ability to withstand continuous attacks from the Russian and Polish nationalist camps. Hrushevsky moved into the public spotlight once he decided to abandon the realm of "cultural" work and began to take part in politics. His insistence on the use of Ukrainian at the Russian Archeological Congress in Kyiv (1899) and his participation in the founding of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party in the same year turned him into a symbol of the Ukrainian national revival. When, in 1906, he joined the Ukrainian deputies of the First Russian Duma, they accepted him as their unquestioned leader and symbol of the unity of Russian- and Austro–Hungarian-ruled Ukraine.[3]

Hrushevsky's main achievement, the separation of Ukrainian history from the Russian as a field of study, turned the Ukrainian historical narrative from a subnational into a national one and immediately plunged the historian into a maelstrom of controversy. The first to attack Hrushevsky were representatives of Polish national historiography, who severely criticized his attempt to construct a Ukrainian national narrative at the expense of the Polish one. The latter continued to include significant parts of the Ukrainian past in both territorial and ethnocultural terms. While the confrontation between Polish and Ukrainian political elites in the Habsburg Monarchy before World War I encouraged the critical assessment of Hrushevsky's works by Polish historians,[4] co-operation between the Ukrainian national parties and Russian liberals in the Russian Empire often shielded him from attack by his Russian opponents.[5] That situation changed in 1917, when Hrushevsky became a principal target of proponents of the all-Russian idea and was deemed the main culprit behind the efforts of the empire's foes to divide "Russia, one and indivisible."[6]

---

[3] One of his followers at the time, the future Ukrainian political leader and historian Dmytro Doroshenko, left the following words in his memoirs concerning Hrushevsky's arrival in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1906: "His great scholarly and public services, his extraordinary organizational talent, created great authority and deep respect for him. In our eyes he was a symbol of pan-Ukrainian unification; in those days his word was law for us" (Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro davnie-mynule [1901–1914 roky]* [Winnipeg: Tryzub, 1954], 83); cf. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 76.

[4] See, e.g., reviews of Hrushevsky's works by Ludwik Kolankowski in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 348–65; and by Czesław Frankiewicz in ibid., 31 (1917): 174–77.

[5] See a comment to that effect in Andrei Storozhenko's pamphlet on the history of the Ukrainian movement, published under the pseudonym A. Tsarinnyi, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie: Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk preimushchestvenno po lichnym vospominaniiam* (Berlin: Tip. Zinaburg, 1925), repr. in *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii: Ideologiia natsionalnogo raskola*, comp. M. B. Smolin (Moscow: Moskva, 1998), 161.

[6] See A. M. Volkonsky, *Istoricheskaia pravda i ukrainofilskaia propaganda* (Turin, 1920), repr. in Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii, 25–123.

This essay, which grew out of my work in the Hrushevsky Translation Project—the collective effort of an international group of scholars led by Frank E. Sysyn to make available to the English-speaking world Hrushevsky's ten-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—takes a close look at the historian's political writings during the first revolution in the Russian Empire (1905–1907). At that time Hrushevsky tried to chart a middle course for the nascent Ukrainian national movement between Russian liberalism and Polish nationalism, applying different tactics in dealing with these two political currents. In discussing this stage of Ukrainian nation building, in this essay I seek to present a better understanding not only of the role Hrushevsky played in this process, but also of the challenges faced by the Ukrainian national revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

* * *

Hrushevsky was appointed to the Chair of European History at Lviv University in 1894 owing to a deal between the Polish elites of Galicia and the region's Ukrainian populists. Apart from the Austrian government, Galicia's Polish political circles, and the Ukrainian populists there, major actors in the "New Era" were the Ukrainophile leaders of Russian-ruled Ukraine, represented by Hrushevsky's mentors in Kyiv, Volodymyr Antonovych and Oleksander Konysky. They established good relations not only with the Ukrainian populists of Galicia, but also with the Polish political circles there. In the mid–1880s, when Austro-Russian relations were deteriorating, Kyiv's Ukrainophile leaders even attracted the attention of the Austrian imperial government and Polish politicians in Galicia, who were looking for possible allies in Russian-ruled Ukraine in case a war broke out between the two states. Disillusioned with the prospects of a federative order in Russia, Antonovych and Konysky placed their hopes in the creation of a central European federation of Slavic states. They also sought ways to circumvent the restrictions on Ukrainian publications and cultural activity in the Russian Empire, which became especially severe after the assassination of Emperor Alexander II in 1881.[7]

