


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## The secret police and the campaign against Galicians in Soviet Ukraine, 1929–1934

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In 1929–1934 Galician intellectuals who emigrated to Soviet Ukraine from abroad were subject to mass repression. This article demonstrates how the party and the Soviet secret police discredited and eliminated this intelligentsia. Leading party officials perceived Galicians as possessing a strong sense of national identity and internal unity, and therefore an obstacle to plans for homogenizing Soviet Ukraine. The research draws on Ukrainian periodicals published in the early 1930s, on files relating to two major group criminal cases that were conducted in the early 1930s and that are now available to scholars in the Security Service archives of Ukraine (the former Soviet secret police archives), and on recent scholarship in the field. The archival evidence demonstrates that the cases were fabricated and the charges against Galicians were constructed as part of a planned “anti-nationalist” campaign.

**Keywords:** Ukrainian nationalism; Galician intellectuals; Soviet repression; 1930s

As a Communist I want to tell you bastards this – that you have all already been written off by the Soviet Union. (A *cheapist* in the Gulag in conversation with a Galician)<sup>1</sup>

In May 1924 an open letter signed by 66 Ukrainian intellectuals was published in the Soviet Ukrainian press. It called on émigré and diaspora Ukrainians to participate in nation-building by supporting cultural development in the Soviet republic. Among the letter's signatories were such prominent figures as Pavlo Khrystiuk, Vasyl' Mazurenko, Mykola Shrah, and Mykola Chechel' (Prystaiko and Shapoval 1996, 26).<sup>2</sup> The appeal was directed not only at Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) who had emigrated to Czechoslovakia and Austria after the Bolsheviks established their rule, but also at broad strata of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in what is today Western Ukraine (namely Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, which after World War I found themselves under Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovakian rule, respectively).<sup>3</sup> The Ukrainization policy, which had been declared in 1923, coupled with a powerful Soviet propaganda campaign, strengthened the letter's appeal, and resulted in a massive emigration or re-emigration of Ukrainians, who sought jobs, security and an opportunity to serve the cause of national unity.<sup>4</sup> Ukrainization reinforced Sovieophilic tendencies in the Ukrainian intelligentsia, both in Galicia (among the *halychany*) and in émigré circles.<sup>5</sup> The first group often hoped to escape Polish harassment and

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persecution, and to work in its chosen professions, something they were denied in interwar Poland due to discrimination, quotas and a policy of forcible Polonization (Rubl'ov 2004, 8–9). The second group dreamed of working on Ukrainian soil for the much-heralded national cultural renaissance.

In the interwar years a new type of “cooperative” intelligentsia appeared in Galicia, one that had emerged from the peasantry and the burgeoning cooperative movement. According to Zenon Pelens’kyi, approximately 45,000 people (11,000 families) belonged to this “cooperative” intelligentsia. Another 54,000–55,000 people came from families of the clergy, and a further 15,000–16,000 from families of teachers. Other members of the intelligentsia that had emerged from the peasantry belonged to various professions: lawyers, engineers and doctors. In total, approximately 240,000–250,000 people in Galicia (80,000 families) could be counted in the nationally conscious intelligentsia and used Ukrainian in daily life. Pelens’kyi estimated that in 1929 the population of Galician Ukrainians was 3,720,000 (64% of the population in Eastern Galicia), while Volodymyr Kubiiowych put the figure on 1 January 1939 at 3,727,000 (64.1%) (Pelens’kyi 1974, 510, 514–515; Kubiiowych 1983, xiv).<sup>6</sup> When other regions (Volhynia, Chelm, Podolia, Podlasie) were included, the population of Ukrainians in Poland was placed at five to six million; unofficially the figure of 7 million was often quoted.

By the mid-1920s discriminatory laws had driven the unemployment level among Ukrainians in Western Ukraine to 1.5 million people. The total number of unemployed in Poland was three to five million, and members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were most strongly affected (Kacharba 2003, 37).<sup>7</sup> Unable to find employment consistent with their training, many had to work as unqualified laborers. They often joined the mass exodus from Poland in the 1920s and 1930s. Polish authorities openly encouraged both Ukrainians and Jews to leave, and in the early 1930s made procedures for re-emigration to Poland more difficult (Kacharba 2003, 42, 45–46, 49–53, 56). As a result, mass emigration meant that in the years 1926–1931 the number of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia increased by only 9.83%, and the Ukrainian share of the overall population there declined by 2.33%. Some 120,000 Galician Ukrainians emigrated (Makarchuk 2004, 103, 105).<sup>8</sup> The majority belonged to the low-income category and could not afford a trip to the USA, Canada or any European country.<sup>9</sup> When the world economic crisis of 1929–1933 struck and restrictions were placed on immigration to the USA, emigration to the Soviet Union seemed to be the only affordable option for many trying to escape hard times in Poland (Kacharba 2003, 158–162; Mandryk 2006, 111).

According to Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the combined figure for Galicians who emigrated to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and those who had remained in Eastern Ukraine after World War I was 50,000 people (Antonovych 1977, 110; Svarnyk 1998, 186, 188).<sup>10</sup> Among them were political emigrants: members of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (renamed the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, or CPWU, in 1923<sup>11</sup>) who had left Western Ukraine for different parts of the world and then re-emigrated to Soviet Ukraine in the early and mid-1920s; World War I prisoners and veterans of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) who had been interned in camps in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and who returned to Soviet Ukraine when the camps were eliminated in 1924; university graduates from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, who were mostly veterans of the UGA; and individuals who had entered Soviet Ukraine both legally and illegally from Eastern Galicia.<sup>12</sup> Kacharba has posited that during the interwar period, approximately 600,000 people of various ethnicities emigrated from Western Ukraine to the Soviet republic, the USA, Latin America, Canada and various European countries (2003, 380). However, Soviet Ukraine attracted representatives of the

intelligentsia for more than pragmatic reasons: often highly qualified, they were motivated by the idea of helping to unify Ukrainians as a nation in its heartland.

During the years 1925–1931 the Soviet secret police, or the State Political Administration (GPU or Cheka as it is known in popular terminology<sup>13</sup>) maintained lists of unreliable Galicians to be arrested if they entered Soviet Ukraine, or in Poland if that country's eastern territories were annexed by the Soviet Union. Those Galicians who resided in Eastern Ukraine after World War I and the revolution were also viewed with suspicion. Lists of “the most active enemies of Soviet power” contained several thousand individuals who were considered likely to become traitors during a war (Baran and Danylenko 2009, 14).<sup>14</sup> Suspected because of their advocacy of Ukraine's political and cultural sovereignty and their connections abroad, they were to be removed first (Rubl'ov 2004, 95–96; Baran and Danylenko 2009, 14). By 1935 almost the entire Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia had been arrested. Maistrenko, who survived the terror of the 1930s, noted that in the mid-1930s if there were any Galician Ukrainians left in Kharkiv they were collaborating with the secret police or had some connection to the GPU (1985, 283). Those in Galicia who were on the lists were arrested when Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in September 1939. According to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) statistics, 5972 people had been arrested in Western Ukraine by 1 November 1939 (Titova 2007, 227; Baran and Danylenko 2009, 15).

In Soviet Ukraine a great wave of arrests took place in the years 1929–1934 as part of the campaign against Ukrainian intellectuals. It opened with the SVU (Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrayny – Union for the Liberation of Ukraine) show trial and continued with revelations that numerous nationalist organizations were engaged in spying and counterrevolutionary work. This campaign was directed against Galicians, a fact made explicit at the November 1933 Party Plenum by Stanislav Kosior, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CP(b)U), who said: “The Ukrainian nationalists are preparing an intervention against the USSR. The majority of those counter-revolutionaries and nationalists who were uncovered recently came to us from abroad – Prague, Galicia and other places [...] These Galician nationalists [...] were sent here to prepare the intervention from inside.” (Titova 2007, 228)<sup>15</sup>

The party, with the assistance of the press and the secret police, presented Galicians as anti-Soviet, subversive nationalists, an image that was exploited in the creation of criminal conspiracies such as the UVО (Ukrains'ka Viis'kova Orhanizatsiia – Ukrainian Military Organization) and the OUN (Ob'iednannia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv – Association of Ukrainian Nationalists). These were fabricated against the most prominent Galician intellectuals.<sup>16</sup> Some Galicians were recruited as secret agents (*seksoty*) and greatly assisted the GPU.<sup>17</sup> The role they played reveals how the secret agency discredited intellectuals. Moscow perceived Western Ukrainians as an ethnic group with a strong sense of national identity and internal unity. Whatever their views or political past, all were considered too committed to the free development of Ukrainian culture, even if they were prepared to work within a proletarian or Soviet state; they were therefore categorized as “nationalists” and potential separatists. There is evidence that such a view of Galicians was held by party leaders in Moscow and by GPU officials in Ukraine, who followed Moscow's promptings slavishly. The repression of *halychany* was a strategic operation conducted by the Soviet secret organs under Moscow's supervision. In Soviet Ukraine it was conducted in a *blitzkrieg* tempo and with great intensity.

### Prioritizing Galicians as a target of ethnic cleansing

After the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was partitioned in 1772, Galicia became a province of the Austrian Empire, and remained under its rule until 1918. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy created a more favorable political and cultural environment for Ukrainians than existed in the Russian empire. Ukrainian parties elected members to the Austrian parliament, the Ukrainian language was to a degree used in public life, and the Ukrainian press and publishing flourished (Shevelov 1986, 83). The Western Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed in 1918. The UGA was created, but a military struggle for independence ended in defeat. In 1923 Galicia (the territory known as Eastern Galicia before World War I) and Western Volhynia were officially transferred to Poland by the Council of Ambassadors.<sup>18</sup>

Robert Magocsi has suggested that the convergence of religious and territorial identities was of particular importance in the history of Galicia-Volhynia (Magocsi 1998, 121). It contributed to a sense of unity that became one of the region's historical markers and which persisted throughout the centuries: "Galician Ukrainians have viewed themselves – and are still viewed by other Ukrainians – as the most avid supporters of an independent and unitary Ukrainian nation-state" (Magocsi 2002, 37). The Austrian government had in the late 1860s transferred power in Eastern Galicia to the Poles. As a result, Ukrainians, who constituted an overwhelming majority in this territory, fought an ongoing battle for their national rights. By 1918, wrote Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, politically Galician Ukrainians had already become a nation, while Eastern Ukrainians were still "at the stage of an ethnographic mass" (1994, 25).<sup>19</sup>

For these reasons the Bolsheviks perceived Galicia as a "nationally charged" territory, one whose intelligentsia had been tempered in struggles and served as an inspiration for the entire national movement. While they attempted to use Ukrainian nationalism to undermine Polish rule, the Bolsheviks also feared the export of a "Galician national spirit" to Soviet Ukraine (Magocsi 1998, 365; Shkandrij 2012, 433). To manipulate Ukrainian Galician political circles, in the early 1920s Bolshevik authorities employed bribery, sending dozens of trains with bread from Ukraine, and providing cash to Galician Ukrainian cooperatives through Mykhailo Lebedynets' who worked for the Soviet embassy (*polpredstvo*) in Warsaw (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.69860fp, t.8, ark.280–281).<sup>20</sup> However, pro-Soviet sentiments were in any case widespread because of discriminatory Polish policies toward Ukrainians, unemployment and – above all – expectations raised by Ukrainianization. In the first half of the decade the Bolsheviks still hoped to direct a Ukrainian national liberation struggle in Galicia and Volhynia, and claimed for Soviet Ukraine the role of a Piedmont. The Soviet attitude changed when in 1926 Jozef Pilsudski came to power and when in the following year dissatisfaction with Soviet Ukraine's nationality policy led to a split in the CPWU. After this, the strength of national sentiment in Western Ukraine was increasingly perceived by Soviet leaders as a threat.

