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## Pavlo Khrystiuk's History and the Politics of Ukrainian Anti-Colonialism

Khrystiuk's *Zamitki i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii, 1917–1920*<sup>1</sup> is one of the earliest and most comprehensive works to appear on the Ukrainian revolution. Written and published during Khrystiuk's émigré period (1919–1923) it is an illuminating read of the years of world war, revolution and then civil war in Ukraine. Khrystiuk exposes how a historian works to compose and frame his understanding of a period of great turmoil and change and the particularities of a recently «imagined» place, namely a Ukraine that was not on the maps of Europe in 1914. What he calls his «notes and materials toward a history of the Ukrainian national revolution» is, in fact, fragments left unfinished; they also expose the author's own engagement in the events that he describes, events that ended in at least temporary disappointment for the author-revolutionary. In this sense, his text recalls that of other revolutionary activists in a contiguous revolution, starting with Leon Trotsky, who not only wrote as an eyewitness-participant of the Russian Revolution, but as a state-builder, speech-maker-agitator, and theorist of what was happening around and under his vision<sup>2</sup>. The fact that Trotsky lost power in the regime that he helped to establish gives his

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<sup>1</sup> Notes and Materials for the History of the Ukrainian Revolution. 4 vols. — Vienna, 1921–1922. My citations to Khrystiuk's text are from an unpublished translation of this work, which doesn't have consistent and unified pagination yet. Khrystiuk's history has long been known to specialists on the Ukrainian revolution. John S. Reshetar, Jr., in «The Ukrainian Revolution» (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952) notes that this work «contains invaluable documents». Those documents have been largely republished from the archives and contemporary newspapers by Vladyslav Verstiuk, in his «Ukrains'kyi natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh: berezen'-lystopad 1917 roku: Dokumenty i materialy» (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Oleny Telihi, 2003). Another standard history of the revolution that made use of Khrystiuk's work was Jurij Borys, in his «Political Parties in the Ukraine», in Taras Hunczak, ed., «The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution» (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). Borys is also the author of «The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: A Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations» (Stockholm, Kungl. Boktryckeriet. P. A. Norstedt, 1960).

<sup>2</sup> *Trotsky L.* The History of the Russian Revolution. — New York: Pathfinder Press, 1980; and his *My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography.* — New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1960; for Trotsky's view of revolution, see *Knei-Paz Baruch.* The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky. — New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

voice a poignant sense of irony and perhaps tragic nostalgia for the lost cause. In a similarly compelling way, a Russian-Jewish Menshevik-Internationalist in exile, Raphael Abramovitch, wrote *The Soviet Revolution*<sup>3</sup>, also from the vantage point of a «loser» in the revolutionary struggle, as someone who insists on understanding why it happened that the Bolsheviks emerged victorious, and does not thereby abandon his own revolutionary sense of justice and the struggle that was so much part of his life and self-identity, though he had to transport that struggle to the diaspora in New York.

Khrystiuk also seeks to understand the rapidly evolving politics of revolution in Ukraine and insists that the revolution in Ukraine, though tied in intimate ways with the revolutions in Petrograd and Moscow, quickly began to diverge from the Russian model in response to local, Ukrainian conditions. He also insisted, however, that that Ukrainian model was as authentically revolutionary and socialist as what the Bolsheviks were waging in Russia, and that a Ukrainian revolution would have a different outcome, if it were not strangled at birth. Khrystiuk, as a veteran political activist aged 27 in 1917, is familiar with the major political parties and their leaders in Ukraine and the Russian capitals; he is an astute reader of the party presses and the platform statements and resolutions of congresses and conferences. He captures the political life of Kyiv, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities across class and ethnic divides. His prism is that of an avowed revolutionary, a fighter for liberation of Ukraine from its double—national and socio-economic—oppression. Indeed, he offers this history as part of the story of «intensified efforts on the part of oppressed peoples everywhere to throw off the shameful and heavy yoke of national oppression», but also the story of the «world-wide struggle of working and exploited classes against the contemporary bourgeois capitalist socio-economic system and for a new socialist society». (Foreword)

Like Trotsky and Abramovich, Pavlo Khrystiuk writes from the perspective of an active and important player in the events he describes, whether in the various Ukrainian national center-left governments or in the insurgency against the «Hetmanate dictatorship» of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, as he calls it. Khrystiuk, a leading member of the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionary party, also tries to explain what happened in Ukraine from his particular type of class analysis, one coupled with a sensitivity to national identity that is remarkably absent in both the previously mentioned revolutionary accounts of the events. Indeed, I shall argue that one of his — and other of his Ukrainian comrades' — leading contributions was to interrogate the failures of Marxism, as it had evolved by the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, to accommodate both the national question in multinational empires and states and the bearers of the «national», the peasantry, who made up the overwhelming majority of the population claimed by the Ukrainian movement. Another Russian Social Democrat, the Georgian Menshevik Iraklii Tseretelli, spoke of the «blindness» of Russian revolutionary democracy on the «national question», by which he meant that the all-Russian

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<sup>3</sup> (George Allen, 1962); Mensheviks were among the best historians of the revolution; a good introduction to their politics in 1917 and after is *Galili Ziva. The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolution: Socialist Realities and Political Strategies.* — Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. See also memoirs of *Sukhanov N. N. Zapiski o revoliutsii. 7 vols.* — Berlin, Petrograd and Moscow, 1922–1923.

parties could not reconcile class with national oppression and resistance, despite conventional commitments to the right of self-determination of nations, a commitment that proved much harder to realize than had been anticipated<sup>4</sup>. As a Social Revolutionary, and eventually a Ukrainian Social Revolutionary when that wing broke with the All-Russian party in 1917, Khrystiuk offers a good counterpoint and corrective to memoirists such as the leader of the Russian SR Party, Viktor Chernov, and Alexander Kerensky (though he broke party discipline early in 1917 to join the first Provisional Government) whose perspective is shaped not surprisingly by events in Petrograd<sup>5</sup>.

Khrystiuk, in turn, is one of several eyewitness-participants who wrote their accounts of the specifically Ukrainian revolution within the larger revolutionary movement in the former Russian Empire, including the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement<sup>6</sup> and others in Kyiv and Ukraine during these events<sup>7</sup>. I have written about two other figures who played prominent roles at various times in the Ukrainian revolution, but were viewed as hostile to the Ukrainian cause by Khrystiuk and many of his revolutionary and socialist comrades: Konstantin Mikhailovich Oberuchev<sup>8</sup>, a Russian SR who served as Commissar of the Provisional Government in Petrograd to the Kiev Military District and then was appointed to Commander in Chief of that District, and Pavlo Skoropadskyyi, who rose from Russian general to Ukrainian Hetman by 1918 and was overthrown in an insurgency in which Khrystiuk played an active role<sup>9</sup>. My perspective of Khrystiuk is also shaped by my earlier acquaintance

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<sup>4</sup> *Tsereteli I. G. Vospominaniia o fevral'skoi revollutsii*. 2 vols. — Paris and the Hague, 1968; Tsereteli's memoirs are another valuable source for understanding the politics of the «dual authority» in Petrograd; he was a member of a delegation sent from the Provisional Government to negotiate with the Ukrainian Central Rada in summer 1917.

<sup>5</sup> *Chernov V. The Great Russian Revolution*. — NY: Russell and Russell, 1966; *Kerensky A. The Catastrophe: Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution*. — New York 1927.

<sup>6</sup> Among the most influential from the Ukrainian national movement have been *Vynnychenko Volodymyr. Vidrozhennia natsii*. — Kyiv, Vienna: Vyd. Dzvin, 1920; *Lototskyi Oleksandr. Storinky mynuloho*. — Warsaw: Ukrainyskyi Naukovyi Instytut, 1934, and *Doroshenko Dmytro. Istoriiia Ukrainy, 1917–1923 rr.* — 2d ed. — New York: Bulava Publishing Corporation; and also his *Moi spomyny pro davne-mynule (1914–1918)* — 4 vols. — Lviv, 1923–1924.

<sup>7</sup> Particularly interesting are: *Goldenveyzer A. A. Iz kievskikh vospominanii (1917–1921 gg.)* // *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*. — Vol. VI. — Berlin, 1922; see also the volume edited by *Alexeev S. A. Revoliutsiia na Ukraine po memuaram belykh*. — Moscow: Gosizdat, 1930; *Chykalenko Evhen. Spohady*. — 3 vols. — Lviv, 1925–1926.

<sup>8</sup> See *Oberuchev K. V dni revoliutsii: Vospominaniia uchastnika Velikoi Russkoi revoliutsii 1917-go goda*. — New York: Izd «Narodnopravstva», 1919, and his later *Vospominaniia*. — New York: Izd. Gruppy pochitatelei pamiati K. M. Oberucheva, 1930; for my essay on Oberuchev's role in the Ukrainian revolution, see: *A Socialist Army Officer Confronts War and Nationalist Politics: Konstantin Oberuchev in Revolutionary Kyiv* // *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. — 2008–2009. — Vols. 33–34: *Tentorium honorum: Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on his Sixtieth Birthday* / Ed. Olga Andrews, Zenon E. Kohut, Serhii Plokhyy, and Larry Wolff. — P. 191–197.

