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Source: *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3/4, The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj (December 1985), pp. 326-341

Published by: [Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036162>

Accessed: 19/10/2014 06:07

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## V. Lypyns'kyj and the Problem of the Elite

JAROSLAW PELENSKI

Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj (1882–1931)<sup>1</sup> was the first Ukrainian political thinker, historian, and ideologue to address the problem of the elite in a systematic and comprehensive manner.<sup>2</sup> His treatment of the role and the functioning of elites from a comparative perspective as well as in the Ukrainian context represents a significant contribution to general political theory and to Ukrainian political thought.

Lypyns'kyj developed his theory of elites following a radical shift from a democratic position to a conservative monarchist and corporatist systemic one. His theory was also formulated during the great Ukrainian debate of the 1920s in connection with its central concern about who was to be held responsible for the Ukrainian defeat in the struggle for independence in the years 1917–1920. Was it the democratic and socialist elite (predominantly the intelligentsia, in the social sense) who, according to Lypyns'kyj and his fellow conservatives (later maintained also by integral nationalists of the authoritarian and totalitarian persuasions), had failed profoundly in the process of revolution and statebuilding because they were incapable of creating a strong national government and military apparatus? Or was it, as argued by the populist democrats and the socialists, the Ukrainian people (*narod*) themselves, with their belated sociopolitical development and anarchistic tendencies, who were mainly responsible for the defeat of Ukrainian efforts to preserve political independence?

<sup>1</sup> For a bibliography of V. Lypyns'kyj's works, and the relevant literature, see the "Select Bibliography of V. Lypyns'kyj's Works and Related Publications" published in this issue.

<sup>2</sup> The literature on elites is immense; for instance, a select computerized bibliography on political elites (1945–1967) amounts to 661 pages; see Carl Beck and J. Thomas McKechnie, *Political Elites* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). For a general introduction to the problem of elites, see H. D. Lasswell, D. Lerner, and C. E. Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography* (Stanford, 1952); Suzanne Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York, 1963); Thomas B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (London, 1964); Perry Geraint, *Political Elites* (New York, 1969); John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite* (Princeton, 1973); R. D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976); Moshe M. Czudnowski, ed., *Does Who Governs Matter?: Elite Circulation in Contemporary Societies* (DeKalb, Ill., 1983); Ronald H. Linden and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Elite Studies and Communist Politics* (Pittsburgh, 1984).

The debate of the 1920s revealed that, regardless of his political eccentricities and ideological idiosyncracies, it was Lypyns'kyj who dared to ask the hard, essential questions about the Ukrainian past and present. It was he who refused to tell his compatriots what they wished to hear in return for instant but transient fame, and it was he who dealt with the realities of power politics, the crucial issues of political process and, above all, the fundamental problem of the relationship of elites to their societies. In his incisive clinical approach he touched the raw nerve of the Ukrainian body politic.

Until the appearance of Lypyns'kyj's writings, Ukrainian political theorists, who also performed many other functions in their society, had by and large avoided these issues. For obvious reasons, they preferred to concentrate their efforts on the current political needs of Ukrainian society within the framework of the existing empire-states and the search for ideal/utopian solutions for the problems facing that society. Contrary to most Ukrainian political thinkers, who exemplified an asystemic approach, Lypyns'kyj, in his treatment of the elite as well as other issues, attempted to present a closed, logical system which bore some characteristics of a fixed dogmatic construction. His system represents the most integrated political doctrine produced by Ukrainian political thought in the twentieth century.<sup>3</sup>

Already in the democratic period of his historical and political thinking, from 1902 to 1917, Lypyns'kyj's concern with the problem of the elite, while not predominant, was nonetheless clearly evident.<sup>4</sup> During that period, and particularly between 1909 and 1917, Lypyns'kyj still attempted to harmonize his commitment to political democracy with his assessment of the role of the elite/elites (namely, selected elements of the nobility) and of the cult/myth of the great personality in Ukrainian history. His early publicistic writings, such as *Szlachta na Ukrainie* (The nobility in the Ukraine; 1909) and historical works, such as "Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski: Z dziejów walki szlachty ukraińskiej w szeregach powstańczych pod wodzą Bohdana Chmielnickiego" (Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski: Concerning the history of the struggle of the Ukrainian nobility in the insurrectionist

<sup>3</sup> Concerning the general treatment of Lypyns'kyj's historical thinking and political ideas, see Jarosław Pelenski, "Der ukrainische Nationalgedanke in Lichte der Werke M. Hruševs'kyjs und V. Lypyns'kyjs" (Ph.D. diss., University of Munich, 1956), pp. 90–223; idem, "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj," in *Zbirnyk "Ukrajins'koji literaturnoji hazety" 1956*, ed. I. Košelivec' and Ju. Lavrinenko (Munich, 1957), pp. 197–213; idem, "Geschichtliches Denken und politische Ideen V. Lypyns'kyjs," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 9, no. 2 (1961): 223–46.