The stenographic report of a meeting on 12 February 1929 in Moscow between Stalin and Ukrainian writers conveys the party leader's perception of Galicians. It shows that he was aware of Galicia as a cultural center of the Ukrainian movement, and, it has been argued, reveals his preoccupation with Ukrainian nationalism. Martin (2001, 281) has indicated that Stalin remained deeply concerned about Ukrainian national sentiment:

His meeting with the Ukrainian writers had been organized to reassure the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia that the socialist offensive did not mean an abandonment of the Soviet nationalities policy. After his informal address, Stalin tellingly inquired of his audience, "How are things in Galicia?" Stalin noted that prior to the revolution Galicia had been the political and cultural center of the Ukrainian movement and he wanted to know if "hegemony" in

your hands.” Stalin was naturally assured that whereas Galicia had previously been considered “the Piedmont of Ukrainian culture,” the opposite was now the case. When Stalin asked if Galicians could understand the Ukrainian spoken in Soviet Ukraine, one writer, picking up on Stalin’s irredentist foreign policy goal, playfully replied: “You can unite Galicia to Ukraine – they understand us.”

The Ukrainization campaign in Soviet Ukraine needed qualified teachers and educators. By the early 1930s the republic also needed approximately 45,300 engineers and qualified workers for the industrialization campaign (Rubl’ov 2004, 111). The People’s Commissariat of Education led by Mykola Skrypnyk initiated a mass recruitment of the Galician intelligentsia. Soon, however, the regime became extraordinarily selective in granting visas to educated Galicians (Rubl’ov 2004, 9, 104–105, 108, 113–114, 125).<sup>21</sup> By the mid-1930s foreign immigration had been curtailed and contacts with Western Ukraine dramatically reduced.<sup>22</sup>

Many Galician immigrants were communists or Sovietophiles. In Poland they supported the CPWU or related organizations, often at considerable personal risk. When they arrived in Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet Ukraine until 1934, they created a vibrant intellectual community and participated actively in cultural construction and the Ukrainization campaign. However, they were closely watched. After Stalin admonished Ukrainian Communists in 1926 for showing symptoms of Ukrainian nationalism, the Soviet secret police issued a circular “On Ukrainian Separatism” (Shapoval 1994).<sup>23</sup> This document identified the uprooting of a dangerous nationalist spirit among the Ukrainian elite as a chief goal, and outlined a course of action. The GPU began infiltrating circles of the Galician intelligentsia in order to fragment this community, a process that eventually led to the fabrication of various “nationalist” conspiracies and underground organizations. In 1931–1934 at the time of greatest resistance to collectivization and during the Great Famine, these cases were used to justify a widespread terror against the nationally conscious Ukrainian elite. In many ways they also represented what Pavel Postyshev called a “crusade against Galicians” (*pokhid na halychan*) (Rubl’ov 2004, 24). The cases were the pretext for the GPU to fabricate thousands of criminal files against Galician intellectuals.

### **Escalating the mass terror: the SVU and UNTs**

The Galicians integrated quickly into the cultural and social fabric of Soviet Ukraine, occupying influential positions in newspapers, journals, publishing houses and the republic’s cultural administration; they made a considerable contribution to all branches of life, including science, literature, architecture and art (Rubl’ov 2004, 89–90, 92).<sup>24</sup> Although a counter-Ukrainization campaign was never officially declared, it was implicit in the attacks on Galicians and on the “incorrect, ‘Petliurite’ Ukrainization” that had been implemented, it was said, by “nationalist deviationists” and had resulted in “resistance to party policies, causing shortages in grain requisitioning, and leading to revolts” (Shkandrij 2012, 431). The GPU played a decisive role in these attacks and assisted the party in “creating an unattractive image of indigenization (and hence of Ukrainization)” (Shapoval 2003, 327).

The return of Hrushevs’kyi and other prominent Ukrainian intellectuals from abroad had from the first been treated with suspicion by the GPU, which was aware of Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s provocative statement, published in *Nova Ukraina* in 1923, stating that those who returned to Soviet Ukraine were potential fighters for the Ukrainian idea and would create a “united Ukrainian front” (Rubl’ov 2004, 97).

The first orchestrated attack on the Ukrainian intelligentsia occurred in 1926–1928. It was aimed at the People’s Commissar of Education Oleksandr Shums’kyi, the writer Mykola Khvyl’ovyti and the economist Mykhailo Volobuev (Shapoval 2003, 328; Mirchuk 2007, 153–157). Shortly afterwards measures were taken to reduce the immigration of *halychany*, and to register those who had already worked in Soviet Ukraine. The *halychany* were identified in GPU documents as a “foreign,” potentially dangerous element (Rubl’ov 2004, 99–100, 102). By July and August 1929, the GPU had begun to methodically arrest people from Western Ukraine, charging them with inflaming nationalism (Mirchuk 2007, 144, 161, 163).

One of the first mass operations was the SVU case, in which 45 intellectuals were tried as nationalists in the Kharkiv Opera Theatre during March and April 1930 (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.67098fp).<sup>25</sup> 474 people from 31 Ukrainian regions were declared to be members in the SVU, and 30,000 people were arrested throughout the republic during and after the trial. They were accused of terrorist activity and Ukrainian nationalism. Some were executed, others exiled (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.67098fp, vol.3; Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar’ov 1997, 41). The party newspaper *Komunist*, the organ of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U in Kharkiv, published a series of articles arguing that the Ukrainian counterrevolution was trying to destroy Soviet Ukraine with the help of imperialists (Prystaiko 1994, 73). The attitude in the GPU toward the Ukrainian intelligentsia can be gauged from a comment by one of the interrogators, Solomon Bruk, who declared: “We must bring the Ukrainian intelligentsia to its knees; this is our task and it shall be fulfilled; those whom we cannot bring to their knees we will shoot!” (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 131; Shapoval 2003, 333–334)<sup>26</sup>

The press summarized the results of the GPU’s work against the SVU before the trial had even occurred. In December 1929 the journal *Chervonyi Shliakh* stated that the accused, who aimed at restoring a capitalist regime in Ukraine, worked in cooperation with a Petliurite center in Western Ukraine and a reactionary youth organization called the Association of Ukrainian Youth (Spilka Ukrains’koi Molodi) (219). During the trial, in April 1930, Mykola Skrypnyk gave a speech at a student meeting in Kharkiv, which was published in the same journal. He identified the SVU members as “wreckers” and “deceased political figures.” He argued that the trial had finally buried “old Ukrainian nationalism,” called the new Ukrainian culture a “culture of state industrialization and agricultural collectivization” and declared that the uncovering of its enemies was a “great political victory” (*Chervonyi Shliakh*, April 1930, 142–143).

The scenario for the SVU case was designed in Moscow. Stalin himself sent a letter to the Politburo of the CP(b)U with suggestions for conducting it. These were reflected in the 30 January 1930 circular about the SVU nationalists, which was signed by the Ukrainian party and secret police leaders Stanislav Kosior, Panas Liubchenko and Vsevolod Balytskyi. Not surprisingly, the postulates of the circular were copied into the final collective verdict (Prystaiko 1994, 75).

Several decades later the state admitted that the SVU had been a GPU fabrication. On 11 August 1989 the Plenum of the Ukrainian Supreme Court dismissed the accusations after a special commission conducted a lengthy study of the many volumes in the case (Prystaiko 1994, 76; *Den’ Ukraina Incognita*, 8 January 2003). It pointed out that, as in thousands of similar cases fabricated in the 1930s, the files contain no concrete descriptions of criminal actions by the accused. The most pronounced feature of the materials, as Shapoval, Prystaiko and Zolotar’ov have noted, is their “absolute anti-Ukrainianism,” an attitude that persistently “travels” from file to file and is revealed in the questions and statements of GPU operatives, which are recorded in the minutes of interrogations (Prystaiko and Shapoval 1995, 58–59; Zolotar’ov 2007, 245).

In 1929–1931 the party gained complete control over public discourse. Reading signals in the press as well as directives from party authorities, the secret police understood that the fabrication of criminal cases against Ukrainian “nationalists” was not only encouraged but required (Plokhhii 2011, 275). The SVU trial legitimized an avalanche of new arrests in Ukraine. In December 1929 the Ukrainian press reported that in Kyiv the GPU had liquidated a group, consisting mostly of Galicians, called Ukrains’kyi Shtab (Ukrainian Headquarters). In May 1930 Kharkiv newspapers revealed that 60 Ukrainians had been arrested in the city for anti-Soviet activity and nationalist propaganda. Most were from Western Ukraine. In December 91 Ukrainians, mostly Galicians, were arrested for their alleged membership in an underground nationalist organization. By 1931 the Soviet press rhetoric characterizing nationalists had escalated. It moved from reporting isolated cases to describing group criminal cases, from outlining charges of “nationalist deviationism” to describing “terrorism” and “anti-Soviet counterrevolutionary activity.”

Reports published abroad conveyed the tone of Soviet newspapers. The German press, which followed the news from Ukraine closely, claimed that in February 1931 the Moscow GPU had identified a Galician organization in Ukraine that was preparing a military uprising to overthrow Bolshevik power in the republic. The leader of this organization was Hryhorii Kossak, a former member of the UGA.<sup>27</sup> Together with Kossak, 30 Ukrainian students, 100 commanders of the Red Army, the Galicians Stepan Indyshchev’s’kyi and the brothers Adam and Mykhailo Mel’nyk, who occupied high positions in the republic’s Commissariat of shipbuilding, had been arrested in Kharkiv (Mirchuk 2007, 167–168, 170–171). In May 1931 the Lviv journal *Dilo* noted that the Soviet secret police was systematically shooting without trial Western Ukrainians who happened to be on the territory of Soviet Ukraine (Mirchuk 2007, 167–168).