<sup>9</sup> For Skoropadskyyi's memoirs, see: *Spohady: Kinets 1917 — hruden 1918* / Ed. Iaroslav Pelenskyi. — Kyiv and Philadelphia: Instytut ukainskoi arkeoholii ta dzereloznavstva im. M. S. Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrainy, Instytut skhidnoievropeyskykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy, and Skhidnoievropeyskyi doslidnyi institut im. V. K. Lypynskoho, 1995; and my essay, «I love

with a then-living Siberian Social Revolutionary, but one of Ukrainian ethnicity, Pavel Sergeevich Dotsenko, who played an important role in the Siberian events of revolution and civil war, and also wrote his memoir-history of his experience after he escaped to exile; Dotsenko's views on federalism and national autonomy were closest of all these to the views of Khrystiuk<sup>10</sup>. Like Dotsenko, Khrystiuk did not harbor any animus for Russians in general, and felt himself the beneficiary of the legacy of Russian revolutionary democrats, especially those critical of Russian imperialism and nationalism. This perspective makes Khrystiuk's history one that contemporary Russian readers should find less hostile to Russia than many, especially later, Ukrainian critics. But like another of his self-declared intellectual and political ancestors, Myhailo Drahomanov, Khrystiuk became troubled and later alarmed at the uncritical Russian nationalism that shaped the attitudes of even the best Russian socialists. Finally, *The Notes and Materials* can be read as a history of lost opportunities for more genuinely egalitarian, dare I say fraternal, Ukrainian-Russian relations.

### Who was Pavlo Khrystiuk?<sup>11</sup>

Pavlo Onykyivych was born in 1890 in a Cossack *stanytsia* to a Cossack farmer family in the Kuban' region, a region claimed in 1917 as part of the historically ethnographic Ukrainian territories of the Russian Empire. He completed high school in Baku (today's Azerbaijan) and finished Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, where he joined the Ukrainian student *hromada* (society) and also began work in the rural cooperative movement. Khrystiuk considered his fellow cooperative workers to be among the «most nationally conscious and politically mature forces of Ukrainian democracy». During 1917 he was in Kyiv, the unrivalled capital of the Ukrainian «national rebirth», where he was a political activist, statesman, journalist/publicist, and literary scholar. He wrote for and edited several Ukrainian journals mostly for the cooperative movement, peasant movement, and Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party. That party broke from the All-Russian Social Revolutionary Party in April 1917.

Khrystiuk was a member of every Ukrainian autonomous and independent coalition government (except for Skoropadskyi's Hetmanate and the several Soviet Ukrainian governments) between 1917–1919. Indeed, he took an active part in the preparation for the insurgency against Skoropadskyi's regime and served in the Directory before fleeing to emigration in Vienna in 1919. In the postwar Austrian capital, he continued as a member of the «left wing» of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries, its Foreign Delegation headed by Myhailo Hrushevskyi, and was co-editor of their journal, *Struggle, and you shall overcome!* (*Boritiesia-poborete!*) While working at the Ukrainian Sociological Institute in Vienna, founded by Hrushevskyi, he

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Russia, and but I want Ukraine», or How a Russian Imperial General Became Hetman of the Ukrainian State // Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Zenon E. Kohut / Ed. Frank E. Sysyn and Serhii Plokyh. — Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2005. — P. 115–148.

<sup>10</sup> *Dotsenko Paul S.* The Struggle for Democracy in Siberia. — Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

<sup>11</sup> For this biographical sketch, see *Verstniuk V., Ostashko T.* Diiachi Ukrainsk'koi Tsentral'noi Rady: Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk. — Kyiv: National Academy of Science of Ukraine, 1998. — P. 179–180.

wrote his history of the Ukrainian revolution. Replicating his career in Russian Ukraine, in 1922 Khrystiuk served as trade representative for the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Union in Austria.

In 1923 KHRYSYTIUK returned to now Soviet Ukraine and found employment in the Ukrainian Bank, then for the State Publishing House in its financial section.<sup>12</sup> Later he worked at the People's Commissariat of Finance of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During this time, he published some literary criticism, worked for the journal of the Ukrainian literary renaissance, *Chervonyi shliakh (The Red Path)*, and wrote a couple more histories that were published. By 1930 he was employed as a research scholar at the Shevchenko Institute of Literature and edited the journal *Literatura i mystetsvtvo (Literature and Art)*.

Khrystiuk was arrested in March 1931 for alleged membership in the so-called Ukrainian National Center together with about 50 other Ukrainian intellectuals associated with HrushevskyI. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison in the notorious Solovki camp, but in 1935 his sentence was prolonged for three years. In September 1937 he was sentenced for an additional eight years. He died in a Soviet gulag, Sevostlag, in 1941 at age 51 in Arkhangel'sk<sup>13</sup>.

### **Some Imperial Origins of Anti-colonialism<sup>14</sup>**

In general, the political and intellectual elites of the Russian Empire, though it spanned 11 time zones and claimed authority of a hundred diverse ethnic and national groups, did not think of Russia as a colonial power, at least they rarely used the term, which they certainly had access to via real and imagined connections with Greek and Byzantine history. When a region and its people was conquered by Muscovy, there was no colonial office to administer the new lands, instead, an ad hoc *Kazanskii prikaz* took over the administration of conquered Kazan and the Tatar population there until it was deemed sufficiently «colonized» and assimilated into general Russian and imperial structures; similarly for Siberia, which had its *Sibirskii prikaz* and Ukraine, or the Cossack Hetmanate, which had its *Malorossiiskii* (or Little

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<sup>12</sup> See the article: *Gilley Christopher*. The «Changing Signposts Movement» in the Ukrainian Emigrations: Myhailo Hrushevsky and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries // *Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas*. — 2006. — B. 54. — H. 3. — S. 345–374. See also Gilley's larger study: The «Change of Signposts» in the Ukrainian Emigration: A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s. — Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> Iury Shapoval has reconstructed Khrystiuk's Soviet life from his dossier in the files of the Ukrainian State Police in an article: *Pisar revoliutsii // Den'*. Because Khrystiuk's work, like that of Hrushevsky and his fellow repatriates remained anathema during Soviet times, there remains little in Ukrainian about him; the one study I have located, thanks to Hennadii Onishchenko, is that: *Kucher V., Mukha D.* Sotsial-revoliutsioner na tli doby: Pavlo Khrystiuk pro sotsial'no-politychni protsessy chasiv Tsentral'noi Rady. — A Social-Revolutionary: Pavlo Khrystiuk on the sociopolitical processes of the era of the Central Rada. — Kyiv: NANU, Kuras Institute, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> I discuss many of these ideas in an earlier version of them, «From Imperial Russia to Colonial Ukraine», keynote lecture, Moore Institute, NUI Galway, 22–23 June 2012, Humboldt-Kolleg: Colonialism within Europe: Fact or Fancy?

Russian) *prikaz*<sup>15</sup>. The closest the empire came to agencies that had pan-imperial purview along these lines was a late imperial agency on resettlement of Russian and Ukrainian peasants to what were perceived fertile and underutilized lands in Turkestan and Siberia. To some extent, the Holy Synod and the Committee on Foreign Confessions played this role in regulating the public affairs of the major religions of the empire, including Islam, Judaism, Catholicism and Buddhism<sup>16</sup>.

Despite the fact that the imperial administration did not have a proper office for colonial affairs<sup>17</sup>, the autocracy did use the concept «colony», but in rather interesting and perhaps unexpected ways. As part of Catherine's «enlightened absolutist» reign and her determination to improve her empire, she invited foreign colonists to immigrate to the Russian empire with incentives of free farmland, religious tolerance, tax benefits and exemption from military service for a period of time. These mostly German farmers were administered as «colonists» by one of Catherine's favorites, Prince Grigorii Orlov, in a special chancellery. The expectation was that the immigrants, or colonists, would bring with them all sorts of human capital that would be beneficial for backward Russian and Ukrainian peasants. In other words, colonists were invited because of their presumed superiority to the native population, whether due to their Protestant work ethic, or their technical skills. This practice resembles that of the «settler colonies» of Britain in North America, Australia and New Zealand, where British settlers were expected to bring Christianity and private property to the indigenous. Later Catherine, who imagined herself as Greek empress if not the goddess of war and wisdom herself, encouraged a number of Greek colonization projects along the northern coast of the Black Sea, a region that had been colonized by Greek merchants in the ancient world. Germans, Greeks, Serbs, and others were invited to «improve» New Russia, lands that had been largely evacuated of their Cossack and Crimean Tatar inhabitants and rulers to clear the way for the new settlements<sup>18</sup>. Under Catherine's successor, Nicholas I, another social experiment was called «military colonies» and was supervised by Count Aleksei Arakcheev, a military man<sup>19</sup>. Notably, both of these initiatives saw their realization in New Russia, later claimed by Ukrainian nation-builders as part of historic Ukraine.

