


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EDITED BY ŞİNASİ TEKİN

GÖNÜL ALPAY TEKİN



RAİYYET RÜSÛMU

Essays presented to  
**HALİL İNALCIK**  
on his Seventieth Birthday  
by his Colleagues and Students

*Guest Editors*

Bernard Lewis • Omeljan Pritsak • Gönül Alpay Tekin  
Şinasi Tekin • Gilles Veinstein

*Managing Editor*

Carolyn I. Cross

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FIVE DOCUMENTS FROM THE TOPKAPI PALACE ARCHIVE ON THE OTTOMAN  
DEFENSE OF THE BLACK SEA AGAINST THE COSSACKS (1639)

Victor Ostapchuk  
(Harvard University)

The importance of the economic resources of the Black Sea basin for the strength and prosperity of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent necessity for control over the region as a cornerstone of Ottoman imperial policy are themes developed in the work of Halil Inalcik. Within several decades after the conquest of Constantinople, the Black Sea was transformed into an "Ottoman lake," and through the sixteenth century the empire enjoyed the economic benefits deriving from relatively easy control of this rich region.<sup>1</sup> During this period, the raiding activities of the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks—descending in their boats or *şaykas*<sup>2</sup> into the Black Sea from their respective borderland sanctuaries in the Ukraine and the middle Don region—were a localized though troublesome problem of the northern frontier. It is in this context that an appreciation can be gained for the magnitude of the problem the Ottomans faced during the height of the Cossack naval raids from the last decade of the sixteenth century through the first half of the seventeenth century, when the threat became one of devastation to any settlement on the Black sea coast as well as of disruption of sea-lanes used by commercial and military traffic. Recent research on Ottoman archival sources has suggested that the consequent damage to the Ottoman Black Sea region was greater than previously assumed.<sup>3</sup> While still successful in realizing their imperial policy of preventing any other major power from seriously challenging their dominion over the Black Sea,<sup>4</sup> the Ottomans were frustrated by the unpredictability, frequency, and destructive capacity of the Cossack raids.

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<sup>1</sup> Thus the growth of Istanbul into a great metropolis was made possible by the foodstuffs, raw materials, and slaves coming from the Black Sea basin which, in turn, was made dependent on the market and transit trade possibilities of the great capital. See Inalcik 1973: 129-33, 144-45; Inalcik 1979; also Inalcik 1960 and Inalcik 1973a.

<sup>2</sup> The Cossack *şayka* (known as *čajka* in Slavic languages), which according to Beauplan was about 60 feet long, 10-12 feet wide and 8 feet deep, had no keel, which allowed it to navigate in shallow water and had a rudder on each end allowing it to change direction without turning around, thus making it extremely maneuverable. With ten to fifteen oars on each side and a sail which was used only in fair weather, the *şayka* was supposedly faster than the Ottoman galley. When the sail could not be used or when it was necessary to escape detection from afar, the mast could be taken down. To increase its buoyancy, especially in high seas when the waves would go over its low sides, thick bundles of large dry reeds were tied to the sides along the entire length. Four or five light cannons were placed on the sides. Large enough to carry fifty to seventy men and extensive supplies, it was small enough to be pulled ashore and dragged across land for making portages (Beauplan: 454, 464-66; also d'Ascoli: 99; Krejs: 68-70; Tušin 1978: 51-55). *Şayka* was also used by the Ottomans to denote a large keelless boat (probably very similar to the Cossack *şayka*) used for transport on rivers (especially on the Danube) and along the coast of the Black Sea, as well as for military purposes such as defense of river shores (Uzunçarşılı 1948: 458).

<sup>3</sup> Berindei 1977; Fisher 1979-1980.

<sup>4</sup> Inalcik 1947.

The Ottoman military response to the perennial Cossack threat was primarily defensive.<sup>5</sup> Fortresses guarding important coastal settlements or passages into the Black Sea were strengthened, and new ones were built. The Ottoman fleet was responsible for the interception of *şayka* fleets setting out on raids or returning laden with booty. It also played an important role in the construction and repair of such fortresses, often in conjunction with land forces. Little is known about the organization and functioning of this defense system. And while Ottoman chronicles and other sources show that Cossack incursions and encounters with Ottoman forces were commonplace during this period, there are in fact few known firsthand testimonies by witnesses or participants of these events.<sup>6</sup> How large were Cossack raiding parties and with what frequency did they strike? Along what routes did the Cossack *şaykas* as well as the Ottoman galleys navigate in their operations in the Black Sea? How large were the fleets and squadrons assigned to the Black Sea in response to the Cossack threat and what types of ships and boats did they include? What types of troops were based in the fortresses guarding the region? What were the sources of labor and materials for the construction and repair of these fortresses? How were operations of Ottoman land-based and naval forces coordinated? What were the Cossack tactics for penetrating Ottoman defenses and executing their raids? What were their tactics during encounters with Ottoman naval and land forces? What types of booty did the Cossacks seek? How did the Ottoman forces go about searching for, pursuing, and combatting the Cossacks? In what ways did the physical geography of the region and weather conditions affect either side? These are some of the questions which need to be addressed to understand better how the Cossacks were apparently so successful against the Ottomans in the Black Sea and to assess the effectiveness of the Ottoman defense system.

The Ottoman archives contain a number of documents by commanders and officials responsible for the defense of the Black Sea. As reports by subordinates to superiors, they are not disinterested accounts, but rather, they tend to present the Ottoman efforts against the Cossacks in the best possible light. Nevertheless, they contain many details on the methods and problems of both sides. Some of the reports are by participants in encounters with the Cossacks, and, as such, provide invaluable firsthand information. Unlike accounts intended for posterity, these communications between contemporaries who were familiar with various facets of the Cossack problem tend to give little exposition. However, sufficient probing and analysis of such documents can reveal more data and clues on organizational and military matters than they would appear to contain on first reading. Their firsthand information is important not only because it augments an almost insignificant corpus of true primary evidence, but also because it can act as a control on the reliability and accuracy of the Ottoman chronicles and travelers' accounts. For example, even Guillaume Le Vasseur, sieur de Beauplan, the French military engineer who spent seventeen years in the Ukraine (1630-1647) and wrote the best contemporary descriptive account of the Zapo-

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<sup>5</sup> A military solution directed at either the Zaporozhian or Don Cossacks or their respective suzerains, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, was not practical during this period (e.g., the war with the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Cossacks in 1621 had no significant effect on the latter's activity in the Black Sea; see Berindei 1977: 290ff.). The Ottomans exerted diplomatic pressure on the Cossacks' suzerains, including the threat of war, in an attempt to compel them to prevent the Cossacks from raiding the Black Sea. The issue of the devastating raids by the Crimean Tatars on the Ukrainian territories of Poland-Lithuania as well as on the borderlands of Muscovy, which had become a serious problem for both states and the affected populations since the end of the fifteenth century, played a role in the bargaining between the Ottoman and Polish-Lithuanian or Muscovite sides.

<sup>6</sup> For examples of short eyewitness accounts in Greek of Cossack raids in Rumelia, see Granstrom 1972.

rozhan Cossacks, never witnessed their operations on the Black Sea and had to rely on the testimony of others for his information of Cossack, as well as Ottoman, naval tactics.<sup>7</sup>

Five such documents from the Topkapı Palace Museum Archive in Istanbul (*Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi*) are presented here. They relate to the beginning, middle, and final phases of a naval campaign by the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea under the command of Piyâle, *kethüdâ* of the imperial naval arsenal (*tersâne-i 'âmire*),<sup>8</sup> as well as to repair work at the Özi (Ochakiv) fortress complex at the mouth of the Dnieper River. The documents are from the period of the Don and Zaporozhian occupation of the Ottoman fortress complex at Azak (Azov) (1637-1642)<sup>9</sup>—the first four can be firmly dated to 1639 and it is likely that the fifth is from that year as well. With the takeover of the key stronghold of Azak at the mouth of the Don River, the Cossacks gained unhindered entry into the Sea of Azov. This heightened the importance of the Straits of Kerch, and put Ottoman control of the Black Sea into considerable jeopardy.<sup>10</sup> The Cossacks became so well entrenched in Azak that it could not be retaken without a full-fledged land and sea campaign, which, because of the war with Iran and unrest in the capital following the death of Sultan Murâd IV, could not be mounted until 1641. In the meantime, the Ottomans tried to

<sup>7</sup>*Description des contrees du Royaume de Pologne, contenues depuis les confins de la Moscovie, iusques aux limites de la Transilvanie*, Rouen, 1651. The 1744 English edition used here is based on the revised second edition, *Description d'Ukraine qui sont plusieurs provinces du Royaume de Pologne . . .*, Rouen, 1660.

<sup>8</sup>The *tersâne-i 'âmire* was located in the Kâsım Pasha district of Istanbul on the Galata side of the Golden Horn. Home base of the imperial fleet (*donanma-i hümayûn*), it was staffed by a large corps of permanent and temporary craftsmen and laborers who saw to the construction as well as repair and supply of the ships (Imber 1980: 235-47). Its *kethüdâ* ("steward, deputy") was the vice admiral of the imperial fleet and at the same time a kind of senior representative of the captains and officers of its ships. In the seventeenth century, unlike most *kapudan paşas* or grand admirals of the fleet, the *kethüdâ* of the arsenal was a professional and, usually, an experienced captain, and was frequently the operational commander of the fleet (Uzunçarşılı 1948: 427-28; Imber 1980: 240, 280). Piyâle b. 'Abdullâh, usually referred to in the sources as Piyâle Kethüdâ and sometimes as Uzun or Tavîl ("Long" or "Tall") Piyâle Kethüdâ, was an accomplished naval commander active from the 1620s (or earlier) until the early 1640s and was involved in many operations in both the Mediterranean and Black Seas. According to an account in a history of the Ottoman navy by Kâtib Çelebi, during the great naval battle in 1625 with the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the waters off Kara Harman (Vadu, a town on the south end of the Danubian delta) he was successful in saving his ship from the Zaporozhians who, having surrounded it with their *şaykas*, boarded and overran it (*Tuhfet*: 110-11). After the conclusion of the battle he was rewarded for this feat by being appointed *kethüdâ* of the arsenal, a post which he held until early 1643 when he was appointed *kapudan paşa*. Sometime late in that year, after returning from campaign, he was executed on the basis of a false accusation of mishandling funds (*Tuhfet*: 114, 143); however, the date given by Kâtib Çelebi for his execution—5 *Muharrem* 1053/26 March 1643—in *Tuhfet*: 143 and *Fezleke*: 226 is contradicted by him in *Fezleke*: 228, where Piyâle is said to have returned to Istanbul from six months' campaign in *Şa'bân* 1053/October-November 1643; according to *Topçular Kâtibi*, Piyâle returned in *Ramazân* 1053/November-December 1643 (see *Topçular*: 537a-38b).

<sup>9</sup>On the Cossack occupation of Azak see Smirnov 1946: 43-90; Novosel'skij 1948: 256-306 passim.

<sup>10</sup>After 1637 Cossack activity in the vicinity of the Straits of Kerch increased (viz. the large encounter across the straits from Kerch near Taman in 1938—see below), and there is evidence that the Cossacks planned to capture fortresses guarding these straits (see Smirnov 1946: 52, 54, 55).

contain the increased Cossack raiding activity which ensued and prevent the fall of any further fortresses defending the Black Sea, the loss of which could have seriously threatened their control of the region. It is perhaps with this concern in mind that the fortress complex at Özi, which guarded the entry into the Black Sea from the Dnieper River, underwent repairs in 1639.

Documents I and II, reports by Piyâle Kethüdâ and the *emîn* of the imperial naval arsenal, Mağşûd Ağa<sup>11</sup> respectively, relate the state of readiness of the Ottoman fleet and its deployments in the Mediterranean and Black Seas in the spring of 1639 at the start of that year's naval campaign season. III and IV, reports by fifteen commanders and officers from the Özi fortresses and by Piyâle Kethüdâ respectively, concern the construction work at Özi and encounters with Cossack *şayka* fleets in the vicinity. V, also by Piyâle Kethüdâ, recounts the Ottoman fleet's search for a reported *şayka* fleet along both the northern and southern coasts of the Black Sea at the end of that campaign season. I and IV were first brought to the fore and published in part by the Paris-based research team headed by Alexandre Bennigsen.<sup>12</sup>

From the point of view of diplomatics, the documents are typical of seventeenth-century reports sent to the sultan or a high official of the Porte by a member of the Ottoman *ümerâ*, that is, a commander or official.<sup>13</sup> However, among published Ottoman documents of this type, III, with its fifteen signatures, is an uncommon example of a collective report. It should also be noted that there is a textual relationship between III and IV, as portions of their narratives are parallel and at some points their texts nearly coin-

<sup>11</sup> The *emîn* ("administrator, commissioner") of the arsenal was in charge of its revenues and expenditures, and was also responsible for overseeing the construction, repair, fitting out, and manning of its ships. He was, after the *kapudan paşa* and *kethüdâ*, the most senior official of the arsenal. Mağşûd was appointed *emîn* of the arsenal at the end of 1635 or beginning of 1636 (Topçılar: 418b) and was transferred to the post of deputy palace-gatekeeper (*kapucular kethüdâsı*) in the second half of 1639 (Topçılar: 518a).

<sup>12</sup> I (E. 599) is presented in a summarized translation (*Khanat*: 162-63); IV (E. 2891/1, given there as "E. 2891/2") is presented in facsimile and summary (*Khanat*: 160, 161-62). For the convenience of the reader, the facsimile of E. 2891/1 is repeated in this article. *Khanat* also includes two other reports by Piyâle: E. 4752 (*Khanat*: 156-57, 159) and E. 2891/2, given as "E. 2891/1" (*Khanat*: 158, 159, 161). While the latter two are from the same period and also relate to the Cossacks, they are more concerned with Crimean, Polish, and other affairs.

<sup>13</sup> The internal characteristics of such documents include an *invocatio* or invocation to God written at the top ( ھ , "He" in these documents), an *intitulatio* replete with praises and prayers for the addressee and often, when the Ottoman sultan is not the addressee, praises and prayers for him as well. A title of the addressee is written several centimeters above the first line of the main text and a hiatus is left in the first line where it is to be read. Between the *intitulatio* and *narratio* is the '*arż-i bende budur ki*-type transitional formula. The main text is concluded with the *bâķî fermân sultânımuñdur*-type formula which is followed by a signature (in this context "signature" denotes the name of the sender which is written by the scribe and not by the actual sender). Often for lack of space the main text is continued in the right-hand margin and sometimes in the top half of the page, which were usually left blank. On the verso there is sometimes an address and sometimes an imprint of the seal (*müħr*) of the sender stamped directly behind the signature written on the recto. This type of document belongs to the broad category of writings that includes letters, reports, and petitions and which can be called '*arż*-type. For a brief treatment of the report-type '*arż* see Fekete 1926: lix-lx. For a more detailed treatment of the petitionary '*arż* see Inalcik 1980: 2-5.

cide. This suggests that these two reports were drawn up in close temporal and spatial proximity, with either one of the documents being based on the other, or both stemming from a common text.<sup>14</sup>

The use in the documents of the word *sultānum*, “my lord,” in reference to the addressee precludes the possibility that they were written to the Ottoman sultan (see n.50). From an address on the verso of IV indicating that the document was to be sent to the *silāhdār paşa*, the chief sword-bearer of the sultan, it becomes evident that IV was written to Silāhdār Muştafâ Pasha, who in 1639 was also the *kapudan paşa* of the Ottoman fleet.<sup>15</sup> Since the other two reports by Piyâle Kethüdâ (I, V) and the one by Maḳşûd Ağa (II) are primarily concerned with the affairs of the fleet, it is most likely that they too were intended for Silāhdār Muştafâ Pasha. In fact, a note on the verso of II indicates that the document was received in the east-central Anatolian town of Zile at approximately the same time that, as is known from other sources, Murâd IV and part of the Ottoman army and high command, including Silāhdār Muştafâ Pasha, were encamped there on their return to Istanbul following the reconquest of Baghdad (see n.61). For III, the collective report from Özi, there is no obvious addressee, although possibilities include the grand vizier, the *ḳâymaḳâm*, as well as Silāhdār Muştafâ Pasha (see n.78).

The documents provide a picture of the deployments of Ottoman warships during the naval campaign season. The types of ships mentioned are galley (*ḳadırga*), galliot (*ḳalyata*), *bastarda*, *mavna*, and *yedek*.<sup>16</sup> It becomes evident that the naval forces of the Ottoman Empire were apportioned between

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<sup>14</sup>Cf. III:5-6 and IV:8-10 (the transport of stone to Özi); III:7-8 and IV:12-14 (the capture of Cossack informants); III:9-10 and IV:14-16 (the search mission to the island of Tendra); III:10-14 and IV:17-22 (the encounter at Tendra). Since the account in IV is fuller and because Piyâle outranked the signatories of III and was their overall commander during the mission to Tendra, it is conceivable that III was submitted to Piyâle, perhaps along with other documents, and used in the compilation of his more comprehensive report and then sent along with it to the capital in one “package.” Alternatively, it is possible that the compiler of III had access to a copy or draft (*müsvedde*) of IV and incorporated portions of it while adding other details not found in IV. Finally, there is the possibility that both reports were compiled on the basis of a common draft.

<sup>15</sup>Silāhdār Muştafâ Pasha was *kapudan paşa* from late December 1638/early January 1639, when he was appointed to the post in Baghdad soon after it fell to the Ottomans (*Fezleke*: 205; see also *Topcılar*: 511b, 512a, 514a), until 26 *Şevvâl* 1049/19 February 1640, when he was appointed *beglerbegi* of Budin (*Topcılar*: 523b). In a list of *kapudan paşas*, *Tuhfet*: 143 gives 1047 (26 May 1637-14 May 1638) as the year in which Silāhdār Muştafâ was appointed *kapudan paşa*, which cannot be accepted in light of the above citation in *Fezleke* and repeated mentions by *Topcılar Kâtibi* of *Ḳara* (Kemânkeş) Muştafâ Pasha as *kapudan paşa* at least until late December 1638, when the latter was appointed grand vizier (*Topcılar*: 495b, 501a, 506a). Insofar as is known, Silāhdār Muştafâ did not have any naval experience prior to his appointment as *kapudan paşa*.

<sup>16</sup>The seventeenth-century *ḳadırga* had one or two masts with lateen sails and usually 25 thwarts on each side with three to five oarsmen per thwart. Several cannons were placed at the prow and perhaps also on the sides. A typical crew included 150-200 oarsmen, 100-150 or more troops, plus about 35 skilled hands—caulkers, carpenters, oarmakers, sailmakers, etc. (*Tuhfet*: 153; *Uzunçarşılı* 1948: 461-63; *Imber* 1980: 214ff.). The *ḳalyata* was a smaller galley with 19-24 thwarts on each side and able to carry about 125 troops. Faster than the standard galley, it was especially useful for pursuit of enemy ships and reconnaissance. According to *Kâtib Çelebi*, when the fleet was in transit, two *ḳalyatas* would sail three *mîls* (on *mîl* see n.86) in advance of the fleet and, when in port, two *ḳalyatas* would stand guard two or three *mîls* offshore (*Tuhfet*: 151-52, 159; *Uzunçarşılı* 1948: 460). The *bastarda* was a large galley reserved for the *kapudan paşa* and other important naval commanders with 26-36 thwarts on each side and five to

the Black and Mediterranean Seas according to the exigencies of a particular year (I, II). In 1639 the majority of the ships belonging to the imperial naval arsenal were assigned to the Black Sea, while a few were sent to reinforce those ships based not in the arsenal but rather in the maritime provinces of the Aegean—the so-called *beg gemileri* or *beg-ships*<sup>17</sup>—and those belonging to the fleets of Tunis and Algiers engaged in the defense of the Mediterranean region. Conversely, some *beg-ships* were sent to supplement the imperial fleet in the Black Sea. The mentions of nine *beg-ships* assigned to the Black Sea in that year and seven *beg-ships* in the previous year are perhaps indications of the typical *beg-ship* force assigned to the Black Sea annually. On the sail to Özi, as well as on the return to Istanbul, the fleet sailed in at least two groups—one along the Rumelian and another along the Anatolian coasts of the Black Sea.<sup>18</sup> In V it is pointed out that such a division of the fleet made possible the simultaneous patrol and defense of both shores of the sea. Presumably another benefit was the more even distribution among the Black Sea ports of the burden of resupplying the ships (see n.109).

One document (II) also contains valuable information on the troop composition of a fleet sent to the Black Sea. In the Ottoman fleet, troops were mostly regular land forces<sup>19</sup> and, as is confirmed in this document, troops from only one corps were assigned to a given ship.<sup>20</sup> Of the thirty-two ships of the imperial naval arsenal assigned to the Black Sea in 1639, six were manned by janissaries, four by *cebecis*,<sup>21</sup> and twenty-two by *timâr*-holders. Another document also mentions the presence of *levends* on this fleet

seven oarsmen per thwart (*Tuhfet*: 152-53; Uzunçarşılı 1948: 463-65; Soucek 1975: 237-38). The *mavna* was a large galley with 26 or more thwarts on each side and seven oarsmen per thwart (similar to the galleass). It had two decks with about ten cannons per side on top and the oarsmen on the bottom (*Tuhfet*: 152; Uzunçarşılı 1948: 460-61; Imber 1980: 218). *Yedek* refers to any ship towed by another, although in the sources it seems also to denote a particular type of ship towed by a galley, perhaps carrying extra supplies and troops; descriptions of it, e.g., whether it could sail under its own power and other details, are lacking in the standard works.

<sup>17</sup>*Beg gemileri* refers to ships, usually of the galley-type, based in one of the maritime *sancağs* of the Aegean or eastern Mediterranean regions which belonged to the *eyâlet* of the *kapudan paşa*. The *sancağbegis* of such *sancağs*, known as *deryâ begleri* or sea-begs, were responsible for fitting out, manning and usually commanding their respective *beg-ship* or ships (*Tuhfet*: 146-50; Lewis B. 1961).

<sup>18</sup>In IV it is clear that the main part of the fleet sailed to Özi along the Rumelian coast while, concerning the rest of the ships, it is only stated that a squadron was sent from the Bosphorus along the Anatolian coast but had not yet linked up with the main part of the fleet (IV:64-65). It is evident from other sources that the fleet would often follow the Anatolian coast as far as Sinop or Samsun and then sail straight across the sea to the Crimea (see Başbakanlık Arşivi [Archive of the Prime Minister (Istanbul)], *Mühimme defteri* 83: nos. 83-122; Topçılar: 529b). At the end of the 1639 campaign, the main part of the fleet took the latter route back to Istanbul, while the rest of the fleet followed the Rumelian coast (V).

<sup>19</sup>Imber 1980: 260.

<sup>20</sup>Cf. Kâtib Çelebi's statement, "out of 21 galleys, nine were janissary ships (*yeñiçeri gemisi*)" in his relation of the battle with the Cossacks at Kara Harman (*Tuhfet*: 110; for another example see Topçılar: 518a).