In 1930–1931 the GPU fabricated the UNTs case, which resulted in the arrest of 50 prominent Ukrainian intellectuals. Among them were many *halychany* and former members of the Central Rada and the UNR, including Matvii Iavors’kyi, Vsevolod Holubovych, Pavlo Khrystiuk, Vasyl’ Mazurenko, Serhii Ostapenko, Mykola Shrak, Mykola Chechel’ and Hryhorii Kossak.<sup>28</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevskyi allegedly led the organization. This “exposure” was followed by the arrest of many individuals born in Galicia (Shapoval 2003, 339). Originally the GPU planned this as another show trial, but Hrushevskyi, who had been released from imprisonment after initially cooperating with the investigators, rescinded his testimony and declared that he had been abused and exhausted by the investigators. The GPU dropped the idea of a show trial when it realized that it might not get the result it wanted.<sup>29</sup>

Nevertheless, within five months, the GPU had arrested and exiled to Siberia thousands of people throughout Ukraine – all charged with illegal activity within the UNTs (Marochko and Hillig 2003, 164). Many had served in the army of the UNR (Mirchuk 2007, 168). Those repressed in 1930–1931 were professors, teachers, engineers, academics, educators and cultural workers. Because these victims were completely annihilated, little evidence has survived of their real attitudes toward the terror against the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasantry. However, Iavors’kyi, who was sentenced in the case, reportedly said the following:

I refuse to deify the “genial, dearest, and precious leader of all the peoples,” and consider it shameful for me to buy freedom this way, especially when tens of thousands of the Ukrainian intelligentsia are perishing in prisons and camps . . . while their families are doomed to certain starvation in the so-called “cultural and prosperous life” provided by Stalin, . . . when hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian peasants are being robbed and sow Russia with their bones

[dying] as convicts at construction sites, in the timber industry and other sites of forced labor ... (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 65)<sup>30</sup>

Iavors'kyi defined Stalin's nationality policy as "national oppression and robbery of the peasantry," and the state as "a kingdom of totalizing deception, provocation and arbitrariness" (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 65).

### **Creation of the secret political department and the UVO**

The growth of nationalism and popular resistance to collectivization in Ukraine were the reasons given for the creation in 1931 of a Secret Political Department within the OGPU of the USSR. In Ukraine the department was formed on 5 April 1931. In 1931–1934 it fabricated thousands of criminal cases against intellectuals and peasants who, it claimed, actively or passively resisted Soviet nationality and collectivization policies. Individual and group cases frequently had one common denominator: membership in a nationalist organization that planned to overthrow the Soviet regime in Ukraine. Among the cases immediately fabricated by the secret police were the Ukrainian National Organization of Borot'bists and the Polish Military Organization (Zolotar'ov 2007, 11).<sup>31</sup>

The Secret Political Department was divided into four sub-departments. The investigation of Ukrainian counterrevolutionaries and immigrants from Galicia was ascribed to the second sub-department (Zolotar'ov 2007, 39). Because rotating the cadres was a routine practice both in the party and the secret organs, the new department had several heads over three years: Henrikh Liushkov, Iukhym Kryvets', Mykailo Oleksandrovs'kyi and Borys Kozel's'kyi (Zolotar'ov 2007, 14, 39, 42, 104, 186, 234). Under the leadership of Oleksandrovs'kyi, early in 1933 the GPU "uncovered" the anti-Soviet UVO. This case was used to arrest the greatest number of Galicians (Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar'ov 1997, 53). Their origin, past membership in various Ukrainian parties, contacts abroad and the lack of protectors in the party hierarchy made Galicians a convenient and easy target.

In 1933 Stalin's protégé Postyshev arrived in Ukraine to put down resistance to the grain requisitioning and to fight Ukrainian nationalism. In his speeches he claimed that cultural institutions in the republic were contaminated with Petliurites, Makhnovites and foreign spies, who supposedly had penetrated all important branches of cultural construction (*Literaturna hazeta*, 25 June 1933). In Postyshev's view, Ukraine's failure to fulfill bread procurements in 1932 was the result of wrecking activities by "various Badans, Erstenuks, Iavors'kyis" and other "anti-Soviet elements" who had been neutralized only belatedly (*Literaturna hazeta*, 18 June 1933).<sup>32</sup>

Spurred by the party to intensify its search for UVO cells, the GPU, which already possessed hundreds of testimonies extracted from those who had been arrested, fabricated criminal cases based exclusively on testimonies, with no material evidence provided, a practice that had by now become standard. Oleksandrovs'kyi's close relationship with Balyts'kyi, the head of the Ukrainian GPU, emboldened him in conducting mass operations against the *halychany*. Balyts'kyi approved Oleksandrovs'kyi's vigor, and insisted that the operation to eradicate Ukrainian nationalists should be completed within a short term.<sup>33</sup>

Kozel's'kyi, who in December 1933 became the next head of the secret political department, successfully completed the operation. He was considered an expert in anti-Soviet Ukrainian parties, and since 1925–1926 had been assigned to handle "terrorist" groups in Ukraine (Zolotar'ov 2007, 234, 241). He was on the team that masterminded the case against Hrushevs'kyi, and signed most of the documents in the operational file (*papka-formular*) that contained surveillance materials on Hrushevs'kyi (Zolotar'ov

2007, 242–243). How the GPU viewed Ukrainian intellectuals is demonstrated in the secret GPU document “On Ukrainian separatism,” issued on 4 September 1926. It reads:

Recently, the tactic of “cultural struggle” against Soviet power employed by anti-Soviet Ukrainian elements has manifested itself more and more distinctly in the Ukrainian public as the idea of national separation. The growth of chauvinist tendencies necessitates that the GPU organs react to this phenomenon in a timely fashion, which is a primary task of great political significance. (Shapoval 1994, 291)

Kozel’s’kyi was one of the authors of this document, which justified and legalized mass repression against the intelligentsia. He also left his imprint on the case of Mykhailo Biliach who had been arrested as a member of the UNTs. At the time of Biliach’s interrogation, Kozel’s’kyi was already “thinking bigger” and was preparing the ground for fabricating a new case against Ukrainian nationalists (Rubl’ov 2004, 347).

The testimonies of Hryhorii Kossack and Mykhailo Biliach, who were arrested in January and February 1931, helped the GPU construct the UVО case (Rubl’ov and Cherchenko 1994, 114). Both men provided the initial outline of the imaginary organization. While Kossak articulated the organization’s goals and described its composition, Biliach elaborated on the history of its emergence and development in Soviet Ukraine. According to Biliach’s testimony, the organization had first been conceived in 1919–1920 in Soviet Ukraine, but took shape in 1926. He claimed that the *halychany* Bezpal’ko, Ozarkiv, Makarushka, Vyshyvanyi, Indyshews’kyi, Lyzanivs’kyi, Holubovych and himself were the original nucleus (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.48; HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.3, ark.31–32).<sup>34</sup> They planned to penetrate the “state machine” and search for new ways to fight Bolshevism. To establish connections with Western Ukraine these individuals supposedly founded the group “Lviv” in Chuhuiv, a town near Kharkiv that was a base for newcomers from Galicia. In 1927, due to tactical disagreements, Biliach allegedly broke with Lyzanivs’kyi and Holubovych, and began to interact with the *halychany* Shrah. According to Biliach’s testimony, in the mid-1920s two groups of *halychany* arrived in Soviet Ukraine under the leadership of Kossak, and for some time two Galician organizations existed until they were united into the UVО (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.48). It is unknown whether Biliach cooperated with the GPU in creating a fantasy about the organization, or was simply forced to sign interrogation protocols prepared by the GPU in advance. Whatever the case, this master plot was used by GPU operatives in many – often contradictory – versions that members of the Galician intelligentsia were subsequently persuaded or – most often – forced to sign (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.49).<sup>35</sup>

Importantly, the GPU was under strict party control. The *chekists* had some flexibility in tactics, but never freedom in the decision-making process, especially in what Stalin described as “such an important [...] large and distinctive republic” as Ukraine (Zolotar’ov 2007, 13).<sup>36</sup> The abuse of prisoners (through blackmail, threats to family members, sleep deprivation, poor food, filthy conditions, promises to improve conditions) and the forgery of documents were widely used at the time. The GPU employed these tactics in response to directives from the party to raise vigilance and productivity in hunting down nationalists. The secret police soon discovered that the party was not interested in the thoroughness of preliminary investigations but only in more arrests and faster sentences, so as to demonstrate the complete and absolute victory over Ukrainian nationalism. In order to fulfill the tasks assigned by the party, the GPU therefore constructed the UVО as a massive “anti-Soviet conspiracy.” Conceived two years earlier, the organization now materialized in 1933 and was used to sweep up hundreds from the Galician intelligentsia (Shapoval 2003, 340–341).

Anti-nationalist hysteria was manufactured by the press throughout 1930–1933. The attacks on Ukrainian “nationalists” justified and facilitated the tasks of the secret police in identifying new targets for repression. Each publication was in essence a camouflaged party order for the GPU to act. GPU interrogators even cut such articles from the press and “sewed” them into criminal files as evidence of treason (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.46293fp, t.1, ark.12).<sup>37</sup> There was hardly a single cultural institution, university or publishing house that was not scrutinized in the press as a potential “nest of Ukrainian nationalists.” Galician members of the CPWU who were staying in the USSR as representatives of the Comintern were especially vulnerable. A series of articles revealed nationalist deviations within the CPWU’s ranks. Iakiv Maistrenko’s review of Ievhen Hirchak’s book *Two Fronts in the Struggle with Nationalism* (*Na dva fronty v borot’bi z natsionalizmom*) claimed that nationalist ideas had become popular among the members of the CPWU. Maistrenko suggested that the factions within the party led by Roman Turians’kyi and Iosyp Vasyl’kiv had “capitulated before UNDO-fascism” and betrayed the party ideals (*Chervonyi Shliakh*, November–December 1930, 212).<sup>38</sup> By the time Turians’kyi, Vasyl’kiv and other members of the CPWU were arrested, public opinion had been thoroughly massaged and shaped by such articles. After they had been accused of “nationalist inclinations,” the charge of membership in an anti-Soviet nationalist organization was accepted by many in the public without surprise.

