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An Ottoman *Ġazānāme* on Ġalīl Paša's Naval Campaign against the Cossacks (1621)

VICTOR OSTAPCHUK

The *Ġazānāme* (“a writing on holy war”)¹ genre held a prominent place in Ottoman literary culture. As matter of course, sultans and pashas contracted men of letters to extol their military exploits in usually high-flown, epic poems or rhymed-prose (*sej'*) pieces. Little is known of *Ġazānāmes* on the Ottoman struggle with the Cossacks, who in the first half of the seventeenth century brought devastation to all shores of the Black Sea. Unlike the typical *Ġazā*, in which the forces of Islam were on the offensive against the infidel, expanding the boundaries of the *dārü'l-Islām* or “abode of Islam” at the expense of the *dārü'l-ḥarb* or “abode of war,” in the Black Sea the Ottomans were engaged in a war to protect the realm of Islam against the infidel.² Perhaps the defensive predicament of the Ottomans in the Black Sea meant that the events of this struggle provided little material suitable for *Ġazānāme* treatment.³ However, it may be that there were more *Ġazānāmes* dealing with the Cossack problem than are presently known. In 1961 G. M. Meredith-Owens published an article in which he described and partially translated a poetic treatment of the expedition of Ken'ān Paša

¹ Also *Ġazāvātnāme* (“a writing on holy wars”). Related to the *Ġazānāme/Ġazāvātnāme* is the *menāqibnāme* (“a writing on exploits, heroic deeds”), *fethnāme* (“a writing on a conquest”)—an official report of a victory sent to notables or foreign rulers—and *zafernāme* (“a writing on a victory”). Frequently these terms were confused and used interchangeably. See G. L. Lewis, “The Utility of Ottoman Fethnāmes,” *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London, 1962), pp. 192–96, esp. p. 192.

² The Arabic word for holy war, *Ġazā*, denotes an offensive, aggressive action, such as a raid, assault, or invasion. In Lane's dictionary, the definition of another form, *Ġazāwat*, includes “to fight with [or to fight with and plunder] the enemy [in the country of the latter (stress added)]” (Edward William Lane, *An Arabic English Lexicon* [London, 1877], p. 2257).

³ For the Ottoman land-wars in Ukraine in the seventeenth century, there are a number of known, though still mostly unstudied and unpublished, *Ġazānāmes*, such as Yusūf Nābī's *Fetiḥnāme-i Qamaniçe*. Recently a *Ġazānāme* devoted to Sultan 'Oḡmān II and the Xotyn campaign has been discovered and published (*II. Osman adına yazılmış Zafer-nāme*, ed. Yaşar Yücel [Ankara, 1983]). A dissertation directed by Omeljan Pritsak provides the first full treatment (texts, translations, and commentaries) of *Ġazānāmes* devoted to the wars in Ukraine in the second half of the seventeenth century: Lubomyr Andrij Hajda, “Two Ottoman Gazanames Concerning the Čyhyryn Campaign of 1678” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1984) (the anonymous *Čehrin Seferi* [Čyhyryn campaign] and 'Abdü'l-Kerīm Efendi's *Aḫvāl-i İjmāl-i Sefer-i Čehrin* [A Summary of affairs of the campaign of Čyhyryn]).

against the Cossacks in 1628, the *Pařanāme* of Ţulū'ī Ibrāhīm Pařa, which he found in an illustrated manuscript in the British Library.⁴ Here I offer a facsimile, translation, and commentary of a section, from another *ġazānāme*, devoted to a different Black Sea campaign.

The work in question is the anonymous *Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Pařa* (*Ġazānāme* of Ĥalīl Pařa). There are three known manuscripts, of which two are in Istanbul, in the Topkapı Sarayı Library (Revan 1482) and the Süleymaniye Library (Es'ad Efendi 2139), and one is in Vienna, in the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (H. O. 72).⁵ All three manuscripts are undated. Only the two Istanbul manuscripts could be inspected and, judging from their watermarks, scripts, and ornamentation, they are from the seventeenth century. While it has not been possible to establish any textual relation between the three manuscripts, the Vienna appears to be furthest removed from the original because its text bears signs of having been "tidied up" by a scribe.⁶ The text of the Topkapı Library's Revan collection manuscript is the basis for the translation given below, and a facsimile of the relevant section is provided. However, it should be noted that the Revan and Es'ad Efendi manuscripts contain about the same number of

⁴ G. M. Meredith-Owens, "Ken'ān Pasha's Expedition against the Cossacks," *British Museum Quarterly* 24 (1961): 76–82.

⁵ These three manuscripts are listed and described, respectively, in *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Türkçe yazmaları kataloġu*, vol. 1, ed. Fehmi Edhem Karatay (Istanbul, 1961), p. 380; *Istanbul kütüphaneleri tarih-coġrafya yazmaları katalogları*, vol. 1, *Türkçe tarih yazmaları* (Istanbul, n.d.), pp. 285–86; and *Die Arabischen, Persischen und Türkischen Handschriften der Kaiserlich-Königlichen Hofbibliothek zu Wien*, vol. 2, ed. Gustav Flügel (Vienna, 1865), no. 1043, pp. 253–54. A title (*Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Pařa*) for the work is found only at the head of the opening page of Vienna MS, fol. 1b. The published manuscript catalogues arbitrarily refer to the work as *Menāqīb-i Ĥalīl Pařa* (The exploits of Ĥalīl Pařa; *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi* 1, p. 380) and *Menāqīb-i Qapūdān-i Deryā Ĥalīl Pařa* (The exploits of Grand Admiral Ĥalīl Pařa; Agāh Sırrı Levend, *Ġazavāt-nāmeler ve Mihaloġlu Ali Bey'in Ġazavāt-nāmesi* [Ankara, 1956] p. 95). Because of the reference to an 'Alī in the first pages of the work, the Topkapı catalogue ascribes authorship to the famous Ottoman author, Gelibolu Muřtafā 'Alī, even though the latter died in 1008/1600 (as the catalogue itself indicates on the same page; see *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi*, p. 380), before most of the events in the work occurred. In addition, because the name "Nādīrī" is written beside a poem on the final page of the Es'ad Efendi MS, the work has also been ascribed to the poet Ġanī-zāde Nādīrī. However, this work is not present in lists of Nādīrī's works (*Istanbul kütüphaneleri tarih-coġrafya yazmaları katalogları*, 1, p. 286). Within the text of the *ġazānāme* the work is referred to as a *risāle-i ġazavāt* ("an epistle of *ġazās*") (Topkapı Sarayı Library, Revan 1482, fol. 167a).

⁶ E.g., while in the other two manuscripts there is frequent alteration (sometimes in the same clause) between the informal address and the *plural majestatis* for the second person when the sultan speaks or writes to Ĥalīl Pařa, in the Vienna manuscript there is, in this context, a tendency to use the informal second person rather than to alternate between the formal and informal second person. For other examples of "hyper-correctness" in the Vienna manuscript, see fns. 62, 63, 82, 84, 91, 95.

problematic readings and scribal errors.⁷ In the translation, reference is made to the Es'ad Efendi and Vienna manuscripts when there is a significantly different reading.

The hero of the *ğazānāme*, Ḥalīl Paşa (1560?–1629), an Armenian in origin, from the Qayşerī (Kayseri) region in central Anatolia, twice held the post of grand vizier (1617–1619, 1626–1628) and four times that of *qapūdān paşa* or grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet (1608–1610, 1614–1617, 1619–1622, 1623).⁸ The *ğazānāme* relates his early career in the palace as a member of the sultan's falconer corps; his participation as the head of that corps (*çaqırjī başı*) in the Egri (Erlau) campaign of 1596 against the Habsburgs; and, with time, as commander of the janissary corps (*yeñiçeri ağası*) in campaigns against Jelālī rebels in the Asian provinces (the Jānbülād tribe in the province of Aleppo, and Qalendār-zāde in central Anatolia) during the first years of the seventeenth century; as *qapūdān paşa* in naval campaigns in the Mediterranean in 1609 and 1614; and as grand vizier and commander-in-chief (*serdār-i ekrem*) of the Ardabīl campaign against Safavid Iran in 1617–1618. The last episode in *Ğazānāme* is devoted to Ḥalīl Paşa's exploits in the Black Sea in 1621 as *qapūdān paşa*.⁹ This was the year of the Xotyń'¹⁰ campaign mounted by Sultan 'Oşmān II against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, primarily in response to the unceasing Black Sea depredations of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, whose bases on the Dnieper were in territory subject to the Commonwealth.¹¹

Here the main interest is in *Ğazānāme-i Ḥalīl Paşa* as a historical source. In dealing with *ğazānāmes*, it must be kept in mind that they are primarily works of *belles-lettres* aimed at extolling the military accomplishments of a Muslim commander (who was often a given work's sponsor) and his men and at entertaining the reader or listener. Exaggerations, half-truths, and even inventions are scarcely avoidable in such pieces. However, as *ğazānāmes* relate to historical events, they can contain valuable, even eyewitness, historical information. Often they are the only available sources for events or are the bases of chronicle accounts. For the historian,

⁷ The Revan MS has 167 folios of 19 x 11.5 cm format; the Süleymaniye Library's Es'ad Efendi MS has 145 folios; and the Vienna MS has 243 folios. All three manuscripts are written in a clear *nesh* script.

⁸ J. H. Kramers, "Halil Paşa," *İslām Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5, pt. 1 (Istanbul, 1950): 160–61.

⁹ Topkapı Sarayı Library, Revan 1482, fols. 155b–162a; Süleymaniye Library, Es'ad Efendi 2139, fols. 135b–141a; Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, H. O. 72, fols. 228a–237b.

¹⁰ Xotyń' (Chocim in Polish, Hotin in Ottoman) a town in southeastern Ukraine, on the right bank of the Dniester, 29 km north of the Prut River and 20 km south of Kam"janec'-Podil's'kyj.

¹¹ In addition to the Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks, there were the Russian Don Cossacks who also raided the Azov as well as the Black Sea, often together with the Zaporozhians.

the *ġazānāme* can be important both as an intellectual document—revealing Ottoman attitudes to and evaluations of given events and their protagonists and Ottoman military and political aims and expectations—and as a source of concrete historical data. In the case of *Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Paša*, it will become apparent that, despite limitations due to genre, it is a useful historical source.

The significance of the events in the Black Sea during the Xotyn' campaign has not been fully appreciated in the historical literature.¹² Throughout the summer of 1621, while the Ottomans were preparing and marching a major force against the Commonwealth, the Zaporozhian Cossacks carried out numerous expeditions directed at various far-flung shores of the Black Sea.¹³ It is not clear whether these expeditions were part of the Commonwealth's anti-Ottoman strategy in the face of the upcoming war or whether they were the usual raids undertaken by the Cossacks for booty.¹⁴ What is clear is that the Cossacks' actions interfered with the main tasks of the Ottoman fleet in the war, which were to convey supplies to the Danube for the sultan's army, help reconstruct and defend the pontoon bridge across the river at Isaqjī (Isaccea)¹⁵ by which the army would pass on its way

¹² Hruševs'kyj, while aware of the degree to which the Ottoman chronicles exaggerate the magnitude of naval successes against the Cossacks, regards the raids of 1621 as few and small, at most irritants to the Porte (Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija Ukrajinjy-Rusy*, vol. 7 [Kiev, 1909; reprint ed., New York, 1956], pp. 462–64). Tušin provides a fuller presentation of the raids and proposes that their occurrence prompted the Ottomans to insist on including an article about them in the pact with the Commonwealth concluded at Xotyn' (Ju. P. Tušin, *Russkoe moreplavanie na Kaspijskom, Azovskom i Černom morjax [XVII vek]* [Moscow, 1978], pp. 107–8); actually the raids were the primary reason the Porte went to war in the first place. Podhorodecki and Rašba provide some information on the attitude of the Commonwealth authorities to Cossack naval expeditions in 1621 (Leszek Podhorodecki and Noj Raszba [Rašba], *Wojna chocimska 1621 roku* [Cracow, 1979], pp. 120–22, 135). None of these authors consider the effect of Cossack naval raids on the outcome of the Xotyn' conflict.

¹³ As will become evident in the text of and commentary to *Ġazānāme* below, the Don Cossacks were also active on the sea in 1621, albeit in lesser numbers.

¹⁴ Podhorodecki and Rašba point out that certain circles in the Commonwealth preferred to have all possible Cossack forces facing the Ottoman army alongside the Polish army, rather than on the Black Sea (Podhorodecki and Raszba, *Wojna chocimska*, pp. 120–22, 135).