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<sup>15</sup> See *Nol'de Boris*. La formation de l'empire russe: Etudes, notes et documents. — Paris: Institut d'études slaves, 1952.

<sup>16</sup> See *Crews Robert*. For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia. — Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006; *Werth Paul*. At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905. — Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, and others on this «confessional state».

<sup>17</sup> For some interesting reflections on this phenomenon, see *Sunderland Willard*. The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was But Might Have Been // *Slavic Review*. — 2010. — Vol. 69. — P. 120–150.

<sup>18</sup> See *Wortman Richard S*. Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in the Russian Monarchy. 2 vols. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, for a discussion of Catherine's various Greek projects.

<sup>19</sup> Ironically, these schools were inspired by British Quaker «Lancasterian» schools and one of them was the site for the prototype of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, made famous by Michel Foucault, as the all-seeing observation tower of modern prisons. Bentham spent time in Ukraine while writing his Panopticon. See this interesting connection made by *Alexander Etkind*, in *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience*. — Cambridge: Polity, 2011. — P. 133–136.

One further test of the utility of the concept of colony for understanding the Russian empire and its complexity was Russian America, or Alaska. It was one of the few known cases of Russian imitation of the British and Dutch in their East India Companies. The Russian-American company was founded in 1799 to exploit the riches of the sea otter fur trade until its winding down in 1867 with the Alaska Purchase by the United States. The Russians sent Orthodox priests to proselytize among the native tribes and built fortresses up the Pacific Coast to protect their merchant-trader outposts in ways that resemble earlier French settlement of eastern North America<sup>20</sup>.

One of the first and most influential uses of the term «colony» as part of a critique of the Russian Empire came in a volume titled, *Siberia as a Colony*, written by Nikolai Iadrintsev in 1882. Iadrintsev was a member of a group of Siberian regionalists, or *oblastniki*, who came together in the imperial capital during the university years; in a curious irony of imperial history, two members of this circle, Iadrintsev and Serafim Shashkov, had landed in St Petersburg and found one another after being exiled from Kyiv and Kazan for their oppositional activities<sup>21</sup>. Siberian regionalists, whose political affiliations spanned a range of parties from Kadets to socialists, contributed one important stream to thinking about federalism in the Russian Empire; another such contribution came from the Cyril and Methodius Society, a student group at Kyiv Imperial University that ended with the arrests and exiles of several of the leading members, including the future Ukrainian national poet, Taras Shevchenko. What these and many other prosecutions illustrate is the danger perceived by the autocracy of any proposals for reorganization of the Russian Empire along more democratic and decentralized lines. Myhailo Drahomanov, a particular hero of Khrystiuk, also wrote from exile in Europe about Russian policy toward non-Russian peoples and criticized the Russian revolutionary progressive movement for its centralist and intolerant politics<sup>22</sup>.

One somewhat perhaps unexpected source for thinking about Russia as a colonizing state came from the «father» of modern Russian history, the Moscow University Professor Vasili Kliuchevskii, who wrote in 1904 that Russian history is «the history of a country that colonizes itself. The space of this colonization widened along with the territory of the state»<sup>23</sup>. Kliuchevskii's own doctoral dissertation was about monastic colonization in medieval Muscovy. From that dissertation insight, he went on to argue that «the colonization of the country is the single most important fact of Russian history» and, that from the Middle Ages the standard periods of Russian history are nothing more than «the major moments of colonization». Alexander Etkind has returned us to the classics of Russian historiography to recover this theme

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<sup>20</sup> See *Vinkovetsky Ilya*. *Russian America: An Overseas Colony of a Continental Empire, 1804–1867*. — Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

<sup>21</sup> See my essay: *Federalisms and Pan-Movements: Re-imagining Empire // Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* / Ed. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatoly Remnev. — Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 2007. — P. 494–510.

<sup>22</sup> He was particularly alarmed by the anarchism of Bakunin and the centralism and advocacy of terror by Petr Tkachev. See my discussion in «Federalisms and Pan-Movements», p. 503–505.

<sup>23</sup> *Kurs russkoi istorii*. — Moscow, 1956. — Vol. 1. — P. 31.

of «inner colonization», as he titled one of his latest books<sup>24</sup>. Etkind traces this legacy in some of Kliuchevskii's most important students and colleagues, among them Paul Miliukov, leader of Russia's Constitutional Democratic party, briefly foreign minister during the Provisional Government and then exile historian; Matvei Liubavskii, later rector of Moscow Imperial University, whose own work was on the colonization of the Baltic lands by Muscovy, but also wrote about colonization of the territory of the imperial capital, St. Petersburg, itself.

Writing during the same years as Kliuchevskii was the «father» of modern Ukrainian history, Myhailo Hrushevskiy. When Hrushevskiy proposed his «alternative scheme» for «organizing» East European history, it amounted to the «unmaking of Imperial Russia», in the title of Hrushevskiy's most recent biographer and historian, Serhii Plokhyy<sup>25</sup>. The fact that Hrushevskiy had to find employment as a professor in Lemberg University from 1894 to 1914 is evidence of the incendiary, if not heretical nature of his challenges to the Great Russian narrative of continuity from Kyivan Rus through the Muscovite and imperial periods of Russian history. Moreover, though he flourished briefly in «Russian» or Greater Ukraine during the revolutionary period when he was elected first head of the independent Ukrainian state, he was later exiled to Moscow in the 1930s for his deviant thinking on Russian and Ukrainian history and died «under suspicious circumstances» in 1934. For the rest of the Soviet period, his name was anathema for any historian of Ukraine and his works were banned from classes on Ukrainian history.

The political, social, and cultural history of Ukraine that marked Hrushevskiy's greatest achievement and lasting legacy was *The History of Ukraine-Rus*<sup>26</sup>. The Russian imperial narrative was only one target, however, of Hrushevskiy's revisionism; Polish historians also considered the history of Ukraine to be an integral part of their national narrative, in particular, the relations with the Cossacks during Poland's golden age of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth<sup>27</sup>. In this sense, Ukraine's history is twice colonial, sometimes under Polish rule, during the era of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also under Habsburg rule in Galicia after 1867, where the Polish elites were entrusted with governing over the Ruthenians, and then during the interwar Polish Republic, when Ukrainian lands were once again relegated as part of

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<sup>24</sup> See *Etkind Alexander*. *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience* — Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.

<sup>25</sup> See *Hrushevskiy M.* *Zvychnina skhema «ruskoi» istorii i sprava ratsional'nogo ukladu istorii Skhidn'ogo slovianstva // Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu.* — Vol. 1. — St. Petersburg, 1904). — P. 298–304; and *Plokhyy Serhii*. *The Unmaking of Imperial Russia.* — Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.

<sup>26</sup> (New York, 1957); see the titanic diaspora to bring all of Hrushevskiy's volumes out in English language with full scholarly apparatus, directed by Frank Sysyn, see his «introduction» to volume 1 of the series (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997).

<sup>27</sup> See two very helpful volumes on Ukraine in Russian/Soviet and Polish historical narratives: *Velychenko Stephen*. *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russia and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914.* — Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992; and *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991.* — New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Poland's *kresy*) and territories to which Polish colonists were directed and elsewhere and at other times under Russian rule. Again, parallel to the history of Polish colonialism, lands claimed by the Ukrainian national movement first came under Russian suzerainty during the reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and following assaults on the Cossack elites under Emperor Peter I and especially Empress Catherine II, then a period of special rule as governor-generalcy (which fused military and civil functions even more than elsewhere in the Russian provinces), then after a brief and tumultuous history of a modern independent Ukrainian state, seventy more years of Soviet Russian domination. Hrushevskiy's challenge, and that of historians of modern Ukraine since then, has been how to «separate» out a history of the lands with historic ethnographically Ukrainian majority population from that of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, and the interwar Republic of Poland, among others. It is not just that the history of Ukraine is at least partly «shared» with Poland and Russia, but also with Romania, Hungary, and even Turkey is also reflected in Ukraine's status vis a vis the overlord states of any given period.

### **Lenin vs Wilson and the Origins of Anti-colonialism: Global Contexts**

The trends in historiography reflected and reacted to broader imperial (Russian) and global challenges to European imperialism. The major European empires witnessed the emergence of national movements and related federalist and pan-movements that challenged the contemporary political borders and multinational states. Historians and social scientists have distinguished the nationalism of late nineteenth-century Eastern and Southeastern Europe as shaped by the peculiar nature of nation-state relations in the Ottoman, Romanov and Habsburg lands. In addition to varieties of national liberation movements, these empires provided the contexts for Austro-Marxism, pan-Turkism, pan-Islam, pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, Communist internationalism, and more intellectual and political challenges to empire and colonialism<sup>28</sup>.

