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Christoph Mick

Incompatible Experiences: Poles, Ukrainians and Jews in Lviv under Soviet and German Occupation, 1939–44

Abstract

Jewish, Polish and Ukrainian memories of the war contradict each other. In Polish and Ukrainian collective memory the glorification of the heroic struggle of national resistance fighters against the oppressors makes it difficult to engage with the question of Polish and Ukrainian collaboration and participation in Nazi crimes. The essay traces these conflicting memories back to contradicting experiences. This is done using the example of the multiethnic Eastern Polish, now Western Ukrainian city of Lviv. Polish and Ukrainian eyewitnesses refer again and again to the collaboration of Jews with the Soviet occupiers, while Jewish accounts accuse Poles and Ukrainians of antisemitism, of having profited from Jewish suffering and of active participation in the murder of the Jewish population. Poles and Ukrainians accuse each other of having started the ethnic cleansing of the Ukrainian-Polish borderlands. This article uses war-time documents by eyewitnesses and focuses on key events which have a firm place in Jewish, Polish and Ukrainian collective memory: the reciprocal perceptions during the Soviet occupation, the pogroms which occurred during the transition from Soviet to German occupation, and the violent resolution of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the second half of the war.

Keywords: German occupation, Holocaust, Polish-Ukrainian relations, Second world war, Soviet occupation, War experiences

‘What men think is more important in history than the objective facts’.

– A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford and New York 1991), 17.

Perceptions of reality, and not reality itself, determine the behaviour of people. Such perceptions are at the same time subjective and socially determined. While most historians would agree with these statements, in historical practice such truisms are often disregarded. When the perceptions of historical actors diverge from the reconstructed reality, this is seen as an expression of

false consciousness. To avoid such specious conclusions I have chosen an approach based on what in German is termed *Erfahrungsgeschichte*: that is, the history of experience. In German both *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* translate as ‘experience’, but they have different meanings. *Erlebnis* is the event and the emotions experienced during the event, while *Erfahrung* is the result of a successful interpretation of events: the events are given meaning. Following Reinhart Koselleck, *Erfahrung* (experience) is defined as a process in which perception, interpretation and actions are continuously adjusted to one another. Expectations regarding the future, as well as the previous conditioning of people, affect this process of adjusting experiences. Both expectations and conditioning function as filters through which events are perceived, and they provide models with the help of which reality is then interpreted. The same events can result in completely different *Erfahrungen*, depending on the factors mentioned. In this article I will use the term ‘experience’ in this sense: that is, as *Erfahrung* rather than *Erlebnis*.¹

What do such considerations have to do with my topic? The end of communism in Eastern Europe initiated a revision of the history of the second world war. Two key questions in this context are the extent of local antisemitism and the anti-Jewish pogroms in Eastern Poland after the German attack on the Soviet Union. Popular interpretations in Poland and Western Ukraine attribute the outbursts of violent antisemitism to an assumed wide-scale collaboration of Jews with the Soviet power. The old stereotype of Judeo-communism has remained very influential, even appearing in scholarly works.² In Polish and Ukrainian collective memory, Poles and Ukrainians are seen as the main victims of German and Soviet occupation. The glorification of the heroic struggle of national resistance fighters against oppressors makes it difficult to engage with the question of Polish and Ukrainian participation in nazi crimes, especially in crimes directed against the Jewish population. In Poland a controversial debate on Polish antisemitism was initiated when Jan Gross published his book on the Eastern Polish village Jedwabne, where Polish inhabitants had murdered their Jewish neighbours on 10 July 1941. The Kaczyński government subsequently announced the launch of a new history policy to preserve the traditional heroic image of the Polish nation.³ In independent Ukraine several governmental and

1 This approach was used in the *Sonderforschungsbereich* (Special Research Area) 437 on ‘The Experience of War – War and Society in Modern History’ at the University of Tübingen, funded by the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*. Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Erfahrungsraum’ und ‘Erwartungshorizont’ – zwei historische Kategorien”, in Reinhart Koselleck (ed.), *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main 1989), 349–72; Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl (eds), *Die Erfahrung des Krieges: Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Paderborn 2001), 11–26.

2 See the very sharp criticism by Joanna Michlic, ‘The Soviet Occupation of Poland, 1939–41, and the Stereotype of the Anti-Polish and Pro-Soviet Jew’, *Jewish Social Studies History, Culture, Society* NS 13(3) (Spring/Summer 2007), 135–76.

3 Jan Tomasz Gross, *Sąsiedzi: Historia zagłady żydowskiego miasteczka* (Sejny 2000), published in English as *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*

parliamentary commissions have focused on the question of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsija Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv*, OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armia*), and how to site these mostly Western Ukrainian nationalist organizations within a new, unifying Ukrainian national narrative. In Eastern Ukraine many people share the dominant Polish and Jewish view of the OUN and UPA as war criminals who collaborated with the nazis, while in Western Ukraine the same nationalists are glorified as heroic fighters against foreign oppression. One person's hero is another person's villain.⁴ Jewish, Polish and Ukrainian memories of the war contradict each other. Piotr Wróbel spoke of the 'double memory' of Poles and Jews, and the Holocaust survivor and historian Philip Friedman wrote of the 'wide gulf separating the Jewish and Ukrainian interpretations'.⁵ Similar mechanisms occur in the debate on Ukrainian-Polish relations, with Ukrainians and Poles accusing each other of having started the ethnic cleansing of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands.⁶

These multiple, often conflicting memories of the war can be traced back to contradictory experiences. I take these experiences seriously, as an expression of how the groups perceived themselves and others. The article focuses on the

(Princeton, NJ 2001). On the Jedwabne debate see Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic (eds), *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland* (Princeton, NJ 2004). See also William Brand (ed.), *Thou Shalt Not Kill: Poles on Jedwabne* (Warsaw 2001). Articles and sources have been published by the Instytut Pamięci Narodowej: *Wokół Jedwabnego: Pod redakcją Pawła Machewicza i Krzysztofa Persaka*, 2 vols (Warsaw 2002).

4 Wilfried Jilge, 'Competing Victimhoods – Post-Soviet Ukrainian Narratives on World War II', in Elazar Barkan, Elisabeth A. Cole and Kai Struve (eds), *Shared History – Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet Occupied Poland, 1939–1941* (Leipzig 2007), 103–31. On the 'deafening silence' about, and the reluctance to confront, war crimes of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Diaspora, see John-Paul Himka, 'War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora', *Spaces of Identity* 5(1) (2005), 9–24; Per Anders Rudling, 'Historical Representations of the Wartime Accounts of the Activities of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists–Ukrainian Insurgent Army)', *East European Jewish Affairs* 36(2) (December 2006), 163–89. See also the overview of history debates in Ukraine in David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest and New York 2007).

5 Philip Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi occupation', *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* 12 (1959), 295f; Piotr Wróbel, 'Double Memory: Poles and Jews after the Holocaust', *East European Politics and Societies* 11(3) (Fall 1997), 560–74; Grzegorz Motyka, 'Między porozumieniem a zbrodnią: II, wojna światowa oraz jej skutki w stosunkach polsko-ukraińskich', in Robert Traba (ed.), *Tematy polsko-ukraińskie* (Olsztyn 2001), 93–102; Aharon Weiss, 'Jewish-Ukrainian Relations during the Holocaust', in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, AL, 2nd edn, 1990), 409–20; Taras Hunczak, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations', in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), *Public Opinion and Relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe* (Westport, CT and London 1989), 396–414.

6 Timothy Snyder, 'The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing, 1943', *Past and Present* 179 (May 2003), 197–234; Timothy Snyder, "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All": The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1(2) (Spring 1999), 86–120; Wanda Gałązka, 'Stan i perspektywy śledztw w sprawach dotyczących zbrodni nacjonalistów ukraińskich', in *Polska i Ukraina po II. wojnie światowej* (Rzeszów 1998), 345–52; Krystyna Kersten, 'The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict under Communist Rule', *Acta Poloniae Historica* 73 (1996), 135–51.

multiethnic Eastern Polish, now Western Ukrainian city of Lviv. Located in an ethnographically mostly Ukrainian region, in the interwar period the city was part of the Second Polish Republic, with a Polish majority population. In 1939, 157,490 of the 312,231 inhabitants were Polish, 49,747 were Ukrainian and 99,595 Jewish.⁷

Diaries, memoirs and other autobiographical documents are the most important sources for war experiences in this city.⁸ This article uses wartime documents created by eyewitnesses of events. The main sources for Jewish views are the notes and diaries of refugees from Eastern Poland collected in the Warsaw ghetto by Emanuel Ringelblum and his co-workers. Many of them have been published in the third volume of the Ringelblum archive.⁹ I also use some published diaries and eyewitness accounts of Jewish survivors, which were collected or inspired by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw in the immediate postwar period. They give trustworthy accounts of events after July 1941, but are less useful for the period of Soviet occupation. In postwar Poland most authors did not dare to write about Soviet repressions or the prison murders of June 1941. For the Polish side I used diaries and documents from the Lviv Command of the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*) and its predecessor organization, the Union for Armed Struggle (*Związek Walki Zbrojnej*). The reports summarize the views of the local Polish population.¹⁰ For the Ukrainian side I have very few suitable wartime documents. Here my main sources are a few diaries and reports by the local group of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

7 Grzegorz Hryciuk, 'Zmiany demograficzne ludności polskiej w latach 1931–1944', in *Wschodnie losy Polaków*, pod red. S. Ciesielskiego (Wrocław 1997), 7–76.

8 James E. Young, 'Zwischen Geschichte und Erinnerung: Über die Wiedereinführung der Stimme der Erinnerung in die historische Erzählung', in Harald Welzer (ed.), *Das soziale Gedächtnis: Geschichte, Erinnerung, Tradierung* (Hamburg 2001), 41–62. On the importance of memoirs see also Jan Tomasz Gross, *Sąsiedzi: Historia zagłady żydowskiego miasteczka* (Sejny 2000), 19f; Saul Friedländer, *Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe* (Bloomington, IN 1993), vii.