<sup>4</sup> For a conceptualization of V. Lypyns'kyj's democratic period, see Pelenski, "Der ukrainische Nationalgedanke," pp. 160–66; idem, "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj," pp. 200–204; idem, "Geschichtliches Denken," pp. 234–36.

army under the command of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj)<sup>5</sup> and the two studies bearing the common title "Dwie chwile z dziejów porewolucyjnej Ukrainy" (Two moments from the history of the postrevolutionary Ukraine)—the first subtitled "U szczytu potęgi" (At the peak of power) and the second, "Na przełomie" (At the turning point)<sup>6</sup>—reflect the various tendencies in his historical and political thinking. In his last major historical work, *Ukrajina na perelomi* (The Ukraine at the turning point; Vienna, 1920), these divergent tendencies were reduced to the fundamental dichotomy encompassing the cult/myth of the great personality as the decisive history-making force and the notion of the determining role of elites in the historical process. This dichotomy he eventually resolved in his *Lysty do bratw-xliborobiv* (Letters to fellow farmers), written in 1919–1926 and published in several editions, and, according to oral testimonies, in *Teorija pravlinnja* (Theory of rule), completed in Berlin in 1927 (its whereabouts are unknown).

Lypyns'kyj's historical interpretation was most evidently influenced by the cult/myth of the great personality in his work on Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski (Kryčevs'kyj), a colonel and Cossack army commander, and, in particular, on Hetman Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj.<sup>7</sup> This cult/myth theory was developed in modern historical thought by the heroic (bombastic) school of Thomas Carlyle, especially in his *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History* (1841) and in his biography of the Prussian king Frederick the Great, among others. However, there is no direct evidence that Lypyns'kyj was influenced by that school.

The cult/myth of the great personality as a history-making force was revived by neoromantic historical schools at the turn of the twentieth century and continued until the early 1930s. The most prominent among them was the group of historians who belonged to the Stefan George Circle (*Kreis*), among whom Ernst Kantorowicz became the best known in the American intellectual milieu. Vasyl' Kučabs'kyj (1895–1945 [?]), Lypyns'kyj's ideological disciple and a noteworthy Ukrainian historian of the interwar period—his eulogizing assessment of his mentor's ideas is

<sup>5</sup> Wacław Lipiński, ed., *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kiev and Cracow, 1912), pp. 145–513; the work also appeared separately as a monograph (Cracow, 1912). For a new edition with a Ukrainian translation by Jurij Kosač, and an introduction, entitled "Krakiv, Ženeva i filijacija 'Kryčevs'koho,'" by its editor, Lew R. Bilas, see V. Lypyns'kyj, *Tvory*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1980).

<sup>6</sup> Lipiński, ed., *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 514–617.

<sup>7</sup> For the identification of the cult/myth of the great personality in Lypyns'kyj's work, see Pelenski, "Der ukrainische Nationalgedanke," pp. 155–59; idem, "Geschichtliches Denken," pp. 233–34. Cf. also Bilas, "Krakiv, Ženeva i filijacija 'Kryčevs'koho,'" pp. xlii–xlvi, lxxviii–lcviii.

reflected in the article “Značinnja idej Vjačeslava Lypyns’koho” (The significance of the ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns’kyj; reprinted in this issue)—belonged to a group of Ukrainian intellectuals who admired the poet and his circle.<sup>8</sup>

Direct influence on Lypyns’kyj by historians who advocated the theory of the great personality in history can be proved only for some Polish historians, especially those of the neoromantic school. Most evident is his reliance on the treatment of Xmel’nyc’kyj by Ludwik Kubala (1838–1918) in the latter’s *Wojna moskiewska, rok 1654–1655* (The Muscovite war, the year 1654–55; Warsaw, 1910).<sup>9</sup> Influences on Lypyns’kyj by Stanisław Zakrzewski (1873–1936) and Szymon Aszkenazy (1867–1935), leading figures in the Polish neoromantic school, have also been tentatively established.<sup>10</sup>

Lypyns’kyj’s hero worship of Krzyczewski and Xmel’nyc’kyj fitted well into the neoromantic context of the beginning of the twentieth century and the period of great disillusionment that followed the catastrophies of World War I and the Ukrainian defeat in the struggle for independence in 1917–1920. However, in Lypyns’kyj’s later writings, especially in his *Lysty do bratw-xliborobiv*, the neoromantic and militarist, or even caesarist, cult of the great personality in history was replaced by a sociological and political-theoretical approach to the issue of the organization of old and new societies and the leading role of their respective elites.

Lypyns’kyj was the first Ukrainian political thinker openly to advocate the thesis that the elites and not the “peoples” (*narody*) or the masses are the principal history-making and nation-building forces. This does not mean that other Ukrainian historians and political thinkers were totally unaware of the role the elites have played in historical processes. Myxajlo Hruševs’kyj (1866–1934), the grand old man of Ukrainian populist historiography and politics who always stressed his anti-elitist predilections and who very consistently defended the sovereign will of the people, did in fact attribute to the intelligentsia a special societal role which for all practical purposes amounted to its identification as an elite. In his important article “Konstytucyjne pytanja i ukrajinstvo v Rosiji” (The constitutional

<sup>8</sup> *Dzvony* (June 1932), 6 (15): 403–419. Vasył Kučabs’kyj is also the author of an excellent book on Ukrainian contemporary history, entitled *Die West-Ukraine im Kampfe mit Polen und dem Bolschewismus in den Jahren 1918–1923* (Berlin, 1934), as well as of other historical and political studies. For the information on Kučabs’kyj’s connection with the Stefan George Circle, I am indebted to Myxajlo Demkovyč-Dobryans’kyj.