In the Russian Empire, Vladimir Lenin must be viewed as an important source of anti-colonialism, and followed on the interest that Karl Marx devoted to this subject in his writings<sup>29</sup>. Other prominent Bolsheviks, including Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky, wrote critical analyses of imperialism as well; all the major all-Russian and national political parties addressed the «national question», or the possible reforms of the empire. Although Lenin did not originate the view of the Russian Empire as a «prison of nations» (*tiur'ma narodov*)<sup>30</sup>, he studied the problem of empire, imperialism and colonialism in several seminal works, including *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916); *The Right of Nations to Self-determination*, and his

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<sup>28</sup> Ariel Roshwald, in his «Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923» (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), makes a similar argument about the importance of World War I in these empires.

<sup>29</sup> Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His despatches [sic] and other writings on China, India, Mexico, the Middle East and North Africa / Ed. with introduction by Shlomo Avineri. — Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1968.

<sup>30</sup> That idea appears to have its origins in the work of the French noble visitor to the Russia of Nicholas I, the Marquis de Custine, «La Russie en 1839»; it was taken up by the Russian populist intellectual Alexander Herzen as part of his broad critique of the Russian autocracy.

«Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions» prepared for the Second Congress of the Communist International<sup>31</sup>.

Lenin's study of the national and colonial questions was part of a larger global critique of European colonialism. Russia's defeat by Japan in the 1905 war marked one of the early sources of a radical reorientation of the colonial peoples toward what had been accepted as European civilizational superiority. Cemil Aydin, author of a recent book about the origins of anti-westernism, asserts

the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 became a truly global movement; by shattering the discourse of the racial and civilizational superiority of the West over the East, and thus the legitimacy of European hegemony, the Russo-Japanese war confirmed that non-western societies, if they followed the path Japan had taken, could indeed fulfill all the standards of civilization within a very short period of time.

Out of that reorientation arose early forms of pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism<sup>32</sup>. But the 1905 revolution that also grew in part out of the Russo-Japanese War saw the first instances of anti-imperial national movements, including in Ukraine, with the founding of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the first political group to advocate independence for Ukraine. In 1900 Mykola Mikhnovskiy penned a fiery brochure, *An Independent Ukraine (Samostiina Ukraina)*, in which he situated the Ukrainian struggle against Russia in the same «fifth act of a great historical tragedy», the 'struggle of nations», which included, among others, Armenians and Cretan-Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, Cubans in the Spanish and then American empires, and the Boers against the British<sup>33</sup>.

Recent scholarship suggests that World War I had a catalyst effect for thinking about Russia in colonial terms, but initially not in critical but self-congratulatory understandings. Guido Hausmann has identified a strong current of colonialist geographical thinking in the 1915 work of the Russian geographer Petr Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, head of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society. But colonialism also began to be used in a more critical understanding in the writings of Ukrainian geographer Stepan Rudnytskyi in Vienna, a year later in 1916<sup>34</sup>. (Like Khrystiuk, Hrushevsky and many other intellectual and political leaders of the revolutionary years, so too Rudnytskyi left for Soviet Ukraine and was eventually arrested for his heretical ideas.)

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<sup>31</sup> First published in June 1920; in *Lenin V. Collected Works*. — Vol. 31. — Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965. — P. 144–151. Lenin solicited comments from his comrades on the following national and colonial situations: Austria, Polish-Jewish and Ukrainian experience; Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium; Ireland; Danish-German, Italo-French and Italo-Slav relations; Balkan experience; Eastern peoples; the struggle against pan-Islamism; relations in the Caucasus; the Bashkir and Tatar republics; Kirghizia; Turkestan its experience; Negroes in America; colonies; China-Korea-Japan.

<sup>32</sup> *Aydin Cemil. The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*. — New York: Columbia, 2007; see chapter 4 «The Global Moment of the Russo-Japanese War: the Awakening of the East/Equality with the West (1905–1912)». — P. 71–92.

<sup>33</sup> *An Independent Ukraine*, in: *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995* / Ed. Ralph Lindheim and George S. N. Luckyj. — Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996. — P. 201.

<sup>34</sup> See unpublished paper, «Maps of the Borderlands: Russia and the Ukraine», Moore Institute, NUI Galway, 22–23 June 2012, Humboldt-Kolleg: Colonialism within Europe: Fact or Fancy?

The rival belligerent empires also helped shape an anti-colonial politics by their sponsorship of «national-liberation» movements of various ethnic and national groups. On the eve of the war, Ukrainians in Lviv proclaimed the creation of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, which sought to «liberate» the Ukrainian brothers from the colonial oppression of the Russian tsars, at this point only to subordinate a newly «liberated» Ukraine under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary or Germany. The Ukrainians' war aims coincided neatly with those of certain circles in the German government who sought to dismantle the Russian Empire by detaching the borderland peoples (*Randvoelker*) from the Russian heartland and thereby diminish Russia's threat to Germany for the foreseeable future. The German Foreign Ministry subsidized the activities of several «national-liberation» parties and organizations in Switzerland and other neutral countries. The Austrians allowed for the creation of Ukrainian military units in the Sichovi striltsi (Ukrainian Sharpshooters) that also were foreseen as agents in a Central Power-occupied Ukraine after the defeat of the Russians there. The Germans sponsored similar military formations for Poles to fight against Russia; Józef Pilsudski, future president of an independent Poland, earned his military reputation as commander of the Polish Legion. However self-destructive it might have seemed, the Russians eagerly embraced the imperial competition for support of national-liberation movements and subsidized and outfitted military units for Poles, Armenians, and Czechs to fight for the «liberation» of their ethnic brothers from the exploitation and oppression of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, again in exchange for the more «enlightened» protectorate of the Orthodox Russian tsar. The Russian Imperial Grand Duke, Nikolai Nikolaievich, as commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, issued a proclamation calling for the unification of Polish partition lands under the Russian throne in the event of Russian victory. Such promises encouraged other national minorities, including the Ukrainian movement in Russia, to ask for-in vain as it turned out — similar proclamations and protectorates. The Russophiles in Galicia and Bukovyna looked to Russia for «liberation» from the Polish, Catholic and Habsburg yokes and were invited to help the Russian army in its initial occupation in 1914<sup>35</sup>.

In spring 1917 the German Foreign Ministry embarked on a brazen act of imperial intervention to break up a rival empire when it granted permission to Lenin and a group of other socialists to travel across enemy territory in sealed German trains to reach Russia to foment revolution there. Lenin was willing to take up that offer, though his revolutionary plans included Germany after the weakest link in the imperialist chain, Russia, would break. Finally, the Central Powers carried their anti-colonial policy against Russia even further when they recognized an independent Ukraine as part of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and forced Soviet Russia under the Bolsheviks to also recognize the Ukrainian People's Republic<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> See *Hagen Mark von*. War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918. — Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2007, chapter 1—3; and *Hagen Mark von*. The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire // *Rubin Barnett R., Snyder Jack*. Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State-Building. — London and New York: Routledge, 1998. — P. 34–57.

<sup>36</sup> *Wheeler-Bennett John*. Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918. — London: Macmillan, 1938; see also *Baumgart Winfried*. Von Brest-Litovsk zur deutschen Novemberrevolution. — Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971.

The real opening for the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism has been explained as the «Wilsonian moment», the promises summarized in the American President's Fourteen Points. The classic study of the «new diplomacy» of American President Woodrow Wilson and Russian Bolshevik leaders Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky is Arno J. Mayer's *Wilson vs. Lenin, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918*<sup>37</sup>. Newer studies highlight the view of the Versailles negotiations and the subsequent treaties from the colonial world and see the rise of anticolonial nationalism in the crisis of the international system and in the disappointed hopes of colonial peoples throughout the world who had looked-in vain as it turned out — to Wilson as the shaper of a better, more just world order. Erez Manela studies the evolution of revolutionary national politics in India, China, Korea, and Egypt, but argues that these are only individual cases of a global phenomenon. He sees World War I's «unprecedented decimation of human lives and the myriad political, social, and economic dislocations it caused», as the «crucial context for the articulation and dissemination of the Wilsonian message and shaped the perceptions and responses to it». Furthermore, «the war strained the resources of the European powers, exposed as hollow their claims to superior civilization, and decimated the image of western military invincibility already tarnished by the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905». What Manela describes as the Wilsonian moment «lasted from the autumn of 1918, when Allied victory appeared imminent and Wilson's principles seemed destined to shape the coming new world order, until the spring of 1919, as the terms of the peace settlement began to emerge and the promise of a Wilsonian millennium was fast collapsing».