The plans worked out by Antonovych and Konysky on the one hand and by the leaders of the Ukrainophile movement in Galicia on the other envisioned the transfer of Ukrainophile activities from Kyiv to Lviv and

[7] On Hrushevsky's appointment to the Lviv University position, see Leonid Zashkilniak, "M. Hrushevskyi i Halychyna (Do pryizdu do Lvova 1894 r.)," in *Mykhailo Hrushevskyi i lvivska istorychna shkola* (New York and Lviv: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo et al., 1995), 114–37. On the Polish-Ukrainian political agreement in Galicia, see Ihor Chornovol, *Polsko-ukrainska uhoda, 1890–1894* (Lviv: Lvivska akademiia mystetstva, 2000).

the creation of a "Ukrainian Piedmont" in Galicia. Consequently it is not surprising that as soon as the Revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire made it possible, the historian sought to go beyond his Galician base and began taking an active part in promoting the Ukrainian cause in the Romanov realm. He even applied for a position in Russian history at Kyiv University, but the Russian nationalists who dominated the city's political life did all they could to prevent the appointment of a "Ukrainophile" as a professor. They claimed that his scholarly achievements were difficult to evaluate, as his works were written in the obscure dialect developed by the Galician Ukrainophiles, and that his desire to lecture in Ukrainian would provoke conflicts at Kyiv University. Some authors of anti-Hrushevsky articles even stated that there was no place for him there and that Kyiv, the "cradle of Russia," had never been and would never become the center of an autonomous Ukraine.[8] Nor did Hrushevsky's application benefit from his active participation in the 1907 campaign to establish chairs of Ukrainian studies at universities in Russian-ruled Ukraine. During the first months of 1907 Hrushevsky spoke out in support of the student movement, agitating for the introduction of such chairs and for the use of Ukrainian as a language of instruction. In a long article published in *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, he discussed the teaching of Ukrainian subjects in the Habsburg Monarchy and advocated the establishment of chairs of Ukrainian studies (history, geography, language, literature, folklore, art, and so on) at the universities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa.[9] A tsarist censor posited a direct link between Hrushevsky's article and student unrest at Kyiv University.[10]

Hrushevsky began his publicistic activity in the Russian Empire in the spring of 1905 with several articles advocating the lifting of the ban on Ukrainian publications. He addressed his writings to the broadest possible audience, but his primary target was the Russian government, which

---

[8] See Dmytro Bahalii, "Akad. M. S. Hrushevskyi i ioho mistse v ukrainskii istoriohrafii (Istorychno-krytychnyi narys)," *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1927, no. 1 (46; January): 174–75.

[9] See Hrushevsky, "Sprava ukrainskykh katedr i nashi naukovi potreby," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, 1907, no. 1: 42–57; no. 2: 213–20; no. 3: 408–18; and separately, Lviv, 1907. For a Russian translation, see "Vopros ob ukrainskikh kafedrakh i nuzhdy ukrainskoi nauki," in Mikhail Grushevsky, *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*: *Stati i zametki* (St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va "Obshchestvennaia polza," 1907), 149–94. Hrushevsky's political writings of the period were reprinted in 2002 in vol. 1 of the 50–vol. edition of his writings being prepared by scholars at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, vol. 1 (Lviv: Svit, 2002), 289–544. The research for this essay was completed before the appearance of that volume, which contains references to the original publications of Hrushevsky's works.