¹⁵ On the right bank of the Danube, about 110 km from the Black Sea going by the northern (Kili) branch. Such a bridge over the Danube, constructed by connecting barges known as *tonbaz* or *tonbaz* (hence *köpri tonbazları*, “bridge barges,” in reference to the supports of the Danube bridge in Kätib Čelebi, *Fezleke*, vol. 1 [Istanbul, 1287/1870–1871], p. 406), was revived in times of need, such as the transfer of large military forces into Wallachia. An observer in July 1621 reported that the river was spanned by building the bridge between islands (*Žerela do istoriji Ukrajinjy-Rusy*, vol. 8, *Materijaly do istoriji ukrajins' koji kozadžyny*, pt. 1, *Dokumenty po rik 1631*, ed. Ivan Kryp"jakevyč [Lviv, 1908], no. 146, p. 228). On 28 August 1621 the nuncio in Venice reported that there were three bridges across the Danube, with one being three miles (*miglia*) long. If this report was accurate, perhaps it referred to three legs of the bridge between the islands (“Nuovi contributi sul Vaevoda Gaspere Graziani e la

north, and participate in the building of a new fortress in the same town. Thus, as the Ottoman chronicles and *Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Paša* relate, throughout the campaign season it was necessary to send sizable flotillas and squadrons of ships or boats to threatened or strategic places in practically all regions of the sea—Anatolia, the mouths of the Dnieper and Danube, the Strait of Kerč¹⁶ between the Azov and Black Seas, and the Bosphorus. At one point *qapūdān paša* Ĥalīl was forced to abandon for more than three weeks the mission on the Danube to which he had been ordered by the sultan, sail off with most of his fleet, and search in vain the far Anatolian coast for a reported Cossack flotilla.

The Ottoman narrative sources—not only *ġazānāmes* but also the chronicles—time and again present Ottoman naval forces as emerging triumphant from their encounters with the Cossacks on the Black Sea in 1621. Other sources, notably French and Papal diplomatic reports from Istanbul and other places but also Muscovite and Polish records, reveal a more mixed picture—greater Ottoman losses in their successful encounters and more Cossack raids on Ottoman shipping and settlements than indicated in the Ottoman sources.¹⁷ Even the somewhat one-sided and exaggerated Ottoman version of events does not conceal that the Cossacks caused significant damages to shipping and settlements, the most substantial being the sack of the important port and salt production center of Aḥyolī (Axtolī)

guerra turco-polacca del 1621,” ed. Anton Mesrobianu, in *Diplomatarium Italicum, documenti raccolti negli archivi italiani*, vol. 3 [Rome, 1934]: 126–239, esp. no. 156, p. 211). Isaqji’s location on the Ottoman road into Wallachia, its suitability for a bridge across the Danube, and its accessibility to ships from the sea made it a main rear staging base for troops and supplies (cf. *Ṭopçılar Kātibi*’s description of logistic activities at Isaqji; see fn. 57).

¹⁶ Kerš in Ottoman.

¹⁷ References to these non-Ottoman sources are provided in the commentary to the translation (see fns. 71, 74, 94, 102; see also fns. 20 and 105). It should be noted that the diplomatic reports, susceptible to hearsay and rumor, tend to exaggerate the magnitude of some of the Cossack actions. This is particularly the case for reports originating from places other than Istanbul, such as Warsaw or Venice, as the following examples demonstrate: in June 1621 the papal nuncio in Venice reported that a fleet of *three hundred* Cossack boats was active near Istanbul (no other sources mention such a large Cossack fleet operating in that year: *Diplomatarium Italicum*, 3, no. 143, pp. 207–8; *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiae Ucrainae illustrantes [1550–1850]*, vol. 4, 1621–1628, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj [Rome, 1960], no. 1495, pp. 18–19); reports from Venice and reports in Rome that the bridge over the Danube had been damaged or destroyed by the Cossacks in July or August (of course an attack cannot be ruled out) (*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1506, p. 25; no. 1516, pp. 30–31; see also fn. 102); news from Ragusa that Ĥalīl Paša himself had been captured in a naval battle with the Cossacks (however, the nuncio in Venice, who transmitted this news, pointed out that this report had not been verified and doubted its validity) (*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1510, p. 28).

pol) on the lower Bulgarian coast.¹⁸ On the basis of even the biased Ottoman narratives, there can be no doubt that Cossack naval activity forced a significant diversion of forces from the war effort against the Commonwealth, which, it can be argued, contributed to the ultimate Ottoman failure at Xotyn' in late September and early October 1621.¹⁹ Aside from the effect Cossack naval activity must have had on the outcome of events at Xotyn' and the physical harm rendered to Ottoman shipping and settlements, it had a significant psychological and political impact in the capital itself. French and Italian diplomatic reports repeatedly tell of bread shortages and panic among the population of Istanbul caused by Cossack raids in the vicinity of the Bosphorus.²⁰ The resulting famine and flight, for fear that the city itself would be sacked, disrupted life in the capital and undoubtedly contributed to the instability that brought serious disorders there in the months following the Xotyn' campaign, including the murder of Sultan 'Osmān himself.²¹ The Ottoman author of *Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Paša* chose to disregard completely some Ottoman reversals in the Black Sea while underplaying others. In his eyes, naval forces under the general command of Ĥalīl Paša managed to contain the Cossacks by preventing the widespread pillage of settlements or destruction of major cities,²² a significant cut in the naval supply line, and the destruction of the Danube bridge. This meant that the events in the Black Sea in 1621 qualified for a *ġazānāme*, with Ĥalīl Paša as its hero.

True to its genre, the narrative of *Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Paša* is couched in the language of *ġazā*, with the ever-present dichotomy between the cause of Islam and its warriors on one side—"the galleys of the people of Islam (*ehl-i Islām*)," "the armies of Islam (*asākir-i Islām*)," "the padishah of Islam (*pādišāh-i Islām*)," "the defense and protection of the lands of Islam (*memālik-i Islāmiyye*)"—and the unbelievers, that is, the Cossacks, "perpetual pillagers of the lands of Islam (*memālik-i Islāmiyān*)" on the other

¹⁸ See fn. 71.

¹⁹ At the very least, the fact that events relating to Cossack activity in the Black Sea in 1621 were deemed worthy of being the subject of a *ġazānāme* and of chapters in the chronicles indicates that they were regarded as significant by Ottoman contemporaries.

²⁰ Dispatches of de Cesy, the French ambassador to the Porte, in *Historica Russiae monumenta/Akty istoričeskie otnosjasčiesja k Rossii*, vol. 2, ed. A. I. Turgenev (St. Petersburg, 1842), pp. 413, 414; dispatches of Papal nuncios in *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1495, p. 18; no. 1496, p. 19; no. 1507, pp. 25–26; no. 1510, p. 28; no. 1514, pp. 29–30; no. 1516, pp. 30–31; no. 1521, p. 33; *Diplomatarium Italicum*, no. 157, p. 212.

²¹ Foreign spies and diplomats in Istanbul reported that there was considerable opposition among 'Osmān's viziers to his leaving the capital with the main army lest the Cossacks attack there during his absence (*Žerela*, 8, no. 148, p. 231; *Historica Russiae*, 2, pp. 412–13).

²² E.g., in 1620 the Cossacks destroyed the city of Varna (de Cesy, dispatch of 25 August 1620, *Historica Russiae*, 2, p. 412); no raid of this magnitude occurred in the current year.

side.²³ Ḥalīl Paşa, in defending the region, is portrayed as protecting the *re'āyā* or subject populations from the “wickedness of the enemies of the faith.”²⁴ The Xotyn’ war is presented as being the result of “unfaithfulness and rebelliousness” of the Cossack and Polish infidels. References to the Cossacks are almost always accompanied by maledictions, most often with the modifiers *mel'ūn*, meaning “accursed,” or *eşqiyā*, which usually translates as “bandits, outlaws, robbers” but actually has the primary meaning denoting those who are “far from God’s grace, under the curse of God.”²⁵ Also frequently applied to the Cossacks are various epithets denoting “wickedness.”

Although *ğazā* is a central concern and language evoking its images recurs over and over, there is room in the narrative for motivations and precepts other than those pertaining to Islam. Thus, while the behavior of the Cossacks in the Black Sea drove the “temperament of ardor and righteous zeal (*‘īrq-i ğayret ve ḥamiyet*)” of the sultan into action—a reference to his religious fervor—the next sentence informs that, as a result, the sultan was in no mood for “promenading in gardens and meadows.”²⁶ Throughout *Ğazānāme-i Ḥalīl Paşa* the language of Persian kingship and statesmanship pervades and, at least in the 1621 section, it is as prominent as the language of *ğazā*. Thus, ‘Osmān II is compared to the ancient Persian kings Jemšīd and Ferīdūn, as well as to Solomon, and Ḥalīl Paşa to the wise men Asaph and Aristotle. As to Ḥalīl Paşa, the qualities of his extolled are not courage in battle but wisdom and abilities in organization and strategy.²⁷ Praise for prowess in battle is reserved for his commanders and forces. In line with the themes of Persian kingship is the stress on obedience to the sultan as a high virtue. Also, there is an abundance of hunting motifs, reminiscent of royal scenes in, for example, Persian and Ottoman miniatures, as well as references to astrology, all of which tend to counterbalance the “Islamic flavor” of the *Ğazānāme*.

As a source for concrete historical data, *Ğazānāme* is of interest because, although there is no explicit indication of when it was written, references at the very end of the work to events centering around the enthronement of Sultan Murad IV in 1623 and to Ḥalīl Paşa’s presence at these events

²³ Fols. 157b, 159a, 161a, 161a, 157a.

²⁴ Fol. 161b.

²⁵ James W. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon* (Constantinople, 1890) p. 1130 (s.v. “*shaqī*”).

²⁶ Fols. 155b–156a.

²⁷ It must be remembered that by 1621 Ḥalīl Paşa was an elderly man of about sixty years, and in *Ğazānāme* there is no hint that he was present at any of the actual battles with the Cossacks.

indicate that the work dates from before the latter's death in 1629. Thus, aside from *Ẓafernāme* ("a writing on a victory") in honor of 'Osmān II, written in 1030/1621,²⁸ it was written closer in time to the events which it describes than the other relevant Ottoman narrative sources, the chronicles. It may even have been a direct source for the chronicles, or for works that did not survive but upon which the chronicles are dependent. The only chronicles of interest for the events in the Black Sea in 1621 are by Kātib Ćelebi, namely, *Fezleke* (Summary), his history of the Ottoman dynasty since 1000 A.H. (on which, for the first half of the seventeenth century, the history of Na'imā is primarily based), and his naval history, *Tuḥfetü'l-kibār fī esfāri'l-bihār* (The Offering to the great ones concerning the campaigns on the seas).²⁹ While the versions of events in both of these works do not significantly diverge from those in *Ġazānāme*, there is no hint of their texts being dependent on the latter. (This does not, of course, rule out that Kātib Ćelebi did not use *Ġazānāme* for either *Fezleke* or *Tuḥfet*.) Nor is there any clear textual relationship between *Ġazānāme* and *Ẓafernāme*. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that the version of events relating to the Xotyn' campaign in *Fezleke* is mostly a summary of that in the *Ẓafernāme*.³⁰ However, in Kātib Ćelebi's naval history there is substantial relevant information not found in the other works.

Although the main features of the events given in *Ġazānāme-i Ḥalīl Paša*, *Ẓafernāme*, and Kātib Ćelebi's two works are the same, there are details that diverge, particularly when it comes to figures such as numbers of ships or men. The main discrepancies between the different texts are made evident in the commentary to the translation below. Of course a *Ġazānāme*, its main aim being to exalt and entertain, exaggerates and embellishes its story; even the chronicles have more than a modicum of invention and distortion. In the case of *Ġazānāme*, the use of excessive

²⁸ *Zafer-nāme*, pp. iv, 187.

²⁹ Kātib Ćelebi, *Fezleke*, 1; idem, *Tuḥfetü'l-kibār fī esfāri'l-bihār* (Istanbul, 1329/1911). Other chronicles consulted (those of Ḥasan Beg-zāde, Qara Ćelebi-zāde, Pečevī, Münejjim Baši, and 'Abdü'l-Qādir Topçılar Kātibi) give only a cursory treatment of the relevant events. There is also a section devoted to the Xotyn' campaign in a long poem by Nev'izāde Aṭā'ī called *Sāqināme* (Topkapı Sarayı Library, Revan 820, fols. 57a–62b) that relates a naval victory against the Cossacks (fols. 58b–59b). However, this story bears little similarity to any of the events in the chronicles or *Ġazānāme* and it has no references to dates or places by which its story can be tied in with the known events of 1621.