<sup>21</sup>A *cebeci* ("armorer") was a member of a *kapukulu* corps responsible for manufacturing, maintaining, guarding and transporting small weapons (Uzunçarşılı 1944: 3-21). Aside from their traditional role in battle of cleaning and repairing jammed muskets at the side of the janissaries and resupplying ammunition, it seems that they also participated in actual fighting (cf. references to the *cebecis* on ships assigned to missions in the Black Sea against the Cossacks as "musket-bearing" [*tüfengli cebeci*] in Topçılar: 456a, 492b).

(IV).<sup>22</sup> Despite the preponderance of timariot forces, their tardiness in reporting for duty and absenteeism were obviously problems. Even though, according to the given document, the fleet had already left the arsenal and was anchored at Kavak near the entry to the Black Sea, the muster of timariots had not yet been completed. At this point Mağşud Ağa, the author of II, promises that separate registers listing those timariots who reported at the muster places and those liable for paying the fee exempting them from service (*bedel*) would be sent to the addressee, i.e., the *kapudan paşa*.<sup>23</sup>

The signatures at the bottom of III indicating the *ağas* or commanders of the various military units stationed at Özi—one for the *ağa* of the *cebecis*, four for *ağas* of *'azeb* units, three for *ağas* of *fârisân* units, and two for *ağas* of *topcı* units<sup>24</sup>—provide a rare sampling of the composition of the troops garri-

<sup>22</sup>In the naval context, a *levend* was a musket-bearing soldier hired on a daily-wage basis for duty on a ship during campaign. *Levends* also served as oarsmen, guards, and marines for shore landings (Kramers, Griswold 1983: 728-29).

<sup>23</sup>On the importance of timariots in the fleet see *Tuhfet*: 146-48; Imber 1980: 261-65; Lewis B. 1961. Usually the timariots assigned to the fleet were from the maritime *sancağs* under the *kapudan paşa*, although in times of need they would also be drawn from other maritime or even non-maritime *sancağs* as well. Although timariots from the maritime *sancağs* are often referred to as *sipâhîs* in the sources, it is most likely that, on naval campaigns such as the one in these documents, they were without their horses (cf. Guilmartin 1974: 113-14); by the seventeenth century they were apparently armed with firearms (see Inalcik 1975: 199; Imber 1980: 265). As in the case of campaigns in the Mediterranean in which timariots would board the ships outside the capital, usually at the Dardanelles, perhaps here the timariots were ordered to gather in the vicinity of Kavak or ferried there from other gathering places. This would help explain the apparent delay of the fleet there. Although twenty-two ships were designated for timariots, it is impossible to determine on the basis of this document whether so many timariots actually participated on this campaign. Note that in reference to actual combat in IV, janissaries, *cebecis* and *levends*, but not timariots, are mentioned. Perhaps the *levends* were hired in place of those timariots who failed to report to the fleet (cf. the levy of fortress-soldiers [*hişâr erleri*] and volunteers to compensate for timariots in such situations, Imber 1980: 262).

<sup>24</sup>One of the functions of the *cebecis* (see n.21) was to serve tours, usually of three years, in frontier fortresses where they were in charge of the fortress arsenals (*cebehâne*). Here *'azeb* refers to a type of musket-armed light infantryman who served in a provincial fortress. was of local origin and was paid with local funds (Uzunçarşılı 1950; Inalcik 1975: 199; Murphey 1979: 178). Although *fâris* (sing. for *fârisân*) was usually a synonym for *sipâhî* or member of the timariot cavalry, *fârisân* here (III) refers to another cavalry formation since the *timâr* system was not in effect in the northern Black Sea region (Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Berindei, Veinstein 1979; Berindei, Veinstein 1981: 273, 318 n.38; Evliyâ Çelebi confirms this for the vicinity of Özi, Evliyâ TSK: 56b; Evliyâ 5: 179-80; Evliyâ 1961: 111). Although little is known about the *fârisân* formation, especially in this region, judging from what is known about other frontier-garrison troops, they were almost certainly of local origin and salaried from local funds (cf. *'ulûfeciyan-i suvârî* or *fârisân* in Fekete 1955: 97; see also Murphey 1979: 177-80; Uzunçarşılı 1943: 3). The *fârisân* formation may have resembled that of the *gönüllüyan* who were also mounted garrison troops serving for pay (*'ulûfe*), although as auxiliaries to janissaries which were not present at Özi, and who would after several years' service become part of permanent regiments. In seventeenth-century sources the *gönüllüyan* are mentioned beside other paid auxiliaries of provincial origin including the *fârisân* (Inalcik 1965). A *topcı* ("cannoneer, gunner") was a member of a *kapukulu* corps responsible for the manufacture, care and operation of cannons as well as for their munitions. One of their functions was to serve in frontier fortresses (Uzunçarşılı 1944: 33-93).

soned at the fortress complex. Although it is unlikely that the units commanded by these *ağas* represented all units of the Özi garrisons, it is worth noting that local forces, that is, the *'azeb*s and *fârisân*, predominate in this sampling. Only the *ağa* of the *cebecis* is qualified as being "of the Sublime Porte" (*dergâh-i 'âli*), that is, of the forces directly attached to the central government (*kapukulu*).<sup>25</sup> The absence of a signature for an *ağa* of the janissaries, the most important of the *kapukulu* troops, supports the claim by the mid-seventeenth-century Ottoman traveler Evliyâ Çelebi that there were no janissaries stationed at Özi.<sup>26</sup>

Evident from the documents is the importance of information on the Cossacks' plans and forces for the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea including the whereabouts of their *şayka* fleets. Thus, ships were sent ahead of the fleet to learn of new developments in the northern Black Sea region (II). In another instance, land forces were dispatched along threatened coastal regions of Anatolia to obtain information on possible Cossack raiding activity (V). The gathering and reporting of information to the fleet (II) and the relay of communications between various far-flung portions of the fleet (V) were among the auxiliary functions of the *beg*-ships. The Ottoman fleet also relied on private merchant ships for these tasks (V).

The most effective method of obtaining intelligence on the Cossacks was the dispatch of local troops and flotillas on missions to capture "informants" (*dils*, "tongues"). In the winter prior to the 1639 naval campaign season, the *kapudan*<sup>27</sup> of Özi sent a raiding party in boats up the Dnieper River (II). From one captured informant, the arsenal in Istanbul was able to learn, perhaps even before the Cossacks set out for the Black Sea, that five *şaykas* were already fitted out while ten more were on the point of being fitted out. During the campaign that summer, the Özi forces sent raiding parties by land and by water to capture informants for intelligence on current raiding activities of the Cossacks (III, IV). It is interesting that it was not considered sufficient to interrogate a captured informant at Özi. Rather, judging by two instances in these documents, it was apparently a common practice to send a captured Cossack all the way to the arsenal in Istanbul for further interrogation (II, IV). Although the case of a captured Cossack not responding truthfully at Özi shows that such captives did not always acquiesce (III, IV), it seems that the Ottomans would not have troubled sending a Cossack the great distance to the capital without reasonable certainty that he would cooperate. Such a captive, perhaps a prominent or experienced Cossack, could presumably be convinced or compelled to defect to the Ottomans once he found himself in the great capital with little hope of rejoining his comrades. Aside from having the opportunity to cross-examine useful captured informants, perhaps the authorities in the arsenal profited from their continual presence by drawing, when the need arose, upon their expert knowledge of Cossack methods and affairs, local conditions and geography, and so forth.

The documents provide only a few details on the construction work at Özi and the fleet's role in it (III, IV): the fleet imported both skilled and unskilled labor; three days after it sailed in, the foundation for the unspecified construction was completed. Because of a delay in the arrival of wagons from Moldavia and Wallachia for the transport of stone, galleys and boats of the fleet (*şandals*) and local barges (*ţombazes*) had to bring in a load of stone to the construction site every few days. At night the ships were stationed in the mouth of the Dnieper by the tower of *Qılburun* (Kinburn)<sup>28</sup> to prevent Cossack attack or passage.

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<sup>25</sup> Presumably the *ţopcis* were also *kapukulu* troops (Uzunçarşılı 1944: 33-93), though it is surprising that "of the Sublime Porte" (*dergâh-i 'âli*) is not part of the signatures for their *ağas*.

<sup>26</sup> Evliyâ TSK: 56b; Evliyâ 5: 180; Evliyâ 1960: 111.

<sup>27</sup> In this context, *kapudan* denotes a local official based in a maritime or river town who commanded its defensive flotilla and tended to its boats and ships (Beldiceanu 1973: 603; Uzunçarşılı 1948: 403-404).

<sup>28</sup> Located on the left bank of the Dnieper estuary across from Özi.

Another Topkapı document (E. 6019), a report by Hâlîl Pasha, *beglerbegi* of Özi (who according to III was in charge of the forces assigned by land to the construction at Özi) provides information on the nature and location of the construction and complements the accounts in III and IV:

... previously a wall [made] of interwoven branches (*çit divânı*) at New Fortress (*kal'e-i cedid*), which was built by the late *kapudan [paşa]* Hasan Pasha near the Özi Fortress, became dilapidated and up until now lies in ruin. Since to not restore it would be contrary to the interest of the state, experts (*ehl-i vukûf adamlar*) were sent to it. According to their estimates of the dilapidated wall, its size was two hundred *zirâ*'s (1 z.  $\approx$  70 cm) in length, that is, one-half of four hundred *zirâ*'s and twelve *zirâ*'s in height. As the [new wall] was to be built of stone, the experts' estimates of the timber<sup>29</sup> and other materials (*levâzimât*) that would be needed were recorded in a register (*defter olunup*). When, before this, permission for the construction was requested from the gate of good fortune [i.e., the Porte], the firman of the padishah for the construction arrived. Therefore our men, his slaves, were sent with noble orders [enjoining] that of the necessary supplies, a quantity be provided from Moldavia and a quantity from Wallachia. The *voyvodas* (governors of Moldavia and Wallachia) made some preparations and procurements, but concerning other provisions they made excuses and pleas and proceeded with negligence. [However] because now strict noble orders from the threshold of felicity [i.e., the Porte] have reached the above-mentioned *voyvodas*, [they] are expending absolutely all of their strength for the gathering and collection of the aforementioned materials. If God—be He exalted!—wills it, henceforth they will not have the power to waver . . . .<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Presumably the timber (*kerâste*) was needed for the foundation, support beams or scaffolding.

<sup>30</sup> According to a note on its verso, E. 6019/1 was received (probably in Istanbul) on 26 *Rebî' I* 1049/27 July 1639; thus it was written about the same time as III and IV. Further information concerning the delay of the wagons from Moldavia and Wallachia can be found in reports in the Topkapı by the *voyvodas* of Wallachia and Moldavia (E. 8066 and E. 5543/1). The Wallachian *voyvoda*, Matei Basarab, in a letter to the Porte with a date on its verso (presumably indicating the time of delivery) of 30 *Rebî' I* 1049/31 July 1639, confirms the receipt of the two successive orders mentioned by Hâlîl Pasha, adding that the one from the Porte (i.e., the second one mentioned by Hâlîl) was delivered on 10 *Rebî' I* 1049/11 July 1639 by a *çavuş* (an official who delivered and enforced orders) of the imperial naval arsenal, while the original order from Hâlîl Pasha arrived three or four days earlier (7 or 8 July). He also mentions that both orders commanded the prompt dispatch of *tarabands* (a mercenary firearm-bearing infantry corps attached to the *voyvoda* of one of the Romanian principalities, Grigoraş 1971: 165-69), and wagons to the Özi fortress designated for repairs. But he protests that he obeyed the first order without delay and that, by the time the second one arrived (i.e., the one from the Porte), the *tarabands*, wagons and necessary supplies were ready and that on 13 *Rebî' I* 1049/14 July 1639 they set out for Özi. For his part, the Moldavian *voyvoda*, Vasile Lupu, states in his letter to the Porte (which has the same date on its verso as the verso of E. 8066) that, while he had been ordered to provide 2,000 *tarabands* and 400 wagons for the repair work at Özi (the wagons here, however, are specified as being for the transport of timber), it was beyond the means of his country to supply so many *tarabands* and wagons. However, he was doing everything possible to gather both in the quantities he had supplied to the Ottomans on many other occasions and was sending two *boyars* or noblemen along with his *ağa* of *tarabands* to the Porte to make further explanations. E. 5543, the report by Vasile Lupu, is published in Decei 1972: 76-69. The date on its verso is given in *Documente*: 168 (however, there, for "rebi II" read "rebi I"). Since the *tarabands* were an elite mercenary corps, it is unlikely that their services were ordered merely to escort the wagons or to work at the repair site. Being a firearm-bearing force, it is more likely that they were needed to reinforce the Özi garrison

Although the development of the Özi fortress complex is not well known, from the account given by Evliyâ Çelebi it is evident that in the second quarter of the seventeenth century there were four fortresses on the Özi side (i.e., right bank) of the Dnieper and a fortress on the Kılburun side (i.e., left bank). Three of the fortresses on the Özi side were built in a line perpendicular to the bank of the Dnieper and attached to each other: on a hill farthest from the river was the old citadel called “Old Fortress of Özi” (*kal'e-i 'atîk-i Özi*). Next to it, descending toward the Dnieper, was “New Fortress” (*kal'e-i cedîd*), also called “Middle Fortress” (*orta hişâr*). Then came “Hasan's or Hasan Pasha's Fortress” (*Hasan kal'esi* or *Hasan paşa kal'esi*), which was also known as “New Fortress of Hasan Pasha” (*kal'e-i cedîd-i Hasan paşa*; see n.32). Several hundred meters downstream, on a sand spit and at the closest point on the right bank opposite the fortress of Kılburun was “New Palanğa” (*palanğa-i cedîd*).<sup>31</sup> The qualification in Halîl Pasha's report that the so-called *kal'e-i cedîd* was built by *kapudan paşa* Hasan leaves little doubt that the construction work in III and IV was not on New Fortress/Middle Fortress but on Hasan's Fortress/New Fortress of Hasan Pasha. According to Evliyâ Çelebi, this latter fortress, built at the very edge of the Dnieper by Hasan Pasha in 1036/1626-1627 and in front of which Cossack *saykas* would often pass, was, of all the fortresses at Özi, in the highest state of readiness in the face of the Cossack threat.<sup>32</sup>

As for actual encounters with the Cossacks, most revealing is the dramatic eyewitness testimony recounting an incident at the island of Tendra (III, IV). There, on 16 July 1639, nine *saykas* were intercepted by seven galleys and fourteen boats. Faced with this overwhelming force (seven galleys alone comprised a force of about a thousand troops along with more than a thousand oarsmen), the immediate response of the Cossacks was to withdraw their *saykas* into shallow and reed-filled waters which the galleys could not enter. The Cossack reliance on shallows (*şığ*) and reedbeds (*sazlık* or *kaşlık*) plays prominently in Ottoman accounts.<sup>33</sup> Because it had no keel, the Cossack *sayka* was ideally suited for navigation in such waters. The presence of extensive shallows, many sandbars, and the abundance of tall reedbeds along the northern shores of the Black Sea, from the Danubian delta past the mouth of the Dnieper, as well as along the shores of the Sea of Azov,<sup>34</sup> gave the Cossack *sayka* a significant advantage over the Ottoman galley.<sup>35</sup> In response to the Cossack tactic of taking advantage of such waters, the galleys would attempt

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and to protect the repair site from possible Cossack attack (see n.119). Perhaps the reluctance or inability of the *voynodas* to obey promptly the orders to send wagons and *tarabands* to Özi was related to the fact that in 1638 they had been required to send to Mosul 300 to 400 pack horses as well as troops who arrived there only in November of that year (Topçılar: 510b).

<sup>31</sup> Evliyâ TSK: 56b-58a; Evliyâ 5: 179-84; Evliyâ 1961: 111-16. These four fortresses are mentioned in a register from 1627 relating to an expedition to Özi (Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Tapu ve tahrir* 748: 1b). A *palanğa* was a small fortress usually made of mud bricks, earthworks or wood, often hastily constructed.

<sup>32</sup> Evliyâ TSK: 57a-57b; Evliyâ 5:182; Evliyâ 1961: 113-14. Evliyâ Çelebi's date is probably reliable since, in the register from 1627 mentioned in the previous note, this fortress is referred to as *kal'e-i cedîd-i Hasan paşa ki müceddeden binâ kerde*, “New Fortress of Hasan Pasha which is newly built.”

<sup>33</sup> E.g., see *Tuhfet*: 107, 109, 112-14.

<sup>34</sup> E.g., see Zelenyj 1868: 170.

<sup>35</sup> Concerning the Cossack use of shallows and reedbeds, Beauplan says only that the Cossacks would hide in reed-filled waters upstream from the mouth of the Dnieper waiting for the opportune moment to slip out onto the sea (Beauplan: 465); Krejs, writing at the end of the seventeenth century, calls the Cossacks masters of sailing close to the shore (Krejs: 71). Chevalier, writing in the early second half of the seventeenth century, states that “it was impossible to catch up to [the Cossacks] once they fled into the reeds or close to the shore where the galleys could not go” (Chevalier: 42-43).

to bombard the *şaykas* with their artillery.<sup>36</sup> However, when the gradient of the sea bottom was gradual enough, the *şaykas* could retreat beyond the range of the galleys' guns.

By the late 1630s, if not earlier, the Ottomans began to employ a formidable countertactic. Rowboats and barges (known as *şandals* and *ţombazes* respectively),<sup>37</sup> manned by troops and sometimes carrying artillery, would be sent into the shallows and reedbeds to assault the *şaykas*. It appears that in such waters the mounting of such assaults was often the only way to defeat and capture the *şaykas* since the extensive supplies they carried made them well suited for enduring "sieges" by the galleys. Even when the galleys could draw close enough so that the *şaykas* would be within range of their guns, without an assault by *şandals* and *ţombazes* the Cossacks were known to escape under the cover of darkness. For instance, in a large and protracted encounter in 1638 in the Straits of Kerch near Taman, Piyâle Kethüdâ was on several separate occasions able to trap a large *şayka* fleet. The first time, the Cossacks minimized their losses by moving most of their *şaykas* into shallow water beyond the artillery's reach. On the second occasion, Piyâle Kethüdâ was able to land some cannons from his galleys and, dragging them along the shore to the Cossacks' rear, bombard them from both land and sea. However, in both instances, most of the *şaykas* slipped past the blockade at night, navigating along shallow waters.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, the galleys managed to keep up with the fleeing Cossacks and trap them several more times. Piyâle Kethüdâ was able to defeat the Cossacks only after repeated assaults on their shallow-water and reedbed sanctuaries using *şandals* and *ţombazes*. It is significant that, even when the Cossacks were completely surrounded from both land and sea with no possibility of escape, the chronicle account states that it was necessary to bring in extra *ţombazes* from Kerch to reinforce the *şandals* and mount an all-out assault because the *şaykas* had enough supplies to outlast the besieging force.<sup>39</sup>

In the encounter in the shallow waters along Tendra, the galleys were unable to draw within cannon range; *şandals* and *ţombazes* carrying troops from Özi and deployed alongside the ships were

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Beauplan's statement that bombardment by the Ottoman galleys would inflict heavy losses upon the Cossacks when the galleys encountered the *şaykas* on the open sea (Beauplan: 466).

<sup>37</sup> *Şandal* has denoted a variety of oared boats including small rowboats (e.g., a two-oared rowboat according to Pakalın 3: 122; a small boat carrying a few passengers according to Mantran 1962: 98-99), as well as large rowboats or longboats (e.g., a wide boat, shallop according to Radloff 4: 304-305; "the largest boat carried by a ship, with seven to twelve pairs of oars," and other examples cited in Kahane, Tietze 1958: 565). In these documents *şandal* refers to large, longboat-type boats carried by galleys—in IV, Piyâle requests that the arsenal not fail to equip each new galley with a *şandal*, and he provides a rare indication of the size of *şandals* in the fleet ("thirteen-thwart *şandal*," IV: 49-50, see n.139); note that the *şandals* were large enough to transport stone to Özi (IV:9). *ţombaz* (also *ţonbaz*, *donbaz*) was a keel-less and flat-bottomed barge-type boat used for transport of heavy loads, mainly in rivers (Pakalın 3: 511; Redhouse: 1181; *Tarama*: 3819). Although the shapes and sizes of *ţombazes* are not certain, judging by the higher tax rates levied on their loads, they could carry much more cargo than Ottoman *şaykas* used for river transport (Cvetkova 1970: 292).

<sup>38</sup> In an incident at Tendra in 1621, Ottoman galliots (*kalyata*), using their cannons, decimated a Cossack fleet that had taken refuge in shallow water. But because the water was shallow, the galliots could not rush the *şaykas*, and the latter succeeded in escaping during the night (*Tuhfet*: 109). Perhaps at that time the Ottoman countertactic involving smaller boats had not yet been adopted?

<sup>39</sup> The account of Piyâle's encounter with the Cossacks in 1638 is given by Kâtib Çelebi (*Tuhfet*: 112-13; *Fezleke*: 209-11) and repeated by Na'îmâ (Na'îmâ: 395-98). It contains many other significant details of tactics involved in Cossack-Ottoman clashes and merits a full translation and commentary.

reinforced with janissaries, *cebecis* and *levends* from the galleys and were immediately sent after the *şaykas*. In the ensuing chase along the length of this narrow island, the boats pursued along one side while the galleys covered the other, presumably because the Cossacks were fleeing along both sides of the island or because they might otherwise have escaped by drawing their keelless boats across the width of the narrow island. The pursuers were on the verge of overtaking the Cossacks when a sudden heavy storm threw the adversaries into disarray. Ensuing high winds pinned both sides down for the rest of the day, that night, and the entire next day. Then at dusk, fearing that the weather would turn calm and that they would subsequently be overcome by their pursuers, the Cossacks attempted to flee. They headed for shore and, after abandoning their *şaykas*, fled into thick brush. The *şaykas* (at this point both III and IV state that there were ten *şaykas* instead of nine) were captured with their equipment and supplies while, according to III, most of the Cossacks fell into the hands of the Tatars.

The unsuitability of the *şandals* and *ţombazes* for withstanding storms and tall waves, as is clear from III and IV, reveals a weak point in the tactic used to counter the Cossack reliance on shallows and reedbeds. The high surf that occurs in shallow water no doubt compounded the predicament of these boats. While the documents do not explicitly relate how the *şaykas* fared in the rough weather, they too must have been temporarily disabled. However, it may well have been that these *şaykas* had reeds tied to their sides (according to Beauplan and others, a technique used by the Cossacks for improving flotation), which allowed them to take in much water without sinking.

Nevertheless, the use of smaller boats was a significant advance in combatting the Cossacks. Speaking as a professional and experienced naval commander, Piyâle Kethüdâ, with a note of admonishment directed at his superior, the *kapudan paşa* of the Ottoman fleet, leaves no doubt as to the reasons for the Cossack successes in the Black Sea:

[the Cossack *şaykas*] are present on very windy and stormy days and in extremely shallow and narrow places. There is no end or conclusion to their successes . . . (IV:25-26); however many galleys are launched, may one *şandal* be built for each one of them and launched together [with it] . . . [otherwise] revenge . . . will not be taken, and service [in the name of the sultan] . . . [as well as] freedom from shame will not be, [for] when they [i.e., the *şaykas*] are found in such shallow parts and reedy places by [our] large galleys, the effort is wasted and the service is in vain (IV:51-61).