9 *Archiwum Ringelbluma* (hereafter 'AR'). *Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy*, vol. 3, *Relacje z Kresów*. Opr. Andrzej Żbikowski (Warszawa 2000). See also Andrzej Żbikowski, 'Jewish Reaction to the Soviet Arrival in the Kresy in September 1939', *Polin*, vol. 13, (2000): *Focusing on the Holocaust and its Aftermath*, 62–72. On the Ringelblum Archive, see Samuel D. Kassow, *Who Will Write Our History: Rediscovering a Hidden Archive from the Warsaw Ghetto* (London 2007).

10 In November–December of 1939, emissaries from the Polish centres of resistance in Paris and London arrived in Lviv and appointed two different leaders for the Lwów Territory ZWZ. This resulted in two rival ZWZ organizations, later called ZWZ-1 and ZWZ-2. ZWZ-1 consisted mainly of members or sympathizers of the National Party (*Stronnictwo Narodowe*) while ZWZ-2 was supported by followers from the Piłsudski camp. ZWZ-1 had about 10,000–15,000 members with a strong presence in the region, while ZWZ-2 had only around 1000–2000 members and was concentrated in Lviv. The early reports cited in this article are from the ZWZ-1. Later, both organizations were united in the Lwów territorial command of the Home Army. See Rafał Wnuk, 'Resistance 1939–1941: The Polish Underground under Soviet Occupation and the Jews', in Barkan, Cole, and Struve (eds), *Shared History – Divided Memory*, op. cit., 147–71.

(Bandera faction) OUN-B.¹¹ In a few cases I have supplemented these sources with material taken from memoirs or from accounts which were written after the war. The sources cannot do justice to the multitude of different experiences of Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish societies, but they represent discourses which were prevalent during the war and were to deeply influence the post-war memory.

I will be concentrating on key events which have a firm place in Jewish, Polish and Ukrainian collective memory: the reciprocal perceptions during the Soviet occupation; the pogroms which occurred during the transition from the Soviet to the German occupation; and the violent settlement of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the second half of the war.

The Soviet Army invaded eastern Poland under the pretext of liberating Belarusians and Ukrainians from the 'Polish yoke' and of bringing social liberation to the toiling masses. And indeed, the end of Polish domination pleased Osy Nazaruk, the editor-in-chief of the Greek-Catholic weekly newspaper *Nova Zoria*, but his joy was clouded by the uncertain future ahead.¹² Soon, the occupiers turned against the pre-war elite, including the leaders of the Ukrainian political parties. Nazaruk fled to the Germans.

During the Soviet occupation, class theoretically mattered more than ethnicity, but in everyday life class and ethnicity were interlinked and ethnic categories played an important role. The Soviet authorities attempted to win the allegiance of the lower classes, the younger generation and parts of the intelligentsia. In government-controlled elections, the population elected a western Ukrainian national assembly, which voted for union with the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. The Ukrainians were the titular nationality, which meant that they took precedence in the administration, and in culture and education over Poles and Jews.¹³

The city was sovietized, flooded with Soviet symbols and inundated with propaganda directed against the Second Polish Republic. Newcomers from eastern Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union occupied key positions in the administration and economy, but local Ukrainians were also given

11 After Evhen' Konovalets, the undisputed leader of the OUN, was murdered in 1938, the OUN split into two hostile factions. The OUN-M, named after its leader Andrii Melnyk, had its stronghold in the emigrant community and after 1941 in Central and Eastern Ukraine, while the OUN-B (named after its leader Stepan Bandera) was strongest in eastern Poland and western Ukraine. Both factions were anti-Soviet and hoped, by joining forces with the German Reich, to achieve a united, independent Ukrainian state. On the OUN see Franziska Bruder, *'Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!'* *Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1928-1948* (Berlin 2007); John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (Littleton, CO, 2nd edn 1980).

12 Osy Nazaruk, *Zi L'vova do Varshava 2-13 zhovtnia 1939 roku* (Lviv 1995), 14ff. See also Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie 1939-1944: życie codzienne* (Warszawa 2000), 30.

13 Adam Sudół, *Początki Sowietyzacji Kresów Wschodnich (Jesień 1939 roku)* (Bydgoszcz and Toruń 1997); Jan Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, NJ 1987); Jan Gross, 'The Jewish Community in the Soviet-Annexed Territories on the Eve of the Holocaust', in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock (eds), *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941-1945* (Armonk, NY 1993), 155-71.

positions which had previously been the sole province of Poles.¹⁴ The Ukrainian scholar Myroslav Semchyshyn writes in his recollections how beautiful it was to hear Ukrainian words and songs on the street and to read Ukrainian inscriptions.¹⁵

The Soviet policy changed once it became apparent that its aggressive strategy to win the sympathies of western Ukrainians was doomed to disappointment. Once the occupied territories had been incorporated into the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, many local Ukrainians supported the anti-Soviet OUN. After the summer of 1940 the Soviet Union turned more towards the Poles, who were courted in their turn and granted concessions in the area of cultural policies.¹⁶

Terror and repression were an integral part of sovietization. Victims were defined either exclusively by their class status (as members of the pre-war social and political elite); by the combination of ethnicity and social status (e.g., Polish military settlers); by their status as aliens (e.g., the mostly Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland); or by their political convictions (Jewish socialists – *Bundists*, Zionists or Ukrainian nationalists). Poles, Ukrainians and Jews were affected differently and at different points in time by the waves of repression. Initially, a large part of the social pre-war elite was arrested or deported. Many of them, such as the Polish officers who were taken by the Red Army as prisoners of war, were later shot. The Polish population was therefore most deeply affected by this first wave of arrests and deportations, followed by the Jewish population. On the night of 12–13 April 1940, some 7000–8500 Poles, mostly family members of officers and policemen, were deported from the city of Lviv. The second wave primarily hit the economic elite; Jews and Poles in particular, but also the few existing Ukrainian entrepreneurs were imprisoned or deported. The last wave of arrests and deportations was specifically directed against Ukrainian nationalists. When the Germans invaded, many Ukrainians were still in the jails of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*, NKVD). Additional groups of victims included Polish peasants who had settled in the eastern areas as part of the population policy of the pre-war Polish government, well-to-do Ukrainian and Polish peasants and about 70,000 refugees, the majority of them Jews, who had fled from German-occupied territories in the autumn of 1939 to the Soviet sphere of influence. No group escaped Soviet repression, but Poles and Jews were proportionately more affected by the terror than the Ukrainian population.¹⁷

14 Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 41ff.

15 Myroslav Semchyshyn, *Z knyhy Leva: Ukraïns'kyi L'viv dvadtsiatykh-sorokovykh rokiu* (Lviv 1998), 65ff, 70, 81ff. See also Ostap Tarnavs'kyi, *Literaturnyi L'viv 1939–1944* (Lviv 1995), 19.

16 Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 44–9; Grzegorz Hryciuk, “‘Nowy Kurs’? Ewolucja Polityki Radzieckiej wobec Polaków we Lwowie (Czerwiec 1940–Czerwiec 1941)”, *Wrocławskie Studia z Historii Najnowszej* 6 (1998), 47–66.

17 Based on published NKVD data, it appears that more than 100,000 people were arrested in Soviet-occupied Polish territory, and between 300,000 and half a million people were deported between 1939 and 1941. Almost 60 per cent of the deportees were ethnic Poles, more than

It is not surprising that the Polish population was broken-hearted. An eyewitness wrote in his diary of ‘complete chaos’ and ‘immeasurable tragedy’.¹⁸ The Polish resistance organizations in Lviv reported that Poles and Ukrainians did not differ much in their reception of the new Soviet power. The working class was initially quite enthusiastic, while the middle class was hostile to the Soviet occupiers. Some reports noted that the majority of the Jewish population had received the Soviets with open pleasure, even enthusiastically, and that some Jews had turned against Polish soldiers, disarmed and bound them.¹⁹

Jewish authors paint a more differentiated portrait of the behaviour of the Jewish population. While the persecution of Zionists, *Bundists* and the destruction of the Jewish middle class are mentioned, all reports agree that a large part of the Jewish youth greeted the Soviets enthusiastically and later participated in Soviet events.²⁰ One Jewish eyewitness even confirmed that after the entry of

20 per cent were Jews, 10 per cent were Ukrainians and more than 7 per cent were Belarusians. Other estimates are much higher and speak of more than one million deportees: Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 35–41; Hryciuk, ‘Victims 1939–1941: The Soviet Repressions in Eastern Poland’, in Barkan, Cole and Struve (eds), *Shared History – Divided Memory*, op. cit., 173–200; Jakov Khonigsman, *Katastrofa Ewreistwa Zapadnoi Ukrainy: Ewrei Vostochnoi Galicii, Zapadnoi Volyni, Bukoviny i Zakarpat’ia 1933–1945 godakh* (Lviv 1998), 104f. See also Christoph Mick, ‘“Only the Jews do not waver...”: L’viv under Soviet Occupation’, in Barkan, Cole and Struve (eds), *Shared History – Divided Memory*, op. cit., 245–62; Jan Gross, ‘The Jewish Community’, op. cit., 155–71.

18 Cited in Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 17.

19 Report (excerpt), not dated (probably from November or December 1941), *Archiwum Akt Nowych* (hereafter ‘AAN’), *Armia Krajowa – Komenda Obszaru Lwowa* (hereafter ‘AK-KOL’), 203 (MF 2400/7), 59f; Report on Jews, Summer 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 3–4; Report on the political situation, July 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 20. Attacks of ‘Ukrainian gangs and Jews’ are also mentioned in a report by General Tokarzewski for General Sosnkowski, 9 January 1940, in *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*, vol. 1, *Sept. 1939–April 1941* (London 1960), 64. See also Memorandum on the Ukrainian Problem, December 1943, in Mikołaj Siwicki, *Dzieje konfliktów polsko-ukraińskich*, (Warsaw 1992), vol. 2, 75.