³⁰ *Zafer-nāme*, p. xiv. For an example of information in *Fezleke* which is not in *Ẓafernāme*, see fn. 71. Here references will be provided to both *Ẓafernāme* and *Fezleke*, even when the text of the latter is dependant on the text of the former. Despite the dependence of *Fezleke* on *Ẓafernāme*, the commentary to the translation below gives references to both works.

metaphor in a passage can act as a signal to the reader that the specifics of a given scene may owe as much to the imagination of the author as to the actual events behind it.

What new or significant historical data on the events of 1621 does *Ġazānāme-i Ġalīl Paša* provide? Like many other contemporary observers, the author stresses the Black Sea raids of the Cossacks, rather than Polish interventions in Moldavia, as the primary cause for the War of Xotyn'.³¹ The author of course had in mind those Cossacks who were subjects of the Commonwealth, the Zaporozhian Cossacks. It is generally assumed that during this period, the Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks were a greater threat to the Ottomans than were the Russian Don Cossacks.³² *Ġazānāme* attests to this, stating that the Dnieper Cossacks "habitually [bring] the most disorder and sedition to the Black Sea."³³

As far as Ottoman naval operations are concerned, *Ġazānāme* stresses more than *Zafarnāme* or Kātib Ćelebi the importance for the sultan's campaign of the fleet's mission to transport armaments and supplies quickly to the Danube and indicates that early in the season, during Ġalīl Paša and the imperial fleet's voyage to the Danube,³⁴ Cossack raids and even attacks against the fleet were expected. The work also emphasizes that throughout the campaign there was a constant danger of a Cossack strike against the Danube bridge, the destruction of which would have seriously hampered the ability of the sultan's large army to cross into Wallachia on the way north or to return to the capital for winter. Accordingly, Ġalīl Paša's main mission—to stay at Isaqjī and defend the bridge—was much more crucial to the success of the Xotyn' campaign than it may appear from the other Ottoman sources. The actuality of the threat to the bridge is corroborated by various sources, including a nuncio's report that in September the Cossacks

³¹ Fol. 155b.

³² It appears that in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, there was a preponderance of raids by the Zaporozhian Cossacks, while in the third and fourth decades the balance shifted in favor of the Don Cossacks (see Victor Ostapchuk, "The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier and the Relations of the Porte with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622–1642" [Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989], pp. 6–8). However, it must be kept in mind that the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks frequently operated together and that the Ottoman sources often fail to distinguish between the two. For a study of the Zaporozhians vis-à-vis the Porte that highlights Ottoman documentary sources, see Mihnea Berindei, "La Porte ottomane face aux Cosaques zaporogues, 1600-1637," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 273–307.

³³ Fol. 157a.

³⁴ The voyage, according to Kātib Ćelebi, lasted from 10 to 25 May (Kātib Ćelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 107).

actually did attack the bridge.³⁵ In addition, as already mentioned above, there was the real threat that, in the absence of the main fleet and the sultan's army, the Cossacks would strike inside the Bosphorus and even attack Istanbul. With regard to this latter threat, *Ġazānāme* relates that, while at Xotyn', the sultan, while ordering Ĥalīl Paša to remain at İsaqjī without fail, instructed him to alert the *qāymāqām* and *bōstānjī bašī* in Istanbul so that they might defend that area.³⁶ While in Kātib Čelebi's account the local Ottoman boat flotillas of Kili (Kilija),³⁷ Aqkermān (Bilhorod-Dnistrovs'kyj),³⁸ and Özi (Očakiv)³⁹ participate in the defense of the Black Sea, *Ġazānāme* is the only Ottoman source which attests to the presence of the Danubian boat (*šayqa*) flotilla.⁴⁰ *Ġazānāme* provides the new information that when Ĥalīl Paša patrolled the Anatolian coast in search of Cossacks, he went much further east (to Vona Burni, which is nearly to Ordu, about half way between Sinop and Trabzon [Trebizond]) than was previously known (the vicinity of Sinop). Finally, it is clear from the work that steady contact between Ĥalīl Paša and the sultan, both in the field and the capital, was maintained.

A shortcoming of the 1621 section of *Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Paša* as a historical source is its lack of any dates.⁴¹ However, there is a good chance that the author consulted actual documents: this section contains five alleged citations from specific documents—three from orders of the sultan (two *ḥatt-i hümayūns*, or orders personally written by the sultan, and one firman), one from a report in the field by a flotilla commander, and one from a message from Ĥalīl Paša to one of his commanders.⁴² Throughout the other parts of *Ġazānāme*, documents are also quoted, sometimes at

³⁵ See fn. 102. On 14 September, at about the time of this alleged attack, the papal nuncio in Istanbul reported that the sultan had again ordered Ĥalīl Paša to be diligent in guarding the bridge (*Diplomatarium Italicum*, no. 170, p. 222; see also *Diplomatarium Italicum*, no. 158, p. 213; *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1517, p. 31). Jan Chodkiewicz reported to Lew Sapieha, chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, that there was a great deal of anxiety among the Turks that the Cossacks would attack the Danubian bridge and for this reason the pontoon bridge was placed further up-river and that Ĥalīl Paša's mission was to guard against them (*Žerela*, 8, no. 143, pp. 224–25). An escaped Polish galley slave described both the great care with which the Ottomans guarded the bridge against a Cossack attack and the five-hundred boat (*šayqa*, see below) fleet mobilized in the Danube to reinforce this defense (*idem*, no. 144, pp. 225–26).

³⁶ Fol. 161b. On the predicament of the *qāymāqām* and *bōstānjī bašī*, see fn. 98.

³⁷ On the northern branch of the Danubian delta, about 40 km inland from the Black Sea.

³⁸ In the estuary of the Dniester River.

³⁹ In the estuary of the Dnieper River.

⁴⁰ See fns. 35 and 68.

⁴¹ There are dates, albeit only a few, in other parts of the work; by comparison, *Žafernāme* regularly provides dates.

⁴² See fols. 157b–158a, 158b–159a, 161a–161b. In one of these cases the author stresses that he has copied into his work the text of a *ḥatt-i hümayūn* (fols. 158b–159a).

length;⁴³ it may have been the case that the author had access to papers of his hero. However, if the author's renditions of documents in the section devoted to 1621 are indeed authentic, they are probably not all complete or word-for-word quotations. The most obvious example is the report from one of Ḥalīl Paša's commanders in which events in the field are recounted with a flamboyant array of hunting metaphors.⁴⁴

The most valuable aspect of the 1621 section of *Ġazānāme-i Ḥalīl Paša* as a historical source is not the concrete facts themselves but, rather, what the work tells about the nature of the Ottoman struggle with the Cossacks in the Black Sea, from dangers involved to strategies employed. Rather than simply portraying the Cossacks as a given—recalcitrant agents of evil—the author displays an interest in explaining their phenomenon and on several occasions directly addresses the problem, at one point through a purported speech by Ḥalīl Paša.⁴⁵ Concerning the Cossacks and the threat they pose, the recurring motif is their elusiveness. In laying out the strategy to be followed, Ḥalīl Paša explains to his commanders that even with a large Ottoman naval force in the Black Sea, it is possible for the Cossacks to “devastate and plunder so many places of the shores of the sea” without even encountering the fleet. The Cossacks are depicted as being extremely cunning in avoiding contact with enemy forces. While the fleet patrols the coasts, unable to locate the Cossacks, the latter are just ahead of it, out of sight but aware of the fleet's every move. On one occasion, according to the work, the Cossacks not only knew where the forces hunting for them were but also obtained intelligence of where another force was waiting in ambush (though on another occasion such a force lying in wait allegedly caught the Cossacks by surprise).

In *Ġazānāme*, it is clear that to the Cossack's advantage was the small size of their boats, known as *šayqas*,⁴⁶ compared to the large Ottoman galleys of the main fleet; the Cossacks were able to spot the galleys twenty or thirty miles away without themselves being sighted and retreat.⁴⁷ To defeat

⁴³ E.g., the 1027/1618 *ahdnāme* (“treaty”) with Iran (fols. 135b–137a), and a copy of a letter (fols. 143a–143b).

⁴⁴ Fol. 158a. It is unlikely that the passage with the speech of Ḥalīl Paša to his commanders on strategy against the Cossacks is an authentic recording of the *qapūdān paša*'s words; it is probably a paraphrase or even a concoction (though its contents are likely to be valid) used as a literary device by the author of the *ġazavānāme*.

⁴⁵ Fols. 156b–157a.

⁴⁶ On the *šayqa*, see fn. 59.

⁴⁷ The Cossacks' ability to track the enemy from not too afar, without themselves being seen, by taking advantage of the low prow of the *šayqa* and the removability of its mast has been noticed in other sources: Guillaume Le Vasseur sieur de Beauplan, *Description d'Ukraine qui sont plusieurs provinces du Royaume de Pologne*. . . (Rouen, 1660), translated as *A Description of Ukraine*. . . in *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, vol. 1, ed. Answam Churchill (London,

the Cossacks, *Ġazānāme* specifies that the Ottoman galleys would ideally encounter the Cossack *šayqas* on the open sea, where the latter would have no chance against the swift ships.⁴⁸ Here the work implicitly supports what other sources say about such encounters—on the open sea the Cossack *šayqa* was no match for the galley, provided there was a wind which gave the latter a significant speed advantage. In calm seas, it was not the galley but the *šayqa* that was swifter and that, coupled with its great maneuverability, thereby had the advantage.⁴⁹

Ġazānāme makes it clear that it was not enough to rely on a fleet superior in size or speed; a strategy had to be devised for the more than likely case that the fleet would be unable to find the Cossacks. This was to post naval squadrons at places through which the Cossacks had to pass on their return home, namely, the mouth of the Dnieper and the Strait of Kerč. Soon after arriving at the Danube, Ĥalīl Paša dispatched the Danubian *šayqa* fleet to the mouth of the Dnieper and twenty ships to the Strait of Kerč, while he himself planned to remain with the main fleet guarding the Danube, as the sultan had ordered. The forces sent to these “choke points” were of significant size because, as *Ġazānāme* implies, the Cossacks would practically always run such blockades; hence, battles were inevitable. The work implies that it was not enough to post such blockades at the strategic passages, for, inevitably, Cossack flotillas would already be operating in the sea by the time the blockades were in place and even with them Cossack entry into the sea could not be completely sealed off. Thus, without patrols in search of the Cossacks, their raids would occur despite whatever awaited them on their return journey. It must have been for this reason that Ĥalīl Paša felt forced to abandon the mission on the Danube assigned to him by the sultan and, with the bulk of the main fleet, sail for the Anatolian coast where a Cossack flotilla had been reported. His inability to find the Cossacks during his three-week sail demonstrates how elusive the Cossacks could be; that they were forced to flee before his ships (implying that their raiding was cut short) and run the gauntlet of the awaiting forces at the pas-

1744): 445–81 esp. p. 465; and Victor Ostapchuk, “Five Documents from the Topkapı Palace Archive on the Ottoman Defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks (1639),” *Raiyyet Rüşmû: Essays presented to Halil İnalçık on his Seventieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987) (= *Journal of Turkish Studies* 11 [1987]: 49–104, esp. pp. 83, 92).

⁴⁸ Fol. 156b.

⁴⁹ Kātīb Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 110; A. Bert'e-Delagard (Berthier-Dalagarde), “Opisanie Černogo morja i Tatarii sostavil dominikanec Emiddio Dortelli d'Askoli, prefekt Kaffy, Tatarii i proč. 1634,” *Zapiski Odesskogo obščestva istorii i drevnostej* 24 (1902): 89–170, esp. p. 98.

sages leading from the sea meant, however, that his mission was not completely in vain.

The Danubian boat flotilla figures as a mainstay in the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea. Immediately upon the imperial fleet's initial arrival and unloading at Kili, Hālīl Paşa set out in earnest to the task of readying "the *şayqas* which are every year prepared on the shores of the Danube for defense of the Black Sea."⁵⁰ In their mission that year of guarding the mouth of the Dnieper, the Danubian *şayqas* successfully engaged a returning flotilla of Zaporozhians. While there were also local flotillas based in, for example, Aqkermān and Özi, the Danubian was the largest and most important flotilla in the Black Sea defense. It was drawn from locales all the way up to Vidin (and sometimes even as far upriver as Belgrade), and there was a well-developed system of taxation and supply for its upkeep.⁵¹ While it consisted of a variety of boats (*qayıqs*, *şandals*) and small ships (*fırqatas*), apparently the *şayqa* was its mainstay. It may have been that the Ottoman *şayqa* was adapted from, or even modeled on, the maneuverable and versatile Cossack *şayqa*, for in the shallow waters of the northern Black Sea coast, the *şayqa* and other shallow-draught vessels were the only means of engaging the Cossacks.⁵²

The *ğazānāme* episode offered here is of interest not only as a sample of a poorly known narrative source type. Aside from providing a glimpse of the Ottoman attitude toward and understanding of the Cossack problem, the work adds to the corpus of *contemporary* texts divulging the nature of Cossack activity in the Black Sea and of the Ottoman response, the publication of which is still rather limited. Such texts are of value because so much of what is known about the Cossack presence in the Black Sea is influenced by legends and biases in the rich historical literature on the Cossacks, both popular and scholarly, and because the fundamental questions of how and to what extent the Cossacks were able to challenge the Ottomans in the Black Sea have not been adequately answered.