Concerning the problem of inclement weather, the fact that in V the early onset of the autumn storms forced a squadron of galleys into port at Sinop and eventually to head back to Istanbul, while at the same time the *şayka* fleet which they had been in search of was still considered a threat, supports the evidence that such weather conditions worked to the advantage of the Cossacks.

The documents include further examples of actions taken against Cossack-raiding parties. In one case, referred to above, a squadron of galleys, having been notified that twenty-one *şaykas* had set out from Azak, covered a great distance patrolling the coast from Özi to the Crimean port of Kefe (Caffa, today Feodosia) and then crossed the sea, extending its search to the Anatolian coast. When stormy weather forced the squadron to port in Sinop, the search could only be continued by mounted fortress-soldiers (*atlu hişâr erleri*) who were sent a great distance in both directions along the Anatolian coast (V). In another instance, local musket-bearing cavalry sent out from Özi, also without naval support, to shores in the vicinity in hope of surprising Cossacks who had come ashore was successful in encountering a Cossack raiding party. The strategy implicit here is worth noting: rather than reacting to sightings of Cossacks and sending troops in pursuit, the Özi authorities dispatched their forces to probable landing places of the Cossacks (*karaya dökilecek yerlere ihtimâlle . . .*, IV:32) hoping to engage them before they reembarked or perhaps even to ambush the Cossacks as they came ashore. The explicit mention of musket-bearing cavalry (*atlu ve tüfeng-endâz yarar yigitler*, IV:33-34) is an indication of the importance of com-

bined mobility and firepower for intercepting and successfully engaging the elusive Cossacks, who were primarily a musket-bearing force.<sup>40</sup>

That there were places in the vicinity of Özi which the defending forces considered as likely landing places for the Cossacks is in itself worthy of notice. The account of the incident at Tendra also mentions that the Ottoman forces headed for that particular island because there was a *chance* that the Cossacks might be there (*Tintere nâm aşada ihtimâli ile . . .*, IV:14). These two instances suggest that there were sites near the mouth of the Dnieper, some known to the Ottomans, where the Cossacks would come ashore to rest and replenish water supplies, particularly after their arduous sea journey on the return from their raids.<sup>41</sup> Tendra must have been an ideal stopover place for the Zaporozhians: it was strategically located near the mouth of the Dnieper and near a valley in the Kılburun peninsula (Kinburns'ka kosa) which, according to Beauplan, was flooded at times, allowing the Cossacks to proceed part way across the peninsula by water and then portage to the Dnieper, bypassing the fortresses of Özi.<sup>42</sup> And it was a good place of refuge, with its shallow waters and reedbeds, ample supply of drinking water<sup>43</sup> and apparent lack of inhabitants.<sup>44</sup>

The documents suggest that the imperial naval arsenal and imperial fleet played a prominent, if not predominant, role in coordinating and directing the defensive effort in the Black Sea. For example, a *çavuş* of the imperial naval arsenal (*tersâne-i 'âmire çavuşu*) was dispatched to the strategic Straits of Kerch to make sure that local officials reported without delay any sign of Cossack activity (IV). (In Matei Basarab's report mentioned above, it was a *çavuş* of the arsenal who delivered initial orders that men and materials be sent from Wallachia to the construction site at Özi.) As was pointed out above, local authorities sent information extracted from captured Cossacks and even the informants themselves to the imperial naval arsenal. And local forces, whether at Özi or Sinop, were put at the disposal of the fleet (III, IV, V).

Interesting in one of the documents is the mention of the recovery of a group of young Turkish boys and women from a Cossack raiding party (IV). Although there is other evidence that the Cossacks took captives,<sup>45</sup> presumably either to sell as slaves or to hold for ransom, this activity has not yet been the subject of a systematic study.

Although the documents tend to highlight the exploits of the Ottoman forces against the Cossacks, they also at times, as in Piyâle Kethüdâ's comments cited above, betray a sense of exasperation and

<sup>40</sup> Inalcik has pointed out that firearms used by the Cossacks in the service of *voyvoda* Mihai were the cause of an unexpected defeat for the Ottomans in Wallachia (Inalcik 1975: 199). Cf. also Evliyâ Çelebi's mention that on one occasion musket-bearing peasantry (*tüfeng-endâz re'âyâ*) from the Laz were marshalled against a Cossack surprise attack on the southeastern Black Sea town of Günye (cited in Inalcik 1975: 202).

<sup>41</sup> Beauplan speaks of the weary condition of the Cossacks upon reaching the mouth of the Dnieper on the return from their expeditions (Beauplan: 466). In the first example it is clear that the Cossacks already had booty when they came ashore near Özi only to be surprised by the Özi forces (see IV:35-42). Although it is possible that they landed to do some further raiding, it seems at least as likely that they were making a stopover on their return journey. In the case of their stopping at Tendra, it seems most unlikely that there were any inhabited points on the island to raid.

<sup>42</sup> Beauplan: 466.

<sup>43</sup> Beauplan: 455. According to a nineteenth-century description, the waters around Tendra were known for their abundance of fish (*Rossija*: 656-57).

<sup>44</sup> Another known instance of the Cossacks stopping at Tendra was in the fall of 1621 when 26 *saykas* anchored there on their return from the Black Sea (*Tuhfet*: 109; see n.38).

<sup>45</sup> E.g., Beauplan: 448; Krejs: 72; Hruševs'kyj 1922: 28, 34; *Khanat*: 169.

frustration reflecting the difficult situation in the Black Sea. Yet the determination and relentlessness of the defending forces is striking. From the documents it is clear that they were vigilant of even relatively small Cossack raiding parties. Thus, for example, the information that two separate parties of five and ten *şaykas* were about to set out for the Black Sea was important enough to report to the *kapudan paşa* of the Ottoman fleet (II).<sup>46</sup> Once it was learned that even a small *şayka* fleet was active in the Black Sea, it was identified by the number of reported *şaykas*, and information on its progress was sought out while measures were taken in earnest to track down and intercept it (III, IV, V). The events related in these documents were minor incidents in comparison with the spectacular events of this era which have made a greater impression on its chroniclers: the famous raids on cities such as Trabzon, Sinop and Varna by scores of *şaykas* carrying thousands of Cossacks or the large naval battles between the *şaykas* and Ottoman galleys.<sup>47</sup> However, the documents suggest that the frequency of raids by smaller *şayka* fleets and the disruption they caused have been underestimated. Further examination of the sources may change the traditional image of Cossack naval expeditions, demonstrating instead that the small raid constituted an effective and perhaps more typical form of Cossack attack on the Ottoman Black Sea.

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<sup>46</sup>It should be kept in mind, however, that, for example, ten *şaykas* carried a not insignificant force of 500 to 700 Cossacks.

<sup>47</sup>In Tušin's appendix listing naval raids by the Cossacks on the Caspian, Azov and Black Seas, which represents evidence from chronicles, travelers' accounts and some documentary sources (but not Ottoman documents), the average Cossack expedition on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov in the first half of the seventeenth century had more than 60 *şaykas* (see Tušin 1978: 162-66).



I. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi E. 599<sup>48</sup>

Report by Piyâle Kethüdâ on the departure of the Ottoman fleet from the arsenal in Istanbul on its way to the Black Sea; includes information on naval deployments in the Mediterranean and Black Seas; sent from Kavak on the Bosphorus and probably intended for *kapudan paşa* Silâhdâr Muşafâ who at the time was in eastern Anatolia, between Diyarbakir and Sivas; undated (written after 24 *Zi'l-hicce* 1048/28 April 1639).<sup>49</sup>

FORMAT: 41.5 x 29.5 cm

WATERMARK: crescent with human profile

INVOCATIO: 0.5 cm below top edge, 20 cm above text (not visible in facsimile)

VERSO: blank

COMMENTS: black ink

## I. TEXT

## Hüve

1 sa'âdetlü ve devletlü ve 'izzetlü şulţânüm hazretlerininüñ hâkipây-i şerîf-i sa'âdet-bağşlarına rûy-i 'ubûdiyet mâlfide kılınup leyl u nehâr Hâkķ sübhânehu ve te'âlâ sa'âdetlü ve şevketlü 2 ve 'azametlü pâdişâhımız hazretlerininüñ vücûd-i şeriflerin haţâ vu haţarlardan maşûn u me'mûn ve 'ömr u devletlerin yevmen feyevmen efzûn idüp yerde ve baırda olan 3 'asâkir-i zafer-me'âşirlerin manşûr u mużaffer idüp taht-i sa'âdet-baht-i sâhib-kırânın bâķî vu pâydâr itmek da'vâtına bi-hulûşî'l-bâl müdâvemet olındugından ğayrı sa'âdetlü 4 ve devletlü şulţânüm hazretlerininüñ daĥi Hâkķ sübhânehu ve te'âlâ vücûd-i şeriflerin haţâ vu haţarlardan şaklayup 'ömr u devletlerin ziyâde idüp mesned-i devletde ber-ķarâr itmek du'âlarına 5 muvâzebetde olındugı 'arż olındugdan soñra 'arż-i bende-i bî-vücûd budur ki donanma-i hümayûn aĥvâlınden tefahuş-i 'âfîleri erzânî buyurlur-ise el-ĥamdü li-llâhi te'âlâ sa'âdetlü devletlü 6 pâdişâhımız hazretlerininüñ ve 'izzetlü şulţânüm hazretlerininüñ eyyâm-i devletlerinde tersâne-i 'âmirede senîn-i sâbıkada donadilup ihrâc olındugı üzere bu sene-i mübârekeke 7 daĥi mükemmel u müretteb kırķ pâre gemi donadilup ĥâlâ bu ednâ vu kemter kullanyle otuz iki pâre tersâne gemisi Kĥara deñiz seferine ta'yîn olunup her gemiñün 8 kürekcî ve cengcisi ve sâyir levâzımât u mühimmâtı görilip işbu mâh-i Zi'l-hiccenün yigirmi dördüncü günü de'b-i kâdim üzere donanma Beşiktaşa çıkup andan soñra 9 sa'âdetlü ve şevketlü pâdişâhımız fermân-i şerifleri üzere Kĥavaķ limanında ârâm olunup fermân buyurıldıgı üzere ĥidemât-i 'aliyye edâsında bezl-i kudret-i bendeĥi 10 olunur benüm sa'âdetlü ve devletlü şulţânüm bu kullarıyle Kĥara deñize ta'yîn olunan otuz iki gemiden ğayrı tokuz kıt'a ümerâ gemisi ta'yîn olunup ikisi donanma çıkımdan 11 evvel gelüp tersânede bulunmak ile Özi ve Kefe taraflarına haber için irsâl olunup yedi kıt'ası henüz daĥi gelmemişdür ve tersânededen donadılan 12 gemilerden üç kıt'a Rodos gemisi ile iki kıt'a gemi Aķ deñiz muĥâfazasında olup sa'âdetlü şulţânüm hazretlerininüñ baştardalarıyle yedek ve mavna ĥâlâ 13 müretteb u mükemmel donanmış ĥâzır u müheyyâ tersâne-i 'âmirede durup taraf-i şeriflerinden emr-i şeriflerine mevķûfdur benüm sa'âdetlü şulţânüm üç seneden berii tersânede 14 kırķar pâre gemi donanmak ile emîn efendi kulları şulţânüm hazretlerininüñ fermân-i şeriflerinde (*sic; read şerifleri*) mücibince dâmen der-miyân idüp bu sene daĥi eyyâm-i

<sup>48</sup>I thank the Topkapı Palace Archive for granting access to its collections and for providing microfilms of these documents.

<sup>49</sup>The concurrence of details in I and II leaves no doubt that they describe the same events. From their relations of Ottoman naval affairs, it seems that I was written before II. A note on the verso of II indicates that the document was received at Zile on 21 *Muĥarrem* 1049/24 May 1639. In the text of I it is stated that the fleet left the arsenal on 24 *Zi'l-hicce*, i.e., 28 April 1639. Thus, allowing for the writing and delivery of II by 24 May, I must have been written no later than a week or two after 28 April.

devlet-i pâdişâhîde ve sa'âdetlü 15 sulţânunuñ zamân-i sa'âdetlerinde kırk pâre gemiyi müretteb u mükemmel donadup bezl-i maqdûr itmişdür Hakk sühbânehu ve te'âlâ hazretlerinden ricâ vu temennâ olunur ki eyyâm-i devlet-i pâdişâhîde 16 ve zamân-i sa'âdetlerinde murâd-i hümâyün-i pâdişâhî ve rızâ-yi şerifleri üzere fütühât-i cemîle müyesser u muğadder ide âmin bâkî emr u fermân sa'âdetlü ve devletlü sulţânun hazretlerinüñdür

17 bende  
18 Piyâle kethüdâ-i  
19 tersâne

## I. TRANSLATION

He!

1-5 Having rubbed the face of slavery into the felicity-giving noble dust [beneath] the foot of his excellency, my felicitous and fortunate and great lord (*sulţânun*),<sup>50</sup> by the sincerity of [my] soul [I am] constant in [making] prayers that God—be He glorified and exalted!—will by night and by day make the noble body of his majesty, our felicitous and majestic and magnificent padishah, safe and secure from errors and dangers and increase his [majesty's] life and good fortune from day to day, and make his [majesty's] armies on land and on sea in whose footsteps victory follows triumphant and victorious, and make everlasting and permanent the throne of the felicity-granting fortune [which emanates from] the possessor of the auspicious (astrological) conjunction. Besides this, after showing my assiduity in prayers that God—be He glorified and exalted!—protect from errors and dangers the noble body of his excellency my felicitous and fortunate lord, increase his [excellency's] life of felicity and make [him] firm in the seat of the state, this is the report (*'arş*) of the slave whose existence is unimportant.

5-7 If it be deemed proper to make an inquiry [for] his highness into the affairs of the imperial fleet (*donanma-i hümâyün*), praise be to God—be He exalted!—[just as] in the previous years, in the days of good fortune of his majesty, our felicitous and fortunate padishah, and of his excellency, my great lord, [the fleet] has been fitted out in the imperial naval arsenal (*tersâne-i 'âmire*) and [readied] to be taken out [to sea], so also in this blessed year forty ships have been excellently and completely filled out.

7-10 At present, thirty-two ships<sup>51</sup> of the naval arsenal have been assigned along with this lowest and base slave of his excellency<sup>52</sup> to the Black Sea campaign. For each ship the [procurement of] oarsmen

<sup>50</sup>Here *sulţânun* as a term of address must be translated "my lord" rather than "my sultan" (were the sultan the addressee, most likely *pâdişâhum* or *pâdişâhumuz* would have been written). Cf. the explicit address on the verso of IV, . . . *sulţânun* . . . *silihdâr Muştafâ hazretleri* . . . (see below); in the seventeenth-century guide to conversational Turkish by 'Alî Beg-Bobowski, *sulţânun* is consistently rendered *mon monsieur* and is used as a polite form of address in much the same way *efendim* is used today (Bibliothèque Nationale, *Manuscrit turc* 235). See also n.60.

<sup>51</sup>These 32 ships were galleys (*ğadırğâ*) and galliots (*ğalyata*) (see II:4).

<sup>52</sup>The plural *majestatis* personal suffix *-leri/-ları* when attached to *kul* or *bende* tends to be non-specific. Here the suffix clearly refers to the addressee, hence *ğulları* is rendered "his [excellency's] slave" (meaning "your slave"). In other instances the referent is the sultan, e.g., *Bekir paşa ğulları*, "his [majesty's] slave Bekir Pasha."

(*kürekci*) and fighting men<sup>53</sup> and other necessities and supplies<sup>54</sup> have been seen to.<sup>55</sup> On the twenty-fourth day of this month of *Zî'l-ḥicce* (28 April 1639), in accordance with the ancient custom, the fleet set out for Beşiktaş.<sup>56</sup> After that, in accordance with the noble firman of our felicitous and majestic

<sup>53</sup>The manning of thirty-two ships entailed assembling a sizable force. With the average galley carrying about 150 to 200 oarsmen and 100 to 150 troops, and the average galliot about 100 to 150 oarsmen and 125 troops, such a fleet required from 7,500 to 11,000 or more men. For estimates of the sizes of galley crews, see Braudel 1972-1973: 841, n.15; *Tuhfet*: 153; Imber 1980: 216. Most oarsmen were free *re'âyâ* levied every spring in certain regions, with a fixed number of households responsible for providing one oarsman. Convicts and enslaved captives from foreign lands were also used as oarsmen (Imber 1980: 266-69).

<sup>54</sup>*Levâzımât u mühimmât*: refers to things necessary for the warships' mission, including items for the operation of the ships, e.g., pitch (*zift*), awnings (*tente*), sailcloth (*yelken bezi*), oars, anchors, cord (*halaṭ*), provisions for the crew such as dried bisquits (*peksimet*), water barrels (*varul*), and munitions such as cannons, cannon balls, lead bullets, and powder. For typical amounts of these items apportioned to ships and for other necessities, see *Tuhfet*: 154-58.

<sup>55</sup>The chronicle of *Topcular Kâtibi* mentions the activities of Piyâle and Maḳşûd in repairing old ships and building new ones, outfitting them and procuring oarsmen in the winter prior to the campaign season of 1639: "In the imperial naval arsenal Long Piyâle Kethüdâ, who is the *kethüdâ* of the naval arsenal, had a new *bastarda* constructed for the fleet and thanks to good prayers it was completed and launched onto the sea. The other galleys, old and new, were prepared and caulked and Maḳşûd Ağa, the *emîn* of the naval arsenal, has been working day and night. In accordance with the noble firman, in *Receb* and *Sa'bân* of the year one thousand forty-eight (8 November 1638-5 January 1639) orders were disseminated to the *każâs* of the *eyâlet* of Anadolu (western Anatolia) in which there were oarsmen (*kürekci*). In the month of *Zî'l-ḥicce* (5 April-3 May 1639) they gathered at the naval arsenal. Thereupon [Maḳşûd] was occupied with the preparations for the fleet [to sail] in the direction of the Black Sea—day and night important supplies and munitions (*mühimmât*) were procured" (*Topcular*: 510b). An interesting Topkapı document (E. 663), a report by Maḳşûd to *kapudan paşa* Silâhdâr Muşafâ from *Zî'l-ka'de* 1048/3 March-4 April 1639 (the addressee and date according to the archival *fiche*), provides further information on the arsenal's activities during that winter and early spring. According to it, because the old dockyards for the *mavnas* were too small, three new docks (*göz*) had been built for *mavnas* and for a *bastarda* and two *mavnas* were in the process of being built. Since ten galliots were being transferred (*virilmek*, "given") to the fleets based in Algiers and Tunis, thirteen new galleys and galliots were under construction and on the point of completion. Maḳşûd also states that the arsenal was preparing all necessities for the imperial fleet to sail either to the Mediterranean or Black Sea and readying its troops and oarsmen, while awaiting further orders.

<sup>56</sup>The fleet followed a specific set of rituals when setting out from the arsenal for the summer campaign including prayers and ceremonies at various points on the Golden Horn involving the grand vizier, the *seyhü'l-islâm* (chief of the ulema), the *âga* of the janissaries, and other high officials as well as the sultan himself. Then the fleet would head for Beşiktaş, the first stop on the Bosphorus near Galata, where it would usually, as required by custom, anchor for three days and where further ceremonies would take place. After that the fleet headed either towards the Mediterranean or Black Sea (Uzunçarşılı 1948: 437-41). However, the ceremonies were no doubt more modest in the spring of 1639, since the sultan and abovementioned officials had not yet returned from the siege of Baghdad (*Topcular*: 495b-521a).

padishah [the fleet] was anchored in the harbor of Kavak.<sup>57</sup> In accordance with the firman that has been decreed, the [utmost] exertion of the power of servitude [i.e., of the slave] is being made in the performance of [these] exalted services.

10-13 My felicitous and fortunate lord, besides the thirty-two ships assigned to the Black Sea with this slave of his [excellency], nine *ümerâ*-ships [i.e., *beg gemileri* or *beg*-ships] have [also] been assigned. Two of them arrived [at the naval arsenal] before the fleet set out and because they were in the naval arsenal, they were sent [out ahead] for news in the direction of Özi and Kefe. The [other] seven have still not arrived. And of the ships fitted out in the naval arsenal, two [of these] ships are engaged in the defense of the Mediterranean Sea along with three ships from Rhodes, [while] *yedeks* and *mavnas*, along with the *başarda* of his excellency my felicitous lord,<sup>58</sup> have now been excellently and completely fitted out [and] stand ready and prepared in the imperial naval arsenal. They are subject to his [excellency's] noble order [coming] from his [excellency's] noble direction.

13-16 My felicitous lord, for [each of] the past three years, his [majesty's] slave the *emîn* efendi [i.e., Maḳşûd Ağa], has made preparations in the naval arsenal including the fitting out of forty ships in accordance with the noble firman of his excellency, my lord. This year too, in the days of imperial good fortune and in the time of the felicity of my felicitous lord, forty ships have been excellently and completely fitted out and the [utmost] exertion of effort has been made.<sup>59</sup> Before the Lord God—be He glorified and

<sup>57</sup> *Ârâm olinup*, "rested." Here near the end of the Bosphorus on opposite shores were two towns with fortresses—today Rumeli Kavağı and Anadolu Kavağı. The fleet probably stopped at the Anatolian town, which was then known simply as *Ḳavaḳ*. According to Evliyâ Çelebi, it had a good harbor capable of holding up to 300 ships (Gökbilgin 1943: 682).

<sup>58</sup> *Sultânnum hazretlerinin başardalarıyle yedek ve mavna*: while *yedek* and *mavna* are translated in the plural, it is assumed that *başarda* with *-lari*, the plural *majestatis*, refers to a single *başarda*, probably the flagship of the *kapudan paşa* (see Soucek 1975: 238). Cf. E. 655 where Maḳşûd, referring to the same naval campaign season, speaks of *mavnas* (*mavnalar*) and mentions the construction of two new *mavnas* at the arsenal (see n.55); note that in II:6 in the same connection, *başarda* is in the singular form; see also Topçılar Kâtibi's statement that a new *başarda* was constructed that year (see n.55).

