Carpatho-Rusyns

A Tortuous Quest for Identity

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In 1875, geographers from the old Kingdom of Hungary erected a monument in a remote region of their country that carried the following inscription: "Precise instruments have confirmed this point where the latitude and longitude lines meet as the center of Europe."[1] Just over a century later, in 1977, the Soviet authorities, who by then ruled the area, erected a second monument to mark the center of the continent that stretches from the arctic shores of Norway in the north to the beaches of Crete in the south, and from the coast of Ireland in the west to the Ural Mountains in the east. The exact location of the monuments is near the village of Dilove (formerly Trebušany) in the foothills of the north-central Carpathian Mountains, which from time immemorial has been inhabited by an East Slavic people called the Carpatho-Rusyns, or simply Rusyns (sometimes Ruthenians). Thus, in geographic terms, the Rusyns are not a peripheral group, but rather one whose homeland—Carpathian Rus'—is located literally in the heart of Europe.

According to present-day international boundaries, the Rusyns live in a more or less compact territory within the boundaries of three countries: Ukraine, Slovakia, and Poland. There is also a small group of Rusyns in Yugoslavia, descendants of immigrants who left the Carpathian homeland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Together they number at most 1.2 million people. This includes 977,000 in the Transcarpathian oblast (former Subcarpathian Rus') of Ukraine; 130,000 in the Prešov region of northeastern Slovakia; 80,000 in the Lemko region of southeastern Poland as well as in other parts of that country; and 30,000 in the Vojvodina (Bačka) and the Croatian republic of Yugoslavia.

Traditionally, the name *Rusyn,* or its local variant *Rusnak,* has been used by the East Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathian region to describe themselves. However, by the twentieth century, in particular its second half, the historic names *Rusyn/Rusnak* were replaced by others, such as Ukrainian in Soviet Transcarpathia and the Prešov Region of Slovakia, or Lemko in Poland. There are also Rusyns who have given up identifying with any East Slavic group and instead associate with the

dominant nationality of the country in which they live. These changes in national self-designation have in some cases come about gradually, prompted either by intellectual conviction or by national assimilation, especially among families of nationally-mixed parentage. In the latter case, children often choose to identify—or are identified by their parents—with the dominant state nationality, Slovak or Polish.

More often, however, the change in nomenclature has been the result of governmental decree banning the name *Rusyn* from official usage, as was the case after 1945 in Soviet Transcarpathia and Poland and by the early 1950s in Czechoslovakia. The result is that today one can find within the same ethnolinguistic group, within the same village, and sometimes even within the same family, people who will identify themselves as Rusyns, Lemkos, Ukrainians, Slovaks, or Poles. Moreover, in the case of the East Slavic designations Rusyn/Rusnak, Lemko, Ukrainian, some people consider these to be synonymous, others to be mutually exclusive terms. In other words, some people will say that *Rusyn* is simply the older historic name for *Ukrainian,* and that *Lemko* is a regional name for *Ukrainian,* while others are convinced that the names *Lemko* or *Rusnak* are regional forms for *Rusyn,* which in turn designates a people that is distinct from the Ukrainian and every other surrounding nationality.

It should be noted that the estimated 1.2 million Rusyns include all people of the same linguistic and ethnographic origin, regardless of how they designate themselves on documents such as internal identity papers, passports, or decennial censuses. Our concern here will be primarily with the present-day Rusyn movement or with that portion of the group (the precise numbers are unknown) that considers Rusyns to comprise a distinct people.

The Rusyns have never had their own state or political independence. From the Middle Ages on, the Rusyn homeland was ruled by Hungary and Poland or Austria. Nonetheless, during the past century and a half, they have at various times been recognized by neighboring or ruling states as having the right to a territorial entity, whose existence was justified on the grounds that it was somehow of and for Rusyns and that it would have some degree of autonomy or self-rule.[2] The first experience in this regard came in late 1849, when in the wake of the failure of the Hungarian revolution, the Austrian government divided Hungary into five military and several civil districts. One of the civil districts (Ungvár/Užhorod) was based in the Subcarpathian region and administered by local Rusyn political and cultural activists. This experiment was to last only a few months.