In the translation that follows an attempt has been made to provide the reader with a taste of the original Ottoman prose, including its eloquence, bombast, redundancies, and occasional ambiguities. Of course compromises have been made, since English is hardly capable of maintaining long and convoluted sentences and lacks any equivalent to the particularly

⁵⁰ Fol. 156a.

⁵¹ See Berindei, "La Porte ottomane," pp. 277, 278, 281, and Ostapchuk, "The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier," pp. 45, 112, 129, 136, 148, 183–84.

⁵² For Ottoman testimony to this effect, see Ostapchuk, "Five Documents," pp. 58–60, 76–96 *passim*, and Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, pp. 113–14.

highfalutin Arabic and Persian vocabulary so prevalent in high-style Ottoman prose texts of the seventeenth century, such as *Ġazānāme-i Ĥalīl Paša*. When the choice was made to maintain a close correspondence to some of the long Ottoman sentences, or even clauses, in translation, care has been taken to ensure that an unambiguous sense, when present in the original, can be gathered from translation.

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Translation

(Topkapı Sarayı Library, Revan 1482, fols. 155b–162a)

<fol. 155b>. . . Thereafter the aggression and seditiousness of the Cossack bandits in the regions of the Black Sea and the unbelief⁵³ and rebelliousness of some infidels in those regions⁵⁴ drove the temperament of ardor and righteous zeal of Sultan ‘Osmān Khan into action. The incitement to launch a campaign against the Polish infidel did not place in his [majesty’s]⁵⁵ mind the ease, and in his heart the desire, for <fol. 156a> promenading in the gardens and meadows. When the turning of his [majesty’s] attention to an imperial campaign became definite and certain and the sounding of the kettledrum to action reached the ear of the revolving verdant heavens, the apparati and materials of war and killing and all of the arms and instruments of combat connected with the armory were sent with the ships endeavoring to make all speed to the port of Kili. Because it was necessary to procure and make complete the aforementioned supplies in that place prior to the arrival of the padishah of high felicity and because on the Black Sea excessive seditiousness by the Cossack bandits was heard of, his excellency,⁵⁶ the aforesaid brave vizier [i.e., Ĥalīl Paša], a master of organization, was appointed to the Black Sea for delivering to the aforementioned place the mentioned apparati of the campaign and for destroying the Cossack bandits who go out onto the Black Sea.⁵⁷ For that reason they [i.e., Ĥalīl Paša and his forces] made their way in the direction of the port of Kili with the

⁵³ *Kefere* in this and in Es‘ad Efendi MS, fol. 135b. Compare, however, *baġi*, “wrong, violence, wickedness” in Vienna MS, fol. 228a.

⁵⁴ Aside from the naval raids of the Ukrainian Cossacks, this is a reference to the deterioration of relations with the Commonwealth caused by interference in Moldavia by Polish nobles as well as by the Cossacks.

⁵⁵ The personal suffix *-leri-lari*, when a *plural majestatis*, is rendered “his [majesty’s] / of his [majesty]” when the referent is the sultan, and “his [excellency’s] / of his [excellency]” when the referent is Ĥalīl Paša.

⁵⁶ *Ĥazretleri* is translated as “his excellency” when the referent is Ĥalīl Paša, “his majesty” when the referent is the sultan.

⁵⁷ The chronicle of ‘Abdü’l-Qādir Topçılar Kātibi contains a detailed description of the supply and logistic arrangements for the Xotyn’ campaign (‘Abdü’l-qādir Efendi Topçılar Kātibi, *Veqāyi-i tārihiyye*, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Mxt. 130 [Flügel 1053], fol. 333a–334b).

armory munitions loaded onto the ships. Defending the shores of Rumeli [on their way], they were successful in arriving at Kili.⁵⁸

After all of the instruments for the campaign were unloaded from the ships, great efforts were expended to assemble all of the *şayqas*,⁵⁹ which are every year prepared on the shores of the Danube for defense of the Black Sea.⁶⁰ They were all brought together <fol. 156b> and when they came to one place with the ships of the imperial fleet,⁶¹ the aforesaid vizier, who is the equal of Aristotle, thus opened the doors to thoughtful management [expressing the following considerations]: “If all the Danubian ships [i.e., the *şayqa* fleet]⁶² along with the ships of the imperial army⁶³ do not separate but rather go together to and fro on the surface of the sea, it is likely that the aforementioned bandits will not be encountered while they devastate and plunder so many places of the shores of the sea and, before these events become known, flee and return to their lands. Consequently, the following [course of action] is worthy of the state and beneficial for the proper course: First, an equal number of ships are to be sent to and made to wait at the straits from which those swine will go out upon

⁵⁸ According to Kātib Čelebi, on 18 *jemāzī II* 1030/10 May 1621 Ĥalīl Paşa set sail from Beşiktaş at the Istanbul end of the Bosphorus with forty-three galleys and arrived at Kili on 4 *rejeb* 1030/25 May 1621 (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuĥfet*, p. 107). In the chronicle of Topçular Kātibi, at this point Ĥalīl Paşa’s fleet consisted of thirty galleys (Topçular Kātibi, *Veqāyi’-i tārihiyye*, fol. 333b).

⁵⁹ The *şayqa* (*čajka* in Ukrainian) denoted a class of keelless longboats suited for both river and sea navigation used by both the Cossacks and the Ottomans. It is not clear to what extent the Cossack and Ottoman *şayqa* differed and what borrowings there were in design and application. The Cossack *şayqa* was a military vessel armed with light cannons and manned by fifty to seventy Cossacks (who, armed with muskets, effectively volleyed the opponent). With its removable mast (which made it possible to lessen the range of detection), rudders at both ends, and ten to fifteen oarsmen per side, the Cossack *şayqa* was extremely versatile and maneuverable. The Ottoman *şayqa* was used for both river commercial and military transport (commonly on the Danube and along the coast of the Black Sea), as well as for defense of river shores and, most notably, as an answer to the Cossack *şayqa* in coastal waters where the fleet’s large ships were ineffective. For sources and literature on the *şayqa*, see Ostapchuk, “Five Documents,” pp. 49, 58–59, 76–96.

⁶⁰ At this point Kātib Čelebi informs that a personal order from the sultan arrived, instructing Ĥalīl Paşa to devote himself to the construction of the bridge at İsaqji and not to set out in any other direction. When seventeen Cossack *şayqas* were reported near Qara Ĥarmān (today, Vadu in Romania, on the Black Sea coast at the southern end of the Danubian delta), Ĥalīl Paşa sent there the former governor-general (*beglerbegi*) of Kefe, Meĥammed Paşa, with fifteen ships; after patrolling these waters for sixteen days, unable to gain any further information on the reported Cossack flotilla, Meĥammed Paşa returned to Kili (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuĥfet*, pp. 107–8).

⁶¹ “Imperial fleet” (*donanma-i hümāyūn*) does not necessarily refer to the entire Ottoman navy, but rather to the galleys based in Istanbul’s *tersāne-i ‘amire* or imperial naval arsenal, the empire’s largest (located on the Golden Horn in the district of Qāsım Paşa). The imperial fleet was usually supported by galleys based in maritime provinces of the Aegean; the presence of these auxiliary forces in the Black Sea in 1621 is attested in Kātib Čelebi, *Tuĥfet*, p. 109.

⁶² Cf. Vienna MS, fol. 229a, where in place of “Danubian ships” (*Ṭuna gemileri*) there is “Danubian *şayqas*” (*Ṭuna şayqaları*).

⁶³ *Ordu-yi hümāyūn sefāyini*, literally, “imperial army ships,” refers to the ships of the imperial fleet under the command of Ĥalīl Paşa. Cf. the variant reading in Vienna MS, fol. 229a: *donanma-i hümāyūn sefāyini*, literally, “imperial fleet ships.”

the open sea⁶⁴ and to which they will return, fleeing to their lands when trouble makes the wide sea close in upon their heads.⁶⁵ If, by the grace of God—be He exalted—they are caught on the open sea, it is inconceivable for them to have the power to flee, and there is no possibility for them to save their souls before the galleys—swift as the wind on the surface of the sea and swimmers like sea dragons in the deep waters of the ocean. And if the good fortune of encountering [them] on the [broad] surface of the sea should not arise, or if they should obtain news of the imperial fleet <fol. 157a> and turn their faces toward flight, in the end the places to which they will return are those straits.” Speaking in this sound manner his decision was made evident.

Accordingly, the former governor-general (*beglerbegi*) of Kefe, Mehemmed Paša, was sent with twenty ships to the vicinity of the Strait of Kerč,⁶⁶ which is the place where the Don Cossacks enter the sea. In order to repel the Dnieper Cossacks, who habitually [bring] the most disorder and sedition to the Black Sea, the aforesaid vizier [i.e., Ĥalīl Paša] appointed one of his *qapuĵi bašis*,⁶⁷ Mehemmed Aġa—whose capability and bravery has his [excellency’s] noble confidence—as commander (*baš ve boġ*) of the Danubian *šayqas* and sent him to the mouth of the Dnieper.⁶⁸ After [these two commanders] heeded the repeated necessary orders and good fortune-bringing advice and admonition that were [issued] to each of them, he himself went forth from the Danube into the sea with twenty-eight galleys. As [his forces] made investigations in the [coastal] regions of Anatolia about the affairs of the Cossack bandits—who are perpetual pillagers of the lands of Islam—news was received that a number of the bandits had gone in front of them and had [already] dropped by those places. Because of this, with the guidance and suggestions of informers [who are] truthful in assertion, [the fleet] set out <fol. 157b> on the heels of the aforementioned accursed ones. Because their *šayqas* are not large-bodied and are not visible and apparent from a far distance like the galleys of the people of Islam, they [are able to] discern the mountain-like galleys of the imperial fleet from a place twenty or thirty miles away and turn face to flight [without being observed

⁶⁴ *Rū-yi deryā*, “surface [literally, “face”] of the sea” is interpreted as referring to the open sea as opposed to coastal waters where, in fact, the Cossacks were often at an advantage vis-à-vis the Ottoman fleet (see Ostapchuk, “Five Documents,” pp. 58–59).

⁶⁵ I.e., one flotilla to the strait formed by the mouth of the Dnieper estuary used to enter and exit the sea by the Zaporozhian Cossacks and a second flotilla to the Strait of Kerč used to enter and exit by the Don Cossacks (see the next paragraph).

⁶⁶ Eighteen ships, according to Kātib Čelebi, who mentions only Kefe, which is, however, on the way to Kerč (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 108).

⁶⁷ The *qapuĵi baši* (literally, “head gatekeeper”), a member of an elite corps of the palace in charge of guarding the outer entrances, also performed special missions, such as going on embassies, conveying orders, and acting as an inspector. High officials such as viziers had *qapuĵi bašis* at their disposal.

⁶⁸ Kātib Čelebi states that the decision to send these two forces was prompted by news that Cossack *šayqas* were in the vicinity of Kefe and Kerč, and Bali, *qapūdān* or commander of the local *šayqa* flotilla of Kili and Aqkermān, was made *serdār* or operational commander of this force; Kātib Čelebi only mentions Mehemmed Aġa as having been sent by Ĥalīl Paša to accompany Bali’s force (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 108). *Ġazānāme*, while highlighting the presence of Ĥalīl Paša’s man in this force and failing to mention Bali, adds the new information that Mehemmed Aġa was in charge of the important Danubian *šayqa* fleet.

first]. To sum up, like foxes fleeing before the male lions, those wicked ones kept to a safe and secret place and in what direction they had gone was not known. With this state [of affairs], while diligently searching [for the Cossacks], a place called Vona Burnî⁶⁹ was reached.