<sup>59</sup> The mention earlier in this document (6-7) of 40 ships fitted out annually and its reiteration here with the additional information that the current year was the fourth consecutive year that this level was maintained must be an allusion to events in the arsenal in the second half of the 1630s (the fitting out of 40 ships is also mentioned in II:4). Apparently, prior to that time some of the operations of the arsenal had fallen into abeyance, for Kâtib Çelebi notes that Ḳara Muştâfâ Pasha, who was named *kapudan paşa* in late December 1635 or early January 1636 (*Fezleke*: 177; Topçılar: 485b), put the affairs of the naval arsenal in order and arranged the revenues (*ocaklık bağladı*) for the arsenal to fit out 40 galleys annually (*Fezleke*: 232; *Tuḥfet*: 143). In his own tract on the Ottoman military and bureaucracy written in 1639 as a letter of advice for İbrâhîm, who became sultan in 1640, Ḳara Muştâfâ himself mentions the existence of the necessary revenues for 40 ships (Unat 1942: 455; it is not certain whether this was a new level or whether Ḳara Muştâfâ merely restored an old level). Having been appointed in the winter, the season when the fleet prepared for the summer campaign, he could have already in early 1636 entered upon the affairs of the arsenal and instituted the 40-ship level. That Kara Muştâfâ Pasha had already been active in the arsenal in the winter of 1635-1636 is implied by the following passage referring to work in the arsenal in preparation for the campaign season of 1637: "when he [i.e., Ḳara Muştâfâ] returned in *Cumâdâ II* [1046] (November 1636) to the arsenal [from the summer campaign], the *emîn* of the arsenal was [then] Maḳşûd Ağa; [at that time] *kapudan* Muştâfâ Pasha again [engaged] in preparations [of the fleet]" (emphasis added; Topçılar 486b).

exalted!—a request and bow are made that praiseworthy conquests be facilitated and divinely decreed in the days of imperial fortune and in the time of felicity of his [majesty] in accordance with the imperial wish of the padishah and his [majesty's] noble sanction. Amen. The ultimate order and command are his majesty's, my felicitous and fortunate lord's.<sup>60</sup>

17-19

The slave  
Piyâle, *kethüdâ* of  
the naval arsenal

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<sup>60</sup> Although usually *sultânûm* unambiguously refers to the addressee (cf. the consistent use of *pâdişâhum* and *şultânûm* when both the sultan and addressee are being referred to, e.g., I:2-6, 13-16; II:1-4, 46-47; IV:1-2, 24-25, 47-48, 72-73; V:1-2, 15-16), it should be kept in mind that *sultânûm* is, as termed by V. L. Ménage, a “non-specific” title (Ménage 1985: 296) and in some cases its meaning is, if not ambiguous, indeterminate. For instance, in the case of the *bâkî fermân sultânûm hazretleriniündür*-type formula, which is a traditional formula indicating that in all matters the last word and final command belong to the sultan (Inalcik 1980: 3-4), an older usage of *sultânûm* is preserved, i.e., “my lord” should be understood as referring to the sultan and hence *hazretleri* is translated “his majesty” rather than “his excellency.”



## II. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi E. 9104

Report by Maḳşûd Ağa, *emîn* of the imperial naval arsenal, on Ottoman naval affairs at the start of the naval campaign season; includes news received on affairs in the eastern Mediterranean and northern Black Sea updating the information provided in I; sent from Istanbul and probably intended for *ḳapudan paşa* Silâhdâr Muştafâ who at the time was between Diyarbakir and Ankara; on the basis of a note on the verso (see below), was written about one or two weeks before 21 *Muḳharrem* 1049/24 May 1639.<sup>61</sup>

VERSO: note in upper left corner: *İstanbuldan Maḳşûd efendiden gelmişdür 'an menzil-i Zile fi 21 Muḳharrem sene 1049*. On 21 *Muḳharrem* in the year 1049 (24 May 1639) [this letter] arrived at the *menzil* of Zile from Istanbul from Maḳşûd Efendi.

Information on external characteristics not available.

## II. TEXT

Hüve

1 sa'âdetlü ve merḫametlü sulṫânüm ḫazretlerinüñ ḫâkipây-i şerîflerine 'arṫ-i ḫâl-i bende budur ki Allâh sübhânehu ve te'âlâ şevketlü ve 'âzametlü pâdişâh-i zıllu'llâh ḫazretlerinüñ vücûd-i şerîflerin âfât-i dehrden maşûn idüp 2 'an ḳarîb rikâb-i hümayûnları ile cemî' 'âlem behremend u ber-murâd olmaḫ müyesser eyleye âmîn yâ Rabbü'l-'âlemîn ve ḫaḳḳ celle ve 'allâ 'izzetlü sulṫânüm ḫazretlerinüñ devâm-i 'ömr u devletlerin mezîd idüp 3 üzerimüzden sâye-i devletlerin dür eylemeye âmîn yâ Rabbü'l-'âlemîn ve yâ ḫayrî'n-nâşırın benüm mürüvvetlü sulṫânüm fermân olınan donanma-yi hümayûn için el-ḫamdü li-llâhi te'âlâ şevketlü ve 'âzametlü 4 pâdişâh-i 'âlem-penâh ḫazretlerinüñ devâm-i salṫanatlarında ve sulṫânümüñ zamân-i sa'âdetlerinde tersâne-i 'âmireden kırḳ gemi ḫesâbı üzere otuz iki pâre ḳadırḡa ve ḳalyata 5 işbu mâh-i Zî'l-ḫiccenüñ yigirmi dördüncü günü mükemmel u müretteb donanup Piyâle kethüdâ ḳulları ile fermân-i hümayûn üzere Ḳara deñiz boğazında Ḳavaḳ iskelesine 6 müteveccih olmışlardur ve üç Rodos yedekleri ile iki ḳıṫ'a tersâne gemileri daḫi Aḳ deñiz muḫâfazasına ta'yîn olunmuşdur ve başarda ile yedek ve mavna 7 ḫâzır (*sic; read ḫâzır*) u müheyvâ olup sulṫânümüñ emr-i şerîflerine munṫazırdur ve Aḳ deñiz aḫvâli su'âl buyunlursa bender-i İskenderiyyeden henüz ḳâfile gemileri gelmemekle Bekir paşa 8 ḳulları Rodo[s] etrâfında Meis ve Finike ve Adraşan semtlerinde alay gemilerine muntazır olmaḡla Saḳız ve Susam ve Boḡaz etrâfı muḫâfaza olmaḫ 9 lâzim gelmegin bir ḳaç beg gemileri ol tarafları muḫâfaza eylemek gerekdür diyü

<sup>61</sup> Silâhdâr Muştafâ left Baghdad for Istanbul along with Murâd IV; Zile, where II was delivered on 21 *Muḳharrem* 1049 (see below), was one of the *menzils* or halting-places along the way (see the list of halting-places [*menzîlnâme*] published in Sahillioḡlu 1965: esp 33; see also *Fezleke*: 214; *Ṭopçılar*: 514a-17b). If Silâhdâr Muştafâ was indeed the addressee of II, the chronology of his return to the capital given by *Ṭopçılar* Kâtibi fits well with the date II arrived at Zile—sometime in *Şafer* the returning party left Sivas for Ankara (*Ṭopçılar*: 515b), in which case II would have arrived at Zile before Silâhdâr Muştafâ passed through it; perhaps it would have been forwarded to him from there. However, the chronology in the *menzîlnâme* and in *Fezleke* places the events of the return trip about a month earlier—when II reached Zile the returning party was already in Çukurcuk, nine *menzils* west of Zile and two *menzils* east of Ankara, and by the end of the first decade of *Şafer* it was already at İzmit (Sahillioḡlu 1965: 12, 34, 35; *Fezleke* 214). In this case it is unlikely that II was sent by land from Istanbul, since it is inconceivable that the document and Silâhdâr Muştafâ bypassed each other going in opposite directions—perhaps II was sent by ship to Samsun and then went the relatively short distance to Zile by land (from where it would have been sent west to catch up with Silâhdâr Muştafâ).

Bekir paşa kulları 'arz itmekle geçen sene Kıra deñiz muhâfazasında olan deryâ 10 beglerinden yedi pâre gemi ve Tunus gemilerinden dañi yedi kıt'a gemi ol etrâfı muhâfaza itmek için Hüsâm beg ođlu 'Alî paşa kulları ile ta'yîn olunmuşdur 11 ve ma'zûl beglerden olup her sene tersânededen kürekcinin ve cengcinin ve sayir mühimmâtın alan 'Abdürrahmân beg kulları Sağızlı olmađla ol dañi 12 'Alî paşa kulları ile ma'an muhâfaza itmek için ta'yîn olunmuşdur bunların cümlesi on beş pâre gemi olur ma'lûm-i devletleri olmađ için 'arz olunur bâkî fermân sultânınumuñdur

13 bende-i  
14 bî-miğdâr  
15 Mağşûd

16 benüm sa'âdetlü sultânım 17 ma'lûm-i sa'âdetleridür ki Rûz-i Hızır eyyâmalarında Duğa ve Malta 18 çekdirmeleri altışar gemi olup hâlî (or câlî [sic], read hâlî) bulduklarını 19 tüccâr gemilerin rencide idegelmişlerdür ol ecilden İstanbul 20 boğazından Sağıza ve ol etrâf adalarına varınca 21 muhâfaza lâzimidür ve Bekir paşa kulları olduđı 22 semt buralara hilâfdür eyle ma'lûm-i devlet buyunla 23 ve Bekir paşa kulları ile olan beg gemileri sekiz pâre beg gemisidür 24 ve üç Rodos yedeki ve biri tersâne gemisidür ki cümlesi 25 on iki kıt'a olur ve bu sene-i mübâreke Kâra deñize 26 ta'yîn olunan beg gemileri tođuz kıt'adur ikisi muğaddem 27 gelüp Özi ve Kefe câniblerinden haber almađ için irsâl 28 olunmuşdur henüz dañi bir eşerleri zühûr itmiş degüldür ve lâkin benüm sa'âdetlü 29 sultânım Özi kapudanı olan Murtaza (sic, read Murtaza) beg kulları bu kış 30 kayıklar donadup Özi boğazından içerüye adam 31 gönderüp varup kazağ çırnıklanna râst gelüp 32 kâfirin bir kaçın kırup ve bir kaçın dil dutup ve bir dili 33 tersâne-i âmireye gönderüp su'âl olunduğda Özi 34 şuyı adalarında on beş pâre kazağ şaykası 35 vardur beş pâresi donanmışdur ve on pâresi 36 donanmağ üzeredür diyü haber 37 virmişdür lâkin beglerden henüz haber gelmiş degüldür 38 ve Kıra deñize ta'yîn olunan beglerin yedisi henüz dañi gelmiş degüldür 39 ve Cezâyirli dañi henüz tersânededürler ve benüm müriyyetlü sultânım Kıra deñize muhâfazasına ta'yîn olunan 40 gemilerin altı kıt'ası yeñiçeri tayifesidür ve dördü cebeci tayifesidür yigirmi ikisi erbâb-i 41 timârdur ve timâr erbâbı henüz dañi yođlamaların tamâm itmiş degüllerdür in şâ'a'llâhü te'âlâ defterleri 42 beyâz olup ne miğdârı donanmaya gitmişdür ve bedel alınmađa ne miğdârı müstağakđdur başka başka defterleri 43 tahrîr olup hâkipây-i şerife 'arz olunur bâkî fermân sultânınumuñdur

44 benüm müriyyetlü sultânım 45 donanma-yi hümâyûn ile Piyâle ketüdâ kulları fermân-i hümâyûn üzere 46 Kıra deñiz boğazında bir habere muntazır olup el-hamdü li-llâhi te'âlâ şimdilik devlet-i pâdişâhîde 47 ve sultânınumun zamanında ümmet-i Muhammed âsûde-hâl üzeredür eger bir tarafa teveccüh iktizâ eylemezse 48 İzmikide (?)<sup>62</sup> başarda ile bir kaç gemi dañi gelmek emriñüz olur mı bu huşûşda fermân-i şerifñüz 49 ricâ olunur bâkî fermân sultânım hazretlerinün<ün>dür

## II. TRANSLATION

He!

1 This is the report of affairs ('arz-i hâl) of the slave to the noble dust [beneath] the foot of his excellency, my felicitous and merciful lord.

<sup>62</sup> از زمكیده, İzmikide or perhaps از زمكیده, İzmikide or İzmikide (see facsimile): obviously a variant of از زمكیده, İznikmide (in the dative). Similar variants of this place name are given by Evliyâ Çelebi, e.g., از زمكیت, İzmikit (Evliyâ 2: 64).

- 1-3 May God—be He glorified and exalted!—make the noble being of his majesty, the majestic and magnificent padishah, the shadow of God, safe from the ravages of time. And may He facilitate that before long the entire world will be happy and contented, [ruled] by his [majesty's] imperial stirrup. Amen, oh Lord of the worlds. And may God—be He glorified and exalted!—increase the duration of the life and good fortune of his excellency, my great lord. And may He not make the shadow of his [majesty's] good fortune distant from us. Amen, oh Lord of the worlds and oh best granter of [divine] aid.
- 3-6 My generous lord, praise be to God—be He exalted!—within the duration of the sultanate of his majesty, the majestic and magnificent padishah, refuge of the world, and in the time of the felicity of my lord, on the twenty-fourth day of the month of *Zi'l-hicce* (28 April 1639), of the total of forty ships of the imperial naval arsenal, thirty-two galleys (*kađırğa*) and galliots (*kaalyata*),<sup>63</sup> excellently and completely fitted out for the imperial fleet which was ordered . . . [into readiness], . . . set out with his [majesty's] slave Piyâle Kethüdâ according to the imperial firman for the port of Kavak on the Black Sea Straits [i.e., the Bosphorus].
- 6-12 [Meanwhile], two ships of the naval arsenal are still assigned to defense of the Mediterranean Sea along with three *yedeks* from Rhodes. And *yedeks* and *mavnas* along with a *bastarda* are ready and prepared and waiting [in the naval arsenal] for my lord's noble order.<sup>64</sup> And if it is deigned [by his excellency] to inquire about affairs in the Mediterranean Sea, his [majesty's] slave Bekir Pasha<sup>65</sup> has made a report saying, "Because the convoy of ships (*kaâfile gemileri*) from the port of Alexandria has not yet arrived, his [majesty's] slave Bekir Pasha is awaiting [this] convoy [of] ships (*alay gemileri*)<sup>66</sup> in the vicinity of Megiste and Finike and Adrasan which are in the neighborhood of Rhodes.<sup>67</sup> As it is necessary to defend the vicinity of Chios (*Sakız*) and Samos (*Susam*, i.e., Sisam) and the Straits, some *beg*-ships (*beg gemileri*) are needed for the defense of that region." Because of this, seven ships from among [those commanded by] *sea-begs* (*deryâ begleri*) who were last year [engaged] in the defense of the Black Sea<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup>It is perhaps significant that only galleys and galliots, and not larger ships such as *bastardas* or *mavnas*, are mentioned as being in this fleet assigned to the Black sea. The larger ships with their deeper drafts may have been less suited for patrolling the shallow waters off the northern shore of the Black Sea and engaging the *şaykas*.

<sup>64</sup>Of the 40 ships of the arsenal claimed to have been fitted out, only 34 or perhaps 35 are specifically accounted for in I and II: 32 arsenal ships sent to the Black Sea (I,II) and two or perhaps three arsenal ships sent to the Mediterranean Sea (II). It is conceivable that the *yedeks* and *mavnas* along with the *bastarda* mentioned above made up the remaining five or six ships. However, it should be noted that Kâtib Çelebi states that customarily there were six *mavnas* in addition to the traditional 40 arsenal ships (*Tuhfet*: 153) and at several points he refers to the 40 ships as galleys (i.e., galley-type ships) which would probably exclude *yedeks* (*Fezleke*: 232; *Tuhfet*: 143).

<sup>65</sup>This must be the same Bekir Pasha who was *deryâ begi* of Rhodes and active in the Mediterranean during this period (Çopçılar: 534b, 537a), and who succeeded Piyâle as *kapudan paşa* in 1643 (*Fezleke*: 226; *Tuhfet*: 144).

<sup>66</sup>*Kaâfile* and *alay gemileri*, "convoy ships": the ships bringing the annual tribute (*irsâliyye-i hazîne*) or perhaps the grain delivery from Egypt (Shaw 1962: 283-85, 272). These ships were attractive targets for corsairers (see n.72).

<sup>67</sup>Megiste (Kastellorizon, *Meis*) is a small island about 4 km off the Tekke peninsula of southwest Anatolia and about 135 km east of Rhodes. Finike is a coastal town about 50 km east-northeast of Megiste. Adrasan is a coastal town in the Bay of Antalya about 30 km east-northeast of Finike.

<sup>68</sup>These seven *beg*-ships may have been with Piyâle's fleet that routed a Cossack fleet near Taman in 1638 (see introduction).

and also seven ships from among the ships from Tunis have been assigned for the defense of these regions, along with his [majesty's] slave 'Alī Pasha, son of Hüsâm Beg. Because his [majesty's] slave 'Abdürrahmân Beg, who is [one] of the *begs* who are out of office<sup>69</sup> [and] who obtains his oarsmen and his warriors and other supplies and munitions (*mühimmât*) from the naval arsenal every year, is from Chios, he too, together with his [majesty's] slave 'Alī Pasha, has been assigned to defense [duty]. Altogether their forces comprise fifteen ships.<sup>70</sup> This is being reported for the knowledge of his [excellency's] good fortune. The ultimate command is my lord's.

13-15

The worthless  
slave  
Maḳşûd

16-25

My felicitous lord, it is known to his [excellency's] felicity that during the days around the *Rûz-i Hızır*<sup>71</sup> the Tuscan (*Duḳa*)<sup>72</sup> and Maltese galleys (*çekdirme*), of which there are [presently] six each, have continually brought harm to merchant ships which they take by surprise. Because of this, protection is necessary from the Straits of Istanbul (the Bosphorus) going as far as Chios and the islands in that region. [May this], along with [the fact that] the region where his [majesty's] slave Bekir Pasha is [presently located] is on the opposite side [of the Aegean] (*hilâf*) from these [places], be known to his [excellency's] good fortune. And the *beg*-ships that are with his [majesty's] slave Bekir Pasha are eight [in number]. And three of [his other ships] are *yedeks* from Rhodes and one of them is a ship of the arsenal, so that altogether there are twelve ships.

25-39

And in this blessed year the *beg*-ships assigned to the Black Sea are nine in number. Two of them arrived [at the arsenal] earlier and were sent out to obtain news from the regions of Özi and Kefe. Still no trace of them has yet appeared. But my felicitous lord, his [majesty's] slave Murtaẓâ Beg,<sup>73</sup> who is the *ḳapudan* of Özi, fitted out boats (*ḳayıḳ*) this winter and sent men with them inland (*içeriye*, i.e., upstream)

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<sup>69</sup> *Ma'zûl beglerden*, "[one] of the dismissed begs [i.e., not currently holding any office]." This passage suggests that officials having certain expertise (in this case knowledge of a region that needed to be defended, by virtue of being a native or long-term inhabitant of it; also perhaps by virtue of experience at some command, such as here, a ship captain and sea-*beg* [*deryâ begi*]) were relieved of their official duties and assigned to special missions. Perhaps manpower and material resources of the arsenal in Istanbul were put at the disposal of 'Abdürrahmân Beg because, being *ma'zûl*, he would not have had a maritime *sancaḳ* in which to fit out and man his ships. Was this "privilege" at the arsenal a function of the importance of his missions?

<sup>70</sup> I.e., the seven *beg*-ships under 'Alī Pasha plus the seven ships from Tunis plus 'Abdürrahmân Beg's ship.

<sup>71</sup> *Rûz-i Hızır*—St. George's Day, 23 April (O.S.), in the seventeenth century 3 May (N.S.)—was the traditional beginning of the naval campaign season, by which time the imperial fleet usually had left the arsenal.

<sup>72</sup> *Duḳa* refers to privateers of Tuscany belonging to the Knights of St. Stephen. They and the Knights of St. John of Malta were, especially from the final quarter of the sixteenth century, very active in the Levant and the Aegean, and even beyond the Dardanelles. Among their favorite targets were the richly laden galleys and galleons (*ḳâfile* or *alay gemileri*; see n.66) going from Alexandria to Istanbul via Rhodes (Braudel 1972-1973: 872-80, 1193-94).

<sup>73</sup> This is perhaps Murtaẓâ b. Ḥalîl who appears in several Topkapı documents from the late 1640s as *sancaḳ begi* of Ḳilburun (*Khanat*: 169-75, 177).

from the mouth of the Dnieper. They set out and came across Cossack *çirniķs*.<sup>74</sup> Some of the infidels they killed, others they took as captured informants (*dil*) and one informant they sent [here] to the imperial naval arsenal. When he was put to the question he gave news saying, "There are fifteen Cossack *şayķas* on the Dnieper River islands."<sup>75</sup> Five of them have been fitted out and ten of them are about to be fitted out." But from the *begs* [i.e., the two *beg*-ships] still no news has come. And still seven of the *begs* assigned to the Black Sea have not yet come in [to the naval arsenal]. And [the ships transferred to] the Algerian [fleet] are still in the arsenal.<sup>76</sup>

39-43

And, my felicitous lord, of the ships assigned for the defense of the Black Sea, six are [of] the janissary troops, four are [of] the *cebeci* troops and twenty-two are [of] the holders of *timârs*. And as of yet the *timâr*-holders have still not completed their musters. If God—be He exalted!—wills it, fair copies of their [muster] registers will be made, [with] separate registers compiled [indicating] how many of them went to the fleet and how many of them are obliged to pay the exemption fee [for absence from military service] (*bedel*). They will be presented to the noble dust [beneath my lord's] foot. The ultimate command is my lord's.

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<sup>74</sup>A *çirniķ* (or *çernik*, from Bulgarian) was a sail-propelled boat used for transport on rivers in the Danubian region described variously as wide at the stern and pointed at the bow (Radloff 3: 1972), or pointed at both ends (Pakalın 1: 362). Judging by respective Ottoman tax rates applied to their cargoes, the *çirniķ* was smaller than the Ottoman *şayķa* (Cvetkova 1970: 292, 293). Here *çirniķ* perhaps refers to a type of boat used by the Zaporozhians for fishing and salt gathering in the lower reaches of the Dnieper. Cf. Evarnickij's mention of a type of river boat fitting no more than ten passengers and used by the Zaporozhians for fishing and transporting supplies (Evarnickij 1892: 454); one Topkapı document refers to Cossack *çirniķs* as carrying four men each (*Khanat*: 169). According to Beauplan, navigating up the Dnieper was a risky venture since it was easy to lose one's way in the labyrinth of channels formed by the river's innumerable islands and to fall prey to the Cossack (Beauplan: 453). In this document it is likely that a mission sent to obtain informants would have taken guides with a good knowledge of the waterways and terrain to be covered. It may well be that the raiding party infiltrated as far as the sanctuaries of the Zaporozhians, i.e., the vicinity of the Sich (the island headquarters of the Zaporozhians, the location of which varied, but was always downstream from the Dnieper cataracts, i.e., in the so-called Zaporizhzhia region; over 250 km upstream from Özi). Cf. Topkapı document E. 4391/2 (from the late 1640s) where Murtaẓâ b. Hâlıl (see n.73) reports that Cossack informants were seized on their island (*ķazak-i bed-ahlâķ aķasından diller alınup*; see *Khanat*: 172, 173, 175). However, the raiding party probably did not have to go this far to find Cossacks. As close as 60 km upstream from Özi (just below present-day Kherson) began a zone with a great many islands, reed marshes and countless channels (today mostly submerged). Hidden away in these islands and their vicinity, small groups of Zaporozhians, engaging in fishing and other activities, camped in these places, some even staying over the winter (Golobuckij 1957: 55-57). Similarly, apparently as early as the sixteenth century Zaporozhians were known to frequent the Prohnojs'k salt lakes on the Kılburun peninsula, about 30 km upstream from the mouth of the Dnieper (*Rossija*: 656).