Manela concludes:

Many in the colonial world who had followed Wilson's increasingly dramatic proclamations in the final months of the war, however, came to expect a more immediate and radical transformation of their status in international society. As the outlines of the peace treaty began to emerge in the spring of 1919, it became clear that such expectations would be disappointed and that outside Europe the old imperial logic of international relations, which abridged or entirely obliterated the sovereignty of most non-European peoples, would remain largely in place. The disillusionment that followed the collapse of this «Wilsonian moment» fueled a series of popular protest movements across the Middle East and Asia, heralding the emergence of anticolonial nationalism as a major force in world affairs<sup>38</sup>.

In the eyes of the colonial elites, the Versailles peace was seen as «the apex of imperial expansion» for the victorious powers, especially Britain, France and Japan.

The language of self-determination had been targeted by the victors at national groups under the control of the enemy Central Powers. And indeed national groups in the Habsburg Empire adopted the language to their cause; the politics of self-

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<sup>37</sup> (Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian Books, 1964); and his *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919*. — New York: Vintage Books, 1967.

<sup>38</sup> *Manela Erez. The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. — New York: Oxford U Press, 2007. — P. 5–6; see also *Adas Michael. Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology // Journal of World History*. — 2004. — Vol. 15. — Issue 1. — P. 31–63.

determination quickly spread to the Russian Empire as well. Out of the collapse of the eastern empires emerged Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes<sup>39</sup>. As Manela reminds us:

most claimants for self-determination, however, never received an official hearing from the conference. Some were European: Albanians, Croatian, Estonians, *Ukrainians*, (my emphasis) and others. Catalan nationalists petitioned Wilson for freedom from Spanish rule, and Sinn Fein leaders demanded independence for Ireland, quoting long excerpts from President Wilson's speeches in support of their demand even as the president's British allies were engaged in a brutal campaign to suppress the Irish movement<sup>40</sup>.

Wilson rejected Irish appeals on the grounds that the appropriate place for anything other than peace talks was the future League of Nations.

Most recent scholarship acknowledges that the socialist alternatives to the liberal Wilsonian politics of self-determination only made headway after the collapse of the Wilsonian moment<sup>41</sup>, though Mayer highlights the significance of the peace declaration of the Petrograd Soviet in March 1917 as an important catalyst for the struggle for a new set of rules for international politics, above all national self-determination<sup>42</sup>. In May, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, still in moderate socialist hands, issued an appeal «to the socialists of all countries» for a «general peace on a basis which is acceptable to the toilers of all countries who do not want conquests, do not strive for plunder, and are equally interested in the free expression of the will of all peoples and in the destruction of the power of international imperialism... the program of peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples»<sup>43</sup>. The 1917 revolutions brought together in a powerful movement of protest the anti-war and anti-imperialist politics that had been an important part of the discussion in international socialism.

After the February Revolution and the creation of the dual authority in Petrograd, the war and the fate of the empire soon became inextricably entangled. What came to be seen as the Leninist alternative to Wilson's liberal vision of the new world order dates back to Lenin and German Social Democrat Rosa Luxemburg's articulation of the far left position on the war and imperialism among Europe's socialists. At the 1907 Stuttgart conference of the Socialist International, the leftists were able to win adoption of a resolution that committed all socialist parties, if war should break out, «to strive with all their power to utilize the economic and political crisis created by

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<sup>39</sup> On East Central Europe, see *Mamatey Victor S. The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda.* — Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.

<sup>40</sup> *Manela Erez. The Wilsonian Moment.* — P. 59–60.

<sup>41</sup> Manela argues that «until late 1919 Wilson's words carried far greater weight in the colonial world than Lenin's... It was only after the collapse of the Wilsonian moment and the stabilization of the Soviet state that Lenin's influence in the colonial world began to eclipse Wilson's». *Manela Erez. The Wilsonian Moment.* — P. 7.

<sup>42</sup> See *Mayer Arno J. Wilson vs. Lenin. «The March Revolution and the Petrograd Formula».* — P. 61–97.

<sup>43</sup> *Fainsod Merle. International Socialism and the World War.* — New York: Anchor Books, 1969. — P. 170.

the war to rouse the masses and thereby hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule». The congress also voted to oppose any support of colonialism. At the same congress, German Social Democratic leader Karl Kautsky also delivered a critique of colonialism more broadly<sup>44</sup>. For advocates of this leftist position, still a decided minority in the Russian and German socialist parties, the outbreak of war and the obedient lining up of the socialists in their parliaments to vote for war credits was denounced as the collapse of the Second International and the betrayal of socialism by Lenin, Luxemburg, and the growing left wing. Lenin called for the creation of a new International to restore the socialist movement to its true revolutionary path<sup>45</sup>. The first meeting of the leading socialist parties after the outbreak of war was called for Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in September 1915. From this conference emerged the Zimmerwald Left manifesto, which was another important step in Lenin's plans for organizing the Third International in March 1919 and marked the definitive split of the left-wing from the Second International Socialists.

Shortly after the Bolsheviks came to power in November 1917, Trotsky, as first Commissar of Foreign Relations, joined the anticolonial forces against the imperialist powers. In his peace plan of December 29, 1917; he denounced the Allies as hypocrites for their endorsement of Wilsonian principles while oppressing national groups in their own empires, among which he singled out Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar, and Indochina. The Brest negotiations with the Central Powers presented the Bolsheviks with their first opportunity to practice the new diplomacy that Lenin had advocated, but the weakness of the Bolsheviks' armed forces and the overwhelming strength of the German armies rendered this first attempt a failure. Lenin had to persuade his colleagues and the party leadership and throughout Soviet Russia that a dishonorable peace was better than the defeat of the revolution<sup>46</sup>. The German victory itself was very short-lived; by November 1918 the generals were forced to surrender and the Hohenzollern dynasty was replaced by a secular republic dominated by the mainstream Social Democrats. Following the November Revolution, the German left broke from the mainstream and appealed to the Bolsheviks to aid them in their revolution.

While the victorious Allies were meeting in Versailles to dictate the terms of peace to the defeated Central Powers, Lenin invited «delegates» from dozens of countries to a four-day conference in Moscow in March 1919 to found a new Communist International to better prosecute the cause of worldwide revolution. The Congress adopted a «Manifesto of the International» which declared the recent war as one «over colonies» and «fought with the help of the colonies». It went on to highlight the «bloody street fighting in Ireland; the uprising of colonial slaves in Madagascar, Annam, and other countries; in India, and elsewhere». The delegates denounced Wilson's program «as no more than changing the label on colonial slavery». The

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<sup>44</sup> *Riddell John*. Lenin's Struggle for a Revolutionary International: Documents 1907-16, the Preparatory Years. — New York: Anchor Foundation, 1984. — P. 5-36.

<sup>45</sup> *Haupt Georges*. Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International. — London: Oxford University Press, 1972; and *Joll James*. The Second International, 1899-1914. — New York: Harper and Row, 1966; also *Fainsod Merle*. International Socialism and the World War. — Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969.

<sup>46</sup> *Mayer Arno J*. Wilson vs. Lenin. — P. 293-312.

manifesto distinguished between the colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East from the «smaller and weaker peoples» of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and from fragments of the tsarist empire. But just as Wilson's promises for colonial peoples were masks for continued imperialism and colonial slavery, so too the «imperialist Allies», while they «never cease talking about the right of nations to self-determination», have ground that right «into the dust both in Europe and throughout the rest of the world». The only guarantee of self-determination for the small nationalities is the proletarian revolution<sup>47</sup>.

Although Ireland was always on the Bolsheviks' anti-colonial agenda, Russia's Bolsheviks did not honor requests from the Ukrainian socialist-revolutionary parties for membership in the Comintern. The Ukrainian Communist Party (*Borotbisty*) had formed from the left-wing militants of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party. On the other hand, Mykola Skrypnyk a Ukrainian Bolshevik, did address the Congress of the Third International «as a representative of the Communist Party of Ukraine», which was admitted as a delegation with a decisive vote. The CPU was one of the radical offshoots of Ukrainian Social Democracy, but closer to the Menshevik position. Skrypnyk reported that the Party had nearly 30,000 members, and that their formal rivals, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries «are simply coming over as a whole to our party». And he called for «our revolutionary movement to spread even wider. It will engulf Galicia and form a bridge for the revolution to cross from Russia to Hungary»<sup>48</sup>.

Shortly after the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin and his fellow Communist Party leaders turned to a group of «national communists», including the Tatar Communist Mir Said Sultan Galiev, to plan a «Congress of Peoples of the East» in Baku. It was reported that over a thousand delegates representing two dozen peoples came from the Russian borderlands and from the colonial world and convened from September 1–7<sup>49</sup>. Sultan Galiev is important for what his biography illustrates about the rapid ideological transformation that the new revolutionary leadership was groping toward. Sultan Galiev joined the Bolshevik party in November 1917 and became an important representative of the «colonial» intelligentsia. He served in the Central Muslim Commissariat, part of Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, he created a Muslim Communist Party, and sought to build a large predominantly Muslim state, the Tartar-Bashkir Republic. For Sultan Galiev, the revolution had to be above all a liberation of the colonial peoples, and he argued that the future of the revolution lay in the East. These ideas troubled the Bolshevik leadership, and they were rejected at the Congress of Peoples of the East. The Muslim Communist Party thereafter lost its autonomy, the idea of the Tatar-Bashkir republic proved stillborn, and Sultan Galiev moved into the opposition to what he called «Great Russian chauvinism». In response to these and other cultural and political demands from other nationalities, the Party's

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<sup>47</sup> *Riddell John*. *Founding the communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress: March 1919*. — New York: Anchor Foundation, 1987. — P. 226–228.