At this time it became standard practice to discredit Ukrainian intellectuals in the press prior to their final elimination.<sup>39</sup> The press portrayed individuals in a gradually more negative light, until it was “discovered” that the person’s latent nationalism had finally blossomed in the appropriate surroundings. Usually it took about a year to construct a persuasive and believable image of a concealed enemy whose professional activities were supposedly aimed at undermining the state’s authority. In the course of such rhetorical escalation, the pressure on the GPU to find a solution to the problem of unruly nationalists progressively increased. The Galician writer Volodymyr Gzhyts’kyi, before he was arrested as an UVO member in early December 1933, suffered systematic attacks in the press for his shortsighted views of collectivization, attacks which began as “mild” criticism of his inability as a writer to “realistically” depict *kurkuls* (rich peasants) and the class struggle in the countryside.<sup>40</sup> One of the first articles appeared in January 1933 in *Literaturna Hazeta* and provided an “analysis” of Gzhyts’kyi’s failure to make his play *The Offensive* (*Nastup*) into a true work of socialist realism (*Literaturna hazeta*, 5 January 1933).<sup>41</sup> The reviewer Hryhorii Ovcharov complained that Gzhyts’kyi employed rational and logical, but not artistic, methods in depicting the actions of characters, and his portrayal of “the forces that fought against socialism” in the village was contradictory, “ambiguous” and “perverted” (*Literaturna hazeta*, 5 January 1933). In 1933 this kind of language had deadly implications. By the time Gzhyts’kyi was arrested, he had been bombarded by dozens of “critical” articles which openly called him a Ukrainian nationalist and a wrecker – a signal to the GPU that the time for his arrest had arrived.<sup>42</sup>

In turn, the secret police worked hard in interrogation rooms to obtain “evidence” of a nationalist conspiracy. By 1934 the lies and insinuations about the UVO had multiplied dramatically. The *halychany* were made to testify that this organization had chapters in the biggest Ukrainian cities (Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa and Vynnytsia) and in Moscow. The supposed members of the Moscow chapter included Oleksandr Shums’kyi, Karl Maksymovich, Hryhorii Hrynn’ko, Petro Solodub, Fedir Bei-Orlovs’kyi and Roman Turians’kyi. The Kharkiv chapter was allegedly supported by Mykola Romaniuk, Myron Chekhovych, Antin Berezhyn’kyi, Khoma Prystupa, Ivhen Cherniak, Oleksii Iavors’kyi, Oleksii Sarvan, Serhii Kholodnyi, Mykhailo Lozyns’kyi, Tymofii Repa, Iosyp

Kubrak, Iosyp Hirniak and Volodymyr Gzhyts'kyi.<sup>43</sup> According to the GPU's scenario, Maksymovych was the link between chapters.

Moreover, the UVÖ allegedly established contacts with Western Ukraine, members of the CPWU and Ukrainian nationalists abroad – in Berlin, Prague, Vienna and Warsaw (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.20,21). According to Maksymovych's testimony, the UVÖ was also represented in Germany, the USA and Canada, and the CPWU took an active part in transporting UVÖ members to Soviet Ukraine where they interacted with Hrushevskyi's group (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.32). The organization's tentacles supposedly reached into Ukrainian villages, where the leaders recruited peasants and created battalions that were to become the basis of a military uprising against Soviet power (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.12, ark.114,116). The UVÖ was depicted as a powerful organization that functioned at all levels – district, regional and international. Its members prepared cadres in the Red Army, the tractor industry, cultural institutions and universities. In the GPU's scenario Galicians inspired the movement, reproducing in Soviet Ukraine the organizational unity they had maintained in Galicia. Among leading UVÖ activists were writers and artists like Myroslav Irchan, Volodymyr Gzhyts'kyi, Mechyslav Hasko, Mykhailo Ialovyi, Ivan Tkachuk, Vasyl' Atamaniuk, Dmytro Zahul and Iakov Strukhmanchuk (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.15–18; HDA SBU, f.6, spr.69860fp, t.8, ark.16–17).<sup>44</sup>

The UVÖ scheme was a step toward the obliteration of Ukrainian cultural organizations that had been prepared by Moscow. It is interesting that the UVÖ's objectives, as described by arrested "members," included a struggle to preserve Ukrainian cultural institutions, an admission that GPU interrogators treated as evidence of a nationalist deviation and counterrevolution. The preposterousness of the implied construct – a Ukrainized Ukraine without Ukrainian cultural institutions – was of little concern either to the party or the GPU. Although the party had carefully thought out its methods of centralizing power, such contradictions were endemic to its practices, and were merely camouflaged by the new rhetoric, such as the slogan of a Bolshevik Ukrainianization in place of the former Petliurite one.

The destruction of Ukrainian cultural institutions and the acts of mass repression against supporters of those institutions were planned operations, designed in Moscow and implemented by the secret police. The 1931 memorandum issued by the OGPU in Moscow reveals the targets of future repression and is critical to understanding the secret police's modus operandi. The targets included Ukrainian universities, the network of scientific research institutes within the Academy of Science, the People's Commissariat of Education and its subordinate entities – the Holovlit, theater associations, the Holopopolitosvita (Chief Administration of Political Education), literary associations, publishing houses, the press, art and musical schools, film associations, museums, libraries, the Ukrainian faculty of higher education, Ukrainian educators, the Ukrainian Red Cross, the technical, literary, agricultural intelligentsia, church establishments and so on (Zolotar'ov 2007, 39–41; Zhulynskyi 2010, 445–446). This is only a partial list of "nationalist nests" that had to be destroyed.

Members of the Berezil' theater allegedly contained one of the more important UVÖ groups. It included the director Les' Kurbas, the theater administrator Mykhailo Datskiv, the writer Myroslav Irchan and the actor Iosyp Hirniak. All were forced to sign false depositions. The minutes of Myroslav Irchan's interrogation, on the surface at least, represent a shocking display of self-abasement. The narrative describes a collective nationalist conspiracy among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Irchan had served in the past in the Austrian and Galician armies and had been a member of the Canadian Communist Party. He

“confessed” to having been recruited into the UVÖ in Prague, and functioning in Western Ukraine and in Canada since 1922 as its most active member. He allegedly continued his “counterrevolutionary” activities in Soviet Ukraine as a member of the literary association “Western Ukraine” through which he helped settle new UVÖ members who had immigrated from the West (Galicia, Poland, Germany, and the USA). Irchan also “confessed” that he had conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and espionage in the Red Army (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.5, ark.246–247,322).

GPU interrogators skillfully interwove the names of other *halychany* into the criminal files of Kurbas, Datskiv and Hirniak, gradually extending the circles of conspirators. They were all accused of planning terrorist activities, through which they intended to free Ukraine from the Bolsheviks and to establish an independent Ukrainian state. In Datskiv’s “confession” the *halychany* Kurbas, Irchan, Turians’kyi, Krylyk-Vasyl’kiv, Kossak, Mak-symovych, Demchuk, Badan-Iavorenko, Hirniak, Sorochan, Chychkevych, Cherniak, Bortnyk and Ialovyti were identified as Ukrainian nationalists who planned to assassinate the leaders of the Communist party and the secret police as a protest against anti-Ukrainian policies (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.17,31,34,35,39,40,40zv.,41–46,50–52zv.,59,60,62,63).<sup>45</sup>

The VUAMLIN (All-Ukrainian Association of the Marx and Lenin Institutes), a network of scientific research institutions in Kharkiv, had been created in June 1931. It was purged of *halychany* who were accused of national fascism and membership in the UVÖ. Among those arrested were Mykhailo Chychkevych, Volodymyr Iurynets, Petro Demchuk, Vasyl’ Boiko, Oleksii Sarvan, Semen Vityk (Vittek), Khoma Prystupa, Iosyp Zozuliak, Mykhailo Svidzyns’kyi, Semen Semko and Vasyl’ Desniak (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.44).<sup>46</sup> In the Kharkiv Institute of Soviet Construction and Law the *halychany* Romaniuk, Chekhovych, Romanishyn, Livyi and Kravchenko were accused of counterrevolutionary activity and membership in the UVÖ (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.44). The Agricultural Academy in Kharkiv also had its share of subversives: Astakhov, Slipans’kyi, Kharchenko, Sokolovs’kyi, Vitort, Bilash, Savenko, Liaskovs’kyi, Kravchuk and Zapara. Havryliuk, Kulykovs’kyi and Nevyyna were unmasked as UVÖ members in the Geographical Institute and All-Ukrainian Institute of the Commissariat of Education. The Artiom Institute in Kharkiv “produced” several UVÖ members: Perehynts’, Karpenko, Horban’, Khomenko and others (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.44.). The directors of these institutions were arrested first. Among them was the *halychany* and director of the Ukrainian scientific research institution of geography and cartography Stepan Rudnyts’kyi. He was accused of Ukrainian nationalism and terrorist activity.<sup>47</sup>

*Halychany* who worked for cultural institutions, such as the Shevchenko Institute, the Publishing Houses “LIM” (Literatura i Mystetstvo), “Zakhidna Ukraina,” “Proletarii,” “Rukh,” the staff of the URE, the Commissariat of Education, the State Pedagogical Institute and many others were the first to be purged; they perished in the Gulag in the late 1930s (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.2, spr.2583, t.2, ark.44–45; Rubl’ov and Fel’baba 2000). Extensive articles in the press with titles like “To Uncover and to Destroy Petliurism on the front of Art Criticism” preceded the arrests of many figures (*Literaturna hazeta*, 25 June 1933).

When this anti-nationalist campaign was at its zenith, in October 1934, the purge committee reported that after clearing “LIM” of Galician influence (Irchan, Tkachuk, Gzhyts’kyi, Kozoris, Atamaniuk, Kachaniuk) the quality of published products had dramatically improved (DAKhO, f.P20, op.3, spr.219, ark.3). Works written in Ukrainian had previously been orientated toward the fascist “West.” They had been replaced by high-

quality publications by contemporary Soviet writers, all of whom were Russian, such as Aleksandr Fadeev, Mikhail Sholokhov, Aleksandr Serafimovich and Aleksei Novikov-Priboi (DAKhO, f.P20, op.3, spr.219, ark.4,10). Needless to say, Russian literature was presented by the commission as superior to Ukrainian. Among other new achievements, the commission reported publishing a full collection of Maxim Gorky's writings, and the works of Anton Chekhov, Nikolai Gogol', Lev Tolstoi and Ivan Turgenev. Publications in Ukrainian were reduced to single volumes by the "official" writers Ivan Le and Ivan Kyrylenko (DAKhO, f.P20, op.3, spr.219, ark.10).