<sup>75</sup>*Özi suyu adaları* probably refers here to the islands permanently inhabited by the Zaporozhians, even perhaps those in the vicinity of the Sich. Cf. the designation *ada ķazakları*, "island Cossacks" apparently denoting the Zaporozhians in Topkapı document E. 12217 (translated in *Khanat*: 177; see also n.74). If this was the case, and assuming the report of the informant was accurate, a total of 15 *şayķas* would have been relatively small for the entire Zaporozhian fleet under normal circumstances. It is likely that the information provided by the informant reflects the aftermath of the Ukrainian Cossack revolt of 1638, which was suppressed by the authorities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, when, to appease the Ottomans, a systematic attempt was made to destroy the Cossack boats (Hruševs'kyj 1922: 27-28).

<sup>76</sup>I.e., of the ten galliots of the arsenal turned over to the fleets of Algiers and Tunis (see n.55).


44-49

My generous lord, his [majesty's] slave Piyâle Kethüdâ, together with the imperial fleet, is ready and waiting according to the imperial firman for some news. Praise be to God—be He exalted!—for at present the community (*ümmet*) of Muhammed is in a state of tranquility within the good fortune of the padishah and during the time of my lord. Is there an order of yours that several more ships along with the *başarda* come to İzmit if [they] are not required to set out in any [other] direction?<sup>77</sup> In this matter your noble firman is requested. The ultimate command is his majesty's, my lord's.

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<sup>77</sup>This query whether to send ships to İzmit in the Sea of Marmara or elsewhere is another clue that both I and II were sent to the *kapudan paşa* (cf. also I:12-13). By the time Silâhdâr Muştafâ reached İzmit (ahead of Murâd IV in order to help prepare the festivities for the sultan's triumphant return to the capital), Mağşûd had already arrived there from Istanbul with a *başarda* and other ships (Topçılar: 516a-16b).





## III. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi E. 6019/2

Collective report by the fortress commanders and garrison officers of Özi on repairs of one of their fortresses and an encounter with the Cossacks at the island of Tendra; addressee unknown;<sup>78</sup> undated (after 16 *Rebi'* I 1049/17 July 1639).<sup>79</sup>

FORMAT: 45.5 x 30 cm

WATERMARK: *tre lune*

INVOCATIO: 0.5 cm below top edge, 14 cm above text (not visible in facsimile)

VERSO: imprints of thirteen seals (*mühür*) stamped in black ink directly behind their corresponding signatures and, except for seal 4, right side up in relation to them; numerals here correspond to those assigned to the signatures in transcription (see below); signatures 1 and 8 have no corresponding seals on the verso.

2. *râcî-i lutf-i ekber Muştafâ bin İskender*  
The one who hopes for the great grace of God, Muştafâ, son of İskender
3. *râcî (?) . . . bende Himmet bin 'Abdî*  
The one who hopes for (?) . . . the slave Himmet, son of 'Abdî
4. *bende-i Âl-i Muhammed ş[alle] 'l[âhu] [aleyhüm ve] s[ellem] Mehemed*  
The slave of the family of Muhammed—God bless him and grant him salvation—Mehemed
5. *el-vâsiķu bi'l-maliki . . . 'Abd 'Abbâs bin Pervâne*  
The one who trusts in the Lord . . . the slave 'Abbâs, son of Pervâne
6. *mazhar-i lutf-i ilâhî Aḥmed bin Ḥasan*  
The bearer of divine grace, Aḥmed, son of Ḥasan.
7. *bende-i Ḥüdâ Ḥabîb bin 'Alî*  
The slave of God, Ḥabîb, son of 'Alî
9. *râcîu lütf-e ş-Şamed Maḥmûd bin Mehemed*  
The one who hopes for the grace of God, Maḥmûd, son of Mehemed
10. . . . *bende Mehemed bin 'Abdullâh (?)*  
. . . . the slave Mehemed, son of 'Abdullâh (?)
11. *'Abd Muştafâ bin Ḥasan [10]48*  
The slave Muştafâ, son of Ḥasan year [10]48
12. . . . *lutf-i Şamed (?) Muştafâ bin Aḥmed*  
. . . . the grace of God (?), Muştafâ, son of Aḥmed
13. *râcî-i lutf-i ilâhî Şa'bân bin 'Abdî*  
The one who hopes for divine grace, Şa'bân, son of 'Abdî
14. *mazhar-i lutf-i Şamed Mehemed bin Muştafâ*  
The bearer of the grace of God, Mehemed, son of Muştafâ
15. *bende Ḥasan bin 'Abdullâh*  
The slave Ḥasan, son of 'Abdullâh

COMMENTS: black ink

<sup>78</sup>Possibilities include grand vizier Kara Muştafâ Pasha who at the time was still in Iraq (Topçular: 518a-19a), *kâymaķâm* Mûsâ Pasha in Istanbul (Topçular: 516b), or even Silâhdâr Muştafâ who was by then in Istanbul as well (Topçular: 516aff.). In the latter case, it is conceivable that III was sent together with IV (see n.14).

<sup>79</sup>III relates to the same events described in IV which has a note indicating its delivery date (see below). III was written before, after or at the same time as IV, depending on the textual relation between these two documents (see n.14).

## III. TEXT

## Hüve

1 devletlü ve sa'âdetlü ve mürüvvetlü sultânüm hazretlerinin hâkipây-i kem-yâb-i sa'âdetlerine yüzler sürmekden soñra mañzar-i fakîrâ-yi (*sic, read* fuqarâ-yi) Özi budur ki Haqq tebâreke ve te'âlâ hazretleri yer yüzi halîfesi olan 2 sa'âdetlü ve devletlü pâdişâhımız hañâlardan şaklayup gölgelerin 'âmme-i 'âlem ve bu serhadde olan gâzî kulları üzerinden dür itmeye sa'âdetlü pâdişâhımız kemâl-i keremlerinden 3 sâkin olduğumuz Özi kal'esin binâ itmek fermân-i şerîfleri olup ve bu hizmet üzerine Özi eyâletine mutaşarîf olan vezîr Halîl paşa hazretleri karadan 4 ve donanma serdârı olan Piyâle kethüdâ deryâdan memûr olmalarıyla kethüdâ-yi müşârün ileyh Rebî'ü'l-evvel ayının on birinci günü Öziye dâhil oldukları günden 5 kal'emüz<de>ün<sup>80</sup> binâsına şürû' idüp ve kal'eye karîb yerde taş olmaduğundan on sekiz mîl yerde vâkı' Yapunca burnında<sup>81</sup> üç dört günde bir gemilerile varup taş getirdüklerinden 6 gayrı gice Kılburun külliyesiyle Özi boğazında şabâha dek serdemende turup küllî muhâfaza ve hizmet üzeredir Haqq te'âlâ hazretleri hayriyatıyla itmâmın naşib eyleye 7 ve benüm sultânüm donanma gelmezden evvel Ramazân gâzî nâm bir ağamız deryâdan dil getürmek için göndürilmiş idi donanma geldükden üç gün soñra mezbûr 8 gelüp bir kaç nefer dil getürüp içinde bundan evvel Öziden çıkan toköz pâre şayka ne tarafda olduğu su'âl olındukda vukû' üzere haber virmedüğü ecilden 9 donanma serdârı Piyâle kethüdâ-ile varup Tintere<sup>82</sup> aşasın ararken zîkr olan şaykalar mañall-i mezbûrda şîğ ve sazlık yerde pusuda olup gemilerin 10 geldüğü yedi sekiz mîl yerden görmeleriyle firâr itdikleri görildükde bu kulları tombaz ve şandallarıyla aşanun iç yüzünden ve Piyâle kethüdâ yedi pâre kadırğa ile 11 taşra yüzünden kovup haylî esbâb [u] eşkâllerin (*sic, read* eşkâllerin) dökürüp yelken altına almış iken hikmet-i Hüda-ile rûzgâr [u] furtuna çıkup şandal ve kayıklarımız 12 deryâya tahammül itmedüklerinden birbirinden a[y]rılıp ve aşşama karîb olmağla ol gice kazağ şaykalarına yedi sekiz mîl yerde yatup şabâh dahî ziyâde rûzgâr 13 olup birbirimize varmağ kâbil olmamağın ol gün dahî aşşama degin gözedilüp vaqt-i gurûbda fırsatile firâr idüp varup şğa ormanlık yere 14 dökilüp firâr itmeleriyle eyyâm-i devlet-i pâdişâhîde on pâre şaykaları alınıp şimdilik şerr u şûrleri ümmet-i ( اومت [sic], read امت ) Muhammed üzerinden def'u ref' olmuşdur bu kulları donanma-yi 15 hümâyûn gemileri bu kadar zahmet çekmiş iken zîkr olunan kazağın ekseri ormanlıkda Tatar eline girüp diyâr-i menhûslarına az kimesne varır hele mezbûrlarun 16 bu yaz bilâd-i miñnetlerinden emîn olmuşdur gelecek sene dahî pâdişâhımız hazretleri ve vekilleri sağ olsun ümîddür ki bu kazağlar huşûsında (*sic ?, read* huşûsında ?) lâyıķ-i dîn [u] devlet olduğu 17 vech üzere bir 'azîm tedârük görilüp bu serhaddler ve Rum ili yahıları dest-i tağallüb [u] fesâdlarından halâş ola bâķî emr [u] fermân luṭf [u] ihsân sa'âdetlü ve mürüvvetlü 18 sultânüm hazretlerininündür

[1] bende-i<sup>83</sup> Mehemed ağa[-i] cebeciyân-i dergâh-i 'âlî hâlâ

[2] bende-i Muşafâ ağa dizdâr-i kal'e-i 'atîķ-i Özi hâlâ

<sup>80</sup>It appears that the scribe first wrote قلعه مزده "in our fortress," then, deciding to write "of our fortress," added the genitive suffix without removing the locative: قلعه مزده ك.

<sup>81</sup>For *burnında* read *burnından*. Cf. *Yapunca burnı nâm mañallden*, IV:9.

<sup>82</sup>تنتره or perhaps تنتره, *Tentere*. Cf. تنتره, *Tentere* in *Evliyâ TKS*: 54a; تن تره, *Ten tere* in *Seyyid Nuh's map* (Kissling 1966: pl. 16).

<sup>83</sup>Although in such signatures the name of the signatory is clearly in apposition to *bende*, the word *bende* occasionally appears with a (grammatically unnecessary) *izâfet* in such constructions ( بنده ). For further examples see a manuscript of a sixteenth-century *inşâ*-manual, *Bibliothèque Nationale, Mahuscrit turc* 221: 79a, 105b, 121b, 122a, 157b; see also *Ferîdûn*: 271, 320, 430).

- [3] bende-i Himmet ağa dizdâr-i palanğa-i cedîd hâlâ  
 [4] bende-i Mehemed ağa<-yi> dizdâr-i kal'e-i cedîd hâlâ  
 [5] bende-i 'Abbâs ağa dizdâr-i Hasan paşa hâlâ  
 [6] bende-i Ahmed ağa[-i] 'azebân hâlâ  
 [7] bende-i Habîb ağa[-i] 'azebân hâlâ  
 [8] bende-i İbrâhîm ağa[-i] 'azebân hâlâ  
 [9] bende-i Maḥmûd ağa[-i] 'azebân hâlâ  
 [10] bende-i Mehemed ağa[-i] 'azebân hâlâ  
 [11] bende-i Muştafâ ağa[-i] fârisân hâlâ  
 [12] bende-i Muştafâ ağa[-i] fârisân hâlâ  
 [13] bende-i Şa'bân ağa-yi fârisân hâlâ  
 [14] bende-i Mehemed ağa[-i] topcıyân hâlâ  
 [15] bende-i Hasan ağa[-i] topcıyân hâlâ

### III. TRANSLATION

He!

1 After rubbing [our] faces into the precious dust of felicity [beneath] the foot of his excellency, my fortunate and felicitous and generous lord, this is the report (*maḥzar*)<sup>84</sup> of the lowliest ones [of] Özi.

1-6 May the Lord God—be He hallowed and exalted!—protect from errors our felicitous and fortunate padishah, who is the caliph of the face of the earth, and not remove his [majesty's] shadow [of protection] from upon the ghazis, slaves of his [majesty], who are [found] in the whole world as well as on this frontier. From the perfect benevolence of our felicitous padishah his [majesty's] noble firman [has been issued for] the execution of construction on the Özi fortress [complex] which is where we dwell. Since his excellency, vizier Ḥalîl Pasha, who is the governor (*mutaşarrıf*) of the *eyâlet* of Özi,<sup>85</sup>

<sup>84</sup>Since there is more than one signatory, *maḥzar* ("collective petition or report") is used in place of *arḡ* ("presentation, report"). Cf. Heyd 1960: 150; Redhouse: 723.

<sup>85</sup>I.e., the *beglerbegi* of the *eyâlet* of Özi. This *eyâlet* also included *sancaḡs* of the western Black Sea region and was formed in the late sixteenth century as a bulwark against the Cossacks (Inalcik 1973: 105). Ḥalîl Pasha was transferred from the post of *mîrâḡhor* ("keeper of the sultan's horse") to, by way of temporary tenure (*ber vech-i arpalıḡ*), the governorship of the *sancaḡ* of Silistre (Silistria, on the Danube, belonging to the *eyâlet* of Özi) and made commander in chief (*ser 'asker*) of the Özi region in early 1639 (Topcular: 512a, see also Fezleke: 205), although he did not set out for his post until June 1639, when he was appointed *beglerbegi* of the *eyâlet* of Özi (Topcular: 515b). He remained at this post until late August 1640, when he was appointed to the imperial council (*dîvân-i hümayûn*) (Topcular: 527b). Aside from being *ser 'asker* of the Özi region, merely the fact that he held the rank of vizier meant that he outranked Piyâle and thereby would have been the commander in chief of the operations at Özi. It is possible, however, that, practically speaking, the operations around Özi were under their joint command. Hence their assignments as respective *serdârs* of the land and sea forces. But this does not mean that their spheres of command were completely separable, given the joint tasks and missions undertaken by the land and sea forces (see below). Perhaps an indication of this is the fact that in his report on his activities at Özi (IV), which was addressed to his superior, *ḡapudan paşa* Silâhdâr Muştafâ, Piyâle makes no mention or hint of Ḥalîl Pasha. Or perhaps his silence concerning Ḥalîl Pasha is a clue that a rivalry existed between

and Piyâle Kethüdâ, the fleet commander (*donanma serdârı*), were charged with this service, [Halîl] by land and [Piyâle] by sea, from the day on which the aforementioned *kethüdâ* entered Özi—the eleventh day of *Rebî' I* (12 July 1639)—[they] set about the construction work on the fortress. Since there is no stone [for construction] at any place close to the fortress, once every three or four days [Piyâle] sets out with the ships and they bring stone from Yapunca Burnı, which is a place located eighteen *mîls*<sup>86</sup> away.<sup>87</sup> Besides bringing stone, at night [the ships] stand until morning with their sails furled<sup>88</sup> in the

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the two commanders. In this connection, it is interesting that, in his report written at the same time, Halîl Pasha likewise makes no mention or hint of Piyâle (E. 6019/1, see introduction).

<sup>86</sup>*Mîl* was a common distance measure used by the Ottomans, especially for nautical distances. In translation it is usually rendered “mile” without any indication of even its approximate value. The value of the *mîl* varied in different times and places. The classical Islamic definition of 4,000 canonical yards or 1/3 *farsah* (approx. 2 km) given by al-Muḩaddasi (Hinz 1955:63) seems too large when compared with the *mîl* distances given by, for example, Kâtib Çelebi or Evliyâ Çelebi, and it appears that the *mîl* used in the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was less than the nautical (1.85 km) or even the statute mile (1.61 km). E.g., Bellin’s map of the Black Sea (1772) gives 75 of the “mille Grec a l’usage en Turquie” per degree or 1.48 km per mile (Bibliothèque Nationale, *Cartes et plans*, Port. 99, div. O, piece 18); d’Ascoli, in rendering distances on the Black Sea, used a mile 90 of which equal one degree, that is, 2/3 of a nautical mile or about 1.23 km (determined in the commentary by Berthier-Delagarde in d’Ascoli: 155-56); a map of the Black Sea (first half of the eighteenth century), probably drawn from a Turkish map, gives a mile slightly larger than a kilometer (according to its scale, 132 “milles anciens” = 112 “milles modernes” = 230 “milles commun de Turquie,” Bibliothèque Nationale, *Cartes et plans*, Port. 99, div. O, piece 7); an undated Ottoman map of the Black Sea (probably late seventeenth or early eighteenth century) gives a scale of *mîls* according to which distances between various points on the sea correspond roughly to their actual kilometer values (Bibliothèque Nationale, *Cartes et plans*, port. 99, div. O, piece 2).

<sup>87</sup>It has been suggested that Yapunca Burnı (“Yapunca Point”) was near the fortress of Yabu (*Khanat*: 454), which appears on a schematic Ottoman map of the Ukraine (original in the Topkapı, E. 12090; published in Abrahamowicz 1969: 95 and *Khanat*: 78-79) and was apparently close to the Black Sea coast between the Dnieper and Dniester Rivers. Although the existence of Yabu is confirmed by other sources, it has not been possible to identify (Abrahamowicz 1969: 80, 91-92 n.21). Since the fortress of Yabu was by the seventeenth century long since in ruins, it may have been the source of the stone for the construction work. However, the distance of 18 *mîls* given here and in IV:9 indicates that Yapunca Point must have been on a shore not too distant from Özi and, depending on the length of the *mîl* used in these documents (see n.86), between about 18 and 27 km away. Thus its presumed location in the Bucak, i.e., southern Bessarabia (*Khanat*: 454) is probably too distant. Since the transport of stone was to be by wagon, it is likely that its source was on the peninsular land mass on which Özi was located, bordered by the Berezan’ estuary to the west, the Dnieper estuary to the south, and the Boh estuary to the east, all being waterways too wide and deep for the wagons to cross. Furthermore, since the text implies that wagons were the preferred mode of transport, perhaps the site was in the interior, or at least not close to easily navigable waters. One possibility for the origin of the stone is the ruins of the ancient Greek city of Olbia located just south of the village of Parutyne on the right bank of the Boh (about 8 km upstream from its entry into the Dnieper) which, it has been commonly claimed, was a source of the stone in the Özi fortifications (e.g., Karasev 1956: 11).

<sup>88</sup>*Serdemende* (سردمنده): from the Italian *serratamente*, “with the sails in” (Kahane, Tietze 1958: 403; note that the form here [also in IV:10] is closer to the Italian than the examples in the work cited [*serdemend*] which confirms the Italian origin of the word suggested by its authors).

mouth of the Dnieper at the tower of *Qılburun*<sup>89</sup> and are in a complete [state of] defense and service.<sup>90</sup> May the Lord God-be He exalted!—ordain with His blessings its [i.e., the construction's] completion.

7-8 And, my lord, before the fleet arrived, one of our [fellow] officers (*ağa*) named Ramaẓân Ghazi<sup>91</sup> had been sent out on water to bring back captured informants (*dil*).<sup>92</sup> Three days after the fleet arrived, the aforesaid returned, bringing back several captured informants. When the question—in what parts are the nine *şaykas* which had earlier set out from the Dnieper?<sup>93</sup>—was put to [one] among them,<sup>94</sup> he gave no true answer consistent with the facts.

8-14 Therefore we set out with the fleet commander Piyâle Kethüdâ. While searching the island of Tendra,<sup>95</sup> the mentioned *şaykas* were lying in ambush [or hiding (*pusuda olup*)] at [this] aforesaid locale

<sup>89</sup>*Qılburun kulesi*, “*Qılburun tower*” refers to either a tower of the fortress of *Qılburun* or a separate tower. In the Mediterranean, coastal fortresses or towers mounted with artillery provided ideal protection for galleys from surprise attack by pirates (see Braudel 1972-1973: 853; Guilmartin 1974: 76-77).

<sup>90</sup>Cf. “The Turk . . . keeps several galleys ready at the mouth of the Boristhenes (Dnieper) to hinder their [i.e., the Cossacks] coming out; but the Cossacks, who are cunninger, slip out in a dark night about the new moon . . .” (Beauplan: 465). According to Beauplan, the night was a particularly dangerous time for the Ottoman galleys, since the Cossacks, having spotted a galley or galleys which they felt they could seize, would wait until the middle of the night and then move in with all speed, taking them by surprise (Beauplan: 465-66).

<sup>91</sup>Perhaps Ramaẓân here is the same Ramaẓân who appears as the former governor (*beg*) of *Qılburun* in several Topkapı documents from the late 1640s and early 1650s (*Khanat*: 192, 196, 197, and also E. 3495).

<sup>92</sup>The raiding party probably went up the Dnieper as in II (or perhaps other rivers connected to the Dnieper estuary). Note that in the analogous passage in IV:13, a party was also sent out by land.

<sup>93</sup>This is a good indication that the nine *şaykas* were of the Dnieper, that is, Zaporozhian Cossacks. After the suppression of the Ukrainian Cossacks in 1638, there was apparently a decrease in naval expeditions launched from the Dnieper (see n.75). However, smaller groups continued to go out onto the sea on their own, unsanctioned by the Zaporozhian command; Polish sources contain notices of a Cossack naval expedition launched in the spring of 1639 (Hruševs'kyj 1922: 27-28) that may have been the same as that of these nine *şaykas* which, according to IV:13 raided Constanța. However, these may have been two separate Zaporozhian expeditions since the frequency of the smaller, independently mounted expeditions may have been greater than previously assumed.

<sup>94</sup>The parallel phrase in IV (*içlerinden biri . . . tokuz pâre şaykadan olmağla . . .*, “among them was one who was from among the nine *şaykas* . . .,” IV:13-14), it is clear that *içinde* here (8) means “one of [the Cossacks] among [the captured informants].”