<sup>48</sup> See Skrypnyk's report on Ukraine, *Riddell John*. *Founding the communist International*. — P. 95–99.

<sup>49</sup> *Premier congress des peuples de l'Orient: Compte rendu stenographique*. — Petrograd, 1920.

Tenth Congress condemned «nationalist deviations». Sultan-Galiev had formed secret alliances with other discontented communists who sought to prevent the Russian Bolsheviks from reimposing tsarist colonial practice and culture. He insisted that combating Russian chauvinism ought to be the primary agenda of the party and that local (non-Russian) nationalisms were simply reactions to Russian chauvinism of imperial officials and elites in the borderlands of the empire. National Bolshevism became the pejorative name for those non-Russian communists who took their national causes too seriously. He was arrested and expelled from the Party in 1923, the first such arrest of an eminent party member. Historians dubbed Galiev's politics «Muslim national communism»<sup>50</sup> and other historians found analogues in Soviet Ukraine<sup>51</sup>.

In a special session devoted to the national and colonial questions, once again Ukraine was highlighted as a success story for the Leninist alternative of national self-determination. Mikhail Pavlovich, a former Menshevik-Internationalist turned Bolshevik and at that time an employee of the new Commissariat of Foreign Relations, delivered the report to the delegates. Pavlovich condemned the Poles for their «long series of wars against Ukraine» and the Allies for seeking to turn over Ukraine to French stockbrokers, but he also announced that «tens of hundreds of honest Ukrainians who sincerely desire the national and cultural rebirth of Ukraine... including Hrushevskyi and Vynnychenko, have become convinced that only Soviet power can now fulfill to the end the role of liberator of Ukraine from all forms of oppression»<sup>52</sup>.

### **Khrystiuk on Class, Nation and Revolution**

With this context of anticolonial politics in mind, we begin our analysis of Khrystiuk's history. Khrystiuk definitively rejects the Wilsonian program of self-determination and, like many other anti-colonial thinkers in other parts of the globe, sees the Versailles peace settlement as the imperialist victors' opportunity to finally divide the spoils of the vanquished empires' colonial possessions. He sees the Entente intervention in the civil war and their temporary occupation of southern Ukraine (by France in particular) as evidence of the imperialist reality behind the rhetoric of national self-determination. His relationship to the Leninist alternative is more ambiguous; as a socialist and a revolutionary, he ties the struggle against capitalism with that against imperialism, but, unlike Lenin, he sees Russia's treatment of Ukraine (and other nations) as colonial as well. Khrystiuk also has the opportunity to judge the Central Powers' version of «national self-determination» after the Brest Treaty delivered Ukraine to German and Austro-Hungarian military occupation. That occupation was marked by ruthless exploitation of the peasants who were obliged by the treaty

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<sup>50</sup> *Bennigsen Alexandre A., Wimbush S. Enders.* Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: a Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World. — Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979; see also *Rodinson Maxime.* Marxisme et Monde Musulman. — Paris, 1972, and his «Sultan Galiev—a forgotten precursor. Socialism and the National Question».

<sup>51</sup> *Mace James.* Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933. — Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.

<sup>52</sup> *To See the Dawn: Baku, 1920. First Congress of the Peoples of the East / John Riddell, ed.* — New York: Pathfinder, 1993. — P. 141–142. See original texts in French: *Le premier congrès des peuples de l'Orient», Bakou, 1–8 sept. 1920. Compte-rendu stenographique, facsimile.* — Milan: Francois Maspero, 1971.

to deliver grain and by the brutal repression of all political opposition, in short, a new form of colonialism for Ukraine.

Khrystiuk accepts that «bourgeois» nationalism is found among the elite classes of society, for whose benefit the recent war [World War I] was waged, but he laments that national chauvinism is not limited to Russian elites, but characterizes «the leadership of the working classes of the dominant nations [here Russia] who underestimate the importance of the national element, ignore demands for the liberation of the workers and peasants of the oppressed nations and betray their national intolerance and chauvinistic centralist tendencies». Khrystiuk, from his class-analysis and sociological perspectives is trying to critically understand the phenomenon of popular or mass nationalism in a revolutionary period. He criticizes the leading political parties of the working classes of the oppressed nations [here, Ukrainians] who «sometimes evince a national maximalism that is harmful to international workers' solidarity». In fact, Khrystiuk declares the greatest tragedy of the events he describes to be the first war in history ever waged between two revolutionary and socialist states, when the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars in Petrograd declared war on the Ukrainian Central Rada. Several decades later, Benedict Anderson began his now influential reflections on nationalism in *Imagined Communities* with an expression of befuddlement or incomprehension — at least — about how a Communist Vietnam was engaged in bloody war with its Communist Cambodian neighbor and abetted by its Communist Chinese neighbor to the north; what ever happened to international proletarian solidarity and the international class struggle?<sup>53</sup> Khrystiuk might well have identified in his study some historic precedents to conflict among «socialist» nations, a prospect Marx and Engels had never considered<sup>54</sup>.

What most troubled Khrystiuk about his experience in 1917-19 was the hostility of Russian revolutionary democracy, not to mention the right-wing and liberal attitudes, toward the Ukrainian national movement and, by extension in Khrystiuk's eyes, to all non-Russians in the former empire. He witnessed a political culture in 1917 where self-defined Great Russian statesmen, whatever their actual ethnonational identity (and this includes the revolutionary socialists), were able to conceive of certain parts or peoples of the Russian Empire as more deserving of autonomy, independence or secession than others, but mostly not deserving at all in the name of a «great Russian state» and, eventually, in the words of the White opposition, Russia could only be «one and indivisible». Russian writers, historians, and bureaucrats had a particularly difficult sticking point when it came to recognizing Ukraine's history as distinct from that of Russia, whereas it was somewhat easier for them to contemplate Polish, Finnish, and Baltic independence, even if that was not always the desired outcome. Khrystiuk during 1917 and 1918 appears to replicate the experience of Myhailo

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<sup>53</sup> *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. — London: Verso, 1983, conclusion; see Partha Chatterjee's disappointment at Anderson's «unmitigated political pessimism» on this score in his: *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. — Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. — P. 22.

<sup>54</sup> A similar utopian theory of liberalism about free markets as the basis for peace has been part of European thought since Immanuel Kant's *Plan of Perpetual Peace*. Kant's essay on perpetual peace is available in: *Friedrich Carl Joachim. Inevitable Peace*. — Cambridge, Mass.: 1948. — P. 245-281.

Drahomanov<sup>55</sup>, whose thought he proclaims as one of the most advanced stages of political thinking in Europe about nation, democracy, and federation.

Khrystiuk makes a valiant effort to identify Russians in Ukraine who were sympathetic to the Ukrainian renaissance and who had good reason to have positive relations to Ukrainians as the latter were discovering their national identity. But over the course of the revolution, first in the negotiations with «revolutionary democracy» in the Petrograd Soviet, the Provisional Government, and the all-Russian socialist parties, and later with the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, Khrystiuk finds a complete lack of understanding of the peculiarities of Ukraine and its revolution, above all the peasant character of that revolution as manifested in the national «awakening». He frequently uses the dual adjective «peasant-worker» to describe institutions or politics that consciously privileged the majority peasants over revolutionary workers; the Bolsheviks, importantly, insisted on the reverse adjective, «worker-peasant», as in Worker-Peasant Red Army (even though that, too, was overwhelmingly majority peasant in composition).

Although Khrystiuk celebrates Kyiv as the capital of the Ukrainian renaissance and the cradle of the plans that Ukrainian politicians craft for a federal outcome of Russia's revolution, he never loses sight of the fact that Kyiv is also the bastion of Russian reaction, the home of right-wing political, cultural, and religious figures who can always be counted on to defame the Ukrainian movement to their counterparts in Petrograd and Moscow. The invasion of Ukraine by the Red armies of Mikhail Murav'ev<sup>56</sup> is, for Khrystiuk, the ultimate tragedy of the revolution; Murav'ev waged cultural war against Ukrainianism, destroying all signs in the Ukrainian language and including the very symbolic bombardment of the home and library of the «father of the modern Ukrainian nation», the historian and political activist Myhailo Hrushevskyy.