The arrest of supposed UVO members was launched in late 1932 and lasted approximately three years. Balyts'kyi reported to Stalin that by April 1933 the GPU had uncovered 255 chapters of the organization in Ukraine and arrested 592 members. Galicians, he said, constituted the UVO's "backbone" and had systematically recruited the local nationally conscious intelligentsia. By 25 July 1933, the GPU reported to Moscow that it had identified 730 UVO members in Ukraine (Rubl'ov 2004, 357–358).<sup>48</sup> By the following year the lists of UVO members had swollen to such proportions that paperwork became practically the only tool for fabricating criminal cases. Fieldwork and surveillance were ignored as secondary, often unnecessary methods. The emphasis had shifted from "the streets" to the interrogation rooms – the real places of action, where "evidence" was collected, shaped and elaborated before being presented in modified form to rudimentary judicial organs (*dvoikas*, *troikas* and GPU courts), which pronounced the final verdict.

### **Galicians – Seksoty**

Their "Western" past doomed Galicians to eventual death. Even those who agreed to work for the Soviet police were not exempt from punishment for crimes they had not committed. As Galicians or members of the CPWU, they were considered potential transgressors and were subject to arrest.

For instance, as soon as the literary organization "Western Ukraine" was created, the GPU put its members under surveillance. Founded in April 1926 by writers and artists who had come from Western Ukraine, the organization had more than 50 members and maintained chapters in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrov's'k and Poltava. "Western Ukraine," whose leaders were the Ukrainian writers Dmytro Zahul, Semen Semko-Kozachuk and later Myroslav Irchan, established its own publishing house and from 1927 issued its own journal, also called *Zakhidna Ukraina* (Western Ukraine). The GPU treated all Ukrainian publishing houses with suspicion, but was especially wary of a nationally coherent group of intellectuals from Galicia. As a result, only two out of over 50 members survived – Antin Shmyhel's'kyi and Liubomyr Dmyterko.

The testimony of the *halychany* Antin Bilen'kyi-Berezyns'kyi, who was the director of the publishing house "Rukh" and headed the editing board of the URE, was used to convict many in the Galician intellectual elite, including the members of "Western Ukraine."<sup>49</sup> He was recruited by the GPU organs together with the scholar Volodymyr Iurynets'.<sup>50</sup> Both worked for several years for the Soviet secret police, systematically writing reports about the "nationalist deviations" of Ukrainian intellectuals. On orders from Pustovoitov, Kozel's'kyi, Dolyns'kyi and other GPU officials who fabricated "evidence" against Ukrainian intellectuals within the UVO scenario, Bilen'kyi-Berezyns'kyi denounced Karl Maksymovych, Serhii Vikul, Semen Vityk, Mykhailo Avdiienko, Andrii Richyts'kyi, Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, Ivan Siiak, Mykhailo Ialovyi and many others (DAKhO, f.R6453, op.4, spr.2048, ark.18).<sup>51</sup> During the Khrushchev Thaw, in 1960 the Presidium of the Kyiv oblast court officially identified Bilen'kyi-Berezyns'kyi as an

agent of the Soviet secret police who helped fabricate evidence of counterrevolutionary activities against prominent Ukrainian intellectuals. On this basis he was denied rehabilitation (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.4, spr.2048, ark.109–115; Drach et al. 1999, vol. 3, 228). Apparently, his inventions were deemed too ridiculous, fanciful and misleading even for the secret police.

Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi’s story is instructive in understanding the methods of the secret police. After his arrest on 31 December 1932, the GPU organs also recruited his wife, Ivana Shtein, who agreed to collaborate with the GPU on condition that the organs release her husband (AU SBUKhO, spr.035183, ark.3). On 9 September 1933 Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi wrote to his interrogator Pustovoitov asking for mercy and promising to provide, whenever possible, any information that might interest the GPU. “Give me a task,” he wrote (AU SBUKhO, spr.035183, ark.179a). The GPU accepted the offer. Despite the decision of a medical commission to approve Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi’s exile to concentration camps, and despite the decision of the GPU troika sentencing him to 10 years in the camps, on Balyts’kyi’s order the secret police released Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi on 26 May 1934 under the pretext of poor health (a supposed ulcer and massive bleeding that threatened his life).

The cooperation had begun. Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi and his wife helped the GPU agents “uncover” many Ukrainian nationalists (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.4, spr.2048, ark.113; AU SBUKhO, spr.035183, ark.320,325,329). With their assistance the secret police arrested a group of former borot’bists and left SRs from Galicia. Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi testified that their attitude toward the Soviet regime was extremely hostile and they presented a danger to the integrity of the Soviet Union (AU SBUKhO, spr.035183, ark.17–18). During meetings in Kharkiv they allegedly discussed the disastrous results of Moscow’s collectivization and nationality policies (AU SBUKhO, spr.035183, ark.39zv.). Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi also denounced a group of people close to Kurbas’s circle and the Berezil’ theater, and hence provided the GPU with “evidence” for their arrest (AU SBUKhO, spr.035183, ark.175). This informer was one of many who worked in Ukraine for the state security services but his contribution to the “struggle against Ukrainian nationalists” was extensive.

Pavlo Ladan, a fellow leader of the CPWU and *halychanyn* who resided abroad, was also on the payroll of the secret police. He gathered information about nationally conscious *halychany* in Berlin, investigated the foreign connections of those who traveled to Germany from Soviet Ukraine and encouraged locals to return to Ukraine. Ladan’s depositions also became indictable “evidence” against the former CPWU leaders, Myron Zaiachkivs’kyi (Kosar), Hryhorii Ivanenko (Baraba), Maksymovych and Turians’kyi, who had been critical of the Soviet collectivization and anti-Ukrainization policies. Accused of being UVO members, they were eliminated one by one (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 155–156).

Unlike Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi, Ladan was not trapped in his position in Berlin. There were a number of ways he could have escaped from the GPU. However, he allowed himself to be lured to the Soviet Union from Germany and was arrested on 18 September 1931 in Moscow in the GPU headquarters. It is likely that his services were no longer needed by the secret police (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 151–153). Ladan’s visibility might have been a factor in the decision to neutralize him. Many Ukrainian intellectuals in Germany as well as in Soviet Ukraine did not trust him, and quite a few knew about his secret activities. For instance, the Ukrainian writer Mykhailo Ialovyi confessed under interrogation that he distrusted Ladan, and was reluctant to meet with him during his trip to Germany in 1929 (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.4, spr.1843, t.1, ark.43,50). Ialovyi testified that Ladan, as a former bureau secretary of the Ukrainian Federation of the Socialist Party in

the USA, had dreamed of using his old connections to escape to America. However, he was pleased with an award promised him by his NKVD supervisor when the latter visited Berlin. Possibly, the award was for investigating connections made in Berlin by scholars; the latter were soon afterwards arrested in Kyiv. His supervisor invited him to visit the USSR to “receive the award, to rest at some resort and to witness the achievements in Soviet socialist construction.” Ladan said to Ialovyi: “Who the hell knows! As soon as I arrive, they might arrest me . . . But I’ll probably go. I haven’t been there for a long while. I’d like to see everyone” (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.4, spr.1843, t.1, ark.52).

Ladan’s suspicions proved correct. The NKVD operative Finkel’berg in Moscow treated him rudely, which spurred Ladan to write a letter of complaint to the Central Committee of the ACP(b) and the GPU. However, his years of faithful service, successful recruiting of informants and gathering of information about the moods in the Ukrainian political emigration meant nothing to the secret police. The letters of complaint he wrote were probably not even delivered to their addressees (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 154).

Ladan was effectively used twice by the GPU, abroad and at home, as both a secret informant and a “witness” in nationalist conspiracies against the Soviet government in Ukraine. Through his “sincere” depositions, the GPU uncovered the “bloc of anti-Soviet Galician parties and the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia that began to form in 1927” (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 156). According to the GPU’s scenario, the bloc had continued to exist in a conspiratorial form after the defeat of *shumkizm* and *khvylovizm* – a situation that required an immediate and radical solution (DAKhO, f.R6452, op.4, spr.1843, t.1, ark.85). Ironically, the same individuals whom Ladan had recruited for work in the secret organs now denounced him as a member of the UVO. Disillusioned, he confessed to “membership” in the organization and his efforts to undermine the Soviet secret police. On 20 January 1933 he was sentenced to death and the verdict was carried out on 27 April 1933 (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 156–157).

The GPU permitted Bilen’kyi-Berezyns’kyi to live several years longer than Ladan. Yet his good service, redoubled through the efforts of his wife, only delayed the inevitable. On 5 November 1934 he was arrested and exiled to labor camps. His patrons allowed him to avoid hard labor. Instead he was sent to Omsk, where he worked as a teacher in the town of Ishym. He also worked for the Omsk NKVD regional department under the code name “L’vovskii” (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.11, ark.86). Arrested on 20 February 1937 by the Omsk NKVD, he was sentenced to death on 27 June 1938 for “providing provocative materials” (Rubl’ov and Fel’baba 2000, 3–4) and executed on 9 July 1938 (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.11, ark.87).<sup>52</sup>

## The OUN

On 5–6 November 1934 the secret police conducted a series of operations in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Moscow, arresting 22 prominent Ukrainian intellectuals under the pretext of their alleged membership in the OUN. Among them were the *halychany* Antin, Ivan and Taras Krushel’nyts’ki, Iulian Bachyns’kyi and Roman Skazyns’kyi (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.11, ark.88–91).<sup>53</sup> The OUN represents here not the well-known Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists that functioned in Western Ukraine but the OUN, an organization that had been created in the imagination of the NKVD. The secret organs claimed that emissaries of the OUN in Western Ukraine had infiltrated Soviet Ukraine for the purpose of organizing branches of this organization. They allegedly found support among the remnants of other nationalist organizations, such as the UVO and the

Nationalist Borot'bist Organization and created chapters in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Moscow. The conspirators allegedly planned terrorist acts against party and government leaders in the republic and in Moscow (TsDAMLU, f.798, op.1, spr.9, ark.32).

In 1934 Antin Krushel'nytskyi, a leading Sovietophile writer in Lviv, under pressure from the Polish authorities in Western Ukraine and encouraged by the prospect of contributing to Ukrainization in Soviet Ukraine, made a decision to emigrate with his entire family (Krushel'nyts'ka 2001 63, 73). He moved to Kharkiv on 11 May (Krushel'nyts'ka 2001, 144; Dziuba 2006, 221). His sons Ostap (a journalist and film critic) and Bohdan (an economist and teacher) arrived in Kharkiv with their parents. A third son Taras (a writer, musician and political figure) with his wife Stefa joined the family two months later. Antin's daughter Volodymyra (a doctor, writer and cultural figure) and another son Ivan (a poet, literary critic and artist) had already settled in Kharkiv in 1932. They had asked the rest of the family to join them. This might have been a GPU trap to lure the family to Soviet Ukraine.<sup>54</sup> Five months after their arrival in Soviet Ukraine, during the night of 5–6 November 1934, Antin and his two older sons Ivan and Taras were arrested and transported to Kyiv to be tried together with other leading writers as “Ukrainian nationalists” (TsDAMLU, f.798, op.1, spr.9, ark.28).