<sup>95</sup>Tendra, Tendrivs'ka kosa (*Tintere* or *Tentere*, see n.82, 103): today a long (about 65 km) and very narrow (1.8 km at its widest) spit running approximately parallel to the coast that extends toward the southeast from the mouth of the Dnieper. The northern tip of Tendra is about 25 km south of Özi. Because of its low elevation and varying sea levels, the shape of Tendra changed over the centuries. In Beauplan's maps of the Ukraine it is represented as a single island with several inlets, elongated in the north-south direction, and about twice as long as it is wide. This may be an indication that in his time only the northern third of the present-day spit (i.e., the segment running approximately north-south, which is the widest part) was above water. However, since Beauplan never visited Tendra, there is the possibility that his representation of the island was more mythical than real. The identical representation of Tendra in other maps (e.g., Jan Jansson's map of the Ukraine [Amsterdam, 1657]) suggests that this was a tradi-

in a shallow (*şığ*) and reedy (*sazlık*) place. It was seen that, because they observed from a place seven or eight *mîls* away the coming of the ships, they took to flight.<sup>96</sup> [We,] these slaves of his [excellency] with the *ţombazes* and *şandals* along the shore side of the island (*iç yüz*, “inner side”), and Piyâle Kethüdâ with the seven galleys from the sea side (*taşra yüz*, “outer side”)<sup>97</sup> of the island gave chase. Though we cast much of [our boats’ and/or the ships’] equipment and baggage [overboard to gain speed] and [we] were under full sail, through a divine mystery a [great] wind [and] storm came up. Since our *şandals* and boats (*ķayıķs*, i.e., the *ţombazes*) could not withstand the sea, they became separated from one another. As it was close to nightfall, we anchored (*yatup*) for that night at a place seven or eight *mîls* from the Cossack *şayķas*. Because there was much wind also in the morning and we were unable to group together, we spent also that [i.e., the second] day keeping [the Cossacks] under surveillance until evening. At the time of sunset, [seeing] an opportunity, they set out to flee and, spilling [out of their *şayķas*] into a shallow, fled into a thickety (*ormanlık*) place.<sup>98</sup>

14-15

By their taking flight, through the influence of the imperial good fortune, ten *şayķas* were captured. For the present, their wickedness and tumult have been repelled and removed from the community of Muhammed. While [we,] these slaves of his [excellency and] the ships of the imperial fleet had undergone so much hardship, most of the mentioned Cossacks fell into the hands of the Tatars in the thicket (*ormanlık*).<sup>99</sup> Few of them are making it back to their accursed country.

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tional representation and that Beauplan may have borrowed it from an earlier imaginative cartographer. In the mid-seventeenth century, Evliyâ Çelebi speaks of the Tendra islands (*Tentere adalari*, Evliyâ TKS: 56a; Evliyâ 5: 177). In an Ottoman map from the late seventeenth or eighteenth century (Bibliothèque Nationale, *Cartes et plans*, Port 99, div. 0, piece 2) and in the seventeenth-century sea atlas of Seyyid Nûh (Kissling 1966: pl. 16), it is given as two elongated islands arranged in a line and separated by a short and narrow strait. In eighteenth-century maps it is also given variously as one, two, or three islands running end to end, e.g., in the map of Charelle: “Les trois îles s’appellent tantere,” Bibliothèque Nationale, *Cartes et plans*, Port 99, div. 0, piece 1. .

<sup>96</sup>Does this and the parallel passage in IV:16 imply that the Cossacks in their low *şayķas* spotted the galleys first? Cf. “their boats are not above two foot and a half above the water, and they discover a ship or galley before they themselves can be perceived by them: Then they strike their masts, observe how the enemy winds . . .” (Beauplan: 465).

<sup>97</sup>While in this document the flotilla of boats is in the channel between Tendra and the mainland coast, and the galleys are on the open-sea side, in the parallel passage in IV:17 they are reversed—the boats are on the sea side and the galleys are in the channel. Since one would assume that the boats would have avoided the open sea and taken the inner route, perhaps the compiler of IV simply erred (can this be an indication that the compiler of IV used III and made a mistake in copying? See n.14). However, it cannot be ruled out that Piyâle for some reason sent the galleys through the channel since, although there were undoubtedly many shoals in the channel, according to maps from the eighteenth century, ships were able to pass through it (see maps in Bibliothèque Nationale, *Cartes et plans*, Port. 99; also Beauplan indicates that all around Tendra there was good anchoring, Beauplan: 455). Nonetheless, the presence of many sand bars, capes, and extensive shallow waters along the coast east of the mouth of the Dnieper (e.g., Zelenyj 1868: 170) would have made navigation through the channel extremely hazardous for the galleys.

<sup>98</sup>Perhaps a dense woods, but more likely a thick, scrubby brush which along Mediterranean shores is known as maquis (but see n.125).

<sup>99</sup>There seems to be a note of disappointment that the prize of capturing the Cossacks fell to the Tatars instead of to those who “deserved” to capture them. That the Cossacks abandoned their boats and that some of them were captured by the Tatars implies that their flight at sunset took them across the channel onto the mainland.

15-18

Above all, this summer we have become safe from [the depredations coming] from the aforesaid's [i.e., Cossacks'] land of affliction. As for the coming year, may the padishah and his ministers (*vekil*) be in good health. It is hoped that great preparations will be seen to in a manner that befits [the interests of] the religion and the state concerning the matter (?) of these Cossacks. May these frontiers and the Rume-  
lian shore settlements be delivered from their hand of usurpation and viciousness. The ultimate order and command and favor and benevolence are his majesty's, my felicitous and generous lord's.

- [1] The slave Mehemed, *ağa* [of] the *cebecis* of the Sublime Porte at present
- [2] The slave Muştafâ Ağa, *dizdâr*<sup>1 0 0</sup> of Old Fortress of Özi at present
- [3] The slave Himmet Ağa, *dizdâr* of New Palanğa at present
- [4] The slave Mehemed Ağa, *dizdâr* of New Fortress at present
- [5] The slave 'Abbâs Ağa, *dizdâr* of Hasan Pasha [Fortress] at present
- [6] The slave Ahmed, *ağa* [of] the 'azebis at present
- [7] The slave Habîb, *ağa* [of] the 'azebis at present
- [8] The slave İbrâhîm, *ağa* [of] the 'azebis at present
- [9] The slave Maḥmûd, *ağa* [of] the 'azebis at present.
- [10] The slave Mehemed, *ağa* [of] the 'azebis at present
- [11] The slave Muştafâ, *ağa* [of] the *fârisân* at present
- [12] The slave Muştafâ, *ağa* [of] the *fârisân* at present
- [13] The slave Şa'bân, *ağa* of the *fârisân* at present
- [14] The slave Mehemed, *ağa* [of] the *topcis* at present
- [15] The slave Hasan, *ağa* [of] the *topcis* at present

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<sup>1 0 0</sup>A *dizdâr* was a commandant or warden of a fortress.



## IV. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi E. 2891/1

Report by Piyâle Kethüdâ on repairs at Özi, an encounter with the Cossacks at the island of Tendra, and other incidents involving the Cossacks; sent from Özi to *kapudan paşa* Silâhdâr Muştafâ; on the basis of information within the text and a note on the verso (see below), written between 17 or 18 *Rebî' I* 1049/18 or 19 July 1639 and at least a day or two before 22 *Rebî' I* 1049/23 July 1639 (see n.101).

FORMAT: 56.5 x 34 cm

WATERMARK: none

INVOCATIO: at top edge, 26 cm above text (not visible in facsimile)

VERSO: address at top: *devletlü ve sa'âdetlü ve müriüvetlü sultânüm sâhib-devlet silihdâr* (sic) *paşa hazretleriniñ hâk-i 'izzetlerine bi-'l-hayr*

[May this letter arrive] in good fortune to the dust of the glory [beneath] his excellency, my fortunate and felicitous and generous lord, the mighty *silâhdâr paşa* [i.e., Silâhdâr Muştafâ Pasha] note in upper right corner: *Qara deñizde Piyâle kethüdâdan gelmişdür fi 22 Rebî'ü'l-evvel sene 1049*

On 22 *Rebî' I* in the year 1049 (23 July 1639) [this letter] came from Piyâle Kethüdâ on the Black Sea<sup>101</sup>

imprint of oval seal (*mühr*) in black ink (14 x 16 mm) behind and upside down in relation to signature on recto: *mazhar-i lutf-i ilâhî Piyâle bin 'Abdullâh . . .*

<sup>101</sup> Although such notes on the versos of reports are not uncommon, they have not been studied and it is not known at what stage in a document's path and by what officials they were affixed. If this note was made upon the arrival of IV in Istanbul, where the addressee Silâhdâr Muştafâ was at the time (see n.78), then the document must have been delivered in four or five days (the incident at Tendra ended on the evening of 16 *Rebî' I*; it is conceivable that the next incident—another encounter with the Cossacks while Piyâle was back to the work on the fortress—occurred within the next day or two, 17 or 18 *Rebî' I* [see n.133]; the other incident recounted after these two could have occurred prior to or simultaneously to them [see n.135]; time must also be allowed for the composition and writing out of the document; hence, IV could have left Özi no earlier than 18 or 19 *Rebî' I*). If the dates given in the text and the date on the verso are accurate, the speed of the document's delivery is remarkable. From what is known about the post-horse (*ulağ*) system at the end of the century, it would have taken a non-stop relay of couriers at least 6 1/3 days (151 hours) to deliver a letter from Özi to Kırk Kilise alone, some 200 km short of the capital (Heywood 1980: 185 n.7). The most plausible explanation is that IV was sent by what Kâtib Çelebi calls an *ulağ gemisi* or courier-ship (*Tuhfet*: 148; perhaps a specially adapted galliot?). Apparently a galley with a newly greased hull could cover 200 *mîls* in fifteen hours with a favorable wind (*Tuhfet*: 150). In the Mediterranean where, granted, sailing conditions were different from those in the Black Sea, a galley could supposedly sail the distance of about 600 km (500 *mîls* according to Kâtib Çelebi) between Alexandria and Rhodes—two-thirds of the distance between Özi and Istanbul sailing roughly along the Rumelian coast or half the distance when going across the sea and along the Anatolian coast—in two nights with a good wind and in four nights otherwise (*Tuhfet*: 149). In Guilmartin's estimates, the cruising speed of a galley sustainable for eight hours was about 3 to 4 knots (5.5 to 7.4 km/hr) and about half that for longer periods (Guilmartin 1974: 203). Assuming the best scenario, in which the oarsmen could be rotated to maintain maximum cruising speed around the clock, it would have taken 115 hours or nearly 5 days to reach Istanbul from Özi following the Rumelian coast (of course this estimate does not take into account the factors of wind and current).

The bearer of divine grace, Piyâle, son of 'Abdullâh . . . .<sup>1 0 2</sup>

COMMENTS: black ink with gold dust sprinkled sparsely throughout recto text and on address on verso.

#### IV. TEXT

##### Hüve

1 sâ'âdetlü ve müriüvetlü ve re'fetlü sulţânüm hazretlerinin türâb-i akdâm-i sa'âdet-encâmılarına yüzler sürdükdün şoñra 'arz-i bende-i bî-vücüd budur ki Hakk sübhânehu ve te'âlâ hazretleri devletlü ve 'azametlü ve şevketlü gâzî ve mücâhid pâdişâhımız 2 hazretlerinin vücüd-i fâyizü'l-hayr ve'l-cûdlerin haţâlardan şaklayup taht-i salţanat ve evreng-i hilâfet üzere ilâ yevmi'l-karâr bâkî vu pâydâr eyleye ve sa'âdetlü ve müriüvetlü sulţânuma dañi çok yıllar 'ömürler virüp zill-i himâyelerin 3 üzerimizden dūr u zâyil itmeye âmîn sa'âdetlü sulţânüm âsitâne-i sa'âdetden çıkup Kalğra nâm maħalle gelince vâkı'-i hâl tafşil üzere hâk-i 'izzetlerine bildürilmişdi maħall-i mezbûrdan kalkup şehr-i Rebî'ü'l-evvelün on birinci 4 gün (*sic, read* günü) hayr-du'ânuz berekâtiyle emîn u sâlim Özi limanına dâhil olduğumuz günün ertesi Kılburun begine ve neferât ağalarına der-i devlet-medârdan virilen emr-i şerîf kırâ'at itdürildükde sa'âdetlü pâdişâhımız hazretlerinin 5 bu intihâ-yi serħadde olan murâbiţ kulları hakkında 'inâyet u ihsân u merħamet-i bî-pâyânları zühür idüp kal'emüzi ta'mîre teveccüh-i hümayûnları erzânî buyurulmuş biz dañi kâdir olduğumuz mertebe hidmet-i mezbûrede (*read mezbûreye?*) 6 dâmen der-miyân iderüz diyü her biri fermân-i vâcibü'l-kabûl ve'l-iz'âna inkiyâd u imtişâl ve devâm-i 'ömr u devlet-i rûz-efzûnları du'âsına müdâvemet u istiğâlde olmalarıyla hemân ol-gün gemilerimizde olan 7 üsârâ ve ğayrıdan neccâr ve ırğad çıkarup binâ olınacak maħallün temeli kazdurılmağâ şürû' olunup mâh-i mezbûruñ on dördüncü günü ki yevmi's-sebt-i mübârekdür bir hayrlu sâ'atda temel birağılıp binâsına mübâşeret 8 olındı Hakk te'âlâ hazretleri vefk-i rızâ-yi sa'âdet-iktizâ'-i pâdişâhî üzere encâm u hayr-itmâm müyesser eyleye kal'e-i mezbûra (*sic, read mezbûreye*) karîb yerde taş olmamağla Eflak ve Boğdandan taş nakline imdâd idecek 'arabalar 9 gelinceye degin gemiler ve şandallar ve yerlü tombazlarile kal'eye on sekiz mil mesâfe olan Yapunca burnı nâm maħallden iki üç günde bir gündüz varup taş getirüp gice Kılburun kulesiyle Özi boğazında 10 gemilerimizi şabâha dek serdemende koyup bâb-i muħâfazada kemâl-i diğkat olduğundan ğayrı tersâne-i 'âmire çavuşlarından 'Abdî çavuş bendeleri varup Kers ve Tâman taraflarında turup Azak 11 ve Ten kazağı şaykalarından çıkar olursa ta'cîl üzere haber gönderilmek için Or begine ve Kers kâdisına mü'ekked mektûblar gönderüp ve etrâf u cevânîbine göz ve kulağ tutup anuñ gibi ol-câniblerde 12 şayka zühür iderse binâ üzerine kifâyet miğdârî âdam ve mu'temedün 'aleyh baş ve buğ naşb itdükden şoñra bu kulları iktizâ itdüğü maħalle teveccüh u 'azîmet niyetinde iken biz Öziye gelmezden evvel Özilüden 13 bir kaç yarar u nâmdâr yigitler karadan ve deryâdan dil almağâ gidüp bizden üç gün şoñra gelüp bir kaç nefer esir ve dil getirüp içlerinden biri muħaddemâ Rum ili yakasında Köstence nâm maħalli ğâret iden 14 toğuz pâre şaykadan olmağla melâ'in-i mezbûrîñ hâliyâ ne maħalde oldukları su'âl olduğda şihħatı üzere haber virmemekle Öziye karîb Tintere<sup>1 0 3</sup> nâm aţada oldukları ihtimâli ile bu kulları donanmadan 15 yedi pâre kadırğa ve yerlü tombazlarından ve şandallarımızdan on dört kıt'a kayık ve şandal ile mâh-i mezbûruñ on beşinci günü seheri aţâ-i mezbûra varup zikr olınan

<sup>1 0 2</sup>In more legible imprints of the same seal on the versos of two other reports by Piyâle in the Topkapı, E. 2891/2 and E. 4752, a partially legible date giving the year the seal was cast is visible: 104 (?)(?)6(1636-1637[?]).

<sup>1 0 3</sup>Vocalized in the original: تينتره *Tintere*. In the facsimile the apparent dot above and to the left of the two dots belonging to the initial *tâ* is, in the original, clearly a *sukûn*. Note that in this document some of the Turkish words are vocalized.

kazaç şayqaların tefahhuş iderken 16 melâ'in qadırğaları yedi sekiz mîl yerden görüp kendülerin şığ ve ormanlık yerlere urup firâr itdükleri direk başlarından görildükde qadırğalar varup yanaşmaq ve top irişmek mümkün olmamağla 17 şandal ve qayıqları tekrâr yeñiçeri ve cebeci ve levendât bahadurları ile tonadup bunların üzerine Qılburun begini serdâr idüp vaqt-i 'aşırdan evvel ağanıñ taşra yüzinden anlar ve iç yüzünden bu kulları 18 'Âl (عال?) boğazı nâm maħalle varınca qovup ve ba'z-i esbâb ve ağırlıq dökürüp irişmek üzere iken meltem zamânı olmağın emr-i Hâkq ile 'azîm rûzgâr ve furtuna zühûr itmekle Özi qayıqları ve şandallar deryâya 19 tayanmaduğundan birbirinden ayrılıp ve aħşam irişüp qayıqlarımız ol gice ağanıñ taşra yüzinde ve bu kulları yedi pâre qadırğa ile iç yüzünde şabâha dek melâ'in-i mezbûrîni gözedüp şabâh olduqda 20 şiddet-i rûzgârdan bir vecihle hareket mümkün olmayup aħşama dek qadırğalarımız ve qayıqlarımız bu hâl üzere qalduğın melâ'in gördükde havâ gice limanlık iderse hücûmdan halâş olmaq ve 'asker-i İslâmdan 21 baş qurtarmaq muħâl olduğın muqarrer bilmek ve kemâl mertebe kendülerinden ye's gelmekle vaqt-i gurûbda şayqalarından şığa çıkup büyük kıyıda vâkı' ormanlığa dökilüp firâr itmeleriyle kuvvet-i tîlî-i hümâyûn-i 22 pâdişâhîde on pâre şayqaları âlât u esbâbları ile . . .<sup>104</sup> nâm maħalde qabza-i zabt u taşarrufa getirilüp hayr-du'ânuz berekâtında bu tarafta olan memâlik-i maħrûse yalıları fesâd 23 u mazarratlarından fazl-i Hâkq ile emîn u sâlim olmışlardur bu kulları qal'e binâsı üzerinde iken melâ'in-i mezbûrîni tekrâr varup iç il yalılarına işâl-i mazarrat ve ilkâ'-i nâ'ire-i hasâret 24 itmeleri havfî müstevlî olmuşdı el-ħamdü li-llâhi te'âlâ âsân vech üzere def' u ref' olup hâ'ib u hâsir firâr itmişlerdür devletlü sulţânım sa'âdetlü ve 'azametlü pâdişâhımızuñ ni'met-i 25 celîleleri haqqıyçün melâ'in-i mezbûrîni diğqat u ihtimâmla aranup bulunmada ve maħalline göre tedârîkle varılmada zerrece taqşîrât olunmamışdur lâkin el-'abdü yüdebbirü ve-llâhü yuqaddirü ziyâde rûzgârlu ve furtunalu 26 günde ve ğâyet şığ ve teng yerde bulunup istidrâc u imhâlleri nihâyet u kemâl bulmamış bunda böyle daħi dîn-i mübîn ve pâdişâh-i rûy-i zemîn uğurında<sup>105</sup> 27 ve zamân-i sa'âdet-i kıtırânlarında niçe nümâyân ħidmetde bulunmağa 28 dâmen der-miyân idüp sa'î ve ikdâmımız kemâldedür 29 Hâkq te'âlâ ħazretleri rûzı kılup mûcib-i sa'âdet-i 30 dünyâ vu âħiret olan hayr-du'â-i icâbet 31 qarînlerine mazhar olmağı müyesser eyleye sa'âdetlü sulţânım 32 melâ'in-i mezbûrîni qaraya dökilecek yerlere ihtimâlle 33 muqaddemce Özilüden yüz nefer atlu ve tûfeng- 34 endâz yarar yigitler irsâl olunmışdı varup 35 qaraya çıktuqlarında mezbûrlar daħi 'azîm ceng idüp 36 vâfir esbâb bırağdurduqlarından ğayrı 37 yedi sekiz yaşında etfâl-i müslimînden 38 on-üç on-dört nefer şabî oğlancıklar 39 ve bir kaç nefer ħatun bırağdurmalarıyla bu taraflarda 40 mekânı ma'lûm olanlar yerlü yerine gönderilüp 41 kendüyi ve vilâyet u qaryesini bilmeyen ma'sûmlardan 42 on nefer oğlancıklar âsitâne-i sa'âdete gönderilmişdür 43 in şâ'llâhü te'âlâ şıħhatla vuşûllerinde manzûr-i 44 sa'âdetleri olduqda vâlid ve akrabâlarından 45 zühûr u tîlib olanlara teslîm itdürilmek 46 bâbında emr u fermân sa'âdetlü ve mürüvetlü sulţânımızdur 47 sa'âdetlü sulţânım ve devletlü ve şevketlü pâdişâhımızuñ 48 mübârek 'azîz u şerîf başlarıyçün vaqt 49 u zamân var iken İznikmidden on üçer 50 oturağ şandal kerâstesı getirilmek fermân-i 51 âlîleri olup ne-miğdâr qadırğa çıkarılırsa 52 her birine birer şandal binâ itdürilüp ma'an çıkarılmağa 53 himmet u inâyet u fermân-i şerîfleri şudûr buyurıla ki 54 Kara deñize ğâret u hasâret içün çıkan 55 şayqaların ke-mâ hüve haqquh haqqlarından gelinmek qâbil 56 ola mâdâmki bu minvâl üzere olmaya 57 sa'âdetlü pâdişâhımızuñ ve ümmet-i Muħammedüñ bu melâ'inden 58 intikâmları alınmaz ve lâyıķı üzere ħidmet 59 ve yüz aqlığ olmaz büyük qadırğalarile böyle 60 şığ yerlerde ve sazlık maħallerde bulınduqda 61 emek hebâ ve ħidmet zâyî' olur vâkı'-i 62 hâl hâk-i 'izzetlerine 'arz olındı ol-bâbda 63 emr u fermân devletlü ve sa'âdetlü sulţânım ħazretleriniñdür 64 devletlü sulţânım şimdilik donanma-i hümâyûn gemileri üç bölük olup biri daħi Boğazda iken 65 Ana-tolî câniblerine gönderilüp daħi gelüp donanmaya mülħaq olmamışlardur ve biri daħi esir 66 ve kürekcileri

<sup>104</sup> In the original there is a blank space where the place name would have been written.

<sup>105</sup> After this word there is a sign (see facsimile) indicating that from here the text continues in the right margin.

ile taşrada kal'e binâsı üzerinde olup leyl u nehâr hizmet-i binâda bezl-i mechûd u iktidâr 67 üzerelerdür ve bu kulları daği sayir gemilerle üç dört günde bir varup kal'eye taş 68 nakl idüp ve gice muhâfaza üzere olduğumuz ilm-i şeriflerine rüşendür ve Ramazân gâzi kulları 69 getürdüğü dillerden hâk-i izzetlerine bir dil gönderildi takriri ma'lûm-i sa'âdetleri olduğda ol-bâbda 70 daği emr u fermân sa'âdetlü sultânüm hazretlerinüfüdür ve donanma-yi hümâyûnda olan ümerâ ve kapudan 71 ve rü'esâ ve yeñiçeri ağası kulları mübârek hâkipây-i şerifiñize yüzler sürüp mağall-i icâbet-i du'â 72 olan rûy-i deryâda sa'âdetlü ve 'âzametlü ve re'fetlü pâdişâhımız hazretlerinüñ ve mürüvvetlü sultânümüñ devâm-i 73 'ömr u devlet-i rûz-efzûnları da'vâtına müdâvemet üzerelerdür bâkî emr u fermân sa'âdetlü sultânümüñdür

74 bende

75 Piyâle

76 kethüdâ.<sup>106</sup>

## IV. TRANSLATION

He!