In the course of this time, with the arrival with felicity of his majesty—the felicitous padishah of the seat of Jemšîd⁷⁰—to near Kili, a high order of his [majesty] reached [Ḥalîl Paşa and the main fleet] saying, “with all speed come to the imperial army.” Therefore he was required to turn toward and set out for the aforementioned place [i.e., Kili] in compliance with the high firman of his [majesty]. While he was returning the grace and spiritual guidance of the Creator aided him.⁷¹

At that instant news came from his *qapuĵi baĵi*, Meĥemmed Aĝa, whom his [excellency Ḥalîl Paşa] had appointed as commander at the mouth of the Dnieper: “The measures and preparations undertaken earlier by his [excellency] are producing results. Fleeing before them [i.e., the main fleet of Ḥalîl Paşa] on the open sea, the Cossacks knew all along about our affairs. <fol. 158a> They had obtained the knowledge that we [i.e., the forces of Meĥemmed Aĝa] are at sea [near Özi]. It is likely that they threw their souls toward the vicinity of Özi, saying, ‘before we

⁶⁹ *Burun* means “nose, cape.” Vona Burnî is a cape west of Ordu (nearly halfway from Sam-sun to Trabzon [Trebizond]).

⁷⁰ Jemšîd, or as in this manuscript, Jem, was an ancient Persian king often confused, according to Steingass, with Solomon and Alexander the Great (F. Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary*. . . [London, 1892], pp. 369–70, 371).

⁷¹ Kâtib Ćelebi reports that Ḥalîl Paşa set out from the Kili Strait for the Anatolian coast with twenty-eight galleys on 27 *reĵeb* 1030/17 June 1621, upon learning that a large fleet of forty Cossack *ĵayqas* had gone there. Crossing the sea in four or five nights, he arrived in Sinop to learn that nine *ĵayqas* were in the harbor of Gerze (about 20 km south) with two captured ships. Although a force was sent there immediately, the Cossacks escaped to sea. The fleet’s only accomplishment was to free a ship that had run aground after its crew fled out of fear of the Cossacks. After traversing the coast in stormy seas for ten to fifteen days without gaining any news of the Cossacks, Ḥalîl Paşa returned to Kili on 19 *ĵa’bân* 1030/9 July 1621 (Kâtib Ćelebi, *Tuĥfet*, p. 108). The two ships captured by these Cossacks may relate to an incident reported only by a certain Szachiewski, a Polish noble who had fled Ottoman captivity, in which some Ottoman ships sent in search of Cossacks were attacked and defeated as they approached Trabzon (*Ĵerela*, 8, no. 145, p. 227). This may have been the same Cossack party that unsuccessfully attacked Rize (see fn. 94). Here *Ĝazânâme* fails to mention several other Cossack raids that occurred in the meantime. First, according to a dispatch by de Cesy from 17 June, in recent days sixteen *ĵayqas* raided the entrance to the Bosphorus, reaching the so-called column of Pompei off-shore from Rumeli Feneri, and destroying several *karamürsels* (small seagoing craft, primarily used to carry cargo) and villages, which caused a great panic in the Pera and Qâsimpaşa districts of Istanbul (*Historica Russiae*, 2, p. 414). Second, according to Kâtib Ćelebi, on 1 *ĵa’bân* 1030/21 June 1621, the day that Ḥalîl Paşa arrived at Sinop with the main fleet, sixty Zaporozhian and Don Cossack *ĵayqas* rendezvoused near Misivri and from there proceeded to attack nearby Aĥyoli, destroying its dock near port (*iskele*) (Kâtib Ćelebi, *Fezleke*, 1, p. 404; idem, *Tuĥfet*, p. 108). Third, according to a certain Worocki, a Polish noble who escaped Ottoman captivity, sometime in late May or early June galleys transporting siege artillery, ammunition, and food supplies to Aqkermân were overcome by the Zaporozhians (according to the same source, soon thereafter the Cossacks attacked Istanbul and its suburb of Galata; this claim is not corroborated by the other sources; *Ĵerela*, 8, no. 144, p. 225). Note that while the raid on Aĥyoli is covered in *Fezleke*, there is no mention of it in *Zaĝernâme*; hence *Fezleke* is not completely dependent on *Zaĝernâme* for the events of the Xotyn’ war.

return, they [i.e., the Ottoman forces] will set out for and hasten to the mouth of the Dnieper to hunt for our throats.⁷² [However] these miserable ones were unwary for the following reason: When the prey-seeking hawks of experience and the hunters who are masters of quick understanding gain news of a great number of foxes⁷³ and bears in a valley, do they attack and do they make a rush upon them without first blocking the paths and passages in that valley that are the places of flight with rows of royal falcons who throw down [their] prey, and without preparing and placing rows of hunters who are unequaled and unsurpassed in the agreed places where the paths and fords of the game that is experienced with [being] hunted are [found]?" To sum up, while the *šayqas* that were previously sent to the mouth of the Dnieper along with the aforementioned Mehemmed Ağa were present and ready in the opportune [position] for ambush, guarding and looking for news of the bandits from every direction, the twenty infidel *šayqas* that were fleeing before the imperial fleet intended to enter the mouth of the Dnieper without knowing about these [extensive] preparations. As they approached, these [awaiting forces] attacked at the first instant and by the grace of God—be He exalted—they captured all of them.⁷⁴

With the reporting of their seizing and capturing them, <fol. 158b> his excellency, the aforesaid vizier, sent a message saying, "quickly take the [Cossack] *šayqas* with all the captives (*esīr*) and arrive [here]." In accordance with [these] instructions they made their way toward the aforesaid vizier.⁷⁵ When this news,

⁷² Here there is a play on two meanings of *boğaz*: "throat" and "strait," as in *Özi Boğazi*, "Dnieper Strait," (i.e., mouth of the Dnieper).

⁷³ Here Es'ad Efendi MS, fol. 137b, and Vienna MS, fol. 231b, also have *ve hūk*, "and hogs."

⁷⁴ According to Kātib Čelebi, those Cossacks engaged near Özi were from the same raiding party that earlier attacked Ahyolī. Even before the encounter at Özi, they were scattered by a strong head wind, losing nineteen *šayqas*. In this chronicle the remaining *šayqas* encountered *qapūdān* Bali's force (see fn. 68) as they were passing through the Dnieper estuary on their way home, with a stiff battle ensuing. After the Özi governor-general, Maḥmūd Beg, arrived, twenty-one of the Cossack *šayqas* were captured (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 108; the printed edition of Kātib Čelebi's naval history has twenty-one *šayqas*, but, for example, a manuscript of the naval history in the Topkapı Sarayı Library [Revan 1190, fol. 96] gives twenty *šayqas*, which agrees with *Ġazānāme*). *Zafernāme* and *Fezleke* relate, with a few variations, basically the same version of events, stressing that a large battle occurred near Özi. However, in these sources the Özi governor-general is Hüseyin Beg and eighteen *šayqas* are captured (*Zafer-nāme*, pp. 29–30, 57–59; Kātib Čelebi, *Fezleke*, 1, pp. 405–6). According to *Zafernāme*, at about this time there was also an encounter with Cossacks in the Bosphorus (*Qara Deñiz Boğazi*, "Black Sea Strait") in which five *šayqas* were captured and their Cossacks executed (*Zafer-nāme*, p. 60). Although these encounters are not dated, they must have occurred in the middle of July—after Ḥalīl Paša returned to Kili (9 July; see fn. 71) and before the captured Cossacks were brought to Kili (15 July; see below). Apparently the Ottoman sources do not give the full story about these encounters for, according to a report by a Polish spy who passed through Kili on 11 July, at that time the Cossacks, using eighteen decoy *šayqas* made of reeds, lured 150 Ottoman *šayqas* sent against them by Ḥalīl Paša into reed-filled shallow waters and overcame them there (*Zerela*, 8, no. 146, p. 228).

⁷⁵ According to the chronicle of Kātib Čelebi, upon receiving news of the success at Özi, Ḥalīl Paša sent his second-in-command, the *kethüdā* of the Istanbul naval arsenal, Aḥmed Ağa, with six galleys to the forces at Özi. On 25 *ša'bān* 1030/15 July 1621 Aḥmed Ağa, *qapūdān* Bali, and the Özi governor-general, Maḥmūd Beg, arrived at Kili, bringing the twenty-one (or twenty, see fn. 74) captured *šayqas*, more than 200 captured Cossacks, and up to 300 Cossack heads (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 108).

which is a sign of the good, reached the imperial knowledge of the padishah and was presented to the sublime threshold of the shah of shahs [i.e., also reported to the Porte], the ultimate level of rejoicing and delight⁷⁶ occurred. A copy of the noble writing (*ḥatt-i šerif*)⁷⁷ on this matter that his [majesty] ordered to be sent to his excellency, the vizier—who has the judgment of Asaph⁷⁸—is reproduced here: “Oh you who are my vizier, my *qapūdān*, you, Ḥalīl Paša, let this be known: your service and freedom from disgrace in the Black Sea for the sake of my imperial cause has come to my imperial knowledge—may you be joyous. Upon the arrival of my noble writing, without tarrying or resting for a moment or an hour you are to reach within three or four days the glory of my noble presence at the place on the bank of the Danube where a bridge has been erected. It is necessary that you come while I am still here, so do not be negligent.” To break off any of his [excellency’s] own sudden individual inspirations,⁷⁹ here are the words of felicity of his [majesty’s] wonders, which his [majesty] wrote with a blessed reed pen [that produces] auspicious characters: “You who are the *qapūdān*, do not tarry for a moment <fol. 159a> and do not be negligent in coming to the shores of the Danube, also taking the Cossack bandits who are captives there.”⁸⁰

Therefore his excellency, the vizier—who is the master of organization—set out from the place named Kili together with the imperial fleet and moved in the direction of the bridge put up in İsaçji for the passage of the armies of Islam, which was the place of the erecting of the tents of the imperial army and the station⁸¹ of the assembling of the armies of the padishah of the inhabited quarter [of the earth]. At that time the mentioned Meḥammed Ağa came with the mentioned twenty infidel *şayqas*, with all the seized Cossack bandits inside them, and with the Danubian *şayqas*, and approached the aforesaid vizier, [while his forces] entered the imperial fleet. With this renown and pomp the ships of the imperial fleet came to places near the imperial army. As [Meḥammed Ağa and Ḥalīl Paša’s forces] became visible and apparent along with this type of ship⁸² of the miserable infidel [i.e., the Cossack *şayqas*], the effects of all sorts of celebrations and [expressions] of joyfulness by the armies of glorious victories that were camping on both sides of the Danube became visible—the sound of earthquake-discharging⁸³ cannons and muskets fired from the

⁷⁶ *Maḥzūz*, should read *maḥzūz* (as in Es’ad Efendi MS, fol. 138a, and Vienna MS, fol. 232a).

⁷⁷ *Ḥatt-i šerif* (or *ḥatt-i hümāyün*, as below, fol. 161a) refers to a document (usually an order) or a passage in a document written by the hand of the sultan.

⁷⁸ Legend had it that Asaph was a sage who was the vizier or secretary of Solomon; hence Asaph connotes the proverbial wise counselor (Steingass, *Persian-English Dictionary*, p. 69; Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, p. 129).

⁷⁹ Undoubtedly a reference to Ḥalīl Paša’s earlier unauthorized departure from the Danube in search of Cossacks on the Anatolian coast (fol. 157a–157b).

⁸⁰ *Onda esir olan qazaq eşqiyāsī*, “the Cossack bandits who are captives there,” in Es’ad Efendi MS, fol. 138a, and Vienna MS, fol. 232b; Revan MS lacks *esir*: *onda olan qazaq eşqiyāsī*, “the Cossack bandits who are there.”

⁸¹ *Menzil*, a halting-place for the army, where supplies were prepared beforehand.

⁸² *Şayqa* in Vienna MS, fol. 233a.

⁸³ Read *endāz*, “throwing, discharging,” as in Es’ad Efendi MS, fol. 138b, and Vienna MS, fol. 233b, rather than *endār* as in Revan MS.

two sides made the edifice of the celestial sphere move about.⁸⁴

His majesty, the felicitous padishah—whose dignity is as exalted as the heavens—<fol. 159b> and the shah of shahs—who is as powerful as Jemšid—looked out of his [majesty's] pavilion—which is [as large as] the girth of the heavens—that was erected at the head of the bridge. Because of this conquest his [majesty's] gracious thoughts gladdened to the highest degree and cheerfulness came forth and unbounded joy surged. To his excellency, the aforesaid brave vizier, he sent a *qayiq*. Because his [majesty] made an order that the seized infidel *šayqas* be brought to a place close to the imperial tent, which was on the edge of the waters of the Danube, the illustrious order of his [majesty] was obeyed and the imperial approval was conformed to. As those swine—who were deserving of destruction—were brought opposite that furious lion who seizes the enemy, they stirred up his [majesty's] emotion of anger and rage and raised the waves of the sea of his [majesty's] anxiety. Because of this, he desired the execution of those accursed ones in various ways and to make thereby a spectacle and diversion. Some of them were set on fire back in their own ships [i.e., Cossack *šayqas*]. Atop the flowing water occurred a show of hellish fire. Some of them were tied between the sea dragon-like ships [i.e., the galleys] and the parts of their bodies were separated from one another and turned into food for the schools of fish. As for others, they had their punishment meted out on the shore of the water—their principal members⁸⁵ were crushed under the feet of enraged elephants and their wicked souls <fol. 160a> were dispatched⁸⁶ to the fire of hell. Thereafter, some of the violence of the rage of the padishah, whose gravity is as that of the revolving celestial sphere, found calm.⁸⁷

In recompense for this service [i.e., delivering the Cossacks and aiding in the executions], [the sultan] performed various observances of respect to his excellency,

⁸⁴ *Jevvāl*, “moving about, migrating, wandering.” Vienna MS, fol. 229a, has instead, *devvār*, “revolving, rotating.”