[10] Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 82.

was then giving consideration to lifting the ban.[11] This was a continuation of the campaign that he had begun with demands to legalize the importation into the Russian Empire of Ukrainian-language books published in Galicia, including his own works, especially the first volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. With the first signs of the liberalization of Russian censorship in 1904, Hrushevsky addressed the new minister of internal affairs, Prince Petr Sviatopolk-Mirsky, with a letter in which he tried to turn the anti-Polish sentiments dominant in Russian ruling circles at the time to the benefit of the Ukrainian cause. Concerning the ban on importing the latest volume of his *History* into the Russian Empire, he wrote as follows: "I find it not only painful but, as a Russian subject, simply shameful to see that, for example, my university colleague's book on the history of Poland and Lithuania in the fifteenth century, which appeared at the same time as the fourth volume of my *History*, has been allowed to circulate in Russia without restriction because it is written in Polish, while my fourth volume, devoted to the same Polish-Lithuanian period of South Russian history, has been banned unconditionally, without even an inspection by the censors, merely because it is written in the Little Russian language."[12] The revolution hastened the liberation of the Ukrainian word in the Russian Empire. The prohibition was silently dropped from the new regulations on publishing activities that the tsarist government issued in the spring of 1906. Hrushevsky, like other activists of the Ukrainian movement, had every reason to celebrate.[13]

The language question, however, was only one of the issues on the activists' agenda. Dubbed "the resolution of the Ukrainian question," that agenda envisaged the achievement of territorial autonomy for the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire. With the opening of the First Duma, the situation changed dramatically. The government was no longer prepared to entertain any demands from the Ukrainian movement, and the only hope of resolving the reformulated "Ukrainian question" was to convince the opposition parties in the Duma—the representatives of liberal Russia—to put the national question on their political agenda. The Russian liberals, not the government, became the primary audience of Hrushevsky's articles, although the proponents of Russian nationalism

---

[11] See my *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, 54–55.

[12] Draft of Hrushevsky's letter to Sviatopolk-Mirsky in TsDIAK, fond 1235, desc. 1, no. 275, fol. 161^{v}. Hrushevsky apparently did not know or preferred to ignore the fact that in Russian bureaucratic and nationalist circles Sviatopolk-Mirsky was perceived as a promoter of Polish interests.

[13] On the Ukrainian campaign to lift the ban on Ukrainian-language publications in 1904–1906, see Olga Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904–1912" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991), 42–78, 114–19.

continued to be the object of his attacks. Particularly worrisome to Hrushevsky were the arguments of the Russian rightists, who were attempting to convince the public that the liberalization of political life would result in the disintegration of the Russian Empire, as the non-Russian nationalities would take advantage of the newly granted freedoms to secede. In the spring of 1906 Hrushevsky traveled to St. Petersburg to advise Ukrainian deputies of the Duma and stayed there into the summer. Through his numerous contributions to *Ukrainskii vestnik*, the mouthpiece of the Ukrainian Club in the Duma, he influenced political debate on the Ukrainian issue in imperial Russian society.[14]

In his article "Unity or Disintegration," published in June 1906, Hrushevsky sought to calm the Russian liberal public. He acknowledged that political independence was indeed the ultimate goal of any national movement, but stated at the same time that "a nationality does not necessarily require political independence for its development." The only way to save the Russian state, according to Hrushevsky, was to adjust it to the demands of the national movements and turn it into a "free union of peoples." Hrushevsky wrote: "aspirations to establish one's own state can only be held in check by the awareness that membership in a given political union offers too many advantages and conveniences. The absence of restrictions on the full and universal development of national forces, the absence of their exploitation by the state for the interests of others or for unproductive ends, is a necessary condition for such consciousness."[15]

For Hrushevsky such conditions could be achieved only through the restructuring of the Russian Empire on the basis of autonomy for its constituent nations—an idea that he put forward in the summer of 1905 in the debate then taking place on the future Russian constitution. At that time Hrushevsky proposed applying the principle of territorial self-government for the Russian Empire's nationalities, a principle that had previously been discussed only in relation to the Empire's Polish provinces, to the empire as a whole. He envisioned the Russian state divided into national regions governed by local diets.[16] Hrushevsky also contin-

---

[14] See my *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, 56–61. On the Ukrainian deputies in the First Duma and their activities, see Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity," 163–99. Cf. Oleh W. Gerus, "The Ukrainian Question in the Russian Duma, 1906–17: An Overview," *Studia Ukrainica* (Ottawa), 4 (1984): 157–73.