Much more important was the period of political upheaval that followed World War I. At that time, in an effort to retain Rusyn-inhabited lands within Hungary, the new government in Budapest created, in December 1918, an autonomous Rusyn Land (Rus'ka Krajina), which continued to function even after a pro-Soviet Communist regime came to power in March 1919.[3] Simultaneously, Czechoslovakia

was also courting the Rusyns, offering them a self-governing province to be called Rusinsko (Rusinia), or Subcarpathian Rus' (*Podkarpatská Rus*), if they would join the Czechs and Slovaks in their new state. In May 1919, the Rusyns accepted the Czechoslovak offer. Most significantly, the Rusyn issue had reached the international political forum, so that "the fullest degree of self-government" for "Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians" was guaranteed by two international treaties at the Paris Peace Conference (St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919 and Trianon, June 4, 1920) and by the Czechoslovak constitution (February 29, 1920).

For the next two decades the vast majority of Rusyns—approximately three-fourths of the total number at the time—lived in Subcarpathian Rus', a Czechoslovak territory that was Rusyn in name, operated its own Rusyn schools, and had all the trappings of self-rule, including a governor, a partially elected diet, a national anthem, and a national theater. Finally, in late 1938, actual autonomy was granted to Subcarpathian Rus' (by then renamed Carpatho-Ukraine). Not only had autonomy been demanded by local politicians, it was also one of the provisions of the infamous Munich Pact, which led to the restructuring of Czechoslovakia. The Carpatho-Ukraine was to function for nearly half a year until the complete liquidation of what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

The twentieth century also witnessed three short-lived attempts at Rusyn independence. The first of these occurred in 1919, when after failing in their bid to join fellow Rusyns south of the mountains, the Lemkos living in the former Austrian province of Galicia created an independent republic that functioned for sixteen months before its government was arrested in March 1920 by the authorities of Poland, which became the new ruler over Rusyn lands north of the Carpathians.[4] At the same time, along the eastern edge of Subcarpathian territory a regional ethnic group known as the Hutsuls established their own republic, which lasted four months (February–June 1919) before being driven out by troops from Romania. The last unsuccessful attempt took place two decades later, when the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous government symbolically declared its independence on the last day of Czechoslovakia's existence (March 15, 1939), before the province was invaded and reannexed to Hungary.[5] The point is that although Rusyns may never have had their own state, they did have for a significant period of time in the twentieth century the experience—and therefore the historical memory—of their own political entity, Subcarpathian Rus', which was recognized both by the state in which they lived (Czechoslovakia) and by the international community (Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations).

While the Rusyn homeland is located in the geographical center of Europe, it also lies along the great divide between the Catholic West and Orthodox East, which Riccardo Picchio has classified in the broadest cultural terms as *Slavia romana* and *Slavia orthodoxa*.[6] This situation has had a profound effect on the Rusyn psyche. The very language or series of dialects that Rusyns speak reflect the influences of both cultural spheres. While their dialect clearly belongs to the East Slavic group of

languages, much of their vocabulary, pronunciational stress, and even syntax is West Slavic.

The cultural divide is most evident in what is for traditional Rusyn culture the all-important area of religion. Some Rusyns are Orthodox, but the majority, at least during the past two centuries, are Catholic, or, more precisely, Greek Catholic. These confessional differences reflect a whole mind-set that is either Western- or Eastern-oriented. The Eastern mind-set tends to surrender the self to fate in the hope that the Christian God and his intercessors, Christ and the Virgin Mary, will somehow alleviate the burdens of this earthly life. In contrast, the Western mind-set tends to allow the individual some control over destiny. The East-West dichotomy is paralleled in Rusyn attitudes toward national identity. The Eastern orientation tends to be expressed in universalistic terms and to treat the Rusyns as part of a single East Slavic Orthodox religious and cultural world. The Western orientation—epitomized by the distinctive Greek Catholic rite—accepts the idea of national and linguistic particularity.

Being a stateless people, the Rusyns, at least until the second half of the twentieth century, have had to depend on their leaders, the intelligentsia, to determine the precise direction of their national revival. The Rusyn national revival began during the second half of the nineteenth century and culminated during the interwar years, by which time it had evolved into a comprehensive movement concerned with political, cultural, and social issues. Most of the nationalist intelligentsia agreed on one basic premise: that the Rusyns were East Slavs and that their linguistic and cultural traditions were based in the East, albeit with pronounced Western influences. What they could not agree upon, however, was whether the Rusyns belonged to the Russian or the Ukrainian nationality, or formed a distinct East Slavic Rusyn nationality. Not surprisingly, debates about national and linguistic orientation quickly became entangled in local partisan politics. Politicians had their own agendas, and they more often than not exploited the nationality question in order to promote party or other ideological interests.