- 1 After rubbing [our] faces into the felicity-bringing dust [beneath] the feet of his excellency, my felicitous and generous and merciful lord, this is the report of the slave whose existence is unimportant.
- 1-3 May the Lord God—be He glorified and exalted!—protect from error the body abundant in goodness and generosity of his majesty, our padishah, the fortunate and magnificent and majestic ghazi and holy warrior, and make it lasting and enduring until the day of judgment upon the royal seat of the sultanate and upon the throne of the caliphate, and also grant many more years of life to my felicitous and generous lord, and not make distant or ephemeral the shadow of his [majesty's] protection upon us. Amen.
- 3-8 My felicitous lord, [our] setting out from the threshold of felicity [i.e., Istanbul, and] the state of things up until [our] coming to a place called Kaliakra<sup>107</sup> have been made known in great detail to the dust [beneath] the glory of his [excellency].<sup>108</sup> We set out from the abovementioned place and on the eleventh day of *Rebi' I* (12 July 1639), with the blessings of your prayers [on our behalf], we entered the harbor of Özi, safe and sound.<sup>109</sup> On the next day, when the *beg* of Kılburun and the [Özi] soldiery-

<sup>106</sup> Although the signature is located in the lower left of the page after 26, it cannot be read there since the report is continued in the margin (27ff.).

<sup>107</sup> Kaliakra (*Kaligra*): a town on a promontory by the same name, on the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria, about 45 km northeast of Varna.

<sup>108</sup> Thus Piyâle sent a report from Kaliakra, presumably to Silâhdâr Muştafâ.

<sup>109</sup> There is virtually no information on the fleet during the approximately two months which elapsed between its anchoring at Kavak (I, II) and its arrival at Özi. The delay at Kavak until final sailing orders were issued may have lasted several weeks. Perhaps the fleet had to patrol the Rumelian shores or had encounters with Cossacks on the way. Under normal circumstances the passage of sizable fleets was slow because with each ship carrying 200 to 300 men, food and water supplies were rapidly used up and had to be replenished at ports along the way (Braudel 1972-1973: 107; Guilmartin 1974: 62-63, 95-97; Imber 1980: 216-17). In 1627 the fleet under *kapudan paşa* Hasan was in Kavak during the first week of June and, taking the same route along the coast of Rumelia, arrived at Özi towards the end of the second week of July (Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Mühimme defteri* 83: nos. 2-51). It is not certain how many ships of the original fleet assigned to the Black Sea (32 ships of the arsenal plus 9 *beg gemileri*, see II) were in Piyâle's fleet when he reached Özi since part of the fleet was sent along the Anatolian shore (see n.18).

officers<sup>110</sup> were made to read the noble order delivered from the gate [around which] good fortune turns [i.e., the Porte], everyone became obedient and compliant to the firman, which demands acceptance and obedience, and assiduous and occupied with prayer for the continuation of the life and daily-increasing good fortune of his [majesty], saying, “The favor and kindness and mercy of his majesty, the felicitous padishah, toward these border-post slaves of his [majesty] who are garrisoned on this extremity of the frontier region is manifest without bounds. It has been seen fit by his imperial solicitude to allow the repair of our fortress. As for us, we are preparing for the abovementioned service to the highest degree of which we are capable.” And so, that very day the carpenters (*neccâr*) and workmen (*ırğad*) from among the slaves (*üsârâ*) and others who were on our ships were landed, and the digging of the foundation at the site where the construction was to be made was commenced.<sup>111</sup> At an auspicious hour of the fourteenth day of the abovementioned month (15 July 1639), which was a blessed Saturday,<sup>112</sup> the foundation was completed and construction was begun. May the Lord God—be He exalted!—facilitate its execution and good completion in accordance with the imperial wish which calls forth felicity.

8-10 Since there is no stone near the abovementioned fortress, until wagons (*araba*) come from Wallachia and Moldavia to help in the transport of stone, once every two or three days, with the ships and the *şandals* and the local *ţombazes* [we] set out during daylight and bring stone from a place named Yapunca Burnı,<sup>113</sup> which is a distance of eighteen *mîls* from the fortress. At night we place our ships with their sails furled (*serdemende*)<sup>114</sup> in the mouth of the Dnieper at the tower of Kılburun and in the matter of defense there is the utmost of attention.<sup>115</sup>

10-14 Aside from this, his majesty’s slave ‘Abdî Çavuş, one of the *çavuşes* of the imperial naval arsenal, has set out and is staying in the area of Kerch and Taman. He has sent stringent letters to the *beg* of Or<sup>116</sup> and the *ķâđi* of Kerch so that, should any of the Azak and Don Cossack (*Azak ve Ten ķazađı*)<sup>117</sup> *şayķas*

<sup>110</sup> *Neferât ağaları*: the officers of the Özi fortress complex including signatories of III. The *beg* of Kılburun, whose *sancaķ* included Özi and the surrounding countryside (Evliyâ TKS: 56b; Evliyâ 5: 179; Evliyâ 1961: 110-11), must have been their regional commander (see n.127).

<sup>111</sup> *ırğad* denotes an unskilled worker or common day laborer. As with *kürekcis*, certain regions were obligated to provide one *ırğad* per a fixed number of tax-collection units (*hâne*). Although the service was compulsory, sources on fortress construction in eastern Anatolia from the same period indicate that to ensure their cooperation and prevent defection they were paid a competitive wage and that the authorities were careful to make sure that able-bodied men were sent (Murphey 1980: 166-67, 171 nn.32, 34, 35). However, *üsârâ ve ğayrıdan neccâr ve ırğad* indicates that part of the work force, probably the unskilled though perhaps also others, included slave labor. That the construction work was started as soon as the fleet arrived (also in III:4-5) suggests that the work could not begin before its arrival, which is a hint of the importance of the fleet and the labor which it imported. Undoubtedly when the fleet was in transit the slaves served as oarsmen.

<sup>112</sup> In modern concordances of *hicrî* dates, this date is given as a Friday (Unat 1959: 70). The one-day discrepancy must be the result of local determination of the beginning of a new month which was made according to the actual sighting of the new moon (*rüyet-i hilâl*) (Unat 1959: xi; Schacht 1966).

<sup>113</sup> See n.87.

<sup>114</sup> See n.88.

<sup>115</sup> See nn.89, 90.

<sup>116</sup> Or (also *Or-ķapı*) was the Tatar fortress guarding Perekop, the isthmus connecting the Crimea with the continent.

<sup>117</sup> *Azak ķazađı* (“Azak Cossacks”), referring to the Cossacks occupying the fortress of Azak, included both Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks. Following the suppression of the Ukrainian Cossacks in

emerge, the news will be dispatched [to us] with all speed. And [thus] he keeps a [watchful] eye and an [alert] ear in all directions and all sides.<sup>118</sup> Had such *şaykas* appeared in those parts, this his [excellency's] slave [i.e., Piyâle], after appointing a sufficient number of men (*adam*) and a reliable commander (*baş ve buğ*) [to guard] the construction,<sup>119</sup> planned to set forth to the necessary place [i.e., to wherever Cossacks had been spotted] when, three days after [our arrival], several capable and reputable young men (*yarar u nâmdâr yigitler*, see n.136) from Özi (*Özilü*) who, before we came to Özi, had gone out by land and on water<sup>120</sup> to capture informants (*dil*), returned bringing back several prisoners (*eşir*) and captured informants.<sup>121</sup> Since among them there was one [Cossack] who was from the nine *şaykas* that had recently raided a place on the Rumelian shore called Constanța (*Köstence*), he was asked at what place the abovementioned accursed ones [in the nine *şaykas*] were now, [but he] gave no true answer.

14-23

So because there was a chance that they were on the island called Tendra,<sup>122</sup> which is close to Özi, this slave of his [excellency], together with seven galleys from the fleet and fourteen boats (*kayık*) and *şandals* from among their local [i.e., the Özi forces'] *tombazes* and our *şandals* [i.e., *şandals* of the fleet

1638 and the measures taken to prevent them from raiding the Black Sea from the Dnieper (see n.75), there was a significant migration to occupied Azak by Zaporozhians fleeing repressive conditions in the Ukraine and in search of better opportunities (Novosel'skij 1948: 260). Joint expeditions on the Black Sea by the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks were common, particularly during this period (Hrušev'kyj 1922: 14ff.; Tušin 1978: 100-134 passim).

<sup>118</sup>Vigilance in the vicinity of the Straits of Kerch was imperative not only so that the fleet stationed at Özi could respond in time, but for the sake of the safety of Kerch and Taman which guarded the straits. It is not certain whether the *beg* of Or was put on the lookout because of the possibility that the Cossacks might attempt to cross the isthmus at Perekop by portage (during this period, however, there were Cossack attempts to penetrate the Crimea by land, Smirnov 1946: 66). Certainly the location of Or would allow for the surveillance of the western shores of the Sea of Azov. Because his responsibilities included patrolling the steppes north of the Crimea, he would have been in a position to learn of Cossacks using the system of rivers and portages to the northwest of his territory connecting the Dnieper and the Sea of Azov (cf. Beauplan: 466). Perhaps the importance here of Or was not only its strategic placement at the entry into the Crimea, but also its approximate midway location on the most direct route from the Straits of Kerch to Özi (by the Sea of Azov from the straits to the isthmus of Perekop, and again by sea from the other side to Özi, or from there by land through the Kılburun peninsula; the alternative route by sea around the Crimea is much longer). So perhaps the *beg* of Or was responsible for ensuring that there was no delay at Perekop in relaying any communications arriving from the Straits of Kerch to couriers or onto boats on the other side of the isthmus.

<sup>119</sup>Since the improvements of the fortifications at Özi were made with the ultimate goal of strengthening Ottoman control of the mouth of the Dnieper, there was the danger that the Cossacks would make a preemptive attack on the construction site. This was perhaps the main reason *tarabands* were called up from Moldavia and Wallachia (see n.30). Cf. the Cossacks' razing of, in 1635, just after its completion, the Polish fortress of Kodak, built to control their movements between the Zaporizhzhia and the rest of the Ukraine.

<sup>120</sup>See n.92.

<sup>121</sup>*Dil almağa gidüp . . . bir kaç nefer eşir ve dil getirüp*: the use of the word *eşir*, "prisoner, captive, slave" in addition to *dil*, "tongue," i.e., captured informant, suggests that, aside from bringing back the latter, the raiding party also took captives for the purpose of selling them on the slave market.

<sup>122</sup>See n.95.

normally carried on the galleys],<sup>123</sup> set out for the abovementioned island at dawn on the fifteenth day of the abovementioned month (16 July 1639). While searching closely for the mentioned Cossack *şaykas*, it was seen from the tops of the masts that the accursed ones, seeing the galleys from a place seven or eight *mils* away,<sup>124</sup> were fleeing and heading for shallow (*şığ*) and thicketed (*ormanlık*)<sup>125</sup> places. At that point, the galleys went [after them]. Because it was impossible to draw near and get within cannon-range, the *şandals* and boats (*kayıks*, i.e., the *ţombazes*) were again manned with brave janissary and *cebeci* and *levend* warriors.<sup>126</sup> The *beg* of Kılburun was made their operational commander (*serdâr*).<sup>127</sup> Before midafternoon they, from the sea side (*taşra yüz*, “outer side”) of the island, and this slave of his [excellency] from its shore side (*iç yüz*, “inner side”)<sup>128</sup> gave chase, going as far as a place called ‘Âl (?) Straits.<sup>129</sup> Although [we] cast some supplies and baggage [overboard] and were almost upon them, as

<sup>123</sup>*Yerlü ţombazlarından ve şandallarımızdan on dört kıt'a kayık ve şandal*: the construction *ţombazlarından . . . kayık . . .* is similar to expressions with the ablative used to convey attributes (see Lewis G. 1967: 253); to paraphrase, “local *kayıks* of the *ţombaz* type and *şandals* of the fleet, altogether fourteen pieces.” *Kayıık* in these documents seems to be a general term for boat. In some passages, as in this one, it is used to denote the Özi *ţombazes* but not the fleet's *şandals* (e.g., *Özi kayıkları ve şandallar* [emphasis added], IV:18; *şandal ve kayıklarımız*, III:11). In other instances *kayıık* includes both the *ţombazes* and the *şandals* (*kayıklarımız* [from Piyâle's perspective], IV:19, 20). For other examples of *ţombaz* referred to as a *kayıık*, see Sâmi: 910; Pakalın 3: 511; *Tarama*: 3819; cf. Barbier 329, Kêlékian: 824. Although *kayıık* was also used for a specific type of boat (a narrow, long-hulled rowboat pointed at both ends, varying in length according to the numbers of oars, from one pair to ten or more pairs, see Arseven: 987; Mantran 1962: 98-99), there are many examples of *kayıık* used for a broad variety of oared boats or even small ships, with or without sails (e.g., *at kayığı* in Meninski 3: 952; *şayka* in Jal s.v. “caïque” and *Tuħfet*: 113; see also Jal s.v. “barque”; Kahane, Tietze 1958: 348, 564).

<sup>124</sup>See n.96.

<sup>125</sup>*Ormanlık* may refer to maquis-type vegetation growing along the shore (see n.98). However, at this point in III:9 *sazlık*, “reedy” is written instead, which suggests that here *ormanlık* refers to very dense and tall “*orman* or forest-like” reedbeds (unlike in III:13, 15 and IV:21 where *ormanlık* seems to refer to land vegetation).

<sup>126</sup>In saying that the boats were *again* manned with troops (*tekrâr . . . ũonadup*) is Piyâle implying that this was a frequently-used tactic (as in the previous summer at Taman) or is he referring to an encounter with the Cossacks on the shores of Rumelia during the sail to Özi which was perhaps mentioned in a previous report?

<sup>127</sup>Both sides of the Dnieper estuary belonged to the *sancaık* of Kılburun, including Özi (Evliyâ TKS 58a; Evliyâ 5: 185; Evliyâ 1961: 117). Therefore its governor, whose identity during this period is not known, must have been the logical choice for *serdâr* or operational commander of this flotilla of boats, since from III it is evident that it was manned by many local troops from Özi. However, from the previous sentence it is clear that the *beg* of Kılburun was, for this mission, also put in charge of some *kayııklı* and other forces brought by the fleet.

<sup>128</sup>See n.97.

<sup>129</sup>*Al (?) boğazu*: this place-name could not be identified. It was probably the name of an outlet at one of the two ends of the channel formed by Tendra and the coast. Perhaps the name should be read *Şimâl* (شمال) *boğazu* (“North Straits”), referring to the northern outlet of the channel. Another possibility is that it was a strait such as the ones that in certain periods broke up the low-lying island into segments (see n.95).

it was the time of the sea breeze,<sup>130</sup> by divine decree, a great wind and storm came up. Because the Özi boats and the *şandals* could not withstand the sea, they became separated from one another. Evening was approaching, [so for] that night our boats on the sea side of the island and this slave of his [excellency] with the seven galleys on the shore side of the island kept the abovementioned accursed ones under surveillance until morning. When morning came, any kind of movement was [still] impossible because of the violence of the wind. When the accursed ones saw that our galleys and boats would remain in this position until evening, they knew for certain that, if the weather became calm at night, it would become impossible to escape from attack and save their heads from the army of Islam.<sup>131</sup> And so, becoming desperate to the highest degree, at the time of sunset they spilled out of the *şaykas* into the shallows and fled, pouring into a thicket (*ormanlık*) along a wide shore. By the ascendancy of the imperial star of the padishah, [all] ten of their *şaykas* with their equipment and apparatus (*âlat u esbâb*) were firmly taken into possession at a place called . . .<sup>132</sup> With the blessings of your good prayers, the shore settlements which are on this side of the well-protected dominions became, by the grace of God, safe and sound from their [i.e. the Cossacks'] viciousness and harm.

23-24

While this slave of his [excellency returned] to the construction work on the fortress, the abovementioned accursed ones set out again.<sup>133</sup> A great fear of their inflicting harm and hurling flames of

<sup>130</sup>*Meltem zamânı*: *meltem* refers to a set of winds alternating between land and shore. Because land heats and cools faster than the sea, in the daytime the land air pressure falls relative to that at sea, causing a sea breeze. Conversely, at night, though less pronounced, a land breeze develops because of the faster cooling of land (the definition "off-shore breeze that blows daily for a period in the summer" given in Redhouse: 752 can apply only to the *meltem* that occurs at night). *Meltem zamânı* must refer to the early afternoon which is when sea breezes reach their full strength (thus in the previous sentence [17] the chase along the island begins "before the time of the afternoon prayer" [*vâkı-i 'aşırđan evvel*], i.e., in early afternoon). The mention in this document of a strong sea breeze indicates a very hot and cloudless day. Thunderstorms can also form during a pronounced sea breeze front, which apparently occurred here as well, although the apparent continuation of a strong wind through the night and into the next day suggests that the initial *meltem* was followed by a different meteorological event (see *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 23 [1971], s.v. "Wind": 563; Öngör 1961: 561-62).

<sup>131</sup>According to Kâtib Çelebi, in windy weather the galleys had an advantage over the *şaykas* whereas in calm seas the situation was reversed (see *Tuhfet*: 110). D'Ascoli states that the galleys were more dependent than the *şaykas* on the wind for mobility, and therefore, no matter how big or well armed, they were very vulnerable to the Cossacks in calm weather (d'Ascoli: 98; Tušın 1978: 53). Here the situation was obviously different since the *şaykas* were outnumbered and blockaded by the galleys, and only the high wind prevented the Ottoman boats from regrouping and making a final assault. In the event the Cossacks made a run for it before the calm, the galleys could probably not fully unfurl their sails and use the wind to their advantage in pursuit since the combination of shallow water and the high wind put them in danger of running aground. See Piyâle's assertion of the ineffectiveness of the galleys in such situations below (25-26).

<sup>132</sup>In the original there is a blank where the place name would have been written. At this point in III:15, there is the additional information that most of the Cossacks were captured by the Tatars, although some of them straggled back to their country.

<sup>133</sup>Obviously another Cossack raiding party is the referent, i.e., *melâ'in-i mezbûrîn*, "abovementioned accursed ones" refers to Cossacks in general. This incident occurred no more than a day or two after the encounter at Tendra, since IV itself was written very soon after the latter (see n.101). This short respite between Cossack raids may be an indication of their frequency.

destruction to the shore settlements of the heartland became widespread.<sup>134</sup> Praise be to God—be He exalted!—they were repelled and removed with ease—frustrated and confounded, they fled.

24-31 For the sake of the glorious happiness of my fortunate lord [and] of our felicitous and magnificent padishah, there has not been the slightest neglect in searching for and finding with [great] care and effort the abovementioned accursed ones and in going out [after them, having made] preparations appropriate to their location. But while the slave proposes, God disposes: they are present on very windy and stormy days and in extremely shallow and narrow places. There is no end or conclusion to their successes [which are] enticements [granted by God] gradually leading [these accursed ones] to perdition (*istidrâc*) and to the reprieves prolonging their term [before damnation] (*imhâl*). Thus we here prepare during the era which is joined with felicity to be in such manifest service for the sake of the pure faith and the padishah of the face of the earth. And our exertions and efforts are of the utmost [degree]. May God—be He exalted!—create the day and facilitate [our] being worthy of the good prayers which cause felicity in this world and in the next world and which are bound to be answered.

31-46 My felicitous lord, a little while before,<sup>135</sup> a hundred soldiers from Özi (*Özilü*), mounted and musket-bearing capable young men,<sup>136</sup> were sent to probable places where the abovementioned accursed ones [i.e., Cossacks in general] would land [from their *şaykas*]. They set out and when they [i.e., the Cossacks] went ashore, the aforementioned ones [from Özi] engaged [the Cossacks] in a great battle. Besides causing [the Cossacks] to abandon much equipment,<sup>137</sup> [our troops] caused them to leave behind thirteen or fourteen little boys—Muslim children between the ages of seven and eight—and several women. Those whose homes in these parts were known were sent [back], each to his own place. Ten innocent little boys who did not know who they were or their [home] district (*vilâyet*) or village have been sent to the threshold of felicity [i.e., to Istanbul]. If God—be He exalted!—wills it, they arrive safely and have been seen by his [excellency's] felicity, the matter of their being turned over to those from among their parents or relatives who come forth and ask for them is up to the command and order of my felicitous and generous lord.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Thus Piyâle, in referring to the great fear of the Cossacks among the Black Sea population, depicts them as striking into the heartland (*iç il*) of the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>135</sup> *Muḳaddemce*, “a little while before”: considering that IV was written very soon after the incident at Tendra and the incident that follows it (see n.101), the Cossack incident about to be recounted here must have occurred prior, or perhaps simultaneously to these events.

<sup>136</sup> *Yarar yigitler*, “capable young men” (also above in 13) probably refers to young volunteers, perhaps sons of *fârisân*, who hoped to obtain permanent membership in one of the Özi garrisons by distinguishing themselves in frontier operations. Sons of *gönüllüs* (see n.24) in an analogous role were also called *yarar yigitler* (see Inalcik 1965: 1121; for further examples of *yarar yigitler* see Heyd 1960: 102, 104). Regardless of whether or not this mission included members of the *fârisân* corps, this passage is a good indication that they too had to be armed with muskets.

<sup>137</sup> *Vâfir esbâb*: or perhaps “much equipment and supplies (and probably booty).” That, in the two cases recounted in this document in which the Ottomans succeeded in capturing the Cossacks' *şaykas*, the seizure of their equipment is mentioned may be a hint that it was considered a worthy prize. Cf. Beauplan's statement that each *şayka* carried in the way of munitions four or five falconets plus, for each Cossack, two muskets, six pounds of powder, sufficient lead bullets, and one curved sword (and in the way of provisions a barrel of biscuits ten feet long and four feet in diameter, a barrel [puncheon] of boiled millet and another of “dough dissolved in water,” Beauplan: 465).

<sup>138</sup> The rescue or redemption of Muslim captives from infidel hands was a major religious duty (*fârîza*) in Islam which the Ottomans took very seriously (see Itzkowitz, Mote 1970: 13-14, there the Koranic injunction to this effect [sura 9, verse 60] is pointed out).