⁸⁵ *A'zā-yi re'īse* probably refers to protruding appendages of the body—arms, legs, heads, and perhaps penes and testicles. Cf. the definition in Steingass: “The principal members, the vital parts (the heart, brain, liver, testicles)” (Steingass, *Persian-English Dictionary*, p. 75).

⁸⁶ *Peyvest it-*, literally, “reunited.”

⁸⁷ In *Zafer-nāme* and Kātib Čelebi, *Fezleke*, ten captured Cossacks were dispatched to the sultan immediately after the battle for execution in various ways; thereafter, the same triumphant arrival and celebrations at the sultan's camp (with eighteen Cossack *šayqas* and 200 Cossacks) are related. The mass execution scene is basically the same with a few variations: along with mention of crushing by elephants and tearing apart by the galleys (the latter applied to apostates from Islam, according to Kātib Čelebi, *Fezleke*), also mentioned are the beheading of some before the sultan, the cutting in half at the waist or impaling on hooks of others, and the shooting with their own arrows of yet others (*Zafer-nāme*, pp. 29–30; Kātib Čelebi, *Fezleke*, 1, p. 406). In his naval history, Kātib Čelebi glosses over the details of the execution scene, stating only that the Cossacks from the captured *šayqas* were turned over to the sultan at Isajī and put to death by various torments (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 108). The cruelty of these executions, which should be viewed in the context of comparable cruelty by the Cossacks in the course of their raids, indicates the degree to which the Cossack menace annoyed the Ottomans. *Zafer-nāme* and both of Kātib Čelebi's works give the same date, 5 *ramazān* 1030/24 July 1621, for the arrival of these captives at the sultan's camp (*Zafer-nāme*, p. 29; Kātib Čelebi, *Fezleke*, 1, p. 406; and *idem*, *Tuhfet*, p. 108). Several Polish sources confirm the presence of four elephants in the sultan's train (*Żerela*, 8, no. 144, p. 226, no. 147, p. 234).

the aforesaid vizier.⁸⁸ Then he himself, with his good fortune and felicity, set about departing for the Polish campaign. He assigned the vizier—who is the equal of Asaph—to the defense of the bridge and to the business of the fortress, of which the building anew at Isaqjī was ordered.⁸⁹

By the wisdom of the Creator, his majesty, the padishah—who is refuge to the world and exalted in stature as Jemšīd—set out from the bridge.⁹⁰ As his [majesty] went one day's march to the other side [of the Danube, news came that] Meḥammed Paša, who had earlier been separated out from the imperial fleet and sent with twenty galleys to the Strait of Kerč, which is the passage of the Don Cossacks, encountered eighteen Dnieper Cossack [i.e., Zaporozhian]⁹¹ *šayqas* that were fleeing for their lives toward the Strait of Kerč out of fear of the imperial fleet.⁹² By the grace of God—be He exalted—the confounded accursed ones were given a huge defeat and all of them were captured. He came to his excellency, the vizier [i.e., Ḥalīl Paša], who is the master of organization, with in excess of four or five hundred live infidels. As they [i.e., Meḥammed Paša and Ḥalīl Paša] came together at the head of the bridge, they at once set out and brought all the Cossack bandits that they had brought to the felicitous <fol. 160b> padishah. One station beyond [the Danube] they delivered [the captives] to the imperial army. For this reason both the sovereign—who is as powerful as Jemšīd—and the intirety of the armies—whose habits are victory—were delighted and made celebrations and rejoicings. All of the accursed captured Cossacks were brought to the lofty presence of his [majesty] with

⁸⁸ More specifically, Ḥalīl Paša and others were honored with ceremonial robes (the *ḥil'at* ceremony) (*Zafer-nâme*, p. 29; Kātib Čelebi, *Fezleke*, 1, p. 406). The *ḥil'at* ceremony is described in more detail on fol. 162a. *Gazānâme* omits an embarrassing incident in which Ḥalīl Paša's *qayıq* tipped over between the bridge supports, spilling him and his entourage into the water and drowning three men (Kātib Čelebi, *Fezleke*, 1, p. 406). In relation to this or another incident, a Polish spy reported that around 14 July a span of the bridge collapsed and six cannons and two hundred oxen drowned; according to him, some of those involved in the construction of the bridge were punished by impalement (*Žerela*, 8, no. 146, p. 228).

⁸⁹ *Zafernâme* acclaims the properties of the planned fortress, mentioning its riverside location, many towers, and mosque, and describes some of the activities of the architects and engineers involved in its construction (*Zafer-nâme*, pp. 72–75; the fortress construction is also mentioned in Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 109).

⁹⁰ 10 *ramazān* 1030/29 July 1621 (*Zafer-nâme*, p. 76).

⁹¹ In Vienna MS, fol. 234b, there is a blank where the number of *šayqas* should be written and instead of “Dnieper Cossacks” (*Özi qazağī*), “Don Cossacks” (*Ten qazağī*) is written. As the other two manuscripts have *Özi*, it is likely that, as elsewhere in Vienna MS (see fns. 62, 63, 82, 84, 95), this is an example of the “hyper-correctness” of this manuscript's copyist: i.e., he altered the text from *Özi* to *Ten* in order to put it in line with the first part of the sentence where the Don Cossacks are mentioned in connection with the Strait of Kerč (see fn. 92).

⁹² When their usual routes of return were inaccessible, the Zaporozhian Cossacks would often head for the Sea of Azov and take refuge with the Don Cossacks or seek to reach the Dnieper River basin by portaging from the river system connected to the Sea of Azov (Beauplan, *Description*, p. 466). However, even without an emergency, these Zaporozhians may have been returning to the Don River from where they had originally set out: in these years many Zaporozhians carried out raids from the Don because of repressions against them in the Commonwealth (see Ostapchuk, “Ottoman Black Sea Frontier”).

their hands bound. Of eight or nine hundred Cossacks,⁹³ not one of them was left alive. They were made prey to the saber and destroyed by the sword of perdition. In recompense for this admirable service, too, his [majesty] became proud and honored and distinguished the enemy-seizing vizier with all sorts of favors and considerations. Then he started off from that station with every sort of pomp and grandeur and set out toward the enemy.⁹⁴

With this, his excellency, the aforesaid vizier of keen judgment, returned to the service of defending the bridge to which his [majesty] had appointed him and he stayed at the aforementioned place until the return again of his majesty, the padishah of Islam and the caesar of slaves. Night and day he was not absent or free from service and, unlike others, he was not a comfortable and reposed slave. His being, in every way earnest and diligent in the services of the sovereign, <fol. 161a> became [a part of] the imperial knowledge and reported [news] of his majesty, the padishah, who is the refuge of the world. Because of this, his [majesty's] imperial writing, full of courteous phrases, was sent from the [sultan's] camp [at Xotyn'] to display favor toward him [i.e., Ĥalīl Paša]. It is registered and displayed here: "You who are my vizier and my *qapūdān*, Ĥalīl Paša, since I [last] honored you with my noble saluta-

⁹³ *Sekiz toquz yüz qazaqdan*, "of eight or nine hundred Cossacks" is omitted in Vienna MS, fol. 235a.

⁹⁴ Kātib Čelebi gives a slightly different version under the heading, "the battle of Taman" (Taman' [Taman or Ṭaman in Ottoman], a town on the Strait of Kerč, opposite the town of Kerč). Mehemmed Paša with his eighteen galleys surprised the Cossacks who were in two large *karamürsels* (see fn. 71) they had captured and to which they had transferred after a large head wind had broken up their boats. After a great battle lasting four or five hours, they were overcome, and 292 Cossacks were taken alive, of which 200 were put to the sword. The surviving captives and the heads of the executed were brought to the main fleet at Isaqji. There the remaining Cossacks were executed and those responsible for the victory were rewarded with ceremonial robes. No specific date is given for this episode, other than an indication that it was prior to 5 *ramazān*/24 July when the first presentation of captured Cossacks to the sultan was made following the encounter near Ōzi (see fn. 87). Accordingly, the episode near Taman' must have happened at approximately the same time or shortly after the one at Ōzi (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuḥfet*, p. 109). On 18 August the French ambassador reported that twenty galleys sent by the *qapūdān paša* engaged sixteen or seventeen Cossack boats in a battle in which "the Turks lost as much as they gained." The survivors were brought to the sultan, who killed some by his own hand while others were crushed by elephants, quartered by galleys, and the rest buried alive (*Historica Russiae*, 2, p. 415). An apparently delayed report (2 October 1621) from the nuncio in Venice, relaying a dispatch from Istanbul, relates a battle of the galleys with twenty Cossack boats, with high mortality on both sides, which brought the Ottomans a great number of prisoners. By order of the sultan, the latter were executed by arrows, burning, quartering, and inhumation (*Litterae nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1527, p. 38). Note that these two dispatches bear features of both the incident involving Mehemmed Ağa (see above, esp. fn. 68) and Mehemmed Paša as related in the Ottoman sources. This Cossack flotilla returning from Anatolia may or may not have been the same as one occurring in the Muscovite diplomatic sources: a force of 1,300 Don Cossacks and 400 Zaporozhians set out in the spring for Anatolia, unsuccessfully attacked Rize, lost many boats in a storm on their return; twenty-seven galleys that were in pursuit caught up with the survivors and defeated them; only three hundred Cossacks returned to the Don (*Tureckie dela*, cited in *Istoričeskoe opisanie zemli Vojska Donskogo*, vol. 1 [Novočerkassk, 1869], pp. 156–57).

tions,⁹⁵ [you should know that] your letter arrived at the high threshold [i.e., the Porte] and whatever presentation and communication was made, it became [part of] my imperial knowledge. May you be joyous. Also, hereafter, let me see how much attention you pay to the service to which you are appointed and do [continue] the good defense of the bridge, [constantly] look out toward the sea with all eyes and ears, and expend your best possible effort and pay great attention in the matter of the defense and protection of the lands of Islam from the enemies and most evil ones. In essence, do not be absent from defending and protecting in all four directions. The grace of my esteem and my benediction is with you. May the Lord—be He exalted—be your abettor and helper in [these] works. You have communicated that sixty⁹⁶ *şayqas* have appeared on the sea. You reported, saying, ‘should I myself set out upon them or, if not, should I send someone else?’ <fol. 161b> For your going out, I have no consent; you are not to depart from guarding the bridge. Look into [this matter] well and in order at last to repulse the accursed ones, send out a capable veteran.⁹⁷ And make the *qāymaqām* and the *bōstānji başı*⁹⁸ in Istanbul aware so that they properly defend those regions [i.e., the Bosphorus].”

A little while later his majesty, that padishah⁹⁹—who is like Ferīdūn¹⁰⁰ in pomp—and that shah of shahs—who is like Solomon in dignity—with felicity and good fortune returned from the campaign.¹⁰¹ When his [majesty] came to the head of

⁹⁵ This clause (*selām-i şerīfūm ile müşerref oldugundan soñra*) seems awkward in this sentence; it is omitted in Vienna MS, fol. 236a.

⁹⁶ *Elli altmīş*, “fifty or sixty” in Vienna MS, fol. 236a.

⁹⁷ In Kātib Čelebi, while Hālīl Paşa was defending the bridge and constructing the new fortress at Isaqjī, news arrived that forty *şayqas* had entered the sea from the Dnieper. Hālīl Paşa sent out the governor of the Morea, ‘Abdī Beg, with ten galleys (presumably the auxiliary galleys based in the Aegean that were assigned to the Black Sea that year; see fn. 61). ‘Abdī Beg set out on 28 *şevvāl* 1030/15 September 1621, and, after passing the Strait of Kili and Aqkermān, he learned that twenty-six *şayqas* with a captured ship were lying in anchor at the island of Tendra (near the mouth of the Dnieper). When attacked, the Cossacks hugged the shallow waters (where they were inaccessible to the larger Ottoman ships) and waited until nightfall when they were able to escape, despite having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire by the Ottoman ships (on the shallow waters of Tendra and the strategic importance of the island to the Cossacks, see Ostapchuk, “Five Documents,” p. 61). Within seven days ‘Abdī Beg returned to the main fleet on the Danube (Kātib Čelebi, *Tuhfet*, p. 109).