As for the nationalist intelligentsia, they easily fulfilled the precepts of all activists in the formative stages of national movements: they used history to formulate an ideology that was able to convince people they were either Russian or Rusyn.[7] The debate over the national orientation of the Rusyns had not been resolved by the outbreak of World War II, despite the achievements of, for instance, the Ukrainian national movement in the largest Rusyn territory, Subcarpathian Rus' (Carpatho-Ukraine).

The year 1939 marked an end to the natural evolution of a Rusyn nationality. Beginning in that year and for the next half-century, the nationality debate was effectively stifled by state intervention: first under fascist regimes in Hungary (which reannexed Subcarpathian Rus'), in Slovakia (which retained the Prešov region), and in the German-ruled Generalgouvernement (which controlled the Lemko region); and then after 1945 under Soviet rule, either directly in Subcarpathian Rus' (ren-

amed Transcarpathian Ukraine) or through pro-Soviet Communist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As is well known, the Communist era with its antidemocratic approach to the nationality question lasted until the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. The only exception was the small group of Rusyns in the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia. Although a Communist regime was imposed in their area as well, the Yugoslav government allowed the Vojvodinian Rusyns to decide their own national orientation.

This was not the case for the Rusyns living in the Carpathian homeland. The Soviet regime declared that further debate was unnecessary because the nationality question had supposedly been resolved long ago. Based on a decision made by the Communist party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine in December 1925, all Rusyns, regardless of what they may have called themselves, were declared to be Ukrainians. Anyone who opposed the Ukrainian viewpoint was accused of having "anti-historical" (and therefore "anti-Soviet") opinions. Such individuals were removed from their jobs and might even be arrested as "counter-revolutionaries." Closely connected with these developments was the liquidation, first in Soviet Transcarpathia (1949) and then in Czechoslovakia (1950), of the Greek Catholic church, which by the mid-twentieth century had become the stronghold of Rusyn nationalist aspirations.

When Communist regimes were established in Poland (1945) and Czechoslovakia (1948), they adopted the Soviet line and decreed that Rusyn minorities within their borders to be Ukrainians. They prohibited Rusyn publications and the use of the name Rusyn in official documents. The situation was particularly bad in Poland. Not only were the Lemko Rusyns declared to be Ukrainians, they were deported en masse from their Carpathian homeland in 1947 and scattered throughout the former German lands of post-1945 western and northern Poland.[8]

It is ironic to note the advantages that accrued to the governments in question through their use—or misuse—of the name "Ukrainian." For example, declaring the Rusyn population Ukrainian allowed the Soviet Union to justify the annexation in 1945 of Subcarpathian Rus', a territory that throughout the war it had agreed should be returned to Czechoslovakia. Nationalist ideology could now conveniently serve Stalin's political designs on the international stage. In any case, how could the Soviet workers' state refuse the request of fellow "Ukrainian workers" in Transcarpathia who "voluntarily" were demanding to be united with the "Mother Ukraine"?

In neighboring Poland, the identification of Lemkos as Ukrainians made it easier for the Communist government to deport them as alleged sympathizers of the anti-Communist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) under Stepan Bandera, which had retreated to the Carpathians and was still fighting the Polish and Soviet authorities after the end of World War II. South of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, the administrative imposition of a Ukrainian identity beginning in 1952 proved advantageous to those Slovaks who had always claimed that "their Rusnaks" were really "Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith."[9] In essence, forced Ukrainianization, combined with the liquidation of the local Greek Catholic church and forced collectivization of

peasant land, led during the 1950s and 1960s to the greatest degree of Slovakization and national assimilation that Rusyns had ever experienced. It is also true that during the same period, the Czechoslovak government provided extensive funding to create a wide range of Ukrainian cultural organizations with a socialist political agenda. A well-paid local Ukrainian intelligentsia was even able to make several significant scholarly and literary achievements. However, these had little real effect upon the Rusyn peasant masses in Slovakia. For them the choice was simple: if one could not be a Rusyn, it was better to declare oneself a Slovak than a Ukrainian (which among other things was associated with the hated East).