20 Report by an anonymous refugee from Lviv, not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 30, 517f, 525f; Report by an anonymous refugee on the Soviet occupation and the first phase of the German occupation in Łuck and Lviv (Polish translation from Yiddish), March 1942, in AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 776; Report on Jewish schools during Soviet occupation, probably by Stanisław Różycki, not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 42, 808–16; Protocol of an interview with the refugee St. Au. on the situation of Jews under Soviet occupation and the beginning of German occupation (Polish translation from Yiddish), Warsaw 1942, in AR, vol. 3, no. 43, 893f. See also Żbikowski, ‘Jewish Reaction’, op. cit., 62–72; Jan Tomasz Gross, ‘“Ja za takie wyzwolenie dziękuję i proszę ich żeby to był ostatni raz”’, in Jan Gross, *Upiorna dekada: trzy eseje o stereotypach na temat Żydów, Polaków, Niemców i komunistów 1939–1948* (Cracow 1988), 61–92; Ben-Zion Pinchuc, *Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule: Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust* (Oxford 1990); Don Levin, ‘The Response of the Jews of Eastern Poland to the Invasion of the Red Army in September 1939 (As Described by Jewish Witnesses)’, *Gal-Ed: On the History of the Jews in Poland* (1989), vol. 11, 87–102. For the northern part of East Poland, see Marek Wierzbicki, *Polacy i Żydzi w zaborze sowieckim: Stosunki polsko-żydowskie na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II RP pod okupacją sowiecką (1939–1941)* (Warsaw 2001).

the Red Army, Jews declared their aversion to Poles:

For us Jews it was politically very unwise that a part of Jewish society behaved very badly to the Polish population and to Polish soldiers.²¹

Some Jewish Polish authors severely censured the friendly behaviour of fellow Jews towards the Soviet power. One refugee from Warsaw believed the tense relationships of other nationalities with the Jews were due 'exclusively to the Jews seeking top positions', and another refugee reported that Jewish teachers went to the country to propagate collectivization; thus, for the peasants, the impression was given that everything was the fault of the Jews.²² Jewish authors account for the friendly reception of the Red Army by pointing to the unpopular German alternative and recalling the experiences of antisemitism and discrimination suffered by Jews in the Second Polish Republic. The equal treatment vouchsafed to Jews and the fight against antisemitism are repeatedly given as the most important reasons justifying Jewish pro-Soviet sympathies.²³

The Polish resistance monitored the behaviour of the Jewish population. High-ranking members of Polish resistance organizations located in Warsaw were usually more understanding than the local resistance organizations in Lviv. General Michał Tokarszewski-Karaszewicz, for example, reported in January 1940 that the Jewish population had welcomed the Soviet occupation not out of pro-communist sympathies but in the hope of improving their situation. Tokarszewski also noted a growing antisemitism in the general Polish and Ukrainian population. The Polish population especially hated the Soviet militia, with its overwhelmingly Jewish and Ukrainian members. Two months later, Colonel Stefan 'Grot' Rowecki, commander of the ZWZ in the German zone of occupation, reported that the occupiers threatened the propertied Jewish classes, but he also confirmed that the hatred directed against the Bolsheviks had unleashed a hatred of Jews.²⁴

Members of the Polish underground in Lviv shared this hatred, even as late as 1942. Although they were aware that many wealthy Jews, Zionists, members of the *Bund* and other socialist parties had been arrested and deported, they quickly passed over such incidents, as they considered the Zionists as having 'no influence over the masses'. The reports took the behaviour of some Jewish youths as the basis for more general accusations. Jewish communists in particular were accused of having used meetings to incite the 'hatred of

21 AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 772.

22 Report by an anonymous refugee from Warsaw on the situation under Soviet occupation in Lviv and Łuck, written in Warsaw after 7 December 1941, in AR, vol. 3, no. 36, 695; AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 774f.

23 AR, vol. 3, no. 36, 694; AR, vol. 3, no. 30, 517f; AR, vol. 3, no. 42, 816; Stanisław Różycki on his experiences in Lviv, 1 June 1941–29 September 1941, not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 538, 543f.

24 Report on the political and economic situation sent by General Michał Tokarszewski-Karaszewicz to General Sosnkowski, 9 January 1940, in *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach*, vol. 1, op. cit., 64–9; Intelligence report sent by Colonel Rowecki to General Sosnkowski, 8 February 1940, in *ibid.*, 107.

the Jewish masses' against the Polish population under the pretext of fighting the Polish bourgeoisie. The 'Jewish masses' was shorthand for the general threat posed by Jews. Jews were accused of collaborating with the Soviets, of denouncing Poles, profiting from their misery and taking over their positions. This was interpreted as the outbreak of a secret and long-standing Jewish hatred of Poles. Only Jewish Polish patriots were excluded from this collective accusation. The reports leave no room for doubt that Poles believed that the Jews were following a policy which was hostile to Poland. In a memorandum from the summer of 1942, the Jewish population was still considered to form a 'natural sphere of influence for Soviet Russia' and as the principal supporters of Bolshevik rule in eastern Poland. Some counter-examples were noted; however, these had no impact on the general opinion:

Among the Jews there are cases of active aid given to persecuted Poles, their liberation from the hands of furious and shouting Jewish mobs, but this behaviour on the part of certain Jewish groups can never take away the blame for the behaviour of Jews during the Bolshevik invasion.²⁵

Ukrainian reports also linked the Jews with Soviet rule. The Ukrainian press appearing in the *Generalgouvernement* took up the old propaganda slogan of 'Judeo-communism' and accused the Jews of profiting from the Soviet occupation and of denouncing Ukrainian resistance fighters to the Soviet security forces. This was consistent with the antisemitic attitude of the OUN.²⁶ Jews were seen as a 'second-rate enemy' linked to Bolshevism and collectively held responsible for Soviet measures.²⁷ The Second General Congress of the OUN-B in April 1941 stated in its resolution:

The Jews in the U.S.S.R. constitute the most faithful support of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in the Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses to divert their attention from the true cause of their misfortune and to channel them in times of frustration into pogroms on Jews. The OUN combats the Jews as the prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and simultaneously it renders them conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow.²⁸

25 Report on Jews, Summer 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 3–4; Report on the Polish situation, May 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203, 34 (MF 2400/9); Report by 'Alfa' on the minority problem, not dated (probably Spring 1942), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 68–123; Report on the political situation, July 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 20. See also the examples given by Michlic, 'The Soviet Occupation', op. cit., 144–6; and Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 30, 157.

26 Karel Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, 'The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 Zhyttiepys', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23(3–4) (1999), 149–84; Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA 2004), 83; Frank Golczewski, "'Shades of Grey': Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia', in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds), *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington, IN 2008), 124ff; I.K. Patryliak, *Viijs'kova diialnist' OUN-B u 1940–1942 rokakh* (Kyiv 2004), 546ff.

27 A. Diukov, *Vtorosteppenyi vrag: OUN, UPA I reshenie 'ievreskogo voprosa'* (Moscow 2008).

28 Paragraph 17 of the resolution of the Congress. *Postanovy II. Velikoho zboru Orhanicacii Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv, shcho vidbusia v kvitni 1941 r; OUN v sviitli postanov Velykykh*

However, other voices also persisted. Milena Rudnytska, the chairwoman of the women's organization *Soiuz Ukrainok*, did not agree with the general accusation of collaboration levelled against the Jews.

In the authorities they [the Bolsheviks, CM] have employed Jews, but with the exception of them they often have nobody else on whom they can depend.

Rudnytska believed that the 'Jews in general are as dissatisfied as we are'. The Jewish middle class had been destroyed, as had their trade. However, Rudnytska does find something positive in the latter:

This is more important for us from a national standpoint than the dissolution of large landed properties.²⁹

This is a reference to a Polish and Ukrainian nationalist discourse which went back to the end of the nineteenth century. In this discourse, the strong position of Jews in the free professions and in the middle class was perceived as hindering the rise of a Polish or Ukrainian middle class and preventing the modernization of both societies.³⁰

The Polish underground organization accused not only Jews but also Ukrainians of disloyalty to the Polish state, of collaborating with the Soviets and driving out Poles from the administration, from industry, trade, the universities and the education system.³¹ However, this behaviour by Ukrainians was not interpreted as an expression of communist or pro-Soviet feelings and differs fundamentally from the Polish interpretation of Jewish behaviour. One report explicitly stated that the Ukrainian elite remained thoroughly nationalist and kept its distance to the regime, despite being granted privileges.³² Jewish authors also accused the Ukrainians of opportunism, but they also realized that it was an opportunism which took advantage of the additional freedoms obtained to pursue their own nationalist interests.

Zboriv, Konferencii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929-1955 (1955), trans. by Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations', op. cit., 265. For more examples of the antisemitic mood of the OUN on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union, see Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (München 1997), 57f; Bruder, 'Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!', op. cit., 124ff.

²⁹ Osyp Nazaruk reports in his diary on Milena Rudnytska's contribution to a discussion of Stepan Baran's book 'What is happening in Galicia?' Cracow 1940, in Milena Rudnytska, *Statti, dysty, dokumenty* (Lviv 1999), 704f.

³⁰ Olaf Bergmann, *Narodowa Demokracja wobec problematyki żydowskiej w latach 1918-1929* (Poznań 1998); John-Paul Himka, 'Dimensions of a Triangle: The Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish Relationship', *Polin* 12 (1999). For Lviv, see Christoph Mick, 'Ethische Gewalt und Pogrome in Lemberg 1914-1941', *Osteuropa* 53 (2003), 1810-29.

³¹ Report on the political situation, July 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 20; Memorandum on the Ukrainian problem, December 1943, in Siwicki, *Dzieje konfliktów*, op. cit., vol. 2, 75; Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 18.

³² Report (excerpt), not dated (probably from November or December 1941), AAN, AK-KOL (MF 2400/7), 203, 59f.

Ukrainian nationalism – one author noticed – survived under the cloak of collaboration (*pod płaszczykiem współpracy*).³³

Almost all inhabitants shared the hatred of the NKVD, of the political commissars and the party bigwigs.³⁴ The Galicians – according to one Jewish author – were united by their distrust of the new colleagues from the Soviet Union.³⁵ This is confirmed by the Ukrainian scholar Semchyshyn: ‘In short – it was US and the newcomers were THEM’.³⁶ But for the Jewish population, Soviet rule was – as the Jewish Pole Stanisław Różycki underlines³⁷ – the only hope.