<sup>9</sup> Concerning the identification of Kubala’s influence on Lypyns’kyj, see Pelenski, “Der ukrainische Nationalgedanke,” pp. 155–56; idem, “Geschichtliches Denken,” p. 233.

<sup>10</sup> Bilas, “Krakiv, Zeneva i filijacija ‘Kryčevs’koho,’” pp. xxxviii–xlvi.

question and the Ukrainians in Russia), published following the Revolution of 1905,<sup>11</sup> Hruševs'kyj dealt with the problem of creating representative institutions in the Ukraine and in a Russian federal state. There Hruševs'kyj argued that the intelligentsia not only should play a special role in the sociopolitical system, but also should be guaranteed a specific number of seats in a future territorial *sojm* (parliament).<sup>12</sup> Hruševs'kyj posulated, in a somewhat artificial manner, that the intelligentsia could serve as a useful, neutral, and objective element against the struggles of material and class interests—as if this particular social group had no vested interests of its own. Lypyns'kyj, on the other hand, did not resort to such facile embellishments to support his arguments. He was outspoken in his preference for the elitist interpretation of history and politics.

All of Lypyns'kyj's work is characterized by a constant intellectual confrontation with the problem of the elite/elites, but the essence of his preoccupation with that problem is contained in the third part of *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, entitled "Pro nacional'nu arystokratiju i pro try metody jji organizaciji: klasokratiju, oxlokratiju i demokratiju" (About the national aristocracy and the three methods of its organization: classocracy, ochlocracy, and democracy), written in 1921–1922 and comprising 232 printed pages.<sup>13</sup> He later elaborated on that thesis in his treatise *Poklykannja "Varjahiv," čy organizacija xliborobiv?* (Invitation of the "Varangians," or organization of farmers?; 1925).<sup>14</sup>

In his own formulation of the theory of elites, Lypyns'kyj did not use the term elite, but instead employed the concepts *nacional'na arystokratija* (the national aristocracy), *providna verstva* (the leading stratum), and *pravljača verstva* (the ruling stratum). Yet he clearly identified these concepts with

<sup>11</sup> Hruševs'kyj's article was first published in *Literaturno-naukovyj vistnyk* 30 (1905): 245–58, and reprinted in two collections of his essays, namely, *Z bižučoji xyvli* (From the current trend; Kiev, 1906), pp. 16–32, and, in abridged form and in Russian translation, in *Osvoboždenie Rossii i ukrainskij vopros* (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 121–31.

<sup>12</sup> For an identification of Hruševs'kyj's constitutional project of 1905, see Pelenski, "Der ukrainische Nationalgedanke," pp. 67–69. On the special role of the intelligentsia, cf. J. Pelenski, "Suspil'no-polityčni ideji Myxajla Hruševs'koho" (unpublished paper read at the M. Hruševs'kyj Centennial Conference of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., in 1966), p. 8. For a recent treatment of Hruševs'kyj's constitutional project, see T. M. Prymak, "Konstytucijnyj projekt M. Hruševs'koho z 1905 roku," *Ukrajins'kyj istoryk*, 1985, nos. 1–4 (85–88), pp. 34–35.

<sup>13</sup> V. Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv* (Vienna, 1926; reprinted New York, 1954), pp. 111–343.

<sup>14</sup> Originally published in *Xliborobs'ka Ukrajinna* 4 [7–8] (1923): 312–40, and 5 (1925): 296–376. It also appeared as an appendix to the 1926 edition of *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, pp. 471–580, and as a separate publication (New York, 1954).

the Western theoretical meaning of "elite." In his introduction to *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, entitled "Vstupne slovo do čytačiv z vorožyx taboriv" (An introductory word to readers from hostile [political] camps), written in the fall of 1926, he specifically stated: "I consider every ruling and leading stratum in each given epoch as an aristocracy (that which is referred to in West European literature as an 'elite'), regardless of its [social] origins."<sup>15</sup>

Lypynys'kyj, in some ways similarly to Karl Marx and Max Weber, was firmly convinced that political theories and ideologies are closely related to the concrete needs of social groups and their elites, who organize states with specific forms of government on definite territories. According to him, the development of a state, its ability to survive, and its degeneration depend on the forms of its organization. Lypynys'kyj made his distinction between "the active minority"—the elite—and "the passive majority"—the masses—by stating that in order to create a state, the former must attain power, because individuals and societies can be convinced only by real power, not by theoretical considerations. Every nation has been created by an active elite which took over power in the given society. From this active elite—that is, "the national aristocracy" in Lypynys'kyj's formulation—come the leaders and organizers who are "the best in their nation." As specific examples of "national aristocracies" Lypynys'kyj mentioned the knights of the feudal age, the French court nobility during the age of absolutism, the officers of Napoleon, the Prussian Junkers during the foundation of the second German Empire, the financial bourgeoisie of France and the United States, the Russian bureaucracy of the imperial St. Petersburg period, the English labor aristocracy associated in labor organizations, and the Soviet party and state leaders.<sup>16</sup> He also maintained that every sociopolitical system must continually revitalize itself by coopting new elites from various classes and groups, a dynamic process he defined as "a permanent renewal of aristocracy," or what in Western terminology is referred to as circulation of elites.