Khrystiuk, because of his steadfast adherence to his own version of the Ukrainian national revolution, a revolution based on the peasants, above all, but also on Ukrainian workers, exposes the dilemmas that nationalism has posed for Marxists and Marxist-friendly scholars. His enthusiasm for federalism and a federative future Russia that would include a Ukraine with equal rights to Russia runs through his analysis and clearly grows out of the experience of the revolution itself; it is here that he summons the spirit of Myhailo Drahomanov, the «father» of Ukrainian-origin federalist thinking. The Rada early had on its agenda the convening of representatives of all the peoples of revolutionary Russia, a meeting that was indeed convened in Kyiv September 21-28 1917 as the «Congress of Enslaved Peoples» and which drafted an outline for a federative future<sup>57</sup>.

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<sup>55</sup> See Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings /Ed. by Ivan L. Rudnytsky. — New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1951.

<sup>56</sup> Murav'ev assault on Kyiv is captured by an eyewitness in *Gol'denveizer A. A. Iz kievskikh vospominanii.* — P. 24–26, *Revoliusiia na Ukraine* / Ed. S. A. Alekseev. — Moscow/Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1930. Murav'ev was a Russian Left-SR whom the Bolsheviks, in the spirit of their short-lived coalition with the Left SR party in the first Soviet government, entrusted with command of the Red Army units sent to Kyiv, but later turned against the Bolsheviks and was shot as a traitor.

<sup>57</sup> Documents from this congress published in: *Revoliusiia i natsional'nyi vopros. Dokumenty i materialy po istorii natsional'nogo voprosa v Rossii i SSSR v XX veke*, vol. 3 1917 (fevral'-oktiabr') / Ed. S. M. Dimanshtein. — Moscow, 1930. — P. 443–450; see a more recent study: *Reent O. P. and Andrysyshyn B. I. Z'ezd ponevolenykh narodiv (21–28 versnia n. st.).* — Kyiv: NANU, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1994.

Khrystiuk took seriously the Rada's aim to create a federative republic with Russia and the former «subject» peoples of empire. On the eve of the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd, the Rada's leaders conducted negotiations with representatives of the Cossacks, of Siberia, and of the Turkic peoples of the former empire. Khrystiuk's federalism is also notably not a derivative of Austro-Marxism, although the Rada did proclaim some measure of personal national autonomy. Khrystiuk would have had more exposure in Vienna to what survived of Austro-Marxism, but his vision of federation was based on the reform of a very different empire, also with a very different political system as regards national minorities.

Still, he does not fetishize federation, nor make it an absolute, just as independence in and of itself is not the entire revolution and, at some points, diverts the revolution from its «true path» of class or social emancipation. When, for example, Skoropadskyi, one of the more or less clear villains in the story, begins advocating federation with the Don Cossacks — a counter-revolutionary movement to be sure — Khrystiuk denounces this reactionary effort to restore the one, indivisible Russia under an all-Russian monarch. After Skoropadskyi so discredits and subverts the ideal of federation, Khrystiuk has to reevaluate the alternatives, above all, independence, but he is not so naïve to expect independence to be feasible as long as hostile powers on Ukraine's borders nurture their irredentist dreams. Only in international revolution, something not only Khrystiuk awaited, would a true federation of independent socialist nations guarantee the sovereignty of all peoples, but also an end to socio-economic exploitation. We might call this naivete too, but for Khrystiuk it was a matter of mostly unwavering faith in the progressive outcome of history through humanity's own efforts.

One of the virtues of Khrystiuk's very political and document-based history of the Ukrainian revolution is the sense he conveys of the state-building experience that the revolution forced on the Kyiv leaders in their negotiations, again, first with the Petrograd authorities from the Provisional Government and Soviet, then with the Central Powers at the Brest peace negotiations, and later with the Bolshevik government in Petrograd and its surrogate in Kharkiv. In these negotiations, several key questions of sovereignty, legitimacy, authority over public functions, and of course culture are hammered out in ways that Khrystiuk would suggest gave Ukraine a much better conceived state than that of the Hetmanate, which usually gets the benefit of the «state school» historiography for its institution building<sup>58</sup>.

*Zamitki* is notable for Khrystiuk's attention to the soldiers' movement in 1917 and the organization of Ukrainian military congresses as key catalysts in the radicalization of the Ukrainian revolution<sup>59</sup>; in this too, he offers a contribution to the

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<sup>58</sup> See a recent study: *Velychenko Stephen*. *State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine: A Comparative Study of Government and Bureaucrats, 1917–1922*. — Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011, for some reflections on the comparative state-making of the serial regimes in Ukraine, including the Whites and the Bolsheviks. The «state school» is most identified with the work of Viacheslav Lypynskyi, whose «*Lysty do bratv khliboroviv*» («*Letters to My Brother Farmers*», 1926) articulated his monarchist views.

<sup>59</sup> See my essay, *The Russian Imperial Army and the Ukrainian National Movement in 1917, in The Period of the Ukrainian Central Rada // The Ukrainian Quarterly* — 1998. — Vol. 54. — nos. 3–4 (Fall—Winter); and an earlier essay: *Shankovsky L*. *Disintegration of the Imperial*

study of nationalism and makes a persuasive case that the peasants in uniform were among the most nationally conscious of the revolutionary actors in 1917. For him, the soldiers' revolution is an integral part of the mobilization of society in large part due to the background of the protracted world war and the attendant economic collapse, which threatened all the gains of the revolution. The Ukrainian soldiers' movement was part of a larger soldiers' movement in the Russian army, but also took radically different directions almost from the start and precisely on the «national» and «international» questions; the soldiers' movement also overlapped with the peasant movements, both in Ukraine and more broadly in the disintegrating Russian Empire.

Khrystiuk is also a master at describing the process of «coming to national and class consciousness» with an almost anthropological (or perhaps sociological) technique. The major metaphor is that of the master and the slave, a not unfamiliar trope from Hegel and Marx, but also appropriated long after Khrystiuk by such anti-colonial writers as Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi<sup>60</sup>. One can compare Khrystiuk's descriptions of these «coming to consciousness» with those of a contemporary, Leon Trotsky, who poignantly described peasant Red Army men experiencing their new status as citizens of the Soviet state and their outraged reactions at the luxuries of the former upper classes<sup>61</sup>.

The last section of Khrystiuk's history deals with new legislation of the Directory government guaranteeing personal autonomy for Jews and other minorities in the Ukrainian People's Republic. Khrystiuk insists all along that the Ukrainian and Jewish workers and peasants movements were not intrinsically hostile to each other, as both their enemies would have it, and that anti-semitic outbursts really only came to the fore during and after the Soviet invasion of 1918. He has no kind words, however, for the Jewish bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, who are equal to the Russians in their fierce opposition to the Ukrainian movement, but he believes that genuine Ukrainian and Jewish democracy are allies in the worldwide liberation of peoples and democratic revolution.

He ends his narrative in 1919, on the eve of the invasion by the White Armies under General Anton Denikin, the true triumph of the Russian reaction—and not the «revolutionary» reaction of the Bolsheviks, but the reaction of the officer corps and the old elites of the empire. In the end, despite his revolutionary optimism, his faith in «the struggle» which was the hallmark of the Social Revolutionary Party, did not prevent him from leaving us with one of the most hard-headed analyses of revolutionary politics in these turbulent years. He is ruthless in his criticism of all major

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Russian Army in 1917 // The Ukrainian Quarterly. — New York, 1957. — Vol. XIII. — No. 4. For the best accounts of the soldiers' movement in 1917, see *Frenkin Mikhail*. Russkaia armiiia i revoliutsiia. — Munich: Posev; 1978; and *Wildman Allan*. The End of the Russian Imperial Army. — 2 vols. — Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980 and 1987; Frenkin, in particular, highlights the Ukrainian soldiers' movement in his work.

<sup>60</sup> For Hegel on the creative conflict of master and slave, see his *Phenomenology of Consciousness*; for the anti-colonial interpretation of that dialectic, see *Fanon Franz*. The Wretched of the Earth / Trans. Richard Philcox. — New York: Grove Press, 2004, 1961; *Black Skin, White Masks* / Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. — New York: Grove Press, 1967.

<sup>61</sup> *Trotskii L. D.* Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia. — Moscow: Vyshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1923–1925.

political tendencies at work in Ukraine at this time, including his own, but also seeks to present as fairly as possible the reasoning behind their views and the real interests they represent.

### **Khrystiuk's Anticolonial Critique and Its Legacy in Ukrainian Politics**

Although the anti-colonial histories discussed in an earlier section were especially attractive for scholar-activists from Turkestan (soon Central Asia) and the Caucasus, some Ukrainian scholars and political activists also began arguing for the colonial status of Ukraine in the Russian Empire, while subtly implying that certain features of the relationship of Russia to Ukraine persisted into the present—at least that was how their Bolshevik critics understood the argument themselves<sup>62</sup>.