[15] Mikhail Grushevsky, "Edinstvo ili raspadenie?" *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 3 (4 June 1906): 39–51, repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 55–67, here 61.

[16] See Hrushevsky, "Konstytutsiine pytannia i ukrainstvo v Rosii," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 8, no. 6 (1905): 245–58; also separately: Lviv, 1905. An abridged version of the article appeared in Russian translation in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 121–31.

ued promoting the idea of Ukrainian autonomy in three of his articles that *Ukrainskii vestnik* published in the spring and summer of 1906. There he legitimized his demand for the autonomization of the Russian Empire by noting that in the spring of 1905 the congress of Russian journalists had adopted a resolution calling for the decentralization of the Russian state and the organization of its future political life on the basis of self-governing national territories.[17] Hrushevsky also referred to the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia, claiming that what the Ukrainians needed was not just regional autonomy, which might leave them subject to another nationality, but national-territorial autonomy, which could ensure their dominance in a given autonomous unit and guarantee their future national development.[18]

In August 1906 Hrushevsky specifically addressed the issue of the Ukrainian intelligentsia's duty to serve its own people, discussing it in relation to the tsarist authorities' dissolution of the First Duma and the prospects of the liberation movement in the Russian Empire. One of his articles dealing with that theme, "On the Following Day," appeared in the eleventh issue of *Ukrainskii vestnik* on 2 August 1906.[19] Another, "Against the Current," was written for the fifteenth issue of the same newspaper, but it was never published there.[20] Hrushevsky's main purpose was to convince the liberal Ukrainian intelligentsia, which had supported Ukrainian aspirations during the first stage of the revolution, not to abandon that cause during the period of official reaction and repression. He argued that in continuing to work for the liberation of Russia and opposing reactionary government policies, there was no need to forsake the Ukrainian cause. Service to broader goals did not contradict the idea of serving one's own people. Hrushevsky called on the Ukrainian intelligentsia to join the ranks of the Ukrainian movement in its effort to liberate Russia.[21] He argued that

---

[17] Hrushevsky also indicated the deep federalist traditions of the Ukrainian movement, although he refused to support his claim for Ukrainian autonomy with reference to Ukraine's historical rights. See Mikhail Grushevsky, "Natsionalnyi vopros i avtonomiia," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 1 (21 May 1906): 8–17; idem, "Nashi trebovaniia," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 5 (18 June 1906): 267–73; and idem, "O zrelosti i nezrelosti," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 4 (11 July 1906): 203–208. These articles were reprinted in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 69–80, 86–92, and 81–85 respectively.

[18] Idem, "Iz polsko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii Galitsii: Neskolko illiustratsii k voprosu: avtonomiia oblastnaia i natsionalno-territorialnaia," in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 195–264.

[19] Idem, "Na drugoi den," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 11 (2 August 1906): 743–48, repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 6–11.

[20] Idem, "Protiv techeniia," in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 1–5.

[21] In this Hrushevsky was quite close to the position taken by Bohdan Kistiakovsky, an ethnic Ukrainian and a leader of the "liberation of Russia" movement who opposed

the alleged sacrifice of the Ukrainian intelligentsia for the benefit of the "all-Russian" cause in fact amounted to a betrayal of the interests of the Ukrainian people and that the long tradition of such Little Russian "self-sacrifice" earned the Ukrainian intelligentsia no respect in Russian liberal circles, while the Poles earned such respect by serving the interests of their nation. Hrushevsky maintained that the tsarist government and Russian progressive circles did not differ greatly in their attitude to the Ukrainian movement, which they saw as naturally subordinate to all-Russian/Great Russian culture and society, intended to serve as building material for the development of both.