Relying on the classic tripartite model of sociopolitical systems—namely, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—Lypynys'kyj developed his own theory of the three methods for the organization of national elites and their circulation. This immediately brings to mind the cyclical theory of elites developed by Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) over a period of twenty years, from 1896 to 1916.<sup>17</sup> Although Lypynys'kyj did not cite Pareto

<sup>15</sup> Lypynys'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. xlvii.

<sup>16</sup> Lypynys'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 131.

<sup>17</sup> Pareto formulated his views on elites and their circulation in the following works: *Cours d'économie politique*, 2 vols. (1896–97; new edition: *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 1 [Geneva, 1964], with an introduction by G. H. Bousquet and a bibliographical note by G. Busino); *Les*

directly in his *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, it appears that he was familiar to some extent with the latter's theory of elites and their circulation.<sup>18</sup> Lypyns'kyj's typologization of the three national aristocracies/elites and their circulation, may, in some respects, be a more sophisticated development of Pareto's dual conception of elite circulation, that is, of "the lions" and "the foxes," or the conservative-regressive and the adaptive-innovative elites. Similarities also exist between Lypyns'kyj and Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), particularly with regard to their application of the notions "ruling stratum" and "ruling class."<sup>19</sup> Again, no direct reference to Mosca can be found in Lypyns'kyj's writings. Lypyns'kyj did, however, rely on and quote from two authors who in one way or another made use of the elite theories. The first was Robert Michels (1876–1936), whose seminal work on political parties, entitled *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie* (Sociology of party systems in modern democracy; Leipzig, 1911), Lypyns'kyj cited.<sup>20</sup> The second, and more influential on Lypyns'kyj's thought, was Georges Sorel (1847–1922), whom Lypyns'kyj called "a great French syndicalist and sociologist," "a commentator and continuator of Marx," and "a great ideologue of syndicalism."<sup>21</sup> (Sorel employed Pareto's theoretical observations, and applied the

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*systèmes socialistes*, 2 vols. (1902–1903; new 3rd edition: *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 5 [Geneva, 1965]); *Trattato di sociologia generale*, 3 vols. (1916; French edition, entitled *Traité de sociologie générale* [1917–19], and English edition, *The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology*, 4 vols. [New York, 1963]); and various articles since 1897 conveniently published by G. Busino, ed., in *Scritti sociologici* (Turin, 1966). For some assessments of Pareto and the literature on his work, see G. H. Bousquet, *Pareto (1848–1923): Le savant et l'homme* (Lausanne, 1960), and R. Cirillo, *The Economics of Vilfredo Pareto* (London, 1979).

<sup>18</sup> For the identification of the similarities between Lypyns'kyj and Pareto, see A. M. Bocheński, "Ukraiński Maurras," *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński* (December 1933), nos. 34–35, p. 3 (reprinted in this issue); Pelenski, "Geschichtliches Denken," pp. 225, 239. Cf. also E. Pyziur, "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj i polityčna dumka zaxidn'oho svitu," *Sučasnist'*, 1969, no. 9, pp. 103–115, especially pp. 106–111; Bilas, "Krakiv, Ženeva i filijacija 'Kryčevs'koho,'" pp. lvi–lxiv.

<sup>19</sup> Mosca's relevant work in this connection is his *Elementi di scienza politica* (1896); English translation, *The Ruling Class* (New York, 1939). For some assessments of Mosca and the literature on his work, see M. Delle Piane, *Gaetano Mosca: Classe politica e liberalismo* (Naples, 1952); J. H. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite"* (Ann Arbor, 1958). For a juxtaposition of the views of Lypyns'kyj and Mosca, cf. Pyziur, "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj," pp. 106–111.

<sup>20</sup> An English translation of Michels's work appeared as *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracies* (New York, 1962). For an identification of Lypyns'kyj's references to the French edition of Robert Michels' work (cf. *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, pp. 147, 162), see Pelenski, "Geschichtliches Denken," p. 225.

<sup>21</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, pp. 34, 58, 61. Here Lypyns'kyj cited specifically the following works by Sorel (pages in parentheses refer to references in *Lysty*): *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris, 1908) (especially the 4th edition, p. 61); *La décomposition du marxisme* (Paris, 1908) (pp. 58–59); *Les Illusions du progrès* (Paris, 1908) (p. 154); "Matériaux d'une

concept of "ruling stratum" in his own ideological formulations).<sup>22</sup> While chronologically following Pareto, Mosca, and Michels, Lypynys'kyj was far ahead of the major sociological debates on the problem of elites that took place in the West in the period from the early 1950s to the 1980s. Specifically, Lypynys'kyj distinguished three methods in the organization of national elites.