⁹⁸ *Qāymaqām*, “locum tenens,” a vizier acting as caretaker in Istanbul when the grand vizier was off on campaign; *bōstānji başı*, a high palace official in charge of the sultan’s imperial guard and whose duties included policing the shores and waters of the Bosphorus. None of the Ottoman sources divulge the predicament of the *qāymaqām* and *bōstānji başı*. According to de Cesy, they were left with only three ships to guard the city and were forced to levy its citizens, commandeered private boats, and assemble a makeshift flotilla (on one occasion this flotilla avoided engaging sixteen Cossack boats at the entrance to Bosphorus, even though half of the Cossacks were ashore pillaging a village) (*Historica Russiae*, 2, p. 414).

⁹⁹ Revan MS has a scribal error, *pāšāh*; cf. *pādišāh* in Es’ad Efendi MS, fol. 140a, and Vienna MS, fol. 236b.

¹⁰⁰ Ferīdūn was an ancient Persian king and descendent of Jemšīd (see fn. 70).

¹⁰¹ It is interesting that there is no reference to the actual outcome of the Xotyn’ campaign. Although neither side vanquished the other, that this sultanic campaign brought the Ottomans no gains, coupled with the heavy losses suffered, meant that it was a disastrous failure and led to the dethronement and murder of ‘Oşmān II. Because of the ambiguous outcome of the conflict, with the help of poetic license its interpretation in the Ottoman sources has been vari-

the bridge he saw that, as he had ordered the aforesaid vizier, he had persisted in the service of defense, and that his defending and protecting had, with blessings [of God], made the subjects [*re'āyā*] of the land safe and sound from the wickedness of the enemies of the faith.¹⁰² The imperial heart, which is connected with victory, bloomed and blossomed [with gladness] and his [majesty's] good will and favors directed at the reliable vizier multiplied a hundredfold. Cheerful and joyful, that most glorious padishah <fol. 162a> placed his foot of magnificence and greatness—[which is like that of] the swift horse of the celestial sphere—at the head of the bridge of sturdy construction—which, from the point of view of its perfection of height, did not bow to the vault of heaven and over which, if the camels of the celestial sphere had passed, they would not have touched or collided with one another [within] its extremities and its breadth—and proudly raised his head high before that bridge of heaven-like semblance. At that moment the aforesaid vizier placed his forehead in supplication to the imperial foot of his [majesty] and took a step toward the brocade and velvet of the highest quality, which were wider than [blank] *endāzes*,¹⁰³ [that were] in front of his [majesty], the twin brother of felicity. When the honorable padishah, who treats kindly his slaves, witnessed this degree of selfless bravery of his [excellency], the aforesaid vizier, he displayed and made public all the various private favors that he was worthy of and he gloried in and distinguished him among [his] peers with magnificent favors. After this, one day before the day in which his own [i.e., the sultan's] troops were to turn toward and set out with felicity in the direction of the gate around which good fortune turns [i.e., Istanbul], he granted the aforesaid slave of his [majesty] permission to return together with the imperial fleet.¹⁰⁴ They returned in the direction of the threshold of

ous. While the chronicler *Topçular Kâtibi* devotes a great deal of attention to the logistics of the campaign—similarly to *Gazānāme*—he brushes over the actual events at Xotyn' in one clause: “the felicitous padishah, upon returning in felicity with the armies of Islam from the Polish campaign. . .” (*Topçular Kâtibi*, *Veqāyi'-i târihiyye*, fols. 334b–335a). On the other hand, the author of *Zafernāme* and, following him, *Kâtib Çelebi*, both of whom could not avoid dealing with the actual events at Xotyn', were able by selective reporting to present these events positively.

¹⁰² Perhaps, in addition to the above encounters with the Cossacks, this is a muted reference to an apparently serious and probably embarrassing incident reported by the nuncio at the Porte but not explicitly referred to in the Ottoman sources. Sometime in September, eighty Cossack *şayqas* attacked the Danube bridge, and the *qapūdān paşa* with forty galleys was able to repel them only after a two-hour battle (dispatch from Istanbul, 25 September 1621, *Diplomatarium Italicum*, no. 165, pp. 217–18; cited by Berindei, “La Porte ottomane,” p. 289; also in *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1521, p. 33). Another setback around this time was the interception by the Cossacks of *karamürsels* with munitions and supplies for the army (dispatch of 30 October by the nuncio in Venice, *Diplomatarium Italicum*, no. 172, p. 224; *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1531, pp. 39–40).

¹⁰³ A measure of length of about 65 cm (cf. “A Turkish cloth measure of about twenty-six inches,” Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, p. 216). In all three manuscripts there is a blank before this measure, that is, where the number of *endāzes* would be indicated.

¹⁰⁴ The sources do not give the exact dates for 'Osmān II's return to or *Ĥalil Paşa*'s departure from Isajī. However, according to *Kâtib Çelebi*, by 22 *zū'l-hijje* 1030/7 November 1621, *Ĥalil Paşa* stopped at the Strait of *Sülūniye* (Sulina, a town on the middle mouth of the Danube) (*Kâtib Çelebi*, *Tuhfet*, p. 109).

felicity and that winter [Ḥalīl Paša] wintered in the abode of the sultanate, Istanbul.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ *Ġazānāme* fails to mention that the return trip was not without incident. Because of the lateness of the season (traditionally the fleet was to be back in its home port by the *Rūz-i Qāsim*, or St. Demetrius's Day [26 October O.S., in the seventeenth century, 5 November N.S.]), the fleet encountered an early winter storm that caused the damage and loss of some of the ships. As a result, the fleet was separated into three parts and its ships straggled into Istanbul over a twenty-day period. Kātib Ćelebi criticizes the handling of the return of the fleet, enjoining that in such situations it is imperative to have on board persons competent in sailing and harboring during storms (Kātib Ćelebi, *Tuḥfet*, p. 109).

Facsimile

(Topkapı Sarayı Library, Revan 1482, fols. 155b–162a)

مروراشه لر نهایت وسعتندن بربرینه طوقمز
 و دکز ایندی وضع قدم اجلال و اعزاز و بای سندی
 فلک پیماسیله اول جبراسمان سانی سرفراز ایندکر
 اشاده وزیر مشارالیه قدم همایونلرنه وضع
 جین نیاز اندازده دن زیاده سراسر و کجای
 اعلائی مقدم سعادت تواملرینه پای انداز ایلدی
 جناب پادشاه بند نواز دخی مشارالیهک بودر
 سربازلقبلین مشاهده ایندکن حقلرنه انواع
 الطاف خفیه لرن اظهار و ابراز و بین الاقران
 مکارم شاهانه ایله مقطر و ممتاز بیوردقدن ^{صیکه}
 کندولر سعادتله در دولت مذا طرفه توجه و
 عزیمت ایند جگری کوندن برکون مقدم مشارالیه
 بند لرینه دوئمه همایون ایله رخصت عودت آرزو
 بیوروب استانه سعادت جانبیه عزیمت ایلدیلر
 اول قیش دارالسلطنه العلیه استانبول قشلا
 ایام بهار و هنگام کشت و کذار اولدوغی کبی پادشا
 جلیل الاعتبار حضرت لرینه کیر و سودای سفر و حرکت قائل

fol. 161b

ابلش سن سنك كند و ككه رضام يوقدز كوپري
 محافظه سندن ابرليوب بز خوشجه كوزه ده سن
 نهايت اول ملاعيناك دفعي اچون بز براز كاردين
 كسنه كوندره سن واستانبولده قايم مقام و
 بوستانجي باشي بي اگاه اينه سنكه انلر دجي اول
 جانبلى او كجه محافظه اينه بز مدتدن صكره
 اول پاشاه فرديون شوكت و شهنشاہ سليمان
 منزلت حضرتلى سعادت و اقبال ايله سفردن
 عودت ايدوب كوپري باشنه كلكلرند و ريز ^{نشار}
 اليه امر ايدكلرى اوزره خدمت محافظه ده قايم
 و حفظ و حراستى بر كاتيله رعايائى مملكت شرعايى
 دين دن امين و سالم ايدوكن كورب قلب همايون
 پادشاه ظفر مقرون شكفته و خندان و دستور ^{معمول}
 عليه توجه و التفاتلى صدچندان اولوب
 قرخان و شادمان اول پادشاه عظيم الشان
 سرجنر رصين البنيانه كه كال رفعت جهندن
 چنبر كرونه باش اكر و اشتران افلاك اوستندن

اور

fol. 161a

عالمپناه حضرتلرنيك معلوم و مسموع همايونلري
 اولمغله طبورذن كندولره التفاتا گوندر دكلر خي
 همايون ملاطفت مشخونلري دركه بومحله قيدو
 اولندي سنكه وزيرم و قبودانم خليل پاشا سن
 سلام شريف ايله مشرف ايلدو كومدن مسكره عتبه
 عليه م مكتوبك كلوب هر نه عرض واعلام اولمش
 معلوم همايون اولدي بز خوردار اوله سن مبعبد
 دخي كوزه فرسني مامور اولدغك خدمته نيجه تقيد
 ايدوب و كوپر و بي او كچه حفظ ايدوب دريا
 طرفلر يه كوز قولاق دوتوب اعداواشردن ممالك
 اسلامته نك حفظ و حراستي باينده مقدر و ركي
 صرف ايدوب زياده تقيد ايدو سن ما حاصل خوا
 اربعه بي حمايت وصيات ايتدن خالي اوليه سن
 حسن نظر و خيرد عام سنكله در حوقا خير لو
 اشلرده يازومعينك اوله و در زياده التمش قطع
 شايقه ظهور ايلدو كن اعلام ايدوب اوزر يه كندمي
 واره ين بوخسه بز آخر كمنه مي كونده ريم ديوعرض

fol. 160b

پادشاه کتوروب بزمنزل اوتده اوردوي همايو
 بتورب بومعنادن دخي اکر خداوند کار جمر اقتدار
 اکر عامه عسا کر ظفر کردار محظوظ اولوب شنک
 وشادمانلقرايدوب جمله النان قراق ملعونلري
 دست بسته حضور عاليلرنه کتوردکلرنه سکر ^{ملقوز}
 يوز قراقدن برلین زنده قوميو ب طمه شمشير
 ومستهک تبغ تدمير ابلدیلر بو خدمت دلپسند
 مقابله سنده دخي وزير دشمن کیری انواع الطاف
 واعطا فایله سرفراز ومغرز وممتاز سپوزدیلر
 اول منزلدن دخي انواع قرو شوکت ايله قانقوب دشمن
 طرفه توجه بيوز مایله مشارالیه وزیر روشن
 رای حضرتلری دخي مأمور اولدقلری کوبری محافظه
 خدمته عودت وتکرار پادشاه اسلام قیصرام
 حضرتلری کلبه به دکین محل مزبوزده اقامت ایلوب
 شب وزوز خدمتدن خالی وبري وسایر لر کبی حضور
 وراحت آسیري اولبوب هروجه مأمور اولدقلری
 خدمات شهر بارید مجتوساعی اولدوقلری پادشاه