Only the Jews do not waver, regardless of their feelings or their rational and moderate attitude towards the Union, although they suffered, although their possessions were seized, their families were deported, nevertheless they counted solely on Russia, because everything is better than the Germans.³⁸

The Polish and the Ukrainian population were – according to reports from the Polish underground – not just united by their common hostility against the regime but also by a shared hatred of Jews, who were perceived as having profited from Soviet rule. Indeed, Jews were collectively linked with Soviet communism. A Polish eyewitness called it a ‘sad paradox’ that the hatred of Jews represented practically ‘the only bridge of communication between Poles and Ukrainians’. This hatred – he continued – extended even beyond the hatred of the Bolsheviks, and the pressure was only waiting for the right moment to be released.³⁹

The Jews did not yet know the terrible fate awaiting them, but the German attack horrified them. The refugees prepared for another flight and the local Jewish communists left. Jewish eyewitnesses observed that the mood of the Polish population appeared to be contradictory. On the one hand there was a certain *Schadenfreude* vis-à-vis Jews, Bolsheviks and Russians; on the other hand the Poles secretly feared the Ukrainians and Germans. Already, prior to the entry of the *Wehrmacht*, Ukrainian nationalists had attempted an uprising and taken advantage of the confusion to attack Soviet officials, but also to carry out the first attacks against Jews. The uprising failed, but immediately after the withdrawal of the Red Army the Ukrainians controlled – according to Różycki – every house, and handed Jews and Poles over to the newly founded

33 AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 774f; AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 542–6.

34 Report, not dated (probably December 1941), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 59–60; AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 774f; AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 542–6.

35 AR, vol. 3, no. 30, 520f.

36 Semchyshyn, *Z knyhy Leva*, op. cit., 65ff, 70, 81ff. See also Ostap Tarnavs'kyi, *Literaturnyi L'viv*, op. cit., 19.

37 Stanisław Różycki had fled from Warsaw to Lviv in Autumn 1939 and returned to Warsaw in October 1941, where he worked for the Oyneg Shabes Archive (Ringelblum Archive). He wrote on his experiences in Soviet Lviv and also contributed essays on the Warsaw ghetto. Samuel D. Kassow assumes that Różycki was a teacher in a secondary school.

38 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 542.

39 S. Kot, cited in Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 157.

Ukrainian militia. Long queues formed in front of grocery shops. Jews standing in the queues were insulted by Poles and Ukrainians and pushed out of the queue. Some Ukrainians and Poles stopped greeting Jews. However, not everybody behaved like this. Różycki noticed that many workers and intellectuals had not changed their behaviour. He came to the conclusion that the Ukrainians actually only hated Poles. But, acting from base motives, they were also prepared to carry out anti-Jewish pogroms. Every day he expected a pogrom to break out, a fear – he believed – which was also shared by Poles.⁴⁰ Another witness, writing in Yiddish, feared not only the Ukrainians, but also the Poles, considering both groups ‘capable of sinking their teeth into the Jews’.⁴¹

The first German troops reached the outskirts of Lviv on 30 June 1941. The Jewish population, which had increased in the last two years to more than 150,000, remained fearfully inside their homes. Opinions differed regarding the behaviour of the Polish population. Some reported that the Poles – with individual exceptions – remained indifferent. One Jewish author reported that the Poles greeted the German soldiers joyfully and that the whole Polish population hurried to them with flowers in their hands.⁴² No other eyewitness reports such a reception, but the Lviv Command of the Home Army confirms that after the experiences under Soviet occupation the Germans were received in a friendly manner, sometimes even with sympathy.⁴³

All Jewish authors were agreed that the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population greeted the German units enthusiastically or, in the words of an eyewitness, ‘The Ukrainians welcomed the Germans with flowers, laughter, joy, full of hope and illusions, as rescuers and liberators’.⁴⁴ The gold and blue Ukrainian flag flew next to the swastika. Posters of the Bandera faction of the OUN calling for a ‘Ukraine for the Ukrainians’ were everywhere.⁴⁵

The *Nachtigall* battalion – a Ukrainian unit of the German military counterintelligence service *Abwehr* – and several Ukrainian so-called expeditionary groups (*pokhidni hrupy*) entered the city together with the German troops. The Ukrainian expeditionary groups worked for the German Army as translators and functioned as intermediaries to the local population, but they had a hidden agenda. Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN-B, had ordered them to establish a Ukrainian administration and lay the foundations for a Ukrainian state. The intention was to confront the German authorities with a *fait accompli*.

40 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 545–51; AR, vol. 3, no. 39, 755; AR, vol. 3, no. 43, 896f. On the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence before the arrival of the German troops, see also AR, vol. 3, no. 36, 695f; AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 721f; AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 777.

41 Report on the situation of the Jewish population at the beginning of the German occupation of Lviv (Polish translation from Yiddish), not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 39, 755.

42 AR, vol. 3, no. 39, 755–9.

43 Report on the political situation, July 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 20; Report (excerpt), probably from November or December 1941, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 59–60.

44 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 550f.

45 Report by an anonymous refugee from Warsaw on the situation of the Jews in Lviv between July and December 1941, not dated, in AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 721f.

Bandera's emissary Yaroslav Stets'ko ignored German orders and met local Ukrainian leaders in the *Prosvita* building to form a Ukrainian government and proclaim a Ukrainian state. Shortly afterwards, two German *Abwehr* officers (Hans Koch and Ernst zu Eickern), who had learned of Stets'ko's intention when they had arrived at the residence of the Greek-Catholic archbishop, succeeded in entering the building through a side entrance. The main entrance was blocked by a large crowd. The assembly greeted them with 'unmeasured enthusiasm'. Hans Koch addressed the meeting but carefully avoided offering any recognition of the proclamation. Later, the local Ukrainians were informed that the proclamation had not been approved by the German government. In the next few days Stets'ko tried to obtain German approval of the proclamation, but failed. In the German plans for the '*Lebensraum im Osten*' there was no space for an independent or even semi-independent Ukrainian state.⁴⁶

At the same time as Stets'ko was proclaiming a Ukrainian state, members of the Ukrainian expeditionary groups (*pokhidni hrupy*) and local people went to the prisons to look for friends and relatives. Before the Red Army had left the city, the NKVD had murdered at least 3000 prisoners. The mass graves were discovered a short time later.⁴⁷ The real culprits – the Soviet prison guards – had already left the city, but many Ukrainians and Poles believed that the NKVD was dominated by Jews. Jewish eyewitnesses understandably rejected the suggestion of any collective responsibility of the local Jewish population for the NKVD murders in the Lviv prisons, or for other Soviet crimes.⁴⁸ But the emissaries of the OUN had formed a local militia which turned against the Jewish population. Ukrainian militiamen and civilians chased down Jews, took them to the prisons, forced them to exhume the bodies, mistreated and finally killed them.⁴⁹

46 Information of undersecretary Kundt on conversations with Hans Koch, 10 July 1941, with the Ukrainian mayor of Lviv Polans'kyj, 11 July 1941, with Major Weiner, 9 July 1941, with SS-Obersturmbannführer Beyer, 8 July 1941, *Bundesarchiv Berlin* (hereafter 'BAB'), R6, 150, Bl. 2–10; Bruder, '*Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!*', op. cit., 140ff. From a sometimes biased Ukrainian point of view, see Wolodymyr Kosyk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine* (New York 1993), 95ff; Vasyl' Kuk, 'Vidnovlennia Ukraïns'koï Derzhavy (Do 50-richchia akty vidnovlennia Ukraïns'koï Derzhavy, proholoshennoho u L'vovi 30 chervnia 1941 r.)', in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na borot'ba 20–50-tykh rokiv XX st. v Ukraïni: Zbirnyk materialiv pershoï narodnoï naukovoï konferentsii, L'viv, 25–26 chervnja 1991 r.* (Kyiv and Lviv 1993), 30–59. See also Yaroslav Stets'ko's recollections: Yaroslav Stets'ko, *30 chervnia 1941* (Toronto 1967).

47 Semchysyn, *Z knyhy Leva*, op. cit., 85ff. It is not known how many prisoners were actually killed. The Polish historian Grzegorz Hryciuk analysed German and Soviet sources and came to the conclusion that between 3100 and 3500 prisoners were murdered: Grzegorz Hryciuk, 'Mordy w więzieniach lwowskich w czerwcu 1941 r.', *Wrocławskie Studia z Historii Najnowszej* 7 (1996), 58–69.

48 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 551; AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 721f.

49 On the murder of the Jewish population of Lviv see Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit.; Eliyahu Jones, *Zydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji 1939–1945* (Łódź 1999); Thomas Sandkühler, '*Endlösung*' in Galizien. *Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz 1941–1944* (Bonn 1996); Thomas Held, 'Vom Pogrom zum Massenmord. Die Vernichtung der jüdischen Bevölkerung Lembergs im Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Peter Fäßler, Thomas Held and Dirk Sawitzki (eds), *Lemberg – Lwów – Lviv: Eine Stadt im*

Różycki was shocked that local Ukrainians were accompanying German officers through the streets and helping them to hunt out 'hostile elements': that is, Jews.⁵⁰ Rumours of terribly tortured and crucified prisoners circulated in the city. Ukrainian patrols rounded up Jews in the street and beat men and women, young and old. From the window of his house, on 1 July 1941, retired law professor Maurycy Allerhand saw Ukrainians beating Jews, using sticks and whips. He recognized them as Ukrainians not just by their blue and gold armbands, but also by the Ukrainian insults they used against the Jews. In front of the prisons an enormous crowd had assembled; Jews were made to run the gauntlet of the crowd. Allerhand's grown-up son Jonatan was captured by Ukrainians. A German soldier took him to the Brygidka prison. While his wife and son were able to escape with the help of a German officer, in the Brygidka Jonatan Allerhand was forced to help remove and clean the corpses. The German soldiers wore gas masks and watched the scene. Ukrainian militiamen beat Jews and constantly threatened them with shooting. Jonatan Allerhand was one of the very few who survived. After his return 12 wounds were counted on his body. It is not known how many Jews were murdered in this pogrom. Estimates range from 4000 to 8000 victims.⁵¹

The German military authorities tolerated this antisemitic violence. A secret order by Reinhard Heydrich, the SS Chief of Security Service and Security Police and head of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (Reich Security Main Office), had recommended inciting the local population to anti-Jewish violence, but there is no evidence that German agitators were responsible for the Lviv pogrom. The first Nazi killing squad, the *Sonderkommando 4b*, arrived after the pogrom had already started.⁵²

Some observers reported that the Ukrainian *Nachtigall* battalion had marched through the streets chanting 'death to the Moscow-Jewish commune'. For Różycki, the Ukrainians collectively were responsible for

Schnittpunkt europäischer Kulturen (Köln, Weimar and Wien 1995), 113–66. See also the testimonies of Holocaust survivors, recorded by the USC Shoah Foundation Institute, quoted by Vladimir Melamed, 'Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Multifaceted Ukrainian Context', *East European Jewish Affairs* 37(2) (August 2007), 217–48, at 222ff; Ivan Khimka (John-Paul Himka), 'Dostovirnist' svichennia relacia Ruzi Vagner pro L'vivskiy pohrom v litku 1941', *Holocaust i Suchasnist'* 2 (2008), 4379.