Taras admitted his guilt, although Ivan did not. They were hastily shot on 17 December 1934, three days after the verdict was signed by the “itinerant session” (*vyiizdna sesiia*) of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court led by Vasiliy Ul'rikh. In accordance with a new law, introduced after Kirov's murder, the party demanded hasty trials and swift executions for terrorists (*Pravda*, 18 December 1934; HDA SBU, spr.36546fp, t.11, ark.90–91; TsDAMLU, f.798, op.1, spr.9, ark.34–37).<sup>55</sup> The 29-year-old Ivan and 25-year-old Taras were shot together with the famous Ukrainian writers Hryhorii Kosynka, Dmytro Fal'kivs'kyi, Oleksa Vlyz'ko and Kost' Burevii (in total 28 people were executed) (Conquest 1990, 44; Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar'ov 1997, 57). Antin's other children, Bohdan, Ostap and Volodymyra, were arrested a month later, in December 1934, and together with their father were sent to Solovky, where they were all executed in 1937 (Drach et al. 1997, vol. 1, 40, 174, 188, 190; 1998, vol. 2, 275; vol. 3, 44, 291–295, 377).

Bilen'kyi-Berezyns'kyi was one of those who denounced the Krushel'nyts'kyis (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.2, ark.126,128; HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.6, ark.150,150a,151–152). However, the names of the extensive Krushel'nyts'kyi family had been mentioned in the depositions of other *halychany*, such as Iulian Bachyns'kyi and Roman Skazyns'kyi, who signed confessions under torture and were shot together with Taras and Ivan Krushel'nytski. The most “powerful evidence” against Antin's children was their origin and past history. Volodymyra was accused of being the daughter of the former “Petliurite Minister of Education,” which constituted sufficient grounds for the NKVD to execute her (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.2, ark.126,128; HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.6, ark.150,150a,151–152; Drach et al. 1999, vol. 3, 291). The Krushel'nyts'kyi family were educators and writers, with a broad European education and knowledge of several languages, who had experienced life in Vienna, Prague and Lviv. They embodied the best traditions and free spirit of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. To the GPU these qualities represented a dangerous foreign spirit. It was considered inevitable that they would become political offenders.<sup>56</sup>

The fate of the Krushel'nyts'kyi family exemplifies the drama of the Galician intelligentsia who, moved by feelings of patriotic duty, came to work for national cultural development. Antin Krushel'nyts'kyi realized too late that his family had no chance of survival in Kharkiv, and perhaps never forgave himself for bringing them with him. Yet, he saved

the lives of several prominent Ukrainian intellectuals from Galicia by discouraging them from emigrating to Soviet Ukraine. Among these was Iaroslav Halan, although Halan's wife went to study in Kharkiv and perished during Stalin's terror (Smolych 1968, 239–263; 1972, 169, 174).

## Conclusion

The party campaign against Ukrainian nationalism in the early 1930s shaped the tactics of the secret police toward Galicians. The required political image of nationalists found its reflection in the SVU, UNTs, UVО and OUN cases – operations that helped eliminate most Galician intellectuals from political and cultural life. However, these cases were part of a larger operation conducted by the Soviet secret police against those who were trying to develop a modern Ukrainian culture. Importantly, neither individual nor group criminal cases contain concrete details of anti-Soviet activities. The vague charges, many inconsistencies and contradictions within each criminal case, and the absence of evidence, later provided grounds for the rehabilitation commissions to invalidate the accusations of anti-Soviet activity and to overturn the verdicts in cases related to Ukrainian nationalist organizations. Although Polish intelligence services made attempts to undermine the Soviet regime, and some underground activity by Western Ukrainians took place on Soviet Ukrainian territory, an organized underground nationalist movement never materialized in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s.

Cultural genocide – using Rafael Lemkin's scheme – involved the destruction of Ukraine's intelligentsia ("the national brain"), the peasantry ("the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, the national spirit"), and its spiritual leaders and religion ("the soul"). The destruction of the Galician intelligentsia who came to work for Ukrainian culture in a Soviet setting formed a part of this plan (Lemkin 2009, 126–128).<sup>57</sup> What Postyshev called the "crusade against Galicians" was completed during the Great Terror. An NKVD statistical operational report of 16 January 1938 reveals that from 2 June 1937 to 15 January 1938, out of 183,343 people arrested in Ukraine, 15,669 were "Ukrainian nationalists" who allegedly belonged to various counterrevolutionary organizations and groups. According to the report, 939 such organizations were liquidated during this period. Of the 136,892 repressed, more than half were sentenced to death – 72,683 people. Among the repressed 30,111 people came from Poland, and Galicia in particular. The head of the 8<sup>th</sup> department of the NKVD State Security Administration in the USSR, Lazar Munvez, identified them as "*halychany*," "Poles," "Ukrainians from Poland," "Jews from Poland" (HDA SBU, f.16, op.31, spr.105, ark.11–22).<sup>58</sup> The Soviet state effectively continued the murder of *halychany* after occupying Western Ukraine in 1939. During the short period from 1939 to 1941, it shot or exiled every tenth resident in Galicia (a figure that included Ukrainians, Poles and Jews who were perceived as anti-Soviet), and continued to exile Galicians to the North after the Second World War (*Literatura Україна*, 12 July 2012, 11).<sup>59</sup>

Galician Ukrainians who chose to participate in the Soviet cultural construction project were doomed by the dominant Soviet view of them as a culturally coherent, nationally conscious group, and of all Ukrainians as receptive to nationalist propaganda. The press was used to shape popular opinion ideologically in order to legitimize their repression. The state ideology of struggle against nationalists – a group defined as irredeemable by nature – allowed for the construction of conspiracy narratives and excluded alternative ways of thinking. Terror against such "potential" opponents of the regime required no evidence of crimes.

The archival evidence, the massive scale of terror and violence, and its tempo – all demonstrate that the violence against Ukrainian intellectuals was not the result of inexperience among Soviet leaders or ad hoc measures by the secret police, nor can the move against Ukrainization be described as something resembling paternal ethnophilia. The extreme form of cultural disruption was not accidental but the result of planned actions directed against the assertion of Ukraine's cultural distinctiveness, which, it was feared, was leading to political separatism. Thousands of files now available in state and secret police archives indicate that this was the case. The fate of the *halychany* was determined by the regime's ideological preconceptions and provides a clear example of the purposeful use of terror as an instrument of Soviet power.

### Acknowledgments

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### Notes

1. Quoted in the memoirs by the Galician Panteleimon Vasylevs'kyi (Tsvetkov 1993, 1:151).
2. Pavlo Khrystiuk (1890–1941), one of the founders of the UPSR, a member of the Ukrainian Central Rada, a Minister of Internal Affairs in the UNR (Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika – Ukrainian People's Republic), worked for the Ukrainian State Publishing House, the People's Commissariat of Finances, and the Shevchenko Institute of Literature in Soviet Ukraine. Vasyl' Mazurenko (1887–1937), an economist and a member of the Central Rada, worked for the Ukrainian Office of Measures and Weights, and was a member of the editorial board in the journal *Naukovo-tehnichnyi visnyk* in Kharkiv. Mykola Shrah (1894–1970) was one of the leaders of the UPSR, assistant to the head of the Central Rada Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. Mykola Chechel' (1891–1937), a member of the Central Rada and an associate of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, taught in the Technological Institute in Kharkiv, and also worked for the State Planning Administration (Derzhplan).
3. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, a historian and head of the Central Rada in 1917–1918, was arrested in 1931 as the leader of the UNTs (Ukrains'kyi Natsional'nyi Tsentr – Ukrainian National Center). After interrogation, he was released and lived in Moscow under the watchful eye of the GPU/NKVD. In 1934, he died from sepsis under mysterious circumstances (for more on Hrushevskyi, see Prystaiko and Shapoval 1996; Plokhy 2005; Shapoval and Verba 2005; Gilley 2009, 163–220; Plokhi 2011).
4. For details about the Ukrainization campaign, see e.g. Martin (2001).
5. On Ukrainian Sovietophilism and its transformation in the 1920s, see Gilley (2009, 93, 94). Gilley argued that those in the Ukrainian emigration who envisioned Ukrainian statehood within a federation with Russia went against the prevailing attitudes of Ukrainian emigrants. The term 'Galicia' here and throughout refers to the predominantly Ukrainian (ethnically and linguistically) territory that was known as 'Eastern Galicia' under Austro-Hungarian rule. Western Galicia constituted a core Polish territory. For more details on the Western and Eastern Ukrainian-Polish front at the turn of 1918–1919, on the Paris Peace Conference and the Polish-Ukrainian War for Eastern Galicia, and on the Western boundary of Eastern Galicia according to Paris draft statute, see Kuchabsky (2009, 114–249).