First is the classocratic (organic) method, which is characterized by the rule of a knightly or military stratum earning its living from material production and serving as a model for the elites of other social groups, all of which are integrated into a corporate monarchic state order. Lypynys'kyj regarded England as the ideal country to foster the classocratic system and the functioning of its elites.<sup>23</sup> He supported this typological definition with a stimulating, albeit controversial, analysis of the emergence of the English classocratic system, in which he stressed the harmonious and rhythmic balance of the English elite's fluctuation between the conservatism of the old aristocracy and the progressivism and revolutionism of the new social groups. According to Lypynys'kyj, the British constitution and the British parliamentary system were the final results of this dynamic balance of societal forces. In his opinion, two other societies approached the British classocratic model. In the European context, Lypynys'kyj regarded Hungary, ruled by an aristocratic elite, as being the best, and the least degenerated, example of the classocratic system; however, Hungary was also threatened by stagnation if it proved unable to integrate the elites of modern social groups into that system.<sup>24</sup> Finally, he postulated that the United States of America was also founded by Anglo-Saxon classocratic elements that established themselves as an elite in the early republic; their sociopolitical system later decayed and became transformed into a republican democracy.<sup>25</sup>

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théorie du prolétariat" (Paris, 1919) (p. 34 fn.); "Vues sur les problèmes de la philosophie" (p. 106). For a discussion of Sorel, his theories, and the literature, see I. L. Horowitz, *Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel* (London, 1961); J. J. Roth, *The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980); J. L. Stanley, *The Sociology of Virtue: The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982).

<sup>22</sup> Pyziur, "Vjačeslav Lypynys'kyj," p. 107.

<sup>23</sup> Lypynys'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, p. 290–98. Lypynys'kyj's acquaintance with English history needs further investigation. We know that he was familiar with and cited the works of English historians, such as John Robert Seeley, *The Expansion of England* (1883), and M. Goldwin Smith, *The Empire* (1863), p. 332.

<sup>24</sup> Lypynys'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, p. 298 fn.

<sup>25</sup> Lypynys'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, pp. 332–34.

Second is the democratic (chaotic) method of elite organization, based on an open and unlimited competition for power among individualistic and materialistic social elements divorced from production and military service. The social strata supporting the democratic form of government and aspiring to the position of the ruling elite are the merchants, the financiers, the intelligentsia, and extraterritorial groups. In Lypyns'kyj's interpretation, all these groups have little or no commitment to the traditional values and organic needs of their societies; they attempt to govern them by rationalistic and utilitarian slogans and methods, as well as by financial and intellectual manipulation. While claiming to speak in the name of a sovereign people, they actually tend to represent fictional majorities, obtained in artificially arranged elections influenced by transient issues couched in the most demagogic terminology (unlimited freedom, equality, brotherhood). The democratic elites tend to destabilize the already existing classocratic system, which in turn leads to chaos and the downfall of the old order. Post-revolutionary France, Poland, the United States of America of his time, and to some extent Mexico served Lypyns'kyj as concrete examples of the functioning of the democratic system and its elites.<sup>26</sup> It deserves mention that Lypyns'kyj treated Polish "nobiliary democracy" of the early modern period in the same negative manner as did Friedrich Engels.<sup>27</sup>

Third is the ochlocratic (mechanical) method of elite organization and of the respective sociopolitical system (not mob rule, but, according to Lypyns'kyj, rule over the mob),<sup>28</sup> which, in contrast to the democratic order, rests on a "real majority," a notion anticipating what would come to be known as the "silent majority." The ochlocratic elite, with its limited interest in genuine material productivity and its inability to sustain

<sup>26</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, pp. 308–315, 332–40.

<sup>27</sup> This negative assessment of Polish "nobiliary democracy" appears in F. Engels's well-known treatise, *The Peasant War in Germany*, originally published in 1850 in the fifth and sixth issues of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, a political and economic review edited by Karl Marx in Hamburg. Concerning the critical edition of the German text, see "Der Deutsche Bauernkrieg," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Erste Abteilung, Werke*, vol. 10, (Berlin, 1977), pp. 367–443. An English translation by M. J. Olgin, entitled *Peasant War in Germany*, was published in New York in 1926 and reprinted in F. Engels, *The German Revolutions*, ed. L. Krieger (Chicago and London, 1967), pp. 3–119. Engels, in discussing Ulrich von Hutten's reform program for the German Empire, observed that Hutten demanded "the restoration of a *democracy of the nobility* headed by a monarchy, a form of government reminiscent of the heyday of the late Polish republic. . . . Founded on serfdom, this democracy of the nobility, the prototype of which could be found in Poland and [in a somewhat modified form] in the empires conquered by the Germanic tribes, at least in their first centuries, is one of the most primitive forms of society" (Engels, *Peasant War in Germany*, ed. Krieger, p. 71).

<sup>28</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Poklykannja "Varjahiv"* (1926 ed.), p. 538 fn.

economic and cultural creativity, is best defined as an unattached nomadic social stratum. According to Lypyns'kyj, the members of this elite are organized in an iron-clad, mechanical, and militant formation (party); are motivated by a fanatical faith (ideology); and have jointly experienced a special type of integrating drill—all of which create a tightly-knit and highly disciplined approach in the struggle for power and in its perpetual application to governance. The ochlocratic elite exploits the passivity, weakness, and simplicity of the masses and rules them by the use of force, terror, and demagoguery. Lypyns'kyj characterized the ochlocracy as the most linear, rigid, and primitive sociopolitical system.