Once again Yugoslavia was the exception. The government there provided both funding and legal guarantees, allowing the local intelligentsia to adopt a Rusyn orientation and develop the local dialect into a sociologically complete Rusyn literary language. In fact, the Rusyns became one of the five official nationalities in the autonomous province of Vojvodina.

The Yugoslav example notwithstanding, after 1945 the Rusyns ceased to exist. All Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish documents and publications referred to the population only as Ukrainian.[10] Publications in the West, both by Ukrainian émigré and North American Soviet and East European specialists, also accepted the view that Rusyns did not exist. To quote the *New Columbia Encyclopedia* (1975): "There is no ethnic or linguistic distinction between Ukrainians and Ruthenians [Rusyns]," and "The majority of the population [of Transcarpathia] is Ukrainian."[11]

Then came the 1980s. Signs of change were first seen in Poland, where the Lemko Rusyns—both those who were dispersed in the west of that country as well as about 10,000 who managed to return to the Carpathian homeland—began to gather at annual cultural festivals. These unofficial festivals received no government financial support, but by the same token they were not under any ideological control. Through them, the Lemkos began to revive the idea that they were neither Poles nor Ukrainians, but rather part of a distinct Slavic people closely related to the Rusyns living south of the mountains in Slovakia. The Lemkos seemed to be acting in isolation, and for several years that was indeed the case.[12]

After the Velvet Revolution of November 1989 in Czechoslovakia, new initiative committees were founded that were often dominated by individuals who had not been associated with the Communist regime. At first, the initiative committees tried to democratize the older Ukrainian organizations, but when these efforts failed, they established their own Rusyn organizations and publications.

In neighboring Transcarpathia, the first Rusyn-oriented organization to exist anywhere in Carpathian Rus' since World War II was established in February 1990 in the oblast's administrative center, Užhorod. Known as the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns (Tovarystvo Karpats'kych Rusyniv) and with branches throughout Transcarpathia, the organization first put forward goals of a cultural and ecological nature—to promote and preserve knowledge of local history and customs. But be-

fore long, the Society moved on to political demands, in particular for the recognition of the Rusyns as a distinct nationality and the restoration of the autonomous status of Subcarpathian Rus', which they argued had been illegally suppressed in 1945.

By the end of 1990, a total of five new Rusyn organizations had been formed in the areas where Rusyns live. In addition to the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns in Ukrainian Transcarpathia, there were the Rusyn Renaissance Society (Rusyns'ka Obroda) in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia (established in March 1990); the Lemko Association (Stovaryšŷnja Lemkiv) in Legnica, Poland (established in April 1990); the Society of Friends of Subcarpathian Rus' (Společnost přátel Podkarpatské Rusi) in Prague (established in October 1990); and the Ruska Matka (Rusyn Matka) in Ruski Kerestur, Yugoslavia (established in December 1990). In the spring of 1991, a sixth group was established; the Rusyn Organization in Hungary (Magyaroszági Ruszinok Szervezete) in Budapest (established in May 1991). Most of these organizations have their own Rusyn-language newspaper or magazine,[13] or they have access to existing publications. All five organizations have put forth basically the same demands: that Rusyns be recognized as a distinct nationality; that a Rusyn literary language be codified and eventually adopted for use in schools; and that Rusyns be guaranteed full rights as a national minority in the countries where they live or, in the case of Transcarpathia, that Rusyns be recognized as the dominant indigenous nationality.

As with all new or revived movements, the Rusyn movement must first be able to make itself known to the constituency it purports to represent. The Rusyn national movement has received more publicity in the non-Rusyn press in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and especially Soviet Transcarpathia than it has managed to generate through its own publications. At the first signs of a Rusyn renaissance, local pro-Ukrainian activists attacked the Rusyn movement as "anachronistic," "ahistorical," "unenlightened," "in the service of American imperialists," and "treacherous" to the Ukrainian nation.[14] The Czech and Slovak press has also given a more balanced account of the Rusyn-Ukrainian debate in the context of the nationality question.