50 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 549–52.

51 Report by Maurycy Allerhand, not dated (prior to 1942); *Żydowski Instytut Historyczny* (hereafter 'ŻIH'), Teka Lwowska, 229/22. See also AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 551; AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 721f; Kazimiera Poraj, 'Dziennik Lwowski', *Biuletyn żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 52 (1964), 79ff; Iakov S. Chonigsman, *Katastrofa Ewrejtva Zapodnoi Ukrainy* (Lviv 1998), 109ff; Andrzej Żbikowski, 'Local Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Occupied Territories of Eastern Poland, June–July 1941', in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock (ed.), *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., 173–9.

52 Telegram of Heydrich to the commanders of the *Einsatzgruppen*, 29 June 1941, reprinted in Peter Longerich (ed.), *Die Ermordung der europäischen Juden: Eine umfassende Dokumentation des Holocaust 1941–1945* (München and Zürich 1989), 118f; Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit., 62. It is not clear how far soldiers of *Nachtigall* participated in the pogrom.

the pogrom.⁵³ Other authors did not blame the entire Ukrainian population. They accused ‘janitors, Ukrainian youths, hysterical women and simple people from the underworld’, absolving the Polish population and the Ukrainian intelligentsia of any responsibility for such acts:

The pogrom and repressive activities were carried out only by lower classes, the scum of the Ukrainians.⁵⁴

This was also the standpoint – according to Maurycy Allerhand – of the Ukrainian elite, even if they did not directly accuse antisocial Polish elements of being the offenders. Allerhand believed that the German front-line soldiers had not behaved badly on the first day, but that the military had given the Ukrainian population a free hand to carry out this ‘legal pogrom’.⁵⁵ Another eyewitness believed that ‘sinister Ukrainians, Petliura supporters and old pogromists’ had begun the pogrom on their own initiative. But Allerhand and other eyewitnesses also reported the active participation of German soldiers, who, in some streets, helped Ukrainians to round up Jews. German soldiers and officers watched the atrocities; some took photographs and even a film crew was present. The actual killing was done by the Ukrainian militia, and members of the local population participated in beating up the victims. Often the Jews had to run a gauntlet before they could enter the prison yard.⁵⁶ According to a report of the Polish underground, the pogrom had been ordered by the Germans and ‘had been carried out by Ukrainian and Polish scum’.⁵⁷ However, no other Polish sources mention any participation of Poles in the pogrom.

In the first days of the occupation the Germans began flooding western Ukraine with antisemitic pamphlets, posters, caricatures and proclamations. Their arguments were taken up and disseminated further by radio and in the legal Ukrainian press.⁵⁸ Apart from propaganda articles in the press, it is difficult to find any contemporary Ukrainian documents which refer to the pogrom against Jews or discuss Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the war. Therefore I must rely here mostly on memoirs. Semchyshyn held ‘urban scum’ to be responsible for the bloody pogrom, believing that many wore badges in the Ukrainian colours yellow and blue without being Ukrainian.⁵⁹

53 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 551; AR, vol. 3, no 37, 721f.

54 AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 777; AR, vol. 3, no. 36, 695f.

55 Report of Maurycy Allerhand, op. cit.; ŻIH, Teka Lwowska, 229/22; AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 777. Other eyewitnesses also report that the German soldiers did not participate in the pogrom: AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 549f; AR, vol. 3, no. 43, 896f.

56 AR, vol. 3, no. 39, 757–9; David Kahane (trans. Jerzy Michalowicz), *Lvov Ghetto Diary* (Amherst, MA 1990), 5ff. See also the recollections of Leon Weliczker Wells, *The Janowska Road* (London 1966), 35ff; Testimony of Rózia Wagner, ŻIH, *Relacje*, 301/442, 1–7.

57 Cited in Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 204.

58 Friedman, ‘Ukrainian-Jewish Relations’, op. cit., 274; O. Veselova et al. (eds), *OUN v 1941 rotsi: Dokumenty* (Kyiv 2006); Vladimir Melamed, ‘Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust’, op. cit., 227.

59 Semchyshyn, *Z knyhy Leva*, op. cit., 86; Tarnavs’kyi, *Literaturnyi L’viv*, op. cit., 67.

How difficult it was for the urban Ukrainian elite to accept the fact that the pogrom was carried out by Ukrainians is shown by reports of conversations between Jewish eyewitnesses and their Ukrainian acquaintances.⁶⁰ The Greek-Catholic archbishop Andrii Sheptyts'kyi evaded the question of the participation of Ukrainians in his letter to Pope Pius XII, written in August 1942. He merely noted that at the beginning of the war the German occupying forces had tried to prove that local citizens or policemen were the offenders, but then the Germans began to kill their victims on the streets in front of all eyes without any shame.⁶¹ In Lviv the NKVD prison murders seemed to be an important motivation for the pogrom, but pogroms also occurred in villages and towns where no prison murders had taken place. We therefore have to look for additional reasons. The Ukrainian *pokhidny hrupy* seemed to have played an important role in inciting the local population, but it is not clear whether they were executing German orders or whether they had been instructed by leaders of the OUN. As in most pogroms, an important motivation was greed. The Jews were not only beaten, but also robbed and blackmailed.

Shortly after the German invasion the Ukrainian militia was dissolved and the occupying power created a Ukrainian auxiliary police. This police force participated in the day-to-day chicaneries and cruelties against Jews, as well as in many murders. It searched houses and harassed Polish passers-by. It is therefore not surprising that, next to the Germans, the Ukrainian auxiliary police became the chief object of hatred for Poles and Jews alike. One Jewish author believed that the Ukrainian police were recruited from the lowest classes of society. Their members had low moral standards, no sense of responsibility and bestial instincts, inclining them to robbery and acts of terror.⁶² Another author believed, on the contrary, that the Ukrainian police was recruited in part from among the academic Ukrainian youth, who only shortly before had held – together with young Jewish men – positions in the Soviet youth organization *Komsomol*. Now they were showing their true bloody, nationalist and anti-semitic face. On 25 and 26 July the German authorities allowed three days during which it was permissible to torture, kill and rob Jews without fear of reprisal. The auxiliary policemen were joined by Ukrainian peasants and by individual Poles greedy to rob and murder. These so-called Petliura days – the name given to them by the occupiers – were not spontaneous; the auxiliary police specifically targeted members of the Jewish intelligentsia. Policemen went from house to house, driving men, women and children like cattle to the

60 Report of Maurycy Allerhand, not dated, op. cit.; ZIH, Teka Lwowska, 229/22. See also AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 777.

61 Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyts'kyi to Pope Pius XII on the situation during the German occupation, 29–31 August 1942, in *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Zhyttia i Diial'nist'.* *Dokumenty i Materialy 1899–1944*, vol. 2, *Tserkva i suspil'ne pytannia. Knyha 2: Lystuvannia* (Lviv 1999), 982–6.

62 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 552. See also AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 726–34. On the Ukrainian auxiliary police, see Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations', op. cit., 278 ff; Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit., 92f.

Gestapo prisons. In the prisons the Jews were tortured and often subsequently murdered.⁶³

Jewish eyewitnesses noted that the relationship between Germans and Ukrainians had already begun to cool after the Germans annulled the proclamation of a Ukrainian state, took over the city, and began to give it a German appearance. The Ukrainian flag disappeared from the streets, leaving only the swastika. However, Ukrainians were again given positions of authority in the city administration. One Jewish witness remarked that Poles were very busy trading, smuggling and speculating.

And once again dreams come true: Poles are busy in 'trade', the Ukrainians are in the administration and the Jews do the physical work.

All the documents tell of endless hours of work, cruelty, murder, hunger, epidemics and innumerable casualties among the Jewish population. Right from the start, the Jews were given much less food than the Poles and Ukrainians; by the middle of July 1941, Jews had to wear special armbands and were only permitted to use the last car in trams; later on they were not allowed to use trams at all. Some Poles and Ukrainians took advantage of the emergency, buying valuable goods for little money and selling food for a lot of money to the Jews. Blackmail was common. When the Jews had to move to the ghetto, on their way there they were robbed and beaten by Germans, Poles and Ukrainians. The perpetrators went to Jewish houses and took anything they wanted.⁶⁴ Jewish eyewitnesses confirm that, without the help of locals, the Germans would not have been able to find so many of the Jews in hiding.⁶⁵

Maurycy Allerhand believed that only in exceptional cases did Poles participate in the plundering of Jewish homes. He placed all the blame on the Ukrainians, who were trying to get rich by any means possible. Thus, for example, they would go from house to house asking the caretakers whether any Jews lived there. Then they would enter the houses and claim the flats for themselves, allowing themselves to be paid off with high sums of money. Poles – according to Allerhand – never participated in such activities.⁶⁶ But some Ukrainians also helped Jews:

In an atmosphere of brutal racist hatred, there were some cases, if not many, of humane behaviour on the part of Poles and Ukrainians.⁶⁷

63 AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 723f; Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 205; Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit., 64f; Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji*, op. cit., 52ff.