- 47-63 For the sake of the blessed, glorious and noble lives (*başları*, "their heads") of my felicitous lord and of our fortunate and majestic padishah, may there be a lofty firman of his [majesty ordering that], as there is still time, the timber for thirteen-thwart *şandals*<sup>139</sup> be brought from İzmit, and may the support and favor and noble firman of his [majesty] be issued so that, however many galleys are launched, may one *şandal* be built for each one of them and launched together [with it];<sup>140</sup> so that it be possible to punish, as is their due, those *şaykas* that go [out] onto the Black Sea to plunder and destroy. For if it is not done in this way, the revenge of our felicitous padishah and of the community of Muhammed against these accursed ones will not be taken, and service as is fitting and freedom from shame will not be, [for] when they are found in such shallow parts and reedy places by [our] large galleys, the effort is wasted and the service is in vain. The true situation has been presented to the dust of glory [beneath] his [excellency]. In this matter the order and command are his excellency's, my fortunate and felicitous lord's.
- 64-68 My fortunate lord, at present ships of the imperial fleet are in three squadrons (*bölük*). As for one of them, while still in the Bosphorus, it was sent to the Anatolian side and has still not come and rejoined the fleet. As for another, it is engaged in fortress construction outside<sup>141</sup> with its slaves (*esir*) and oarsmen (*kürekci*). Night and day they expend the utmost of effort and energy in the service of construction work. And it is resplendently apparent to the noble knowledge of his [excellency] that this slave of his still sets out once every three or four days with the rest of the ships, and transports stone to the fortress and that at night we are [engaged] in defense.
- 68-70 And one of the captured informants from among the captured informants brought by his [majesty's] slave Ramazân Ghazi has been sent to the dust [beneath] his [excellency's] glory. When his oral statement (*takrîr*) becomes known to his [excellency's] felicity, in that matter also the order and command are his excellency's, my felicitous lord's.

<sup>139</sup>*On üçer oturak şandal*: this phrase is interpreted to mean "şandals with 13 thwarts or oar benches" (what in the modern Turkish might be expressed by *on üçer oturaklı şandal* or perhaps *on üçer oturak bulunan şandal*). This rare indication of the size of the *şandals* confirms that, at least where the fleet was concerned, *şandal* meant a larger longboat type of craft rather than a small rowboat (see n.37). It is not clear whether in specifying 13 thwarts Piyâle is referring to a type of *şandal* already carried by the galleys or whether he is requesting a particular-sized *şandal* that was best suited for carrying the necessary troops into shallow waters against the *şaykas*. A *şandal* with 26 men at the oars (or 24 if one of the thwarts was for the helmsman) must have been large enough to carry more than a handful of troops.

<sup>140</sup>Presumably the request is that the necessary timber be obtained in İzmit (the timber resources of its hinterland were very important for the fleet; Darkot 1952: 1252) and delivered to the arsenal in time (*zamân var iken*) so that each new galley could be equipped with a *şandal* of the specified size. The fact that the Piyâle was writing in July and new vessels were usually built in the winter suggests that wood suitable for a certain type of vessel had to be ordered well in advance. Alternatively, this passage can be interpreted as two separate requests: one for the issuance of an order that wood for 13-thwart *şandals* be supplied as soon as possible, perhaps so that they could be built in time for the same campaign season, and another for the issuance of an order that the shipbuilders not neglect to fit out each new galley with one *şandal*. According to Kâtib Çelebi, every galley was equipped with one *şandal* (*Tuhfet*: 154). Piyâle's insistence on this point implies that either in his time this standard had not yet been established or that it was not being conscientiously adhered to by those responsible for fitting out the ships. Are Piyâle's admonishments an indication that the arsenal, either because of inertia or other obligations of the fleet, favored the building of large ships rather than the needed smaller craft?

<sup>141</sup>*Taşrada*, "on the outside": although possibly used in the sense of "in the provinces," here it is interpreted to mean that the slaves and oarsmen were working, and perhaps also bivouacking, outside of the enclosure of fortress walls at Özi.

70-73 And the commanders (*ümerâ*) and captains (*kapudan*) and skippers (*rü'esâ*) and janissary commander (*ağa*) [or commanders], [all] slaves of his [majesty]<sup>142</sup> who are with the imperial fleet, rub their faces into your blessed noble dust [beneath] your feet and [while] on the face of the sea, which is the place of answers to prayers, they are assiduous in prayers for the continuation of the life and daily-increasing good fortune of his majesty, our felicitous and magnificent and merciful padishah and of my generous lord. The ultimate order and command is my felicitous lord's.

74-76

The slave  
Piyâle  
Kethüdâ<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup>*Ümerâ ve kapudan ve rü'esâ ve yeñiçeri ağası kulları*: here Piyâle makes salutations on behalf of the chief commanders and officers present with the fleet. Since governors of *sancağs* were often referred to as *ümerâ* "commanders" (pl. of *emîr*), this word must refer to the *deryâ begleri* who were in charge of the *beg*-ships (*beg gemileri*) assigned to the fleet for this campaign (see II). *Kapudan* should probably be understood as a collective (cf. *tersâne-i 'âmire kapudanları* in an analogous part in the next document V:14-15) referring to sea captains in charge of squadrons or detachments of ships of the arsenal (Imber 1980: 254). *Rü'esâ* (pl. of *re'is*) refers to captains or skippers of ships of the arsenal (Imber 1980: 251ff.). *Kapudan* and *rü'esâ* here perhaps also include captains and skippers of the individual *beg gemileri*. *Yeñiçeri ağası* cannot refer to the *ağa* or commander of the janissary corps since at the time he was still in Baghdad, returning to Istanbul only in the beginning of January 1640 (Topçılar: 511a, 520a-21a). Rather, it must refer to the commander of the janissaries assigned to the fleet (or perhaps janissary commanders or officers if, like *kapudan, yeñiçeri ağası kulları* is being used collectively).

<sup>143</sup>The fleet's campaign of 1639, and, specifically, the incident at Tendra, appears in the Ottoman chronicles. The entries for it in Kâtib Çelebi's *Fezleke* and *Tuhfet*, under the heading "Campaign of Piyâle Kethüdâ," are identical except for a few minor variations. Here I give the slightly fuller entry in *Tuhfet*: "Since the *kapudan*, Silâhdâr Muştafâ Pasha, could do without the Black Sea campaign, that service was conferred upon Piyâle Kethüdâ. The abovementioned [Piyâle] in accordance with the sultanic decree first set out for the Özi fortress, made the repairs and restorations which were necessary, and saw to its other important affairs. After that, he received news of ten *şaykas* that were raiding some shore settlements of the Islamic countries and bringing harm to their populations. He set out in that direction with some galleys and came across them at an island called Tendra (*Tentere*). He captured [all] ten of [the *şaykas*] and sent the women and infants which [the Cossacks] had taken from the Islamic countries [back] to their homelands" (*Tuhfet*: 114; *Fezleke*: 215). The same or abridged account occurs in other seventeenth-century chronicles (e.g., Na'imâ: 420-21; Vecihî: 10 [fol. 15r]; Müneccim: 675; Hammer, in summarizing Na'imâ's version, presents Piyâle's campaigns of 1638 and 1639 as both occurring in 1639, Hammer 1829: 296-70). It can be seen that the account in the mainstream chronicle tradition combines several events into one: although perhaps compiled in part on the basis of IV and other documents, the chronicle version telescopes into one episode the separate episodes of the incident at Tendra and the rescue of the Muslim captives related in IV, giving the incorrect impression that the captives were rescued from the *şaykas* that were defeated at Tendra.



## V. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi E. 6555

Report by Piyâle Kethüdâ on the search of the northern and southern coasts of the Black Sea for a fleet of twenty-one *şaykas* reported to have set out from Azak and on the Ottoman fleet's return to Istanbul; sent from some where on the Bosphorus and probably intended for *kapudan paşa* Silâhdâr Muştâfâ; undated (around 8 *Cumâdâ I* 1049/6 October 1639; 1049/1639 according to archival *fiche*)<sup>144</sup>

Information on external characteristics and verso not available.  
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## V. TEXT

## Hüve

1 'izzetlü ve sa'âdetlü ve mürüvvetlü sulţânüm hazretlerinüñ türâb-i aqdâm-i sa'âdet-encâmılarına yüzler sürdükten soñra 'arz-i bende-i bî-vücûd budur ki Hâkık celle ve 'allâ hazretleri sa'âdetlü ve devletlü ve mehâbetlü gâzî ve mücâhid pâdişâhımızuñ 2 vücûd-i şerîflerin haţâlardan şaklayup sâye-i sa'âdet ve zıll-i himâyetlerin 'amme-i 'ibâdu'llâh üzerinden dūr u zâyil itmeye âmîn ve sa'âdetlü ve mürüvvetlü sulţânüm hazretlerine dañi çok yıllar 'ömürler virüp 'izz u sa'âdetde bâkî vu ber-ķarâr 3 eyleye bi-mennihi ve cûdih benüm devletlü sulţânüm bundan aķdem Azaķdan yigirmi bir pâre şayķa çıkduđı haberi ile Öziden Balıķ-

<sup>144</sup>The mention in V that Piyâle and his ships entered Eređli on 26 *Cumâdâ I*, intending to arrive at the Bosphorus 30 days before the *Rûz-i Kâsım* (see n.154), i.e., on 6 October (this appears to be a reference to a specific date since it is repeated in the paraphrase given in V:12 of an order sent to another part of the fleet) provides a *terminus post quem*. For if the document is dated to 1638, Piyâle would have entered Eređli on 5 October, one day before the intended date of arrival at the Bosphorus, which is about 200 km away. But if we date the document 1639, Piyâle would have entered Eređli on 25 September 1639, allowing ample time to rest and resupply the ships and to arrive in the Bosphorus by 6 October. In addition, according to the chronicles, in 1638 Piyâle made a triumphant return to the capital with the Cossacks and *şaykas* captured in the major encounter near Taman (*Fezleke*: 211; *Tuħfet*: 114) of which there is no hint in V where, rather than being near Taman, Piyâle patrolled the shores between Özi and Kefe before crossing the Black Sea. The late return of the fleet to the arsenal from the siege of Azak in 1641, i.e., on 10 *Şa'bân* 1051/14 November 1641, eliminates that year (*Topcular*: 533a), while 1642, the year of Piyâle's last campaign on the Black Sea, is eliminated by the fact that he was still in Kefe in *Cumâdâ II* and returned to the capital on 8 *Receb* 1052/2 October 1642 (*Topcular*: 535b), which is incompatible with his being in Eređli on 26 *Cumâdâ I*. This leaves only 1639 and 1640. In his account of the fleet's activities in V, Piyâle implies that he was the operational commander of the fleet, whereas, although the fleet was indeed in the Black Sea in 1640, its operational commander was the *kapudan paşa*. On 3 *Cumâdâ I* 1050/21 August 1640 the latter set out in search of 24 *şaykas* which he successfully intercepted (*Topcular*: 527a). Piyâle makes no mention of such an encounter even though his report begins several days before 14 *Cumâdâ I*, i.e., before he reached the Anatolian side of the sea from the Crimea. Although the contents of V may not readily fit these circumstances in 1640, it is not possible definitely to eliminate 1640 on this basis. However, if one were to assign 1640 to V, it would mean that the ships entered Eređli on 13 September, which would make it difficult to explain the subsequent passage of 23 days before the ships left Eređli and arrived at the Straits. Finally, the similarity between V, where the fleet returns to the Straits 30 days before the *Rûz-i Kâsım* and the chronicle statement under 1639 that the fleet returned to the Porte "before the *Rûz-i Kâsım*" (*Tuħfet*: 114) should be noted.

lağya ve andan Kıırım ve Kefe kıyıların muhâfaza iderek mâh-i Cumâde'l-ülânun on dördüncü 4 günü yanımızda mevcûd donanma-i hümâyûn gemileriyle bi-hamdî'llâhi te'âlâ emîn u sâlim Sinoba dâhil olduğumuzda kazağ şaykalarından haber olmamağla Bafradan tâ Şamsun ve Giresuna ve İstefandan üç dört 5 menzil aşağı yahlara varınca haber îrâdiyçün karadan atlu hişâr erleri gönderildiği hâk-i 'izzetlerine bildirilmişdi mağall-i mezbûrda bir hafta ikâmet olup gönderilen âdamlar gelüp bu câniblerde 6 kazağ şaykalarından nâm u nişân yokdur ve civârımızda vâkı' kurâ ve kaşabâtdan bir mağallde zühûr itmemişdür diyü Bafra kâdisından mührlü kâğıdler gelüp fi'l-hâkıka bu aralıklarda şimdilik şaykalardan 7 haber u eser olmayup Abaza ve Çerkes vilâyetlerinde midür veyâhûd donanma-i hümâyûndan haber alup içeri mi gitmişlerdür şıhhatı ile haber olmaduğundan gayrı bundan böyle donanma ile ol tarafa 8 varılmağ mağall-i tehlike olmağın bir kaç gün Sinobda ikâmet olup Kara denizün şiddet u hareketi zamânı olup gemilerimize Ereğli limanından gayrı münâsib yatağ yeri olmamağla in şâ'llâhü te'âlâ 9 Rûz-i Kâsıma otuz gün kalduğda izn-i şerifleri ve emr-i 'âlîleri ile Boğaza varılmağ niyeti ile mâh-i mezbûrun yigirmi altıncı günü Ereğli nâm mağalle dâhil olup yine her tarafa göz ve kulağ 10 tutmağ üzereyüz ve Amaşın (or Amaşın [أماشرى]) nâm mağalle dâhil olacağımız gün rûy-i deryâda Varnadan gelür bir rençber gemisine râst gelinüp Özide muhâfaza için alıkoğumuz on üç pâre kadırgalardan 11 su'âl olunduğda cümlesi 'inâyet-i Hâk ve sa'âdetlü ve kerâmetlü pâdişâhımız hazretlerinün hayr-du'â'i icâbet mağrûnları berekâtı ile emîn u sâlim Varnaya dâhil olup bu taraftan habere müterâkkip oldukların 12 inhâ itmeleriyle in şâ'llâhü te'âlâ siz Sözeboliye varup anda gemileri bağhyasız ve Rûz-i Kâsıma otuz gün kalduğda gelüp Boğazda bizüm ile mülâkî olasız diyü baş ve buğlan olan 13 Şa'bân beğ mektûb tahrîr ve yanımızda olan ümerâ kullarından İbrâhîm Begzâde ile Varnaya irsâl olunmuşdur mezbûrlar Rum ili ve bu kulları Anağolı yalıların muhâfaza iderek mağall-i mezbûra dâhil olmuşsuzdur 14 bu bâbda re'y u fermân devletlü ve sa'âdetlü sulţânım hazretlerinündür ve l-hamdü li-llâhi te'âlâ bu sene-i mübarekede hayr-du'âñuz berekâtı ile 'asker-i İslâm-i zaferencâm kemâl-i şıhhat u selâmet üzere olup ümerâ kulları 15 ve yeñiçeri ağası ve tersâne-i 'âmire kapudanları ve sâ'ir iş erleri mübarek hâk-i 'izzetlerine yüzler sürüp rûz u şeb devletlü ve sa'âdetlü ve azametlü pâdişâhımız devâm-i 'ömr u devlet-i rûz-efzûnları 16 ve sa'âdetlü ve mürüvvetlü sulţânımız beğâ-yi eyyâm-i sa'âdetleri da'vâtına cân u dilden müdâvemet üzereledür bâkî emr u fermân ve luğf u ihsân sa'âdetlü sulţânım hazretlerinünüdür

17 bende  
18 Piyâle  
19 kethüdâ

## V. TRANSLATION

He!

- 1 After rubbing [our] faces into the felicity-bringing dust [beneath] the feet of his excellency, my great and felicitous and generous lord, this is the report of the slave whose existence is unimportant.
- 1-3 May the Lord God—be He exalted and glorified!—protect from errors the noble body of our padishah, the felicitous and fortunate and awesome ghazi and holy warrior, and not make distant or ephemeral his [majesty's] shade of felicity and shadow of protection upon all of the slaves of God. Amen. And grant many years of life also to his excellency, my felicitous and generous lord, and by His grace and generosity make [him] last and endure in greatness and felicity.
- 3-6 My fortunate lord, because of the news that twenty-one *şaykas* had set out from Azak, we were engaged in defense from Özi to Balaklava,<sup>145</sup> and from there in the defense of the shores of the Crimea

<sup>145</sup> Balaklava (*Balığlağı*): a port on the southwestern coast of the Crimea.

and Kefe. And on the fourteenth day of the month of *Cumâdâ I* (12 September 1639) we arrived safe and sound in Sinop with the ships of the imperial fleet that were with us. Because there was no news of Cossack *şaykas*, it was made known to the dust of glory [beneath] his [excellency]<sup>146</sup> that mounted fortress-soldiers (*atlu hisâr erleri*)<sup>147</sup> were sent [eastward] by land from Bafra<sup>148</sup> to Samsun and Giresun, and from İstefan<sup>149</sup> going [westward] to the shore settlements three or four halting-stations (*menzil*) away<sup>150</sup> in order to bring back news. [We] had stayed in the aforementioned place [i.e., Sinop] for one week, [when] letters with seals (*mührlü*) came from the *kâdî* of Bafra saying, “The men who were sent out have returned. There is no rumor or sign of Cossack *şaykas* in these parts, and they have not appeared anywhere in the villages or towns located in our vicinity.”<sup>151</sup>

6-10

In truth, for the present there is no trace or sign of *şaykas* in these parts. There is no reliable news [about] whether they could be in the regions (*vilâyet*) of Abkhazia (*Abaza*) of Circassia (*Çerkes*), or whether, having learned of the imperial fleet, they went inland.<sup>152</sup> Besides, to go over thusly from here to that side [of the Black Sea] with the fleet would be perilous. Because of this, we stayed in Sinop for a few [more] days. As it was the time of restlessness and turmoil of the Black Sea, and because, besides the harbor of Ereğli, there is no [other] suitable place of anchorage for our ships,<sup>153</sup> on the twenty-sixth day of the abovementioned month (24 September 1639) we entered the place called Ereğli with the intention, if God—be He exalted!—wills it, of arriving at the Bosphorus with his [excellency’s] noble permission and according to his lofty order with thirty days remaining to the *Rûz-i Kâsım*<sup>154</sup> [i.e., on 6 October 1639]. Again we were keeping a [watchful] eye and an [alert] ear in every direction.

<sup>146</sup>Thus it can be assumed that Piyâle sent a report from Sinop, presumably to Silâhdâr Muştafâ.

<sup>147</sup>Normally *hisâr erleri* (also known as *mustahfizân*) were foot soldiers assigned to garrisons and usually compensated by *timâr* revenues instead of by salary (*ulûfe*) (Murphey 1979: 178-79). Does the reference to “mounted (*atlu*) fortress soldiers” here mean that in these fortresses there were *hisâr erleri* who were cavalry or that *hisâr erleri* were sent out on horseback merely because of the need for mobility in the given situation?

<sup>148</sup>Bafra: a town on the Kızılırmak River, about 50 km northwest of Samsun and less than 20 km inland from the Black Sea.

<sup>149</sup>İstefan: a town in a small harbor on the Anatolian coast of the Black Sea, 85 km northeast of Kastamonu and 50 km west of Sinop (near present-day Ayancık).

<sup>150</sup>According to Evliyâ Çelebi, there were five *konaks* (i.e., *menzils*) between Sinop and Amasra (Evliyâ 2: 62). Assuming that İstefan was one or less halting-places west of Sinop, the three or four *menzils* which the *hisâr erleri* covered going west from İstefan would have taken them somewhere between İnebolu and Amasra.

<sup>151</sup>Thus from the time the order that the *hisâr erleri* be sent out was issued in Sinop until the final report from the *kâdî* of Bafra giving the result of their ride to Giresun (about 260 km east of Bafra) one week had elapsed. Altogether, the *hisâr erleri* sent in both directions covered about half of the Anatolian coast in search of Cossacks or news of them.

<sup>152</sup>*İçerü*: either back to their home territory or into the interior somewhere along the Black Sea. Even though no contact with Cossacks was made, Piyâle is surmising that the fleet’s presence served as a deterrent.

<sup>153</sup>The western part of the Anatolian Black Sea coast has few natural harbors. Although Amasra had good natural harborage (Evliyâ 2: 72), the harbor of Ereğli, about 220 km from Istanbul and 100 km southwest of Amasra, was considered the best. Facing west, it provided ideal shelter from the strong north and northeast (*poyraz*) winds which prevailed in the fall and winter (Darkot 1946: 308).

<sup>154</sup>*Rûz-i Kâsım*—St. Demetrius’ Day, 26 October (O.S.), in the seventeenth century 5 November (N.S.)—was the traditional conclusion of the naval campaign season, by which time the imperial fleet

10-14 And on the day that we were to enter the place called Amasra,<sup>155</sup> a private merchant ship (*rencber gemisi*) was encountered at sea coming from Varna. When [we] asked about the thirteen galleys that we left [behind] at Özi for defense, those [on the merchant ship] informed [us] that all of them had arrived at Varna safe and sound by the providence of God and with the blessings of the good prayer of his majesty, our felicitous and noble padishah, which is bound to be answered, and that now they are waiting for news from this side. A letter was written for Şa'bân Beg who is their operational commander (*baş ve buğ*) and sent to Varna with İbrâhîm Begzâde, one of the commanders (*ümerâ*) [i.e., *beg*-ship commanders], his [majesty's] slaves, who were at our side, saying, "If God—be He exalted!—wills it, you are to set out for Sozopol<sup>156</sup> and tie your ships there. And with thirty days remaining to the *Rûz-i Kâsım*, you will come and meet [us] at the Bosphorus." With the abovementioned ones defending the Rumelian shore settlements and with this slave of his [excellency] defending the Anatolian shore settlements, we entered the abovementioned place [i.e., the Bosphorus].<sup>157</sup> In this matter the ultimate opinion and command are his majesty's, my fortunate and felicitous lord's.

14-16 Praise be to God—be He exalted!—in this blessed year, with the blessings of your good prayer the army of Islam, bound for victory, is [in a state of] perfect health and well-being. The commanders, slaves of his [majesty], and the janissary commander [or commanders] and the captains of the imperial naval arsenal (*ümerâ kulları ve yeñiçeri ağası ve tersâne-i 'âmire kapudanları*, see n. 142) and the other men of competence (*iş erleri*) rub [their] faces into the blessed dust of his [majesty's] greatness, and in [their] souls and hearts they are day and night assiduous in supplication for the continuation of the life and daily-increasing fortune of our fortunate and felicitous and magnificent padishah and for the perpetuity of the days of felicity of my felicitous and generous lord. The ultimate order and command and favor and benevolence are his majesty's, my felicitous lord's.

17-19

The slave  
Piyâle  
Kethüdâ

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usually returned to the arsenal. Thus here, it appears that the early onset of autumn weather forced the fleet to end its campaign about a month earlier than usual.

<sup>155</sup> Since the fleet was sailing west and Amasra, about 240 km west of Sinop, is east of Ereğli, the narrative here is out of chronological order.

<sup>156</sup> Sozopol (*Sözeboli*): a small town on the Bulgarian coast about 12 km southeast of Burgaz and about one-third of the way from Varna to the Bosphorus by way of the shoreline.

<sup>157</sup> Once the fleet reassembled in the Bosphorus, some time would be spent putting the ships in order in preparation for the traditional festivities and ceremonies which were mounted for the fleet's return to the arsenal in the fall (Uzunçarşılı 1948: 443-44).

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