A relative liberalization of cultural policies in Ukraine during the years when Petro Shelest was the Communist Party's first secretary in Ukraine encouraged students and intellectuals to organize literary and historical circles that soon led to arrests and other persecutions of so-called «bourgeois nationalists»<sup>63</sup>. In this climate of renewed repression, Ivan Dziuba penned a critique of contemporary Soviet nationalities policies, which he argued were anti-Leninist and anti-communist<sup>64</sup>. Dziuba rehabilitated a view of the tsarist past as one of colonialism that had been prevalent in the first years of the Soviet state and was a legacy of Russian and non-Russian revolutionary democrats of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries<sup>65</sup>. In doing so, he comes very close to Khrystiuk's own approach of criticizing the colonial past of the Russian Empire, but hesitating to explicitly label the Soviet regime in Ukraine as colonial. He also recovers a broader critique of Great Russian chauvinism, which the Communist Party pledged itself to overcome at its Tenth and Twelfth Congresses (1921 and 1923)<sup>66</sup>, in the resolutions of the Communist International<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> See Chapter V «Mykhailo Volobuiev and the Problem of the Ukrainian Economy» in *Mace James*. *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933*. — Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. In literature, Mykola Khvylovyi presented another anti-colonial challenge to the hegemony of Russia over Ukrainian culture and literature in his Polemical Pamphlets (1925–1926) and his novel, *Woodsnipes* (Valkshnepy, 1926). For an argument casting Khvylovyi's oeuvre in terms «similar to the way Homi Bhabha has described Fanon's divide between black skin and white masks, not as a neat division but as a doubling dissembling image of being in at least two places at once», see *Shkandrij Myroslav*. *Russia and Ukraine: Literature and the Discourse of Empire from Napoleonic to Postcolonial Times*. — Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001. Also *Mace J*. *Communism*. — Chapter IV «Mykola Khvylovyi and the Dilemmas of Ukrainian Cultural Development» and an older study, *Luckyj George S. N*. *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917–1934*. — New York, 1956.

<sup>63</sup> See a forthcoming manuscript from Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press by Simone Attlioi Bellezza «The Shore of Expectations: A Study on the Culture of the Ukrainian Shistydesiatnyky».

<sup>64</sup> See *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* / Ed. M. Davies, 2d ed. — London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970; original Ukrainian text published in Munich: Suchasnist Publishers, 1968.

<sup>65</sup> He is particularly fond of Alexander Herzen, Ivan Turgenev, Nikolai Dobroliubov, Chernyshevskii, and Bakunin, (p. 16, 68, 74, 78, 80, 166–169).

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* — P. 11, 131–133, 136, 200.

and through the policies of Ukrainization of cultural and educational facilities and the promotion of ethnic Ukrainians into positions of political and cultural power. Dziuba started from a critique of what he saw as the betrayal of Lenin's policy by Stalin and Khrushchev and a mistaken drive to unity of the Soviet peoples at the expense of their national characters and state independence<sup>68</sup>. And he evoked the memory of the Borot'bists-Communists, a breakaway faction of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries who called themselves Communists and were accepted as such, at least temporarily, by Lenin and the Bolshevik Central Committee<sup>69</sup>. Although Dziuba never goes so far as to explicitly label Soviet Ukraine in its current form as a form of colonial oppression by a new socialist version of the Russian Empire, he makes the implicit case throughout his text by demonstrating how current policies in education, culture, politics, economics, and administration all contribute to the degradation of not only the Ukrainian nation, but all the nations of the Soviet Union, including the Russians themselves, and that Russification is the new cultural tool of imperialism in Soviet conditions<sup>70</sup>.

Among those whose legacies Dziuba also appeals to are the voices of cultural and national autonomy among Ukrainian Communists and their allies during the 1920s, all of whom met tragic fates either at their own hands or in Stalinist camps<sup>71</sup>. To trace the political roots allied with these intellectual trends, historians have followed the evolution of the left wings of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries into the Borotbisty and of some Bolsheviks in Moscow and Ukraine to Ukrainian nationalism. In an unpublished article and larger manuscript, Stephen Velychenko makes a strong case for an anticolonialist politics among left-wing Ukrainian Social Democrats; the author compares the Ukrainian politics with contemporary developments in Ireland, as well as with the politics of the Tatar Sultan Galiev and Turar Ryskulov in Turkestan<sup>72</sup>. One of the works in this orientation that has been long known but for the most part dismissed as utopian or quixotic, namely, the pamphlets of Vasyl Shakhrai and Serhyi Mazlakh, *Do Khvyli* (On the Current Moment), written in 1918. Velychenko

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid. — P. 129—130

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. — P. 8, 15, 213.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. — P. 57, 180. More on the Borot'bisty below. This insistence by Dziuba that Lenin understood the crucial obstacle that Great Russian chauvinism posed to any revolutionary transformation of the empire has also been raised for the early years of Lenin by Roman Szporluk, who also has written extensively about the problems of nation for Marxists and about the early anti-imperial school of Soviet Russian historiography under Mikhail Pokrovskii. *Szporluk Roman*. Lenin, «Great Russia», and Ukraine // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. — 2006. — Vol. 28. — No. 1-4. — P. 611-626.

<sup>70</sup> See Dziuba's hints about the colonial nature of Soviet rule, p. 66-81, 88-87, and many other places throughout text.

<sup>71</sup> Dziuba appeals to the critiques of Mykola Skrypnyk and Khvyl'ovy, as well as the important autonomist legacy of Myhailo Hrushevskiy. Ibid. — P. 11, 34-37, 57, 80, 116, 143, 145-146, 172.

<sup>72</sup> *Velychenko Stephen*. Ukrainian Anti-Colonialist Thought 1911-1923: A Comparative Overview (to be published in «Ab Imperio»). See also Velychenko's larger study of this topic, «Painting Imperialism and Nationalism Red: Ukrainian Communists, Russian Communists, and the Ukrainian Revolution (1918-1925). Sultan Galiev is generally thought to be the first Communist to be charged with and punished for «bourgeois nationalist deviationism», which translated as a too critical view of Russian nationalist attitudes among Bolsheviks.

calls this as a version of «anti-colonial Marxism», and Shakhrai and Mazlakh considered themselves to be Ukrainian Communists<sup>73</sup>. Others in this wing of Ukrainian Social Democracy «accused the Russian Bolsheviks of invading Ukraine in 1918–1919, subverting its indigenous revolution, and reinforcing rather than dismantling imperial structures of domination». Documents from the Ukrainian Communist Party (the breakaway wing of the Ukrainian Social Democrats, in opposition to the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was set up by Moscow to represent the Bolshevik Party's interests in Ukraine) make open references to the Bolsheviks as new «Communist governor-generals» (referring to the tsarist rulers of the provinces) and informed the leadership in Moscow that it represented «the metropole desirous of benefitting from the colony». Iurii Mazurenko, co-founder of the UCP, demanded that the Bolsheviks respect the «character of national economic liberation» and the national movement<sup>74</sup>. Another co-founder of the UCP, Andrii Richytskyi also insisted that his party «is that of a proletariat in an oppressed colonial nation»<sup>75</sup>. These charges were made in response to the vague declarations made by the Comintern congress «on the national and colonial question»<sup>76</sup>. Finally, another study, published in Vienna in 1921 by Vasyl Mazurenko, another UCP theorist and leader, *The Economic Independence (Samostiinist') of Ukraine*, was an early critique of Bolshevik centralism. He used Russian economists' arguments that Russia could in fact exist economically without Ukraine, and that Ukraine's dependence on Russia for manufactured goods was the outcome of decades of colonialist imperialism. He called for the International to «save communism from Muscovite imperialism!»<sup>77</sup> Such observations brought charges of a deadly sin in the Bolshevik-controlled world, «national communism».

In summary, despite a history of persecution and a forced underground and exile existence, a left-wing version of Ukrainian anti-colonialism that had its roots in the years of war, revolution, and civil war was «rediscovered» by a new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals in the relative «thaw» of the late 1950s and 1960s and once again suppressed and its adherents persecuted for what they considered a patriotic Soviet self-criticism. I hope I have presented a persuasive case for considering Pavlo Khrystiuk to be a contribution to that political history and the anti-colonial struggle which it articulated.

Tempe, Arizona  
July 25, 2013

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<sup>73</sup> On the Current Situation in Ukraine / Peter Potichnyi, ed. — Ann Arbor, 1970.

<sup>74</sup> Cited from: Chervonyi prapor. — 1920. — 8 February. Cited from Khrystiuk, vol. IV, p. 55–56, 72.

<sup>75</sup> Chervonyi prapor. — 1920. — 4, 26 March; 19 June.

<sup>76</sup> This memorandum was published as a pamphlet in Vienna in 1920; English translation: Ford C. Memorandum of the Ukrainian Communist Party to the Second Congress of the III Communist International July-August 1920 // Debatte. — 2009. — No. 2 (August). — P. 248–262.

<sup>77</sup> Ekonomichna samostiinist Ukrainy v tsyfrakh. — Vienna, 1921.