64 AR, vol. 3, no. 31, 553; AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 726–34; AR, vol. 3, no. 39, 757–9; AR, vol. 3, no. 40, 778f. See also Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit., 318ff; Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations', op. cit., 272ff.

65 Dawid Kahane on Lwów, ŻIH, 302/44 (translated from Yiddish to Polish), in Michał Grynberg and Maria Kotowska (eds), *życie I zagłada żydów polskich 1939–1945: Relacje świadków* (Warsaw 2003), 261–87, at 262ff.

66 Report by Maurycy Allerhand, not dated, ŻIH, Teka Lwowska, 229/3 and 229/22.

67 AR, vol. 3, no. 37, 723–6.

Jewish eyewitnesses were also critical of the Jewish ghetto police, the Jewish *Ordnungsdienst*, who helped the German authorities to control the ghetto before its members themselves became victims of the Holocaust. This police force was a great misfortune for the Jewish population, because it included many corrupt elements.⁶⁸ Leon Weliczker Wells echoed this view in his memoirs: 'Those who had any self-respect did not join this group, and it was composed essentially of those from the Jewish rabble'.⁶⁹

In these inter-ethnic relationships Jews appear exclusively as the victims of violence and attacks. Jewish society itself underwent an internal restructuring, which thereafter only partially reflected the old pre-war structures of Jewish society. From June to September 1941, many Lviv Jews were killed in pogroms and by German *Einsatzgruppen*. From October 1941 to June 1942, as the '*Endlösung*' was prepared, members of the Jewish intelligentsia and 'unproductive' people were murdered, the Lviv ghetto was established, mass murders intensified and many Jews were deported to the Belżec death camp. From July 1942 to June 1943 the ghetto was scaled down and finally liquidated.⁷⁰ Almost all Jews in the city or surrounding villages were killed – only about 800 survived the war, either with the help of Poles and Ukrainians or by successfully hiding their identity.⁷¹

After the establishment of the Lviv ghetto, the Jewish eyewitness accounts of the war break off or change in character. Now reports focus predominantly on hunger, misery, murders and fear. Reflections on Jewish relations to other ethnic groups become rare. With the destruction of the Lviv ghetto they stop altogether. On his flight by train to Warsaw, one author of a report who was travelling with fake papers met Aryan smugglers. Despite the whole-scale murders of Jews they were still full of hatred against Jews: 'The only area where we profit from the Germans is when they deal with the Jews'.⁷²

Numerous actions against Jews who had fled to the forests show that, even after the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews, Ukrainian partisan groups were still strongly anti-Semitic.⁷³ Nevertheless, it should not be assumed from

68 AR, vol. 3, no. 43, 896f.

69 Weliczker Wells, *Janowska Road*, op. cit., 52. See also Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji*, op. cit., 76ff.

70 Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit., 43ff; Kahane on Lwów, op. cit., 264; Tatiana Berenstein, 'Eksterminacja ludności żydowskiej w dystrykcie Galicja (1941–1943)', *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 61 (1967), 3–33; Tatiana Berenstein, 'Praca przy-mosowa ludności żydowskiej w tzw. Dystrykcie Galicja (1941–1944)', *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 69 (1969), 3–45.

71 According to a report of the OUN, on 1 August 1944 the Soviet authorities in Lviv registered 811 Jews who had survived the war in the city or in neighbouring villages: Report of the OUN from Lviv on the period 17 July to 3 August 1944, *Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv Vlady ta Upravlinnia Ukrainy* (hereafter 'TsDAVO'), f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 96–100. Pohl quotes a Soviet source, which states that on 1 October 1944 1689 Jewish survivors were registered in Lviv: Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit., 385.

72 AR, vol. 3, no. 36, 698.

73 Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji*, op. cit., 193ff; Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, op. cit., 374ff; Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzeżany: Poles, Jews,*

this that the entire Ukrainian population supported such exterminatory anti-semitism. At least 100 death sentences were passed against Ukrainians who had aided Jews. Hundreds of Jewish adults and children were hidden in the residence of Archbishop Sheptyts'kyj and in Uniate monasteries.⁷⁴

Despite the murder of tens of thousands of Jews from Lviv, a memorandum by the local Command of the Home Army still considered the Jews in Spring 1942 to be a danger to the Poles. In this memorandum, stereotypes from the arsenal of Polish pre-war antisemitic accusations are combined with nazi antisemitic tropes. Jews were seen as the most important internal enemy, whose final plan it was to replace the Poles as the ruling class. The argument was that the Jews had not been defeated, only weakened, as only the weakest parts of the Jewish society had been murdered. Indirectly, this had even somehow strengthened the Jews, because those who had survived were 'not weighed down in the struggle for existence by this ballast'.

One can say without reservation that the problem of the Jewish minority has the aspect of a difficult chronic disease among us which complicates the normal functioning of the social organism.

Traditional national-democratic antisemitic arguments are used here, even though the context had changed fundamentally. The Jewish minority prevented – the report continued – the development of an independent third estate and thereby prevented the modernization of society. The rise of talented Poles from the lower classes was being hampered by Jews. In this way Jews not only weakened the Poles but also stood in the way of a democratization of society.⁷⁵

Yet this does not mean that the Polish population supported the murder of the Jewish population which took place directly before their eyes. The Lviv Command of the Home Army called the German plan to destroy the Jews in Lviv 'ultrabestial' (*ultrabestialski*) and gave a detailed description of the so-called 'August action' in 1942, in the course of which the German police and Ukrainian auxiliary police murdered at least 40,000 Jews or had them

and Ukrainians, 1919–1945 (Bloomington, IN 2002), 101ff; Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford 2001), 288ff.

74 On Ukrainians helping Jews, see Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations', op. cit., 287ff; Zhanna Kovba, *Liudianist' u bezodni pekla. Povedinka mistsevoho naseleння Schidnoi Halychyny v roky 'ostatochnoho rozv'iazannia ievreis'koho pytannia'* (Kyiv 1998), 3ff; Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji*, op. cit., 206ff; Kahane, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, op. cit.; Frank Golczewski, 'Die Revision eines Klischees: Die Rettung von verfolgten Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg durch Ukrainer', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit*, vol. 2 (Berlin 1996), 9–82; Myroslava Keryk, 'Strategii i sposoby poratunku ievreiv v L'vovi v 1941–1944', in O. Arkusha and M. Mudryi (eds), *L'viv: Misto, suspil'stvo, kul'tura* (Lviv 2007), 546–66.

75 Report by 'Alfa' on the minority problem, not dated (probably Spring 1942), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 68–123.

deported to the extermination camp at Belzec. The scenes witnessed moved even people who were hostile to Jews:

The Aryan population witnessed this action with pain, even if in the relationships to Jews a strong aversion had developed after the Bolshevik invasion, nevertheless, when their own eyes saw what was done to Jews, it made a pitiable impression on them.⁷⁶

The reaction of the masses to the murder of Jews was relatively uniform:

All condemn the bestiality and the premeditation with which the Jews are being murdered, but generally it is said that the Jews are getting the punishment of history.

Deep sympathy was often felt for individual Jews, to whom help was at times given even at the risk of the helper's own life. But in 'relation to the Jews generally there is a subconscious satisfaction that there will be no more Jews in the Polish organism'.⁷⁷

While the Nazi regime had decided by the end of 1941 to kill all Jews, a more differentiated policy was employed vis-à-vis Poles and Ukrainians, which depended on the general military situation and the willingness of the respective groups to co-operate with the Germans. The German occupiers gave Ukrainians preferential treatment and relied heavily on Ukrainian collaboration. This does not mean that Ukrainian national ambitions would have had a future under German rule. According to the *Generalplan Ost*, Lviv and East Galicia were earmarked as future German settlement areas. The Ukrainian dreams of an autonomous state were finally crushed when East Galicia was included in the *Generalgouvernement* as 'District Galicia' and not in the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine. The German secret police, the Gestapo, arrested Bandera, Stets'ko and other leaders of the OUN-B and brought them to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Such acts disillusioned the Ukrainian population and drove the OUN-B underground. For the Ukrainian nationalists, the main enemy was the Soviet Union and resistance against the German occupiers was mostly limited to actions of self-defence and preventing the deportation of Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* to the Third Reich.⁷⁸

The antagonism between Ukrainians and Poles increased under the German occupation. Their mutual hatred – as reported by the Lviv Command of the Home Army – permeated all social classes.⁷⁹ The Polish 'general opinion' held the Ukrainians to be responsible not only for the deportation of Polish settlers and of thousands of members of the Polish intelligentsia during the Soviet occupation, but also accused them – falsely – of complicity in the murder of 25 professors during the first days of the

76 Internal report of the AK-KOL in Lviv, Autumn 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 12.

77 Report for December 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 51–7.

78 Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, op. cit., 79ff; Kosyk, *Third Reich and Ukraine*, op. cit., 94ff; Bruder, 'Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!', op. cit., 157ff, 204ff.

79 Report (excerpt), not dated (probably from November or December 1941), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 59f.

German occupation.⁸⁰ One report listed numerous cases in which the Ukrainian auxiliary police had shot Poles. The Command also believed Ukrainians to be behind numerous robberies and murders. Moreover, Ukrainians were believed to be the main informers of the Gestapo and the 'eyes and ears' of the occupying forces.⁸¹ The Poles, wrote another underground report, now had more reservations towards the Ukrainian police than about the German police.⁸²

The Ukrainian auxiliary police were hated by Jews and Poles alike. In contrast, both the OUN and other Ukrainians had a different perception of the Ukrainian police. The OUN noted that the police were greatly respected by the Poles. In a report dated March 1944, the Ukrainian police are referred to as 'ours' (*nashi politsianty*).⁸³ The fact that Ukrainians did not see the auxiliary police as hostile can be deduced from a diary entry of Arkadii Liubchenko dated 7 April 1943. He notes that the majority of Ukrainian policemen in Galicia were people with middle and higher levels of education. Many engineers, teachers and scientists had entered the police, raising the general level of the auxiliary police.