Whatever latent isolation Rusyn leaders in their respective countries may have still felt was overcome in March 1991, when, at the initiative of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, the first World Congress of Rusyns was convened in Medzilaborce. It was the first time that representatives from all countries where Rusyns live had assembled in one place. The congress constituted itself as a permanent umbrella organization.[15]

It is interesting to note that one week after the congress took place, Czechoslovakia conducted its decennial census, in which people had the right to answer that they were of Rusyn nationality for the first time since World War II. Despite problems with the formulation of the nationality question and the subsequent analysis of the responses to it, in Slovakia 17,000 persons identified themselves as Rusyns, compared to 14,000 who claimed Ukrainian nationality.[16] This raises the question of

numbers. Observers will legitimately ask just how many people consider themselves Rusyns? Even among those who consider themselves Rusyn, does such a response preclude the possibility that they may also think of themselves as Ukrainians? At this point, no one can tell. All we know is that in Slovakia, in March 1991, of those people of East Slavic background who did not identify as Slovak and who could choose between a Rusyn or Ukrainian identity, 55 percent chose Rusyn. As for the number of Rusyns in Poland and Ukrainian Transcarpathia, we have no indications, such as census data, scientific polling, or membership in political parties, that might help provide a reasonable estimate.

What we can be certain of, however, is that after forty years of Communist rule, the Rusyns have not gone away. Today there are Rusyn organizations, Rusyn publications, and people from all walks of life who continue to demonstrate their belief that they belong to a distinct Rusyn minority.[17]

As with many minorities, the future of the Rusyns' survival depends on the willingness of the governments in the states where they live to provide them with adequate legal protection and perhaps financial assistance for their national development. For their part, the Rusyns need to inform and constantly remind the international community that they exist. In turn, the Rusyns should be able to expect that the international community will monitor their status and, if necessary, put pressure on the governments of Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and the former Yugoslavia, in order to ensure that their national rights are protected.

In fact, all four states in which Rusyns live have already ratified several agreements pertaining to national minorities at recent meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Of particular importance for Rusyns were the decisions reached in June 1990 at the Copenhagen meeting of the CSCE. At Copenhagen it was agreed that "to belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice." Moreover, "persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group."[18]

This means that regardless of how scholars or governments might define Rusyns, individuals and/or groups who call themselves Rusyns and believe they constitute a distinct nationality have a right to do so and be recognized as such by the governments of the countries in which they live. The Copenhagen agreement also recognized the role of nongovernmental organizations in promoting the interests of national minorities, and it called on the participating states to assure that the history and culture taught in their educational establishments "will also take account of the history and culture of national minorities."[19] At a follow-up CSCE meeting in Geneva in July 1991, member states accepted the provisions of a special report that guaranteed the right of national minorities to participate in nongovernmental organizations

outside their country of residence. The report also reaffirmed the principle that individuals or organizations representing national minorities be allowed "unimpeded contacts . . . across frontiers . . . with persons with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin."[20]

Finally, at the CSCE meeting held in Moscow in September/October 1991, member states reaffirmed the agreements reached at all previous meetings and agreed further that "commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE [including those pertaining to national minorities] are matters of direct legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned."[21]

Before looking specifically at what Rusyns need in each country to protect and guarantee their future existence, it is necessary to clarify the issue of international boundaries. In the Carpathian homeland, Rusyns live within the borders of three states. The Society of Carpatho-Rusyns in Transcarpathia has called openly for the restoration of the autonomy that Subcarpathian Rus' enjoyed in Czechoslovakia during the interwar years.[22] In order to determine the views of the local population, the society, joined by other minority organizations, called for a question on Transcarpathian autonomy to be added to the 1991 referendum on Ukrainian independence.[23] This, of course, is an internal issue for whatever kind of government and state structure is finally established in what was until recently the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, as a sovereign member of the international community, Ukraine must guarantee the individual and corporate rights of Rusyns—or of those citizens of Ukraine who choose to call themselves Rusyns. The Ukrainian government has already provided guarantees for national minorities living on its territory: Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Tatars, and so on. To this list must be added the Rusyns. This would mean that the "official"—or, one might say, traditional—Ukrainian view of the Rusyns would have to change. Ukrainian authorities would have to accept the fact that within Ukraine's borders, primarily in the Transcarpathian oblast, there are people who define themselves as Rusyns as distinct from Ukrainians. Such people should have the right to declare themselves on their passports and internal documents as Rusyns, and the state census bureau should publish data on the number of persons who identify themselves as Rusyns and not simply classify them—as has been done until now—as Ukrainians.[24] If such guarantees were provided, there would be no reason why Rusyns in Transcarpathia could not remain Rusyns and still function as full-fledged citizens of a sovereign and democratic Ukrainian state. Indeed, it is likely that a future independent Ukraine will want to become one of the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and this will oblige it to accept and implement the principles of the Copenhagen and other agreements on national minorities outlined above.