Lypyns'kyj distinguished between two types of ochlocracy: the historical, as represented by centralized absolutistic monarchical states of the late medieval and early modern period; and the contemporary, as exemplified by communism and, somewhat later, by fascism. In its most advanced form, the ochlocratic order existed in prerevolutionary France, where a strong ochlocratic monarchy destroyed the classocratic foundations and the old aristocracy and ruled with the help of a new court aristocracy, bureaucracy, and a strong military establishment. Following the Revolution, the French ochlocratic system degenerated and was replaced at first by a revolutionary ochlocracy and subsequently by a classical version of democracy.<sup>29</sup>

According to Lypyns'kyj, the most ideal and permanent type of ochlocratic system, and its corresponding elite, can be found in Russia.<sup>30</sup> His treatment of what he perceived as the traditional Russian ochlocracy foreshadows in many respects one of the current and increasingly influential approaches to Russia's sociopolitical system, political culture, and relations between the elite and society. In particular, Lypyns'kyj's brief but excellent exposition concerning the systemic parallels and historical analogies between the Russian *ancien régime* and the Bolshevik system is surprisingly original.<sup>31</sup> It anticipates in many respects more recent debates on the issues in question, as reflected in Richard Pipes's *Russia under the Old Regime* (1974) and in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's statements.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 302-311.

<sup>30</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 316-26.

<sup>31</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 321.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. A. Solzhenitsyn's article, "Misconceptions about Russia are a Threat to America," *Foreign Affairs* 58, no. 5 (Summer 1981), and especially his "Open Letter to the Conference on Russian-Ukrainian Relations," which took place 8-9 October 1981, at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, published in Russian in *Novoe russkoe slovo* (21 June 1981) and in a Ukrainian translation in *Svoboda* (5, 6, 7 August 1981; nos. 145, 146, 147). For a reply on behalf of the conference organizers by Jaroslaw Pelenski, see "Pro potrebu rosij's'ko-ukrajins'koho dialohu: Vidpovid' na lyst Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna," *Svoboda*, 18-19 November 1981, nos. 218-19. The systemic parallels and historical analogies in the context of

Yet Lypyns'kyj's most original contributions to the analysis of sociopolitical systems and elite functioning were not only his exceptionally early identification of Bolshevism as an ochlocratic system and his respective typologization of the Communist party and its leadership (1921–1922), but also his brilliant and concise explication, formulated already in 1925–26, of the systemic and structural correlation between communism and fascism and, by implication, emergent Ukrainian integral nationalism. This explication can be found in his article “W dyskusji o idei” (Discussion about an idea). It was written in the form of a letter to Professor Władysław Leopold Jaworski, his former university teacher, who, according to Lypyns'kyj, had “taught [him] the principles of law and political thinking,”<sup>33</sup> and appeared in the Polish conservative newspaper *Czas* (1 May 1926).<sup>34</sup> There Lypyns'kyj, within the context of a discussion on agrarian ideology, critically evaluated the three influential ideologies of his time—bourgeois liberalism, communism, and fascism—and juxtaposed communism and fascism as follows:<sup>35</sup>

Is communism an agrarian ideology? Is bourgeois liberalism, which opposes communism or, similarly to communism, intelligentsia-based fascism—not a socialist but a nationalist one—an agrarian ideology? Obviously not.

Above all, as has been correctly stressed by the distinguished Professor [Jaworski] in his article, the basic characteristic of agrarian ideology is irrationalism. Irrationalism is, however, completely alien both to the mentality of the contemporary West European liberalism of the bourgeois, and to the [mentality] of the *intelligent* (member of the intelligentsia) or of the *póintelligent* (member of the semi-intelligentsia) who is a communist or a fascist and who struggles with [the bourgeois] for power. . . . For the contemporary “mechanized”—if one can say so—bourgeois and for the communist or the fascist who has been produced by this

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Russian-Ukrainian relations were discussed by Vasył' Hryško, Natal'ja Gorbanjevska, Petro Grigorenko, Omeljan Pritsak, and Nicholas Riazanovsky in a roundtable discussion at the aforementioned conference; the substance of the discussion, entitled “Problems of the Russian-Ukrainian Dialogue,” was published in Ukrainian translation in *Vidnova 2* (Winter 1984/85–Spring 1985): 24–50. See also J. Pelenski, “Do problemy ukrajins'ko-rosijs'kyx vzajemovidnosyn,” *Vidnova 2*: 5–16.

<sup>33</sup> V. Lypyns'kyj Archives, W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute (Philadelphia), roll. 1, p. 95.

<sup>34</sup> For a Ukrainian version, see V. Lypyns'kyj, *Universalizm u xliborobskij ideologii*, trans. Jevhen Tomašivs'kyj (Prague, 1926).