In addition, one sees in it [the police] here the new seed of the Ukrainian army. They hate Poles, and the yellow and blue badge with its trident is a knife in the heart of every Pole.⁸⁴

The Polish underground recognized the fact that Ukrainian society was not monolithic. However, only the OUN appears as an actor, terrorizing the Ukrainian population, enforcing unconditional support and using the Germans to liquidate the Poles. Ukrainian youth were primed to fight the Poles 'even if this battle should be lost'. However, the Home Army was aware that the Bandera faction of the OUN also fought against the Germans and reported waves of arrests among Ukrainians.⁸⁵

80 Report on the Polish situation in Lviv, May 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/9), 34. See also Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, op. cit., 154f. This time the Ukrainian auxiliary police were innocent: Zygmunt Albert, *Każń profesorów lwowskich lipiec 1941* (Wrocław 1989); Dieter Schenk, *Der Lemberger Professoren-mord und der Holocaust in Ostgalizien* (Bonn 2007), 113–41.

81 Report no. 2, 25 January 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 1–7; Additional report for 10 March to 20 March 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 104–11; Report on the Polish situation in Lviv, May 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/9), 34.

82 Report on Ukrainian affairs, 15 February 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 23–5.

83 Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv, November 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 29–36; Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv for January and February 1944, 10 March 1944, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 49–50. See also Gabriel N. Finder and Alexander V. Prusin, 'Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust', *East European Jewish Affairs* 34(2) (2004), 95–118.

84 Diary entry for 7 April 1943, in Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk Arkadiia Liubchenka* (Lviv and New York 1999), 140. See also entry for 20 October 1943, in *ibid.*, 179. Friedman believes that the Ukrainian auxiliary police came from the 'rubbish of the Ukrainian society': Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations', op. cit., 282.

85 Evaluation of the Ukrainian enemy, 27 November 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 17–23. On the arrest of Ukrainian nationalists, see Report for December 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 51–7. See also Report no. 18, 24 September 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203

At the beginning of 1943 hope germinated on the Polish side that a rapprochement might be possible. Talks were held between the OUN-B and the Home Army. The fear of a return of the Bolsheviks softened the behaviour of Ukrainians towards Poles. However, this rapprochement was only of short duration. The talks clearly showed that positions were incompatible. Neither side was ready to renounce their claim to Lviv. Polish and Ukrainian underground organizations alike expected a new Polish-Ukrainian war, similar to the battle for East Galicia and Lviv in 1918–19.⁸⁶

After the defeat of Stalingrad, the Nazi occupiers changed their strategy and attempted to win over Poles, and more especially Ukrainians, with the hope of inducing them to contribute more actively to the war against the Soviet Union. In 1943 the Ukrainian SS division 'Galicia' was formed, and tens of thousands of Ukrainians volunteered to fight against the Soviet Army. While the leaders of the OUN-B and the UPA initially warned against joining the SS division, they later changed their position. The SS would provide Ukrainians with weapons and military training. Both could become important in a future fight for an independent Ukrainian state, not least against Polish military organizations in East Galicia and Volhynia.⁸⁷

In the spring of 1943 Ukrainian nationalist partisans in Volhynia began attacking Polish villages and massacring the inhabitants. Their aim was to expel all Poles from these territories, which were claimed for an independent Ukrainian state. Soon the first refugees began arriving and the Volhynian murders became the talk of all Polish homes. In July 1943 the wave of murderous attacks reached East Galicia. The local Command of the Home Army stated that 'our Ukrainians' assumed that this was their biggest opportunity yet to drive away all Poles. While the Germans were considered the main enemy, followed by the 'Bolsheviks', the 'next and the most terrible' enemy was 'the Ukrainian'.⁸⁸

The Ukrainian writer Arkadii Liubchenko wrote in his diary that 'now one also begins to destroy Poles here'. He shows a certain sympathy for the Poles, who had already suffered much under Soviet and German occupation, and

(MF 2400/8), 14–16; Memorandum on the 'Ukrainian problem', December 1942, in Siwicki, *Dzieje konfliktów*, op. cit., vol. 2, 77.

86 Report on Ukrainian affairs in January 1943, February 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 19–22. See also report no. 6, 29 June 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 35–7; Report on the political and military situation in Eastern Little Poland, not dated (probably January 1944), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 43–53; Report on Ukrainian affairs, 15 February 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 23–5. On the negotiations between the Home Army and the UPA, see Grzegorz Motyka and Rafał Wnuk, *Pany i rezuny: Współpraca AK-WiN i UPA, 1945–1947* (Warsaw 1997).

87 Andrii Boljanovs'kyj, *Dyvizija 'Halychyna': Istorija* (L'viv 2000), 101ff. Kosyk, *Third Reich and Ukraine*, op. cit., 383ff.

88 Report no. 5, 22 May 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 28–34; Report no. 6, 29 June 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 35–7; Report no. 7, 23 July 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 38–44. Internal report in the AK-KOL, not dated (November/December 1942), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 58–65; Commentary in the AK-KOL to a report on the Ukrainian question, not dated (January/February 1944), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 63–4. Snyder, 'The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing', op. cit., 197–234.

from the Ukrainian insurgents in Volhynia. Liubchenko noted that the Poles trembled with fear and the Ukrainians hated them with an exceptional hatred, which was returned by the Poles.

The aggravation of the relations between Ukrainians and Poles increases. The individual murders of each group by the other are escalating. There is much consternation in both groups.⁸⁹

Polish society was 'lethally tired'. Their physical and psychological strength was dwindling and nerves were stretched to breaking point. Poles overheard Ukrainian policemen greeting each other in the summer of 1943 with the slogan 'death to the *Lachi* [Poles] – death'. Similar slogans appeared on many trains and on many walls. In June 1943 one slogan on the walls of the Lviv ghetto read: 'The ghetto for Poles'. The Poles, according to a report by the Polish underground, all thought the Ukrainians should be punished for their crimes.⁹⁰

The OUN-B accused the Home Army of attacking Ukrainian villages. It did not connect this to the murders carried out by Ukrainian combat units in Polish villages. Most Poles counted on a quick English victory and were prepared for a revolt 'against us, the autochthonous population of Western Ukraine'. In November 1943 the OUN reported that everywhere Poles were increasing their activities and stepping up the armed struggle against Ukrainians.⁹¹ The OUN observed that as the situation of the war changed, the self-confidence of the Polish population grew. This led to patriotic proclamations in public (on the streets, in the trams and in the markets). On 1 November 1943, Poles decorated the graves in the military cemetery for the 1918–19 'Defenders of Lwów' with Polish flags and lit candles. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the battle for Lviv, pamphlets appeared bearing titles such as '*Leopolis – semper fidelis*', calling for a 'free Poland with a Polish Lwów'. The Poles felt themselves to be so strong that they even carried out a compulsory collection of monies for the 'battle against the Germans' in a cinema. The Ukrainian population was shaken by the strength of the Home Army. Several prominent Ukrainian professors were assassinated and their deaths were followed by attacks on both Ukrainian auxiliary policemen and German targets.⁹² But this did not deter the Ukrainian auxiliary police from continuing to murder Poles.⁹³

89 Diary entry for 5 August 1943, in Liubchenko, *Shchodenmyk Arkadiia*, op. cit., 158f; diary entry for 7 September 1943, in *ibid.*, 164.

90 Report no. 5, 22 May 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 28–34; Report no. 6, 29 June 1943, *ibid.*, 35–7; Report no. 7, 23 June 1943, *ibid.*, 38–44; Report no. 4 on the situation in Lviv, 9 March 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/3), 136–7.

91 Report by the OUN from Lviv, 15 September–15 October 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 5–8; Report by the OUN from Lviv, 15 October–15 November 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 26, ark. 9–10. From a note of the 'Kruk' unit, summer 1943, cited in Grzegorz Motyka, 'Lachów usunąć! Wołyń i Galicja Wschodnia 1943–44', *Gazeta Wyborcza* 13 (April 2002).

92 Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv, November 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 29–36.

93 Report for 1–15 March 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/3), 114–26; Report for 15 March–15 April 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/3), 97–100; Report for 15–31 May 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/4), 185–90. On the killing of Poles during passport controls, see

While the Home Army was strong in Lviv and in some towns, the situation of the Polish population in the villages was desperate. Open war raged between Poles and Ukrainian nationalist partisans, who were attempting to cleanse the eastern areas of Poles.⁹⁴ The OUN reported that Ukrainian retaliatory actions filled the Poles with fear, so much so that they fled even from safe areas to the big cities or to central Poland; moreover, the OUN accused Poles of terrorizing the Ukrainian population and of using the Germans, and also Soviet partisans and the NKVD to settle their score with the Ukrainians. The OUN talked of a 'Polish-Ukrainian front'. At night armed Polish commandos patrolled the streets in Lviv and shot at least 11 auxiliary policemen. In several incidents, Polish units left the city in retaliation for UPA actions against Polish villages and killed about 130 Ukrainians.⁹⁵ Liubchenko noted that the Poles had a 'scornful expression on their faces' as they waited for the Bolsheviks.⁹⁶

By this time the retaliatory acts of the Home Army were making the auxiliary police more cautious, and by April 1944 desertions among Ukrainian auxiliary policemen were increasing. In July the attacks on Polish villages also began to die down. The Polish population took heart again from the landing of the Allied Forces in Normandy.⁹⁷ The OUN noted how the Poles on the street were full of self-confident triumph.⁹⁸

The approach of the Red Army unnerved the Ukrainian population. The intelligentsia reacted panic-stricken, and by February many were already trying to flee to the West with their families. The OUN accused the intelligentsia of having forgotten their patriotic duty and their responsibility for the national destiny. In the spring of 1944 the Ukrainian intelligentsia had completely lost hope and lacked – according to the OUN – a positive sense of the struggle. Dantesque scenes were described as taking place at the railway station shortly before the return of the Red Army. The OUN, for its part, placed its hopes in those who awaited 'the new evil' with dignity and calm.⁹⁹

Grzegorz Motyka, *Tak było w Bieszczadach: Walki polsko-ukraininskie 1943–1948* (Warsaw 1999), 127.

94 Commentary to a report on the Ukrainian question, not dated (January/February 1944), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 63–4; Report on the political and military situation in Eastern Little Poland, not dated (probably January 1944), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 43–53; Draft of an operational plan, 10 October 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF2400/4), 22–7.