Following the trend that has taken hold in the former Soviet Union, it would seem desirable that the new Ukrainian state become a decentralized entity in which

each component region would have a great degree of autonomy in economic and cultural matters.[25] Thus, decisions regarding what language might be taught in elementary schools, what kind of national orientation should be adopted by regional cultural and educational institutions, or what amount of funding might be given to Rusyn-oriented groups would be made by the people's assembly in Užhorod and not in Kiev. It goes without saying that freedom of movement across borders with neighboring Rusyn regions in Slovakia and Poland would be guaranteed. Fortunately, this freedom exists already, although on any day of the week the average wait for border crossings is between fifteen and twenty hours.

In Slovakia, the situation of the Rusyns, especially since the Velvet Revolution, is much better than in either Ukrainian Transcarpathia or Poland. However, until now the Slovak government (generally through its Ministry of Culture) has provided only ad hoc grants to the new Rusyn organizations and publications. The Slovak government must recognize that there are two clearly defined national orientations—Rusyn and Ukrainian—and that if it is going to continue supporting national minorities, it must provide funding for Rusyn as well as Ukrainian organizations. The question of schools in Slovakia is particularly problematic, because beginning in the 1960s the language of instruction in the vast majority of Rusyn-inhabited villages was changed from Ukrainian to Slovak. Moreover, as part of a consolidation process that took place over the course of the past two decades, many small elementary schools in Rusyn-inhabited villages were closed. Even if private or public elementary schools are reopened in Rusyn villages, it is likely that Slovak will be the language of instruction. However, the Slovak ministry of education must provide Rusyn-speaking teachers and textbooks in Rusyn or in Ukrainian for those villages that request them. Most important, the standard Slovak-language history textbooks used throughout Slovakia should include an adequate discussion of the history and culture of the Rusyns and other minorities, which will be of benefit to all students. These policies would be in keeping with the CSCE agreement reached in Copenhagen, which is "universally binding on its territory and supersedes its own laws."[26]

The Lemko Rusyns of Poland perhaps need the most help. Not only are the majority of Lemko Rusyns scattered throughout the western and northern regions of Poland, but their fledgling pro-Rusyn organization—the Lemko Association, with its amateur theatrical troupe—and the older Lemkovyna folk ensemble receive no financial support at all from the Polish government, either as an annual budgetary allotment or as ad hoc grants. Whatever government funds are assigned to national minority cultural activity are given to the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (Ob"jednannja Ukrajinciv Pol'šči), the direct descendant of the Communist-dominated Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Society (USKT). Support for the new Union of Ukrainians must continue, especially since most Ukrainians in Poland are not originally from nor do they live in the Carpathian region. Lemko Rusyns, however, must also be recognized as a distinct national minority and receive a fair share of funding.

How to determine what is a "fair share" will be difficult, since Poland does not

even include nationality as a category on its decennial census questionnaires. Perhaps a referendum attached to the ballot in the next national vote could include a question that asks voters to support the cultural activities of one national minority, to be chosen from a list of all such groups in Poland, through an elective contribution of tax money. This would be somewhat similar to municipalities in Canada that ask their residents to indicate whether they want their tax dollars to be assigned to public or to private (Catholic) schools. Whatever the mechanism decided upon, in keeping with its commitments as a member state of the CSCE, the Polish government is obliged to recognize Lemko Rusyns as a distinct national minority and to provide funding for Lemko cultural organizations and Lemko-language schools in those communities that demand them.

Lastly, we turn to the situation in Yugoslavia. Ever since World War II, the Yugoslav policy of equality for its six constituent republics and support for the national minorities that live within them has encouraged the Croatian Republic, and the Vojvodina Autonomous Region of the Serbian Republic in particular, to finance Rusyn cultural and educational activity. It is to be expected that when the republics of Yugoslavia sort out their present difficulties, the republics of Croatia and Serbia will continue their judicious support and protection of their Rusyn minorities.