The significance of the ideas Hrushevsky expressed in these two articles went far beyond the specific circumstances that the dissolution of the First Russian Duma created. In 1907 Hrushevsky reprinted both articles in *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*. They touched not only upon the enormously important question of the loyalty of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to its own people, without which the Ukrainian movement was doomed to extinction, but also on the inter-relation between Ukrainian, Russian, and so-called all-Russian culture and society. As argued earlier, in his political writings of 1905–1907 Hrushevsky postulated the "Ukrainian question" as part of the national question in the Russian Empire in general, while divorcing it from the "all-Russian" context. That postulate had highly important consequences for the future of the Ukrainian movement, but for the time being the consciousness of the Ukrainian intelligentsia remained predominantly "Little Russian," regarding the Ukrainian people and culture as part of the all-Russian nation and culture. Hrushevsky's strategy under such circumstances was not to counterpose the goals of the Ukrainian and all-Russian (all-imperial) movements for the "liberation of Russia," but to present them as complementary. The Ukrainian movement was too weak to set goals antithetical to those that the Russian liberal intelligentsia pursued, or even significantly different from them.

Hrushevsky adopted a different strategy in dealing with the Polish movement in the Russian Empire. As early as in May 1905 Hrushevsky had raised the alarm about the unequal treatment of imperial Russia's nationalities in connection with an edict permitting the use of Polish and Lithuanian in the secondary schools of the western gubernias.[22] While

---

Ukrainian nationalism but believed that Ukrainians could become equal members of the liberation movement if they organized on an ethnic basis. See Susan Heuman, *Kistiakovsky: The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1998), 114–15.

[22] On the Polish political action that led to the issuing of the edict, see Céline Gervais-Francelle, "La grève scolaire dans le royaume de Pologne," in *La première révolution*

welcoming the edict in general, he noted that it was rather limited in scope, excluding elementary schools and languages other than Polish and Lithuanian. Hrushevsky argued that the Ukrainians of the western gubernias were just as entitled as the Poles and Lithuanians to be taught in their own language. He made reference to the opinion of the Imperial Academy of Sciences that the "all-Russian language" was in fact Great Russian, which was foreign to the Ukrainian population of the empire.[23] Hrushevsky considered an imperial policy that helped Polonize the Ukrainian masses not only harmful to the Ukrainians, but also absurd from the government's own viewpoint. He asked the rhetorical question, "Is a Polonized Ukraine less dangerous to Russia than a Ukraine loyal to her own nationality?"[24]

Hrushevsky's sojourn in the Russian Empire in the spring of 1906 and his sharing of the experience of the Ukrainian cultural and political struggle in Galicia with the Ukrainian deputies of the First Duma caused alarm among the Polish political elite in Galicia, resulting in the publication of a number of articles commenting on his visit to St. Petersburg. They implied that Hrushevsky's efforts to strengthen links between Russian- and Austrian-ruled Ukraine were dangerous to the Austro-Hungarian state. Readers were also reminded that the Shevchenko Scientific Society was receiving subsidies from the Galician Diet and that Hrushevsky would do well to remember that the Poles were still masters in Galicia. The authors' real concern was that by disseminating information about the abuses the Ukrainian movement suffered at the hands of the Galicia's Polish masters, Hrushevsky could compromise Polish prospects in the Russian Empire. Hrushevsky, who did not attempt to conceal his dissatisfaction with Polish attacks on him and the Ukrainian movement in general, made the whole story public in St. Petersburg.[25]

---

russe, ed. François-Xavier Coquin and Céline Gervais-Francelle (Paris, 1986), 261–98. On the Ukrainian reaction to the edict, see Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity," 75–88.

[23] Mikhail Grushevsky, "Ravnoiu meroiu," *Syn otechestva*, no. 73 (12 May 1905), repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 101–103.

[24] Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Bezhluzda natsionalna polityka Rosii," *Dilo* (Lviv), 1905, no. 100 (18 May), quoted in Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 73. In August 1905 Hrushevsky noted in his diary: "It looks as if there will be reaction and somnolence in Russia, and the Ukrainians are again prepared to lie down on the stove, having obtained nothing, while the Poles are gaining power over them as well. Sorrow overcomes me for our people and foreigners alike" ("Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevskoho [1904–1910 rr.]," ed. Ihor Hyrych, *Kyivska starovyna*, 1995, no. 1: 15).