عالمنا

fol. 160a

پیوست ایله کلرندن صکره پادشاه فلك تمکینک بر مقدار
 شدت غضبیری نسکین بولوب و بو خدمت مقابله ^{سند}
 وزیر مشارالیه حضرتلرینه انواع رعایتلر ایدوب
 بعد کدولری دولت و اقبال ایله لینه سفرینه توجه
 و عزیمت کوشتروب وزیر آصف نظیری کوپری محافظه ^{سند}
 و اینسابقی ده مجددک بناسی فرمان اولنان قلعه لر ^{مصلحت}
 تعیین یوزدیلر حکمت باری پادشاه عالمپناه حجاجه
 حضرتلری کوپریدن قالقوب بر منزل اوت کدکلری کبی
 مقدا دو نمه هایوندن ایروب تن فراغنگ مری
 اولان کرش بوغازنه بکر می پاره قدرغه ایله کوندردکلر
 محل پاشادخی دو نمه همایون خوفدن قاچوب کرش
 بوغازنه جان اتان اون سکر پاره اوزی فراغی شیقه ^{سند}
 راست کلوب بلطف الله ^{عظیم} ملاعین خاسرینه
 شکست ویروب جمله سن اله کتورب درت لشیوزدن
 متجاوزدزی کافر ایله مشارالیه وزیر صاحب تدبیر
 حضرتلرینه کلوب کوپری باشند بولشدقلری کبی انلر
 دخی ^{دتلر} الحال قالقوب کتوزدکلری جمله قراقاشقیاسن ^{دتلر}

fol. 159b

وشهنشاه جم اقتدار حضرتلری کو پری باشند قورنلا
 اوطاق کردون نطا قلرندن سیرایدوب خاطر عاظر
 بوفتخدن نهایت دره جه ده مسرور و واصل نشاط
 و ابنساطرنا محصور اولوب مشارالیه وزیر دلیز
 حضرتلرینه قایق کوندرب انان کافر شیفه لری طو
 صوبی کنارندن اولان چترهما یونلرینه قریب محله کتور
 امراتیمزلیه امرعالی لرینه متابعت و رضای هما یون
 موافقت کوستریلوب اول خنازیر مستوجب التیمیر
 اول شیرزیان دشمن کیرک قارشوسنه کتورلدوکی
 کبی عرق خشه و غضب لری تهیج و بحر قهر لری تهوج
 ایتمکله اول ملمونلری سیاست کونا کون ایله تماشا
 و تفریح ایتمک مراد ایدینوب بعضلرین کو و کتور
 آتسه یاقوب بالایی آب روانده اظهار نارحجه ایله
 و بعضلرین نهنگ پیکر کینله بغلیوب اجزای بدنلرین
 بزرنندن جدا و زمره ماهیانه غذا قلدی بزمره
 دخی کنار آبدن جزاسن و پروب زیر ناپی پیلان مست
 اعضای ریسه لرین شکست و جان خینلرین آتش

بومر

fol. 159a

واونده اولان قزاق اشقیاسینه بینه الوب کله سن
 اهنمال ائیمه سن بناء علی هذا وزیر صاحب تدبیر
 حضرتلری دونمه همایون کینلریه کلی نام محمدن
 قالمقوب عساکر اسلام مرور ایتک ایچون ایساقچیده
 قوریلان کوپری طرفه که محل قیام خیام اوردوی
 و منزله و جمع عساکر پادشاه ربع مسکون ایدی
 اول طرفه توجه ایتدکلی ائشاده ذکر اولسان کیرمی باره
 کافر شیفه لرله و انچلرندن ائخدا اولسان جله قزاق
 اشقیاسینه و طونه شیفه لرله مذکور محمد اغا کلون
 وزیر مشارالینیه و اصل و دونمه همایونه داخل
 اولوب بو شهرت و شوکت ایله دونمه همایون کینلری
 اوردوی همایونه قریب محله کلوب بود کلوکفار
 خاکسار کینلری ایله ظاهر و نمایان اولدوغی کیمی طونه
 نک ایکی جانبند قونان عساکر طرفه مائثر طرفدن نوع
 سنک و شادمانلق ائاری بدیدار و جانبیندن
 اتلان طوب و توفک صداسی زلزله اندار بنای
 فلك جوال اولوب سفا دتلو پادشاه کردون وقار

fol. 158b

مشارالیه حضرتلری داخی النان شیفه لری جمله اسیر
 ایله مجتلاً کتورن ایرشه سز د یو خبر کوندر مکه انار
 دخی علی حسب الأشاره وزیر مشارالیه طرفه توجیه کوسر
 یو خبر خیر اثر معلوم هما یون پادشاهی و معروض
 عبثه علیه شهنشاهی اولدقن کمال مرتبه مسرور و محظوظ
 اولوب اولیابین دستور آصف را حضرتلرین ارسا
 بیورد قاری خط شریفک صورتی دزکه بو حله نقل اولد
 سنکه وزیر مقبود انم خلیل پاشا سن شوپله معلوم
 اولاکه او غور هما یومدن قره دکرده واقع اولان
 خدمت و یوز اقلق لری بیز معلوم هما یونم اولدی
 بز خور داز اوله سز خط شریفیم واصل اولیجی بران
 و بر ساعت توقف و آرام ایتیموب اوج درت کودیک
 لبطنه ده کوپری فورلدوغی حلدن عز حضور شریفه
 ایریشه سز بن بوندن ابکن کلک کرکنسن اهما ل ایتیمه سز
 بالذات کند و قریحه لرندن قویوب مبارک قلم چخته
 رقم لریله یازد قاری کلمات سعادت یا قاری بودر
 سنکه قیودانسن بران توقف ایتیموب طونه یا کسینه

اون

أولدوغمری معلوم ایدندیلر اخیمالدرکه بزوارمزدن ^{مقدم}
 اوزی بوغازنه توجه وشتاب و بوغازمزی اولیه دیو
 اوزی سمتہ جان اتوب درد مند لیر بو معنادن غافلرکه
 شکاربازان کاردان وصیادان صاحب اذغان بزلائی
 روباه و حرسانک بر وادید خبرن الدقن ابتدا اول
 وادین محل فرزا اولان تمر و کدز کا هلرن صفوف شامبا
 صیدا فکن ایله مسدود و تمر و مغیر تخیزان صیادان
 اولان محل مفهوذ لرندن صفوف شکاریان بی قیاس و
 ونا محدودی حاضر و موجود ایتمدن اول وادینک شکار
 هجومی ایدلر و اوز لر نینه می کچد لر و الحاصل اورا
 بوغازنه مقدما مزبور محمد اعا ایله کوند ریلان شتیقه لر
 کینکاه فرستد موجود و حاضر و مر جانبدن اشقیان
 احوال مترقب و ناظر لر ایکن دونمه هایون اوکدن
 چکان بکرمی پاره کافر شتیقه نی بوتدار کدن بی خبر اورا
 بوغازنه کیرمک مراد ایدنیوب یقلاشد قلری کبی بونلر
 دفعه و احد دن هجوم ایدوب بفضل الله تکمله
 اله کتورب اخذ و قبض ایلد کلری احوالز بلدزمکله و ز

fol. 157b

عقبرنجہ واریلوب انلک شیقہ لری جبہ دار و
 اسلام قدرغہ لری کبی مسافہ بعید دن مرئی و نمودار
 اولماغله انلر دونمه هسایونک کوه پیکر قدر
 لرین یکریمی اوتوز میل یزدن سچوب فراره یوز طو
 والحاصل شیر نر لراو کندن فراز ایدن روباہلر کبی
 اول کمر اہلر ایز ازدورب نہ جانہ کند کلری معلوم
 اولیوب بو حال ایله تجسسن اولنه رق و ونه بور
 دیمکله معروف عله کلنوب بو ائشاده سفالو
 پادشاه جزدستکاه حضرتلری سعادتله کلی فری
 کلر نیله مجھلا اوردوی هسایونمه کله سزدیونر
 عالیلری وارد اولمغله فرمان عالیلر نیله امثالاً
 محل مزبوره میل وتوجه افصنا ایدوب کلوزکن
 عنایت و هدایت باری یاری قیلوب اولدیمدی
 اوزی بو غازنه باش و بوغ تعیین ایتدکلری قوجا
 محمد اغان خیر کلوب مقدا ایتدکلری تدبیر و تد
 نتیجه بخش اولوب روی دریاہ اوکلرندن فراز
 ایدن قزاقلر شمدن ضمکه احوالمری بلدیلر و دریاہ

اولدوروی

fol. 157a

یوزد و تر لر ایسه آخر کار واره جقیر لری اول بوغاز لر
 دیو بو وادی صابنه قرار کوشتر یلوب بناء علی هذا
 بکر می پاره کی ایله سابقا کفه بکر بکیسی محمد پاشا
 تن قراغنگ دزیایه چقا جق محلی که کرش بوغازی دز
 اول سمته کوندر یلوب وزیر مشار الیهک قیو جی
 باشیلرندن اولوب برارلق و دلا وزلکه اغما
 شریفی اولان محمد اغایی اکثر قره دکرده فتنه و فساد
 معتاد اولان اوزی قراغی دفی ایچون طونه شیقه
 باش و بوغ نصب ایدوب اوزی بوغازنه کوندر ب
 هر برینه لازم اولان تنبیه و تآکید و نضع و نپند
 سعادت نونیدی ادا ایتدکن صکره کند و لر دخی
 بکر می سکر پاره قدرغه ایله طونه صونیدن جانب
 دزیایه روان وانا طولی طرفلرند مدام غارتکران
 ممالک اسلامیان اولان اشقیای قراق احوالی پرسان
 اولدقلرند بر مقدار اشقیاکند و لر دن مقدم اولد
 سمتله اوغرایوب اوکلر نیجه کتد کلری اخباری النغله
 خبران صحیح القولک دلاک و القاسیله ملاعین زوبو

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دو نمة همايون کینلریله بزیره کلدکن مشارالیه
 وزیر ارسطو نظیر بوجمله فتح ابواب حسن بند
 ایندیکه جمله طونه کینلری اوردوی همايون سقا
 اینله بربرندن ایزلیوب روی دزیاده جمعه کشت
 و کذاز ایدر راینه احتمالدا شقیای مزبوره ^{ست} به را
 کلنلیوب انر سواحل دزیادن پنجه یز لری غارت و ^{خسارت}
 و احوالری معلوم اولمزدن اول کذود یار لریه فراز
 و عزیمت اینله لز پس لایق دولت و نافع مصلحت
 بودرکه ابتدا اول خناز برك روی دزیابه چقاچی
 و دزیای و شیخ باشلریه تنک اولدوغی مضایقه
 وقتنه کیرود و نوب و لایت لریه قجاجی بوغاز لره
 بز مقدار کینلر کوندزلیوب بکلندرله شویله که
 بلطف الله ^{تعالی} روی دزیاده اله کیرر لریسه باذ پایان
 جانب بحر و نهنگ آب لجه عثمان شناسنا و اولان قدر
 لزاو کندن فراره مجاللری مجال و خلاص جانلری تمنع
 الاجتمال اولوز و اادزیایوزندن بولشتمی نصیب
 اولیوب و یاخود دو نمة همايون خبرین المرنلیه فراز

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fol. 156a

نماشای باغ و راغ قومیبوب سفرهایبونه توجهری
 محقق و مقرز و صدای کوس حرکتاری رشیده کوش
 فلک اخضر اولدقن آلات و اسباب حرب و قتال
 وجه خانیه متعلق عامه اسلحه و ادوات جدال برو
 استیصال کیمیلرایله کلی اسکله سنه ارسال و پادشاه
 بلنداقبال و از مردن اول متهات مزبوره اول محلل
 و اکمال اولنق لازم و قره دکرده قراق اشقیاسنک
 زیاده طغیانق استماع اولنماعین مشارالیه وزیر
 صاحب تدبیر حضرتلری ذکر اولنان آلات سفرک
 محل مزبوره ایضالی و قره دکره چقان قراق اشقیاسنک
 اهلاکی ایچون قره دکرنجانبنه مأمور اولوب فلها
 انلر دخی کیمیلره تمجیل اولنان جبه خانه مهمتاتی ایله
 کلی اسکله سنی ستمنه توجه کوشتروب زومرایی
 محافظه اولنارق کلی به وصول میستر اولوب جمله آلات
 سفر کیمیلردن اخراج اولندقدن صکره هر سنه قره دکره
 محافظه سیچون طونه بالیلرندن تدارک اولنان شبقه
 جمعنه زیاده اهتمام اولنوب بالتمام کتوردیلوب

fol. 155b

سفر آیدن سفاین اسلامیانہ بر ضرر مشاہدہ الہمی
لکن احتیاطاً گبر و دزیا بکری محافظہ بہ الیقونیلوب
سایزدونمہ ہایون کینرلیہ مشارالیه سردار صانع
وقار حضرتلری در دولت مدار ترانہ یوز سوروب کل کل
خدمتلی مقابله سندہ انواع توجہ والتفات پادشا
مفتخر و مباهی و واصل اصناف الطاف و اعطاف پادشا
قیلوب خدمتلی مقبول خاص و عام و دلاور لکری
پسندین کاہ اهل اسلام اولمشدر و قلعه مزبورہ دن
النان طوب و باروت و اسرا و خمس مال عنایمدن
اولنان بشیک غروش مغروض پیشکاه یادشاه سرب
آرا و مرفوع حضور ملک پیرا قلوب صدورہ کلان
سعی و دقتلری دین اعتبار و خاطر خاطر خداوندکار
کما هو حقہ قرار بولمشدر بعد قرہ دکر جانبرین
قراق اشقیاسنک تجاوز و طغیان و اول جانبردہ
اولان بعض کفرہ نک کفر و عصیان عرق غیرت و
سُلطان عثمان خانی حرکتہ کتورب لیه کفرہ سی اورزیہ
سفر آیمک داعیہ سی دماغلرند فراغ و خاطر لرند درو

تغاضی