<sup>35</sup> Elements of Lypyns'kyj's incisive critique of emergent Ukrainian integral nationalism and European fascism can be found in his *Poklykannja “Varjahiv”* (1925), pp. 538–45. While critical of fascism as a system, Lypyns'kyj, for a brief time, evaluated positively Mussolini's early “reformist” political activity, mistakenly assuming that the latter had genuinely accepted the monarchical (organic) political system and integrated the conservative elite into the framework of the revived Italian system (p. 495). Already by 1926, Lypyns'kyj's assessment of fascism was completely negative, as evident from his article “W dyskusji o idei.”

bourgeois machine, hierarchy, diversity of matters, and values do not exist. The entire world and, primarily, the human being are represented in their mentality with respect to their content, as identical numbers from which the human mind can and should create arbitrary combinations. Hence the irrational and metaphysical religiosity and the faith in God of the farmer; hence the rationalistic free-thinking and nonreligiosity of the contemporary bourgeois; hence the fanatical, in its conviction about its rationalist and dialectical "truth," materialist theory of communism, and the similar, only couched in nationalist terms, theory of fascism. Hence the substitution of religion and church by modern magic in "bourgeois," "proletarian," as well as "fascist" circles: by means of faith in the divine omnipotence of the human mind and its miracle workers officiating in Masonic lodges and in the League of Nations, or in the Third International and in the communist "cells," or, finally, in fascism.<sup>36</sup>

... Hence communism and fascism, which captivate ever broader circles, which organize the masses torn from the land into militant hordes, weld them together with an iron discipline of terror, awaken them by means of fanatical class or national hatred, and use them for the destruction or conquest of the remnants of the agrarian sedentary culture.

... A communist or a fascist *intelligent*, in order to dominate and lead the contemporary hordes, must subjugate all political freedom. ... Hence the communist or fascist dictatorships of the revolutionary intelligentsia which are an expression of the fanatical intolerance of individuals who thrive on demagoguery and hypnotization of the masses. ...

The ideology of liberalism, the ideology of democracy victorious after the Great War, is represented by the bourgeoisie that administers contemporary capitalist mechanized production. It [liberalism] is opposed by communism and fascism led by an unproductive revolutionary intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia engaged exclusively in politics and in the reform of the world.

These brief but incisive observations on the affinities between communism and fascism can be regarded as an embryonic definition of the modern totalitarian model developed in the United States two to three decades later (late 1940s–early 1960s) by Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich, Zbigniew Brzeziński, John Armstrong, and others.

Whereas Lypyns'kyj offered a well-rounded and integrated theory of elites and their circulation on the European and even Atlantic scale, he did not present an equally elaborate theoretical analysis of the same problem in the Ukrainian context. This may be partially explained by a lack of sufficient time to develop his views on these topics *in extenso*—he died at the age of forty-nine. He intended to do so in the planned but apparently unwritten work, *Het'manstvo (Teorija Ukrajins' koji trudovoji monarxiji)* (Hetmanitism [The theory of the Ukrainian labor monarchy]);<sup>37</sup> also his untraceable work *Teorija pravlinnja* may have included a discussion of

<sup>36</sup> In Lypyns'kyj's own text, the formulation on fascism reads: "represented by various 'leaders' of fascism."

<sup>37</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 70.

these problems. Lypyns'kyj's task was especially difficult insofar as the Ukrainian example was concerned because his general theory of elites was based on their functioning in fully established sociopolitical systems. In the Ukrainian case he had to search for precedents and examples in the history of a relatively unstructured polity. However, on the basis of the various references in his available works, it is possible to reconstruct an outline of Lypyns'kyj's theory of historical Ukrainian elites.

Only four periods in Ukrainian history received a positive evaluation from the perspective of Lypyns'kyj's classocratic elite theory: (1) Galician-Volhynian Rus'; (2) the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state until the incorporation of Ukrainian Rus' into Crown Poland (1569); (3) the Xmel'nyc'kyj age; and (4) the brief period of the Hetmanate under Pavlo Skoropads'kyj.<sup>38</sup>

According to Lypyns'kyj, in the first two periods a classocratization of the Ukrainian society had begun to take place and a landed military aristocracy was developing into an elite. However, following the incorporation of the Ukrainian lands into Crown Poland, the Ruthenian classocratic aristocracy was democratized and as a consequence completely demoralized. The third and, in Lypyns'kyj's view, most successful attempt at creating a classocratic society on Ukrainian territory took place when the *horodove kozactvo* (urban and sedentary Cossacks) not only created a strong military organization, but also, following the successful revolution under the leadership of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj, began, in its role as the new national aristocracy, to cooperate in the founding of a hereditary monarchic classocratic order in the Ukraine. The last period of Ukrainian history—which can be classified as a nascent classocratic experiment, namely, the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropads'kyj (1918)—was too brief for the development of a classocratic elite which could have functioned according to Lypyns'kyj's theoretical expectations.

Lypyns'kyj's preoccupation with Ukrainian history and politics made him recognize several principal flaws affecting the endeavors of Ukrainian state- and nationbuilding. He attempted to deal with these from a monarchist and corporatist perspective. But regardless of the answers he provided—answers difficult to accept in a post-monarchist age—the problems he identified and tried to analyze are still besetting Ukrainian life.