The Rusyns are one of the many groups who suffered under the totalitarian regimes imposed on East Central Europe during the past four decades. Now that those regimes no longer exist, there is a real opportunity to correct past injustices and to assure the future survival of the Rusyns. It is, after all, in the interest of all four countries where Rusyns live to become part of the larger European community. The way in which those countries resolve the Rusyn issue will determine in part how their requests for membership in the new Europe are received.

Notes

1. For a description, see Fedor Korecki, "Stredok Evropi—na Hornjici," *Nova dumka* 8 (21): 101–2 (Vukovar, Yugoslavia, 1979.

2. For further details on Rusyn political entities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848–1948* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 46–47, 93–95, 237–45.

3. Soviet-Marxist literature is fond of elaborating upon the forty days of Soviet rule in Transcarpathia. See Borys Spivak and Mychajlo Trojan, *40 nezabutnich dniv: z istoriji bor-ot'by za vladu Rad na Zakarpatti v 1919 roci* (Užhorod: Karpaty, 1967).

4. On the little-known Lemko Republic and its relationship to political thought in the western Ukrainian lands, see Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Ukrainian Question Between Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Lemko Rusyn Republic (1918–1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus'-Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* (forthcoming).

5. Ukrainian-oriented émigrés from Carpatho-Ukraine have put great stress on the March 15, 1939, declaration of independence, arguing that it reveals how the Ukrainian orientation has supposedly won the hearts and minds of the entire population even before the

Soviets arrived in the region in late 1944. Cf. Peter G. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine, 1919–1939* (New York: Carpathian Research Center, 1971). This view is also being promoted in Ukraine since the onset of the Gorbachev era. See the minutes of the RUCH meeting held in the former Carpatho-Ukrainian capitol of Chust to coincide with the 52nd anniversary of the one day of independence: "4 sesija Velykoji Rady Ruchu," *Visnyk Ruchu*, no. 4 (Kiev, 1990).

6. Riccardo Picchio, "Guidelines for the Comparative Study of the Language Question among the Slavs," in *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, vol. 1, ed. Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984), 1–42.

7. Generally, the Russian-oriented intelligentsia, or Russophiles, were Orthodox adherents or sympathizers who believed in the unity of Eastern Slavic Christian culture represented by three branches of the East Slavs—Great Russians, Belorussians, and Little Russians (including Carpatho-Rusyns)—all considered to be part of one common Russian (*obščerusskij*) nationality. The Ukrainian-oriented and Rusyn-oriented intelligentsia were Western-oriented Greek Catholics who believed in various degrees of national and/or regional differentiation—the Ukrainophiles arguing for the unity of one people that stretched "from the Carpathians to the Caucasus," the Rusynophiles arguing that the Rus' population in the Carpathians (from the Poprad to the Tysa rivers) comprised a separate people.

8. The actual deportations took place in two phases. Between 1945 and 1946, about 200,000 Lemko Rusyns "voluntarily" took up the offer to resettle eastward in the Ukraine in exchange for Poles, who moved west within the new postwar boundaries of Poland. The remaining 80,000 Lemko Rusyns, mostly in the western Lemko region, were forcibly deported in 1947. For details, see Kazimierz Pudlo, *Łemkowie: process wrastania w środowisko Dolnego Śląska, 1947–1985* (Wrocław: Polskie Towarszystwo Ludoznawcze, 1987), esp. 24–34.

9. Beginning already in 1945, new Rusyn political and cultural organizations carried the name Ukrainian. However, despite their name, they paradoxically used Russian or vernacular Rusyn as their language of instruction and communication. In 1952, a decree of the Communist party of Slovakia initiated a policy of Ukrainianization that banned the use of the term *Rusyn* and replaced Russian with Ukrainian as the language of instruction in schools. For details, see Pavel Maču, "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia," *East-Central Europe* 2 (2): 101–31 (Pittsburgh, 1975).

10. Whereas the idea of a Rusyn nationality in the Carpathians was not recognized by schools and official circles in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, they have recognized the Rusyns (Rusnaks) of Yugoslavia as a distinct ethnic group with its own literary language. See A. E. Suprun and A. M. Kaljuta, *Vvedenie v slavjanskuju filologiju* (Minsk: Vyšejšaja škola, 1981), 137–39.

11. "Ruthenia," in the *New Columbia Encyclopedia*, ed. William H. Harris and Judith S. Levey (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), 2383.