6. The Ukrainian scholar Makarchuk estimated that the Ukrainian population in Galicia in the late 1920s was 3,226,546 (59.09%), according to the 1931 Polish census (2004, 105).
7. See Rubl'ov (2004, 88–89) on discrimination practices in higher education.
8. According to Pelens'kyi, from 1920 to 1939 approximately 120,000 Ukrainians left Galicia (1974, 510). Both Pelens'kyi and Makarchuk used data from the 1921 Polish census which were flawed because a deliberate attempt was made to reduce numbers for the Ukrainian population. Magocsi has posited that during the interwar period 150,000 Ukrainians emigrated from Poland (1998, 586). According to Kacharba, who used data from the 1931 Polish census, the population growth in Eastern Galicia was 14.36% (2003, 24).
9. The prices for travel by ship to the USA or Canada rose quickly; in 1933 they went from US\$ 117 to US\$ 125 (Kacharba 2003, 110).
10. Rubl'ov gives the figure of 60,000 people (2004, 131).
11. For more details on the CPWU, see Shkandrij (1992, 116–125).
12. On groups of Western Ukrainians who emigrated to the Ukrainian SSR in the 1930s, see Marynysh (2008, 197–198); on the illegal emigration of Galicians from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, see Rubl'ov (2004, 101). Some Galicians who were soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army were captured by the Russians and began to work for the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s, others when the UGA joined the Red Army in February 1920 after the defeat of Denikin's army (Gilley 2009, 291–292). On various Sovietophile groups, see Gilley (2009, 19–34, 399–413).
13. Cheka (1917–1923) is the term for the first Soviet secret police (an acronym for the VChK or All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage). After a number of organizational changes, on 15 October 1923 it became the OGPU or GPU (United State Political Administration, 1923–1934). The NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, 1917–1946) took over the secret police in 1934. In 1946 the secret police became the MGB (an acronym for Ministry of State Security) and from 1954 until 1991 it became the KGB. Because Russian acronyms for the Soviet secret police are more recognizable, they are used here. The Ukrainian forms are DPU and NKVS. The secret police in Ukraine (VUChK) had never been independent. It was founded on 3 December 1918, but was dissolved on 23 July 1919 and the central organ VChK in Moscow took complete control of Ukraine. On 13 August 1924 Moscow issued a law stipulated that the head of the Ukrainian GPU had to be a plenipotentiary (*povnovazhnyi*) of the OGPU in the USSR, and the agency's operational activities were then supervised and directed by the OGPU in Moscow (Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar'ov 1997, 8–10).
14. For a discussion concerning the image of the enemy cultivated by Soviet authorities, see Baberowski (2007, 90–111), Figes and Kolonitskii (1999, 167–186) and Bonnell (1997, 207–221).
15. Kosior's speech was delivered in the Russian language and also officially marked the change of course on Ukrainianization by the ACP(b). Kosior called the policy conducted until then "a Petliurite Ukrainianization". The ACP(b) – or All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks (1925–1952), known as VKP(b) – in 1952 became the CPSS (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) (1952–1991).
16. When the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic was defeated by the Poles, its veterans and officers in the Sich Riflemen continued the struggle for independence. In July–August 1920 they created an underground revolutionary organization – the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVО). Ievhen Konovalets' was appointed its head in 1921. The organization operated mainly in Galicia and was responsible for arsons, "expropriations" (bank robberies) and some high-profile assassinations. After a wave of arrests conducted by the Polish government, it moved its leadership to Berlin while retaining a home command in Lviv. For more details on the UVО in Eastern Galicia and abroad, see Boiko (1974, 237–255) and Mirchuk (2007, 499–537). In February 1929 at the First Congress of Ukrainian nationalists in Vienna, the UVО became one of the founding groups of the OUN (Boidunyk 1974, 370; Knysh 1974, 289). There is little evidence that branches of this OUN existed in Soviet Ukraine. Archival materials recently declassified in Ukraine suggest that all Ukrainian "nationalist" organizations were fabricated by the secret police in the 1930s. Surveillance by the GPU minimized opportunities for real UVО or OUN members to move legally to Soviet Ukraine and organize national resistance (Rubl'ov 2004, 100, 102). On the possibility of an underground nationalist movement operating in Soviet Ukraine, see Snyder (2005, 23–59), Boiko (1974, 577–617), Mirchuk (2007, 169–172) and Martynets' (1949). Martynets' mentions how amazed émigrés were that the GPU accused people who

- had nothing to do with the “real” OUN and failed to identify those who did (1949, 305). On the failure of Western Ukrainians to create a Ukrainian state, see Kuchabsky (2009).
17. *Seksoty* refers to *sekretnye sotrudniki*, a Russian term for GPU/NKVD/KGB agents, recruited from the civilian population.
  18. For historical details and a concise geographical description of the region, see Magocsi (1998, 18, 525; 2002, ix–x, 3–4, 15–25).
  19. On Galician “national spirit” and political developments, see also Wilson (2000, 110, 129).
  20. *Mykhailo Lebedynets’* (1889–1934), a former borot’bist (a member of an indigenous Ukrainian communist party) and a writer who before his arrest worked for the staff of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia (URE), was among 28 people who were shot on 17 December 1934 (Conquest 1990, 44; Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar’ov 1997, 57).
  21. Skrypnyk also played a crucial role in creating the Association of Political Refugees from Western Ukraine and in supporting the literary association “Zakhidna Ukraina” (Western Ukraine) and the Berezil’ theater.
  22. In 1934, out of 128 applications to the USSR’s Lviv consulate, only 14 families received permission to immigrate (*Holos Ukrayiny*, 12 June 2010).
  23. Stalin considered that the Ukrainization campaign launched in 1923 had spun out of control and had produced a dangerous phenomenon, a Ukrainian intelligentsia that “looked” to the West and spoke of a culturally independent Ukraine (Stalin 1954, 149–154). See Stalin’s text in Luckyj’s translation (1990, 66–68).
  24. At the same time, many *halychany* wanted to assimilate linguistically: they viewed the language of Eastern Ukrainian as the standard and Galician Ukrainian as a Polonized, “impure” variant. One of their tasks was to purify it, while creating a new phenomenon – Ukrainian Soviet culture (Shevel’ov 2009, 230–231).
  25. The group criminal case called SVU is presented in 239 volumes. Today there is a consensus among historians that the SVU never existed in Soviet Ukraine but was entirely a GPU fabrication. For more on the SVU case, see also Shapoval (1990, 84–87), Prystaiko (1994, 70–88) and Prystaiko and Shapoval (1995).
  26. *Solomon Bruk* (1896–1938) was arrested on 11 July 1937 and shot in Moscow in February 1938 as a member of a terrorist organization (Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar’ov 1997, 40, 160–161, 445).
  27. *Hryhorii Kossak* (1882–1937), a colonel of the UGA and an active participant of the Ukrainian–Polish War of 1918–1919, returned to Soviet Ukraine in 1924. He taught the Ukrainian language and literature, and military tactics and strategy in the School of Red Officers in Kharkiv. Arrested as a UNTs member, but under unclear circumstances, Kossak survived the purge of 1931 to perish during the Great Terror.
  28. *Matvii Iavors’kyi* (1885–1937) was a lawyer, political figure, writer, academic in the Ukrainian Academy of Science, and the major theoretician of Ukrainian Marxist historiography in the 1920s. For more details on him see Mace (1983, 232–263), and Plokhhii (2011, 353–364, 368–371, 380–382, 384–393, 395–397, 552–555, 557–559, 561–564). *Vsevolod Holubovych* (1885–1939) was an engineer and head of the Council of the People’s Ministry and a Minister of Foreign Affairs in the UNR in 1918. He worked in the Department of Building in Soviet Ukraine. *Serhii Ostapenko* (1887–1937) was an economist and head of the Council of the People’s Ministry in the UNR in 1919, a member of the editorial board of *Chervonyi Shliakh* and a professor of the Kyiv Agricultural Institute. All were arrested as UNTs members and exiled to labor camps where all except Shrah perished (Prystaiko 1994, 80–88; Mirchuk 2007, 168). For details about Shrah, see Demchenko and Kuras (2004).
  29. A plausible explanation for the secrecy surrounding the OUN and UVO operations is provided in Martynets’s book (1949), excerpts from which the Soviet secret police photocopied and attached to Ivan Krushel’nyts’kyi’s group criminal file (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.69860fp, t.8, ark.211 [blue envelop]). For a possible explanation of the secrecy surrounding the UNTs and Hrushevskyi’s criminal file, see Shapoval and Verba (2005, 322–323, 325–326, 330–331). In April 1931, Genrikh Iagoda instructed the Ukrainian GPU to expedite the creation and prosecution of the UNTs case. On 15 April 1931 in Moscow Hrushevskyi rejected all accusations, and in September 1931 he wrote a letter to Stalin explaining how GPU associates extracted an initial confession from him.

30. Iavors'kii wrote this protest in Solovky on 30 November 1936. See also the 4 November 1932 operational report on Iavors'kyi's views about Stalin's collectivization policies in Drach et al. (1998, vol. 2, 174–175).
31. For more details on the atmosphere of suspicion in the 1930s that produced new conspiracy theories and new criminal cases against "oppositionists", see Baberowski (2007, 128, 130).
32. Oleksandr Badan-Iavorenko (born in 1894 in the village Vil'ky, Eastern Galicia), a professor of history and head of the dictionary department in the URE, was arrested on 19 February 1933 as an UVО member and on 2 September 1933 was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. Mykola Ersteniuk (born in 1892 in the village Pererisl' in Stanislaviv oblast), a lawyer and Mykola Skrypnyk's personal secretary, was arrested as an UVО member on 19 February 1933, and on 23 September 1933 was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
33. In 1937 both Balyts'kyi and Oleksandrovs'kyi were accused of conducting anti-Soviet conspiracy in the secret organs; they were executed in 1937 and 1938, respectively. Absurdly, they were accused of plotting a conspiracy against the Soviet government together with the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the very people whom they had systematically executed and exiled for a decade (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 160, 163).
34. Mykhailo Biliach (1891–1937), a former officer of the UGA, worked as a journalist for the newspaper *Khar'kovskii Proletarii* in Kharkiv. All those mentioned in Biliach's deposition were later rehabilitated; their criminal cases proved to be complete fabrications.
35. For details on Biliach, see Vyshnia (1989, 110).
36. On Stalin's views about Ukraine, see his 11 August 1932 letter to Kaganovich in Davies et al. (2003, 180).
37. See, for instance, the Galician Mykhailo Boichuk's criminal case, which contains a newspaper article by M. Solomonov characterizing the artists Boichuk, Padalka and Sedliar as "enemies of the people" who "distorted our Soviet realities and impeded the development of Ukrainian Soviet art".
38. UNDO is the Ukrainian National Democratic Association. Created in 1925 it was the most widely supported Ukrainian political party in Galicia and regularly winning seats during elections to the Polish Sejm (parliament). In 1926 the Sovietophile wing within the association was defeated. Subsequent crises in Soviet Ukraine (collectivization, terror, famine) strengthened anti-Soviet attitudes within the association. Roman Turians'kyi (Kuz'ma) (born in 1894 in the village Stryivka, Ternopil' oblast) was an active member of the CPWU who protested Soviet policies in Ukraine. He was excluded from the party but repented and came to work in Moscow. In February 1933 he was arrested as an UVО member and sentenced to 5 years in labor camps. In February 1940 the case was reopened, and Turians'kyi was shot as a German and Polish spy. Iosyp Krylyk-Vasyl'kiv (born in 1899 in Krakovets', Galicia), head of the Holovlit [Chief Administration of Literary and Publishing Affairs, a state censorship organization], was arrested on 23 April 1933, and was sentenced on 23 September 1933 to 10 years in labor camps.
39. On the preliminary attack on Hirchak see *Literaturna hazeta*, 22 April 1933. Ievhen Hirchak, an assistant to the head of the People's Commissariat of Education, was arrested on 16 December 1934 and sentenced to 10 years in labor camps as an UVО member. For details on campaigns in the press, and Ievhen Hirchak, see Marochko and Hillig (2003, 6–9, 86, 135). The critics Mais-trenko (brother of Ivan Maistrenko and secretary of the party journal *Bil'shovyk Ukrayiny*) and Hirchak were themselves eventually arrested as Ukrainian nationalists.
40. "Kurkul'" is the Ukrainian word for "kulak".
41. Volodymyr Gzhyts'kyi (born in 1895 in the village Ostrivets', Ternopil' oblast) was a Ukrainian writer and member of the literary associations "Pluh" and "Zakhidna Ukraina". He was arrested on 7 December 1933 and sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. He survived the camps, and resided in Lviv where he died in 1973.
42. Ovcharov was editor of the journal *Krytyka* and from 1931 to 1933 worked as a scientific secretary in the People's Commissariat of Education. On 5 December 1934, he, a Russian, was arrested as a Ukrainian nationalist and sentenced to three years in labor camps, which survived. Along with Gzhyts'kyi, the Ukrainian writers Todos' Os'machka, Valerian Polishchuk and Kost' Burevii were identified as "kurkul'" bards" and nationalists (*Literaturna hazeta*, 30 April 1933).
43. Karl Maksymovych (Savrych) (born in 1892 in the village Konkol'nyky, Eastern Galicia), one of the leaders of the CPWU and a supporter of Shums'kyi in Ukraine, worked as the chief inspector