[25] Mikhail Grushevsky, "Vstrevozhennyi muraveinik," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 6 (25 June 1906): 331–41, repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 149–94.

In 1907, when plans for granting autonomy to the former Congress Kingdom of Poland were being widely discussed in the Russian Empire, Hrushevsky published a number of articles in which he once again discussed the history and current status of Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia, protesting plans to include his native Kholm region in the prospective autonomous realm. Hrushevsky's essay on the issue, "For the Ukrainian Bone (In the Matter of the Kholm Region)," was printed in Ukrainian in the Kyiv newspaper *Rada*, then appeared as a separate brochure, and finally was published in Russian translation in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*.[26] The essay was a response to an article published in December 1906 by one of the leaders of the Polish National Democratic Party, Count Antoni Tyszkiewicz, in the newspaper *Rech*, the organ of the Russian Constitutional Democrats. Tyszkiewicz argued against the tsarist government's attempts to make the Kholm region a separate gubernia, claiming that the whole enterprise had been thought up by Russian nationalist circles and local elites that would benefit from the elevation of Kholm to the status of a gubernial capital. He was certainly right in his evaluation of official intentions: facing the prospect of having to grant autonomy to the lands of the former Kingdom of Poland, the government wanted to save the Ukrainian population of the Kholm region for the "all-Russian" cause. It is hardly surprising that Tyszkiewicz's argument found support from the oppositional Constitutional Democrats, whose representatives argued that the whole issue should be taken out of the hands of the government and submitted for a decision to the State Duma.[27]

Hrushevsky was clearly alarmed that the Polish National Democrats and the Russian Constitutional Democrats might reach an agreement at the expense of the Ukrainians. In his article he rebuffed Tyszkiewicz's argument, pointing out that by playing the pan-Slavic and liberal cards it failed to take into account the interests of the local population, which was neither Russian nor Polish and had the right to a separate national and cultural development.[28] Hrushevsky argued that granting autonomy

---

[26] Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Za ukrainskyi maslak (v spravi Kholmshchyny)," *Rada*, 1907, nos. 2–4; also separately: *Za ukrainskyi maslak (v spravi Kholmshchyny)* (Kyiv, 1907). Russian translation: "Za ukrainskuiu kost (vopros o Kholmshchine)," in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 278–91.

[27] On the formation of Kholm gubernia, see Theodore E. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 172–92; and Edward Chmielewski, *The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), 117–20.

[28] Hrushevsky's argument in that regard was close to the one Kistiakovsky made in an

to Poland within its ethnic boundaries was a just cause, but not within the boundaries of the former Congress Kingdom of Poland, which included non-Polish ethnic territories. He believed that Russian and Polish policies toward the Ukrainians were intended to promote the assimilation of the Ukrainian population to their respective cultures and societies. Nevertheless, along with a significant number of Ukrainian activists, Hrushevsky continued to believe that there were better prospects for the development of Ukrainian culture under Russian than Polish rule. Once again, the interests of the Ukrainian movement and those of the central government in St. Petersburg coincided on the issue of Polish dominance in the ethnic Ukrainian territories, but this time, unlike after the Polish Uprising of 1863, the Ukrainian activists did not have to hide their true intentions. They no longer presented themselves as proponents of the all-Russian cause. Instead they joined the battle under their own flag.

* * *

A close reading of Hrushevsky's political writings leaves no doubt that during the Revolution of 1905 his main goal, like that of the whole Ukrainian movement, was the achievement of Ukrainian autonomy. The strategies he adopted to achieve it depended on whether he was dealing with Russian liberals or Polish nationalists. In the first case, he subscribed to the broadly defined goals of the democratic movement throughout the Russian Empire, arguing that the "liberation of Russia" required a solution to the empire's national question and the granting of territorial autonomy to the ethnic minorities. By posing the "Ukrainian question" as part of the "national question" facing the empire as a whole, Hrushevsky gave new legitimacy to the Ukrainian demands for autonomy, even as he sought to persuade the Ukrainian intelligentsia within the ranks of the "liberation of Russia" movement that it had not only "all-Russian" but also specifically Ukrainian goals if that movement was to succeed.