12. On the Lemko-Rusyn revival, see the series of articles in the *Carpatho-Rusyn American* 10 and 11 (Fairview, N.J., 1987–88).

13. These include *Besida* (Legnica, Poland, 1989–present); *Otčyj chram* (Užhorod, 1990–present); *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1991–present); *Rusyn* (Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia, 1990–present); and *Narodný novynkŷ* (Prešov, 1991–present).

14. The best (or worst) examples of the anti-Rusyn polemical attacks come from scholars in the former Soviet Ukrainian and Soviet Russian intellectual establishment: Pavlo Čučka, "Kak rusiny stali ukraintsami," *Zakarpatskaja pravda* (Užhorod), September 12–16, 1989;

Vasyl' Mel'nyk, "Neorusynstvo i joho interpretatory," *Zakarpats'ka pravda* (Užhorod), August 18, 21, 22, 24, 1990; Jurij Balega, "Rusynstvo: ideolohy i pokrovyteli," *Zakarpatška pravda* (Užhorod), September 6, 7, 9, 1990; and Oleksa Myšanyč, "To chto že vony?: do idejnych vytokiv novitn'oho 'karpatorusynstva,'" *Literaturna Ukrajina* (Kiev), January 17, 1991.

15. Information on the First World Congress and its official declaration can be found in the *Carpatho-Rusyn American* 14 (2 and 3): 7–9, (Fairview, N.J., 1991).

16. Mykola Mušynka, "Skil'ky rusyniv-ukrajinciv u Slovaččyni?" *Svoboda,* July 19, 1991 (Jersey City, N.J.).

17. Among the best known of these to date are, in Transcarpathia, the writers Volodymyr Fedynšynec', Ivan Petrovcij, and Vasylij Sočka, and the political activists Mychajlo Tomčanij, Petro Hodmaš, and Vasyl' Zajac; in Czechoslovakia, the head of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, Vasyl' Turok, and the advisor to the Slovak government on nationality affairs, Ivan Bicko, and the editor Aleksander Zozuljak; in Poland, the poets Petro Trochanovskij and Olena Duc, and the head of the Lemko Association, Andrij Kopča; and in Yugoslavia, the director of the Ruske Slovo publishing house, Ljubomir Medješi, and the writers Djura Papharhaj and Natalja Dudaš.

18. *Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE* (Copenhagen, 1990), 40–41, paragraphs 32 and 32.6.

19. Ibid., 41, paragraph 34.

20. *Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities* (Geneva, 1991), 10.

21. *Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE* (Moscow, 1991), 2.

22. The text of the declaration, which was sent to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and to the United Nations, appeared first in the Society's newspaper, *Otčyj chram* (September–October 1990). It is available in English translation in the *Carpatho-Rusyn American* 14 (1): 4–5 (Fairview, N.J., 1991).

23. "Rezoljucija mityngu Tovarystva Karpats'kych Rusyniv z pytannja nacional'noho vidrodžennja rusyns'koho narodu i vidnovlennja statusu Pidkarpats'koho kraju, Mukačevo, 01.09.1991," *Molod' Zakarpattja* (Užhorod), September 14, 1991, 4.

24. Soviet guidelines used by the State Committee for Statistics in order to classify answers in the census reports were determined largely on the basis of recommendations from authorities in individual republics and from the Institute of Ethnography and the Institute of Linguistics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. See *Slovari nacional'nostej i jazykov dija kodirovanija otvetov na 8 i 9 voprosy perepisnych listov* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyj komitet SSSR po statistike, 1988).

It is interesting to note that a recent report by the Institute of Ethnography (No. 14110/2171, dated February 6, 1990) has stated: "It is theoretically possible to conclude that Rusyns can be considered at the same level as Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, and that they are not a part of any of those groups" (document in the author's possession).

25. Discussions regarding the restructuring of Ukraine have been going on for the past few years. Both neighboring Galicia and Transcarpathia feel confident that each could do much better economically if it were independent of the center in Kiev. See Ivan Hrančak, "Vidnovleni haluzky karpats'koho kraju: Ukrajina federatyvna?" *Novyny Zakarpattja* (Užhorod), February 6, 1991.

26. See Section 2 of the Constitutional Act of January 9, 1991, instituting the charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as a Constitutional Act of the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.