Embracing the view that elites are the fundamental element in the quest for Ukrainian independence, as well as in the nationbuilding process, Lypyns'kyj correctly assumed that without the active participation of elite groups capable of organizing material production, as well as the bureau-

<sup>38</sup> Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratviv-xliborobiv*, pp. 299, 317, 322–23 fn.; *Poklykannja "Varjahiv"* (1926 ed.), p. 551.

cracy and the armed forces, a Ukrainian state could not be founded or recreated, and, as a consequence, the Ukrainian polity would remain underdeveloped, undifferentiated, and unstructured—in short, an incomplete nation. Since Ukrainians endowed with such capabilities have served for centuries in the state systems of foreign or hostile powers having imperial centers outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, a formula must be found to reintegrate them into the Ukrainian polity. Also, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which constitutes a service elite only, has an important, innovative role to play in the society. Yet, because the intelligentsia's general role in society is restricted to the functions of writing and social rhetoric, and does not include material production, its contribution to the development of Ukrainian needs and aspirations will be limited.

Lypynys'kyj also maintained that the Ukrainian intelligentsia had developed a tendency to offer literary programs as solutions for Ukrainian national aspirations. By considering this approach to be tragicomic and utopian, he even coined for it the phrase “literaturna Ukrajina” (a literary Ukraine), which he used sarcastically on various occasions. He rejected the very notion of a political theory and practice based primarily on literary-cultural perceptions, the theory and practice so dear to Ukrainian populist democrats and, in a perverted manner, to Ukrainian integral nationalists. Instead, he argued in favor of a theory of elites and nation founded on territorial unity, mutually shared productive work, jointly experienced service obligations, and enlightened, vested self-interest—in short, on the realities and not the dreams of national life, a theory closely approximating the traditional and contemporary American Anglo-Saxon model of elites and their roles in society (in particular his ideas about the role of the intelligentsia, or intellectuals in society, coincided with those traditionally dominant in the Anglo-Saxon world). In *Lysty do bratuv-xliborobiv*, Lypynys'kyj made the following observation about the formation of the American nation:

This is how the American nation is being formed before our eyes, through the process of the living together of different nations and different classes on the territory of the United States. These United States did not separate from their Metropolis either under a nationalist slogan (down with the English) or under a socialist one (down with the lords and the bourgeoisie), but under a political slogan: Let us, the inhabitants of America, regardless of nations or classes, create our own American state.<sup>39</sup>

Closely related to Lypynys'kyj's elite theory was his concern with the problem of the institutional versus personalistic approach in Ukrainian history and politics. He observed that the various modern Ukrainian polities have never enjoyed a complete and fully developed institutional framework,

<sup>39</sup> Lypynys'kyj, *Lysty do bratuv-xliborobiv*, p. xvi.

and Ukrainian politics have traditionally been dominated by chance and accident, frequently even by the almost exclusively personalistic approach of individuals, what in Ukrainian political terminology is known as *otamanija* or *otamansčyna*. He therefore argued that this deficiency could have been corrected by the establishment of a hereditary, monarchical hetman state at the time of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj or, in modern times, of Pavlo Skoropads'kyj—a conception which does not appeal to the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians today, and which he himself abandoned in the last years of his life. Lypyns'kyj also did not take into account that the Ukrainian polity of the Hetman state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was largely a variant of the Polish mixed system of the oligarchic period, and not of nobiliary democracy, as some incorrectly assume, and that the elected offices of the hetman and other officials precluded an absolutistic monarchical solution.

The mixed system and oligarchic framework of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ukrainian Hetmanate were never completely institutionalized or legitimized. Election procedures were not defined in written constitutional terms and were often conducted in an unstructured fashion. The hetmans and other officials either attempted to cling to their positions as long as possible or were simply deposed in a coup.

Even in the modern period of Ukrainian history, the originally institutionalized and structured political process of the Ukrainian Central Rada during the first phase of the Ukrainian National Republic was soon replaced by the *otamansčyna* of the Directory period, and no other than Symon Petljura, who was a devout Ukrainian patriot and who died for the Ukrainian cause, symptomatically chose the code word *holovnyj otaman* for his military and popular title. From that time up to the present day, it has been the person, and not the constitution or the precedent of a codified tradition, for whom institutional frameworks have been created and ideological justifications formulated. It has been the traditional *otaman* who has run affairs from his own perspective. The history of modern Ukrainian nationalism abounds in examples of this Ukrainian predilection for the political cult of the *otaman*, and is best reflected in the popular, personalized definition of political movements (*mazepynci*, *petljurivci*, *mel'nykivci*, *banderivci*, *bul'bivci*, etc.). The personalistic *otaman* approach has even been transplanted into Ukrainian political, social, and cultural life in the diaspora.

Lypyns'kyj regarded the lack of institutionalization in Ukrainian political life as a deeply-rooted anomaly, because he sincerely wished the Ukrainian polity to be just like others, not better and not worse, but normal and grounded in the contextual realities of the respective historical periods. He may have erred temporarily insofar as his projection of the ultimate

forms of the Ukrainian political system was concerned. He was, however, an outstanding theorist of the political processes, the dynamics of political life, and, above all, the interaction of elites and society in the Ukraine and in the Ukrainian diaspora.

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