The the Polish national movement's self-awareness and political maturity served as an example to the nascent Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire, and Polish activists were important allies in the struggle for federalization. But they were also dangerous competitors in the contest to "nationalize" the empire's western borderlands, and outright enemies of the Ukrainian movement in Austrian-ruled Galicia. As Hrushevsky considered developments in the Russian Empire from the perspective of Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia, he became more alarmed than

---

article he wrote in 1908 to educate his fellow Russian liberals on the Ukrainian dimension of the Kholm issue. See Heuman, *Kistiakovsky*, 120–21.

his Kyivan colleagues at the prospect of Russia solving its "Polish question" at the expense of the Ukrainians. The introduction of school instruction in Polish in lands where ethnic Ukrainians constituted the majority or plurality of the population would mean further cultural Polonization of the Ukrainian peasantry unless the schools were Ukrainianized, and the official "accommodation" of Polish political and cultural demands, rather than those of the other nationalities, would diminish the national "autonomists'" prospects in Russian politics. If the Kholm region were included in autonomous Polish territory, Polish culture would again become dominant in that traditionally Ukrainian land.

Hrushevsky's proposed solution to the complex political dilemmas that faced the Ukrainian movement in its dealings with its much stronger Russian and Polish counterparts was quite simple. During the Revolution of 1905 he emerged as a formidable supporter and tireless propagandist of the unity of all democratic forces in their struggle for the "liberation of Russia." For Hrushevsky that slogan implied the achievement of territorial autonomy by the non-Russian nationalities. There was no place in this struggle for any separate deals between individual members of the anti-autocratic camp or between them and the government. Hrushevsky believed that the "liberation of Russia" would bring freedom not only to Russia and Poland, but to Ukraine as well.



The privilege of 1063 for the Abbey of St. Crépy le Grand in Soissons (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Collection Picardie, t. 294, acte 38). The parchment original measures 560 x 312 mm.

Source: C. Couderc, "Une signature d'Anne de Russie," in *La Russie géographique, ethnologique, historique* ... (Paris: Larousse, 1892), plate between pp. 473 and 474.

National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848–1948 (1978), *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (1983), *Ukraine: A Historical Atlas* (1985), *A History of Ukraine* (1996, revised ed. forthcoming 2010), *Historical Atlas of Central Europe* (2002), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture* (co-editor, 2002), *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (2002), and *Ukraine: An Illustrated History* (2007).

DAVID R. MARPLES is a Distinguished University Professor of history at the University of Alberta and director of the CIUS's Stasiuk Program on Contemporary Ukraine. He is the author of twelve books on twentieth-century Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, most recently *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (2008).

YURII MYTSYK is a professor of Ukrainian history at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University, an archpriest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, and the head of the Department of Monuments of the Princely and Cossack Periods at the Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. A specialist in the history of Cossack-era Ukraine, Ukrainian church and regional history, and Ukrainian archeography, he has written over 1,300 articles and over thirty books and archeographic publications, most recently *Lystuvannia mytropolyta Ilariona (Ohiienka)* (2006), *Chyhyryn: Hetmanska stolytsia* (2007), and *Albaruthenica: Studii z istorii Bilorusi* (2009).

VICTOR OSTAPCHUK is an associate professor in the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations at the University of Toronto. A specialist in Ottoman historical archaeology.and in the Porte's relations with Muscovy, Poland, and Ukraine, he is the author of *Warfare and Diplomacy across Sea and Steppe: The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier in the 1620s* (forthcoming).

ULIANA M. PASICZNYK is the managing editor of the Hrushevsky Translation Project of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the CIUS Toronto Office. Previously she was the managing editor of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies.*

SERHII PLOKHY (PLOKHII) is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University. A specialist of the intellectual, cultural, and international history of Eastern Europe, he has lived and taught in Ukraine, Canada, and the United States. His recent publications include *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (2005), *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus* (2006), *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (2008), and *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (forthcoming 2010).

ANDRZEJ POPPE is a professor emeritus of Warsaw University and a leading Polish authority on the history of medieval Eastern Europe and Kyivan Rus'. He