95 Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv in January and February 1944, 10 March 1944, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 49–50. On the attack of Polish units on Ukrainian policemen and retaliatory acts outside Lviv, see Jerzy Węgiński, *W lwowskiej Armii Krajowej* (Warsaw 1989), 99ff.

96 Diary entry for 4 February 1944, in Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk Arkadiia*, op. cit., 191.

97 Report for 15 March–15 April 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/3), 97–100; Report for June 1944, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/4), 9–14.

98 Special socio-political report by the OUN on Lviv, 20 July 1944, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 21.

99 Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv in November 1943, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 29–36; Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv in January and February 1944, 10 March 1944, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 49–50; Report by the OUN on the situation in Lviv in March 1944, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 62–4; Report by the OUN on the

The majority of the Polish population was inclined to support a radical solution for the Ukrainian question. The average Pole – as the Polish underground had already noted at the end of 1941 – was in favour of deporting all Ukrainians over the river Zbrucz to Soviet Ukraine. Any thoughts on a possible reconciliation were, at best, voiced by only a few members of the elites of both groups; but as soon as the question touched on possible borders between a Ukrainian and a Polish state, all talks ceased.¹⁰⁰ In their memoranda on the ‘solution of the Ukrainian question’, the staff of the Home Army of Lviv mirrored the mood of the population. In July 1942 it recommended deporting between one and one and a half million Ukrainians to the Soviet Union and settling the remainder in other parts of Poland. In the eastern areas of Poland not more than 10 per cent of the population should consist of national minorities. Any suggestions regarding a limited autonomy for Ukrainians, as was being discussed in Warsaw and London, would find no support among the local population.¹⁰¹

The attacks of Ukrainian partisans on Polish villages in Volhynia increased the Polish determination to remove the Ukrainian population living in the eastern Polish areas by resettling them. After the war, as one author stated in a memorandum, the conditions would be ideal, because the Ukrainians could expect to be punished for their criminal behaviour. One report recommended expropriating the Ukrainian peasants and resettling them. Such a resettlement would guarantee a Polish majority in the *Kresy*. The battle against the Ukrainians and the Soviets was seen as in the tradition of a ‘centuries old battle to ensure that these areas belonged to Europe’.¹⁰² The authors still firmly believed in the civilizing mission of Poles in the east – ‘our historic mission is to carry religion and culture to the East’ – with the Ukrainians considered as belonging to the East.¹⁰³ The education of the Ukrainian intelligentsia at Western universities had changed this perception as little as had

situation in Lviv in April 1944, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 70–6. Special socio-political report by the OUN on Lviv, 20 July 1944, TsDAVO, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 126, ark. 21. See also the diary entry for 4 February 1944, Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk Arkadiia*, op. cit., 191.

100 Report, not dated (probably December 1941), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 59–60; Report no. 22, 4 July 1942, in Siwicki, *Dzieje konfliktów*, op. cit., vol. 2, 52.

101 Report on the political situation, July 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 20; Report by ‘Alfa’ on the minority problem, not dated (probably Spring 1942), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 68–123; Report for December 1942, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/5), 51–7; Report no. 2, 25 January 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 1–7; Report no. 6, 29 June 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/7), 35–7; Memorandum on the ‘Ukrainian problem’, December 1942, in Siwicki, *Dzieje konfliktów*, op. cit., vol. 2, 81f. On the position of Polish political groups in the Ukrainian question, see the report of the office for information and propaganda of the High Command of the Home Army, 27 May 1943, in *ibid.*, 233–40. On the more moderate position of the Home Army in Warsaw and the Government-in-Exile, see Ryszard Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw 1993), 197ff.

102 Project of ‘Lasota’, not dated, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 18–32.

103 Commentary to a report on the Ukrainian question, not dated (January/February 1944), AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 63–4.

their Catholic affiliation, since Ukrainians were held to possess an ‘eastern, Byzantine mentality’.¹⁰⁴

But all such mooted plans came to nothing. Poles and Ukrainians underestimated the strength of the Soviet Army and overestimated the willingness of Britain and the United States to confront the Soviet Union over the question of the Eastern borders of Poland. On 9 September 1944, the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the communist Polish proto-government agreed in Lublin on a large-scale population exchange between the Soviet Union and Poland. All Poles, including the Lviv Poles, had to leave the territory of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Lviv became a Soviet city with a predominantly Ukrainian population.

The analysis of contemporary sources has shown that the incompatible recollections of Poles, Jews and Ukrainians can be explained by their incompatible experiences (*Erfahrungen*). The Soviet occupation policy in Eastern Poland was based, first of all, on *Realpolitik* or class politics, and only in the second instance on ethno-political categories. However, the impressions of the local populations were structured by their respective ethnic patterns of perception. Soviet measures were reinterpreted accordingly. When the Soviet power implemented its class-conflict policies against the pre-war elites, this affected all ethnic groups; however, because of their dominant position before the war it affected the Poles most, followed by the Jews. Survival strategies, which were accepted and understood as such when employed by members of their own group, were used to reproach the ‘other’ group if they employed them, and were categorized using traditional ethnic patterns of interpretation. Only behaviour which strengthened and confirmed ethnic stereotypes was taken in. Contradictory information was noted, but did not flow into the process of interpretation. Before the NKVD murders in the prisons in June 1941, many Poles and Ukrainians were already collectively blaming the Jews for Soviet actions. After the German invasion and in the absence of the real culprits – the NKVD – the Polish and Ukrainian populations reverted to their traditional scapegoating of the Jews. Traditional local antisemitism and antisemitic stereotypes, German antisemitic propaganda, grievances for injuries suffered under the Soviet occupation and terrible hatred came together. The first pogroms followed the pattern of pogroms during the first world war and earlier. But this time there was a big difference. The Austrian and Polish authorities had tried to prevent pogroms, and, despite their strong antisemitic sentiments, even the Russian military authorities in 1914–15 did not incite the local population to commit pogroms. The new nazi German authorities not only did not lift a hand to prevent the pogroms, but actually encouraged them. To win over the local population and make them accomplices in the mass murder of Jews was part of their programme of annihilation.¹⁰⁵

104 Report on the Ukrainian situation in February 1943, AAN, AK-KOL, 203 (MF 2400/8), 1–6.

105 Friedman, ‘Ukrainian-Jewish Relations’, op. cit., 274ff; Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji*, op. cit., 52ff. See also Jonathan Frankel (ed.), *Dark Times, Dire Decisions: Jews and Communism* (Oxford 2005).

It is unclear what role the German propaganda played in this interpretative process, which did everything to encourage antisemitism among Ukrainians and Poles and massively propagated the identification of Jews with Bolshevism, minting the slogan of 'Jewish Bolshevism'. The German propaganda used the old stereotype of Judeo-Communism to link antisemitism and anti-Bolshevism. It made use of antisemitism in its war against the Soviet Union and utilized anti-Bolshevism to destroy the Jews.

There was no shared feeling of common suffering. After the war all groups perceived themselves as the principal victim.¹⁰⁶ The Poles thought they had suffered most, not least from Ukrainian attacks. The Ukrainians thought they had endured most, first from the Poles, then from the Soviets, whom they bracketed with the Jews, and later from the Germans. But in the end, Poles, Ukrainians and Jews formed different categories of victims. The Jews were not only the victims of an unexampled programme of murder by the state, but also victims of their Polish and Ukrainian neighbours. In Jewish analyses of Polish and Ukrainian behaviour, it was not merely a question of passivity; of reproaching Poles and Ukrainians for having stood aside and let the Holocaust happen, but of accusing them of having actively participated, first in the pogroms at the beginning, then – with particular reference to the Ukrainian auxiliary police – as active agents in the murder of Jews. The auxiliary police had connections to the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which was thereby also implicated as jointly responsible. Moreover, many Jews who were able to escape to the forests were subsequently killed by Ukrainian partisans.

The German occupiers had given a terrible example of how to get rid of a whole ethnic group. They created the frame within which the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was played out. But it was less exterminatory racism than an ideology of integral nationalism which, until the spring of 1944, determined the anti-Polish actions of the UPA. One can say that the mass murder of Polish villagers by Ukrainian partisans attempting to force all Poles to leave Volhynia and East Galicia drew its inspiration from the cynical and murderous German population policies. But they were not identical. The same applies to the Polish underground. Particularly in Lviv, the 'Polish-Ukrainian front line', the Polish population and parts of the leadership of the Home Army were unable to imagine that it would be possible to live side by side with Ukrainians after the war and favoured the wholesale ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians from East Galicia.

The Polish experience was shaped by the devastating attacks of Ukrainian partisans on Polish villages and finally by the loss of their homeland. The west Ukrainian experience was closely linked to the fight against the Poles for East Galicia, the ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, the failure to build a nation in the postwar period, the terrible Soviet repression after 1944 and the bloody and exhausting guerrilla war against sovietization.

106 Himka, 'War Criminality', *op. cit.*, 12; Jilge, 'Competing Victimhoods', *op. cit.*, 103–31.

In Ukrainian-Polish relations, crimes stand against crimes. The task here is for each side to accept the suffering of the 'other' side and condemn the crimes committed by its 'own' side.

This is difficult enough in itself, but in connection with the Jews we have an asymmetric relationship. Firstly, there are virtually no Galician Jews left in Western Ukraine or in Poland. Secondly, it is difficult to accept that the dimension of victimhood is extremely unequal. This was already a problem during the war. Neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians were able to come to terms with the unique aspect of Jewish suffering. They categorized the annihilation of the Jewish community in East Galicia using stereotypes inherited from a very different past. Traumatized by their own experiences of suffering, they were unable to adapt the old categories which they used to interpret Jewish behaviour to the new circumstances. Until 1942 there were still people who believed that, in the last instance, the Jews would profit from the war. Linking the Jews to the Soviet regime and Soviet crimes was one way of exculpating the members of one's own group from their participation in pogroms and mass murders. In the last two years of the war the Jewish question disappeared from the agenda of the OUN and the Home Army. Only a few Jews remained, and they played no role in the Polish and Ukrainian plans for the postwar period. The Jews were marginal in Polish and Ukrainian perceptions of the war, and stayed marginal for over 40 years.

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