- of “Zagotzerno” before his arrest. (In the early 1930s, Moscow governed the bread procurement process through the centralized state office Soiuzkhleb which soon became Zagotzerno.) He was arrested on 9 January 1933 and on 5 September 1933 was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. In 1934 he committed suicide in the NKVD White-Sea Baltic camp. *Hryhorii Hryn'ko* (1890–1938) was in charge of the People's Commissariat of Education in 1920–1922. In 1922–1926 he was one of the leaders of Derzhplan, the state planning agency, in the Ukrainian SSR, later becoming the chief assistant to the head of Derzhplan in the USSR. From 1930 he was the People's Commissar of Finance in the USSR. *Petro Solodub* worked in the Ukrainian Council of the People's Commissariat, the highest organ of executive power in Ukraine. Before his arrest he was in charge of the planning sector in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry in Moscow. *Serhii Kopach-Kholodnyi* (born in 1897 in the village Grushevo, Poland) was a journalist and a former member of the CPWU. Before his arrest he worked as an inspector of the foreign department of the Holovlit. He was arrested on 21 February 1933. He confessed that he was recruited to the UVО in Prague in 1922, and helped send the UVО cadres to Soviet Ukraine. On 23 September 1933 he was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.69860fp, t.8, ark.268–272).
44. *Myroslav Irchan* (real name *Andrii Bab'uk*) (born in 1897 in the village P'iadyky, Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast), a writer, translator, journalist, the leader of the literary association “Zakhidna Ukraina”, was arrested on 28 December 1933 and sentenced to 10 years in Solovsky. On 3 November 1937 he was shot in Sandarmokh (Karelia) together with many other Ukrainian writers. *Mechyslav Hasko* (born in 1907 in Luts'k), a poet and a member of “Zakhidna Ukraina”, was arrested in summer 1933 and sentenced to 6 years in labor camps. He survived the camps and returned to Kyiv where he died in 1996. *Mykhailo Ialovyi* (pen name *Iulian Shpol*) (born in 1895 in the village Dar-Nadezhda, Poltava oblast), a writer, journalist and editor, was arrested on 12 May 1933 and sentenced to 10 years in prison camps. He was shot on 3 November 1937 in Sandarmokh. *Ivan Tkachuk* (born in 1891 in the village P'iadyky, Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast), a writer and journalist, was arrested on 7 December 1933 and was sentenced to 5 years in labor camps. He was released in 1939, and returned to Lviv where he died in 1948. *Vasyl' Atamaniuk* (born in 1897 in the town of Iabloniv, Eastern Galicia), a writer, was arrested on 31 January 1933, and on 1 October 1934 was sentenced to 5 years in labor camps. *Dmytro Zahul* (born in 1890 in the village Milieve, Vyzhnyts'kyi region, Chernivets'ka oblast), a poet, literary critic, journalist, educator, was arrested in February 1933, and in May 1933 was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. *Iakiv Strukhmanchuk* (born in 1884 in the village Rosokhuvatets', Ternopil' oblast), an artist and member of “Zakhidna Ukraina”, was arrested in 1933 and sentenced to 10 years in Solovsky. He was executed on 2 December 1937. For biographical details about these writers, see Ushkalov and Ushkalov (2010).
45. *Mykhailo Datskiv* (born in 1893 in the village Horodnytsia, Galicia) was arrested on 3 November 1933, and sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. *Petro Demchuk* (born in 1900 in the village Horodenka, Galicia), a philosopher and professor of the VUAMLIN, was arrested in May 1933 for his membership in the UVО, and on 23 September 1933 was sentenced to 5 years in labor camps. *Iosyp Hirniak* (born in 1895 in Strusov, Galicia), a former soldier of the UGA, and at the moment of arrest an actor of the Franko Theatre, was arrested on 27 December 1933 as an UVО member, and on 21 May 1934 was sentenced to 3 years in labor camps. *Ostap Sorochan* (born in 1903 in Ternopil', Galicia) was arrested first in early 1933 as a member of the UVО but because of his work for the GPU since 1929 was not exiled. However, on 16 August 1937 he was again arrested and sentenced to death. *Mykhailo Chychkevych* was arrested on 3 November 1933 and sentenced to death. *Ievhen Cherniak* (born in 1895 in Galicia), assistant to the director of the Institute of Ukrainian Culture, was arrested as an UVО member and sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. *Ianuarii Bortnyk* (born in 1897), a former director of the Khakov Revolution Theatre, was arrested for his alleged membership in the UVО.
46. On individual histories of these people, see Marochko and Hillig (2003) and Drach et al. (3 vols, 1997–1999).
47. *Stepan Rudnyts'kyi* (1877–1937), a well-known scientist in Europe, returned to Soviet Ukraine in October 1926. He was executed in Sandarmokh on 3 November 1937. In 1929 Rudnyts'kyi signed a collective protest against the Ukrainian intelligentsia who were supposedly members of the SVU; it congratulated the GPU with uncovering this bourgeois nationalist organization (*Visti*

- VUTsVK, 25 November 1929, 2). For more details on Rudnyts'kyi, see Babak, Danylenko, and Plekan (2007) and Gilley (2009, 352–355).
48. Most of them originated in or had connections with Galicia. All “members” of this imaginary organization were rehabilitated in the 1950s, 1980s and 1990s.
  49. *Bilen'kyi-Berezyns'kyi* (born in 1897 in Lviv) was a former member of the CPWU, who in 1927–1928 was a secretary of the Bureau of its Central Committee in Danzig (later Gdansk in Poland). In June 1928, together with Iakov Voitiuk, the former deputy of the Polish Sejm, *Bilen'kyi-Berezyns'kyi* arrived in Kharkiv. *Iakov Voitiuk* (born in 1894 in the village Sel'tsi, Kholms'kyi district, Liublin hubernia, Poland) was a professor at the Medical and Cooperative Institutes in Kharkiv before his arrest. On 1 October 1933, as an UVO member, he was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps (AU SBUKhO, spr. 035183, ark.16; Rubl'ov and Fel'baba (2000); on Voitiuk see HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.11, ark.109–110).
  50. The *halychanyn* and professor *Volodymyr Iurynets'*, a former member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, was on the payroll of the GPU. He denounced hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals who were arrested in 1933; most were shot in November 1937. *Iurynets'* was also arrested in 1933 and shot on 4 October 1937 (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.36546fp, t.11, ark.72–73).
  51. Serhii Pustovoitov was shot in September 1937; on 2 January 1936 Borys Kozel's'kyi committed suicide in his office in Kyiv; Semen Dolyns'kyi (Hlazberg) was arrested in August 1937 and was shot in February 1938 (Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar'ov 1997, 63–64, 463, 490–491; Drach et al. 1998, vol. 2, 130).
  52. His wife survived the terror.
  53. *Antin Krushel'nyts'kyi* (born in 1878 in the Austrian province of Galicia in Łąńcut) was a writer, journalists and teacher. *Iulian Bachyns'kyi* (born in 1870 in the village Novosilka, Galicia) was a journalist and political figure, and worked on the staff of the URE. In 1927 he asked for Piłsudski's support and collaboration against the Soviet Union. However, influential Ukrainian circles in Poland blocked Bachyns'kyi's efforts and excluded him from the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.69860fp, t.8, ark.284–85). Persuaded by Soviet propaganda, he, together with his daughter, left Berlin and returned to Soviet Ukraine on 26 November 1933. On 6 November 1934 he was arrested, and on 28 March 1935 he was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. *Roman Skazyns'kyi* (born in 1901 in the town of Hrabkovets', Zborovs'k region, lived in Lviv) was a journalist and editor of the Natsmenschvydav Publishing House. After Skazyns'kyi was shot, his wife Sof'ia Skazyns'ka began to work for the Polish intelligence service to avenge her husband's death (HDA SBU, f.6, spr.69860fp, t.8, ark.282). For more details about Bachyns'kyi and Antin Krushel'nyts'kyi, see Gilley (2009, 370–388).
  54. Recent studies confirm that the Soviet secret police did indeed undertake a number of operations to lure the Ukrainian intelligentsia to Soviet Ukraine. For instance, in 1923 Mykhailo Skuhars'kyi was sent to Czechoslovakia to uncover the anti-Soviet activity of local Ukrainian immigrants and to persuade them to return to Soviet Ukraine (Vedeneev and Shevchenko 2001, 139).
  55. On 1 December 1934 Sergei Kirov, a prominent Bolshevik, was assassinated. Kirov's murder was an officially announced reason for increasing vigilance and a hunt for enemies.
  56. The members of the Krushel'nyts'kyi family were posthumously rehabilitated in the late 1950s. The interrogators Hrushevskyi and Pustovoitov who “investigated” their cases were accused of counterrevolutionary conspiracy in the secret organs and were shot in 1937 (Drach et al. 1999, vol. 3, 295.).
  57. Even according to imprecise data from 1948, 75% of Ukrainian intellectuals and professionals in Western Ukraine, Carpathian Ukraine and Bukovina were “brutally exterminated by the Russians”. See also Naimark (2010).
  58. Not all the arrested were sentenced to various terms in labor camps or to death. Of 183,343 people arrested, 136,892 people suffered this fate. By 16 January 1938 the NKVD still continued to investigate 611 “Ukrainian nationalists”, as indicated in the report. *Lazar' Munvez* (1895–?) was a member of the NKVD troika in the Ukrainian SSR, the head of the communication department of the NKVD in the Ukrainian SSR. He was arrested on 29 May 1936 and was sentenced to death (Shapoval et al. 2009, 508–509).
  59. On Soviet post-war repression in Galicia, see also Krushel'nyts'ka (2001).

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